Whether a person who asserts possessory title over a particular property will have to show that he is under settled or established possession of the said property. ?

Whether a   person   who   asserts possessory title over a particular property will have to show that he is under settled or established possession of the said property. ?



2019 ACJ- APEX COURT JUDGMENTS VOL.NO.1/2019 APEX COURT DIGEST VOL.NO.1



15. Generally, it is not open to the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court when such findings are based on the evidence on record, and are not perverse or against the material on record. - A   suit   came   to   be   filed   for   declaration   of   title   and   for

possession   by   Respondent   No.   1   herein.   Undisputedly,   the plaintiff     Moti   Ram   had   no   document   of   title   to   prove   his possession,   but   claimed   possessory   title   based   on   prior

possession for a number of years. Per contra, the   defendants   relied   on   two   sale   deeds,   viz.,   Ex.   A­6   dated 06.02.1956,   executed   by   the   original   owner   Khoom   Singh   in favour of Purkha Ram, and Ex. A­2 dated 21.06.1966, executed by Purkha Ram in favour of the appellant/Defendant No. 1.

 However, according to the plaintiff, he had been wrongly dispossessed by defendants on 30.04.1972,  which was within the 12 years preceding the filing

of the present suit.

The Trial Court decreed the suit and the First Appellate Court reversed the findings of the Trial Court. The First Appellate Court dismissed the said suit on the ground that the defendants had proved their title and possession over the suit property. - High court reversed the same and restore the trial court judgment - Apex court held that Section 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963 contemplates a suit for   possession   of   immovable   property   based   on   previous possession and not on title, if brought within 12 years from the date of dispossession.     Such a suit is known in law as a suit based   on   possessory   title   as   distinguishable   from   proprietary title.   It cannot be disputed and is by now well settled that ‘settled possession’ or effective possession of a person without title entitles him to protect his possession as if he were a true owner. -

whether the plaintiff had better title over the suit property and whether he was   in   settled possession   of   the   property,   which   required dispossession in accordance with law.

The   crux   of   the   matter   is   that   a   person   who   asserts possessory title over a particular property will have to show that he is under settled or established possession of the said property.

But merely stray or intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner.  Settled possession means such possession over the property which has existed for a sufficiently

long period of time, and has been  acquiesced to by the true owner.   A casual act of possession does not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner.   A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force.   Settled possession must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. There cannot be a straitjacket formula to determine settled possession. Occupation of a property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual legal possession.

The possession should contain an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser is to be decided based on the facts and circumstances of each case.

In order to prove possession of the property, the plaintiff relied upon the rent note Ex. 1, which shows that the plot in question was let out by the plaintiff to one Joga Ram in the year 1967. On  12.05.1967, a fire broke out  and the entire fodder stored on the plot got burnt. Thereafter, the plot was kept vacant. DW­7, who has been referred to in order to establish spreading of the fire, stated that the fire started due to sparks coming from a railway engine. But there was no railway line adjacent to the disputed land which could have caused a fire.  Even otherwise, the rent note Ex. 1 does not refer to the plot in question, and its boundaries have also not been mentioned.   Merely on doubtful

material and cursory evidence, it cannot be held that the plaintiff was ever in possession of the property, and that too in settled possession.The plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 makes much of the old body of a motor vehicle belonging to him lying on the property. Ex. 2 clearly reveals that one part of the motor vehicle was lying on the disputed property and another part was lying on the plot of the

plaintiff.  The said body of the motor vehicle is about 3 to 4 feet in length   only   and   the   same   was   lying   on   the   boundary   of   the disputed property.   But the plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 claims possession of the entire plot based on such fact. Absolutely no material is found to show that the plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 was in actual possession, much less continuous possession, of the

property   for   a   longer   period   which   may   be   called   settled possession or established possession. As mentioned supra, mere casual possession, that too relying on a motor vehicle body lying on a part of the property, would not prove settled possession of the plaintiff.  The plaintiff has to prove his case to the satisfaction of the Court. He cannot succeed on the weakness of the case of the

defendant.   Even otherwise, there is no confusion at all regarding the   identity   of   the   property   in   question   and   on   the   basis   of material on record, the First Appellate Court has correctly ruled that   the   appellant/Defendant   No.   1   has   proved   his   title   and possession over the suit property since the date of his purchase of the property.   Prior to the purchase, his predecessor­in­interest was in possession of the same. Having regard to the position of law and facts of the case,

we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the judgment of the First Appellate Court,   which   has   come   down   very   heavily   on   the   procedure adopted   by   the   trial   Judge   in   deciding   the   matter,   more particularly   when   no   fault   can   be   found   on   facts   with   the judgment of the First Appellate Court.  

Whether the secured creditor can file a winding up petition after such secured creditor has obtained a decree from the DRT and a recovery certificate based thereon ? 2019 - ACJ- APEX COURT JUDGMENTS VOL.NO.1/2019 APEX COURT DIGEST VOL.NO.1 14. the right of a secured creditor to file a winding up petition after such secured creditor has obtained a decree from the Debts Recovery Tribunal [“DRT”] and a recovery certificate based thereon. - The respondent, Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited, advanced various loans to the companies in question. The outstanding amount against these companies as on date, together with interest, is stated to be in the region of INR 48 crores. The respondent approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai by filing three separate original applications to recover the debt owed to them. The Debts Recovery Tribunal delivered three separate judgments on 16.01.2015 allowing the applications filed by the respondent bank. Apparently, the said orders are final as no appeals have been preferred to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal [“DRAT”], Mumbai. Recovery certificates dated 12.08.2015 for the said amounts were then issued by the Recovery Officer under Section 19(19) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 [“Recovery of Debts Act”]. We have been informed that various attempts were made to auction the properties that were security for the loans granted, but each of these attempts has yielded no results.- In the meanwhile, the respondent issued statutory notices dated 15.04.2015 under Sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956. As no payments were forthcoming, a company petition was filed before the Bombay High Court on 03.07.2015. By an order dated 26.07.2017, the said petition was admitted as the companies in question were said to be commercially insolvent.- In the appeals that were filed to the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, the main point argued was that once a secured creditor has obtained an order from the DRT, and a recovery certificate has been issued thereupon, such secured creditor cannot file a winding up petition as the Recovery of Debts Act is a special Act which vests exclusive jurisdiction in the DRT. Also, a secured creditor can file a winding up petition only on giving up its security, which has not been done in the present case. These contentions did not find favour with the Division Bench who then dismissed the appeals in question.-Section 434(1)(b) is attracted only if execution or other process is issued in respect of an order of a Tribunal in favour of a creditor of the company is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part. This is only one of three instances in which a company shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debts. If the fact situation fits sub-clause (b) of Section 434(1), then a company may be said to be deemed to be unable to pay its debts. However, this does not mean that each one of the sub-clauses of Section 434(1) are mutually exclusive in the sense that once Section 434(1)(b) applies, Section 434(1)(a) ceases to be applicable. Also, on the facts of this case, we may state that the company petition was filed only on 03.07.2015, pursuant to a notice under Section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956 dated 15.04.2015. This petition was filed under Section 433(e) read with Section 434(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 1956. At the stage at which the petition was filed, it could not possibly have been filed under Section 434(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 1956, as execution or other process in the form of a recovery certificate had not been issued by the Recovery Officer till 12.08.2015, i.e., till after the company petition was filed. For this reason also, it is clear that this contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant must be rejected. We may only end by saying that cases like the present one have to be decided by balancing the interest of creditors to whom money is owing, with a debtor company which will now go in the red since a winding up petition is admitted against it. It is not open for persons like the appellant to resist a winding up petition which is otherwise maintainable without there being any bona fide defence to the same. We may also hasten to add that the respondent cannot be said to be blowing hot and cold in pursuing a remedy under the Recovery of Debts Act and a winding up proceeding under the Companies Act, 1956 simultaneously.

Whether the secured creditor can file a winding up petition after such secured creditor has obtained a decree from the DRT and a recovery certificate based thereon ?

2019 - ACJ- APEX COURT JUDGMENTS VOL.NO.1/2019 APEX COURT DIGEST VOL.NO.1

14.  the right of a secured creditor to file a winding up petition after such secured creditor has obtained a decree from the Debts Recovery Tribunal [“DRT”] and a recovery certificate based thereon. - The respondent, Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited, advanced various loans to the companies in question. The outstanding amount against these companies as on date, together with interest, is stated to be in the region of INR 48 crores. The respondent approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai by filing three separate original applications to recover the debt owed to them. The Debts Recovery Tribunal delivered three separate judgments on 16.01.2015 allowing the applications filed by the respondent bank. Apparently, the said orders are final as no appeals have been preferred to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal [“DRAT”], Mumbai. Recovery certificates dated 12.08.2015 for the said amounts were then issued by the Recovery Officer under Section 19(19) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 [“Recovery of Debts Act”]. We have been informed that various attempts were made to auction the properties that were security for the loans granted, but each of these attempts has yielded no results.- In the meanwhile, the respondent issued statutory notices dated 15.04.2015 under Sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956.
As no payments were forthcoming, a company petition was filed before the Bombay High Court on 03.07.2015. By an order dated 26.07.2017, the said petition was admitted as the companies in question were said to be commercially insolvent.- In the appeals that were filed to the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, the main point argued was that once a secured creditor has obtained an order from the DRT, and a recovery certificate has been issued thereupon, such secured
creditor cannot file a winding up petition as the Recovery of Debts Act is a special Act which vests exclusive jurisdiction in the DRT. Also, a secured creditor can file a winding up petition only on giving up its security, which has not been done in the present case. These contentions did not find favour with the Division Bench who then dismissed the appeals in question.-Section 434(1)(b) is
attracted only if execution or other process is issued in respect of an order of a Tribunal in favour of a creditor of the company is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part. This is only one of three instances in which a company shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debts. If the fact situation fits sub-clause (b) of Section 434(1), then a company may be said to be deemed to be unable to pay its debts. However, this does not mean that each one of the sub-clauses of Section 434(1) are mutually exclusive in the sense that once Section 434(1)(b) applies, Section 434(1)(a) ceases to be applicable. Also, on the facts of this case, we may state that the company petition was filed only on
03.07.2015, pursuant to a notice under Section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956 dated 15.04.2015. This petition was filed under Section 433(e) read with Section 434(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 1956. At the stage at which the petition was filed, it could not possibly have been filed under Section 434(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 1956, as execution or other process in the form of a recovery certificate had not been issued by the Recovery Officer till 12.08.2015, i.e., till after the company petition was filed. For this reason also, it is clear that this contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant must be rejected. We may only end by saying that cases like the present one have to be decided by balancing the interest of creditors to whom money is owing, with a debtor company which will now go in the red since a winding up petition is admitted against it. It is not open for
persons like the appellant to resist a winding up petition which is otherwise maintainable without there being any bona fide defence to the same. We may also hasten to add that the respondent cannot be said to be blowing hot and cold in pursuing a remedy under the Recovery of Debts Act and a winding up proceeding under the Companies Act, 1956 simultaneously.

whether the rent agreed is to be considered as the rent paid by the date of comencement of the Act 2001[2003]under Rajasthan Rent control Act and it can not be considered as a revisied enhanced rent with 10% increase – more than the prescribed in the Act 2001 ?

whether the rent agreed is to be considered as the rent paid by the date of comencement of the Act 2001[2003]under Rajasthan Rent control Act and it can not be considered as a revisied enhanced rent with 10% increase – more than the prescribed in the Act 2001 ?

2019 – ACJ- APEX COURT JUDGMENTS VOL.NO.1/ 2019 APEX COURT DIGEST -VOL.NO.1

Rajasthan Rent Control Act, = Rent deed contained a clause for yearly increase of rent by 10%. The tenant continued to pay rent to the landlord as per the agreed rent with 10% enhancement yearly. The landlord issued notice dated 27.03.2004 stating that with effect from 01.08.2003 upto 29.02.2004, for a period of seven months, the tenant has neither paid or tendered rent, arrears from 01.08.2003 to 29.02.2004 amounting to Rs.1,15,945/­ were asked to be deposited
in the bank account of landlord. Notice mentioned that in the event the tenant does not deposit the amount in the account, landlord shall be compelled to carry out legal proceedings for eviction of the tenant.-After the aforesaid notice dated 27.03.2004 the tenant deposited an amount of Rs.95,200/­ on 26.04.2004 in the bank account of the landlord .- Landlord filed an Application No.1258 of 2004 under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act,

2001”) praying for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. – The tenant filed reply opposing the abovesaid application. The tenant took stand in the application that in accordance with the provisions of Act, 2001, which has come into effect from 01.04.2003, on increasing the rent under the provisions of Section 6 in the prescribed rent of Rs.8,500/­ @ 7.5% per annum

the rate of rent from 01.04.2003 comes to be Rs.13,600/­ per month. It was stated In the written statement that tenant has deposited rent upto February, 2004 @ Rs.13,600/­ per month i.e. a total of Rs.95,200/­ in the bank account. – Rejoinder was filed by the landlord where it was pleaded that respondent­tenant has been paying rent from August, 2002 @ Rs.16,564/­ per month which rent was paid till July, 2003. It was claimed that the

respondent­tenant is liable to pay rent @ Rs.16,564/­ per month. The Rent Tribunal heard the parties and by its judgment and order dated 22.04.2011 directed for eviction of the tenant. The Rent Tribunal held that the case of tenant that rent is payable @ Rs.13,600/­ per month cannot be accepted. The tenant having not deposited at the rate of Rs.16,564/­ per month, has

committed default in paying rent -An appeal was filed by the tenant before the Rent Appellate Tribunal which too was dismissed by order dated 15.01.2014. The order of the Rent Tribunal was upheld- The tenant aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Tribunal filed Writ

Petition in the High Court which writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Ju Against the

judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 0dge vide its judgment and order dated 09.10.2014.9.10.2014 Special Appeal was filed which was dismissed by the Division Bench vide its judgment dated 14.12.2015 holding writ appeal as not maintainable.- The High Court in its judgment has held that after the enforcement of the Act, 2001 no agreement can provide for higher revision of rent. The High Court in its judgment has made following observation: “Section 6 of the Act starts with nonobstantive clause, thus no agreement to provide higher or lower rate of revision of rent would operate after commencement of the Act of 2001. The landlord was thus not at liberty to claim rent with enhancement @ 10% per annum.”- Aggrieved against the judgments of the High Court landlord has filed these appeals. –

Apex court held that By the notice given by the landlord dated 27.03.2004 an amount of Rs.1,15,945/­ which was due from August, 2003 to February, 2004 was demanded at the rate of Rs.16,564/­ per month. The tenant having not deposited the due amount and having deposited amount of only Rs.95,200/­ on 26.04.2004 has committed default.- Learned counsel for the respondent refuting the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants submits that the High Court has rightly taken the view that the landlord was not entitled to enhancement of

the rent more than 5% in view of the Act, 2001. The landlord was not at liberty to claim rent with enhancement at the rate of 10% per annum. The High

Court had rightly held that permitting the landlord to demand rent with increase of 10% shall be contrary to the Section 6 of the Act, 2001.-The issue in these appeals pertains to rate of rent and the revision of rent as prescribed by the Act, 2001, hence, only those provisions of both the earlier Act and the Act,2001 need to be noted. Act, 2001 has repealed the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950.- The observation of the High Court that landlord was entitled to the rent as was payable on the date of commencement of the Act, 2001 without its revision is perfectly correct. The landlord cannot claim revision of rent as per agreement at the rate of 10% per annum after the enforcement of the Act. The present is not a

case that the landlord is claiming rent after the enforcement of the Act by adding 10% increase in the rent. The landlord’s case throughout is that the rent at the rate of Rs.16,564/­ per month was being paid by the tenant since before the commencement of the Act and even after the commencement of the Act, till the month of July, 2003 the tenant paid rent at the rate of

Rs.16,564/­ per month.-Section 4 of the Act which deals with the agreed rent provides that rent payable for any premises shall subject to the provisions of this Act, be such as may be agreed between the landlord and the tenant. When the tenant was paying the rent of Rs.16,564/­ per month before the enforcement of the Act as per the rent agreement, the said amount was agreed amount which wasbeing paid before the enforcement of the Act. It is true that in the agreed amount which was being paid immediately before the commencement of the Act, the landlord cannot increase @ 10% of the rent as per agreement. The increase after the enforcement of the Act shall be in accordance with Section 6 and in the event the tenant does not agree for the said increase,the landlord is free to file application under Section

6 read with Section 14. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the High Court has not appreciated the true import of Sections 6 and 7 of the Act, 2001 in observing that the tenant is not in default. -In the present case arrears demanded by the notice i.e.

Rs.16,564/­ per month starting from December, 2003 to February, 2004 totalling Rs.1,15,945/­ were required to be paid by the tenant, the tenant having paid only Rs.95,200/­ as per his calculation of the rent at the rate of Rs.13,600/­ per month has committed default. According to the learned counsel for the tenant, the rent paid by the tenant was sufficient to cover the rent upto December, 2003 and part of January, 2004, admittedly, the arrears as demanded having not been paid and we having found that the landlord has demanded

arrears of rent for seven months according to rate of rent Rs.16,564/­ per month which was being paid by the tenant even before the enforcement of the Act, 2001 and after the enforcement of the Act, 2001. The landlord having not added 10% increase in the rent demanded,

there was no breach of Section 6 and the High Court has committed error in allowing the writ petition of the tenant.

Section 245(2) CrPC/Sec.482 Cr.P.C = Discharge of accused- quashing of complaint - in the absence of source for the claim of purchasing shares out of his funds - without establishing the same in right forum, complaint is not maintainable

Section 245(2) CrPC/Sec.482 Cr.P.C. = Complaint - under Sections 406, 420, 467, 471, 323, 504, 506, 447 and 448 IPC. - the 3rd Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad found that no ground to summon the appellants for trial was made out and the complaint being devoid of merits was liable to be dismissed under Section 203 CrPC - The aforesaid order was, however, set aside in Criminal Revision  preferred by Respondent No.2 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.2, Ghaziabad, who by his order remanded the matter with a direction to pass fresh orders after granting an opportunity of hearing to Respondent No.2.- The appellants being aggrieved, preferred application under Section 482 CrPC in the High Court. - Said application was disposed of by the High Court  observing that if the appellants moved an application under Section 245(2) CrPC the same be heard and disposed of expeditiously.-The application for discharge was rejected by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.3, Ghaziabad - While so rejecting, it was observed that sufficient grounds to frame charges under Sections 420, 323 and 504 IPC were made out.- the appellant  filed petition in High Court under sec.482 Cr.P.C. - However, the High Court observed that in a petition under Section 482 CrPC disputed questions of fact could not be gone into and whether the shares were purchased by the appellants or by Respondent No.2 was a matter of evidence and as such no interference was called for. The aforesaid application was thus dismissed by the High Court on 29.05.2018, which decision is presently under challenge. -

Apex court held that 
. 
To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/ complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. 
For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. 
The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. 
In such a situation, thejudicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 
Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC: 
1. Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 
2. Step two: whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? 
3. Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 
4. Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?
5. If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.”
In the present case the shares in question, right since the date of acquisition have always been in the custody of Appellant No.1. The material on record is absolutely clear that the acquisition was from the funds of Appellant No.1. The complainant has merely alleged that the funds came from his bank account but beyond such allegations no material has been placed on record at any stage. 
The stand taken by the appellants in their application under Section 245(2) CrPC is quite clear that the shares can be sold in the market and the proceeds can be divided between Appellant No.2 and Respondent No.2. If Respondent No.2 is insisting on having complete ownership in respect of the concerned shares, the matter must first be established before a competent forum. 
We have considered the material on record through the steps indicated in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor (supra) and are convinced that the instant case calls for interference under Section 482 CrPC. 
Further, from the facts that Appellant No.1 had disowned Respondent No.2 and had filed civil proceedings seeking appropriate orders against them, we are also convinced that the present criminal complaint is nothing but an attempt to wreck vengeance against the father, brother and the brother in law of the complainant. The instant criminal complaint is an abuse of the process of Court and is required to be quashed.
We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the orders passed by the Courts below and allow the application for discharge under Section 245(2) CrPC in complaint No.3804 of 2009 on the file of third Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit (

Criminal Appeal No.56 of 2019
 Sri Suresh Kumar Goyal & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 56 OF 2019
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.8143 of 2018)
Sri Suresh Kumar Goyal and Others …Appellants
VERSUS
State of Uttar Pradesh and Another …Respondents
JUDGMENT Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
1. Leave granted. This appeal challenges the order dated 29.05.2018 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dismissing application preferred by the appellants under Section 482 CrPC being Application No.22324 of 2011.
2. Respondent No.2 filed Complaint No.3804 of 2009 in the Court of 3rd Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad on 02.12.2009 against Appellant Nos.1, 2 and 3 namely his father, brother and brother-in-law. The main allegations as set out in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10 of the Complaint were as under:- 
 Criminal Appeal No.56 of 2019 Sri Suresh Kumar Goyal & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
 2
“3. THAT Complainant had purchased 2 folios consisting of 100 shares of Reliance Industry. 1st folio was in the name of the Complainant and accused no.2 and 2nd folio was in the joint names of accused no.2 and complainant. The address in these shares is House no. KC-102/2, Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad. Thereafter Reliance company sent to complainant 100 shares in the year 1997 and 200 shares of their company in this year itself.
4. THAT all the accused in furtherance of their conspiracy beat the Complainant and threw him out of the house along with his children in the year 1998 for mala fide reasons. They also forged signatures of complainant in the years 1997 and 2006 and illegally procured bonus shares and when complainant demanded back his original shares and bonus shares from them, they misbehaved with the complainant and refused to disclose anything to him. The complainant is presently living in Chiranjiv Vihar with his children for the sake of lives of himself and his children and also to maintain peace in the family.
5. THAT Folio number of the shares is 068119227 and complainant is not aware of the number of 2nd folio and he will provide it later on whenever he comes to know of it. Because all the shares are in the custody of the accused. Not only this, 100 shares of M/s. Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd., belonging to Complainant, are also in the custody of the accused.
7. THAT all the original shares had been handed over to accused no.2 by the complainant after purchasing them for safe custody.
10. THAT all shares of complainant are in custody of accused and cost of the shares is approx. Rs.4.50 Lacs.”
 Criminal Appeal No.56 of 2019 Sri Suresh Kumar Goyal & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
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3. It was thus alleged that the appellants had betrayed and cheated Respondent No.2 and were guilty of offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 467, 471, 323, 504, 506, 447 and 448 IPC. However, by his order dated 18.06.2010 the 3rd Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad found that no ground to summon the appellants for trial was made out and the complaint being devoid of merits was liable to be dismissed under Section 203 CrPC. The aforesaid order was, however, set aside in Criminal Revision No.179 of 2010 preferred by Respondent No.2 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.2, Ghaziabad, who by his order dated 11.11.2010 remanded the matter with a direction to pass fresh orders after granting an opportunity of hearing to Respondent No.2. The appellants being aggrieved, preferred application under Section 482 CrPC being Application No.9156 of 2011 in the High Court. Said application was disposed of by the High Court on 23.03.2011 observing that if the appellants moved an application under Section 245(2) CrPC the same be heard and disposed of expeditiously.
4. Accordingly, an application under Section 245(2) CrPC was moved by the appellants. Paragraphs 6 to 15 of the application for discharge dealt with acquisition of shares of Reliance Industries Ltd. Criminal Appeal No.56 of 2019 Sri Suresh Kumar Goyal & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. 
 4
“6. THAT true and correct position is that an application for allotment of 100 debentures of M/s. Reliance Polythene Limited was given by the coapplicant, Suresh Goyal in the year 1993. This application was filed by him for allotment of shares in the names of his sons i.e. Arun Kumar Goyal (i.e. the complainant) and Devinder Kumar Goyal and for which the said co-applicant had given a cheque of his own bank. 7. THAT thereafter Reliance Polythene Limited issued 100 debentures of their Company being Debenture Nos. 004959401 to 004959500 vide Master Folio No.68119227 and Certificate No.0049595 on the basis of above application of applicant Suresh Kumar Goyal on 15.4.1993. 8. THAT thereafter above said 100 debentures were converted by M/s. Reliance Polythene Limited into shares and accordingly issued 100 shares bearing Share Nos.154702201 to 154702300 in the names of Arun Kumar Goyal (i.e. the complainant) and Devinder Kumar Goyal vide Master Folio no.68119227 and Certificate No.00545523. It is pertinent to mention here that conversion of debentures into 100 shares vide Master Folio No.68119227 was done by the above said company in pursuance of their own policy and no application for this conversion was ever given by the applicant. 9. THAT later on M/s. Reliance Polythene Limited merged with M/s. Reliance Industries Limited and thereafter 25 shares of this company in lieu of above said 100 shares were allotted by the company according to their policy bearing Share Nos. 400314745 to 400314769 in the names of Arun Kumar Goyal (i.e. complainant) and Devinder Kumar Goyal vide Folio No.68119227 and Certificate No.056387476. It is pertinent to mention
 Criminal Appeal No.56 of 2019 Sri Suresh Kumar Goyal & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
 5
here that this conversion of shares into 25 shares was also done by the Company under their own policy. The above shares were issued under Folio No.68119227. 10. THAT thereafter M/s. Reliance Industries Limited issued 25 shares of their company in the names of Arun Kumar Goyal (i.e. complainant) and Devinder Kumar Goyal bearing Share Nos.400314745 to 400314769 Folio No.68119227 and Certificate No.056387476. 11. THAT later on Reliance Industries Limited divided its company into 4 companies, whose names are mentioned hereinafter, under their Policy and issued 50 shares each in the joint names of Arun Kumar Goyal (i.e. complainant) and Devinder Kumar Goyal – (a) Reliance Energy Ventures Limited: Folio No.001486420, Certificate No. 000148642, Share Nos.0007302483 to 0007302532 dated 27.1.2006 – Total No. of shares 50. (b) Reliance Communication Ventures Limited: Folio No.001486420, Certificate No. (Illegible) Share Nos. (Illegible) dated (Illegible) – total no. of shares 50. (c) Reliance Resources Limited: Folio No.001486420, Certificate No.000148642, Share Nos. 0007302483 to 0007302532 dated 27.1.2006 – Total No. of shares 50. (d) Reliance Capital Ventures Limited: Folio No.001486420, Certificate No.000148642, Share Nos. 0007302483 to 0007302532 dated 27.1.2006 – Total No. of shares 50.

Criminal Appeal No.56 of 2019 Sri Suresh Kumar Goyal & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
 6
12. THAT thereafter 3 new Companies were formed in the names of Reliance Capital Limited, Reliance Energy Limited and Reliance Power Limited under the Company Policy after merging all the above named 4 companies and following shares were issued in the joint names of Arun Kumar Goyal (i.e. complainant) and Devinder Kumar Goyal – (a) M/s. Reliance Capital Limited: Master Folio No.102341601, Certificate No.016334160, share Nos. 0225139303 to 0225139305 = 2 Shares. (b) M/s. Reliance Energy Limited: Master Folio No.102341601, Certificate no. 015734160, share Nos.0213764143 to 0213764145 = 3 Shares. (c) M/s. Reliance Power Limited: Master Folio No.20148620, Certificate no. (Illegible), share Nos. 23978999076 to 2397899087 = 12 Shares. 13. THAT thereafter M/s. Reliance Industries Limited under its Company policy issued 50 bonus shares in the joint names of Arun Kumar Goyal (i.e. complainant) and Devinder Kumar Goyal vide Folio No.608119227, Certificate No.622733328, Share Nos.002226357219 to 00222357268 dated 28.11.2009. 14. THAT in this manner it would be apparent from the above facts that 100 shares of Reliance Industries Co.; 2 shares of Reliance Capital Limited; 3 shares of Reliance Energy Limited; and 12 shares of Reliance Power Limited have been issued in the joint names of Arun Kumar Goyal (i.e. complainant) and Devinder Kumar Goyal. These shares were sent by the company at House No.KC-102/2, Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad i.e. the address maintained in their

 Criminal Appeal No.56 of 2019 Sri Suresh Kumar Goyal & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
 7
records. The originals of all the above shares are available with Devinder Kumar Goyal. In this manner, it would be apparent from the above that neither the applicants nor the complainant have purchased these shares from the open market. All the shares have been allotted by the company in lieu of the money paid by Suresh Kumar Goyal (i.e. father of Arun Kumar Goyal and Devinder Kumar Goyal) although these shares have been issued by company in the joint names of Arun Kumar Goyal and Devinder Kumar Goyal. None of the applicants had given any application in writing for collecting bonus shares nor any one of them ever attempted to sell any of these shares. Therefore allegation of the complainant that applicants have obtained bonus shares by cheating and/or by forging his signatures, is patently wrong and false and accused emphatically deny the same. (illegible). 15. THAT it thus becomes evident from perusal of above facts that no shares have been purchased by Arun Kumar Goyal either from the Company or from the open market.”
5. Similarly, the acquisition of shares of M/s. Amrit Vanaspati Company Ltd. was also dealt with and it was asserted:- “18. THAT all the above shares are in joint names. It is pertinent to mention here that no one can either sell or transfer the shares which are in the joint names nor anyone can change the address, unless and until both the shareholders agree and sign for this. 19. THAT no other shares have been purchased except the above shares. Therefore, the allegations
 Criminal Appeal No.56 of 2019 Sri Suresh Kumar Goyal & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
 8
of complainant that he will furnish details/information of one other folio as and when he becomes aware of that, are patently wrong, false and baseless and applicants emphatically deny such allegations. 20. THAT it is thus evident from the above facts that all the shares allotted by M/s. Reliance Industries have been issued in the joint names of Arun Kumar Goyal (i.e. complainant) and Devinder Kumar Goyal. Resultantly Complainant and Devinder Kumar Goyal have equal share in the above shares. Originals of all these shares are in the possession of Devinder Kumar Goyal. 21. THAT similarly shares allotted by M/s. Amrit Vanaspati Company are also in the joint names of Arun Kumar Goyal (i.e. complainant) and Devinder Kumar Goyal and consequently both the complainant and Devinder Kumar Goyal have equal shares in them. The originals of these shares are also in possession of Devinder Kumar Goyal. 22. THAT Anil Kumar Garg has absolutely nothing to do with this case. He is the real Son-inlaw of Suresh Kumar Goyal and that is why he too has been falsely implicated in this case. 23. THAT Suresh Kumar Goyal and Devinder Kumar Goyal even offered the Complainant-Arun Kumar Goyal to collect money of his half share in the above shares after selling them in the open market. But he is not ready for this offer. He is not entitled to demand all the shares.” 6. The application for discharge was rejected by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.3, Ghaziabad vide his order dated 14.06.2011.

 Criminal Appeal No.56 of 2019 Sri Suresh Kumar Goyal & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
 9
While so rejecting, it was observed that sufficient grounds to frame charges under Sections 420, 323 and 504 IPC were made out.
7. The aforesaid order was challenged by the appellants by filing application under Section 482 CrPC namely Application No.22324 of 2011. The High Court noted the contentions on behalf of the appellants as under: “As applicant no. 1 was not happy with the conduct of the opposite party no.2, he disowned him and also filed O.S. No.406 of 2007 in the court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ghaziabad for a decree of declaration. A criminal complaint was also initiated by applicant no.1 against the opposite party no.2 under Sections 420, 406, 409, 321, 323, 385, 442 IPC. … … … On 2.12.2009, the opposite party no. 2 filed a Complaint Case No.3884 of 2009 against the applicants on the ground that opposite party no. 2 had purchased shares from the Reliance Industries in the name of complainant and applicant no. 2. It is further alleged in the complaint that in the year 1997 and in the year 2006 by making forged signature of the complainant bonus shares were received by the applicants and original shares were also in the possession of the applicants. In spite of demand same has not been handed over to the complainant. It is further alleged in the complaint that applicants with mala fide intention on 9.10.2007 sent a letter to the company which was received to the company on 10.10.2007 and thereafter complainant on 15.8.2009

 Criminal Appeal No.56 of 2019 Sri Suresh Kumar Goyal & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. 10
and 17.8.2009 sent mails to the company in this regard. It is submission of the learned counsel for the applicants that shares were purchased by the applicant no. 1, although they were also in the name of opposite party no.2. At no point of time any forgery has been committed and preparation of any act cannot be termed as forgery.”
8. However, the High Court observed that in a petition under Section 482 CrPC disputed questions of fact could not be gone into and whether the shares were purchased by the appellants or by Respondent No.2 was a matter of evidence and as such no interference was called for. The aforesaid application was thus dismissed by the High Court on 29.05.2018, which decision is presently under challenge.
9. In support of the appeal, it was submitted that the instant complaint was a counter blast after Appellant No.1 had disowned Respondent No.2 by issuing an advertisement in the newspaper and swearing an affidavit to that effect; and after he had filed a civil suit seeking injunction against Respondent No.2 from coming to the house of the appellants and causing any hindrance; and after a criminal complaint was filed by the Appellant No.1 against Respondent No.2. It was submitted that as disclosed in the application under

 Criminal Appeal No.56 of 2019 Sri Suresh Kumar Goyal & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. 11
Section 245(2) CrPC, the entire funding for acquisition of the shares in question had come from Appellant No.1 in the year 1992-1993 when Respondent No.2 was a youngster aged about 24 years. In support of the assertion that the acquisition was from the funds of Appellant No.1, the photocopies of the concerned bank accounts were also placed on record. On the other hand, the learned counsel for Respondent No.2 reiterated the submission that the issue of ownership was essentially a question of fact which had to be decided in the pending complaint and that the matter ought not to be entertained in an application for discharge. In support of the submission that Respondent No.2 had acquired those shares from his own funds, reliance was placed upon a typewritten extract showing debit entries of Rs.1250/-, Rs.1250/- and Rs.500/- dated 04.05.1993, 08.06.1994 and 15.10.1994 which extract was however without any details.
10. This Court adjourned the matter to enable the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement whereafter the appellants agreed to withdraw all the cases filed by them against Respondent No.2 on the condition that similar such cases filed by Respondent No.2 against them also be withdrawn, giving quietus to all the proceedings between the parties. Respondent No.2, however, did not agree to the proposal.

 Criminal Appeal No.56 of 2019 Sri Suresh Kumar Goyal & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. 12
11. The thrust of the allegations in the complaint is that the shares in question were acquired from the funds of the complainant, though they have always stood in the names of the complainant and his brother. It is also accepted that the shares have always been in the custody of the father i.e. Appellant No.1. Beyond mere allegation that the funds for acquisition came from his bank account, nothing has even been suggested by the complainant. The entries dated 04.05.1993, 08.06.1994 and 15.10.1994 relied upon by him are much after the issuance of 100 debentures by Reliance Polythene Ltd. on 15.04.1993. As detailed in the application under Section 245(2) CrPC the basic acquisition was these 100 debentures which investment, with the passage of time, got converted and progressed to the present level. The complainant was not even aware of these details. The allegations of beating and intimidation are of the year 1998 and completely devoid of any substance. The question is: are these aspects sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction to discharge the appellants or should the appellants be made to go through the rituals and rigour of trial.
12. While dealing with the jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings at the stage of issuance of process, or at the stage of committal, or at the stage of framing of charges, that is to say before the

 Criminal Appeal No.56 of 2019 Sri Suresh Kumar Goyal & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. 13
 commencement of actual trial, in the light of material placed on record by the accused, this Court in Rajiv Thapar and Others v. Madan Lal Kapoor1 laid down as under:- “28. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, must make a just and rightful choice. This is not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant against the accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty the defences raised on behalf of the accused are. Even if the accused is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt, in the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, it would be impermissible to discharge the accused before trial. This is so because it would result in giving finality to the accusations levelled by the prosecution/ complainant, without allowing the prosecution or the complainant to adduce evidence to substantiate the same. The converse is, however, not true, because even if trial is proceeded with, the accused is not subjected to any irreparable consequences. The accused would still be in a position to succeed by establishing his defences by producing evidence in accordance with law. There is an endless list of judgments rendered by this Court declaring the legal position that in a case where the prosecution/ complainant has levelled allegations bringing out all ingredients of the charge(s) levelled, and have placed material before the Court, prima facie evidencing the truthfulness of the allegations levelled, trial must be held. 1 (2013) 3 SCC 330

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29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have farreaching consequences inasmuch as it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/ complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the

 Criminal Appeal No.56 of 2019 Sri Suresh Kumar Goyal & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. 15
judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC: 30.1. Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2. Step two: whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? 30.3. Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4. Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?

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30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.”
13. In the present case the shares in question, right since the date of acquisition have always been in the custody of Appellant No.1. The material on record is absolutely clear that the acquisition was from the funds of Appellant No.1. The complainant has merely alleged that the funds came from his bank account but beyond such allegations no material has been placed on record at any stage. The stand taken by the appellants in their application under Section 245(2) CrPC is quite clear that the shares can be sold in the market and the proceeds can be divided between Appellant No.2 and Respondent No.2. If Respondent No.2 is insisting on having complete ownership in respect of the concerned shares, the matter must first be established before a competent forum. We have considered the material on record through the steps indicated in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor (supra) and are convinced that the instant case calls for interference under

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Section 482 CrPC. Further, from the facts that Appellant No.1 had disowned Respondent No.2 and had filed civil proceedings seeking appropriate orders against them, we are also convinced that the present criminal complaint is nothing but an attempt to wreck vengeance against the father, brother and the brother in law of the complainant. The instant criminal complaint is an abuse of the process of Court and is required to be quashed.
14. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the orders passed by the Courts below and allow the application for discharge under Section 245(2) CrPC in complaint No.3804 of 2009 on the file of third Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad. 15. Since we have found that the initiation of complaint was not a bona fide exercise, we direct Respondent No.2 to pay a sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) within two months from today to each of the appellants by way of costs for initiating frivolous litigation. .………..………..…..……..……J. (Uday Umesh Lalit) ..………...………….……………J. (Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud) New Delhi, January 11, 2019.

Whether one can made alternattions to his vihicle as per his wish and will ?- No.

Whether one can made alternattions to his vihicle as per his own wish and will ?- No.

Section 52 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Rule 126 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 and the effect of Rules 96, 103 and 261 of the Kerala Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989.-  permissible alteration in a Motor Vehicle -The Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment has opined that alteration is not totally prohibited. More so, in view of Rules 96 and 103 of the Kerala Rules, the Registering Authority is competent to consider roadworthiness and safety of the vehicle and it cannot be rendered a mechanical exercise. It is not only to verify as to whether the measurement conforms to the prototype test etc. The Rules provide for the dimensions of the vehicle. Rule 93 is not an enabling provision to make prototype certification. Rule 47(1)(g) of the Central Rules contemplates on road-worthiness certificate in Form 22 from the manufacturers and in Form 22A from the bodybuilders for applying for registration of the motor vehicles. The body can be built on a chassis in compliance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The manufacturer or the authorities specified under Rule 126 do not provide for any prescription as to the dimensions or nature of the body that is to be built on the chassis. The writ petitions have been allowed and orders passed by the Registering Authorities have been quashed.-

Apex court held that  What   is   permitted   has   been   specifically provided for and what has not been specifically stated would obviously be deemed to have been excluded from these Rules. Let us take a few examples. Rule 104 requires that every motor vehicle, other than three­wheelers and motorcycles shall be fitted with two red reflectors, one each on both sides at their
rear.   Every   motorcycle   shall   be   fitted   with   at   least   one   red reflector at the rear. Rule 104A provides that two white reflex in the front of the vehicle on each side and visible to oncoming
vehicles from the front at night.  
Rule 106 deals with deflections of lights and requires that no lamp showing a light to the front shall be used on any motor vehicle including construction equipment vehicle unless such lamp is so constructed, fitted and maintained that the beam of light emitted therefrom is permanently deflected downwards to such an extent that it is not capable of dazzling any person whose eye position is at a distance of 8 meters from the front of lamp etc. 
Rules 119 and 120 specify the kind, size, and manner in which the horn and silencer are to be fixed in a vehicle. 
These provisions demonstrate the extent of minuteness in the Rules and the efforts of the framers to ensure, not only the appropriate   manner   of   construction   and   maintenance   of  the vehicle but also the safety of other users of the road.
It is the duty of all citizens to comply with the law. The Rules are mandatory and nobody has
the authority in law to mould these rules for the purposes of convenience or luxury and certainly not for crime.
As per Section 32(1) and 32(2) of the Old Act, corresponding to Section   52(1)   and   52(2)   of  the   new   Act,   before   making   any alteration,   the   owner   was   required   to   give   notice  to   the registering   authority   and   obtain   permission.   The   registering authority   was  required   to   communicate   its   approval   or disapproval within seven days and if no such communication was served within the period of seven days, approval of such authority to the proposed alteration was deemed to have been given. 
Apex court held that 
The vehicle has to comply with the provisions of the Rules contained in Chapter V of the Central Rules as provided in Rule 92(1). Rule 92(1) has to be read as subservient to the provisions contained in section 52 of the Act and what is prohibited therein to allow the same is not the intendment of the rules contained in the Chapter. Various provisions in Chapter V are additional safeguards to what is prohibited in section 52(1) that is to say, what has been specified originally by the manufacturers and once that has been entered in the particulars in the certificate of registration, cannot be varied. No vehicle can be altered so as to change original specification made by manufacturer. Such particulars cannot be altered which have been specified by the manufacturer for the purpose of entry in the certificate of registration. It is provided in Rule 126 of the Central Rules, prototype of every type of vehicle is subject to test. The provisions of Rule 126 intend for fitness of vehicle to be plied on the road by the agencies which are specified therein. Approval and certification of motor vehicles for compliance to these rules shall be in accordance with the AIS: 017-2000. Rule 93 deals with overall dimensions of the motor vehicles such as width, length, height, overhang etc. No doubt about it that the vehicle has to be in conformity with the rules also but Rules cannot be so interpreted so as to permit the alteration as prohibited under section 52(1) of the Act. The alteration under the Rules is permissible except as prohibited by section 52. The specification of the rules would hold good with respect to the matters as not specifically covered under section 52(1) and not specified therein by manufacturer. The emphasis of section 52(1) is not to vary the “original specifications by the manufacturer”. Remaining particulars in a certificate of registration can be modified and changed and can be noted in the certificate of registration as provided in section 52(2), (3) and (5) and the Rules. Under section 52(5), in case a person is holding a vehicle on a hire purchase agreement, he shall not make any alteration except with the written consent of the original owner. 
In our considered opinion the Division Bench in the impugned judgment of the High Court of Kerala has failed to give effect to the provisions contained in section 52(1) and has emphasized only on the Rules. As such, the decision rendered by the Division Bench cannot be said to be laying down the law correctly. 
The Rules are subservient to the provisions of the Act and particulars in certificate of registration can also be changed except to the extent of the entries made in the same as per the specifications originally made by the manufacturer. Circular No.7/2006 is also to be read in that spirit. Authorities to act accordingly.




Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  219­222 OF 2019)
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NOs.13228­13231 OF 2013)
REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICER & ORS. ETC.    ..APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
K. JAYACHANDRA & ANR. ETC. ..RESPONDENT(S)
With C.A. No. 223 of 2019 [@ SLP [C] No.27499/2013]
J U D G M E N T
ARUN MISHRA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The question involved is as to the permissible alteration in a Motor
Vehicle in view of the provisions contained in section 52 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), Rule 126 of the Central Motor
Vehicles Rules, 1989 and the effect of Rules 96, 103 and 261 of the Kerala
Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989. The Central Government has framed the rules called
Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 (for short “the Central Rules”) in exercise of
the power conferred under section 27 of the Act, and in exercise of powers
conferred under Section 28 of the Act, the Kerala Government has framed the
2
Kerala Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as “the Kerala
Rules”). The validity of Circular No.7/2006 issued by the Transport
Commissioner, Kerala to all the Registering Authorities stating that the body of
the vehicle constructed in violation of the prototype test certificate and which
was not built in strict compliance of the specifications given by the
manufacturer are to be denied the registration. Pursuant thereto the Regional
Transport Authorities did not grant permission to certain motor vehicles in view
of the provisions contained in section 52 and the Circular. As such several writ
petitions came to be filed in the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam.
3. In Writ Petition (C) No.29946 of 2006 decided on 16.1.2007 by the
learned Single Judge it was held that Rule 126 of the Central Rules does not
fetter the powers of the Regional Transport Authorities to intelligently exercise
their discretion in terms of the Kerala Rules, in particular Rules 96, 103 and
261; whereas a contrary view was taken by another Single Judge vide order
dated 23.5.2007 in Writ Petition (C) No.8836 of 2007 and it was observed that
the alteration in derogation of prototype test in terms of Rule 126 of the Central
Rules cannot be approved.
4. Writ Petition (C) No.28702 of 2007 for quashing Circular No.7/2006 and
the order passed on 3.7.2007 declining registration was filed.
5. Writ Petition (C) Nos.1323 of 2010 and 1468/2010 were filed with
respect to the denial of registration by the Registering Authorities as the body
3
built over the chassis extended by a length of 15 cms. beyond the chassis which
was not adhering to the specifications given by the manufacturer of the vehicle.
6. Writ Petition (C) No.274 of 2012 was filed by the owner of the vehicle to
question denial of registration in view of the aforesaid rule and the Circular. Yet
another Writ Petition (C) No.274 of 2012 was filed against the refusal to grant
registration of a vehicle which was re-modelled as a ‘recovery vehicle’ altered
in an unauthorised manner by cutting the chassis of the vehicle by one feet at
the rear end which was not in conformity with the prototype test in terms of
Rule 126 of the Central Rules.
7. In view of the conflict in judgments in Writ Petition (C) No.29946 of
2006 and Writ Petition (C) No.8836 of 2007 regarding the issue of alteration
whether alteration is permissible at variance with the manufacturer’s
specification contained in the prototype test certification, the matter was
referred to a Division Bench of the High Court. The High Court by the common
judgment passed in the writ petitions came to the conclusion that structural
alteration is permissible as per the provisions of the Kerala Rules. The view
taken by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (C) No.29946 of 2006 has
been upheld hence the appeals have been preferred in this Court. This Court has
stayed the operation of the impugned judgment and order on 16.4.2013.
Considering the importance of the matter notice was issued to the Ministry of
4
Road Transport and Highways through its Secretary, and Mr. K.V. Viswanathan,
learned senior counsel was appointed as amicus curiae to assist the Court.
8. It is apparent from the factual matrix of Writ Petition (C) No.28702 of
2007 that it was a case of medium commercial bus chassis. The registration was
declined on the ground that the platform of the bus was extended to a distance
of 37 cms. and the body was having an extension of 39 cms. from the extreme
rear end of the chassis. The vehicle had an extended length of 39 cms. The
technical specifications of model TATA bus chassis have specified length of
757.5 cm. After the body was built, it had a total length of 796.5 cm.
9. Similarly, in Writ Petition (C) No.1323 of 2010 and Writ Petition (C)
No.1468 of 2010, the body was built over the chassis extended by 15 cm.
beyond the chassis. In Writ Petition (C) No.274 of 2012 the vehicle was remodeled as a recovery vehicle by cutting the chassis of the vehicle by one foot
at the rear end. In Writ Petition (C) No.29946 of 2006, the unladen weight of the
vehicle before alteration was 2315 kg. and the same had been increased on
alteration to 2715 kgs. Besides, there were changes in the measurement of the
body which resulted in declining the permission for registration. In Writ Petition
(C) No.8836 of 2007, the length of the chassis of the vehicle as per prototype
was 832.5 cm. but after building the body it was found to have been extended to
885 cm.
5
10. Section 52 of the Act deals with alteration in the motor vehicle. Prior to
that, provision with respect to alteration in motor vehicles was contained in
section 32 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Section 32 of the Act of 1939 is
extracted hereunder:
 “SECTION 32: ALTERATION IN MOTOR VEHICLE
(1) No owner of a motor vehicle shall so alter the vehicle that the
particulars   contained  in the  certificate  of  registration are   no
longer accurate, unless­
(a) he has given notice to the registering authority within whose
jurisdiction he resides of the alteration he proposes to make,
and
(b) he has obtained the approval of the registering authority to
make such alteration:
   Provided that it shall not be necessary to obtain such approval
for  making   any  change   in   the   unladen   weight   of   the   motor
vehicle   consequent   on   the   addition   or   removal   of   fittings   or
accessories if Such change does not exceed two percent. of the
weight entered in the certificate of registration. 
(2) Where a registering authority has received notice under subsection (1), it shall, within seven days of the receipt thereof,
communicate, by post, to the owner of the vehicle its approval to
the proposed alteration or otherwise:
     Provided that where the owner of the motor vehicle has not
received   any   such   communication   within   the   said   period   of
seven   days,   the   approval   of   such   authority   to   the   proposed
alteration shall be deemed to have been given.
(3)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   sub­section   (1),   a
State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
authorise, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the
notification, the owners of not less than ten transport vehicles to
alter any vehicle owned by them so as to change its engine
number by replacing the engine thereof without the approval of
the registering authority.
(4) Where any alteration has been made in a motor vehicle either
with the approval of the registering authority given or deemed to
have   been   given   under   sub­section   (2)   or   by   reason   of   any
change in its engine number without such approval under sub­
6
section (3), the owner of the vehicle shall within fourteen days of
the   making   of   the   alteration,   report   the   alteration   to   the
registering authority within whose jurisdiction he resides and
shall   forward   the   certificate   of   registration   to   that   authority
together with the prescribed fee in order that particulars of the
alteration may be entered therein.
(5) A registering authority other than the original registering
authority making any such entry shall communicate the details
of the entry to the original registering authority.”
(emphasis supplied)
11. The alteration in a motor vehicle under the parent Act is dealt with in
section 52 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Section 52 as originally enacted is
extracted hereunder:
"52. Alternation in a motor vehicle .­ 
(1) No owner of a motor vehicle shall so alter the vehicle that
the particulars contained in the certificate of registration are
no longer accurate, unless.­ 
(a) he has given notice to  the registering authority within
whose   jurisdiction   he   has   the   residence   or   the   place   of
business where the vehicle is normally kept, as the case may
be of the alteration he proposes to make; and 
(b) he has obtained the approval of that registering authority
to make such alteration:
     Provided that it shall not be necessary to obtain such
approval for making any change in the unladen weight of the
motor   vehicle   consequent   on   the   addition   or   removal   of
fittings or accessories if such change does not exceed two
percent of the weight entered in the certificate of registration. 
       Provided further that modification of the engine, or any
part thereof, of a vehicle for facilitating its operation by a
different type of fuel or source of energy including battery,
compressed  natural  gas, solar power or any other fuel  or
source of energy other than liquid petroleum gas shall be
treated as an alteration but that shall be subject to such
conditions as may be prescribed.
(2) Where a registering authority has received notice under
sub­section   (1),   it   shall,   within   seven   days   of   the   receipt
thereof, communicate, by post, to the owner of the vehicle its
approval to the proposed alteration or otherwise:
7
Provided that where the owner of the motor vehicle has not
received any such communication within the said period of
seven days, the approval of such authority to the proposed
alteration shall be deemed to have been given.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub­section (1), a
State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
authorise, subject to such conditions as may be specified in
the notification, the owners of not less than ten transport
vehicles to alter any vehicle owned by them so as to change
its engine number by replacing the engine thereof without the
approval of the registering authority.
(4) Where any alteration has been made in a motor vehicle
either with the approval of the registering authority given or
deemed to have been given under sub­section (2) or by reason
of any change in its engine number without such approval
under sub­section (3), the owner of the vehicle shall within
fourteen   days   of   the   making   of   the   alteration,   report   the
alteration   to   the   registering   authority   within   whose
jurisdiction  he  resides   and  shall  forward   the  certificate  of
registration to that authority together with the prescribed fee
in order that particulars of the alteration may be entered
therein.
(5) A registering authority other than the original registering
authority   making   any   such   entry   shall   communicate   the
details of the entry to the original registering authority.
(6)   No   person   holding   a   vehicle   under   a   hire­purchase
agreement shall make any alteration to the vehicle for which
approval of the registering authority is required under subsection (1) except with the written consent of the registered
owner.” 
(emphasis supplied)
12. Section 52 has undergone change by way of Amendment Act 27/2000.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons of Amendment Act 27/2000 is extracted
hereunder:
“Amendment   Act  27   of  2000   –   Statement   of  Objects  and
Reasons.  –   The   Motor   Vehicles   Act,   1988   consolidated   and
rationalized various laws regulating road transport. The said Act
was amended in 1994. 
2.  Further   amendments   in   the   aforesaid   Act   have   become
necessary so as to reduce the vehicular pollution and to ensure
the safety of the road users. It is, therefore, proposed to prohibit
alteration of vehicles in any manner including change of tyres of
higher capacity. However, the alteration of vehicles with a view
to facilitating the use of eco­friendly fuel including Liquefied
8
Petroleum Gas (LPG) is being permitted. Further, it is proposed
to   confer   powers   on   the   Central   Government   to   allow   the
alteration of vehicles for certain specified purposes. 
3. At present, the educational institutions are not required to
obtain permits for the operation of buses owned by them. It is
proposed to bring the buses run by these institutions within the
purview of the aforesaid Act by requiring them to obtain permits.
4.   It   is   also   proposed   to   allow   renewal   of   permits,   driving
licences and registration certificates granted under the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939 to be renewed under the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988, by inserting new section 217 – A. 
5. The proposed amendments are essential in the overall interest
of securing road safety and maintaining a clean environment.”  
(emphasis supplied)
13. It is apparent that section 52 has been amended with the purpose to
prohibit alteration of vehicles in any manner including change of tyres of higher
capacity, keeping in view road safety and protection of environment. Section 52
has been amended by virtue of Amendment Act 27/2000 in the following
manner:
 “52. Alteration in a motor vehicle. –
(1) No owner of a motor vehicle shall so alter the vehicle that the
particulars   contained   in   the   certificate   of   registration   are   at
variance with those originally specified by the manufacturer: 
     Provided that where the owner of a motor vehicle makes
modification of the engine, or any part thereof of a vehicle for
facilitating its operation by different type of fuel  or source of
energy including battery, compressed natural gas, solar power,
liquid petroleum gas or any other fuel or source of energy, by
fitment of a conversion kit, such modification shall be carried
out subject to such conditions as may be prescribed: 
    Provided further that the Central Government may prescribe
specifications   conditions   for   approval,   retrofitment   and   other
related matters for such conversion kits; 
     Provided also that the Central Government may grant an
exemption  for  alteration   of  vehicles   in   a  manner  other  than
specified above, for any specific purpose.
9
(2)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   sub­section   (1),   a
State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
authorise, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the
notifications, and  permit any person owning not less than ten
transport vehicles to alter any vehicle owned by him so as to
replace the engine  thereof with engine of the same make and
type, without the approval of registering authority.
(3)   Where   any   alteration   has   been   made   in   a   motor  vehicle
without the approval of registering authority or by reason of
replacement of its engine  without such approval under subsection
(2), the owner of the vehicle shall, within fourteen days of the
making of the alteration, report the alteration to the registering
authority within whose jurisdiction he resides and shall forward
the certificate of registration to that authority together with the
prescribed fee in order that particulars of registration may be
entered therein.
(4) A registering authority other than the original registering
authority making any such entry shall communicate the details
of the entry to the original registering authority. 
(5) Subject to the provisions made under sub­section (1), (2), (3)
and   (4),   no   person   holding   a   vehicle   under   a   hire­purchase
agreement shall make any alteration to the vehicle except with
the written consent of the registered owner.
     Explanation. ­  For the purpose of this section, “alteration”
means a change in the structure of a vehicle which results in
change in its basic feature.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. Rule 126 of the Central Rules deals with the prototype of every motor
vehicle to be subject to test. Rule 126 is extracted hereunder:
“126.     Prototype   of   every  motor   vehicle   to   be   subject   to
test.­­ On and from the date of commencement of Central Motor
Vehicles   (Amendment)   Rules,   1993,   every   [manufacturer   or
importer] of motor vehicles [including trailers, semi trailers and
modular   hydraulic   trailer]   [including   registered   association
(identified by the concerned State Transport Department) for Erickshaw wherever applicable] shall submit the prototype of the
vehicle [to be manufactured or imported by him] for test by the
Vehicle   Research   and   Development   Establishment   of   the
Ministry of Defence of the Government of India or Automotive
Research   Association   of   India,   Pune,   [or   the   Central   Farm
Machinery Testing and Training Institute, Budni (MP)], or the
Indian   Institute   of   Petroleum,   Dehradun,   [or   the   Central
Institute of Road Transport", Pune, or the International Centre
10
for Automotive Technology, Manesar,] [or the Northern Region
Farm   Machinery   Training   and   Testing   Institute,   Hissar   (for
testing of combine harvester) and such other agencies as may be
specified by the Central Government for granting a certificate by
that agency as to the compliance of provisions of the Act and
these rules:]
          [Provided   that   the   procedure   for   type   approval   and
certification of motor vehicles for compliance to these rules shall
be in accordance with the AIS:017­2000, as amended from time
to time:]
     [Provided further that in respect to the vehicles imported into
India as completely built units (CBU), the importer shall submit
a   vehicle   of   that   particular   model   and   type   to   the   testing
agencies   for   granting   a   certificate   by   that   agency   as   to   the
compliance to the provision of the Act and these rules.]
      [126A. The testing agencies referred to in rule 126 shall in
accordance   with   the   procedures   laid   down   by   the   Central
Government   also   conduct   tests   on   vehicles   drawn   from   the
production   line   of   the   manufacturer   to   verify   whether   these
vehicles conform to the provisions of [rules made under section
110 of the Act]:]
     [Provided that in case the number of vehicles sold in India for
a given base model and its variants (manufactured in India or
imported to India) are less than 250 in any consecutive period of
six months in a year, then such base model and its variants
need not be subjected to the above test, if at least one model or
its variants manufactured or imported by that manufacturer or
importer, as the case may be, is subjected to such tests at least
once in a year:
     Provided further that, in case the number of base models and
its variants manufactured/imported is more than one and if the
individual base model and its variants are less than 250 in any
consecutive period of six months in a year, then the testing
agencies can pick up one of the vehicles out of such models and
their variants once in a year for carrying out such test.] ”
 
15. Rule 93 deals with the overall dimension of motor vehicles. The Rule
prescribes the overall width, overall length, and overall height etc. Rule 93(1)
deals with overall width. Rule 93(2) with overall length. Rule 93(4) with overall
height. Rule 93(6) with overhang etc.
11
16. The relevant Rules 96, 103 and 261 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules,
1989, providing for inspection of vehicles, recording alteration and body
construction are extracted hereunder:
“96. Inspection of vehicle prior to Registration:­ (1) Inspecting
Officer.­   The   Registering   Authority   or   such   authority   as   the
Government may by order appoint shall inspect the vehicle as
required by section 44 of the Act. 
(2) Production of vehicle for inspection:­ The vehicle shall be
produced for inspection along with the required documents for
registration,   before   the   inspecting   officer,   for   comparative
scrutiny of the particulars contained in the application with the
physical features of the vehicles, and for ascertaining its fitness
for use in public place.
(3) Report of Inspecting Officer:­ The Inspecting Officer after
making   modifications   deemed   necessary   in   the   particulars
contained in the application, shall certify therein regarding the
correctness of the entries and the fitness of the vehicle:
     Provided that in the case of a transport vehicle, or for any
other   vehicle   of   which   the   body   is   not   factory­built   or   a
stereotyped   pattern   previously   approved   by   the   Registering
Authority, he shall prepare and issue a measurement certificate
in   Form   "MC"   and   a   sketch   showing   therein   the   seating
arrangements, dimensions and other relevant particulars under
Chapter   VII   of   these   rules.   The   Inspecting   Officer   shall
simultaneously   forward   a   copy   each   of   the   measurement
certificate and sketch  to the  concerned  Registering  Authority
also.
103. Recording alteration to a motor vehicle:­ (1) Ascertaining
suitability of alteration – The Registering Authority may require
inspection of the vehicle by himself or by any other Inspector of
motor vehicles to satisfy that any alteration made is suitable.
The owner of the vehicle shall, on demand, produce the vehicle
for inspection.
(2)   The   Inspecting   Officer   shall   prepare   and   issue   a   fresh
measurement certificate in Form “MC” and a sketch showing
therein the seating arrangement, dimensions etc., as found on
inspection in the following circumstances:
12
(a)  When  consequent   to  any  structural alteration  made  in   a
motor vehicle the particulars of registration noted in one or more
of items 1, 3, 11, 13 & 19 of the certificate of registration are no
longer accurate.
(b)  When consequent to any re­arrangement of loading space or
seats,   their   position   or   dimensions   are   altered   though   such
arrangement does not affect the registration particulars referred
to in clause (a) above.
       
261.     Body   construction:­   The   body   of   every   transport
vehicle shall be soundly constructed and securely fastened to
the   frame   of   the   vehicle   and   in   accordance   with   the
specifications,   if   any,   laid   down   by   the   State   or   Regional
Transport Authority.”  
(emphasis supplied)
17. The Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment has
opined that alteration is not totally prohibited. More so, in view of Rules 96 and
103 of the Kerala Rules, the Registering Authority is competent to consider
roadworthiness and safety of the vehicle and it cannot be rendered a mechanical
exercise. It is not only to verify as to whether the measurement conforms to the
prototype test etc. The Rules provide for the dimensions of the vehicle. Rule 93
is not an enabling provision to make prototype certification. Rule 47(1)(g) of
the Central Rules contemplates on road-worthiness certificate in Form 22 from
the manufacturers and in Form 22A from the bodybuilders for applying for
registration of the motor vehicles. The body can be built on a chassis in
compliance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules framed
thereunder. The manufacturer or the authorities specified under Rule 126 do not
provide for any prescription as to the dimensions or nature of the body that is to
13
be built on the chassis. The writ petitions have been allowed and orders passed
by the Registering Authorities have been quashed.
18. It was urged by Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, learned senior counsel appearing
as amicus curiae that the provisions contained in section 52 of the Act and Rule
126, as well as the Kerala Rules, have not been correctly interpreted by the High
Court. It is not permissible to make alteration under the Rules in contravention
of the provisions contained in section 52 of the Act. The provisions of the Act
and the Rules have been enacted for the purpose of safety on the roads and
environment and it is not permissible to alter the vehicle in derogation to the
provisions of the Act. He has referred to a plethora of decisions and has also
attracted the attention of this Court towards the pending Motor Vehicles
Amendment) Bill, 2017 and the extracts of 243rd Report of the Parliamentary
Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture on the Motor Vehicles
(Amendment) Bill, 2016.
19. Mr. Aman Lekhi, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on
behalf of the Ministry of Transport contended that the correct interpretation of
the amended provisions in section 52 has not been made by the High Court. He
has also attracted our attention to the Rules.
20. In Avishek Goenka (1) v. Union of India & Anr. (2012) 5 SCC 321, a
question came up for consideration with respect to Rule 100 of the Central
Rules prescribing a standard for safety. This Court held the same to be a valid
14
piece of legislation. The object of the Act also came up for consideration and the
Court observed that the legislative intent attaching due significance to the
“public safety” is evident from the Objects and Reasons of the Act. The Court
should give an interpretation of the Rules which would serve the legislative
intent and the object of framing such Rules, in preference to the one which
would defeat the very purpose of enacting the Rules as well as undermining the
public safety and interest. This Court considered the provisions contained in
section 52, Rules 92 and 100 of the Central Rules and observed thus:
“18. From the above provisions, it is clear that the Rules deal
with every minute detail of construction and maintenance of a
vehicle. In other words, the standards, sizes, and specifications
which the manufacturer of a vehicle is required to adhere to
while   manufacturing   the   vehicle   are   exhaustively   dealt   with
under   the   Rules.   What   is   permitted   has   been   specifically
provided for and what has not been specifically stated would
obviously be deemed to have been excluded from these Rules. It
would neither be permissible nor possible for the Court to read
into these statutory provisions, what is not specifically provided
for. These are the specifications which are in consonance with
the   prescribed   IS   No.   2553­Part   2   of   1992   and   nothing   is
ambiguous or uncertain.
19.   Let us take a few examples. Rule 104 requires that every
motor vehicle, other than three­wheelers and motorcycles shall
be fitted with two red reflectors, one each on both sides at their
rear.   Every   motorcycle   shall   be   fitted   with   at   least   one   red
reflector at the rear. Rule 104A provides that two white reflex in
the front of the vehicle on each side and visible to oncoming
vehicles from the front at night. 
20.  Rule 106 deals with deflections of lights and requires that
no lamp showing a light to the front shall be used on any motor
vehicle including construction equipment vehicle unless such
lamp is so constructed, fitted and maintained that the beam of
light emitted therefrom is permanently deflected downwards to
such an extent that it is not capable of dazzling any person
whose eye position is at a distance of 8 meters from the front of
15
lamp etc. Rules 119 and 120 specify the kind, size, and manner
in which the horn and silencer are to be fixed in a vehicle. 
21.  These provisions demonstrate the extent of minuteness in
the Rules and the efforts of the framers to ensure, not only the
appropriate   manner   of   construction   and   maintenance   of   the
vehicle but also the safety of other users of the road.
28. The legislative intent attaching due significance to the 'public
safety' is evident from the object and reasons of the Act, the
provisions of the Act and more particularly, the Rules framed
thereunder. Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that
Rule 100 is capable of any interpretation, then this Court should
give it an interpretation which would serve the legislative intent
and the object of framing such rules, in preference to one which
would frustrate the very purpose of enacting the Rules as well as
undermining the public safety and interest.
32. In the present case as well, even if some individual interests
are likely to suffer, such individual or private interests must give
in to the larger public interest. It is the duty of all citizens to
comply with the law. The Rules are mandatory and nobody has
the authority in law to mould these rules for the purposes of
convenience or luxury and certainly not for crime.” 
21. It has been observed that the Rules deal in minute details with the
construction and maintenance of the vehicle. Rules also deal with the safety of
other users on the road. If some individual interest is likely to suffer, such
individual interest must give way to the larger public interest.
22. Before dilating further upon the issue we take note of the decision in R.
Ramasamy v. The Secretary, Ministry of Transport, Chennai & Ors. (2009) 1
Mad.LJ 1027 wherein the Madras High Court has considered the provisions of
section 52(1)(a) as amended by Act 27/2000 and has opined thus:
“8.4 A comparison of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that
Section 32(1)(a) and (b) of the Old Act along with the proviso had
been practically re­enacted as Section 52(1)(a) and (b) of the New
Act. However, in the New Act, a second proviso was added which
16
permitted modification of the engine for facilitating its operation
by a different type of fuel. Section 32(2) of the Old Act along with
the proviso was re­enacted as Section 52(2) of the New Act. As
per Section 32(1) and 32(2) of the Old Act, corresponding to
Section   52(1)   and   52(2)   of   the   new   Act,   before   making   any
alteration,   the   owner   was   required   to   give   notice   to   the
registering   authority   and   obtain   permission.   The   registering
authority   was   required   to   communicate   its   approval   or
disapproval within seven days and if no such communication
was served within the period of seven days, approval of such
authority to the proposed alteration was deemed to have been
given. Section 32(3) of the Old Act corresponding to Section 52(3)
of the New Act, contained an enabling provision whereunder the
State   Government   could   authorize   the   owners   having   ten   or
more   transport   vehicles   to   change   its   engine   number   by
replacing such engine without the approval of the registering
authority. Section 32(4) of the Old Act corresponding to Section
52(4) of the New Act, cast a duty on the owner of the vehicle to
report the alteration made with actual or deemed approval as
contemplated under Section 32(2) of the Old Act corresponding
to Section 52(2) of the new Act or, and without approval as
contemplated under Section 32(3) of the Old Act corresponding
to Section 52(3) of the New Act "in order that particulars of the
alteration   may   be   entered   in   the   certificate   of   registration".
Section 32(5) of the Old Act corresponding to Section 52(5) of the
New Act envisaged that the registering authority making any
such entry should communicate the details of the entry to the
original   registering   authority.   Section   52(6)   of   the   New   Act
contained a new provision laying down that a person holding a
vehicle   under   a   hire   purchase   agreement   cannot   make   the
alterations contemplated in Section 52(1) of the New Act without
the written consent of the registered owner.
8.5 After amendment of Section 52 of the New Act under Act 27
of 2000, Section 52(1) has been retained as Section 52(1) with
significant   modification.   It   is   important   to   notice   that   the
provisions contained in Section 32(1)(a) & (b) of the Old Act
corresponding to Section 52(1)(a) & (b) of the New Act relating to
giving   of   notice   and   obtaining   of   approval   of   the   registering
authority have been deleted in the Amended Act. The amended
section does not contain any provision relating to giving of notice
or obtaining of approval. The first proviso to Section 52(1) of the
New Act has also been deleted and the second proviso to Section
52(1) of the New Act relating to the modification of engine has
been   re­enacted   as   the   first   proviso   to   Section   52(1)   of   the
Amended Act. Moreover, two other provisos have been added to
Section 52(1). Since the earlier provision in Section 52(1)(a) & (b)
17
of the New Act relating to the issuance of notice and approval
have been deleted. Section 52(2) of the New Act which related to
deemed approval on expiry of seven days has also been deleted
and   Section   52(3)   of   the   New   Act   has   been   renumbered   as
Section 52(2) of the Amended Act. Section 52(4) of the New Act
has been re­enacted with certain changes as Section 52(3) of the
Amended   Act   requiring   the   owner   to   report   regarding   the
alteration to the registering authority. Under Section 52(4) of the
New Act, the owner was required to report about the alteration,
made   either   with   the   approval   or   deemed   approval   of   the
registering   authority,   or  by   reason   of   replacement   of   engine,
without such approval, to the registering authority within whose
jurisdiction   he   resided   and   shall   forward   the   certificate   of
registration to that authority together with the prescribed fee "in
order that particulars of the alteration may be entered therein".
8.6 A minute examination of the provisions makes it clear that
the   expression   "particulars   of   the   alteration   may   be   entered
therein" as contained in Section 52(4) of the New Act, now reads
as "in order that particulars of the registration may be entered
therein" in the Amended Act. It is crystal clear that the word
"registration" in the Amended Act is an obvious typographical
mistake, which has been inadvertently incorporated instead of
the word "alteration". What is intended is that the particulars of
the alteration made in a vehicle should be incorporated in the
certificate of registration.
8.7 Sections 52(5) and 52(6) of the New Act, have been now reenacted   as   Sections   52(4)   and   52(5)   of   the   Amended   Act
respectively. The Amended Act, however, contains an important
explanation, which was absent in the Old Act or the New Act.
The explanation is to the effect that, for the purpose of Section
52, "alteration" means a change in the structure of a vehicle
which results in a change in its basic feature.
9. Section 52(1) of the Amended Act obviously is not very happily
worded. By altering the vehicle the particulars contained in the
certificate   of   registration   cannot   be   a   variance   with   those
specified by the manufacturers. The certificate of registration
contains some of the vital particulars of the vehicles. The real
meaning is that the particulars of alteration to be incorporated
in   the   Certificate   of   Registration   as   contemplated   in   Section
52(3) of the Amended Act are at variance with those originally
specified by the manufacturer. When the provision is read in the
light   of   the   explanation,   it   is   obvious   that   changes   or
modification which do not result in a change in basic feature
18
need not be considered as an alteration within the meaning of
Section 52 of the Amended Act.
……
11.1 A comparison of the relevant provisions contained in the
Old Act and the New Act with the provisions of the Amendment
Act clearly indicates that the Legislature has dispensed with the
requirement of obtaining permission relating to every change or
modification effected in a motor vehicle. In fact, the 1988 Act
itself   has   been   amended   in   such   a   manner   as   to   make   it
unnecessary for seeking permission to make such minor change
or modification. Moreover, every minor change or modification is
not necessarily considered as an alteration within the meaning
of Section 52 of the Amended Act. In the present case, the RTO
has   practically   applied   the   provisions,   which   were   available
before the amendment was effected in 2000, without taking note
of such amendment.”
23 It has been observed by the High Court of Madras that an alternation in
the vehicle is not permissible which may be at variance with the particulars
contained in the certificate of registration which contains vital particulars of the
vehicle and the permissible changes or modifications and which do not result in
change in the basic feature, need not be considered as alternation within the
meaning of section 52 of the Amended Act.
24. The decision in the case of K.S. Rajesh Kumar v. The Additional
Registering Authority of Kerala High Court delivered on 1.2.2010 has also been
referred to wherein the question of alteration in the vehicle came up for
consideration. The passenger vehicle was purchased as defined in section 2(17)
of the M.V. Act. The petitioner wanted to convert the same into the vehicle that
could be used as a cinema outdoor unit by fixing a generator set therein. The
Court held that the petitioner has not made any alteration to either the chassis or
19
the body of the vehicle as the manufacturer has manufactured only the chassis
of the vehicle and not its superstructure. In place of the seats meant for
passengers, the petitioner was fitting only a generator which alteration was
permissible. There was no violation of the provisions of section 52.
25. The decision in Mohd. Javeed v. Union of India & Ors. (2001) 9 ALD 88
= 2009 1 ALT 507 has also been referred by the learned amicus curiae. In the
said case chassis were changed. The Court held that the chassis is the base
frame of a motor vehicle and no doubt is an important feature of the vehicle.
Whether the change of the chassis would amount to change in the structure of
the vehicle. The replacement became necessary on account of the accident.
There was no other change in the structure of the vehicle. It was held that
section 52(3) enables the owner of the vehicle to replace the engine of the
vehicle but the factum of replacement has to be reported to the Authority within
14 days. On the same analogy, the Court held that the chassis was changed by
the manufacturer with the approval of the insurance company and the bank and
change became necessary due to the damage caused to the chassis owing to the
accident. Thus the refusal of registration was held to be bad in law and set aside.
In fact, there was no change of chassis except the replacement in the said case.
26. The decision in V.N. Dharmakrishnan v. Deputy Commissioner of
Transport, AIR 2006 Mad. 340 has also been placed for consideration. The
question arose whether a Delivery Van Goods Carrier can be altered as an
20
ambulance. The Court held it to be a clear violation of the provisions of the
M.V. Act and using goods carriage as an ambulance for which permit had
already been canceled, cannot be condoned on the ground that the 5th respondent
was rendering some free service. The decision turned on its own facts.
27. The very object of the amendment of section 52(1) by Act 27/2000 is to
prohibit alteration of a vehicle as provided including the change of tyres of
higher capacity. The amended section 52(1) has specified the extent to which
vehicle cannot be altered. A reading of the provisions makes it clear that no
vehicle can be altered in a manner where particulars in the certificate of
registration are at variance with those “originally specified by the
manufacturer”. The proviso to sub-section (1) permits modification of the
engine, or any part thereof, of a vehicle for facilitating its operation by a
different type of fuel or source of energy including battery etc., such
modification is permissible to be carried out subject to such conditions as may
be prescribed. The second proviso to section 52(1) empowers the Central
Government to prescribe specifications, conditions for approval, retro-fitment
and other related matters for such conversion kits. The Central Government has
power to grant an exemption for alteration of vehicles for any specific purpose.
Section 52(2) authorizes a State Government to issue a notification and permit
any person owning not less than 10 transport vehicles to alter any vehicle
owned by him so as to replace the ‘engine’ with an engine of the same make and
21
type, without the approval of the Registering Authority. Section 52(3) provides
that where the alteration has been made without the approval of the Registering
Authority, obviously the one which is permissible in the motor vehicle, the
owner of the vehicle has to report the same within 14 days to make an entry in
the particulars of the registration. The provisions of section 52(2), (3), (4) and
(5) have to be read harmoniously. The Explanation to section 52 says that
“alteration” means a change in the structure of a vehicle which results in a
change in its basic feature. The alterations which do not change the basic
features are outside the purview of alteration.
28. The object and the clear intent of amended section 52 is that the vehicle
cannot be so altered that the particulars contained in the certificate of
registration are at variance with those “originally specified by the
manufacturer”. The manufacturer issues sale certificate in Form 21 which has
been framed under Rule 47(1)(a) of the Central Rules. Rule 47(1)(a) is extracted
hereunder :
“47.  Application for registration of motor vehicles.­­ (1)   An
application for registration of a motor vehicle shall be made in
Form 20 to the registering authority within a period of 1[seven
days]   from   the   date   of   taking   delivery   of   such   vehicle,
excluding the period of journey and shall be accompanied by­­
(a) sale certificate in Form 21;”
29. The particulars are to be specified by the manufacturer. An application for
registration of the motor vehicle has to be filed in Form 20. It has to accompany
22
a sale certificate issued by the manufacturer or dealer etc. as the case may be as
provided in Rule 47(1)(a) and (d). Form 20 is extracted hereunder:
“APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF A MOTOR VEHICLE
(To be made in duplicate if the vehicle is held under an agreement of HirePurchase/Lease/Hypothecation and a duplicate copy with the endorsement of the Registering
Authority to be returned to the Financier simultaneously on Registration of motor vehicle)
To
The Registering Authority,
.................................
1. Full name of person to be registered as Registered
 Owner son/Wife/daughter of ............................
2. Age of person to be registered as Registered owner ...........................
3. Permanent address
(Electoral Roll/Life Insurance Policy/Passport/ Pay slip issued by any office of the Central
Government/State Government or a local body/ Any other document on documents as may be
prescribed by the State Government/Affidavit sworn before an Executive Magistrate or a First
Class Judicial Magistrate or a Notary Public to be enclosed)
 ............................
4. Temporary address/ Official address, if any ............................
5. Duration of stay at the present address ............................
6. PAN number (optional) ............................
7. Place of birth ............................
8. If place of birth is outside India, when migrated to India ...........................
9. (Omitted) . ..........................
10. Name and address of the Dealer or Manufacturer
 from whom the vehicle was purchased (sale certificate
 and certificate of roadworthiness issued by the
 manufacturer to be enclosed) …………………
11. If ex-army vehicle or imported vehicle, enclose proof.
 If Locally manufactured Trailer/Semi-trailer, enclose the
 Approval of design by the State Transport Authority and
 note the proceedings number and date of approval ............................
12. Class of vehicle (if motorcycle, whether with or without gear ............................
23
13. The motor vehicle is ............................
(a) a new vehicle, ..............
(b) ex-army vehicle, ..............
(c) imported vehicle ..............
(d) in-use E-rickshaw or E-cart ………………
14. Type of body ............................
15. Type of vehicle ............................
16. Maker's name ............................
17. Month and year of manufacture ............................
18. Number of cylinders ............................
19. Horse power ............................
20. Cubic capacity ............................
21. Maker's classification or if not known, wheel base ............................
22. Chassis No. (Affix Pencil print) ............................
23. Engine Number or Motor Number in case of
 Battery Operated Vehicles
 ............................
24. Seating capacity (including driver) ............................
25. Fuel used in the engine ...........................
26. Unladen weight ............................
27. Particulars of previous registration and registered number (if any) ............................
28. Colour or colours of body wings and front end ............................
I hereby declare that the motor vehicle has not been registered in any State in India.
ADDITIONAL PARTICULARS TO BE COMPLETED ONLY IN THE CASE OF
TRANSPORT VEHICLES OTHER THAN MOTOR CAB
29. Number, description, size and ply rating of tyres, as declared by the manufacturer
(a) Front axle = ...............................
(b) Rear axle = ................................
(c) Any other axle = .........................
24
(d) Tandem axle = ............................
30. Gross vehicle weight
(a) as certified by manufacturer ......... Kgms
(b) To be registered ......................... Kgms
31. Maximum axle weight
(a) Front axle= .................................Kgms
(b) Rear axle= .................................Kgms
(c) Any other axle=..........................Kgms
(d) Tandem axle= ...........................Kgms
32. (a) Overall length............................
(b) Overall width...............................
(c) Overall height .............................
(d) Over hang .................................
 The above particulars are to be filled in for a rigid frame motor vehicle of two or more axles
for an articulated vehicle of three or more axles or, to the extent applicable, for trailer, where a
second semi-trailer or additional semitrailer are to be registered with an articulated motor
vehicle. The following particulars are to be furnished for each such semi-trailer.
33. Type of body ………………………
34. Unladen weight ……………………...
35. Number, description and size of tyres on each axle ……………………..
36. Maximum axle weight in respect of each axle ……………………..
37. The vehicle is covered by a valid certificate of Insurance under Chapter XI of the Act

 Insurance Certificate Or Cover Note
 No .............................
 Date ........................... of ..............................
 (Name of company) Valid from .......... to .......
38. The vehicle is exempted from insurance
 The relevant order is enclosed ………………………….
25
39. I have paid the prescribed fee of Rs. .……………………….
Date.............. ……………………………….
 Signature or thumb impression of the
 person to be registered as registered owner
Note.- The motor vehicle above described is--
(i) Subject to Hire-purchase agreement/lease agreement with ...................................................
(ii) Subject to hypothecation in favour of ............................................................................
(iii) Not held under Hire-purchase agreement, or lease agreement or subject to Hypothecation
Strike out whatever is inapplicable, if the vehicle is subject to any such agreement the signature
of the Financier with whom such agreement has been entered into is to be obtained.
........................................................ ………………………………………

Signature of the financier with whom an Signature or thumb impression of the registered
 Agreement of Hire-purchase, Lease owner
 or Hypothecation has been entered into.
CERTIFICATE OF INSPECTION OF MOTOR VEHICLE
 Certified that the particulars contained in the application are true and that the vehicle
complies with the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Rules made
thereunder.
Date .............................
Ref. No..............................
 …………………………
 Signature of the Inspecting Authority
 Name.....................................
 Designation ..............................
 OFFICE ENDORSEMENT
 Office of the..............................
The above-said motor vehicle has been assigned the Registration number.................... and
registered in the name of the applicant and the vehicle is subject to an agreement of Hirepurchase/Lease/Hypothecation with the Financier referred above.
Date......................... ……………………………..
 Signature of the Registering Authority
To
26
The Financier ......................................................................................................................
 ......................................................................................................................
 (To be sent by registered post acknowledgment due)
Specimen signature or thumb-impression of the person to be registered as Registered Owner
and Financier are to be obtained in original application for affixing and attestation by the
Registering Authority with office seal in Forms 23 and 24 in such a manner that the part of
impression of seal or a stamp and attestation shall fall upon each signature.
Specimen signature of the Financier Specimen Signature of Registered Owner

1) …………………………. 1) ……………………………...
2) ………………………… 2)……………………………….”
30. Form 21 as provided in Rule 47(a) and (d) contain sale certificate issued
by the manufacturer same is extracted hereunder:
“Form 21
SALE CERTIFICATE
(To be issued by manufacturer or dealer or registered E-rickshaw or E-cart Association (in case
of E-rickshaw or E-cart) or officer of Defence Department (in case of military auctioned
vehicles) for presentation along with the application for registration of a motor vehicle).
Certified that........................................................................................................
(brand name of the vehicle) has been delivered by us to.......................................
on................................ (date)
Name of the buyer .....................................................
Son/wife/daughter of .....................................................
Address (Permanent) .....................................................
 (Temporary) .....................................................
The vehicle is held under agreement of hire-purchase/lease/hypothecation
with......................................................
The details of the vehicle are given below :
1. Class of vehicle ...................................................
27
2. Maker's name...................................................
3. Chassis No....................................................
4. [Engine number or motor number in the case of Battery Operated
Vehicles] ...................................................
5. Horsepower or cubic capacity...................................................
6. Fuel used ...................................................
7. Number of cylinders ...................................................
8. Month and year of manufacture ...................................................
9. Seating capacity (including driver) ...................................................
10. Unladen weight ……………………..
11. Maximum axle weight and number and description of tyres (in case of transport vehicle)
(a) Front axle……………….
(b) Rear axle ……………….
(c) Any other axle ………….
(d) Tandem axle ……………
12. Colour or colours of the body ………………………..
13. Gross vehicle weight ……………………………
14. Type of body ……………………………………
 [Signature of the manufacturer or dealer or Officer
 of Defence Department or registered E-rickshaw or
 E-cart Association]
*Strike out whichever is inapplicable.”
31. The certificate of registration has to be issued in Form 23 as provided in
Rule 48 of the Central Rules. Rule 48 deals with the issue of the certificate of
registration under Rule 47. Rule 48 is extracted hereunder :
“48. Issue of certificate of registration.-- On receipt of an application
under rule 47 and after verification of the documents furnished
therewith, the registering authority shall, subject to the provisions of
section 44, issue to the owner of the motor vehicle a certificate of
28
registration in Form 23 or Form 23A, as may be specified in the
Notification issued by the concerned State Government or Union
Territory Administration [within the period of thirty days from the
receipt of such an application]:
 [Provided that where the certificate of registration pertains to a
transport vehicle it shall be handed over to the registered owner only
after recording the certificate of fitness in Form 38 [within the period
of thirty days from the date of receipt of such an application].]”
32. The vehicle has to comply with the provisions of the Rules contained in
Chapter V of the Central Rules as provided in Rule 92(1). Rule 92(1) has to be
read as subservient to the provisions contained in section 52 of the Act and what
is prohibited therein to allow the same is not the intendment of the rules
contained in the Chapter. Various provisions in Chapter V are additional
safeguards to what is prohibited in section 52(1) that is to say, what has been
specified originally by the manufacturers and once that has been entered in the
particulars in the certificate of registration, cannot be varied. No vehicle can be
altered so as to change original specification made by manufacturer. Such
particulars cannot be altered which have been specified by the manufacturer for
the purpose of entry in the certificate of registration. It is provided in Rule 126
of the Central Rules, prototype of every type of vehicle is subject to test. The
provisions of Rule 126 intend for fitness of vehicle to be plied on the road by
the agencies which are specified therein. Approval and certification of motor
vehicles for compliance to these rules shall be in accordance with the AIS: 017-
2000. Rule 93 deals with overall dimensions of the motor vehicles such as
width, length, height, overhang etc. No doubt about it that the vehicle has to be
29
in conformity with the rules also but Rules cannot be so interpreted so as to
permit the alteration as prohibited under section 52(1) of the Act. The alteration
under the Rules is permissible except as prohibited by section 52. The
specification of the rules would hold good with respect to the matters as not
specifically covered under section 52(1) and not specified therein by
manufacturer. The emphasis of section 52(1) is not to vary the “original
specifications by the manufacturer”. Remaining particulars in a certificate of
registration can be modified and changed and can be noted in the certificate of
registration as provided in section 52(2), (3) and (5) and the Rules. Under
section 52(5), in case a person is holding a vehicle on a hire purchase
agreement, he shall not make any alteration except with the written consent of
the original owner.
33. In our considered opinion the Division Bench in the impugned judgment
of the High Court of Kerala has failed to give effect to the provisions contained
in section 52(1) and has emphasized only on the Rules. As such, the decision
rendered by the Division Bench cannot be said to be laying down the law
correctly. The Rules are subservient to the provisions of the Act and particulars
in certificate of registration can also be changed except to the extent of the
entries made in the same as per the specifications originally made by the
manufacturer. Circular No.7/2006 is also to be read in that spirit. Authorities to
act accordingly.
30
34. Resultantly, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and is hereby set
aside. The appeals are allowed.
………………………….J.
(Arun Mishra)
New Delhi; …………………………..J.
January 9, 2019. (Vineet Saran)