1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.20 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.18413 of 2015)
National Kamgar Union ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Kran Rader Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is filed by the appellant-Trade
Union against the final judgment and order dated
12.09.2014 passed by the High Court of Judicature
at Bombay in Writ Petition No.5241 of 2003
whereby the High Court allowed the writ petition
filed by respondent No.1-Kran Rader Pvt. Ltd. and
set aside the award dated 08.04.2003 passed by the
2
Industrial Court, Pune in a Complaint (ULP) No.544
of 1990 and, in consequence, dismissed the
complaint filed by the appellant herein.
3. In order to appreciate the short issue involved
in the appeal, it is necessary to set out few relevant
facts infra.
4. The appellant is the Trade Union registered
under the Trade Union Act, 1926 having several
members working in Factories. Respondent No.1
owned a factory (manufacturing unit) at Pune. This
Unit was originally owned by respondent Nos. 2 and
3 who, in turn, sold it to respondent No.4 in 1991
and then it was owned by respondent No.1. The
Unit was engaged in the manufacture of several
components like Traction Gears for supply to
Railways, forging for oil industries and other
manufacturing units etc. The members of the
appellant-Union were working in respondent No.1’s
factory at all relevant time.
3
5. In 1990, respondent No.1 suffered business
loss in running the said manufacturing unit and,
therefore, decided to close down the said unit
permanently. With that end in view, respondent
No.1 served a notice of closure to the State
Government (Maharashtra) under Section 25 FFA of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short, “ID Act”)
on 29.08.1990 with a copy to the appellant-Union
expressing therein their intention to close the
operation of the Unit on expiry of 60 days with effect
from 29.10.1990.
6. The appellant-Union, felt aggrieved of the
closure notice issued by respondent No.1, filed
complaint against respondent No.1 under Section
28 read with Items 9 and 10 of the Schedule IV of
the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and
Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) in the Industrial
Court at Pune in October 1990 being
Complaint(ULP) No.544/1990.
4
7. In substance, the grievance of the appellant in
their complaint was that since respondent No.1 had
employed more than 100 workers on an average per
working day for preceding 12 months in their
manufacturing unit, the provisions of Chapter VB
(Section 25-K) of the ID Act and, in turn, all the
relevant provisions contained therein were
applicable to respondent No.1. It was alleged that
due to this reason, it was obligatory upon
respondent No.1 to have ensured compliance of all
the relevant provisions applicable for closure of the
Unit. It was alleged that since admittedly the
relevant provisions applicable to closure were not
complied with by respondent No.1, a case was made
out under the ID Act read with the Act to seek a
declaration that the intended closure declared by
respondent No.1, vide their notice dated
29.08.1990, is illegal under the ID Act read with the
Act with a further grant of all consequential reliefs
to each worker arising out of grant of such
5
declaration sought by the appellant in the
Complaint in their favour.
8. Respondent No.1 (employer) filed a reply and
denied therein the allegations made by the
appellant-Union in their complaint. According to
Respondent No.1 they never employed more than
100 workers in their Unit so as to attract the rigor
of Chapter VB and other related provisions of the ID
Act to give effect to the closure. In other words,
according to respondent No.1, the strength of
workers working in their Unit was always less than
100 in number, therefore, the provisions of Chapter
VB and the related provisions of the I.D. Act had no
application to respondent No.1. It was, therefore,
contended that the decision taken by respondent
No.1 to close the Unit with effect from 29.10.1990
was legal, proper and in accordance with law and
hence could not be faulted with.
9. The parties adduced evidence
(documentary/oral) in support of their respective
6
contentions. The Industrial Court, by its award
dated 08.04.2003, allowed the appellant's
complaint. It was held that respondent No.1 had
employed 115 workers at all relevant time in their
Unit, therefore, the provisions of Chapter VB of the
ID Act were required to be followed while effecting
the closure of the Unit. It was held that since the
relevant provisions were not complied with by
respondent No.1, the closure in question was bad in
law entitling the members of the appellant-Union to
claim all consequential benefits arising therefrom as
if there was no closure of the Unit.
10. Respondent No.1 felt aggrieved and filed a writ
petition before the Bombay High Court. By
impugned judgment, the Single Judge allowed the
writ petition and while setting aside of the award of
the Industrial Court dismissed the appellant's
complaint. The High Court held that the total
strength of the workers working at all relevant time
in respondent No.1’s Unit was 99 and not 115 as
7
held by the Industrial Court. It was held that due
to this reason, it was not necessary for respondent
No.1 to ensure compliance of the provisions of
Chapter VB of the ID Act while declaring the closure
of their Unit.
11. The appellant-Union felt aggrieved and filed
the present appeal by way of special leave in this
Court.
12. Heard Mr. B.H. Marlapalle, learned senior
counsel for appellant and Mr. D.J. Bhanage and Mr.
Sanjay R. Hegde, learned senior counsel for
respondents.
13. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties at length and on perusal of the record of the
case, we find no good ground to interfere in the
impugned judgment of the High Court. In other
words, the reasoning assigned by the High Court
appears to be just and reasonable calling no
interference for the reasons mentioned hereinbelow.
8
14. The main question, which arises for
consideration in this appeal, is only one, viz., how
many workers were working in the Unit of
respondent No.1 at all relevant time, whether the
strength of the workers was above 100 or below
100. In other words, the question, which arises for
consideration, is whether the provisions of Section
25-K of Chapter VB of the ID Act were applicable to
respondent No. 1-Unit at the relevant time.
15. If the strength of the workers was above 100 at
the relevant time, in that event, the provisions of
Section 25-K were applicable to respondent No.1
whereas if the strength was below 100, in such
event, the provisions of Section 25K had no
application. In the case of former, the
appellant-Union succeeds and in the case of later,
respondent No.1 succeeds.
16. As mentioned above, the Industrial Court held
that 115 workers were found working at the
relevant time whereas the High Court held that 99
9
workers were found working in the Unit of
respondent No.1 at the relevant time.
17. There can be no dispute to the proposition that
the question as to what is the total strength of the
workers employed in the Unit or, in other words,
how many workers were working in a particular unit
is essentially a question of fact. Such question is
required to be decided by the Courts on
appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties.
18. Once the Courts record a finding on such
question, be that of concurrence or reversal, the
finding is usually held binding on this Court while
hearing the appeal under Article 136 of the
Constitution.
19. It is only when such finding is found to be
against any provision of law or evidence or is found
to be wholly perverse to the extent that no average
judicial person could ever record such finding, it
would not be held binding on the superior Court.
10
20. When the question arises as to what is the
status of a “workman”, this Court has held that it
has to be inferred as a matter of law from facts
found and if the question involved is one of drawing
a legal inference as to the status of a party from
facts found, it is not a pure question of fact. It is
held that if the inference drawn by the Tribunal in
regard to the status of the workman involved the
application of certain legal tests, it necessarily
becomes a mixed question of fact and law.
21. This Court has, however, cautioned that it
must be remembered that even if the question
raised is one of the mixed question of fact and law,
this Court would not readily interfere with the
conclusion of the Tribunal unless it is satisfied that
said conclusion is manifestly or obviously
erroneous. (See AIR 1967 SC 428)
22. With a view to examine the question from both
angels which is taken note of above, we perused the
evidence and also called upon the parties to file
11
additional evidence before this Court and it was
filed.
23. Having perused the record, we are not inclined
to interfere in the finding recorded by the High
Court though of reversal. In other words, we are
inclined to agree with the reasoning of the High
Court and accordingly hold that the total strength of
workers employed at the relevant time in
respondent No.1’s Unit was 99 and that the status
of 16 disputed employees could not be conclusively
proved to be that of a “workman” for the reasons
stated infra.
24. First, the High Court assigned the reasons as
to why the finding of the Industrial Court holding
the strength of workers as 115 is not factually and
legally sustainable. Second, the reasons assigned
are neither arbitrary nor against the record and nor
perverse to that event so as to call for any
interference by this Court. Third, in these
circumstances, this Court would be slow to
12
appreciate the entire evidence afresh on this
question in this appeal and lastly, such being a
question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact,
it is binding on this Court.
25. Inspite of this, we have gone through the
evidence with a view to find out as to whether the
High Court has committed any jurisdictional error
in reaching to its conclusion. In our view it is not.
We notice that the Industrial Court held that there
was no dispute regarding the status of 79 workers.
The dispute of status of an employee was confined
only to 36 employees, namely, whether their status
was that of the “worker” or “supervisor”. The
Industrial Court, however, held that the status of all
the 36 employees was that of “worker” and
accordingly recorded a finding that 79+36 = 115
employees were working as “worker” in the Unit at
the relevant time.
26. The High Court, however, while reversing the
aforementioned finding of the Industrial Court came
13
to a conclusion that out of 36 employees, only 20
employees could be regarded as “worker” and,
therefore, the total strength of workers at all
relevant time was 79+20 = 99. In our opinion, the
High Court rightly held that there was no cogent
evidence adduced by the appellant to prove the
status of remaining 16 employees as to whether
they also could be regarded as “worker” employed in
the Unit and, therefore, it was not possible to hold
that the total strength of the workers at the relevant
time was more than 100, i.e., 115.
27. We, while concurring with the reasoning of the
High Court, also find that since the Industrial Court
did not elaborately discuss the issue regarding the
status of 16 employees while holding the strength of
workers at 115 except clubbing 36(20+16) with 79,
the High Court was right in going into the evidence
to the extent permissible and reversed the finding of
Industrial Court. In our view, the Industrial Court
should have examined the status of each such
14
disputed employee independently for holding
whether they could also be regarded as “worker”. It
was, however, not done so.
28. Mr. B.H. Marlapalle, learned senior counsel for
the appellant-Union, strenuously argued with the
help of the entire evidence and the relevant
provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 and the
Payment of Wages Act including the statutory forms
prescribed in the two Acts for filing the details of
workers working in the Unit that the finding of the
Industrial Court appears to be more plausible and
reasonable as compared to the finding recorded by
the High Court on this question and hence the
finding of the Industrial Court deserves to be
restored.
29. We cannot accept this submission of learned
counsel for the appellant in the light of what we
have held above. In our view, the appellant, in order
to prove the status of 16 employees, did not adduce
any cogent evidence as against the evidence of the
15
respondent No.1. It is, therefore, not possible for
this Court to hold that the finding of the High Court
is wholly arbitrary or illegal or against the evidence.
We do not wish to go into this factual question any
more.
30. Learned counsel for the appellant then urged
that the High Court has committed a jurisdictional
error when it went on to re-appreciate the evidence
and then reversed the finding of the Industrial
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. In our
view, it does not appear to be so.
31. It is the duty of the High Court while
exercising the supervisory jurisdiction to see that
the subordinate Court has exercised its powers in
accordance with law and did not commit any
illegality or perversity in reaching to its conclusion.
32. While recording a finding, if it is noticed by the
High Court that the subordinate Court has failed to
take into consideration the material evidence or
recorded a finding without there being any evidence,
16
then the High Court would be entitled to interfere in
such finding in exercise of its supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.
Such is the case here.
33. In the light of foregoing discussion, we do not
consider proper to disturb the findings recorded by
the High Court which are more plausible and
reasonable rather than that of the Industrial Court.
34. In view of the foregoing discussion, we also
hold that respondent No.1 had employed 99 workers
in their manufacturing Unit at the time of declaring
the closure of the Unit in 1990. Since the strength
of workers was below 100, it was not necessary for
respondent No.1 to ensure compliance of Chapter
VB. In other words, in such circumstances, the
provisions of Section 25-K had no application to
respondent No.1.
35. This takes us to examine the next question as
to how much compensation and under which heads
17
the workers are entitled to receive from respondent
No.1 (Company).
36. Learned counsel for respondent No.1, however,
stated that out of total workers, most of the workers
have settled their claims by accepting the
compensation offered by respondent No.1
voluntarily. Learned counsel stated that the
compensation paid to each worker consisted of (i)
amount of Gratuity payable under the Payment of
Gratuity Act, (ii) closure compensation payable
under the I.D. Act, and over and above these two
statutory payments of compensation, the
respondent No.1 also paid 30 days’ wages for each
completed year of service as ex gratia payment to
each worker. It was also stated that now hardly 16
workers or so remain unpaid because they did not
accept the compensation when offered to them and
preferred to prosecute the present litigation.
18
37. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 stated
that the total compensation paid to every worker in
1990-1991 varies between Rs.1 lakh to Rs.2 lakhs.
38. Taking into consideration the aforementioned
background facts and circumstances of the case, we
consider it just and proper to award in lump sum a
compensation of Rs.2,50,000/- (Rs.Two Lakhs and
Fifty Thousand) to each worker who did not accept
the compensation.
39. Let Rs.2,50,000/- (Rs.Two Lakhs and Fifty
Thousand) be paid to each such worker after
making proper verification. If any worker is not
available for any reason, the amount payable to
such worker be paid to his legal representatives or
nearest relatives, as the case may be, after making
proper verification.
40. Respondent No.1 will, accordingly, deposit the
entire compensation payable to all such workers
with details in the Industrial Court, Pune. A notice
will then be served to each worker or his legal
19
representatives, as the case may be, by the
Industrial Court to enable the workers to withdraw
the amount from the Industrial Court.
41. The amount will be paid to every worker or his
nominee as the case may be by the demand draft
issued in his/her name or in the name of legal
representatives, as the case may be. It will be duly
deposited in his/her Bank account to enable
him/her to withdraw the same.
42. The appellant would submit necessary details
of each such worker before the Industrial Court.
The Industrial Court would ensure compliance of
the directions of this Court and complete all
formalities within three months from the date of this
order.
43. We make it clear that this order is applicable
only to those workers who did not accept the
compensation from respondent No.1.
20
44. In other words, those workers who already
accepted the compensation will not be entitled to get
any benefit of this order.
45. With these directions, the appeal stands
disposed of finally.
………...................................J.
[R.K. AGRAWAL]
…...……..................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi;
January 5, 2018
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.20 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.18413 of 2015)
National Kamgar Union ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Kran Rader Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is filed by the appellant-Trade
Union against the final judgment and order dated
12.09.2014 passed by the High Court of Judicature
at Bombay in Writ Petition No.5241 of 2003
whereby the High Court allowed the writ petition
filed by respondent No.1-Kran Rader Pvt. Ltd. and
set aside the award dated 08.04.2003 passed by the
2
Industrial Court, Pune in a Complaint (ULP) No.544
of 1990 and, in consequence, dismissed the
complaint filed by the appellant herein.
3. In order to appreciate the short issue involved
in the appeal, it is necessary to set out few relevant
facts infra.
4. The appellant is the Trade Union registered
under the Trade Union Act, 1926 having several
members working in Factories. Respondent No.1
owned a factory (manufacturing unit) at Pune. This
Unit was originally owned by respondent Nos. 2 and
3 who, in turn, sold it to respondent No.4 in 1991
and then it was owned by respondent No.1. The
Unit was engaged in the manufacture of several
components like Traction Gears for supply to
Railways, forging for oil industries and other
manufacturing units etc. The members of the
appellant-Union were working in respondent No.1’s
factory at all relevant time.
3
5. In 1990, respondent No.1 suffered business
loss in running the said manufacturing unit and,
therefore, decided to close down the said unit
permanently. With that end in view, respondent
No.1 served a notice of closure to the State
Government (Maharashtra) under Section 25 FFA of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short, “ID Act”)
on 29.08.1990 with a copy to the appellant-Union
expressing therein their intention to close the
operation of the Unit on expiry of 60 days with effect
from 29.10.1990.
6. The appellant-Union, felt aggrieved of the
closure notice issued by respondent No.1, filed
complaint against respondent No.1 under Section
28 read with Items 9 and 10 of the Schedule IV of
the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and
Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) in the Industrial
Court at Pune in October 1990 being
Complaint(ULP) No.544/1990.
4
7. In substance, the grievance of the appellant in
their complaint was that since respondent No.1 had
employed more than 100 workers on an average per
working day for preceding 12 months in their
manufacturing unit, the provisions of Chapter VB
(Section 25-K) of the ID Act and, in turn, all the
relevant provisions contained therein were
applicable to respondent No.1. It was alleged that
due to this reason, it was obligatory upon
respondent No.1 to have ensured compliance of all
the relevant provisions applicable for closure of the
Unit. It was alleged that since admittedly the
relevant provisions applicable to closure were not
complied with by respondent No.1, a case was made
out under the ID Act read with the Act to seek a
declaration that the intended closure declared by
respondent No.1, vide their notice dated
29.08.1990, is illegal under the ID Act read with the
Act with a further grant of all consequential reliefs
to each worker arising out of grant of such
5
declaration sought by the appellant in the
Complaint in their favour.
8. Respondent No.1 (employer) filed a reply and
denied therein the allegations made by the
appellant-Union in their complaint. According to
Respondent No.1 they never employed more than
100 workers in their Unit so as to attract the rigor
of Chapter VB and other related provisions of the ID
Act to give effect to the closure. In other words,
according to respondent No.1, the strength of
workers working in their Unit was always less than
100 in number, therefore, the provisions of Chapter
VB and the related provisions of the I.D. Act had no
application to respondent No.1. It was, therefore,
contended that the decision taken by respondent
No.1 to close the Unit with effect from 29.10.1990
was legal, proper and in accordance with law and
hence could not be faulted with.
9. The parties adduced evidence
(documentary/oral) in support of their respective
6
contentions. The Industrial Court, by its award
dated 08.04.2003, allowed the appellant's
complaint. It was held that respondent No.1 had
employed 115 workers at all relevant time in their
Unit, therefore, the provisions of Chapter VB of the
ID Act were required to be followed while effecting
the closure of the Unit. It was held that since the
relevant provisions were not complied with by
respondent No.1, the closure in question was bad in
law entitling the members of the appellant-Union to
claim all consequential benefits arising therefrom as
if there was no closure of the Unit.
10. Respondent No.1 felt aggrieved and filed a writ
petition before the Bombay High Court. By
impugned judgment, the Single Judge allowed the
writ petition and while setting aside of the award of
the Industrial Court dismissed the appellant's
complaint. The High Court held that the total
strength of the workers working at all relevant time
in respondent No.1’s Unit was 99 and not 115 as
7
held by the Industrial Court. It was held that due
to this reason, it was not necessary for respondent
No.1 to ensure compliance of the provisions of
Chapter VB of the ID Act while declaring the closure
of their Unit.
11. The appellant-Union felt aggrieved and filed
the present appeal by way of special leave in this
Court.
12. Heard Mr. B.H. Marlapalle, learned senior
counsel for appellant and Mr. D.J. Bhanage and Mr.
Sanjay R. Hegde, learned senior counsel for
respondents.
13. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties at length and on perusal of the record of the
case, we find no good ground to interfere in the
impugned judgment of the High Court. In other
words, the reasoning assigned by the High Court
appears to be just and reasonable calling no
interference for the reasons mentioned hereinbelow.
8
14. The main question, which arises for
consideration in this appeal, is only one, viz., how
many workers were working in the Unit of
respondent No.1 at all relevant time, whether the
strength of the workers was above 100 or below
100. In other words, the question, which arises for
consideration, is whether the provisions of Section
25-K of Chapter VB of the ID Act were applicable to
respondent No. 1-Unit at the relevant time.
15. If the strength of the workers was above 100 at
the relevant time, in that event, the provisions of
Section 25-K were applicable to respondent No.1
whereas if the strength was below 100, in such
event, the provisions of Section 25K had no
application. In the case of former, the
appellant-Union succeeds and in the case of later,
respondent No.1 succeeds.
16. As mentioned above, the Industrial Court held
that 115 workers were found working at the
relevant time whereas the High Court held that 99
9
workers were found working in the Unit of
respondent No.1 at the relevant time.
17. There can be no dispute to the proposition that
the question as to what is the total strength of the
workers employed in the Unit or, in other words,
how many workers were working in a particular unit
is essentially a question of fact. Such question is
required to be decided by the Courts on
appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties.
18. Once the Courts record a finding on such
question, be that of concurrence or reversal, the
finding is usually held binding on this Court while
hearing the appeal under Article 136 of the
Constitution.
19. It is only when such finding is found to be
against any provision of law or evidence or is found
to be wholly perverse to the extent that no average
judicial person could ever record such finding, it
would not be held binding on the superior Court.
10
20. When the question arises as to what is the
status of a “workman”, this Court has held that it
has to be inferred as a matter of law from facts
found and if the question involved is one of drawing
a legal inference as to the status of a party from
facts found, it is not a pure question of fact. It is
held that if the inference drawn by the Tribunal in
regard to the status of the workman involved the
application of certain legal tests, it necessarily
becomes a mixed question of fact and law.
21. This Court has, however, cautioned that it
must be remembered that even if the question
raised is one of the mixed question of fact and law,
this Court would not readily interfere with the
conclusion of the Tribunal unless it is satisfied that
said conclusion is manifestly or obviously
erroneous. (See AIR 1967 SC 428)
22. With a view to examine the question from both
angels which is taken note of above, we perused the
evidence and also called upon the parties to file
11
additional evidence before this Court and it was
filed.
23. Having perused the record, we are not inclined
to interfere in the finding recorded by the High
Court though of reversal. In other words, we are
inclined to agree with the reasoning of the High
Court and accordingly hold that the total strength of
workers employed at the relevant time in
respondent No.1’s Unit was 99 and that the status
of 16 disputed employees could not be conclusively
proved to be that of a “workman” for the reasons
stated infra.
24. First, the High Court assigned the reasons as
to why the finding of the Industrial Court holding
the strength of workers as 115 is not factually and
legally sustainable. Second, the reasons assigned
are neither arbitrary nor against the record and nor
perverse to that event so as to call for any
interference by this Court. Third, in these
circumstances, this Court would be slow to
12
appreciate the entire evidence afresh on this
question in this appeal and lastly, such being a
question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact,
it is binding on this Court.
25. Inspite of this, we have gone through the
evidence with a view to find out as to whether the
High Court has committed any jurisdictional error
in reaching to its conclusion. In our view it is not.
We notice that the Industrial Court held that there
was no dispute regarding the status of 79 workers.
The dispute of status of an employee was confined
only to 36 employees, namely, whether their status
was that of the “worker” or “supervisor”. The
Industrial Court, however, held that the status of all
the 36 employees was that of “worker” and
accordingly recorded a finding that 79+36 = 115
employees were working as “worker” in the Unit at
the relevant time.
26. The High Court, however, while reversing the
aforementioned finding of the Industrial Court came
13
to a conclusion that out of 36 employees, only 20
employees could be regarded as “worker” and,
therefore, the total strength of workers at all
relevant time was 79+20 = 99. In our opinion, the
High Court rightly held that there was no cogent
evidence adduced by the appellant to prove the
status of remaining 16 employees as to whether
they also could be regarded as “worker” employed in
the Unit and, therefore, it was not possible to hold
that the total strength of the workers at the relevant
time was more than 100, i.e., 115.
27. We, while concurring with the reasoning of the
High Court, also find that since the Industrial Court
did not elaborately discuss the issue regarding the
status of 16 employees while holding the strength of
workers at 115 except clubbing 36(20+16) with 79,
the High Court was right in going into the evidence
to the extent permissible and reversed the finding of
Industrial Court. In our view, the Industrial Court
should have examined the status of each such
14
disputed employee independently for holding
whether they could also be regarded as “worker”. It
was, however, not done so.
28. Mr. B.H. Marlapalle, learned senior counsel for
the appellant-Union, strenuously argued with the
help of the entire evidence and the relevant
provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 and the
Payment of Wages Act including the statutory forms
prescribed in the two Acts for filing the details of
workers working in the Unit that the finding of the
Industrial Court appears to be more plausible and
reasonable as compared to the finding recorded by
the High Court on this question and hence the
finding of the Industrial Court deserves to be
restored.
29. We cannot accept this submission of learned
counsel for the appellant in the light of what we
have held above. In our view, the appellant, in order
to prove the status of 16 employees, did not adduce
any cogent evidence as against the evidence of the
15
respondent No.1. It is, therefore, not possible for
this Court to hold that the finding of the High Court
is wholly arbitrary or illegal or against the evidence.
We do not wish to go into this factual question any
more.
30. Learned counsel for the appellant then urged
that the High Court has committed a jurisdictional
error when it went on to re-appreciate the evidence
and then reversed the finding of the Industrial
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. In our
view, it does not appear to be so.
31. It is the duty of the High Court while
exercising the supervisory jurisdiction to see that
the subordinate Court has exercised its powers in
accordance with law and did not commit any
illegality or perversity in reaching to its conclusion.
32. While recording a finding, if it is noticed by the
High Court that the subordinate Court has failed to
take into consideration the material evidence or
recorded a finding without there being any evidence,
16
then the High Court would be entitled to interfere in
such finding in exercise of its supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.
Such is the case here.
33. In the light of foregoing discussion, we do not
consider proper to disturb the findings recorded by
the High Court which are more plausible and
reasonable rather than that of the Industrial Court.
34. In view of the foregoing discussion, we also
hold that respondent No.1 had employed 99 workers
in their manufacturing Unit at the time of declaring
the closure of the Unit in 1990. Since the strength
of workers was below 100, it was not necessary for
respondent No.1 to ensure compliance of Chapter
VB. In other words, in such circumstances, the
provisions of Section 25-K had no application to
respondent No.1.
35. This takes us to examine the next question as
to how much compensation and under which heads
17
the workers are entitled to receive from respondent
No.1 (Company).
36. Learned counsel for respondent No.1, however,
stated that out of total workers, most of the workers
have settled their claims by accepting the
compensation offered by respondent No.1
voluntarily. Learned counsel stated that the
compensation paid to each worker consisted of (i)
amount of Gratuity payable under the Payment of
Gratuity Act, (ii) closure compensation payable
under the I.D. Act, and over and above these two
statutory payments of compensation, the
respondent No.1 also paid 30 days’ wages for each
completed year of service as ex gratia payment to
each worker. It was also stated that now hardly 16
workers or so remain unpaid because they did not
accept the compensation when offered to them and
preferred to prosecute the present litigation.
18
37. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 stated
that the total compensation paid to every worker in
1990-1991 varies between Rs.1 lakh to Rs.2 lakhs.
38. Taking into consideration the aforementioned
background facts and circumstances of the case, we
consider it just and proper to award in lump sum a
compensation of Rs.2,50,000/- (Rs.Two Lakhs and
Fifty Thousand) to each worker who did not accept
the compensation.
39. Let Rs.2,50,000/- (Rs.Two Lakhs and Fifty
Thousand) be paid to each such worker after
making proper verification. If any worker is not
available for any reason, the amount payable to
such worker be paid to his legal representatives or
nearest relatives, as the case may be, after making
proper verification.
40. Respondent No.1 will, accordingly, deposit the
entire compensation payable to all such workers
with details in the Industrial Court, Pune. A notice
will then be served to each worker or his legal
19
representatives, as the case may be, by the
Industrial Court to enable the workers to withdraw
the amount from the Industrial Court.
41. The amount will be paid to every worker or his
nominee as the case may be by the demand draft
issued in his/her name or in the name of legal
representatives, as the case may be. It will be duly
deposited in his/her Bank account to enable
him/her to withdraw the same.
42. The appellant would submit necessary details
of each such worker before the Industrial Court.
The Industrial Court would ensure compliance of
the directions of this Court and complete all
formalities within three months from the date of this
order.
43. We make it clear that this order is applicable
only to those workers who did not accept the
compensation from respondent No.1.
20
44. In other words, those workers who already
accepted the compensation will not be entitled to get
any benefit of this order.
45. With these directions, the appeal stands
disposed of finally.
………...................................J.
[R.K. AGRAWAL]
…...……..................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi;
January 5, 2018
