exparte decree obtained by paper publication - appeal allowed by High court - confirmed by Apex court = neither the report of the bailiff nor the order of the Trial Court indicate that a copy of the summons was affixed in a conspicuous place on the court house and at the house where the defendant was known to have last resided. The High Court held that there was a breach of the provisions of Order V Rule 20 (1) of the CPC. The High Court observed that the order of the Trial Court permitting substituted service was cryptic and that the Court had not recorded its satisfaction that the defendant was keeping out of the way to avoid service or that the summons could not be served in the ordinary manner for any other reason. - “An appeal against an ex parte decree in terms of Section 96(2) of the Code could be filed on the following grounds: (i) the materials on record brought on record in the ex parte proceedings in the suit by the plaintiff would not entail a decree in his favour; and (ii) the suit could not have been posted for ex parte hearing.” A defendant against whom an ex-parte decree is passed has two options: The first is to file an appeal. The second is to file an application under Order IX Rule = The defendant can take recourse to both the proceedings simultaneously. The right of appeal is not taken away by filing an application under Order IX Rule 13. But if the appeal is dismissed as a result of which the ex-parte decree merges with the order of the Appellate Court, a petition under Order IX Rule 13 would not be maintainable. When an application under Order IX Rule 13 is dismissed, the remedy of the defendant is under Order XLIII Rule 1. However, once such an appeal is dismissed, the same contention cannot be raised in a first appeal under Section 96. The three Judge bench decision in Bhanu Kumar Jain has been followed by another bench of three Judges in Rabindra Singh v Financial Commissioner, Cooperation, Punjab2 and by a two Judge bench in Mahesh Yadav v Rajeshwar Singh3 . In the present case, the original defendant chose a remedy of first appeal under Section 96 and was able to establish before the High Court, adequate grounds for setting aside the judgment and decree.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO 71 OF 2018
[Arising out of SLP(C) No.5847 of 2017]
M/S NEERJA REALTORS PVT LTD ..Appellant
VERSUS
JANGLU (DEAD) THR. LR. ..Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
1 Delay condoned.
2 The present appeal is from the judgment of a Single Judge at the
Nagpur Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. While allowing
a first appeal, the High Court set aside the judgment and order of the Civil
Judge (Senior Division) at Nagpur which had decreed a suit for specific
performance instituted by the appellant, ex-parte.
3 The subject matter of the suit for specific performance is an agreement
dated 15 July 2006 entered into by the appellant with the original defendant in
REPORTABLE
2
respect of agricultural land admeasuring 1.66 Hectares (4.07 acres) situated in
Mauza-Sondapar, Tahsil Hingna, District Nagpur. The total consideration
payable under the agreement was Rs 13,04,391 out of which an amount of Rs
3,26,000 was recorded to have been paid. The balance of Rs 9,78,391 was to
be paid at the time of the execution of the sale deed.
4 On 30 June 2007, Shobha, who is the daughter of the original respondent
instituted a suit (Old Regular Suit No 726/2007 which was renumbered as
Regular Suit No 269/2008) against her father and the appellant for partition,
possession and for declaratory and injunctive reliefs in relation to the land. In
that suit the plaintiff claimed that her father was in dire financial need and had
obtained a loan from the appellant and that as security, the appellant got certain
documents executed. According to the plaintiff, the agreement was vitiated by
fraud and misrepresentation and the land being ancestral property, the
agreement was not binding on her. The original defendant entered appearance
and disclosed his residential address in a proceeding under Order VIII Rule 11
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘the CPC’). The appellant also filed her
written statement. The suit was dismissed on 8 July 2010 on the ground that
the land belonged to the original defendant and that the plaintiff had no right,
title and interest.
5 On 5 February 2011, the appellant filed a suit for specific performance
(Suit 184 of 2011) of the agreement to sell dated 15 July 2006. On 9 February
3
2011, the Trial Court issued notice to the original defendant for settlement of
issues. It appears that summons were issued on two occasions to the original
defendant but were returned unserved. On 11 April 2011, the bailiff submitted
a report stating that when he went to serve the defendant, he was informed by
persons residing in the village that he had left the premises two years earlier
and was residing elsewhere. The summons were returned since the defendant
was not residing at the address given therein.
6 The appellant filed an application for substituted service under Order V
Rule 20 (1-A) of the CPC on 2 September 2011. The Trial Court allowed the
application on the same day in terms of the following order:
“Issue S/S to deft. u/o 5 R 29 (1-A) of CPC at the expense of the
Plaintiff.”
7 The appellant claims to have effected substituted service by publication
in the Marathi daily Lokmat. On 29 November 2011, the Trial Court passed the
following order:
“Deft. served on public notice in daily news paper Lokmat on
04.10.2011 but he remained absent. Suit proceeded ex parte
against the defendant. Suit proceeded ex parte against the Deft.”
8 The suit was decreed on 13 June 2014 and the appellant was directed to
deposit the balance consideration of Rs 9,78,391 within one month.
4
9 The appellant claims to have deposited the amount on 17 July 2014.
10 On 12 September 2014, the original defendant filed a first appeal under
Section 96 of the CPC before the High Court. He died on 21 August 2015. The
appellant submitted an application for bringing his legal representatives on
record. The application was eventually allowed on 23 September 2016.
11 The High Court by its judgment dated 7 July 2015 held that neither the
report of the bailiff nor the order of the Trial Court indicate that a copy of the
summons was affixed in a conspicuous place on the court house and at the
house where the defendant was known to have last resided. The High Court
held that there was a breach of the provisions of Order V Rule 20 (1) of the
CPC. The High Court observed that the order of the Trial Court permitting
substituted service was cryptic and that the Court had not recorded its
satisfaction that the defendant was keeping out of the way to avoid service or
that the summons could not be served in the ordinary manner for any other
reason. Moreover, the serving officer had not followed the procedure stipulated
in Order V Rule 17 where the defendant was not found to reside at the place
where he was last residing. The Court noted that besides the service to be
effected through the bailiff, the summons were not sent to the defendant at the
address furnished by the plaintiff by registered post, with acknowledgment due.
The High Court also found that the Trial Judge had ignored the provisions of
5
Chapter III of the Civil Manual issued by the High Court on the Appellate side
for guidance of Civil Courts and officers subordinate to it.
12 On behalf of the appellant, it has been submitted that the High Court has
misconstrued the provisions of Order V Rule 20. According to the appellant,
Order V Rule 20 allows an option to either affix the notice at the court premises
coupled with affixation at the home of the defendant or by any other mode
including publication in a newspaper. In the present case, service of summons
was effected on the original defendant by publication in the newspaper on 4
October 2011. Hence, it was urged that there was no further requirement to
affix the summons at the court premises and at the house of the original
defendant. Moreover, it was urged that the order of the Trial Court was not
cryptic and the report of the bailiff clearly indicated that the original defendant
was not residing at the address submitted by the appellant because of which
the summons were returned.
13 On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent urged that the
findings of the High Court in the first appeal are borne out from the record and
are in accordance with law. Hence no interference is warranted in the present
proceedings.
14 The record before the Court would indicate that the Trial Court by its order
dated 9 February 2011 directed the issuance of summons to the original
6
defendant, returnable on 15 March 2011. In pursuance of the order, summons
were issued on 4 March 2011. The report of the bailiff dated 11 April 2011
indicates that the summons were returned unserved and the bailiff was
informed that the original defendant had left the premises nearly two years
earlier and resided elsewhere.
15 Order V Rules 17 provides as follows:
“17. Procedure when defendant refuses to accept service, or cannot be
found.- Where the defendant or his agent or such other person as
aforesaid refuses to sign the acknowledgment, or where the serving
officer, after using all due and reasonable diligence, cannot find the
defendant, who is absent from his residence at the time when service is
sought to be effected on him at his residence and there is no likelihood
of his being found at the residence within a reasonable time and there is
no agent empowered to accept service of the summons on his behalf, nor
any other person on whom service can be made, the serving officer shall
affix a copy of the summons on the outer door or some other conspicuous
part of the house in which the defendant ordinarily resides or carries on
business or personally works for gain, and shall then return the original
to the court from which it was issued, with a report endorsed thereon or
annexed thereto stating that he has so affixed the copy, the
circumstances under which he did so, and the name and address of the
person (if any) by whom the house was identified and ‘whose presence
the copy was affixed.”
Evidently as the report of the bailiff indicates, he was unable to find the
defendant at the address which was mentioned in the summons. The report of
the bailiff does not indicate that the summons were affixed on a conspicuous
part of the house, at the address mentioned in the summons. There was a
breach of the provisions of Order V Rule 17. When the application for
substituted service was filed before the Trial Court under Order V Rule 20, a
7
cryptic order was passed on 2 September 2011. Order V Rule 20 requires the
Court to be satisfied either that there is reason to believe that the defendant is
keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service or that for any other
reason, the summons cannot be served in the ordinary way. Substituted
service is an exception to the normal mode of service. The Court must apply its
mind to the requirements of Order V Rule 20 and its order must indicate due
consideration of the provisions contained in it. Evidently the Trial Court failed to
apply its mind to the requirements of Order V Rule 20 and passed a mechanical
order. Besides this, as observed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court,
the Trial Judge ignored the provisions contained in Chapter III of the Civil
Manual issued by the High Court on its appellate side for the guidance of civil
courts and officers subordinate to it. Paragraphs 33 to 36 of Chapter III are
extracted below:
“33. In addition to the service to be effected through a bailiff, a
summons may also be sent to the defendant, to the address given
by the plaintiff, by registered post, prepaid for acknowledgement,
provided there is a regular daily postal service at such place.
34. Rules as to service of summons are contained in rules 9 to 30
of Order V. Care should be taken to see that bailiffs follow those
rules as well as the instructions given in the Bailiffs’ Manual.
35. It is the duty of the serving officer to follow the procedure and
take all the steps laid down in rule 17 of Order V. He has no
discretion for not taking the necessary steps, when the conditions
laid down in the said rule are fulfilled.
36. It is for the Court to determine whether the service is good or
bad. In determining whether the service is good or not, the attention
of Courts is drawn to the necessity of strictly following the provisions
of the Civil Procedure Code as to the service of processes.
Ordinarily, service should not be considered sufficient unless all the
requirements of the law in that behalf are fulfilled. The object of the
service is to inform a party of the proceedings in due time. When
8
from the return of a serving officer it appears that there is no
likelihood that a process will come to the knowledge of the party in
due time, or a probability exists that it will not so come to his
knowledge, the service should not be considered to be proper. The
law contemplates that the primary method of service should be
tendering or delivering a copy of the process to the party personally,
in case in which it may be practicable to do so. It is the duty of the
serving officer to make all proper efforts to find the party, with a view
to effect personal service. If it be not possible after reasonable
endeavour to find the party, then only the service may be made on
an adult male member of the family residing with him.”
The submission that under Order V Rule 20, it was not necessary to affix a copy
of the summons at the court house and at the house where the defendant is
known to have last resided, once the court had directed service by publication
in the newspaper really begs the question. There was a clear breach of the
procedure prescribed in Order V Rule 17 even antecedent thereto. Besides, the
order of the Court does not indicate due application of mind to the requirement
of the satisfaction prescribed in the provision. The High Court was, in these
circumstances, justified in coming to the conclusion that the ex-parte judgment
and order in the suit for specific performance was liable to be set aside.
16 In Bhanu Kumar Jain v Archana Kumar1
, a Bench of three Judges of
this Court has held that :
“An appeal against an ex parte decree in terms of Section 96(2) of
the Code could be filed on the following grounds:
(i) the materials on record brought on record in the ex parte
proceedings in the suit by the plaintiff would not entail a
decree in his favour; and

1
(2005) 1 SCC 787
9
(ii) the suit could not have been posted for ex parte hearing.”
A defendant against whom an ex-parte decree is passed has two options: The
first is to file an appeal. The second is to file an application under Order IX Rule
13. The defendant can take recourse to both the proceedings simultaneously.
The right of appeal is not taken away by filing an application under Order IX
Rule 13. But if the appeal is dismissed as a result of which the ex-parte decree
merges with the order of the Appellate Court, a petition under Order IX Rule 13
would not be maintainable. When an application under Order IX Rule 13 is
dismissed, the remedy of the defendant is under Order XLIII Rule 1. However,
once such an appeal is dismissed, the same contention cannot be raised in a
first appeal under Section 96. The three Judge bench decision in Bhanu
Kumar Jain has been followed by another bench of three Judges in Rabindra
Singh v Financial Commissioner, Cooperation, Punjab2 and by a two Judge
bench in Mahesh Yadav v Rajeshwar Singh3
. In the present case, the original
defendant chose a remedy of first appeal under Section 96 and was able to
establish before the High Court, adequate grounds for setting aside the
judgment and decree.

2
(2008) 7 SCC 663
3
(2009) 2 SCC 205
10
17 For the above reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment
and order of the High Court. The appeal accordingly stands dismissed. There
shall be no order as to costs.
...........................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]
 ...........................................J
 [A M KHANWILKAR]
 ...........................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi;
January 29, 2018

amendment of plaint - after 9 years of the suit - trial not commenced - allowed = suit for specific performance - After a period of about nine years - to add compensation in case specific performance was not allowed, and a figure of Rs. 50,00,000/- plus Rs. 15,00,00,000/- for mental agony etc. was claimed in the proposed amendment. - Both the Bombay City Civil Court as well as the High Court have dismissed the amendment filed on the ground that there was no reason as to why such amendment was not made earlier, and as to why it was not claimed in the original plaint. = After the judgment of this Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. vs. Union of India, (2003) 1 SCC 49 / (2005) 6 SCC 344 it is difficult to say that an amendment, which is otherwise innocuous and does not fall foul of any of the well settled parameters of disallowing amendments, should not be allowed, and, if necessary, on payment of costs. We feel that the amendment should, therefore, be allowed. We have also been informed that evidence has yet to be taken.

1
ITEM NO.5               COURT NO.12               SECTION IX
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s)   for   Special   Leave   to   Appeal   (C)   No(s).
25471-25472/2015
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  23-03-2015
in   RP   No.   31/2015   31-10-2014   in   WP   No.   8750/2014   23-03-2015   in   WP
No. 8750/2014 passed by the High Court Of Judicature At Bombay)
NARAIN HINGORANI & ANR                              Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
HARISH KISHINCHAND CHANDNANI                        Respondent(s)
WITH
SLP(C) No. 25360-25361/2015 (IX)
Date : 22-01-2018 These petitions were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Adv.
                   Mr. Jatin Zaveri, AOR
Mr. Neel Kamal Mishra, Adv.                 
For Respondent(s)
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
Nobody appears on behalf of the respondent, through served.
A   suit   for   specific   performance   was   filed   on   30.04.2004.
After a period of about nine years, a Chamber Summons was moved on
03.05.2013 to add compensation in case specific performance was not
allowed,   and   a   figure   of   Rs.   50,00,000/-   plus   Rs.   15,00,00,000/-
for mental agony etc. was claimed in the proposed amendment. 
Both   the   Bombay   City   Civil   Court   as   well   as   the   High   Court
have dismissed the amendment filed on the ground that there was no
reason as to why such amendment was not made earlier, and as to why
it was not claimed in the original plaint.

2
After   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   Salem   Advocate   Bar
Association,   T.N.   vs.   Union   of   India,   (2003)   1   SCC   49   /   (2005)   6
SCC   344   it   is   difficult   to   say   that   an   amendment,   which   is
otherwise   innocuous   and   does   not   fall   foul   of   any   of   the   well
settled   parameters   of   disallowing   amendments,   should   not   be
allowed, and, if necessary, on payment of costs.
We feel that the amendment should, therefore, be allowed.   We
have also been informed that evidence has yet to be taken.
In   this   view   of   the   matter,   we   allow   the   plaintiff   to   amend
the   plaint   in   accordance   with   the   Chamber   Summons   moved,   but   on
payment of costs of Rs.10,000/-.
The Special Leave Petitions are disposed of accordingly.
(R. NATARAJAN)                                  (SAROJ KUMARI GAUR)
COURT MASTER (SH)                                  COURT MASTER 

Divorce – on amicable settlement of parties – lived separately from 2013 - Divorce - transfer petition - the parties appear before the Supreme Court Mediation Centre on 13.5.2017. -The learned Mediator has recorded the settlement, which has been arrived at between the parties. - The settlement agreement reads as follows:- Because of disputes and differences both the parties started residing separately since June, 2013. - the parties have resolved all the dispute amicably in relation to the marriage and have been left with no claims against each other whatsoever or their respective family members. - We have perused the settlement agreement. Accepting the said settlement, we direct that the parties shall abide by the terms and conditions incorporated in the settlement agreement. - In the course of hearing, learned counsel for the parties submitted that this Court may grant divorce. - In view of the aforesaid, we think it appropriate to direct that the marriage between the parties stands dissolved on consent. - We appreciate the efforts made by the learned Mediator to convince the parties and make them arrive at the settlement.

TP(C) 106/2017
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 106/2017
KAVI SHARMA @ KAVITA SHARMA                  Petitioner
                                VERSUS
SAURABH SHUBHAM                              Respondent
O R D E R
This Court vide order dated 18.4.2017 had directed
the   parties   to   appear   before   the   Supreme   Court   Mediation
Centre   on   13.5.2017.     Thereafter,   they   appeared   and   the
mediation   proceedings   continued.     The   learned   Mediator   has
recorded   the   settlement,   which   has   been   arrived   at   between
the parties.  The settlement agreement reads as follows:-
�SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
This   Settlement   Agreement   is   entered   into
between   petitioner-wife,   Ms.   Kavi   Sharma   @   Kavita
Sharma,   D/o   Shri   Moti   Lal   Sharma,   R/o   Surajgarh,
P.O.   &   P.S.   Surajgarh,   Distt.   Jhunjhnoo,
Rajasthan,   presently   at   Flat   No.   65,   Mahipath
Jujarki,   Jaipur,   Distt.   Jaipur,   Rajasthan   and
respondent-husband, Mr. Saurabh Shubham, S/o Prof.
Sudesh   Mehta,   R/o   Bye   Pass   Road,   near   Kashi
Nagari,   P.O.   Sudna,   P.S.   Daltonganj,   Distt.
Palamau, Jharkhand.
The   marriage   between   the   petitioner-wife   and
the respondent-husband was solemnized as per Hindu
rites   and   customs   on   17.1.2006   at   Jaipur,
Rajasthan.     Because   of   disputes   and   differences
both the parties started residing separately since
June, 2013.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its order dated
18.4.2017   was   pleased   to   refer   the   matter   to   the
Supreme Court Mediation centre.

TP(C) 106/2017
2
Comprehensive   mediation   sessions   were   held
with   the   parties   separately   and   jointly   in
presence   of   their   respective   counsels   on
13.5.2017,   25.5.2017,   9.6.2017   and   today   i.e.   on
7.7.2017.
Both   the   parties   hereto   have   settled   their
dispute in following manner:-
1. That the respondent-husband will withdraw O.S.
No.   55   of   2016   under   Section   13   H.M.A.   pending   in
the   principal   Judge,   Family   Court   Palamau   at
Daltonganj filed by him.
2. That   it   is   agreed   between   the   parties   that
they   shall   jointly   pray   for   treating   divorce
petition   O.S.   No.   55   of   2016   as   divorce   petition
with   mutual   consent   before   the   Hon'ble   Supreme
Court at the time of next date of hearing invoking
the   inherent   power   under   Article   142   of   the
Constitution   of   India   and   for   grant   of   divorce   by
mutual   consent   as   both   the   parties   are   staying
separately since last 4 years and there is no hope
for   reunion/reconciliation.     In   case   this   Hon'ble
Court   declines   the   above   prayer   then   the   parties
shall   file   petition   for   mutual   divorce   before   the
competent   Court   Palamau   at     Daltonganj,   Jharkhand
within   one   month   from   the   disposal   of   the   present
Transfer Petition.
3. The   petitioner-wife   is   not   taking   any   amount
towards   full   and   final   settlement   of   all   her
claims towards alimony, maintenance (past, present
and   future),   Stridhan,   belongings   and   any   other
claim   whatsoever.     However,   all   rights   of   the
minor   son   qua   the   respondent-father   shall   remain
intact.
4. That the respondent-husband will pay a minimum
amount   of   Rs.10,000/-   (Rupees   Ten   Thousand   Only)
per month for the maintenance of their minor child
namely   Sakshya   Shubham   aged   about   8   years   on   or
before   every   10 th
  of   the   Month   which   shall   start
from   July,   2017   and   he   will   also   pay   any   further
amount which occurs on account of education of the
child.  For this purpose Bank account of the minor
child shall be opened by the petitioner-wife under
her   guardianship   and   the   account   number   should   be
communicated   to   the   respondent-husband   within   15
days   of   the   opening   of   the   same.     However,   the
amount of maintenance of month of July, 2017 shall

TP(C) 106/2017
3
be deposited in August, 2017 alongwith the payment
of Rs.10,000/- of month of August, 2017 subject to
the   above   intimation   of   Bank   Account   by   the
petitioner.
5. The   respondent-husband   shall   have   visitation
right of the minor child namely Sakshya Shubham on
weekends   and   any   other   duration   that   the   parties
may   mutually   agree   with   the   prior   intimation   to
the petitioner.
6. In   summer   vacation   of   the   school,   the
respondent-husband   shall   have   visitation   rights
for   15   days   of   the   summer   vacation   with   prior
intimation to the petitioner-wife.   The respondent
can take child with him with the prior intimation.
7. That   the   petitioner   and   the   respondent   have
agreed   that   none   of   them   or   their   family   members
or   anyone   involved   in   any   of   the   cases   related   to
this   matrimonial   alliance   will   initiate   any   other
legal   action   or   complaint   against   each   other   or
against the family members of each other or anyone
involved with respect to this matrimonial dispute.
8. That in case there is any other case/complaint
pending before any Court/Authority filed by any of
the   parties   involved   in   any   of   the   case   filed   or
their   family   members   apart   from   cases   detailed   in
the   present   agreement   with   regard   to   matrimonial
dispute   shall   be   withdrawn   by   the   respective
parties   within   4   weeks   from   the   signing   of   this
agreement.
9. Subject   to   the   aforesaid   terms,   the   parties
have resolved all the dispute amicably in relation
to   the   marriage   and   have   been   left   with   no   claims
against   each   other   whatsoever   or   their   respective
family members.
10. By   signing   this   Agreement   the   parties   hereto
solemnly   state   and   affirm   that   they   have   no
further   claims   or   demands   against   each   other   or
their   families   and   all   the   disputes   and
differences   have   been   amicably   settled   by   the
parties hereto through the process of mediation.
11. The   parties   undertake   to   abide   by   the   terms
and   conditions   set   out   in   the   above   mentioned
Agreement,   which   have   been   arrived   without   any
coercion, duress or collusion and undertake not to
raise any dispute whatsoever henceforth.

TP(C) 106/2017
4
11. The contents of this settlement-agreement have
been   explained   to   all   the   parties   through   their
respective counsels.�
We   have   perused   the   settlement   agreement.
Accepting   the   said   settlement,   we   direct   that   the   parties
shall abide by the terms and conditions incorporated in the
settlement agreement.
In   the   course   of   hearing,   learned   counsel   for   the
parties submitted that this Court may grant divorce.
In   view   of   the   aforesaid,   we   think   it   appropriate
to   direct   that   the   marriage   between   the   parties   stands
dissolved   on   consent.     We   appreciate   the   efforts   made   by
the   learned   Mediator   to   convince   the   parties   and   make   them
arrive at the settlement.
The   transfer   petition   is   accordingly   disposed   of.
Pending   interlocutory   applications,   if   any,   also   stand
disposed of.
..................CJI.
[Dipak Misra]
....................J.
[A.M. Khanwilkar]
....................J.
[Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud]
New Delhi;
January 16, 2018.

TP(C) 106/2017
5
ITEM NO.17                 COURT NO.1                 SECTION XVI-A
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 106/2017
KAVI SHARMA @ KAVITA SHARMA                        Petitioner
                                VERSUS
SAURABH SHUBHAM                                    Respondents
(FOR STAY APPLICATION  ON IA 1/2017)
Date : 16-01-2018 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.M. KHANWILKAR
         HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
For Petitioner
                    Mr. Aditya Singh, AOR
Mr. Rajiv Dalal, Adv.
                 
For Respondent
                    Mr. Sureshan P., AOR
                   
           UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
The   transfer   petition   is   disposed   of   in   terms   of
the signed order.
Pending   interlocutory   applications,   if   any,   also
stand disposed of.
   (Deepak Guglani)      (H.S. Parasher)
 Court Master Assistant Registrar
(Signed order is placed on the file) 

Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 (for short, the 'Act') - This suit has been filed by the plaintiff � State of Odisha seeking the following reliefs inter alia by way of injunction against the contesting defendant no.1 � State of Chhattisgarh : = It is clear that the above statement made by the Minister is with reference to this very dispute and the Ministry has concluded that the disputes cannot be resolved by negotiations. We, therefore, have no hesitation in directing that the Central Government shall issue appropriate notification in the Official Gazette and constitute a Water Disputes Tribunal for adjudication of the water dispute between the parties herein within a period of one month from today. Accordingly, the plaint in Original Suit No.1 of 2017 is returned to the plaintiff for its presentation and adjudication by the Water Disputes Tribunal to be newly constituted by the Central Government. We order accordingly. With the aforesaid directions, the instant suit is disposed of as having returned to the plaintiff for its presentation to the Water Disputes Tribunal.

1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
ORIGINAL SUIT NO.1 OF 2017
State of Odisha ....Plaintiff
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh & Ors.      ....Defendants
O R D E R
This suit has been filed by the plaintiff � State of
Odisha seeking the following reliefs  inter alia  by way of
injunction   against   the   contesting   defendant   no.1   �   State
of Chhattisgarh :
(a) Grant   an   injunction   restraining   Defendant
No.1,   its   servants   and   agents   from   continuing
with   the   construction   and   operation   of   the   six
ongoing   industrial   barrages   namely   Samoda,
Seorinarayan,   Basantpur,   Mirouni,   Saradiha   and
Kalma,   pending   constitution   of   the   Tribunal   as
sought in the complaint dated 21.11.2016 filed by
the   Plaintiff   for   resolution   of   the   water
disputes   in   respect   of   waters   of   the   Mahanadi
Basin;
(b) Grant   an   injunction   restraining   Defendant
No.1,   its   servants   and   agents   from   continuing
with   the   construction   and   operation   of   seven
ongoing   projects   for   utilization   of   2.95   MAF   of

2
water   annually   viz.,   Kelo,   Arpa-Bhaisajhar
Barrage,   Sondhur,   Rajiv   Samodanisda   Diversion
Project,   Phase-II,   Mongra   Barrage,   Ph-II
Sukhanalla   barrage   and   Ghumariya   Nalla   Barrage,
pending constitution of the Tribunal as sought in
the   complaint   dated   21.11.2016   filed   by   the
Plaintiff for resolution of the water disputes in
respect of waters of the Mahanadi Basin;
(c) Grant   an   injunction   restraining   Defendant
No.1, its servants and agents from taking up any
projects  against  the  category  of  future  projects
mentioned   in   the   letter   dated   27.08.2016   of   the
State   of   Chhattisgarh   in   ANNEXURE   P-1,   pending
constitution   of   the   Tribunal   as   sought   in   the
complaint dated 21.11.2016 filed by the Plaintiff
for   resolution   of   the   water   disputes   in   respect
of waters of the Mahanadi Basin. 
Union   of   India   is   defendant   no.2   and   the   States   of
Madhya   Pradesh,   Maharashtra   and   Jharkhand   are   proforma
defendant   nos.3,   4   and   5   respectively,   in   the   instant
Suit.
Having   regard   to   the   provisions   of   the   Inter-State
River Water Disputes Act, 1956 (for short, the 'Act'), a
submission   was   made   before   us   that   it   would   be
appropriate   to   refer   the   matter   to   a   Water   Disputes
Tribunal   under   the   said   Act.   We   were   then   informed   that
such   a   Tribunal   has   not   been   constituted   so   far.   From
time   to   time,   adjournments   were   sought   in   the   matter   on
behalf   of   Defendant   No.2   �   Union   of   India   to   report   the

3
stage  at  which  the  matter  pertaining  to  the  constitution
of   Water   Disputes   Tribunal,   rests.   We   find   that   no   such
Tribunal   is   constituted   till   date   by   the   Central
Government.
Mr.   Atmaram   N.S.   Nadkarni,   learned   Additional
Solicitor General appearing for Defendant No.2 � Union of
India, submits that the Water Disputes Tribunal could not
be   constituted   because   one   of   the   disputing   States   did
not come forward to resolve the disputes by negotiations.
Therefore,   according   to   Mr.   Nadkarni,   learned
Additional   Solicitor   General   appearing   for   Defendant
No.2,   the   Central   Government   has   not   come   to   the
conclusion   that   the   dispute   cannot   be   settled   by
negotiations, as contemplated by Section 4 of the Act.
Mr.   Mukul   Rohatgi,   learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing
for   the   plaintiff,   has   pointed   out   a   statement   made   by
the   Minister   of   State   for   Water   Resources,   River
Development   and   Ganga   Rejuvenation,   on   the   floor   of   the
Rajya   Sabha,   Parliament   of   India,   to   the   following
effect:
�The   Negotiation   Committee   held   two   meetings
on 28.02.2017 and 22.05.2017 and submitted its
report   in   which   it   is   mentioned   that   any
further   meetings   of   this   Committee   would   not
be fruitful as there had been no participation
from complainant State i.e. State of Odisha in
both   the   meetings.   Accordingly,   the   Ministry
concluded   that   the   dispute   cannot   be   resolved
by   negotiation   and   it   has   been   decided   to
constitute   a   Tribunal   for   adjudication   of   the
dispute. Draft Cabinet Note in this regard has
been prepared.

4
It   is   clear   that   the   above   statement   made   by   the
Minister   is   with   reference   to   this   very   dispute   and   the
Ministry   has   concluded   that   the   disputes   cannot   be
resolved by negotiations. 
We,   therefore,   have   no   hesitation   in   directing   that
the   Central   Government   shall   issue   appropriate
notification   in   the   Official   Gazette   and   constitute   a
Water   Disputes   Tribunal   for   adjudication   of   the   water
dispute between the parties herein within a period of one
month   from   today.   Accordingly,   the   plaint   in   Original
Suit   No.1   of   2017   is   returned   to   the   plaintiff   for   its
presentation   and   adjudication   by   the   Water   Disputes
Tribunal   to   be   newly   constituted   by   the   Central
Government.
We order accordingly.  
With   the   aforesaid   directions,   the   instant   suit   is
disposed   of   as   having   returned   to   the   plaintiff   for   its
presentation to the Water Disputes Tribunal. 
Needless to mention that questions of all reliefs as
may be allowed to the parties, are left open.
....................J
[S. A. BOBDE]
....................J
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 23, 2018.

5
ITEM NO.10               COURT NO.7               SECTION XVII
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Original Suit No.1/2017
STATE OF ODISHA                                    Plaintiff(s)
                                VERSUS
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & ORS.                       Defendants
(IA   No.60623/2017-PERMISSION   TO   FILE   ADDITIONAL   DOCUMENTS 
FOR  [APP FOR PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS] ON IA 2/2017
and   IA   No.134950/2017-CLARIFICATION/DIRECTION   and   IA
No.7781/2018-XTRA)
Date : 23-01-2018 This Suit was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.A. BOBDE
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE L. NAGESWARA RAO
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Sr. Adv.
Mr. S.P. Mishra, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Mohan V. Katarki, Adv.
Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv.
Mr. Karan Lahiri, Adv.
Ms. Parul Shukla, Adv.
Mr. Abhinav Agrawal, Adv.
Mr. Raghav Dwivedi, Adv. 
                    Mr. E. C. Agrawala, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. Nitin Sonkar, Adv.
                    Mr. Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, AOR
Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Atul Jha, Adv.
Mr. Sandeep Jha, Adv.
Mr. Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, AOR
Mr. Atmaram N.S. Nadkarni, ASG
Mrs. V. Mohana, Sr. Adv.
Mr. S. Wasim A. Qadri, Adv.
Mrs. Swarupma Chaturvedi, Adv.
                    Mr. Mukesh Kumar Maroria, AOR
               
                    Mr. Tapesh Kumar Singh, AOR 
Mr. Mohd. Waquas, Adv.

6
Mr. Aditya Pratap Singh, Adv.
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The instant suit is disposed of as having returned to the
plaintiff, in terms of the signed order.
Pending   interlocutory   applications,   if   any,   stand
disposed of.
(SANJAY KUMAR-II)                          (INDU KUMARI POKHRIYAL)
COURT MASTER (SH)                                  ASST.REGISTRAR
(Signed Order is placed on the file) 

whether Smt. Lakshmi is a fictitious person or not. If she is not a fictitious person, she would be in the region of about 97 years of age and we have no idea whether she is still alive. Similarly, we have no idea whether Shri V. Sreeramulu, her General Power of Attorney is alive or not since no one has put in appearance on their behalf. Prima facie , on going through the records of the case and after hearing learned counsel for the parties, it does appear to us that Smt. Lakshmi was a fictitious person. Even her General Power of Attorney Shri V. Sreeramulu could not produce her as is evident from the proceedings for contempt being CCC (Criminal) No.12 of 2006. Under the circumstances, since it appears that the civil suit filed by Smt. Lakshmi being a non-existent person was based on a complete fraud, the decree granted in her favour is set aside.

1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1303 OF 2008

ST. ANN�S EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY ...APPELLANT(s)
                           VERSUS
LAKSHMI & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(s)
O R D E R
  We   have   heard   learned   counsel   for   the   parties   in
respect   of   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   dated   20 th
January,   2004   passed   by   a   learned   Single   Judge   of   the
Karnataka High Court in RFA No.846 of 1999 as well as the
order  dated  22 nd
  November,  2005  in  Review  Petition  No.510
of 2005.
  The proceedings arise out of a civil suit having been
filed   by   Smt.   Lakshmi   through   her   General   Power   of
Attorney, Shri V. Sreeramulu.
  One   of   the   issues   framed   in   the   civil   suit   was
whether   Smt.   Lakshmi   is   a   fictitious   person   or   not.
There was no final determination in this regard either by
the   Trial   Court   or   by   the   First   Appellate   Court   (High
Court).
  As   far   as   the   present   appeal   is   concerned,   it   may
only   be   stated   that   the   suit   was   for   a   decree   seeking
permanent   injunction   against   the   appellant   (St.   Ann�s
Educational   Society)   in   respect   of   10   acres   of   land   in

2
Survey   No.27   in   Village   Kowdenahalli,   Bangalore.     While
the   civil   suit   filed   by   Smt.   Lakshmi   was   dismissed,   the
First   Appellate   Court   (High   Court)   decreed   the   suit   in
her favour.
  It is under these circumstances that the appellant is
now before us.
  In   the   present   appeal,   Smt.   Lakshmi   has   been   served
through her General Power of Attorney Shri V. Sreeramulu.
Neither of them has put in appearance in this Court.  
  When   Smt.   Lakshmi   filed   the   suit,   she   was   about   60
years of age in 1989.  In the normal course, Smt. Lakshmi
would now be about 97 years of age.
  As   far   as   Shri   V.   Sreeramulu   is   concerned,   he   was
about   80   years   of   age   when   certain   proceedings   for
contempt   being   CCC   (Criminal)   No.12   of   2006   were
initiated   against   him   by   the   Karnataka   High   Court   in
2009.   He would, therefore, be in the region of 87 years
of age today.
  We   have  no   idea  whether   Smt.  Lakshmi   is  a   fictitious
person   or   not.     If   she   is   not   a   fictitious   person,   she
would   be   in   the   region   of   about   97   years   of   age   and   we
have no idea whether she is still alive.  
  Similarly,   we   have   no   idea   whether   Shri   V.
Sreeramulu, her General Power of Attorney is alive or not
since no one has put in appearance on their behalf.

3
  Prima facie , on going through the records of the case
and   after   hearing   learned   counsel   for   the   parties,   it
does   appear   to   us   that   Smt.   Lakshmi   was   a   fictitious
person.     Even   her   General   Power   of   Attorney   Shri   V.
Sreeramulu   could   not   produce   her   as   is   evident   from   the
proceedings   for   contempt   being   CCC   (Criminal)   No.12   of
2006.
  Under   the   circumstances,   since   it   appears   that   the
civil   suit   filed   by   Smt.   Lakshmi   being   a   non-existent
person  was  based  on  a  complete  fraud,  the  decree  granted
in her favour is set aside.
  We may note that insofar as the grant of the land to
the   appellant   is   concerned,   that   has   been   found   against
the   appellant   right   up   to   this   Court   in   SLP(C)   No.1519-
1520 of 2003 decided on 31 st
 March, 2003.
  We are informed that the appellant has preferred some
writ   petition   which   is   pending   in   the   Karnataka   High
Court   being   W.P.   No.23158   of   2008.     We   do   not   make   any
comment   or   any   observations   with   regard   to   these
proceedings. 
  It   is   also   brought   to   our   notice   by   learned   counsel
for the appellant that the civil suit being OS No.4709 of
2010   has   been   filed   by   the   appellant   in   the   City   Civil
Court,   Bangalore   for   relief   of   permanent   injunction
restraining   the   State   of   Karnataka   from   interfering   with
the appellant�s possession of the suit scheduled property

4
without following due process of law.
  It   is   submitted   that   an   injunction   has   been   granted
in favour of the appellant on 1 st
 October, 2011.
  In   this   context,   we   may   note   that   all   proceedings
with   regard   to   the   grant   of   the   land   to   the   appellant
have   attained   finality   against   the   appellant   by   the
dismissal   of     SLP(C)   No.1519-1520   of   2003   filed   by   the
appellant in this Court.
  This may be taken note of by the High Court and Civil
Court as well.
  The appeal stands disposed of.


.............................J.
  (MADAN B. LOKUR)
.............................J.
  (DEEPAK GUPTA)
NEW DELHI
JANUARY 23, 2018

5
ITEM NO.102               COURT NO.4               SECTION IV-A
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal  No(s).1303/2008
ST. ANN�S EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY                      Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
LAKSHMI & ANR.                                     Respondent(s)
Date : 23-01-2018 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MADAN B. LOKUR
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
For Appellant(s) Mr. Raju Ramachandran, Sr. Adv.
Mr. K. Parameshwar, Adv.
Mr. George Thomas, Adv.
Mr. R. Sathish, AOR
Hamsini Shankar, Adv.
Mr. Ishwar Mohanty, Adv.
                 
For Respondent(s)
                   Mr. V. N. Raghupathy, AOR
Mr. Parikshit P. Angadi, Adv.
Mr. Md. Apzal Ansari, Adv.
As per appearance slip
                   
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                               O R D E R
The appeal stands disposed of.
  Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
  (SANJAY KUMAR-I)                 (KAILASH CHANDER)
     AR-CUM-PS                          COURT MASTER
(Signed order is placed on the file) 

Order XXXII, Rules 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13 and 14 of the Code (as amended in Karnataka State Not only, is there no provision for appointment of next friend by the Court, but the permission of the Court is also not necessary.

                                                              REPORTABLE


                            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                            CIVIL APPEAL NO.  22969  OF 2017


     Nagaiah and another                                      ..Appellants

                                              Versus

     Smt. Chowdamma (dead) By Lrs.
     and another                                              ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.
1.The judgment dated 08.01.2013 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Regular Second Appeal No. 1102 of 2004 is called in question in this appeal by the unsuccessful plaintiffs. Signature Not Verified
2. Digitally signed by SARITA PUROHIT Brief facts leading to this appeal are: Original Suit No. 228 Date: 2018.01.09 17:21:11 IST Reason: of   1989   was   filed   by   the   appellants   herein   (plaintiffs   1   and   2  respectively   in   the   suit)   praying   for   a   declaration   that   the   suit schedule   property   is   the   joint  property  of  the  appellants  along   with their   father   Kempaiah   (defendant   no.1   in   the   suit/respondentno.2herein) and that they are entitled to 2/3rd share in the said property; that the sale deed executed by the father¬Kempaiah (defendant no.1 in the   suit/respondent   no.2   herein)   in   favour   of   defendant no.2/respondent   no.1¬Chowdamma   was   not   binding   on   their   2/3 rd share in the suit schedule property.  A relief for permanent injunction was also sought.   A certain set of other facts was also pleaded which may not be material for the disposal of this appeal.   It is relevant to note   that   at   the   time   of   filing   of   the   suit,   i.e.   on   24.01.1985,   the appellant no.2 herein, namely, Krishna was aged about 17 years.  The appellant   no.1/Plaintiff   No.1   herein   being   the   elder   brother   of appellant no.2 filed the suit not only on his personal behalf but also on behalf of the second appellant-second plaintiff (who was a minor). 
3. The  trial Court dismissed the suit   on   merits.     The   first Appellate Court allowed the Regular Appeal No. 90 of 2003 filed by the unsuccessful   plaintiffs   and   decreed   the   suit.     Aggrieved   by   the judgment   of   the   first   appellate   Court,   the   unsuccessful   defendant no.2¬   Chowdamma/purchaser   of   the   property   filed   Regular   Second Appeal before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. 
By   the   impugned   judgment,   the   High   Court   has   allowed   the appeal and dismissed the suit mainly on the ground that the plaintiff no.1 being the elder brother could not act as the guardian of plaintiff no.2   during   the   life¬time   of   Kempaiah, the father   of   the   plaintiffs (defendant no.1), inasmuch as plaintiff no.1/appellant no.1 was not appointed as a guardian of the minor plaintiff no. 2 by any competent Court.  Since the first defendant is the father of plaintiff no.2, he was the natural guardian and hence he could only represent plaintiff no.2 and none else.
  It is to be noted that no issue was raised in the trial Court with regard to competency of plaintiff No.1 to represent plaintiff no.2 in the suit.   Even in the first appellate Court, such question was not raised, hence not considered.  However, the High Court seems to have permitted such question to be raised for the first time in the second appeal, since it is purely a question of law.
4. Hence,   the   only   question   to   be   decided   in   this   appeal   is, whether   the   first   plaintiff   being   the   elder   brother   of   minor   second plaintiff (at the time of filing of the suit) could have filed the suit on behalf of the minor as his next friend/guardian.
5. The   High   Court,   while   coming   to   the   conclusion   that   the first plaintiff could not have acted as a guardian of the minor¬ second plaintiff,   has   relied   upon   Section   4(b)   of   the   Hindu   Minority   and Guardianship   Act   (hereinafter   called   as   ‘Hindu   Guardianship   Act’). Sub-Section (b) of Section 4 of the Hindu Guardianship Act reads as under:
“(b) "guardian” means a person having the care of the person of a minor or of his property or of both his person and property, and includes—
(i) a natural guardian,
(ii)   a   guardian   appointed   by   the   will   of   the   minor's father or mother,
(iii) a guardian appointed or declared by a court, and
(iv)  a   person   empowered to act  as such  by   or  under any enactment relating to any court of wards;” As mentioned supra, the High Court has ruled that defendant no.1, being   the   father   of   minor   plaintiff   no.2,   is   the   natural   guardian   of plaintiff no.2 and consequently plaintiff no.1 could not have acted as the guardian in the suit on behalf of minor plaintiff, particularly when he was not appointed as a guardian by any competent court of law.  In our considered opinion, the High Court has totally misdirected itself while concluding so.
6. There cannot be any dispute that the plaintiff no.1 did not and does not come within the meaning of a “Guardian” as specified in sub-section (b) of Section 4 of the Hindu Guardianship Act. But the present   facts   are   not   governed   by   the   provisions   of   Hindu Guardianship   Act;   rather   they   are   governed   by   Order   XXXII   of   the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to “Code”).  To decide the present   controversy   it   would   be   relevant   to   note   the   following provisions as contained in Order XXXII,   Rules 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13 and 14 of the Code (as amended in Karnataka State, since the matter is from Karnataka State) :
1. Minor   to   sue   by   next   friend.–Every   suit   by   a minor shall be instituted in his name by a person who in such suit shall be called the next friend of the minor.
[Explanation:  In this Order, “minor” means a person who has not attained his majority within the meaning of Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (9 of 1875), where the suit relates to any of the matters mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 2 of that Act or to any other matter.]
2. Where   suit   is   instituted   without   next   friend, plaint   to   be   taken   off   the   file.–  (1)   Where   a   suit   is instituted   by   or   on   behalf   of   a   minor   without   a   next friend, the defendant may apply to have the plaint taken off the file, with costs to be paid by the pleader or other person by whom it was presented.
(2)   Notice   of   such   application   shall   be   given   to   such person,   and   the   Court, after  hearing  his  objections  (if any) may make such order in the matter as it thinks fit.
3. Qualifications to be a next friend or guardian.— (1) Any person who is of sound mind and has attained majority   may   act   as   next   friend   of   a   minor   or   as   his guardian for the suit:
Provided that the interest of that person is not adverse to that of the minor and that he is not, in the case of next friend, a defendant, or, in the case of a guardian for the suit, a plaintiff  (2) Appointed or declared guardians to be preferred and to be superseded only for reasons recorded.— Where a minor   has   a   guardian   appointed   or   declared   by competent authority, no person other than the guardian shall act as the next friend of the minor or be appointed his guardian for the suit unless the Court considers, for reasons to be recorded, that it is for the minor’s welfare that another person he permitted to act or oe appointed as the case may be.
(3) Where the defendant is a minor, the Court on being satisfied   of   the   fact   of   his   minority   shall   appoint   a proper person to be guardian for the suit for the minor. A   person   appointed   as   guardian   under   this   sub¬rule, shall,   unless   his   appointment   is   terminated   by retirement or removal by order of Court on application made   for   the   purpose   or   by   his   death,   continue throughout all proceedings in the suit or arising out of the   suit   including   proceedings   in   any   appeal   or   in revision and  any  proceedings in execution of a decree and the service of any process in any such proceeding on the said guardian if duly made shall be deemed to be good service for the purposes of such proceedings.
(4) An order for the appointment of a guardian for the suit may be obtained upon an application in the name and   on   behalf   of   the   minor   or   by   the   plaintiff.   The application   where   it   is   by   the   plaintiff   shall   whenever necessary set forth in the order of their suitability a list of   persons   who   are competent  and qualified  to  act as guardian for the suit for the minor defendant. (5) The application referred to in the last preceding sub¬ rule whether made by the plaintiff or on behalf of the minor   defendant   shall   be   supported   by   an   affidavit verifying the fact that the proposed guardian has not or that no one of the proposed guardians has any interest in the matters in controversy in the suit adverse to that of   the   minor   and   that   the   proposed   guardian   or guardians   are   fit   persons   to   be   so   appointed.   The affidavit   shall   further   state   according   to   the circumstances of each case particulars of any existing guardian appointed or declared by competent authority, the name and address of the person, if any, who is the de   facto   guardian   of   the   minor,   the   names   and addresses of persons, if any, who, in the event of either the   natural   or   the   de   facto   guardian   or   the   guardian appointed or declared by competent authority, not being permitted   to   act,   are   by   reason   of   relationship   or interest,   or   otherwise   suitable   persons   to   act   as guardians for the minor for the suit.
(6) An application for the appointment of a guardian for the   suit   of   a   minor   shall   not   be   combined   with   an application   for   bringing   on   record   the   legal representative of a deceased party.
(7)   No   order   shall   be   made   on   any   application   under sub-rule (4) above except upon notice to the minor and also to any guardian of the minor appointed or declared by an authority competent in that behalf, or where there is no such guardian upon notice to the father or natural guardian   of   the   minor   or   where   there   is   no   father   or natural   guardian   upon   notice   to   the   person   in   whose actual care the minor is and after hearing any objection which may be urged on behalf of any person so served with notice. The notice required by this sub-rule shall be   served   at   least   seven   clear   days   before   the   day named in the notice for hearing of the application. (8)   Where   none   of   the   persons   mentioned   in   the   last preceding   sub¬rule   is   willing   to   act   as   guardian,   the Court   shall   direct   notice   to   other   person   or   persons proposed   for   appointment   as   guardian   either simultaneously to some or all of them or successively as it   may   consider   convenient   or   desirable   in   the circumstances of the case. The Court shall appoint such person as it thinks proper from among those who have signified   their   consent   and   intimate   the   fact   of   such appointment to the person appointed by registered post unless he is present at the time of appointment either in person or by pleader.
(9) No person shall be appointed guardian for the suit without   his   consent   and   except   in   cases   where   an applicant himself prays for his appointment as guardian notices issued shall clearly require the party served to signify his consent or refusal to act as guardian. (10) Where the Court finds no person fit and willing to act as guardian for the suit the Court may appoint any of its officers or a pleader of the Court to be a guardian and may direct that costs to be incurred by that officer or pleader in the performance of his duties as guardian shall   be   borne   either   by  the  parties or  by  any  one or more   of   the   parties   to   the   suit   or   out   of   any   fund   in Court   in   which   the   minor   is   interested   and   may   give direction for the repayment or allowance of the costs as justice and the circumstances of the case may require. (11) When a guardian for the suit as a minor defendant is appointed and it is made to appear to the Court that the   guardian   is   not   in   possession   of   any   or   sufficient funds   for   the   conduct   of   the   suit   on   behalf   of   the defendant and that the defendant will be prejudiced in his  defence  thereby, the Court may from time to time order  the   plaintiff to advance moneys to the guardian for   the   purpose   of   his   defence   and   all   moneys   so advanced   shall   form   costs   of   the   plaintiff   in   the   suit. The  order shall direct that the guardian as and when required by the Court shall file into Court the account of the moneys so received by him."¬¬
6. Receipt by next friend or guardian for the suit of property under decree for minor. – (1) A next friend or guardian for the suit shall not, without the leave of the Court, receive any money or other movable property on behalf of a minor either—
(a) by way of compromise before decree or order, or
(b)   under   a   decree   or   order   in   favour   of   the   minor. (2) Where the next friend or guardian for the suit has not been appointed or declared by competent authority to be guardian of the property of the minor, or, having been so appointed or declared, is under any disability known   to   the   Court   to   receive   the   money   or   other movable property, the Court shall, if it grants him leave to receive the property, require such security and give such   directions   as   will,   in   its   opinion,   sufficiently protect the property from waste and ensure its proper application:
[Provided   that   the   Court   may,   for   reasons   to   be recorded,   dispense   with   such   security   while   granting leave   to   the   next   friend   or   guardian   for   the   suit   to receive money or other movable property under a decree or order, where such next friend or guardian—
(a) is the manager of a Hindu undivided family and the decree or order relates to the property or business of the family; or
(b) is the parent of the minor.] Provided that the Court may in its discretion dispense with   the   security   in   cases   where   the   next   friend   or guardian   for   the   suit   is   a   manager   of   a   joint   Hindu family or the Karnavan of a Tharwad or the Ejaman of an   Aliyasanthana   family   and   the   decree   is   passed   in favour   of   such   joint   family   or   Tharwad   or   the Aliyasanthanafamily as the case may be.
7.  Agreement   or   compromise   by   next   friend   or guardian  for the suit.–(1) No next friend or guardian for   the   suit   shall,   without   the   leave   of   the   Court, expressly   recorded   in   the   proceeding,   enter   into   any agreement   or   compromise   on   behalf   of   a   minor   with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian.
(2) Where an application is made to the Court for leave to   enter   into   an   agreement   or   compromise   or   for withdrawal of a suit in pursuance of a compromise or for taking any other similar action on behalf of a minor or other person under disability, the affidavit in support of the application shall set out the manner in which the proposed   compromise,   agreement   or   other   action   is likely to effect the interests of the minor or other person under   the   disability   and   the   reason   why   such compromise, agreement or other action is expected to be for   the   benefit   of   the   minor   or   other   person   under disability, where in such a case the minor or the other person   under   disability   is   represented   by   counsel   or pleader, the said counsel or pleader shall also file into Court   along   with   the   application   a   certificated   to   the effect   that   the   agreement   or   compromise   or   action proposed is in his opinion for the benefit of the minor or other person under disability. If the Court grants leave under sub rule (1) of this Rule, the decree or order of the   Court  shall  expressly recite the grant of the leave sought   from   the   Court   in   respect   of   the   compromise, agreement   or   other   action   as   aforesaid   after consideration   of   the   affidavit   and   the   certificate mentioned   above   and   shall   also   set   out   either   in   the body   of   the   decree   itself   or   in   a   schedule   annexed thereto   the   terms   of   the   compromise   or   agreement   or the particulars of other action.
(3)   Any   such   agreement   or   compromise   entered   into without   the   leave   of   the   court   so   recorded   shall   be voidable against all parties other than the minor.
9.  Removal   of   next   friend.–(1)   Where   the   interest   of the next friend of a minor is adverse to that of the minor or   where   he   is   so   connected   with   a   defendant   whose interest  is   adverse to  that  of the minor  as to make it unlikely   that   the   minor’s   interest   will   be   properly protected by him, or where he does not do his duty, or during the pendency of the suit, ceases to reside within India, or for any other sufficient cause, application may be made on behalf of the minor or by a defendant for his removal; and the Court, if satisfied of the sufficiency of the   cause   assigned,   may   order   the   next   friend   to   be removed accordingly, and make such other order as to costs as it thinks fit.
(2) Where the next friend is not a guardian appointed or declared by an authority competent in this behalf, and an application is made by a guardian so appointed or declared,   who   desires   to   be   himself   appointed   in   the place of the next friend, the Court shall remove the next friend unless it considers, for reasons to be recorded by it, that the guardian ought not to be appointed the next friend   of   the   minor,   and   shall   thereupon   appoint   the applicant to be next friend in his place upon such terms as to the costs already incurred in the suit as it thinks fit
12.   Course   to   be   followed   by   minor   plaintiff   or applicant on attaining majority.– (1) A minor plaintiff or   a   minor   not   a   party   to   a   suit   on   whose   behalf   an application is pending shall, on attaining majority, elect whether he will proceed with the suit or application.  (2)   Where   he   elects   to   proceed   with   the   suit   or application, he shall apply for an order discharging the next friend and for leave to proceed in his own name.  (3) The title of the suit or application shall in such case be corrected so as to read henceforth thus:— “A,B.,  late  a  minor, by C.D., his next friend, but now having attained majority”.
(4) Where he elects to abandon the suit or application, he shall, if a sole plaintiff or sole applicant, apply for an order to dismiss the suit or application on repayment of the costs incurred by the defendant or opposite party or which may have been paid by his next friend.
(5)   Any   application   under   this   rule   may   be   made   ex parte;   but   no   order   discharging   a   next   friend   and permitting a minor plaintiff to proceed in his own name shall be made without notice to the next friend.
13.   Where   minor   co ¬plaintiff   attaining   majority desires   to   repudiate   suit.–(1)   Where   a   minor   co¬ plaintiff   on  attaining  majority desires to repudiate the suit, he shall apply to have his name struck out as co¬ plaintiff;   and   the   Court,   if   it   finds   that   he   is   not   a necessary   party,   shall   dismiss   him   from   the   suit   on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit.  (2) Notice of the application shall be served on the next friend, on any co¬ plaintiff and on the defendant. (3) The costs of all parties of such application, and of all or any proceedings theretofore had in the suit, shall be paid by such persons as the Court directs.
(4) Where the applicant is a necessary party to the Suit, the Court may direct him to be made a defendant.
14.  Unreasonable   or   improper   suit.–(1)   A   minor   on attaining majority may, if a sole plaintiff, apply that a suit   instituted   in   his   name   by   his   next   friend   be dismissed   on   the   ground   that   it   was   unreasonable   or improper.
(2) Notice of the application shall be served on all the parties concerned; and the Court, upon being satisfied of such unreasonableness or impropriety, may grant the application and order the next friend to pay the costs of all parties in respect of the application and of anything done in the suit, or make such other order as it thinks fit.
14¬A.  When a minor defendant attains majority either he or the guardian appointed for him in the suit or the plaintiff   may   apply   to   the   Court   to   declare   the   said defendant a major and to discharge the guardian and notice thereof shall be given to such among them as are not  applicants.   When the Court by  order  declares the said   defendant   as   major   it   shall   by   the   same   order discharge the guardian and thereafter the suit shall be proceeded with against the said defendant as a major. A  bare   reading   of   Order   XXXII, Rule 1 of the  Code makes it amply clear that every suit by a minor shall be instituted in his name by a person who in such suit shall be called the “next friend” of the minor. The next friend need not necessarily be a duly appointed guardian as specified under Sub-Section (b) of Section 4 of Hindu Guardianship Act.   “Next friend” acts for the benefit of the “minor” or other person who is unable to look after  his or her own interests or manage his or her   own   law   suit   (person   not  sui   juris)   without   being   a   regularly appointed guardian as per Hindu Guardianship Act.   He acts as an officer of the Court, especially appearing to look after the interests of a minor or a disabled person whom he represents in a particular matter. The afore-said provision authorises filing of the suit on behalf of the minor by a next friend.   If a suit by minor is instituted without the next   friend,   the   plaint   would   be   taken   off   the   file   as   per   Rule   2   of Order   XXXII   of   the   Code.     Order   XXXII   Rules   1  and   3  of   the   Code together make a distinction between a next friend and a guardian ad litem; i.e., (a) where the suit is filed on behalf of a minor and (b) where the suit is filed against a minor.   In case, where the suit is filed on behalf of the minor, no permission or leave of the Court is necessary for   the   next   friend   to   institute   the   suit,   whereas   if   the   suit   is   filed against a minor, it is obligatory for the plaintiff to get the appropriate guardian ad litem appointed by the Court for such minor. A “guardian ad   litem”  is   a   special   guardian   appointed   by   a   court   in   which   a particular litigation is pending to represent a minor/infant, etc. in that particular litigation and the status of guardian ad litem exists in that specific litigation in which appointment occurs. Various High Courts have also adopted this view. The Madras High Court in  Kaliammal, minor by Guardian, Patta Goundan v. Ramaswamy Goundan, AIR 1949   Mad.   859  observed   that   there   is   no   need   of   sanction   of   the Court for a next friend to sue, if he is not incapacitated.  This was also the view taken by the High Court of Allahabad in K. Kumar v. Onkar Nath, AIR 1972 All. 81.
7. The   Kerala   High   Court   upheld   the   same   in   no   uncertain terms in Gopalaswamy Gounder v. Ramaswamy Kounder, AIR 2006 Ker 138. In that case, the High Court observed that any person who does not have any interest adverse to that of the minor can figure as his next friend. It held as follows:
“Law   does   not   contemplate   the   appointment   of   a next   friend   for   a   minor   who   institutes   a   legal proceeding   either   as   a   Plaintiff   or   as   a   Petitioner. The object of a minor being represented through a next friend is only for the purpose of enabling the opposite party to look upon the next friend for costs, if any, ordered against the minor…” ….      ….         ….
Where   the   minor   institutes   a   proceeding   as   a Plaintiff or applicant any person who does not have any interest adverse to that of the minor can figure as  his  next friend. The mere fact that the minor's mother Selvi was appointed as the guardian of the minor   in   execution   proceedings   where   the   minor was   impleaded   as   an   additional   Respondent,   will not   disable   Gopalaswamy   Kounder   from   styling himself   as   the   next   friend   of   the   minor   for   the purpose of filing the petitions under Order 21, Rule 90 Code of Civil Procedure There was absolutely no necessity   for   the   next   friend   to   seek   his appointment  as   the next  friend nor  was the  court below   justified   in   dismissing   the   said   application. Even in a case where the proceedings are instituted by   the   minor   through   his   next   friend,   the   real Plaintiff  or applicant is the minor himself and not the next friend.”
8. Not   only,   is   there   no   provision   for   appointment   of   next friend   by   the   Court,   but   the   permission   of   the   Court   is   also   not necessary.
However, even in respect of minor defendants, various High Courts are consistent in taking the view that the decree cannot be set aside even where certain formalities for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the defendant have not been observed.  The High Courts   have   observed   in   the   case   of   minor   defendants,   where   the permission of the Court concerned under Order XXXII Rule 3 of the Code is not taken, but the decree has been passed, in the absence of prejudice   to   the   minor   defendant,   such   decree  cannot  be  set  aside. The   main   test   is   that   there   has   to   be   a   prejudice   to   the   minor defendant for setting aside the decree. For reference, see the cases of Brij   Kishore   Lal   v.   Satnarain   Lal   &   Ors.,   AIR   1954   All.   599, Anandram   &   Anr.   v.   Madholal   &   Ors.   AIR   1960   Raj.   189 Rangammal   v.   Minor   Appasami   &   Ors.   AIR   1973   Mad.12,Chater Bhuj Goel v. Gurpreet Singh AIR 1983 Punjab 406 & Shri Mohd.  Yusuf  and  Ors.  v.  Shri Rafiquddin Siddiqui.  ILR  1974 (1) Delhi 825.
In the matter on hand, the suit was filed on behalf of the minor and therefore   the   next   friend   was   competent   to   represent   the   minor. Further, admittedly no prejudice was caused to plaintiff no. 2.

9.      “Guardian” as defined under the Hindu Guardianship Act is a different concept from the concept of “next friend” or the “Guardian ad litem”.     Representation   by   “next   friend”   of   minor   plaintiff   or   by “guardian  ad litem” of minor defendant is purely temporary, that too for the purposes of that particular law suit.
10. There   is   no   hurdle   for   a   natural   guardian   or   duly constituted   guardian   as   defined   under   Hindu   Guardianship   Act   to represent   minor   plaintiff   or   defendant   in   a   law   suit.       But   such guardian   should   not   have   adverse   interest   against   minor.     If   the natural guardian or the duly constituted guardian has adverse interest against the minor in the law suit, then a next friend or guardian  ad litem,   as   the   case   may   be,   would   represent   the   minor   in   the   civil litigation.
11.   It is by now well settled and as per the provisions of Order XXXII   of   Code   that   any   person   who   is   of   sound   mind,   who   has attained majority, who can represent and protect the interest of the minor, who is a resident of India and whose interest is not adverse to that of the minor, may represent the minor as his next friend. Such person who is representing the minor plaintiff as a next friend shall not be party to the same suit as defendant. Rules 6 and 7 of Order XXXII of the Code specifically provide that the next friend or guardian
in the suit shall not without the leave of the Court receive any money or immovable property and shall not without the leave of the Court enter into any agreement or compromise.  The rights and restrictions of the natural guardian provided under the Hindu Guardianship Act do not conflict with the procedure for filing a suit by a next friend on behalf of the minor.   Not only is there no express prohibition, but a reading of Order XXXII of the Code would go to show that wherever the legislature thought it proper to restrict the right of the next friend, it has expressly provided for it in Rules 6 and 7 of Order XXXII of the Code.  Rule 9 of Order XXXII – apart from other factors, clarifies that where a next friend  is not a guardian appointed or declared by the authority competent in this behalf and an application is made by the guardian so appointed or declared who desires to be himself appointed in the place of the next friend, the Court shall remove the next friend unless   it   considers,   for   reasons   to   be   recorded,   that   the   guardian ought   not   to   be   appointed   as   the   next   friend   of   the   minor.     Order XXXII, Rules 12, 13 and 14 of the Code empower the minor plaintiff to take a decision either to proceed with the suit or to abandon the suit, after attaining majority.  Thus, after attaining majority,  if the plaintiff elects   to   proceed   with   the   suit,   he   may   do   so   by   making   an application,   consequent   upon   which   the   next   friend   ceases   to
represent the minor plaintiff from the date of attaining majority by the minor.  Order XXXII Rule 12 of the Code requires the minor plaintiff to have the option either to proceed with the suit or to abandon the suit and  does not  at all  provide that if no such election is made by the minor  plaintiff  on attaining majority, the suit is to be dismissed on that ground. In case, if the Court discovers during the pendency of the suit that the minor plaintiff has attained majority, such plaintiff needs to be called upon by the Court to elect whether he intends to proceed with the suit or not. In other words the minor who attained majority during the pendency of the matter must be informed of the pendency of the suit and in the absence of such a notice the minor cannot be imputed with the  knowledge of the pendency of the suit. So, before any adverse orders are to be made against the minor who has attained majority, the Court has to give notice to such person. Of course, in the present matter, under the facts and circumstances, such occasion did not arise, since plaintiff no. 2 on attaining majority has continued with the suit, which means he has elected to proceed with the suit.
12. The principles arising out of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and the Hindu Guardianship Act may not be apposite to the next friend appointed under Order XXXII of the Code. The appointment of a guardian  ad   litem  to   represent   the   defendant   or   a   next   friend   to
represent the plaintiff in a suit is limited only for the suit and after the discharge   of   that   guardian  ad   litem/next   friend,   the   right/   duty   of guardian as defined under sub-section (b) of Section 4 of the Hindu Guardianship   Act   (if   he   has   no   adverse   interest)   automatically continues as guardian. In other words, a next friend representing the minor in the suit under Order XXXII, Rule 1 of the Code, will not take away   the   right   of   the   duly   appointed   guardian   under   the   Hindu Guardianship Act as long as such guardian does not have an adverse interest or such duly appointed guardian is not removed as per that Act.
13. In the case on hand, respondent No.2/defendant 1, though was the father of the plaintiff no.2 could not have represented plaintiff no.2   in   the   present   suit   as   his   guardian,   because   his   interest   was adverse to that of plaintiff no.2.   A number of allegations are made against the vendor of the property i.e. against the natural guardian by plaintiff no.2 in the suit while questioning the validity of the sale deed. The action of respondent no.2 herein (defendant no.1) in selling the property without any valid reason and family necessity is the subject matter in the suit. On the other hand, plaintiff no.1 (elder brother of plaintiff no.2) who did not have any adverse interest to that of plaintiff no.2, has properly represented plaintiff no.2 as his next friend.   The 
plaintiff   no.2   has   not   made   a   single   allegation   against   the   plaintiff no.1/his next friend, after he attained majority.
14. The   minor¬plaintiff   no.2   had   attained   majority   within   one   year from the date of filing of the suit. The suit, as afore¬mentioned, was filed on 21.04.1985 when the plaintiff No.2 was 17 years of age. Thus plaintiff   no.2   attained   the   age   of   majority   on   or   about   20.04.1986. Evidence of PW1 (the first witness of the plaintiffs) was recorded on 15.10.1992, which means, much prior to the recording of evidence of any of the witnesses, plaintiff no.2 had attained majority and he had by then elected to continue with the suit.   It is also relevant to note that plaintiff no.2 is pursuing the matter from the date of attaining majority till this date on his own. Therefore, it was not open for the High   Court   to   non¬suit   the   plaintiff   no.2   for   the   afore¬mentioned reasons.
15. Though   records   are   not   produced   before   us   to   show   that plaintiff no.2 had filed a formal application for discharging the next friend   after   he   attained   majority,   the   fact   remains   that   he   has continued with the proceedings on his own, from the trial Court to this Court.   The   same   clearly   shows  his  intention  of  continuing  with  the litigation. He has not abandoned his claim but has elected to continue with civil action.

16. To sum up, instituting a suit on behalf of minor by a next friend or to represent a minor defendant in the suit by a guardian ad litem  is   a   time¬tested   procedure   which   is   in   place   to   protect   the interests of the minor in civil litigation. The only practical difference between   a   “next   friend”   and   a   “guardian  ad   litem”   is   that   the   next friend is a person who represents a minor who commences a lawsuit; guardian  ad litem  is a person appointed by the Court to represent a minor   who   has   been   a   defendant   in   the   suit.   Before   a   minor commences   suit,   a   conscious   decision   is   made   concerning   the deserving adult (next friend) through whom the suit will be instituted. The   guardian  ad   litem  is   appointed  by  Court  and whereas  the next friend   is   not.   The   next   friend   and   the   guardian  ad   litem  possess similar powers and responsibilities. Both are subject to control by the Court  and   may   be   removed by  the  Court  if the  best  interest of  the minor so requires.
17. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the   impugned   order   relying   upon   the   provisions   of   Hindu Guardianship Act to non¬suit the plaintiff no.2 is not justified.  Having regard   to   the   totality   of   the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case,  it would be just and proper if the matter is remitted to the High Court for a fresh decision on merits in accordance with law.   Accordingly,
this appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for a fresh   decision   on   merits,   in   accordance   with   law.     Needless   to mention, that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.  There shall be no order as to costs. 
…………………………………J.
         [Arun Mishra]               …………….……………………J.
[Mohan M. Shantanagoudar] New Delhi;
January  08, 2018






ITEM NO.1501                     COURT NO.10                         SECTION IV-A
(For Judgment)

                  S U P R E M E C O U R T O F                I N D I A
                          RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No(s).22969/2017

NAGAIAH    & ANR.                                                  Appellant(s)

                                      VERSUS

SMT. CHOWDAMMA (DEAD) BY LRS.        & ANR.                        Respondent(s)


Date : 08-01-2018 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of Judgment today.
For Appellant(s) Mr. Nikhil Majithia,Adv.
Mr. Yadav Narender Singh,AOR For Respondent(s) Mr. Nishanth Patil,Adv.
Mr. Prasanna Mohan,Adv.
Mr. Anup Jain,AOR Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar pronounced the Reportable Judgment of the Bench comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra and His Lordship.
The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs in terms of the signed Reportable Judgment. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
      (Sarita Purohit)                             (Jagdish Chander)
         Court master                                Branch Officer

(Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)