1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.19662 OF 2017
[Arising out of S.L.P. (C)No. 23410 of 2017]
Medical Council of India ....Appellant
Versus
G.C.R.G. Memorial Trust & Ors. ....Respondents
J U D G M E N T
DIPAK MISRA, CJI.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeal frescoes the scenario where one is
tempted to quote a few lines from what has been stated in
Quillen v. Board of Education1
. It reads thus:-
“The distinction between the gourmet and the
gourmand is as neat and decisive in the prosaic
realm of negotiation as in the festive sphere of
gastronomic enjoyment — attempting to satisfy an
unrestrained or exaggerated appetite in either field
may prove discomforting if not disastrous.”
The purpose of referring to the same is to highlight the
unrestrained and exaggerated appetite. When the factual
1 115 NYS 2d 122, 126 (1952)
2
matrix would be unrolled, the greed in all its colours shall
come to the forefront.
3. The present appeal by special leave calls in question
the legal acceptability of the order dated 01st September
2017 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of
Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Misc. Bench No.13530 of
2017 whereby the High Court has quashed the order dated
19th August 2017 as well as order dated 31st May 2017
passed by the Central Government and eventually granted
permission to the 1st respondent to admit students for the
Academic Session 2017-2018.
4. When the matter was listed on 06th September 2017,
this Court had passed the following order :
“Issue notice fixing a returnable date within
four weeks.
As Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Additional
Solicitor General for respondent No.3-Union of
India and Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior
counsel has entered appearance on behalf of
respondent No.1 and 2, no further notice need be
issued.
As far as respondent No.5 and 6 are
concerned, let notice be issued.
Dasti in addition is permitted.
As an interim order, it is directed that there
shall be stay of the operation of order dated 1st
3
September, 2017 further corrected on 4th
September 2017.
If the Institution has admitted students they
are debarred from continuing in the course. We
have passed this order as we while disposing of the
writ petition preferred under Article 32 of the
Constitution had passed the following order :-
'Learned counsel for the petitioners
seeks leave of this Court to withdraw
the writ petition to approach the High
Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
The writ petition is permitted to be
withdrawn. However, it is made clear
that the High Court, while entertaining
the writ petition, shall not pass any
interim order pertaining to the
academic year 2017-2018.'
We really fail to fathom the manner in which
the High Court has misconstrued our order and
passed the final order for 2017-2018. We are
issuing notice only to test the propriety of the
order and also if the Institution is eligible to get
the renewal of letter of permission for 2018-2019.”
The aforesaid order eloquently reflects the shock
expressed by this Court. As is reflectible from the aforesaid,
notice was issued only to test the propriety of the order and
also if the institution is eligible to get the renewal for
2018-2019.
5. We shall initially address the first issue. To adjudge
4
the issue of propriety of the order passed by the High Court,
we are compelled to travel in a time machine. The
respondent-institution had filed a writ petition, i.e., Writ
Petition (Civil) No.13530 of 2017 before the High Court and
was dealt with by the Division Bench of the High Court on
08th August 2017. On that day, the following order came to
be passed:
“In reference to order dated 4.8.2017, the Central
Government, as per the instructions received by
Mr. Asit Kumar Chaturvedi, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the respondent no.1, has
agreed to entertain the petitioners' matter along
with other similar matters and consider it to
revaluate the recommendations/views of the MCI,
Hearing Committee, DGHS and the Oversight
Committee as available on record for grant of
approval to the petitioner-institution to admit the
students in MBBS Course, after affording an
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner-institution
to the extent necessary. To facilitate the Central
Government, the whole paragraph 25 of the
judgment in which directive has been issued by
the Supreme Court is reproduced below:
'25. In the above persuasive premise, the
Central Government is hereby ordered to
consider afresh the materials on record
pertaining to the issue of confirmation or
otherwise of the letter of permission granted
to the petitioner colleges/institutions. We
make it clear that in undertaking this
exercise, the Central Government would
revaluate the recommendations/views of the
MCI, Hearing Committee, DGHS and the
Oversight Committee, as available on
5
records. It would also afford an opportunity
of hearing to the petitioner
colleges /institutions to the extent
necessary. The process of hearing and final
reasoned decision thereon, as ordered, would
be completed peremptorily within a period of
10 days from today. The parties would
unfailing co-operate in compliance of this
direction to meet the time frame fixed.'
Therefore, we also direct the Central
Government to consider the petitioners'
matter accordingly within seven days as
framed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court.
The matter is listed before Hon'ble the
Supreme Court on 24.8.2017.
We, therefore, also direct the registry to list
this matter on 28.8.2017.”
6. In pursuance of the aforesaid order, taking note of the
deficiencies, the Central Government passed the following
order on 19.8.2017 :
“17. Now, in compliance with the above direction
of Court, the Ministry granted hearing to the
college on 16.08.2017. The Hearing Committee
after considering the records and oral & written
submission of the college submitted its report to
the Ministry. The findings of the Hearing
Committee are as underThe
Committee notes that there was no
deficiency of faculty and residents as per MCI
assessment report. The findings of the assessor
indicate some deficiency of clinical material and
the observance of hospital protocols.
6
During the course of hearing, the college
produced certain documents contesting the
findings of the assessors. The Committee perused
the case sheet of single normal delivery on the day
of inspection as shown by the college. The delivery
of Ms. Sameerun was performed without blood
transfusion and the mother was discharged
without treatment of anaemeia when she was
severely anaemic at the time of admission with a
haemoglobin level of 6.5 gm%. This is gross
negligence. Further, the college could not produce
any Government issued birth certificates in
support of their claim of average number of
deliveries.
The inept handling of patients in the hospital
is further confirmed during the perusal of cases
pertaining to casualty and ICUs. The college could
not satisfy regarding the patients in casualty
wards. None of the 3 patients in ICCU seemed to
have cardiac history. The pulse rate of one of the
patient who was a PSVT (tachycardia) case was
noted as 72/min at the time of admission. NO
investigation was done. Other two patients with
diagnosis of Kyphoscoliosis (spinal deformity) and
vestibular neuritis (ear problem) were also
admitted in the cardiac ICU. This confirms the
finding of assessors and the college had no
explanation. It is understood that as per MSR, the
requirement is for requisite number of beds in
ICUs, however, the college seem to be employing
doubtful measures to show patients.
It was also noted that the college was neither
aware nor following the provisions of biomedical
waste (BMW) rules.
The explanation offered by the college in
obtaining 14 cadavers from `Dera Saccha Sauda'
Sirsa, Haryana without requisite permission and
death certificates is a serious issue to be looked
into by the concerned authorities.
7
In view of the above, despite the fact that no
deficiency of faculty and residents is noted, the
functioning of the hospital as per norms is in
serious doubt and the Committee agrees with the
decision of the Ministry vide letter dated
31.05.2017 to debar the college for two years and
also permit MCI to encash bank guarantee.
18. Accepting the recommendations of the
Hearing Committee, the Ministry reiterates its
earlier decision dated 31.05.2017 to debar the
college from admitting students for a period of two
years i.e. 2017-18 and 2018-19 and also to
authorize NCI to encash the Bank Guarantee of
Rs.2 Crore.”
7. As the facts would further uncurtain, the institution
filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before
this Court and chose to withdraw the same to approach the
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The said
order has already been quoted while reproducing the order
dated 06.09.2017.
8. The content of the order dated 28.08.2017 is
graphically clear. The High Court was not allowed to pass
any interim order pertaining to the Academic Session
2017-2018 but the Division Bench of the High Court, for
some unfathomable and inscrutable reason, referred to
certain judgments of this Court and allowed the prayer. It is
8
beyond our comprehension as to how the High Court could
have even remotely thought of passing an order granting the
Letter of Permission for the Academic Session 2016-2017
and renewal for 2017-2018. It is worthy to mention here
that before the High Court, time was sought on behalf of the
Central Government and the MCI to file counter affidavits.
The same was denied and the contesting parties were
deprived of the opportunity to contest. Be it noted, the writ
petition that was filed before this Court was withdrawn on
28th August, 2017 and a fresh writ was filed before the High
Court on 29th August 2017 and the judgment was delivered
without waiting for the reply from the Central Government
or MCI on 01st September 2017. It is clear as the cloudless
sky that the judgment of the High Court shows unnecessary
and uncalled for hurry, unjustified haste and an
unreasonable sense of promptitude possibly being oblivious
of the fact that the stand of the Medical Council of India and
the Central Government could not be given indecent burial
when they were parties on record. Such a procedure cannot
be countenanced in law.
9. The controversy cannot be allowed to end with our
9
aforesaid finding. The judicial propriety requires judicial
discipline. In the absence of a reply filed by the Medical
Council of India and the Central Government, it could not
have been possible to answer the factual matrix of the case.
What is not possible, is not possible. We may hasten to add
that in respect of the cases where renewal was granted, Mr.
Vikas Singh would submit that the deficiency was within
the permissible limit but in the present case, it was not so
and in any case, granting renewal for 2017-2018 and
confirmation of letter of permission for 2016-2017 was
totally unwarranted. In most of the cases, this Court has
directed for re-inspection by the MCI which would then take
a final decision for the academic year 2018-2019. It is a
most unfortunate situation that the Division Bench has
paved such a path. One cannot but say that the
adjudication by the Division Bench tantamounts to a state
as if they dragged themselves to the realm of “willing
suspension of disbelief”. Possibly, they assumed that they
could do what they intended to do. A Judge cannot think in
terms of “what pleases the Prince has the force of law”.
Frankly speaking, the law does not allow so, for law has to
10
be observed by requisite respect for law.
10. In this context, we may note the eloquent statement of
Benjamin Cardozo who said:
“The judge is not a knight errant, roaming at will
in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty and goodness.”
11. In this regard, the profound statement of Felix
Frankfurter2
is apposite to reproduce:
“For the highest exercise of judicial duty is to
subordinate one's personal pulls and one's private
views to the law of which we are all guardians -
those impersonal convictions that make a society a
civilized community, and not the victims of
personal rule.”
The learned Judge has further stated3
:
“What becomes decisive to a Justice's functioning
on the Court in the large area within which his
individuality moves is his general attitude toward
law, the habits of the mind that he has formed or
is capable of unforming, his capacity for
detachment, his temperament or training for
putting his passion behind his judgment instead
of in front of it. The attitudes and qualities which I
am groping to characterize are ingredients of what
compendiously might be called dominating
humility.”
12. In Shiv Mohan Singh v. The State (Delhi
Administration)4
, the Court has observed:
2 Clark, Tom C., “Mr. Justice Frankfurter :’A Heritage for all Who Love the Law”, 51
A.B.A.J. 330, 332 (1965)
3 Foreword, to Memorial issue for Robert H. Jackson, 55 Columbia Law Review
(April, 1955) p. 436
4
(1977) 2 SCC 238
11
“... a Judge even when he is free, is still not wholly
free; he is not to innovate at pleasure; he is not a
knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own
ideal of beauty or of goodness; he is to draw inspiration
from consecrated principles’...”
13. In this context, we may refer with profit the authority
in Om Prakash Chautala v. Kanwar Bhan5 wherein it has
been stated:
“19. It needs no special emphasis to state that a
Judge is not to be guided by any kind of notion.
The decision-making process expects a Judge or
an adjudicator to apply restraint, ostracise perceptual
subjectivity, make one’s emotions subservient
to one’s reasoning and think dispassionately. He is
expected to be guided by the established norms of
judicial process and decorum.”
And again:
“20. A Judge should abandon his passion. He
must constantly remind himself that he has a singular
master “duty to truth” and such truth is to
be arrived at within the legal parameters. No heroism,
no rhetorics.”
14. In Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heavy
Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and another6
, the
three–Judge Bench observed:
“32. When a position in law is well settled as a result
of judicial pronouncement of this Court, it
would amount to judicial impropriety to say the
least, for the subordinate courts including the
5
(2014) 5 SCC 417
6
(1997) 6 SCC 450
12
High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and
then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary
to the settled legal position. Such judicial adventurism
cannot be permitted and we strongly
deprecate the tendency of the subordinate courts
in not applying the settled principles and in passing
whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect
of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to
one of the parties. It is time that this tendency
stops.”
15. The aforestated thoughts are not only meaningfully
pregnant but also expressively penetrating. They clearly
expound the role of a Judge, especially the effort of
understanding and attitude of judging. A Judge is expected
to abandon his personal notion or impression gathered from
subjective experience. The process of adjudication lays
emphasis on the wise scrutiny of materials sans emotions.
A studied analysis of facts and evidence is a categorical
imperative. Deviation from them is likely to increase the
individual gravitational pull which has the potentiality to
take justice to her coffin.
16. As is perceptible, we had stayed the operation of the
order at the interim stage and further directed that if the
Institution had admitted students they were debarred from
continuing in the course. The same stands confirmed.
17. Further, the question that remains to be adjudicated is
13
whether the students who were given admission by the
institution that had taken recourse to unholy and uncalled
for practice should be allowed to suffer. We think not.
Students are to be compensated. They had paid the fees.
Hopes were kindled in their hearts and aspirations in their
mind. Their young minds were polluted by the institution
and, therefore, we direct the respondent-institution to pay
Rs.10,00,000/- to each of the students who had taken
admission apart from refunding their fees. Additionally, as
the conduct of the 1st respondent, namely, G.C.R.G.
Memorial Trust, is absolutely blameworthy, we impose costs
of Rs.25 lacs to be deposited before this Court within eight
weeks hence.
18. Before parting, it is necessary to add and repeat that
the Division Bench had no reason to abandon the concept of
judicial propriety and transgress the rules and further
proceed on a path where it was not required to. Such things
create institutional problems and we are sure that the
learned Judges shall be guided by it. As far as the prayer of
the institution as regards the Academic Session 2018-2019
is concerned, it does not deserve consideration and,
14
accordingly, stands rejected. We say so as an unscrupulous
litigant who conceived the idea of paving the path of his own
desire, moving according to his design, proceeding as per
his whim and marching ahead with brazenness abandoning
any sense of prudence cannot be leniently dealt with. It is
the duty of the Court to take stringent action, for he has
polluted the purity attached to the justice dispensation
system and sullied the majesty of law.
19. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the appeal stands
allowed. Costs as already assessed.
….……........................CJI.
[DIPAK MISRA]
….………........................J.
[A.M. KHANWILKAR]
…….……..........................J.
[Dr. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi.
November 23, 2017.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.19662 OF 2017
[Arising out of S.L.P. (C)No. 23410 of 2017]
Medical Council of India ....Appellant
Versus
G.C.R.G. Memorial Trust & Ors. ....Respondents
J U D G M E N T
DIPAK MISRA, CJI.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeal frescoes the scenario where one is
tempted to quote a few lines from what has been stated in
Quillen v. Board of Education1
. It reads thus:-
“The distinction between the gourmet and the
gourmand is as neat and decisive in the prosaic
realm of negotiation as in the festive sphere of
gastronomic enjoyment — attempting to satisfy an
unrestrained or exaggerated appetite in either field
may prove discomforting if not disastrous.”
The purpose of referring to the same is to highlight the
unrestrained and exaggerated appetite. When the factual
1 115 NYS 2d 122, 126 (1952)
2
matrix would be unrolled, the greed in all its colours shall
come to the forefront.
3. The present appeal by special leave calls in question
the legal acceptability of the order dated 01st September
2017 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of
Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Misc. Bench No.13530 of
2017 whereby the High Court has quashed the order dated
19th August 2017 as well as order dated 31st May 2017
passed by the Central Government and eventually granted
permission to the 1st respondent to admit students for the
Academic Session 2017-2018.
4. When the matter was listed on 06th September 2017,
this Court had passed the following order :
“Issue notice fixing a returnable date within
four weeks.
As Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Additional
Solicitor General for respondent No.3-Union of
India and Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior
counsel has entered appearance on behalf of
respondent No.1 and 2, no further notice need be
issued.
As far as respondent No.5 and 6 are
concerned, let notice be issued.
Dasti in addition is permitted.
As an interim order, it is directed that there
shall be stay of the operation of order dated 1st
3
September, 2017 further corrected on 4th
September 2017.
If the Institution has admitted students they
are debarred from continuing in the course. We
have passed this order as we while disposing of the
writ petition preferred under Article 32 of the
Constitution had passed the following order :-
'Learned counsel for the petitioners
seeks leave of this Court to withdraw
the writ petition to approach the High
Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
The writ petition is permitted to be
withdrawn. However, it is made clear
that the High Court, while entertaining
the writ petition, shall not pass any
interim order pertaining to the
academic year 2017-2018.'
We really fail to fathom the manner in which
the High Court has misconstrued our order and
passed the final order for 2017-2018. We are
issuing notice only to test the propriety of the
order and also if the Institution is eligible to get
the renewal of letter of permission for 2018-2019.”
The aforesaid order eloquently reflects the shock
expressed by this Court. As is reflectible from the aforesaid,
notice was issued only to test the propriety of the order and
also if the institution is eligible to get the renewal for
2018-2019.
5. We shall initially address the first issue. To adjudge
4
the issue of propriety of the order passed by the High Court,
we are compelled to travel in a time machine. The
respondent-institution had filed a writ petition, i.e., Writ
Petition (Civil) No.13530 of 2017 before the High Court and
was dealt with by the Division Bench of the High Court on
08th August 2017. On that day, the following order came to
be passed:
“In reference to order dated 4.8.2017, the Central
Government, as per the instructions received by
Mr. Asit Kumar Chaturvedi, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the respondent no.1, has
agreed to entertain the petitioners' matter along
with other similar matters and consider it to
revaluate the recommendations/views of the MCI,
Hearing Committee, DGHS and the Oversight
Committee as available on record for grant of
approval to the petitioner-institution to admit the
students in MBBS Course, after affording an
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner-institution
to the extent necessary. To facilitate the Central
Government, the whole paragraph 25 of the
judgment in which directive has been issued by
the Supreme Court is reproduced below:
'25. In the above persuasive premise, the
Central Government is hereby ordered to
consider afresh the materials on record
pertaining to the issue of confirmation or
otherwise of the letter of permission granted
to the petitioner colleges/institutions. We
make it clear that in undertaking this
exercise, the Central Government would
revaluate the recommendations/views of the
MCI, Hearing Committee, DGHS and the
Oversight Committee, as available on
5
records. It would also afford an opportunity
of hearing to the petitioner
colleges /institutions to the extent
necessary. The process of hearing and final
reasoned decision thereon, as ordered, would
be completed peremptorily within a period of
10 days from today. The parties would
unfailing co-operate in compliance of this
direction to meet the time frame fixed.'
Therefore, we also direct the Central
Government to consider the petitioners'
matter accordingly within seven days as
framed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court.
The matter is listed before Hon'ble the
Supreme Court on 24.8.2017.
We, therefore, also direct the registry to list
this matter on 28.8.2017.”
6. In pursuance of the aforesaid order, taking note of the
deficiencies, the Central Government passed the following
order on 19.8.2017 :
“17. Now, in compliance with the above direction
of Court, the Ministry granted hearing to the
college on 16.08.2017. The Hearing Committee
after considering the records and oral & written
submission of the college submitted its report to
the Ministry. The findings of the Hearing
Committee are as underThe
Committee notes that there was no
deficiency of faculty and residents as per MCI
assessment report. The findings of the assessor
indicate some deficiency of clinical material and
the observance of hospital protocols.
6
During the course of hearing, the college
produced certain documents contesting the
findings of the assessors. The Committee perused
the case sheet of single normal delivery on the day
of inspection as shown by the college. The delivery
of Ms. Sameerun was performed without blood
transfusion and the mother was discharged
without treatment of anaemeia when she was
severely anaemic at the time of admission with a
haemoglobin level of 6.5 gm%. This is gross
negligence. Further, the college could not produce
any Government issued birth certificates in
support of their claim of average number of
deliveries.
The inept handling of patients in the hospital
is further confirmed during the perusal of cases
pertaining to casualty and ICUs. The college could
not satisfy regarding the patients in casualty
wards. None of the 3 patients in ICCU seemed to
have cardiac history. The pulse rate of one of the
patient who was a PSVT (tachycardia) case was
noted as 72/min at the time of admission. NO
investigation was done. Other two patients with
diagnosis of Kyphoscoliosis (spinal deformity) and
vestibular neuritis (ear problem) were also
admitted in the cardiac ICU. This confirms the
finding of assessors and the college had no
explanation. It is understood that as per MSR, the
requirement is for requisite number of beds in
ICUs, however, the college seem to be employing
doubtful measures to show patients.
It was also noted that the college was neither
aware nor following the provisions of biomedical
waste (BMW) rules.
The explanation offered by the college in
obtaining 14 cadavers from `Dera Saccha Sauda'
Sirsa, Haryana without requisite permission and
death certificates is a serious issue to be looked
into by the concerned authorities.
7
In view of the above, despite the fact that no
deficiency of faculty and residents is noted, the
functioning of the hospital as per norms is in
serious doubt and the Committee agrees with the
decision of the Ministry vide letter dated
31.05.2017 to debar the college for two years and
also permit MCI to encash bank guarantee.
18. Accepting the recommendations of the
Hearing Committee, the Ministry reiterates its
earlier decision dated 31.05.2017 to debar the
college from admitting students for a period of two
years i.e. 2017-18 and 2018-19 and also to
authorize NCI to encash the Bank Guarantee of
Rs.2 Crore.”
7. As the facts would further uncurtain, the institution
filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before
this Court and chose to withdraw the same to approach the
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The said
order has already been quoted while reproducing the order
dated 06.09.2017.
8. The content of the order dated 28.08.2017 is
graphically clear. The High Court was not allowed to pass
any interim order pertaining to the Academic Session
2017-2018 but the Division Bench of the High Court, for
some unfathomable and inscrutable reason, referred to
certain judgments of this Court and allowed the prayer. It is
8
beyond our comprehension as to how the High Court could
have even remotely thought of passing an order granting the
Letter of Permission for the Academic Session 2016-2017
and renewal for 2017-2018. It is worthy to mention here
that before the High Court, time was sought on behalf of the
Central Government and the MCI to file counter affidavits.
The same was denied and the contesting parties were
deprived of the opportunity to contest. Be it noted, the writ
petition that was filed before this Court was withdrawn on
28th August, 2017 and a fresh writ was filed before the High
Court on 29th August 2017 and the judgment was delivered
without waiting for the reply from the Central Government
or MCI on 01st September 2017. It is clear as the cloudless
sky that the judgment of the High Court shows unnecessary
and uncalled for hurry, unjustified haste and an
unreasonable sense of promptitude possibly being oblivious
of the fact that the stand of the Medical Council of India and
the Central Government could not be given indecent burial
when they were parties on record. Such a procedure cannot
be countenanced in law.
9. The controversy cannot be allowed to end with our
9
aforesaid finding. The judicial propriety requires judicial
discipline. In the absence of a reply filed by the Medical
Council of India and the Central Government, it could not
have been possible to answer the factual matrix of the case.
What is not possible, is not possible. We may hasten to add
that in respect of the cases where renewal was granted, Mr.
Vikas Singh would submit that the deficiency was within
the permissible limit but in the present case, it was not so
and in any case, granting renewal for 2017-2018 and
confirmation of letter of permission for 2016-2017 was
totally unwarranted. In most of the cases, this Court has
directed for re-inspection by the MCI which would then take
a final decision for the academic year 2018-2019. It is a
most unfortunate situation that the Division Bench has
paved such a path. One cannot but say that the
adjudication by the Division Bench tantamounts to a state
as if they dragged themselves to the realm of “willing
suspension of disbelief”. Possibly, they assumed that they
could do what they intended to do. A Judge cannot think in
terms of “what pleases the Prince has the force of law”.
Frankly speaking, the law does not allow so, for law has to
10
be observed by requisite respect for law.
10. In this context, we may note the eloquent statement of
Benjamin Cardozo who said:
“The judge is not a knight errant, roaming at will
in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty and goodness.”
11. In this regard, the profound statement of Felix
Frankfurter2
is apposite to reproduce:
“For the highest exercise of judicial duty is to
subordinate one's personal pulls and one's private
views to the law of which we are all guardians -
those impersonal convictions that make a society a
civilized community, and not the victims of
personal rule.”
The learned Judge has further stated3
:
“What becomes decisive to a Justice's functioning
on the Court in the large area within which his
individuality moves is his general attitude toward
law, the habits of the mind that he has formed or
is capable of unforming, his capacity for
detachment, his temperament or training for
putting his passion behind his judgment instead
of in front of it. The attitudes and qualities which I
am groping to characterize are ingredients of what
compendiously might be called dominating
humility.”
12. In Shiv Mohan Singh v. The State (Delhi
Administration)4
, the Court has observed:
2 Clark, Tom C., “Mr. Justice Frankfurter :’A Heritage for all Who Love the Law”, 51
A.B.A.J. 330, 332 (1965)
3 Foreword, to Memorial issue for Robert H. Jackson, 55 Columbia Law Review
(April, 1955) p. 436
4
(1977) 2 SCC 238
11
“... a Judge even when he is free, is still not wholly
free; he is not to innovate at pleasure; he is not a
knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own
ideal of beauty or of goodness; he is to draw inspiration
from consecrated principles’...”
13. In this context, we may refer with profit the authority
in Om Prakash Chautala v. Kanwar Bhan5 wherein it has
been stated:
“19. It needs no special emphasis to state that a
Judge is not to be guided by any kind of notion.
The decision-making process expects a Judge or
an adjudicator to apply restraint, ostracise perceptual
subjectivity, make one’s emotions subservient
to one’s reasoning and think dispassionately. He is
expected to be guided by the established norms of
judicial process and decorum.”
And again:
“20. A Judge should abandon his passion. He
must constantly remind himself that he has a singular
master “duty to truth” and such truth is to
be arrived at within the legal parameters. No heroism,
no rhetorics.”
14. In Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heavy
Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and another6
, the
three–Judge Bench observed:
“32. When a position in law is well settled as a result
of judicial pronouncement of this Court, it
would amount to judicial impropriety to say the
least, for the subordinate courts including the
5
(2014) 5 SCC 417
6
(1997) 6 SCC 450
12
High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and
then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary
to the settled legal position. Such judicial adventurism
cannot be permitted and we strongly
deprecate the tendency of the subordinate courts
in not applying the settled principles and in passing
whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect
of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to
one of the parties. It is time that this tendency
stops.”
15. The aforestated thoughts are not only meaningfully
pregnant but also expressively penetrating. They clearly
expound the role of a Judge, especially the effort of
understanding and attitude of judging. A Judge is expected
to abandon his personal notion or impression gathered from
subjective experience. The process of adjudication lays
emphasis on the wise scrutiny of materials sans emotions.
A studied analysis of facts and evidence is a categorical
imperative. Deviation from them is likely to increase the
individual gravitational pull which has the potentiality to
take justice to her coffin.
16. As is perceptible, we had stayed the operation of the
order at the interim stage and further directed that if the
Institution had admitted students they were debarred from
continuing in the course. The same stands confirmed.
17. Further, the question that remains to be adjudicated is
13
whether the students who were given admission by the
institution that had taken recourse to unholy and uncalled
for practice should be allowed to suffer. We think not.
Students are to be compensated. They had paid the fees.
Hopes were kindled in their hearts and aspirations in their
mind. Their young minds were polluted by the institution
and, therefore, we direct the respondent-institution to pay
Rs.10,00,000/- to each of the students who had taken
admission apart from refunding their fees. Additionally, as
the conduct of the 1st respondent, namely, G.C.R.G.
Memorial Trust, is absolutely blameworthy, we impose costs
of Rs.25 lacs to be deposited before this Court within eight
weeks hence.
18. Before parting, it is necessary to add and repeat that
the Division Bench had no reason to abandon the concept of
judicial propriety and transgress the rules and further
proceed on a path where it was not required to. Such things
create institutional problems and we are sure that the
learned Judges shall be guided by it. As far as the prayer of
the institution as regards the Academic Session 2018-2019
is concerned, it does not deserve consideration and,
14
accordingly, stands rejected. We say so as an unscrupulous
litigant who conceived the idea of paving the path of his own
desire, moving according to his design, proceeding as per
his whim and marching ahead with brazenness abandoning
any sense of prudence cannot be leniently dealt with. It is
the duty of the Court to take stringent action, for he has
polluted the purity attached to the justice dispensation
system and sullied the majesty of law.
19. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the appeal stands
allowed. Costs as already assessed.
….……........................CJI.
[DIPAK MISRA]
….………........................J.
[A.M. KHANWILKAR]
…….……..........................J.
[Dr. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi.
November 23, 2017.
