1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).319-320 OF 2009
SARDAR SURJEET SINGH Appellant(s)
VERSUS
JUGUNA BAI (SINCE DEAD) & ORS. Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2. These appeals have been preferred against the judgment
and order dated 30.11.2007 passed by the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh in Civil Revision Petition Nos.3914 and 3144 of
2007, whereby the High Court allowed the impleadment of
respondent No.3 in the final decree proceedings on the basis
of deed of settlement dated 30.12.1978.
3. The facts indicate that defendant Nos.2 and 3 are
sisters. Late Sardar Santh Singh, with the consent of his
wives, adopted the appellant herein-Sardar Surjeet Singh,
when he was three years old. After the adoption, Smt. Juguna
Bai gave birth to one daughter-Sathnam Kaur, defendant No.3.
Later on, one adoption deed was executed on 7.7.1978.
4. A suit for partition was filed in which the Trial
Court passed a preliminary decree on 11.10.1990 giving 1/3rd
share to the appellant, 1/3rd share to be shared between two
wives-Rama Bai and Juguna Bai, with 1/6th share each and
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remaining 1/3rd to Sathnam Kaur-daughter.
5. The appeal against the final decree was ultimately
withdrawn by the plaintiff after the death of Rama Bai,
during the pendency of the appeal. Thereafter, an application
was filed in the year 1993 for passing of the final decree.
Nima Kaur, the foster daughter of Sardar Santh Singh, filed
I.A. No.1491 of 1993 under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC for impleading
her as defendant No.4, claiming herself to be foster daughter
of Sardar Santh Singh and, in view of the settlement deed
dated 30.12.1978, she claimed 1/3rd share.
6. The appellant resisted the application. It was
contended that she was not having any right as the
preliminary decree, which had been passed in civil suit, had
attained finality. The existence of the settlement deed dated
30.12.1978 was denied. On 12.7.1996, the Civil Judge
dismissed the application filed by Nima Kaur. She preferred
a revision in the High Court in C.R.P.No.3124 of 1996, to be
impleaded as defendant No.4 in the Suit being O.S. No.54/81,
which was allowed vide order dated 28.7.1997.
7. The Trial Judge, by a docket order dated 26.11.2002,
directed the plaintiff to carry out the amendment and ordered
that the final decree proceedings be closed. Against the
said order, C.R.P.No.6088/2002 in O.S.No.54/81 and C.R.P.
No.620/2003 in I.A.No.697/93 in O.S.No.54/81 were filed
before the High Court.
8. The High Court allowed both the CRPs and directed the
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Trial Court to proceed with the final decree proceedings only
and dispose of the same in accordance with law. The High
Court opined that it was evident that admittedly no challenge
was made as against the preliminary decree by respondent
No.4, the preliminary decree passed on 11.10.1990 had become
final and even the appeal filed by the plaintiff had been
dismissed on 6.4.1993 confirming the said decree. A
preliminary decree once passed could not be set aside unless
and until the appeal was filed. Mere allowing an impleading
petition, and that too during the final decree proceedings,
would not entitle respondent No.4 to plead that the
preliminary decree has to be reopened. Vide order dated
8.12.2003, the High Court opined that if at all respondent
No.4 has any say, within legal parameter, the same is open to
her to be agitated.
9. Nima Kaur thereafter, filed an application being
I.A.No.1258 of 2004 in I.A.No.697/93 in O.S.No.54/81 to
receive a document dated 12.8.1979 purported to be a
relinquishment deed but the said application was rejected by
the Civil Judge vide order dated 8.12.2004. Aggrieved
thereby, C.R.P. No.86/05 was preferred by Nima Kaur, which
was dismissed by the High Court. The High Court observed that
these rights have to be considered by the executing court, if
any, during final decree proceedings.
10. On 5.2.2007, the Civil Judge passed the final decree
allotting half share to the appellant, 1/6th share to Juguna
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Bai and 1/3rd share to Satnam Kaur. It was also held by the
said Court that Nima Kaur was not entitled for any share in
the suit property and her remedy was to file a separate suit.
It would not be possible for the Court to determine her
share in the final decree proceedings on the basis of the
deed dated 30.12.1978. Aggrieved thereby, Juguna Bai and
Satnam Kaur filed C.R.P.No.3914/07 and Nima Kaur filed C.R.P.
No.3114/07. The High Court vide impugned order dated
30.11.2007 directed the Trial Court to examine the claim of
Nima Kaur independently so that she would be able to
establish her claim over the property left by Sant Singh.
preliminary decree shall be modified to the extent needed and
shall also decide as to who succeeded to the estate of the
deceased and re-determine the shares accordingly. The said
order has been questioned before us in this appeal.
11. It was submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant that once a preliminary decree has
been passed, determining the shares, during the final decree
proceedings, the shares could not have been altered as has
been ordered by the High Court. Preliminary decree had
attained finality. It was not an intervening event which has
taken place after passing of the preliminary decree and
before passing the final decree which can only be taken into
consideration for redeterrmining of shares. The only remedy
available to workout any right, if at all available to Nima
Kaur, was to file an independent suit to establish her
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right, title or interest on the basis of deed dated
13.10.1978 or relinquishment deed of 1979 and not by way of
filing application in a final decree proceedings to get rid
of the preliminary decree, which has attained finality.
12. Learned counsel further submitted that Nima Kaur
otherwise would not have any right, title or other interest
in the property left by the deceased. Document itself was
doubtful. Thus, the High Court has erred in violating its
own earlier order laying down that preliminary decree would
not be reopened. The High Court has ordered reopening of
the preliminary decree which was not permissible.
13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent
has strenuously urged that during the final decree
proceedings, the extent of the share to be allotted to each
of the respondent parties can be worked out. Once the gift
deed has been executed, in the form of settlement deed in
favour of respondent No.3 - Nima Kaur, she was entitled to
press her claim for settlement of the said property during
the final decree proceedings. To that extent, the shares of
other members were rightly required to be reduced. Learned
counsel has relied upon various decisions of this Court to be
referred later.
14. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we
are of the opinion that the question whether preliminary
decree can be reopened, has been considered by this Court
in T. Ravi V. B Chinna Narasimha [2017(3) SCALE 740], in
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which reliance has been placed on Venkata Reddy & Ors. v.
Pethi Reddy {AIR 1963 SC 992] and in view of section 97 of
CPC it has been laid down that once the matter has been
considered in preliminary decree, it cannot be reagitated in
the appeal against the final decree. Preliminary decree is
final with respect to the shares. In T. Ravi V. B Chinna
Narasimha this Court held as under:
“37. In the instant case preliminary decree was
passed in the year 1970 and the shares were
declared to the aforesaid extent of the
respective parties therein who were the heirs of
Late Nawab Jung. Hamid Ali Khan, defendant No.1,
had only 14/104th share in the disputed property.
Preliminary decree dated 24.11.1970 has attained
finality which was questioned in appeal on
limited extent in the High Court which has
attained finality by dismissal of LPA on
12.10.1977. Thus the determination of shares as
per preliminary decree has attained finality,
shares of the parties had been crystalised in
each and every property. Purchaser pendente lite
is bound by the preliminary decree with respect
to the shares so determined and it cannot be
re-opened and whatever equity could have bee
claimed in the final decree proceedings to the
extent of vendor's share has already been
extended to the purchasers.
38. In Venkata Reddy & Ors. v. Pethi Reddy AIR
1963 SC 992, it has been laid down that the
preliminary decree for partition is final. It
also embodies the final decision of the Court.
The question of finality has been discussed thus
:
“6. The new provision makes it clear that
the law is and has always been that upon the
father's insolvency his disposing power over
the interest of his undivided sons in the
joint family property vests in the Official
Receiver and that consequently the latter
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has a right to sell that interest. The
provision is thus declaratory of the law and
was intended to apply to all cases except
those covered by the two provisos. We are
concerned here only with the first proviso.
This proviso excepts from the operation of
the Act a transaction such as a sale by an
Official Receiver which has been the subject
of a final decision by a competent Court.
The short question, therefore, is whether
the preliminary decree for partition passed
in this case which was affirmed finally in
second appeal by the High Court of Madras
can be regarded as a final decision. The
competence of the Court is not in question
here. What is, however, contended is that
in a partition suit the only decision which
ca be said to be a final decision is the
final decree passed in the case and that
since final decree proceedings were still
going on when the Amending Act came into
force the first proviso was not available to
the appellants. It is contended on behalf
of the appellants that since the rights of
the parties are adjudicated upon by the
Court before a preliminary decree is passed
that decree must, in so far as rights
adjudicated upon are concerned, be deemed to
be a final decision. The word 'decision'
even in its popular sense means a concluded
opinion (see Stroud's Judicial Dictionary –
3
rd ed. Vol. I, p. 743). Where, therefore,
the decision is embodied in the judgment
which is followed by a decree finality must
naturally attach itself to it in the sense
that it is o longer open to question by
either party except in an appeal, review or
revision petition as provided for by law.
The High Court has, however, observed :
“The mere declaration of the
rights of the plaintiff by the
preliminary decree, would, in our
opinion not amount to a final
decision for it is well known that
even if a preliminary decree is
passed either in a mortgage suit or
in a partition suit, there are
certain contingencies in which such
a preliminary decree can be modified
or amended and therefore would not
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become final.”
It is not clear from the judgment what the
contingencies referred to by the High Court are
in which a preliminary decree can be modified or
amended unless what the learned Judges meant was
modified or amended in appeal or in review or in
revision or in exceptional circumstances by
resorting to the powers conferred by Sections 151
and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If that
is what the High Court meant then every decree
passed by a Court including decrees passed in
cases which do not contemplate making of a
preliminary decree are liable to be modified and
amended. Therefore, if the reason given by the
High Court is accepted it would mean that no
finality attaches to decree at all. That is not
the law. A decision is said to be final when, so
far as the Court rendering it is concerned, it is
unalterable except by resort to such provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure as permit its
reversal, modification or amendment. Similarly,
a final decision would mean a decision which
would operate as res judicata between the parties
if it is not sought to be modified or reversed by
preferring an appeal or a revision or a review
application as is permitted by the Code. A
preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a
mortgage suit or a partition suit, is not a
tentative decree but must, in so far as the
matters dealt with by it are concerned, be
regarded as conclusive. No doubt, in suits which
contemplate the making of two decrees – a
preliminary decree and a final decree – the
decree which would be executable would be the
final decree. But the finality of a decree or a
decision does not necessarily depend upon its
being executable. The legislature in its wisdom
has thought that suits of certain types should be
decided in stages and though the suit in such
cases can be regarded as fully and completely
decided only after a final decree is made the
decision of the Court arrived at the earlier
stage also has a finality attached to it. It
would be relevant to refer to S.97 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which provides that where a party
aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal
from it, he is precluded from disputing its
correctness in any appeal which may be preferred
from the final decree. This provision thus
clearly indicates that as to the matters covered
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by it, a preliminary decree is regarded as
embodying the final decision of the Court passing
that decree.”
15. In the case of Phoolchand and Anr. vs. Gopal Lal, AIR
1967 SC 1470, this Court has laid down that there can be
variation in shares in the preliminary decree. Variation itself
is a Decree. In a case for partition, if any event transpires
after preliminary decree, which necessitates the change in
shares, same can be considered. This Court laid down thus :
“6. The next contention is that there
cannot be two preliminary decrees and
therefore when the trial court varied the
shares as indicated in the preliminary
decree of August 1, 1942 there was no fresh
preliminary decree passed by the trial
court. It is not disputed that in a
partition suit the court has jurisdiction
to amend the shares suitably even if the
preliminary decree has been passed if some
member of the family to whom an allotment
was made in the preliminary decree dies
thereafter : (Parshuram v. Hirabai "AIR
1957 Bom 59'). So the trial court was
justified in amending the shares on the
deaths of Sohan Lal and Smt. Gulab Bai. The
only question then is whether this
amendment amounted to a fresh decree. The
Allahabad High Court in Bharat Indo v.
Yakub Hassan (1913 ILR 35 All 159) the Oudh
Chief Court in Kedemath v. Pattu Lal (ILR
20 Luck 557 (AIR 1945 Oudh 312), and the
Punjab High Court in Joti Parshad v.
Ganeshi Lal (AIR 1961 Punj 120) seem to
take the view that there can be only one
preliminary decree and one final decree
thereafter. The Madras, Bombay and Calcutta
High Courts seem to take the view that
there can be more than one preliminary
decree : (Kasi v. V. Ramanathan
Chettiar(1947-2 Mad LJ 523) Raja Peary
Mohan v. Manohar (27 Cal WN 989 (AIR 1924
Cal 160), and Parshuram v. Hirabai. AIR
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1957 Bom 59.
7. We are of opinion that there is nothing in
the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits
the passing of more than one preliminary
decree if circumstances justify the same and
that it may be necessary to do so particularly
in partition suits when after the preliminary
decree some parties die and shares of other
parties are thereby augmented. We have already
said that it is not disputed that in partition
suits the court can do so even after the
preliminary decree is passed. It would in our
opinion be convenient to the court and
advantageous to the parties, specially in
partition suits, to have disputed rights
finally settled and specification of shares in
the preliminary decree varied before a final
decree is prepared. If this is done, there is
a clear determination of the rights of parties
to the suit on the question in dispute and we
see no difficulty in holding that in such
cases there is a decree deciding these
disputed rights; if so, there is no reason why
a second preliminary decree correcting the
shares in a partition suit cannot be passed by
the court. So far therefore as partition suits
are concerned we have no doubt that if an
event transpires after the preliminary decree
which necessitates a change in shares, the
court can and should (1) A.I.R. 1957 Bom. 59.
(3) (1945) I.L.R. 29 Luck, 557. (5) [1947] II
Mad. L.J. 523. (2) (1913) I.L.R. 35 All. 159.
(4) A.I.R. 1961 Puni. 120. (6) [1923] 27 Cal.
W.N. 989. do so; and if there is a dispute in
that behalf, the order of the court deciding
that dispute and making variation in shares
specified in the preliminary decree already
passed is a decree in itself which would be
liable to appeal. We should however like to
point out that what we are saying must be
confined to partition suits, for we are not
concerned in the present appeal with other
kinds of suits in which also preliminary and
final decrees are passed. There is no
prohibition in the Code of Civil Procedure
against passing a second preliminary decree in
such circumstances and we do not see why we
should rule out a second preliminary decree in
such circumstances only on the ground that the
Code of Civil Procedure does not contemplate
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such a possibility. In any case if two views
are possible-and obviously this is so because
the High Courts have differed on the
question-we would prefer the view taken by the
High Courts which hold that a second
preliminary decree can be passed, particularly
in partition suits where parties have died
after the preliminary decree and shares
specified in the preliminary decree have to be
adjusted. We see no reason why in such a case
if there is dispute, it should not be decided
by the court which passed the preliminary
decree, for it must not be forgotten that the
suit is not over till the final decree is
passed and the court has jurisdiction to
decide all disputes that may arise after the
preliminary decree, particularly in a
partition suit due to deaths of some of the
parties. Whether there can be more than one
final decree does not arise in the present
appeal and on that we express no opinion. We
therefore hold that in the circumstances of
this case it was open to the court to draw up
a fresh preliminary decree as two of the
parties had died after the preliminary decree
and before the final decree was passed.
Further as there was dispute between the
surviving parties as to devolution of the
shares of the parties who were dead and that
dispute was decided by the trial court in the
present case and thereafter the preliminary
decree al- ready passed was amended, the
decision amounted to a decree and was liable
to appeal. We therefore agree with the view
taken by the High Court that in such
circumstances a second preliminary decree can
be passed in partition suits by which the
shares allotted in the preliminary decree
already passed can be amended and if there is
dispute between surviving parties in that
behalf and that dispute is decided the
decision amounts to a decree. We should
however like to make it clear that this can
only be done so long as the final decree has
not been passed. We therefore reject this
contention of the appellant.“
The decision is distinguishable and cannot be said to
be applicable in view of the factual matrix of the instant
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case where the right has been asserted, which came into
existence before the preliminary decree was passed and Nima
Kaur was not a party to suit. It also appears that it was
not the plea that was taken by any of the parties during the
course of preliminary decree that she was having right, title
or interest on the basis of settlement/gift deed dated
30.12.1978.
16. Learned counsel has also relied upon the decision of
this Court in SS Reddy vs. Narayan Reddy, (1991) 3 SCC 647,
in which there was change of law after passing of the
preliminary decree. In that context, this Court has laid down
that since Hindu daughter's rights in coparcenary property
were not recognized earlier, it should be taken on the basis
of the law which prevails on the date of final decree
proceedings. In the meanwhile, after passing of preliminary
decree the amendment that has been taken place by way of
Amending Act was taken into consideration and the final
decree was modified, accordingly. It was also a case of
subsequent event after passing of the preliminary decree
which necessitated re-determination of the shares, otherwise
preliminary decree was final. Factual matrix is not the same
in the instant case. In S. Sai Reddy vs. S. Narayana Reddy &
Ors. (supra), this Court laid down thus:
“7. The question that falls for our
consideration is whether the preliminary
decree has the effect of depriving
respondents 2 to 5 of the benefits of the
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amendment. The learned counsel placed
reliance on clause (iv) of Section 29-A to
support his contention that it does. Clause
(ii) of the section provides that a daughter
shall be allotted share like a son in the
same manner treating her to be a son at the
partition of the joint family property.
However, the legislature was conscious that
prior to the enforcement of the amending
Act, partitions will already have taken
place in some families and arrangements with
regard to the disposition of the properties
would have been made and marriage expenses
would have been incurred etc. The
legislature, therefore, did not want to
unsettle the settled positions. Hence, it
enacted clause (iv) providing that clause
(ii) would not apply to a daughter married
prior to the partition or to a partition
which had already been effected before the
commencement of the amending Act. Thus if
prior to the partition of family property a
daughter had been married, she was
disentitled to any share in the property.
Similarly, if the partition had been
effected before September 5, 1985 the date
on which the amending Act came into force,
the daughter even though unmarried was not
given a share in the family property. The
crucial question, however, is as to when a
partition can be said to have been effected
for the purposes of the amended provision. A
partition of the joint Hindu family can be
effected by various modes, viz., by a family
settlement, by a registered instrument of
partition, by oral arrangement by the
parties, or by a decree of the court. When a
suit for partition is filed in a court, a
preliminary decree is passed determining
shares of the members of the family. The
final decree follows, thereafter, allotting
specific properties and directing the
partition of the immovable properties by
metes and bounds. Unless and until the final
decree is passed and the allottees of the
shares are put in possession of the
respective property, the partition is not
complete. The preliminary decree which
determines shares does not bring about the
final partition. For, pending the final
decree the shares themselves are liable to
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be varied on account of the intervening
events. In the instant case, there is no
dispute that only a preliminary decree had
been passed and before the final decree
could be passed the amending Act came into
force as a result of which clause (ii) of
Section 29-A of the Act became applicable.
This intervening event which gave shares to
respondents 2 to 5 had the effect of varying
shares of the parties like any supervening
development. Since the legislation is
beneficial and placed on the statute book
with the avowed object of benefiting women
which is a vulnerable section of the society
in all its stratas, it is necessary to give
a liberal effect to it. For this reason
also, we cannot equate the concept of
partition that the legislature has in mind
in the present case with a mere severance of
the status of the joint family which can be
effected by an expression of a mere desire
by a family member to do so. The partition
that the legislature has in mind in the
present case is undoubtedly a partition
completed in all respects and which has
brought about an irreversible situation. A
preliminary decree which merely declares
shares which are themselves liable to change
does not bring about any irreversible
situation. Hence, we are of the view that
unless a partition of the property is
effected by metes and bounds, the daughters
cannot be deprived of the benefits conferred
by the Act. Any other view is likely to
deprive a vast section of the fair sex of
the benefits conferred by the amendment.
Spurious family settlements, instruments of
partitions not to speak of oral partitions
will spring up and nullify the beneficial
effect of the legislation depriving a vast
section of women of its benefits.
8. Hence, in our opinion, the High Court has
rightly held that since the final decree had
not been passed and the property had not
been divided by metes and bounds, clause
(iv) to Section 29-A was not attracted in
the present case and the
respondent-daughters were entitled to their
share in the family property.”
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18. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of this
Court in S. Satnam Singh and Ors vs. Surender Kaur and Anr.
[(2009) 2 SCC 562] in which this Court laid down thus:
“18. In certain situations, for the purpose of
complete adjudication of the disputes between the
parties an appellate Court may also take into
consideration subsequent events after passing of
the preliminary decree.
In Ct. A. Ct. Nachiappa Chettiar & Ors. V.
Ct. A. Ct. Subramaniam Chettiar [(1960) 2 SCR 209],
it was held :
"20 It would thus be seen that the
respondent's share in the family
properties was not in dispute nor was his
share in the properties in Burma seriously
challenged. The only plea raised in
respect of the latter claim was that the
court had no jurisdiction to deal with it.
This state of the pleadings in a sense
truly reflected the nature of the dispute
between the parties. It is common ground
that the family is a trading family and
there could be no doubt that the assets of
the family were partible between the
members of the family. It was on these
pleadings that the trial judge framed
fifteen issues and set down the case for
hearing."
19. While dealing with the application under
Section 21 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 where
one of the questions was as to whether an
immoveable property situated in Burma could be a
subject matter of reference, in Phoolchand & Anr.
v. Gopal Lal [(1967) 3 SCR 153], it was held :
"7. We are of opinion that there is
nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure
which prohibits the passing of more than
one preliminary decree if circumstances
justify the same and that it may be
necessary to do so particularly in
partition suits when after the
preliminary decree some parties die and
16
shares of other parties are thereby
augmented. We have already said that it
is not disputed that in partition suits
the court can do so even after the
preliminary decree is passed. It would in
our opinion be convenient to the court
and advantageous to the parties,
specially in partition suits, to have
disputed rights finally settled and
specification of shares in the
preliminary decree varied before a final
decree is prepared. If this is done,
there is a clear determination of the
rights of parties to the suit on the
question in dispute and we see no
difficulty in holding that in such cases
there is a decree deciding these disputed
rights; if so, there is no reason why a
second preliminary decree correcting the
shares in a partition suit cannot be
passed by the court. So far therefore as
partition suits are concerned we have no
doubt that if an event transpires after
the preliminary decree which necessitates
a change in shares, the court can and
should do so; and if there is a dispute
in that behalf, the order of the court
deciding that dispute and making
variation in shares specified in the
preliminary decree already passed is a
decree in itself which would be liable to
appeal. We should however like to point
out that what we are saying must be
confined to partition suits, for we are
not concerned in the present appeal with
other kinds of suits in which also
preliminary and final decrees are passed.
There is no prohibition in the Code of
Civil Procedure against passing a second
preliminary decree in such circumstances
and we do not see why we should rule out
a second preliminary decree in such
circumstances only on the ground that the
Code of Civil Procedure does not
contemplate such a possibility."
Thus, subsequent event can be taken consideration while
working out the preliminary decree into the shape of final
17
decree. It was also a case of subsequent event. As such, it
is quite distinguishable. In the instant case, the
preliminary decree has attained finality. The High Court has
earlier rightly observed that preliminary decree would not be
reopened due to impleadment which had been ordered.
19. In our opinion, the High Court has erred in law while
directing that further preliminary decrees can be passed. It
was not a case of subsequent event or change of law. The
only remedy available to Nima Kaur was to file a separate
suit. Accordingly, we restore the order passed by the Civil
Judge and set aside the order passed by the High Court in the
revision petition. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid
extent. It is made clear that we have not adjudicated on the
rights of Nima Kaur while deciding this matter and we have
prima facie made the observations to decide whether any share
she could claim in the final decree proceedings. Therefore,
fresh suit, if any, to be filed by her, be decided unfettered
by any observations made by us in the order or in the final
decree.
.......................J.
(ARUN MISHRA)
.......................J.
(MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 2, 2017.
18
ITEM NO.115 COURT NO.11 SECTION XII-A
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s).319-320/2009
SARDAR SURJEET SINGH Appellant(s)
VERSUS
JUGUNA BAI (SINCE DEAD) & ORS. Respondent(s)
Date : 02-08-2017 These appeals were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR
For Appellant(s) Mr. K. Maruthi Rao, Adv.
Ms. K. Radha, Adv.
Ms. Anjani Aiyagari, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. Jeetendra Mohan Sharma, Sr. Adv.
Mr. P. Venkat Reddy, Adv.
Mr. Prashant Tyagi, Adv.
Mr. Anil Kumar Tandale, AOR
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed
order.
(B.PARVATHI) (TAPAN KUMAR CHAKRABORTY)
COURT MASTER (SH) BRANCH OFFICER
(Signed order is placed on the file)
