REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1008 OF 2017
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.19117 OF 2013]
NIDHI ….. Appellant
Versus
RAM KRIPAL SHARMA (D) THROUGH LRs. ….. Respondents
J U D G M E N T
R. BANUMATHI, J.
This appeal by way of special leave is preferred against the order
dated 23.01.2013 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in
Writ Appeal No.19835 of 2003, wherein the High Court affirmed the order
passed by Additional District Judge, Moradabad, thereby setting aside
release order dated 29.10.1991 passed by the Prescribed Authority.
2. Brief facts of the present case are that the appellant is the owner
and landlord of the premises in question, which is a non-residential
accommodation. Allegedly, the premises was let out by ancestors of the
appellant’s family when they did not require the premises for personal use
as the previous owner of the accommodation Smt. Krishna Devi wife of Kunwar
Mahendra Pratap Singh had adequate place to reside in. After the demise of
Smt. Krishna Devi, appellant Nidhi became the owner of the premises in
question and continued to receive rent from the respondent. The appellant
filed a release application being PCS No.97 of 1987, under Section 21(1)(a)
of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as U.P. Act XIII of 1972), seeking
possession of the suit premises on the ground of her bona fide personal
requirement. The appellant alleged that she is in need of the premises as
the appellant wants to accommodate her grandparents in the demised house
who live in village and are in need of care and medical treatment.
Moreover, the appellant alleged that she and her younger sister required
separate room for study. It was alleged that the respondent carries out
the said hotel business for namesake only and is being carried out by the
servant of the respondent. It was further alleged by the appellant that the
respondent’s main business is that of a sweet shop and he has sufficient
means to take some other place on rent to run his hotel business.
3. Respondent-tenant admitted the tenancy in the property in dispute and
resisted the application for release of accommodation, claiming that the
appellant and her sister live in a big house called Kath Mahal which has
sufficient space comprising of large rooms and large halls. It was averred
that the grandparents of the appellant are big landlords in the village and
live in a palatial house there and they are unable to climb stairs in the
suit premises. Also, the alleged business of sweet shop is run by his son
and the entire family is dependent upon the income from hotel business.
4. Upon consideration of evidence and on hearing the parties, the
Prescribed Authority held that the balance of convenience lies in favour of
the appellant and taking into consideration the social status of family and
that the grandparents of the appellant want to live with her parents, found
that the appellant bona fide requires the premises and vide order dated
29.10.1991 allowed the application for release of suit premises. The
Prescribed Authority directed the appellant-landlord to compensate the
respondent by giving him a sum equivalent to two years of rent before
taking possession.
5. Respondent-tenant challenged the aforesaid order by way of Rent
Control Appeal No.72 of 1991 under Section 22 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972,
before the Additional District Judge at Moradabad, who vide order dated
04.02.2003, allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the
Prescribed Authority holding that the appellant’s need for the suit
premises is not based on bona fide requirement and her need for
accommodation is not immediate or pressing.
6. Aggrieved by the said order of the appellate court, the appellant
filed Writ Appeal No.19835 of 2003 before the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad. The High Court upon consideration of the facts and materials
placed on record before it and after hearing the contentions of the parties
before it dismissed the writ appeal holding that the relief claimed
originally has, by reason of subsequent development in circumstances,
become inappropriate. The High Court found that when the statement of
appellant was recorded, she was a student of B.Sc. and was of marriageable
age and as the matter went before the appellate authority, the situation
changed as the Court noticed that the appellant was married on 23.01.1996
and her husband was a member of Indian Revenue Service who was, at that
time, posted at Delhi and subsequently in Mumbai. The High Court also
observed that the sisters of the appellant also got married and were living
with their husbands, elsewhere and that the alleged need had disappeared
long back. The High Court relied on the judgments of this Court in Hasmat
Rai vs. Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3 SCC 103 and Kedar Nath Agrawal and Anr.
vs. Dhanraji Devi and Anr. 2004 (4) AWC 3709 (SC), to take the cognizance
of subsequent events.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the first appellate
court and the High Court have erroneously denied the relief sought by the
appellant in the release application only because during the pendency of
the appeal filed by the respondent, the appellant got married which is a
subsequent development which would naturally take place and the appellant
cannot be made to suffer on account of delay in adjudication. It was
further contended that only because the husband of the appellant has been
allotted a government accommodation, the need of the appellant did not
disappear as the appellant required the scheduled premises for her own use
and occupation as well as for the use and occupation of her family and the
appellant requires the scheduled premises for herself as well as for her
parents and grandparents and her bona fide requirement has not been
properly considered by the High Court.
8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that this
Court has in numerous cases held that in case of eviction on the ground of
bona fide need and comparative hardship, the court must consider the
subsequent changes in events to decide the bona fide requirement of the
landlord. It was further submitted that in her release application, the
appellant had set up her bona fide need but failed to substantiate her
stand and hence the first appellate court and the High Court rightly
dismissed the release application.
9. We have considered the rival contentions of learned counsel for the
parties and perused the impugned order and other materials on record.
10. The point falling for consideration is whether the marriage of the
appellant/landlady as subsequent event can extinguish the bona fide
requirement of a landlady and disentitle her for the relief sought in the
release application filed prior to her marriage.
11. Before proceeding further, it is apposite to have a look over the
related provision under Section 21(1) of the U.P. Act which deals with
proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant, clause (a)
of sub-Section (1) of Section 21 of the Act alone is germane in the present
proceedings and the said clause reads as under:-
“21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant.- (1)
The Prescribed Authority may, on an application of the landlord in that
behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or
any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following
grounds exists namely-
(a) that the building is bona fide required either in its existing form
or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by
himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is
held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any
profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a
public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust;
………..”
An analysis of the above provision would show that the landlord of rented
property is entitled to the vacant possession of his rented premises in the
event of his bona fide requirement of the said premises for his own
residential or professional requirements or for any person related to him.
12. In the facts of present case, the appellant-landlady herein was
living in a small house with her family comprising four members and was not
able to accommodate her ailing grandparents who used to visit them
frequently for medication purposes and were willing to reside with them
permanently as they were living alone in their village where nobody was
there to look after them. Appellant in order to accommodate her
grandparents with them and in the light of growing needs of her and her
younger sister (who were then studying) filed the release application
before the prescribed authority and the release order was granted by the
prescribed authority in favour of the appellant/landlady directing
respondent-tenant to handover vacant possession of suit premises to the
appellant. As noticed earlier, during the pendency of appeal, preferred by
the respondent-tenant, the appellant got married and settled with her
husband. The first appellate court as well as the High Court took note of
this as subsequent development and held that the requirement no longer
subsists and the claim of personal requirement has disappeared. Of course,
during the pendency of lis between the parties, situation underwent a
change and the appellant got married to an Indian Revenue Service Officer
and started residing with him in Delhi and Mumbai etc. Though the appellant
is married and settled with her husband, her bona fide requirement cannot
be said to have ended as she wanted the premises not just for herself but
to accommodate her parents and grandparents in the suit premises so that
they can live together. The family of the appellant is still said to be
residing in rented premises in Moradabad, despite having their own suit
premises to reside in. In the facts of present case, the change in
subsequent events is not such that would deprive the appellant of her right
to vacant possession of suit premises as it is a natural event that the
daughter of the house would get married and settle with her husband.
Though the appellant has got married and shifted to different accommodation
with her husband, the actual bona fide requirement of premises is still the
same, since her parents and grandparents are still residing separately from
each other with no one to look after them. More so, the appellant got
married but the family stays where it is and the bona fide requirement of
premises for accommodation of parents remains the same. Being married and
shifting to other place does not automatically result in extinguishing of
bona fide requirement of the appellant as being the owner of property, she
alone is to decide what she wants to do with her property.
13. The legislations made for dealing with such landlord-tenant disputes
were pro-tenant as the court tends to bend towards the tenant in order to
do justice with the tenant; but in the process of doing justice the Court
cannot be over zealous and forget its duty towards the landlord also as
ultimately, it is the landlord who owns the property and is entitled to
possession of the same when he proves his bona fide beyond reasonable doubt
as it is in the case before this Court.
14. First appellate court as well as the High Court observed that during
the pendency of the appeal, the appellant got married, her husband a member
of Indian Revenue Service (IRS) posted at Delhi, Mumbai and other places
and this subsequent event has extinguished the personal requirement of the
appellant. In the impugned judgment, the High Court referred to number of
judgments Hasmat Rai and Another vs. Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3 SCC 103;
Ramesh Kumar vs. Kesho Ram (1992) Suppl. (2) SCC 623 and other judgments.
15. Ordinarily, rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of
institution of the suit. However, the court has power to take note of the
subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly. Power of the court to
take note of subsequent events came up for consideration in a number of
decisions. In Om Prakash Gupta vs. Ranbir B. Goyal (2002) 2 SCC 256, this
Court held as under:-
“11. The ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand
crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the
decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood
at the commencement of the lis. However, the Court has power to take note
of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly subject to the
following conditions being satisfied: (i) that the relief, as claimed
originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or
cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or
changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice
being done to the parties; and (iii) that such subsequent event is brought
to the notice of the court promptly and in accordance with the rules of
procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. In
Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders (1975) 1 SCC 770 this
Court held that a fact arising after the lis, coming to the notice of the
court and having a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner
of moulding it and brought diligently to the notice of the court cannot be
blinked at. The court may in such cases bend the rules of procedure if no
specific provision of law or rule of fair play is violated for it would
promote substantial justice provided that there is absence of other
disentitling factors or just circumstances. The Court speaking through
Krishna Iyer, J. affirmed the proposition that the court can, so long as
the litigation pends, take note of updated facts to promote substantial
justice. However, the Court cautioned: (i) the event should be one as would
stultify or render inept the decretal remedy, (ii) rules of procedure may
be bent if no specific provision or fair play is violated and there is no
other special circumstance repelling resort to that course in law or
justice, (iii) such cognizance of subsequent events and developments should
be cautious, and (iv) the rules of fairness to both sides should be
scrupulously obeyed.
Om Prakash Gupta’s case was referred with approval in Ram Kumar Barnwal vs.
Ram Lakhan (Dead) (2007) 5 SCC 660.
16. Though the court has the power to take note of the subsequent events,
court has to consider the effect of subsequent development on the bona fide
need of the landlord. For the purpose of coming to the conclusion on bona
fide need of the landlord, comparative hardship to the parties will have
to be taken into consideration. As discussed above, in the present case,
the appellant got married during the pendency of the appeal and settled
with her husband; still her requirement to accommodate her parents and
grandparents continued. Appellant has established her bona fide requirement
for accommodating her parents and grandparents in the suit premises merely
because the appellant got married amidst the proceedings does not
extinguish her claim for the relief of possession of the suit premises. In
our view, the subsequent event, namely, marriage of appellant does not
extinguish her requirement considering the comparative hardship, it is to
be pointed out that the respondents have another business of sweet shop and
thus, is not going to suffer if ordered to vacate the suit premises as they
can shift the place of business to some other place without suffering any
loss of occupation, whereas the parents of the appellant would be subjected
to hardship as she has no other premises to accommodate her grandparents as
well as her parents. While taking note of the subsequent events, the High
Court has not considered the comparative hardship to the appellant and
erred in declining the relief to the appellant.
17. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order of the High
Court is set aside and the order passed by the prescribed authority i.e.
Court of Second Upper Civil Judge, Moradabad dated 29.10.1991 is restored.
The appellant shall deposit the compensation before the prescribed
authority payable to the respondent within four weeks from today. The
respondent shall handover the possession of the suit premises within one
month from the date of deposit of the amount, failing which the respondent-
tenant shall be liable for committing contempt of this Court. No costs.
...……………………….J.
[DIPAK MISRA]
.………………………..J.
[R. BANUMATHI]
New Delhi;
February 07, 2017
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1008 OF 2017
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.19117 OF 2013]
NIDHI ….. Appellant
Versus
RAM KRIPAL SHARMA (D) THROUGH LRs. ….. Respondents
J U D G M E N T
R. BANUMATHI, J.
This appeal by way of special leave is preferred against the order
dated 23.01.2013 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in
Writ Appeal No.19835 of 2003, wherein the High Court affirmed the order
passed by Additional District Judge, Moradabad, thereby setting aside
release order dated 29.10.1991 passed by the Prescribed Authority.
2. Brief facts of the present case are that the appellant is the owner
and landlord of the premises in question, which is a non-residential
accommodation. Allegedly, the premises was let out by ancestors of the
appellant’s family when they did not require the premises for personal use
as the previous owner of the accommodation Smt. Krishna Devi wife of Kunwar
Mahendra Pratap Singh had adequate place to reside in. After the demise of
Smt. Krishna Devi, appellant Nidhi became the owner of the premises in
question and continued to receive rent from the respondent. The appellant
filed a release application being PCS No.97 of 1987, under Section 21(1)(a)
of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as U.P. Act XIII of 1972), seeking
possession of the suit premises on the ground of her bona fide personal
requirement. The appellant alleged that she is in need of the premises as
the appellant wants to accommodate her grandparents in the demised house
who live in village and are in need of care and medical treatment.
Moreover, the appellant alleged that she and her younger sister required
separate room for study. It was alleged that the respondent carries out
the said hotel business for namesake only and is being carried out by the
servant of the respondent. It was further alleged by the appellant that the
respondent’s main business is that of a sweet shop and he has sufficient
means to take some other place on rent to run his hotel business.
3. Respondent-tenant admitted the tenancy in the property in dispute and
resisted the application for release of accommodation, claiming that the
appellant and her sister live in a big house called Kath Mahal which has
sufficient space comprising of large rooms and large halls. It was averred
that the grandparents of the appellant are big landlords in the village and
live in a palatial house there and they are unable to climb stairs in the
suit premises. Also, the alleged business of sweet shop is run by his son
and the entire family is dependent upon the income from hotel business.
4. Upon consideration of evidence and on hearing the parties, the
Prescribed Authority held that the balance of convenience lies in favour of
the appellant and taking into consideration the social status of family and
that the grandparents of the appellant want to live with her parents, found
that the appellant bona fide requires the premises and vide order dated
29.10.1991 allowed the application for release of suit premises. The
Prescribed Authority directed the appellant-landlord to compensate the
respondent by giving him a sum equivalent to two years of rent before
taking possession.
5. Respondent-tenant challenged the aforesaid order by way of Rent
Control Appeal No.72 of 1991 under Section 22 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972,
before the Additional District Judge at Moradabad, who vide order dated
04.02.2003, allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the
Prescribed Authority holding that the appellant’s need for the suit
premises is not based on bona fide requirement and her need for
accommodation is not immediate or pressing.
6. Aggrieved by the said order of the appellate court, the appellant
filed Writ Appeal No.19835 of 2003 before the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad. The High Court upon consideration of the facts and materials
placed on record before it and after hearing the contentions of the parties
before it dismissed the writ appeal holding that the relief claimed
originally has, by reason of subsequent development in circumstances,
become inappropriate. The High Court found that when the statement of
appellant was recorded, she was a student of B.Sc. and was of marriageable
age and as the matter went before the appellate authority, the situation
changed as the Court noticed that the appellant was married on 23.01.1996
and her husband was a member of Indian Revenue Service who was, at that
time, posted at Delhi and subsequently in Mumbai. The High Court also
observed that the sisters of the appellant also got married and were living
with their husbands, elsewhere and that the alleged need had disappeared
long back. The High Court relied on the judgments of this Court in Hasmat
Rai vs. Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3 SCC 103 and Kedar Nath Agrawal and Anr.
vs. Dhanraji Devi and Anr. 2004 (4) AWC 3709 (SC), to take the cognizance
of subsequent events.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the first appellate
court and the High Court have erroneously denied the relief sought by the
appellant in the release application only because during the pendency of
the appeal filed by the respondent, the appellant got married which is a
subsequent development which would naturally take place and the appellant
cannot be made to suffer on account of delay in adjudication. It was
further contended that only because the husband of the appellant has been
allotted a government accommodation, the need of the appellant did not
disappear as the appellant required the scheduled premises for her own use
and occupation as well as for the use and occupation of her family and the
appellant requires the scheduled premises for herself as well as for her
parents and grandparents and her bona fide requirement has not been
properly considered by the High Court.
8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that this
Court has in numerous cases held that in case of eviction on the ground of
bona fide need and comparative hardship, the court must consider the
subsequent changes in events to decide the bona fide requirement of the
landlord. It was further submitted that in her release application, the
appellant had set up her bona fide need but failed to substantiate her
stand and hence the first appellate court and the High Court rightly
dismissed the release application.
9. We have considered the rival contentions of learned counsel for the
parties and perused the impugned order and other materials on record.
10. The point falling for consideration is whether the marriage of the
appellant/landlady as subsequent event can extinguish the bona fide
requirement of a landlady and disentitle her for the relief sought in the
release application filed prior to her marriage.
11. Before proceeding further, it is apposite to have a look over the
related provision under Section 21(1) of the U.P. Act which deals with
proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant, clause (a)
of sub-Section (1) of Section 21 of the Act alone is germane in the present
proceedings and the said clause reads as under:-
“21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant.- (1)
The Prescribed Authority may, on an application of the landlord in that
behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or
any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following
grounds exists namely-
(a) that the building is bona fide required either in its existing form
or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by
himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is
held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any
profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a
public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust;
………..”
An analysis of the above provision would show that the landlord of rented
property is entitled to the vacant possession of his rented premises in the
event of his bona fide requirement of the said premises for his own
residential or professional requirements or for any person related to him.
12. In the facts of present case, the appellant-landlady herein was
living in a small house with her family comprising four members and was not
able to accommodate her ailing grandparents who used to visit them
frequently for medication purposes and were willing to reside with them
permanently as they were living alone in their village where nobody was
there to look after them. Appellant in order to accommodate her
grandparents with them and in the light of growing needs of her and her
younger sister (who were then studying) filed the release application
before the prescribed authority and the release order was granted by the
prescribed authority in favour of the appellant/landlady directing
respondent-tenant to handover vacant possession of suit premises to the
appellant. As noticed earlier, during the pendency of appeal, preferred by
the respondent-tenant, the appellant got married and settled with her
husband. The first appellate court as well as the High Court took note of
this as subsequent development and held that the requirement no longer
subsists and the claim of personal requirement has disappeared. Of course,
during the pendency of lis between the parties, situation underwent a
change and the appellant got married to an Indian Revenue Service Officer
and started residing with him in Delhi and Mumbai etc. Though the appellant
is married and settled with her husband, her bona fide requirement cannot
be said to have ended as she wanted the premises not just for herself but
to accommodate her parents and grandparents in the suit premises so that
they can live together. The family of the appellant is still said to be
residing in rented premises in Moradabad, despite having their own suit
premises to reside in. In the facts of present case, the change in
subsequent events is not such that would deprive the appellant of her right
to vacant possession of suit premises as it is a natural event that the
daughter of the house would get married and settle with her husband.
Though the appellant has got married and shifted to different accommodation
with her husband, the actual bona fide requirement of premises is still the
same, since her parents and grandparents are still residing separately from
each other with no one to look after them. More so, the appellant got
married but the family stays where it is and the bona fide requirement of
premises for accommodation of parents remains the same. Being married and
shifting to other place does not automatically result in extinguishing of
bona fide requirement of the appellant as being the owner of property, she
alone is to decide what she wants to do with her property.
13. The legislations made for dealing with such landlord-tenant disputes
were pro-tenant as the court tends to bend towards the tenant in order to
do justice with the tenant; but in the process of doing justice the Court
cannot be over zealous and forget its duty towards the landlord also as
ultimately, it is the landlord who owns the property and is entitled to
possession of the same when he proves his bona fide beyond reasonable doubt
as it is in the case before this Court.
14. First appellate court as well as the High Court observed that during
the pendency of the appeal, the appellant got married, her husband a member
of Indian Revenue Service (IRS) posted at Delhi, Mumbai and other places
and this subsequent event has extinguished the personal requirement of the
appellant. In the impugned judgment, the High Court referred to number of
judgments Hasmat Rai and Another vs. Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3 SCC 103;
Ramesh Kumar vs. Kesho Ram (1992) Suppl. (2) SCC 623 and other judgments.
15. Ordinarily, rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of
institution of the suit. However, the court has power to take note of the
subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly. Power of the court to
take note of subsequent events came up for consideration in a number of
decisions. In Om Prakash Gupta vs. Ranbir B. Goyal (2002) 2 SCC 256, this
Court held as under:-
“11. The ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand
crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the
decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood
at the commencement of the lis. However, the Court has power to take note
of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly subject to the
following conditions being satisfied: (i) that the relief, as claimed
originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or
cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or
changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice
being done to the parties; and (iii) that such subsequent event is brought
to the notice of the court promptly and in accordance with the rules of
procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. In
Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders (1975) 1 SCC 770 this
Court held that a fact arising after the lis, coming to the notice of the
court and having a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner
of moulding it and brought diligently to the notice of the court cannot be
blinked at. The court may in such cases bend the rules of procedure if no
specific provision of law or rule of fair play is violated for it would
promote substantial justice provided that there is absence of other
disentitling factors or just circumstances. The Court speaking through
Krishna Iyer, J. affirmed the proposition that the court can, so long as
the litigation pends, take note of updated facts to promote substantial
justice. However, the Court cautioned: (i) the event should be one as would
stultify or render inept the decretal remedy, (ii) rules of procedure may
be bent if no specific provision or fair play is violated and there is no
other special circumstance repelling resort to that course in law or
justice, (iii) such cognizance of subsequent events and developments should
be cautious, and (iv) the rules of fairness to both sides should be
scrupulously obeyed.
Om Prakash Gupta’s case was referred with approval in Ram Kumar Barnwal vs.
Ram Lakhan (Dead) (2007) 5 SCC 660.
16. Though the court has the power to take note of the subsequent events,
court has to consider the effect of subsequent development on the bona fide
need of the landlord. For the purpose of coming to the conclusion on bona
fide need of the landlord, comparative hardship to the parties will have
to be taken into consideration. As discussed above, in the present case,
the appellant got married during the pendency of the appeal and settled
with her husband; still her requirement to accommodate her parents and
grandparents continued. Appellant has established her bona fide requirement
for accommodating her parents and grandparents in the suit premises merely
because the appellant got married amidst the proceedings does not
extinguish her claim for the relief of possession of the suit premises. In
our view, the subsequent event, namely, marriage of appellant does not
extinguish her requirement considering the comparative hardship, it is to
be pointed out that the respondents have another business of sweet shop and
thus, is not going to suffer if ordered to vacate the suit premises as they
can shift the place of business to some other place without suffering any
loss of occupation, whereas the parents of the appellant would be subjected
to hardship as she has no other premises to accommodate her grandparents as
well as her parents. While taking note of the subsequent events, the High
Court has not considered the comparative hardship to the appellant and
erred in declining the relief to the appellant.
17. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order of the High
Court is set aside and the order passed by the prescribed authority i.e.
Court of Second Upper Civil Judge, Moradabad dated 29.10.1991 is restored.
The appellant shall deposit the compensation before the prescribed
authority payable to the respondent within four weeks from today. The
respondent shall handover the possession of the suit premises within one
month from the date of deposit of the amount, failing which the respondent-
tenant shall be liable for committing contempt of this Court. No costs.
...……………………….J.
[DIPAK MISRA]
.………………………..J.
[R. BANUMATHI]
New Delhi;
February 07, 2017
