NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.181 OF 1998
VILAS V. SANGHAI … APPELLANT
VERSUS
SUMERMAL MISHRIMAL BAFNA
& ANR. …RESPONDENTS
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.210 OF 1998
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA … APPELLANT
VERSUS
SUMERMAL MISHRIMAL BAFNA
& ANR. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
ANIL R. DAVE, J.
1. Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 22nd December, 1997 delivered
by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition No.22
of 1994, Criminal Appeal No.181 of 1998 has been filed by Vilas V. Sanghai
against the order of punishment imposed upon him under the provisions of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) and
Criminal Appeal No.210 of 1998 has been filed by the State of Maharashtra
for setting aside the said judgment.
2. The facts giving rise to the present litigation in a nutshell are as
under :-
As two appeals have been filed against the same judgment, for
narration of the facts, we have referred to the facts from Criminal Appeal
No.181 of 1998, which has been filed by Vilas V. Sanghai, a Police
Inspector, who was entrusted with investigation of a case filed against
Respondent No.1, Sumermal Mishrimal Bafna, a Trustee of Bafna Charitable
Trust. Respondent no.1, who is aged about 64 years and is having some
heart ailment, claims to be a man with good reputation. A private
complaint was filed against Respondent No.1 by Shri Umesh Karia to the
effect that Respondent No.1 had committed an offence punishable under the
provisions of Section 420 read with Sections 120-B and 109 of the Indian
Penal Code. Investigation in relation to the said complaint had been
entrusted to the Appellant, who was attached to the Crime Branch at the
relevant time.
3. Respondent No.1 had an apprehension that he might be arrested in the
course of investigation and therefore, he had filed an application for
anticipatory bail. During the pendency of the said anticipatory bail
application, the Appellant used to remain present to brief the learned
Public Prosecutor, who was opposing the said application. No interim order
was passed in the said application when the application was being heard but
in the presence of the Appellant and in pursuance of the instructions given
by the Appellant, the learned Public Prosecutor had made a statement that
during the pendency of the said application, Respondent No.1 would not be
arrested, provided Respondent No.1 would cooperate with the Police in the
investigation.
4. In spite of the aforestated assurance given to the Court by the
learned Public Prosecutor in pursuance of the instructions given by the
Appellant, Respondent No.1 was arrested on 21st September, 1993, though
hearing of the anticipatory bail application was fixed on 22nd September,
1993. The case made out against the Appellant was that after the arrest,
Respondent No.1 was handcuffed and was photographed in handcuffed condition
and the said photograph had been published in local newspapers.
Publication of such a photograph adversely affected reputation of
Respondent No.1.
5. In the aforestated circumstances, Respondent No.1 had initiated
contempt proceedings against the Appellant as the Appellant had committed
breach of an assurance given to the Court through the learned Public
Prosecutor that Respondent No.1 would not be arrested during the pendency
of the anticipatory bail application.
6. In the aforestated contempt proceedings, defence of the Appellant was
that the assurance or undertaking which had been given to the Court was
conditional. The condition was that Respondent No.1 would extend his
cooperation in the investigation, but as Respondent No.1 was not
cooperative and was deliberately trying to create hurdles in the
investigation, the Appellant was constrained to arrest Respondent No.1 on
21st September, 1993.
7. After hearing the concerned parties and looking at the record, the
High Court came to the conclusion that the Appellant was guilty of
committing contempt of Court and was, therefore, sentenced to simple
imprisonment for 7 days with a fine of Rs.2,000/-.
8. The learned counsel appearing for the Appellant submitted that the
Appellant had not committed criminal contempt, as alleged or otherwise.
The main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel was that the
provisions of Section 15 of the Act had not been complied with before
passing the impugned order punishing the Appellant for committing criminal
contempt of Court. He also submitted that there was no breach of any
undertaking or assurance given to the Court as the assurance given on
behalf of the Appellant was conditional. By not extending cooperation to
the investigating agency, Respondent No.1 had committed breach of his
assurance and therefore, undertaking given by the Appellant had also come
to an end.
9. So far as the legal provisions are concerned, he submitted that the
provisions of Section 15 of the Act ought to have been complied with for
initiating proceedings for punishing the Appellant for criminal contempt.
In the instant case, the action was not initiated on a Motion made by the
Advocate General or on a reference made by the subordinate Court concerned
as per the provisions of Section 15 of the Act. For the aforestated
reason, the entire proceedings were vitiated.
10. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.1
supported the order passed by the High Court and submitted that there was
clear violation of the undertaking given by the Appellant to the Court. He
stressed on the fact that the application for anticipatory bail was to be
heard on 22nd September, 1993 and Respondent No.1 was arrested on 21st
September, 1993. There was no justifiable reason for arresting Respondent
No.1 a day before the date of hearing. The Appellant could have very well
waited for a day and could have made the grievance before the Court that
Respondent No.1 was not cooperative and therefore, the investigation was
adversely affected, if the averment with regard to non-cooperation of the
Appellant was correct. Instead of waiting for a day, in a hot haste, the
Appellant arrested Respondent No.1 on 21st September, 1993 and the said
fact clearly denotes that the Appellant had very scant respect for the
assurance given by him to the Court. He, therefore, submitted that the
impugned order is just and proper and therefore, the Appeal deserved
dismissal.
11. We have heard the learned counsel and have recorded the facts of the
case.
12. We find substance in what has been submitted by the learned counsel
appearing for the Appellant.
13. The impugned order is in violation of the provisions of Section 15 of
the Act. Relevant portion of Section 15 reads as under :
“15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases. - (1) In the case of a
criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in section 14, the
Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a
motion made by—
(a) the Advocate-General, or
(b) any other person, with the consent in writing to the Advocate-General,
or
(c) in relation to the High Court for the Union territory of Delhi, such
Law Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any other person, with the consent in
writing of such Law Officer.
(2) In the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the High
Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or
on a motion made by the Advocate-General or, in relation to a Union
territory, by such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf.
(3) xxx xxx xxx.”
14. In the instant case, the alleged criminal contempt was of a
subordinate Court and therefore, the action could have been taken on a
reference made to the High Court by the subordinate Court or on a Motion
made by the Advocate General, but the proceedings had been initiated in
pursuance of an application submitted by Respondent No.1. From the record,
we do not find that the learned Advocate General had ever given his consent
for initiation of the said proceedings.
15. Without going into the facts of the case, only on this limited ground
that the criminal contempt proceedings had not been initiated as per the
provisions of Section 15 of the Act, in our opinion, the proceedings are
vitiated and therefore, the impugned order passed by the High Court is
neither just nor legal and therefore, we set aside the impugned order.
16. The appeals are accordingly disposed of as allowed.
.…………………………….J.
(ANIL R. DAVE)
……………………………..J.
(L. NAGESWARA RAO)
NEW DELHI
SEPTEMBER 30, 2016.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.181 OF 1998
VILAS V. SANGHAI … APPELLANT
VERSUS
SUMERMAL MISHRIMAL BAFNA
& ANR. …RESPONDENTS
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.210 OF 1998
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA … APPELLANT
VERSUS
SUMERMAL MISHRIMAL BAFNA
& ANR. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
ANIL R. DAVE, J.
1. Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 22nd December, 1997 delivered
by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition No.22
of 1994, Criminal Appeal No.181 of 1998 has been filed by Vilas V. Sanghai
against the order of punishment imposed upon him under the provisions of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) and
Criminal Appeal No.210 of 1998 has been filed by the State of Maharashtra
for setting aside the said judgment.
2. The facts giving rise to the present litigation in a nutshell are as
under :-
As two appeals have been filed against the same judgment, for
narration of the facts, we have referred to the facts from Criminal Appeal
No.181 of 1998, which has been filed by Vilas V. Sanghai, a Police
Inspector, who was entrusted with investigation of a case filed against
Respondent No.1, Sumermal Mishrimal Bafna, a Trustee of Bafna Charitable
Trust. Respondent no.1, who is aged about 64 years and is having some
heart ailment, claims to be a man with good reputation. A private
complaint was filed against Respondent No.1 by Shri Umesh Karia to the
effect that Respondent No.1 had committed an offence punishable under the
provisions of Section 420 read with Sections 120-B and 109 of the Indian
Penal Code. Investigation in relation to the said complaint had been
entrusted to the Appellant, who was attached to the Crime Branch at the
relevant time.
3. Respondent No.1 had an apprehension that he might be arrested in the
course of investigation and therefore, he had filed an application for
anticipatory bail. During the pendency of the said anticipatory bail
application, the Appellant used to remain present to brief the learned
Public Prosecutor, who was opposing the said application. No interim order
was passed in the said application when the application was being heard but
in the presence of the Appellant and in pursuance of the instructions given
by the Appellant, the learned Public Prosecutor had made a statement that
during the pendency of the said application, Respondent No.1 would not be
arrested, provided Respondent No.1 would cooperate with the Police in the
investigation.
4. In spite of the aforestated assurance given to the Court by the
learned Public Prosecutor in pursuance of the instructions given by the
Appellant, Respondent No.1 was arrested on 21st September, 1993, though
hearing of the anticipatory bail application was fixed on 22nd September,
1993. The case made out against the Appellant was that after the arrest,
Respondent No.1 was handcuffed and was photographed in handcuffed condition
and the said photograph had been published in local newspapers.
Publication of such a photograph adversely affected reputation of
Respondent No.1.
5. In the aforestated circumstances, Respondent No.1 had initiated
contempt proceedings against the Appellant as the Appellant had committed
breach of an assurance given to the Court through the learned Public
Prosecutor that Respondent No.1 would not be arrested during the pendency
of the anticipatory bail application.
6. In the aforestated contempt proceedings, defence of the Appellant was
that the assurance or undertaking which had been given to the Court was
conditional. The condition was that Respondent No.1 would extend his
cooperation in the investigation, but as Respondent No.1 was not
cooperative and was deliberately trying to create hurdles in the
investigation, the Appellant was constrained to arrest Respondent No.1 on
21st September, 1993.
7. After hearing the concerned parties and looking at the record, the
High Court came to the conclusion that the Appellant was guilty of
committing contempt of Court and was, therefore, sentenced to simple
imprisonment for 7 days with a fine of Rs.2,000/-.
8. The learned counsel appearing for the Appellant submitted that the
Appellant had not committed criminal contempt, as alleged or otherwise.
The main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel was that the
provisions of Section 15 of the Act had not been complied with before
passing the impugned order punishing the Appellant for committing criminal
contempt of Court. He also submitted that there was no breach of any
undertaking or assurance given to the Court as the assurance given on
behalf of the Appellant was conditional. By not extending cooperation to
the investigating agency, Respondent No.1 had committed breach of his
assurance and therefore, undertaking given by the Appellant had also come
to an end.
9. So far as the legal provisions are concerned, he submitted that the
provisions of Section 15 of the Act ought to have been complied with for
initiating proceedings for punishing the Appellant for criminal contempt.
In the instant case, the action was not initiated on a Motion made by the
Advocate General or on a reference made by the subordinate Court concerned
as per the provisions of Section 15 of the Act. For the aforestated
reason, the entire proceedings were vitiated.
10. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.1
supported the order passed by the High Court and submitted that there was
clear violation of the undertaking given by the Appellant to the Court. He
stressed on the fact that the application for anticipatory bail was to be
heard on 22nd September, 1993 and Respondent No.1 was arrested on 21st
September, 1993. There was no justifiable reason for arresting Respondent
No.1 a day before the date of hearing. The Appellant could have very well
waited for a day and could have made the grievance before the Court that
Respondent No.1 was not cooperative and therefore, the investigation was
adversely affected, if the averment with regard to non-cooperation of the
Appellant was correct. Instead of waiting for a day, in a hot haste, the
Appellant arrested Respondent No.1 on 21st September, 1993 and the said
fact clearly denotes that the Appellant had very scant respect for the
assurance given by him to the Court. He, therefore, submitted that the
impugned order is just and proper and therefore, the Appeal deserved
dismissal.
11. We have heard the learned counsel and have recorded the facts of the
case.
12. We find substance in what has been submitted by the learned counsel
appearing for the Appellant.
13. The impugned order is in violation of the provisions of Section 15 of
the Act. Relevant portion of Section 15 reads as under :
“15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases. - (1) In the case of a
criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in section 14, the
Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a
motion made by—
(a) the Advocate-General, or
(b) any other person, with the consent in writing to the Advocate-General,
or
(c) in relation to the High Court for the Union territory of Delhi, such
Law Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any other person, with the consent in
writing of such Law Officer.
(2) In the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the High
Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or
on a motion made by the Advocate-General or, in relation to a Union
territory, by such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf.
(3) xxx xxx xxx.”
14. In the instant case, the alleged criminal contempt was of a
subordinate Court and therefore, the action could have been taken on a
reference made to the High Court by the subordinate Court or on a Motion
made by the Advocate General, but the proceedings had been initiated in
pursuance of an application submitted by Respondent No.1. From the record,
we do not find that the learned Advocate General had ever given his consent
for initiation of the said proceedings.
15. Without going into the facts of the case, only on this limited ground
that the criminal contempt proceedings had not been initiated as per the
provisions of Section 15 of the Act, in our opinion, the proceedings are
vitiated and therefore, the impugned order passed by the High Court is
neither just nor legal and therefore, we set aside the impugned order.
16. The appeals are accordingly disposed of as allowed.
.…………………………….J.
(ANIL R. DAVE)
……………………………..J.
(L. NAGESWARA RAO)
NEW DELHI
SEPTEMBER 30, 2016.
