NON REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 459 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6950 OF 2009
TAMILNADU TERMINATED FULL TIME
TEMPORARY LIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION …PETITIONER
Vs.
S.K. ROY, THE CHAIRMAN, LIFE
INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA & ANR. …CONTEMNORS
WITH
CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 634 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6956 OF 2009,
REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 3846 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6950 OF 2009,
REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 2994 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6953 OF 2009,
REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 2991 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6956 OF 2009,
CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 637 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6953 OF 2009,
REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 2990 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6954 OF 2009,
REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 2993 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6952 OF 2009,
CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 502 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6952 OF 2009,
REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 2989 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6951 OF 2009
AND
CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 21 OF 2016
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6950 OF 2009
J U D G M E N T
V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.
Delay condoned in filing the Review Petitions.
These Review Petitions arise from the impugned judgment and order dated
18.03.2015 passed by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 6950 of 2009 and
connected appeals, whereby it was held that the Award passed by Central
Government Industrial Tribunal, New Delhi (CGIT) in I.D. No. 27 of 1991 is
legal and valid and the same be restored and implemented by the Life
Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as the “LIC”) by
absorbing the concerned workmen in the permanent posts. It was further held
that the Corporation would be liable to pay all consequential benefits
including monetary benefits taking into consideration the revised pay scale
in the cases of those workmen who had attained the age of superannuation.
As the facts of the case are already stated in the judgment in Civil Appeal
No. 6950 of 2009, the same need not be reiterated herein for the sake of
brevity. The following contentions were advanced by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the parties in support of their case:
Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, the learned Attorney General appearing on behalf of
the review petitioner-LIC contends that this Court, while passing the
judgment and order dated 18.03.2015, failed to appreciate that the Tulpule
and Jamdar awards stood substituted by the “Terms of Compromise” way back
on 01.03.1989, which stood finally disposed of vide judgment and order
dated 07.02.1996 passed by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 1790 of 1989. It
is further contended that this Court failed to appreciate the effect of
settlement of an award, in the light of the decision of this Court in the
case of Herbertsons Ltd. v. Workmen[1], which has further been followed by
this Court in the cases of Transmission Corpn., A.P. Ltd. v. P. Ramchandra
Rao[2] and ITC Ltd. Workers Welfare Assn. v. ITC Ltd.[3]
The learned Attorney General further submits that under Section 24 of the
Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the “LIC
Act, 1956”), the Central Government does not allocate any fund for LIC, and
the funds for LIC are generated from the payments made to it and that the
Central Government does not contribute towards the funding of LIC. It is
further submitted that under Section 28 of the LIC Act, 1956, 95% of the
surplus of LIC is to be allocated to or reserved for its life insurance
policy-holders. Thus, the contention that LIC has a huge surplus and is in
a position to implement the order of this Court is misconceived as the same
goes against the statutory provisions of the LIC Act, 1956.
The learned Attorney General further submits that the financial
implications on LIC in complying with the impugned judgment and order of
this Court cannot be ignored.
At this stage, we would deem it fit to point out that the same, however,
does not find any mention in the Review Petition filed by LIC before this
Court and does not form a part of its pleadings.
The learned Attorney General further submits that as on 31 03.2015, LIC had
55,427 Class III employees and 5,190 Class IV employees. If LIC is directed
to consider the absorption of the workmen to the advertisement, then the
number of Class III employees will increase by 11.14% and Class IV
employees by 56.65% and the same will affect the employee’s ratio in
addition to the increase in its financial burden and that the same will be
contrary to the interests of the policyholders. The learned Attorney
General estimates the financial liability for implementing the order of
this Court at approximately Rs.7087 crores, with the annual liability at
around Rs.728 crores per year and that this will be a huge financial burden
for LIC to bear.
On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents-workers submit that it becomes clear from a perusal of the
Review Petitions filed by LIC that it is trying to re-agitate the case on
merits. The learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court
in the case of Enviro Legal Action v. Union of India[4] wherein this Court
elaborated the scope of the review power of this Court under Article 137 of
the Constitution. It was held as under:
“The ratio of these judgments is that a court of final appeal has power in
truly exceptional circumstances to recall its order even after they have
been entered in order to avoid irremediable injustice.
Reviewing of various cases of different jurisdictions lead to irresistible
conclusion that though the judgments of the apex court can also be reviewed
or recalled but it must be done in extremely exceptional circumstances
where there is gross violation of principles of natural justice.”
Further reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in the case of
Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati[5], wherein this Court held as under:
“20.1 When the review will be maintainable:-
Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise
of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not
be produced by him;
Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
Any other sufficient reason.
The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chhajju Ram
vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios
Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors., (1955) 1 SCR 520,
to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those
specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union
of India vs. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors.
20.2 When the review will not be maintainable:-
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen
concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the
case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the
face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of
justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous
decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi)The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for
review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error
which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of
the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review
petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of
arguing the main matter had been negatived.”
The learned counsel contend that the ground raised in the review petitions
filed by LIC do not warrant any interference by this Court in the name of
exercise of power of review under Article 137 of the Constitution, as all
the averments in the Review petition are nothing but attempts made by the
review petitioner-LIC to protract the implementation of the order passed by
this Court.
We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties. At
this stage, it would be useful to reiterate what this Court had held in the
impugned judgment and order dated 18.03.2015:
“27. In view of the law laid by this Court in the case referred to supra,
both the Award of Justice Tulpule reiterated by way of clarification Award
by Justice Jamdar are still operative as the same are not terminated by
either of the parties as provided under Section 19(6) of the Act. The
compromise between the parties in SLP No. 14906 of 1988 and the Scheme
formed in E. Prabhavathy & Ors. and G. Sudhakar & Ors. cases referred to
supra do not amount to substitution of the Awards passed by Justice R. D.
Tulpule and by Justice S. M. Jamdar. Hence, in view of the aforesaid
reasons, the submissions made by Mr. Naphade, learned Amicus Curiae, in
justification of the Award passed by the CGIT is based on the terms and
conditions laid down in the Awards passed by the NIT (by Justice Tulpule
and Justice Jamdar) in favour of the workmen for absorption as they have
been rendering their service to the Corporation in the perennial nature of
work for a number of years and hence, the High Court was not justified in
interfering with the said Award passed by the CGIT. The said contention
urged by the learned amicus curiae is accepted by us, as the impugned
judgment and order of the High Court is contrary to the Awards referred to
supra, the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the law laid down
by this Court in the aforesaid cases. The Awards passed by the NIT is
binding upon the Corporation till it is substituted by another Award or
replaced by another settlement in relation to the service conditions of the
workmen of the Corporation in accordance with law as provided under Section
12 read with Section 18(3) of the Act or another Award that is required to
be passed by the Jurisdictional CGIT in relation to the above subject
matter after the Awards which are in operation are terminated by either of
the parties as provided under Section 19(6) of the Act. Until then, the
said Award passed by the NIT will still be operative in law. Therefore, the
same has been rightly applied to the fact situation on hand in the Award
passed by the CGIT and it could not have been set aside by the High Court.
Thus, we are of the opinion that the single Judge erroneously set aside the
Award passed by the CGIT and the said judgment of the single judge has been
further erroneously affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The
said judgments of the High Court are clearly contrary to law and legal
principles laid down by this Court in cases referred to supra. Hence, the
same are liable to be set aside by allowing these appeals and restoring the
Award of the CGIT.”
The review petitioner-LIC has not submitted anything on record to suggest
that the impugned judgment and order suffers from an error apparent in law.
While in the review petitions the factual and legal submissions urged in
the Civil Appeal have been reiterated, in the written submissions placed
before us, the emphasis shifted to the practical difficulty in
implementation of the order of this Court. It has been well settled by this
Court that a mere repetition of the same arguments which were urged in the
appeal and have been rejected, is not sufficient to justify the exercise of
power of review under Article 137 of the Constitution by this Court. In the
case of Kamlesh Verma (supra), this Court has held as under:
“Review is not re-hearing of an original matter. The power of review cannot
be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct
all errors committed by a subordinate court. A repetition of old and
overruled argument is not enough to re-open concluded adjudications. This
Court, in Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. (2006) 5 SCC
501, held as under:
11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the
Learned Counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the
applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of
arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been
refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the
original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be
confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all
errors committed by a subordinate court. It is not rehearing of an original
matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen
concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme
care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases.”
(emphasis laid by this Court)
While ordinarily, the aspect of financial hardship would not be a
sufficient ground to warrant our interference in the instant case, but
keeping in view the fact that LIC is a statutory Corporation operating in
the interest of the public at large, on the limited point of payment of
full back wages to the temporary and badli workers who are entitled for
regularisation, we may reconsider the same. A constitution bench of this
Court in the case of Keshav Mills Co. v. CIT[6] held as under:
“23. ………In reviewing and revising its earlier decision, this Court should
ask itself whether in the interests of the public good or for any other
valid and compulsive reasons, it is necessary that the earlier decision
should be revised. When this Court decides questions of law, its decisions
are, under Art. 141, binding on all courts within the territory of India,
and so, it must be the constant endeavour and concern of this Court to
introduce and maintain an element of certainty and continuity in the
interpretation of law in the country. Frequent exercise by this Court of
its power to review its earlier decisions on the ground that the view
pressed before it later appears to the Court to be more reasonable, may
incidentally tend to make law uncertain and introduce confusion which must
be consistently avoided. That is not to say that if on a subsequent
occasion, the Court is satisfied that its earlier decision was clearly
erroneous, it should hesitate to correct the error; but before a previous
decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the Court must be satisfied
with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its members that a revision of the
said view is fully justified. It is not possible or desirable, and in any
case it would be inexpedient to lay down any principles which should govern
the approach of the Court in dealing with the question of reviewing and
revising its earlier decisions. It would always depend upon several
relevant considerations: What is the nature of the infirmity or error on
which a plea for a review and revision of the earlier view is based? On the
earlier occasion, did some patent aspects of the question remain unnoticed,
or was the attention of the Court not drawn to any relevant and material
statutory provision, or was any previous decision of this Court bearing on
the point not noticed? Is the Court hearing such plea fairly unanimous that
there is such an error in the earlier view? What would be the impact of the
error on the general administration of law or on public good? Has the
earlier decision been followed on subsequent occasions either by this Court
or by the High Courts? And, would the reversal of the earlier decision lead
to public inconvenience, hardship or mischief? These and other relevant
considerations must be carefully borne in mind whenever this Court is
called upon to exercise its jurisdiction to review and revise its earlier
decisions.”
For the limited purpose of modifying the relief granted in the Civil Appeal
only with regard to the Back wages, we directed Mr. Ashok Panigrahi, the
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the review petitioner-LIC to submit
a document containing the pay scales indicating the basic pay and other
emoluments payable to the concerned workmen. The same were furnished with
the periodic revisions in the years 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012,
without furnishing the other component figures which would be the gross
salary of the different classes of workmen in the present dispute. These
periodic revisions of pay of basic salary, along with other component
figures comprising the gross salary including Dearness Allowance, House
Rent Allowance etc. etc., as applicable, must be accounted for while
computing the amount due to the workmen towards the back wages.
The temporary and badli workers of LIC, who are entitled for regularisation
as permanent workmen in terms of the impugned judgment and order dated
18.03.2015 passed by this Court, by applying the terms and conditions of
the modified award dated 26.08.1988 passed by Justice Jamdar, are held to
be entitled to full back wages as well. However, keeping in mind the
immense financial burden this would cause to LIC, we deem it fit to modify
the relief only with regard to the back wages payable and therefore, we
award 50% of the back wages with consequential benefits. The back wages
must be calculated on the basis of the gross salary of the workmen,
applicable as on the date as per the periodical revisions of pay scale as
stated supra. The computation must be made from the date of entitlement of
the workmen involved in these cases, that is, their absorption, till the
age of superannuation, if any concerned workman has attained the age of
superannuation as per the regulations of the review petitioner-LIC, as
applicable to the concerned workman.
With the above modifications to the judgment and order sought to be
reviewed, these review petitions are disposed of in the terms as indicated
above. Since the judgment and order is passed in favour of workmen and
their dispute is being litigated for nearly twenty five years, the
directions contained in the judgment and order dated 18.03.2015 with the
above modifications shall be complied with by the review petitioner-LIC
within eight weeks of the receipt of the copy of this order.
In view of the disposal of the Review Petitions, the Contempt Petitions
are also disposed of, but in case of non-compliance of the above order
within the stipulated time, the parties will be at liberty to file Contempt
Petitions afresh. All pending applications are disposed of.
…………………………………………………J. [V. GOPALA GOWDA]
…………………………………………………J.
[C. NAGAPPAN]
New Delhi,
August 9, 2016
-----------------------
[1] (1976) 4 SCC 736
[2]
[3] (2006) 9 SCC 623
[4]
[5] (2002) 3 SCC 411
[6]
[7] (2011) 8 SCC 161
[8]
[9] (2013) 8 SCC 320
[10]
[11] AIR 1965 SC 1636
[12]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 459 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6950 OF 2009
TAMILNADU TERMINATED FULL TIME
TEMPORARY LIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION …PETITIONER
Vs.
S.K. ROY, THE CHAIRMAN, LIFE
INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA & ANR. …CONTEMNORS
WITH
CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 634 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6956 OF 2009,
REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 3846 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6950 OF 2009,
REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 2994 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6953 OF 2009,
REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 2991 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6956 OF 2009,
CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 637 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6953 OF 2009,
REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 2990 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6954 OF 2009,
REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 2993 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6952 OF 2009,
CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 502 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6952 OF 2009,
REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 2989 OF 2015
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6951 OF 2009
AND
CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 21 OF 2016
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6950 OF 2009
J U D G M E N T
V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.
Delay condoned in filing the Review Petitions.
These Review Petitions arise from the impugned judgment and order dated
18.03.2015 passed by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 6950 of 2009 and
connected appeals, whereby it was held that the Award passed by Central
Government Industrial Tribunal, New Delhi (CGIT) in I.D. No. 27 of 1991 is
legal and valid and the same be restored and implemented by the Life
Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as the “LIC”) by
absorbing the concerned workmen in the permanent posts. It was further held
that the Corporation would be liable to pay all consequential benefits
including monetary benefits taking into consideration the revised pay scale
in the cases of those workmen who had attained the age of superannuation.
As the facts of the case are already stated in the judgment in Civil Appeal
No. 6950 of 2009, the same need not be reiterated herein for the sake of
brevity. The following contentions were advanced by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the parties in support of their case:
Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, the learned Attorney General appearing on behalf of
the review petitioner-LIC contends that this Court, while passing the
judgment and order dated 18.03.2015, failed to appreciate that the Tulpule
and Jamdar awards stood substituted by the “Terms of Compromise” way back
on 01.03.1989, which stood finally disposed of vide judgment and order
dated 07.02.1996 passed by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 1790 of 1989. It
is further contended that this Court failed to appreciate the effect of
settlement of an award, in the light of the decision of this Court in the
case of Herbertsons Ltd. v. Workmen[1], which has further been followed by
this Court in the cases of Transmission Corpn., A.P. Ltd. v. P. Ramchandra
Rao[2] and ITC Ltd. Workers Welfare Assn. v. ITC Ltd.[3]
The learned Attorney General further submits that under Section 24 of the
Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the “LIC
Act, 1956”), the Central Government does not allocate any fund for LIC, and
the funds for LIC are generated from the payments made to it and that the
Central Government does not contribute towards the funding of LIC. It is
further submitted that under Section 28 of the LIC Act, 1956, 95% of the
surplus of LIC is to be allocated to or reserved for its life insurance
policy-holders. Thus, the contention that LIC has a huge surplus and is in
a position to implement the order of this Court is misconceived as the same
goes against the statutory provisions of the LIC Act, 1956.
The learned Attorney General further submits that the financial
implications on LIC in complying with the impugned judgment and order of
this Court cannot be ignored.
At this stage, we would deem it fit to point out that the same, however,
does not find any mention in the Review Petition filed by LIC before this
Court and does not form a part of its pleadings.
The learned Attorney General further submits that as on 31 03.2015, LIC had
55,427 Class III employees and 5,190 Class IV employees. If LIC is directed
to consider the absorption of the workmen to the advertisement, then the
number of Class III employees will increase by 11.14% and Class IV
employees by 56.65% and the same will affect the employee’s ratio in
addition to the increase in its financial burden and that the same will be
contrary to the interests of the policyholders. The learned Attorney
General estimates the financial liability for implementing the order of
this Court at approximately Rs.7087 crores, with the annual liability at
around Rs.728 crores per year and that this will be a huge financial burden
for LIC to bear.
On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents-workers submit that it becomes clear from a perusal of the
Review Petitions filed by LIC that it is trying to re-agitate the case on
merits. The learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court
in the case of Enviro Legal Action v. Union of India[4] wherein this Court
elaborated the scope of the review power of this Court under Article 137 of
the Constitution. It was held as under:
“The ratio of these judgments is that a court of final appeal has power in
truly exceptional circumstances to recall its order even after they have
been entered in order to avoid irremediable injustice.
Reviewing of various cases of different jurisdictions lead to irresistible
conclusion that though the judgments of the apex court can also be reviewed
or recalled but it must be done in extremely exceptional circumstances
where there is gross violation of principles of natural justice.”
Further reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in the case of
Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati[5], wherein this Court held as under:
“20.1 When the review will be maintainable:-
Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise
of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not
be produced by him;
Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
Any other sufficient reason.
The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chhajju Ram
vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios
Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors., (1955) 1 SCR 520,
to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those
specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union
of India vs. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors.
20.2 When the review will not be maintainable:-
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen
concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the
case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the
face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of
justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous
decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi)The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for
review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error
which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of
the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review
petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of
arguing the main matter had been negatived.”
The learned counsel contend that the ground raised in the review petitions
filed by LIC do not warrant any interference by this Court in the name of
exercise of power of review under Article 137 of the Constitution, as all
the averments in the Review petition are nothing but attempts made by the
review petitioner-LIC to protract the implementation of the order passed by
this Court.
We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties. At
this stage, it would be useful to reiterate what this Court had held in the
impugned judgment and order dated 18.03.2015:
“27. In view of the law laid by this Court in the case referred to supra,
both the Award of Justice Tulpule reiterated by way of clarification Award
by Justice Jamdar are still operative as the same are not terminated by
either of the parties as provided under Section 19(6) of the Act. The
compromise between the parties in SLP No. 14906 of 1988 and the Scheme
formed in E. Prabhavathy & Ors. and G. Sudhakar & Ors. cases referred to
supra do not amount to substitution of the Awards passed by Justice R. D.
Tulpule and by Justice S. M. Jamdar. Hence, in view of the aforesaid
reasons, the submissions made by Mr. Naphade, learned Amicus Curiae, in
justification of the Award passed by the CGIT is based on the terms and
conditions laid down in the Awards passed by the NIT (by Justice Tulpule
and Justice Jamdar) in favour of the workmen for absorption as they have
been rendering their service to the Corporation in the perennial nature of
work for a number of years and hence, the High Court was not justified in
interfering with the said Award passed by the CGIT. The said contention
urged by the learned amicus curiae is accepted by us, as the impugned
judgment and order of the High Court is contrary to the Awards referred to
supra, the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the law laid down
by this Court in the aforesaid cases. The Awards passed by the NIT is
binding upon the Corporation till it is substituted by another Award or
replaced by another settlement in relation to the service conditions of the
workmen of the Corporation in accordance with law as provided under Section
12 read with Section 18(3) of the Act or another Award that is required to
be passed by the Jurisdictional CGIT in relation to the above subject
matter after the Awards which are in operation are terminated by either of
the parties as provided under Section 19(6) of the Act. Until then, the
said Award passed by the NIT will still be operative in law. Therefore, the
same has been rightly applied to the fact situation on hand in the Award
passed by the CGIT and it could not have been set aside by the High Court.
Thus, we are of the opinion that the single Judge erroneously set aside the
Award passed by the CGIT and the said judgment of the single judge has been
further erroneously affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The
said judgments of the High Court are clearly contrary to law and legal
principles laid down by this Court in cases referred to supra. Hence, the
same are liable to be set aside by allowing these appeals and restoring the
Award of the CGIT.”
The review petitioner-LIC has not submitted anything on record to suggest
that the impugned judgment and order suffers from an error apparent in law.
While in the review petitions the factual and legal submissions urged in
the Civil Appeal have been reiterated, in the written submissions placed
before us, the emphasis shifted to the practical difficulty in
implementation of the order of this Court. It has been well settled by this
Court that a mere repetition of the same arguments which were urged in the
appeal and have been rejected, is not sufficient to justify the exercise of
power of review under Article 137 of the Constitution by this Court. In the
case of Kamlesh Verma (supra), this Court has held as under:
“Review is not re-hearing of an original matter. The power of review cannot
be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct
all errors committed by a subordinate court. A repetition of old and
overruled argument is not enough to re-open concluded adjudications. This
Court, in Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. (2006) 5 SCC
501, held as under:
11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the
Learned Counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the
applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of
arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been
refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the
original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be
confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all
errors committed by a subordinate court. It is not rehearing of an original
matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen
concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme
care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases.”
(emphasis laid by this Court)
While ordinarily, the aspect of financial hardship would not be a
sufficient ground to warrant our interference in the instant case, but
keeping in view the fact that LIC is a statutory Corporation operating in
the interest of the public at large, on the limited point of payment of
full back wages to the temporary and badli workers who are entitled for
regularisation, we may reconsider the same. A constitution bench of this
Court in the case of Keshav Mills Co. v. CIT[6] held as under:
“23. ………In reviewing and revising its earlier decision, this Court should
ask itself whether in the interests of the public good or for any other
valid and compulsive reasons, it is necessary that the earlier decision
should be revised. When this Court decides questions of law, its decisions
are, under Art. 141, binding on all courts within the territory of India,
and so, it must be the constant endeavour and concern of this Court to
introduce and maintain an element of certainty and continuity in the
interpretation of law in the country. Frequent exercise by this Court of
its power to review its earlier decisions on the ground that the view
pressed before it later appears to the Court to be more reasonable, may
incidentally tend to make law uncertain and introduce confusion which must
be consistently avoided. That is not to say that if on a subsequent
occasion, the Court is satisfied that its earlier decision was clearly
erroneous, it should hesitate to correct the error; but before a previous
decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the Court must be satisfied
with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its members that a revision of the
said view is fully justified. It is not possible or desirable, and in any
case it would be inexpedient to lay down any principles which should govern
the approach of the Court in dealing with the question of reviewing and
revising its earlier decisions. It would always depend upon several
relevant considerations: What is the nature of the infirmity or error on
which a plea for a review and revision of the earlier view is based? On the
earlier occasion, did some patent aspects of the question remain unnoticed,
or was the attention of the Court not drawn to any relevant and material
statutory provision, or was any previous decision of this Court bearing on
the point not noticed? Is the Court hearing such plea fairly unanimous that
there is such an error in the earlier view? What would be the impact of the
error on the general administration of law or on public good? Has the
earlier decision been followed on subsequent occasions either by this Court
or by the High Courts? And, would the reversal of the earlier decision lead
to public inconvenience, hardship or mischief? These and other relevant
considerations must be carefully borne in mind whenever this Court is
called upon to exercise its jurisdiction to review and revise its earlier
decisions.”
For the limited purpose of modifying the relief granted in the Civil Appeal
only with regard to the Back wages, we directed Mr. Ashok Panigrahi, the
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the review petitioner-LIC to submit
a document containing the pay scales indicating the basic pay and other
emoluments payable to the concerned workmen. The same were furnished with
the periodic revisions in the years 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012,
without furnishing the other component figures which would be the gross
salary of the different classes of workmen in the present dispute. These
periodic revisions of pay of basic salary, along with other component
figures comprising the gross salary including Dearness Allowance, House
Rent Allowance etc. etc., as applicable, must be accounted for while
computing the amount due to the workmen towards the back wages.
The temporary and badli workers of LIC, who are entitled for regularisation
as permanent workmen in terms of the impugned judgment and order dated
18.03.2015 passed by this Court, by applying the terms and conditions of
the modified award dated 26.08.1988 passed by Justice Jamdar, are held to
be entitled to full back wages as well. However, keeping in mind the
immense financial burden this would cause to LIC, we deem it fit to modify
the relief only with regard to the back wages payable and therefore, we
award 50% of the back wages with consequential benefits. The back wages
must be calculated on the basis of the gross salary of the workmen,
applicable as on the date as per the periodical revisions of pay scale as
stated supra. The computation must be made from the date of entitlement of
the workmen involved in these cases, that is, their absorption, till the
age of superannuation, if any concerned workman has attained the age of
superannuation as per the regulations of the review petitioner-LIC, as
applicable to the concerned workman.
With the above modifications to the judgment and order sought to be
reviewed, these review petitions are disposed of in the terms as indicated
above. Since the judgment and order is passed in favour of workmen and
their dispute is being litigated for nearly twenty five years, the
directions contained in the judgment and order dated 18.03.2015 with the
above modifications shall be complied with by the review petitioner-LIC
within eight weeks of the receipt of the copy of this order.
In view of the disposal of the Review Petitions, the Contempt Petitions
are also disposed of, but in case of non-compliance of the above order
within the stipulated time, the parties will be at liberty to file Contempt
Petitions afresh. All pending applications are disposed of.
…………………………………………………J. [V. GOPALA GOWDA]
…………………………………………………J.
[C. NAGAPPAN]
New Delhi,
August 9, 2016
-----------------------
[1] (1976) 4 SCC 736
[2]
[3] (2006) 9 SCC 623
[4]
[5] (2002) 3 SCC 411
[6]
[7] (2011) 8 SCC 161
[8]
[9] (2013) 8 SCC 320
[10]
[11] AIR 1965 SC 1636
[12]
