IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4436 OF 2010
NICHOLAS PIRAMAL INDIA LTD. …APPELLANT
Vs.
HARISINGH …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the impugned judgment
and order dated 28.4.2009 passed by the High Court of judicature of Madhya
Pradesh at Indore, in Writ Petition No. 2309 of 2009, whereby the High
Court has affirmed the award dated 27.1.2009 passed by the Industrial
Court, Indore in Civil Appeal No. 340/MPIR of 2007 which arises out of the
Award dated 29.10.2007 passed by the Labour Court in Case No. 421/MPIR of
2001.
For the purpose of considering the rival legal contentions urged on behalf
of the parties in this appeal and with a view to find out whether this
Court is required to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the
High Court, the necessary facts are briefly stated hereunder:
The respondent was employed as a workman at the drug manufacturing
unit of the appellant-Nicholas Piramal India Ltd. (for short “the
Company”), situated at Pithampur, Madhya Pradesh. The Company issued two
charge sheets dated 26.2.2000 and 13.3.2000 against him, alleging that he
has violated and disregarded the orders of his senior officers and
intentionally slowed down the work under process and made less production
by adopting “go slow work” tactics which is a grave misconduct on the part
of the respondent-workman under Clause 12(1)(d) of The M.P. Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1963 (for short “the SSO”). The
respondent denied the charges levelled against him by the appellant and
submitted his reply to the charge-sheets. Not being satisfied with the
same, the domestic enquiry proceedings were initiated by the disciplinary
authority against him. In the domestic enquiry proceedings, the Inquiry
Officer found the respondent-workman was guilty of the misconduct after
holding that the charges levelled against him were proved which finding of
fact is recorded by him in the enquiry report. The findings of the Inquiry
Officer were accepted by the Disciplinary Authority of the appellant-
Company and it served the second show cause notice on the respondent on
31.5.2001 along with the copy of the enquiry report, the same did not refer
to any of his past service record. The respondent-workman submitted his
written explanation to the second show cause notice, denying the findings
of the Inquiry Officer by giving point wise reply to the findings of the
enquiry report. On 30.7.2001 an order of dismissal was passed by the
appellant-Company dismissing him from his service, after accepting the
findings of the domestic Inquiry Officer in his report and not considering
the reply of the respondent-workman to the said show cause notice.
Being aggrieved by the order of dismissal passed against the respondent-
workman by the appellant-Company, he raised an industrial dispute before
the Labour Court by filing application No. 421 of 2001 under Section 31(3)
read with Sections 61 and 62 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations
Act, 1960 (for short “the M.P.I.R. Act”), questioning the correctness of
the order of dismissal dated 30.7.2001, passed by the Disciplinary
Authority of the appellant-Company from his services and prayed to set
aside the same and reinstate him in the service to the said post with all
the consequential benefits including back wages.
The Labour Court, on the basis of the rival legal and factual contentions
urged on behalf of the parties, framed the following issues for its
determination:-
Whether the domestic enquiry conducted against the applicant is illegal,
malafide and liable to be quashed?
Whether the applicant is the guilty of misconduct as described in the
charge-sheet?
Whether the applicant is unemployed after termination of service?
Relief and costs.
The enquiry report was produced before the Labour Court by the appellant-
Company and was considered by it and answered the preliminary issue No. 1,
regarding the validity of the domestic enquiry in the affirmative in favour
of the appellant-Company.
The Labour Court, after adverting to the relevant Clause 12(1)(d)&(m) of
the SSO and on re-appreciation of the material evidence on record in
exercise of its original jurisdiction examined the correctness of the
findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer on the charges levelled against
the workman which is accepted by the Disciplinary Authority and answered
issue No. 2 in the affirmative as well holding that the alleged misconduct
of the workman is proved and held that the same does not warrant
interference by the Labour Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction
and power conferred under Section 107 of M.P.I.R. Act, which is equivalent
to Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “the I.D.
Act”) to substitute the punishment of dismissal order passed against the
workman as the charges levelled against him have been proved during the
enquiry proceedings and the same is held to be valid in law by answering
the preliminary issue regarding the validity of the domestic enquiry.
Further, it has held on the merits of the case after re-appreciation of
material evidence on record that the penalty of dismissal awarded on the
respondent-workman is legal and valid in law which does not call for
interference by the Labour Court.
The correctness of the same was challenged by the respondent-workman before
the Industrial Court which is the Appellate Court, by filing C.A. No.275 of
2006. The Appellate Court by its order dated 22.11.2006 set aside the Award
passed by the Labour Court and remanded the case no. 421 of 2001 to it for
its re-consideration. The Labour Court again passed the award dated
15.2.2007 after reconsidering the case as directed by the Appellate Court,
in favour of appellant-Company, holding that the order of dismissal passed
by the Company does not warrant interference by it. The correctness of the
same was again challenged by the respondent-workman before the Industrial
Court which again remanded the case to the Labour Court by its order dated
7.8.2007 in C.A. No. 53 of 2007.
The Labour Court after re-consideration of the case, has partly allowed
the application of the respondent-workman and set aside the order of
dismissal dated 30.7.2001 passed against the respondent-workman and the
appellant-Company was directed to reinstate the respondent-workman in the
service with 50% back wages. The Labour Court however, denied him the
remaining 50% back wages, treating the same as penalty imposed upon him in
place of the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority of the
appellant-Company.
The appellant-Company filed an appeal before the Industrial Court,
questioning the correctness of the Award passed by the labour Court by
filing C.A. No.340 of 2007 urging certain legal grounds and vide its order
dated 27.1.2009, the Industrial Court has held that the evidence produced
by the appellant-Company during the domestic enquiry does not show that the
workman has made less production intentionally during the relevant period
in respect of which the two charge sheets were served upon him. However,
the Industrial Court held that withholding of 50% of the back wages from
the respondent-workman for the proved misconduct is justified and it found
no other reason for its interference with the Award passed by the Labour
Court and dismissed the appeal of the appellant-Company. It has further
held that the order of dismissal passed by the appellant-Company is
disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct of the respondent-workman
by recording its findings to that effect with reference to the material
evidence on record and held that the charges are proved partially by the
appellant-Company against the respondent-workman before the Inquiry
Officer.
The Appellate Court examined the proportionality of the order of dismissal
passed against the respondent-workman by the Disciplinary Authority of the
appellant-Company, after adverting to the judgments of this Court in the
cases of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. M. Chandrasekhar Reddy & Ors.[1]
and Regional Manager, U.P.S.R.T.C., Etawah & Ors. v. Hoti Lal & Anr.[2]
and held that the charges levelled against the respondent-workman only
proved that he has not completed the production to the full capacity but
the punishment order of dismissal from service awarded against the
respondent-workman is disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct
committed by the workman. Further, it has opined that the Disciplinary
Authority could have imposed a lesser punishment, such as censure,
withholding of increments or any other fine as provided under Clause
12(3)(a)to(c) of the SSO upon the respondent-workman for the proved
misconduct. However, the employer has awarded severe punishment of
dismissal on the respondent-workman which is much harsher and unjustified
in proportion to the proved misconduct as it would deprive the livelihood
of the respondent-workman and his family members. Hence, the Labour Court
interfered with the same in exercise of its jurisdiction conferred under
Section 107 of M.P.I.R. Act and held that the order of dismissal passed
against the workman is not proper and the same is liable to be set aside.
Accordingly, the same was set aside.
The Award of reinstatement of the workman with 50% back wages was
challenged by the appellant-Company by filing the writ petition before the
High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, urging various
legal grounds. The High Court, after adverting to the relevant facts and
the findings of fact recorded in the Awards passed by both the Labour Court
and the Industrial Court, after examining the relevant provisions of the
M.P.I.R. Act and the standing orders and keeping in view the order of
dismissal passed against the respondent-workman as punishment under the
provisions of the SSO, has held that the exercise of power under Section
107 of M.P.I.R. Act by both the Labour Court and the Appellate Court in
substituting the lesser punishment in place of the order of dismissal
imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is bad in law and it further held
that it is not a fit case for it to interfere with the same and held that
the Labour Court in exercise of its power under Section 107 of M.P.I.R. Act
has got the original jurisdiction and power to interfere with the quantum
of punishment imposed upon the workman by the Disciplinary Authority of the
appellant-Company and the same is concurred with by the Industrial Court in
exercise of its Appellate Jurisdiction after re-appreciation of evidence on
record. Secondly, it has held that the charges levelled against the
respondent-workman were partially proved but it did not call for the
appellant-Company to impose extreme punishment by passing the order of
dismissal against him. Further, looking into the nature of the charges and
its gravity, the imposition of punishment of dismissal upon him is
disproportionate to that of the charges levelled against the respondent-
workman which are partially proved and lastly producing less tablets by the
respondent-workman during that particular duration may have been due to
several reasons. Therefore, it was held by the Labour Court that the
punishment of withholding 50% back wages justifies the proved act of
misconduct against the respondent-workman. It has further held that the
same would be proper, particularly, having regard to the fact that no past
misconduct of the workman was relied upon by the appellant-Company which is
one of the relevant considerations at the time of passing the order of
dismissal against him as per Clause 12(3)(vi) of the SSO required to be
followed by the appellant-Company. The correctness of the impugned judgment
and the order of the High Court has been questioned in this appeal by the
appellant-Company on certain grounds raising substantial questions of law.
It has been contended by Mr. C.U. Singh, the learned senior counsel on
behalf of the appellant-Company that the charges of misconduct of “go
slow”, for giving less production during the relevant period of time as
mentioned in the charge-sheets has been proved in the domestic enquiry
against the respondent-workman. Further, he has urged that the same is a
grave misconduct on the part of the respondent-workman which warranted an
order of dismissal to be imposed upon him by the appellant-Company in view
of his past service record as mentioned in the order of dismissal. Further,
it is contended that the order of dismissal was passed after holding
domestic enquiry as provided under the SSO and in compliance with the
principles of natural justice.
The learned senior counsel has further contended that the charge sheets
issued against the respondent-workman would show that he has disobeyed the
orders of his superiors and wilfully slowed down the performance of work
which is a grave misconduct for which the disciplinary proceedings were
initiated and the domestic enquiry was conducted against the respondent-
workman after giving him an opportunity in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the SSO and the second show cause notice was issued to him in
this regard. Thereafter, not being satisfied with his reply to the second
show cause notice, the order of dismissal was passed against the workman by
the appellant-Company as it is major misconduct under Clause 12(3)(b)(vi)
of the SSO and therefore, such a major penalty imposed upon him is legal
and valid and the same could not have been interfered with by the Labour
Court.
He has further placed reliance upon the findings recorded in the report
by the Inquiry Officer on the basis of the evidence adduced by both the
employer and the defence witnesses, namely, co-employees, DW-1 and DW-3. He
has also contended that during the relevant period of time the less
production of tablets by the respondent-workman is a clear case of wilful
slowing down of work which is a grave misconduct on the part of the workman
which warranted an order of dismissal passed against him by the
Disciplinary Authority of the appellant-Company.
He has further contended that the finding of the Labour Court that the
respondent has not worked to his full capacity in the establishment of the
appellant-Company and holding that the order of his dismissal from the
service by the appellant-Company is not justified, is an erroneous finding
of fact as the same is contrary to the material evidence produced on
record, particularly, the evidence adduced before the Inquiry Officer and
the evidence of the defence witnesses DW-1 and DW-3 who have spoken about
the wilful go slow by the respondent-workman in producing the tablets for
the appellant-Company. Therefore, the finding recorded by the Labour Court
on the misconduct by the respondent-workman is erroneous in law as the same
is contrary to the legal evidence and no reasonable person could have
arrived at such a conclusion. Hence, the Labour Court has erred in law in
holding that the charges are partially proved against the respondent-
workman even after two remand orders were passed by the Industrial Court in
recording the aforesaid finding on the charges in favour of the respondent-
workman and the exercise of power by the Labour Court under Section 107 of
the M.P.I.R. Act is vitiated in law as the same is contrary to the judgment
of this Court in the case of Bharat Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Jai Singh & Ors.[3]
wherein this Court has held that the charge of wilful go slow in producing
less production on the part of the workman is a grave misconduct which
warrants order of dismissal passed against the workman.
The learned senior counsel, Mr. C.U. Singh, has further contended that
the finding recorded by the Labour Court at para 20 of the Award dated
29.10.2007 passed by it, wherein it is held that the order of dismissal of
the respondent-workman from the service is disproportionate with respect to
the gravity of the proved misconduct, is once again an erroneous finding
and therefore, it is unsustainable in law. The same was erroneously
endorsed by both the Industrial Court and the High Court as they have
declined to exercise their appellate jurisdiction and therefore, the same
requires to be corrected by this Court in exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction in this Appeal.
It has been further contended by the learned senior counsel for the
appellant-Company that the Labour Court has erred in awarding 50% back
wages by passing an award of reinstatement and setting aside the order of
dismissal by holding that the order of dismissal is disproportionate,
without there being any plea or evidence adduced by the workman in this
regard.
On the other hand, Mr. Niraj Sharma, the learned counsel on behalf of the
respondent-workman has vehemently sought to justify the findings and
reasons recorded by the Labour Court on the contentious issue No. 2 in
exercise of its power under Section 107 of the M.P.I.R. Act and has
contended that the Labour Court on re-appreciation of evidence on record
has held that the imposition of the major penalty of dismissal is
disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct that was partially proved
and the same has been rightly interfered with by applying the decision
referred to in the judgment passed by the Labour Court, as the same is in
accordance with law as laid down by this Court in Raghubir Singh v. General
Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar[4] and Jitendra Singh Rathor v.
Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. & Anr.[5] wherein this Court has held that
the denial of back wages to the workman itself is an adequate punishment
for the proved misconduct against him.
It has been further contended by him that the statutory duty cast upon
the Disciplinary Authority under Clause 12(3)(c) of the SSO requires it to
take into consideration the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record
of the workman and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances at
the time of passing an order of dismissal. In the present case, the
appellant-Company has not notified the workman about any of his past record
in the show cause notice as required in law as per the Constitution Bench
decision of this Court in the case of State of Mysore v. K. Manche
Gowda[6].
Further, there are no extenuating and aggravating circumstances existing
against the workman which would lead to the imposition of major or extreme
penalty of dismissal by the appellant-Company. Therefore, there is a
violation of statutory duty on the part of the Disciplinary Authority of
the appellant-Company. This important aspect of the case has been rightly
considered by both the Labour Court and the Industrial Court therefore, the
same has rightly not been interfered with by the High Court in exercise of
its supervisory jurisdiction. Therefore, he has submitted that the same
does not call for interference by this Court.
He has further contended that concurrent finding of fact recorded by the
fact finding courts need not be interfered with by this Court in exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction in view of the fact that the Labour Court and
the Industrial Court on re-appreciation of the evidence on record and by
placing reliance upon the judgments referred to in the impugned judgment
and Award, have held that the dismissal of the respondent-workman from the
service in the Company of the appellant for the partially proved misconduct
is contrary to the punishment enumerated under Clause 12(3)(b)(i)to(v) of
the SSO, which provides punishment of censures, fine, etc. for major
misconduct. The dismissal enumerated under Clause 12(3)(vi) of the
aforesaid SSO, should not have been imposed by the Disciplinary Authority
of the Company, in the fact situation of the present case and the
concurrent view of the fact finding courts which has also been concurred
with by the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction and it
has rightly held that it is legal and valid and does not require the
interference of this Court.
He has also contended before the Labour Court that the finding recorded by
the Inquiry Officer in his enquiry report, which is accepted by the
Disciplinary Authority, is erroneous in law as there is no material
evidence on record against the respondent-workman by the appellant-Company
to prove the charge that he had intentionally adopted “go slow” work for
the period mentioned in the charge-sheets. The Disciplinary Authority has
not taken into consideration the past service record and extenuating and
mitigating circumstances at the time of passing the order of dismissal,
keeping in view the relevant provisions of the SSO Clause 12(3)(a)&(b).
Therefore, the courts have repeatedly held that the order of dismissal
passed against the respondent-workman is illegal and improper and against
the provisions of the SSO and the principles of natural justice. Therefore,
it is claimed that the respondent-workman is entitled for reinstatement
with consequential benefits after setting aside the order of dismissal
passed by the Disciplinary Authority of the appellant-Company against him.
With reference to the aforesaid rival legal contentions urged on behalf
of the parties and the evidence on record, we have carefully examined the
following points to find out as to whether the impugned judgment and Award
warrant interference in this appeal :-
Whether the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the High Court in not
interfering with the order of the Industrial Court in directing the
appellant-Company to reinstate and pay 50% back wages to the respondent-
workman is legal and valid?
What order?
The first point is required to be answered in favour of the respondent-
workman for the following reasons:-
The Labour Court at the first instance has erroneously failed to
exercise its jurisdiction by not re-appreciating the evidence on record
after holding that the preliminary issue regarding the domestic enquiry
conducted by the appellant-Company is legal and valid. The said erroneous
finding was challenged by the respondent-workman in the Appellate Court
after two remand orders were passed by the Industrial Court. Ultimately,
the Labour Court has exercised its jurisdiction and on re-appreciation of
the facts and the evidence on record and in accordance with the decision of
this Court in The Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company of India
(P) Ltd. v. The Management and Ors.[7], it has found fault with the
findings of the Inquiry Officer which was endorsed by the Disciplinary
Authority which has erroneously held that the workman was guilty of the
misconduct. The Labour Court after the two remand orders has rightly come
to the conclusion on re-appreciation of the evidence on record and held
that the charge levelled against the respondent is partially proved and
even then the order of dismissal imposed upon him by the Disciplinary
Authority, has been done without notifying the respondent-workman about his
past service record, as required under Clause 12(3)(b)&(c) of the SSO,
which aspect is rightly noticed and answered by the Labour Court at para 20
of its Award dated 29.10.2007. Thus, the order of dismissal of the workman
from the service is disproportionate and severe to the gravity of the
misconduct. The same has been laid down by this Court in the case of
Raghubir Singh v. Haryana Roadways (supra), wherein this Court has held
thus:-
“39. The above said “Doctrine of Proportionality” should be applied to the
fact situation as we are of the firm view that the order of termination,
even if we accept the same is justified, it is disproportionate to the
gravity of misconduct. In this regard, it would be appropriate for us to
refer to certain paragraphs from the decision of this Court in Om Kumar v.
Union of India, wherein it was held as under: (SCC pp. 410-11, paras 66-68)
“66. It is clear from the above discussion that in India where
administrative action is challenged under Article 14 as being
discriminatory, equals are treated unequally or unequals are treated
equally, the question is for the constitutional courts as primary reviewing
courts to consider correctness of the level of discrimination applied and
whether it is excessive and whether it has a nexus with the objective
intended to be achieved by the administrator. Hence the court deals with
[pic]the merits of the balancing action of the administrator and is, in
essence, applying ‘proportionality’ and is a primary reviewing authority.
67. But where an administrative action is challenged as ‘arbitrary’ under
Article 14 on the basis of Royappa (as in cases where punishments in
disciplinary cases are challenged), the question will be whether the
administrative order is ‘rational’ or ‘reasonable’ and the test then is the
Wednesbury test. The courts would then be confined only to a secondary role
and will only have to see whether the administrator has done well in his
primary role, whether he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant
factors from consideration or has taken irrelevant factors into
consideration or whether his view is one which no reasonable person could
have taken. If his action does not satisfy these rules, it is to be treated
as arbitrary. [In G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council.]
Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) pointed out that ‘reasonableness’ of
the administrator under Article 14 in the context of administrative law has
to be judged from the standpoint of Wednesbury rules. In Tata Cellular v.
Union of India (SCC at pp. 679-80), Indian Express Newspapers Bombay (P)
Ltd. v. Union of India, Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of
India and U.P. Financial Corpn. v. Gem Cap (India) (P) Ltd. while judging
whether the administrative action is ‘arbitrary’ under Article 14 (i.e.
otherwise then being discriminatory), this Court has confined itself to a
Wednesbury review always.
68. Thus, when administrative action is attacked as discriminatory under
Article 14, the principle of primary review is for the courts by applying
proportionality. However, where administrative action is questioned as
‘arbitrary’ under Article 14, the principle of secondary review based on
Wednesbury principles applies.”
40. Additionally, the proportionality and punishment in service law has
been discussed by this Court in Om Kumar case as follows:
“69. The principles explained in the last preceding paragraph in respect of
Article 14 are now to be applied here where the question of ‘arbitrariness’
of the order of punishment is questioned under Article 14.
70. In this context, we shall only refer to these cases. In Ranjit Thakur
v. Union of India, this Court referred to ‘proportionality’ in the
[pic]quantum of punishment but the Court observed that the punishment was
‘shockingly’ disproportionate to the misconduct proved. In B.C. Chaturvedi
v. Union of India, this Court stated that the Court will not interfere
unless the punishment awarded was one which shocked the conscience of the
court. Even then, the court would remit the matter back to the authority
and would not normally substitute one punishment for the other. However, in
rare situations, the court could award an alternative penalty. It was also
so stated in Ganayutham.””
Further, in the case of State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda (supra), this
Court has held thus:-
“8…….It is suggested that the past record of a government servant, if it is
intended to be relied upon for imposing a punishment, should be made
specific charge in the first stage of the enquiry itself and, if it is not
so done, it cannot be relied upon after the enquiry is closed and the
report is submitted to the authority entitled to impose the punishment. An
enquiry against a government servant is one continuous process, though for
convenience it is done in two stages. The report submitted by the Enquiry
Officer is only recommendatory in nature and the final authority which
scrutinizes it and imposes punishment is the authority empowered to impose
the same. Whether a particular person has a reasonable opportunity or not
depends, to some extent, upon the nature of the subject-matter of the
enquiry. But it is not necessary in this case to decide whether such
previous record can be made the subject matter of charge at the first stage
of the enquiry. But, nothing in law prevents the punishing authority from
taking that fact into consideration during the second stage of the enquiry,
for essentially it relates more to the domain of punishment rather than to
that of guilt. But what is essential is that the government servant shall
be given a reasonable opportunity to know that fact and meet the same.”
Further, the Labour Court after adverting to the judgments of this Court
referred to supra has rightly held that the punishment of dismissal is
disproportionate and interfered with the same by imposing the lesser
punishment of denial of 50% back wages with reinstatement and the same has
been examined and rightly upheld by the Appellate Court and the High Court
in exercise of its judicial review power under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
Having regard to the nature of judicial review power conferred upon the
High Court, it has rightly accepted the impugned Award passed by the Labour
Court which is affirmed by the Appellate Court by recording valid and
cogent reasons in the impugned Award/judgment. The same can neither be
termed as erroneous nor error in law.
The workman’s wilful disobedience of lawful or reasonable order under
Clause 12(1)(d) of the SSO and the wilful slowing down of the work
performance by him has been held to be partially proved. Therefore, the
Labour Court has imposed a lesser punishment as against the order of
dismissal in exercise of its original jurisdiction and power under Section
107 of the M.P.I.R. Act as the Disciplinary Authority has failed to give
any valid reasons for not imposing any one of the lesser punishments as
provided under Clause 12 (3)(b)(i) to (v) of SSO. Hence, the denial of 50%
back wages to the workman by the Labour Court is itself a punishment
imposed upon the workman as held by this Court in the case of Jitendra
Singh Rathor (supra), upon which reliance has been rightly placed by the
learned counsel for the respondent- workman. The contention urged on behalf
of the appellant-Company that the award of back wages in the absence of any
plea and evidence by the respondent-workman that he was not gainfully
employed cannot be accepted by us in view of the decision in the case of
Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D. Ed.) &
Ors[8]. delivered by this Court to which one of us, (Justice V. Gopala
Gowda), is a party to the judgment.
For the reasons stated supra, we do not find any good reason to interfere
with the impugned judgment and Awards of the High Court as well as the
Appellate Court and the Labour Court. The appeal is devoid of merit and is
accordingly dismissed. The order dated 28.8.2009 granting stay of the
impugned order shall stand vacated.
Since, the matter has been pending before various courts for the last
14 years, we direct the appellant-Company to reinstate the workman within 4
weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment and compute 50%
back wages payable to him from the date of his dismissal from the service
till the date of passing of the Award, as per the periodical revision of
the same and pay full salary from the date of the passing of the Award till
the date of reinstatement.
……………………………………………………………J.
[V.GOPALA GOWDA]
……………………………………………………………J.
[C. NAGAPPAN]
New Delhi,
April 30, 2015
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[1] (2005) 2 SCC 481
[2] (2003) 3 SCC 605
[3] (1962) 3 SCR 684
[4] (2014) 10 SCC 301
[5] (1984) 3 SCC 5
[6] (1964) 4 SCR 540
[7] AIR (1973) SC 1227
[8] (2013) 10 SCC 324
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|NON-REPORTABLE |
