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Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1241 OF 2005
Vathsala Manickavasagam & Ors. ….
Appellants
VERSUS
N. Ganesan & Anr. …. Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the Division Bench judgment of
the Madras High Court dated 19.06.2003, in A.S.No.367 of 1985.
2. Originally the suit for partition was filed by one late
Mrs.Nagarathnam, along with her two sons late Manickavasagam
and Saravanamurthi as well as her daughter Sethulakshmi as
plaintiffs 3, 2 and 4.
The present first appellant is the wife of the
late Manickavasagam, the third plaintiff, along with her sons, the
second appellant and the third appellant. The fourth appellant is
the second plaintiff and the fifth appellant is the fourth plaintiff.
The first defendant who is the first respondent herein is also the
son of the first plaintiff. The second respondent was the second
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 1 of 24Page 2
defendant in the suit, who purchased the property from one
Barnabass Nadar, to whom the first defendant earlier sold the
suit property on 11.11.1978.
3. The suit was for partition. The plaintiffs claim 4/5th shares in
respect of three items of the suit properties, which was decreed
by the Trial Court, as against which, the first respondent/first
defendant, filed the first appeal before the High Court. The High
Court by the impugned judgment, modified the judgment and
decree of the Trial Court and held that the decree with reference
to item Nos.1 and 2 of the suit properties, cannot be sustained
and that the decree of the Trial Court for partition, was confirmed
only in respect of the third item of the suit property and that the
preliminary decree for partition in respect of the third item of the
suit property was alone granted.
It is against the said judgment
and decree of the Division Bench of the High Court, the
appellants have come forward with this appeal.
4. The simple case of the plaintiffs in the suit was that the
plaintiffs and the first defendant, are the descendants of the late
Nithyanandam, who died intestate on 22.09.1956.
They filed the
suit for partition for their 4/5th shares in respect of items 1 to 3.
The first item of the suit property was sold by the first defendant
to one Barnabass Nadar, on 11.11.1978, who in turn sold the
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 2 of 24Page 3
property to the second defendant/second respondent.
It was the
common case that the deceased Nithyanandam had no ancestral
property and that his wife, sons and daughter have got equal
share in the property.
Therefore, as regards the eligibility and
extent of share, there was no dispute.
According to the first
defendant/first respondent herein, out of the three items of the
suit properties, the first and second items of properties were the
exclusive properties of the first defendant and therefore, others
were not entitled for any share in it.
5. So far as the first item of the property was concerned,
according to the first defendant, the said property was gifted to
him by his father and that the second item of the property was
purchased by him by selling the jewels of his wife, as well as from
the money advanced by his father-in-law to him.
6. The trial Court framed as many as 8 issues for consideration.
Issue Nos.1 to 3 related to the stand of the first respondent
herein that the first item of the suit property was gifted in his
favour by his father and that the second item of the property was
purchased from the proceeds of the jewels belonging to his wife,
as well as, from the money advanced by his father-in-law. The
third issue related to the question as to whether items 1 to 3 of
the suit schedule properties, were the joint family properties, as
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 3 of 24Page 4
claimed by the plaintiffs. The question relating to limitation, with
regard to the claim of items 1 and 2 of the suit properties, was
the 4th issue. The 5th issue related to the question whether,
proper Court Fee was mentioned in the plaint. The sixth issue
related to the entitlement of equity claimed by the second
defendant/second respondent herein, as regards the first item of
the suit schedule property. The last two issues related to the
entitlement of the plaintiff for partition and the relief to be
granted.
7. The first item of the suit property is a house property, in a site
measuring 10,000/- sq.ft. in T.S.No.2951/3, at Arulananda Nagar,
Thanjavur. The said house site was allotted by a Housing Society
called Little Flower Colony House Building Co-operative Society,
and the same was purchased by late Nithyanandam, in the name
of his eldest son viz., the first defendant/first respondent herein.
8. The second item of the suit property is also a house site
bearing Door No.17/35, purchased in the name of the first
defendant on 21.10.1964, from one Visalakshmi Ammal, which is
located in Rajappa Nagar, Thanjavur.
The third item of the suit
property is also a house and since there is no dispute about the
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 4 of 24Page 5
status of the property as a joint family property, we need not deal
with the same in detail.
9. The trial Court while answering the issues, considered the
evidence both oral and documentary and reached a conclusion
that
even suit items 1 and 2 though were also purchased in the
name of the first defendant yet they were joint family properties
and therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to claim a share in all
the three items of the suit schedule properties.
10. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants, as well
as the respondents and having bestowed our serious
consideration to the judgments of the Division Bench of the High
Court, as well as that of the Trial Court and other material papers
placed before us, we feel that the controversy, which centers
around this appeal will have to be briefly stated to appreciate the
respective contentions of the parties.
11. The appellants and the first respondent are the descendants
of late Nithyanandham, who died intestate on 22.09.1956. His
wife, the first plaintiff, along with her deceased son
Manickavasagam, 4th and 5th appellants, filed a suit for partition,
as against the first respondent herein. During the pendency of
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 5 of 24Page 6
the litigation before the High Court, the first plaintiff viz., the wife
of the late Nithyanandham, as well as one of her sons, the third
plaintiff Manickavasagam also died. The wife and the children of
late Manickavasagam viz., appellants 1 to 3, therefore, came to
be impleaded along with appellants 4 and 5.
12. The suit was for partition in respect of three items of
properties. As far as the third item of the property is concerned,
the first respondent tacitly admitted the same to be a joint family
property and conceded for partition of 4/5th share of the
plaintiffs.
As far as the first item of the suit schedule property is
concerned, according to him, though funds were provided by the
late Nithyanandham for purchasing the same from a Co-operative Housing Society viz., Little Flower Colony House Building Cooperative Society,
it was gifted to him by his father and therefore,
it was purchased in his name.
The first respondent, therefore,
claimed that the suit property was his absolute property.
13. As far as the second item of the property is concerned, the
first respondent claims that the suit property was purchased from
out of the funds provided by his Father-in-law at the time of his
marriage, which he kept in a Fixed Deposit in a Co-operative
Bank, which got matured in 1964 and that the balance amount
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 6 of 24
was paid by disposing of his wife’s jewels.
The first respondent
therefore, claimed that the suit property was also his own
property and, therefore, the appellants were not entitled for any
share in the 1st and 2nd items of suit properties.
14. As already stated, the trial Court rejected the stand of the
first respondent and held that the appellants were entitled for
partition in respect of all the three properties, as they were joint
family properties. The High Court however, held that except the
suit third item of the property, the first and second items of
properties were exclusive properties of the first respondent
herein and therefore, the preliminary decree was restricted to the
third item of property and in other respects the judgment of the
trial Court was set aside.
15. The trial Court while granting the relief in favour of the
appellants, considered the oral evidence of P.W.1, the mother
and Ex.A-17 in particular.
The High Court while reversing the
judgment of the Trial Court placed reliance upon the release deed
executed by the first respondent in the year 1959 viz., Ex.A-3 and
partition deed of the year 1973, which was entered into between
the four plaintiffs in which document the first respondent affixed
his signature.
The High Court took the view that having regard to
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 7 of 24Page 8
the release deed of the year 1959 viz. Ex.A-3 and the partition
deed of the year 1973 viz., Ex.A-28, it was established that the
first and second items of the suit scheduled properties which
were purchased in the name of the first respondent were the
exclusive properties of the first respondent and therefore, the
appellants were not entitled for partition in those properties.
16. In light of the above factors, the question of law that arise for
consideration in this appeal is as to
“ whether there was total
misreading of evidence by the High Court by not considering or
referring to Ex.A-17 while interfering with the judgment of the
Trial Court and
whether legal principles of gift were established in
regard to the first item of the suit schedule property.”
17. Mr.S.Nanda Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants
vehemently contended that at the time when the first item of the
suit scheduled property was purchased, the first respondent was
only a student, that the evidence of the mother P.W.1, discloses
that the property was purchased in his name after due
deliberations by the husband and wife and in order to avoid any
violation of service conditions of the late Nithyanandham, who
was then working as a Joint Registrar of Co-operative Society.
The learned counsel contended that the Trial Court considered
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 8 of 24Page 9
the documents relating to the said properties as per Ex.No.A-10
produced by the plaintiffs, which persuaded the Trial Court to
hold that the first item of the suit scheduled property was
purchased by the late Nithyanandham in the name of his son only
to avoid any violation of the rules relating to his service
conditions and that the first respondent failed to show that it was
gifted to him by his father as claimed by him.
The learned
counsel contended that none of the ingredients relating to gift
was neither pleaded nor proved by the first respondent.
18. As far as the second items of the suit scheduled property is
concerned, the learned counsel contended that in the first place,
the trial Court had specifically found that the terminal benefits,
which were settled pursuant to the demise of late
Nithyanandham, were sufficient enough for the purchase of the
second item of the suit scheduled property, as well as, the third
item of the suit scheduled property and that the claim of the first
respondent that the same was purchased from the funds
provided by his father-in-law and from the sale proceeds of the
jewels of his wife, were not conclusively proved.
19. The learned counsel pointed out that while the first
respondent in his submission claimed that for purchasing the
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 9 of 24
second item of the suit schedule property, he utilized a sum of
Rs.10,000/- advanced by his father-in-law at the time of his
marriage and for the balance, he utilized the sale proceeds of his
wife’s jewels, in the oral evidence let in on his side was to the
effect that the balance sale consideration was paid by his fatherin-law and his brother-in-law in several installments, which was
contradictory to his earlier stand in the written statement.
20. The learned counsel further contended that having regard to
his prevaricating stand, one in the written statement and the
other in the oral evidence, the trial Court rightly rejected the
claim of the first respondent and chose to decree the suit. He
further pointed out that de hors the above glaring contradiction in
the written statement and the oral evidence let in by the first
respondent, there was a tacit admission in Ex.A-17, which was
relied upon by the Trial Court to conclude that all the three
properties of the suit schedule were the joint family properties in
which the plaintiffs and the first respondent were entitled for
equal share. The learned counsel further contended that the
High Court miserably failed to examine the above relevant
material piece of evidence namely Ex.A17, while reversing the
judgment of the trial Court.
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 10 of
24
21. As against the above submissions, Mr.A.T.M.Sampath,
learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that
the Division Bench of the High Court was well justified in relying
upon Exs.A-3 and A-28 apart from Ex B-11 viz. the sale deed
which stood in the name of the first respondent, to hold that
items 1 and 2 of the suit scheduled properties exclusively
belonged to the first respondent. The learned counsel pointed
out that if really items 1 and 2 of the suit scheduled properties
were also part of the joint family properties, it was not known as
to why they were not part of the release deed executed by the
first respondent under Ex.A-3 and also part of Ex.A-28 the
partition deed, as between the four plaintiffs, in which document,
the first respondent also affixed his signature.
22. The learned counsel further contended that the parties were
well aware by 1959, as well as by 1973 that items 1 and 2 of the
suit schedule properties, were the exclusive properties of the first
respondent and, therefore, the parties never intended to include
those two properties, either for the purpose of the release to be
executed by the first respondent nor for the purpose of partition,
as between the plaintiffs and the first respondent in the year
1973.
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 11 of
24Page 12
23. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties,
we are of the considered opinion that at the forefront, it will be
necessary to consider the effect of Ex.A-17, in as much as, the
said document is fully controlled by Section 17 of the Evidence
Act.
Section 17 of the Evidence Act reads as under:
“S.17. Admission defined:- An admission is a
statement, oral or documentary or contained in
electronic form, which suggests any inference as to
any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made
by any of the persons, and under the circumstances,
hereinafter mentioned.”
24. As far as the principle to be applied in Section 17 is
concerned, the Section as it reads is an admission, which
constitutes a substantial piece of evidence, which can be relied
upon for proving the veracity of the facts, incorporated therein.
When once, the admission as noted in a statement either oral or
documentary is found, then the whole onus would shift to the
party who made such an admission and it will become an
imperative duty on such party to explain it. In the absence of any
satisfactory explanation, it will have to be presumed to be true.
It is needless to state that an admission in order to be complete
and to have the value and effect referred to therein, should be
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 12 of
24Page 13
clear, certain and definite, without any ambiguity, vagueness or
confusion.
In this context, it will be worthwhile to refer to a
decision of this Court in Union of India Vs. Moksh Builders
and Financiers Ltd. and others - AIR 1977 SC 409 wherein it
is held as under:
“…It has been held by this Court in Bharat Singh
v. Bhagirath [1966] 1 SCR 606 = AIR 1966 SC 405 that
an admission is substantive evidence of the fact
admitted, and that admissions duly proved are
"admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party
making them appeared in the witness box or not and
whether that party when appearing as witness was
confronted with those statements in case it made a
statement contrary to those admissions."
In taking this
view this Court has noticed the decision in Ajodhya
Prasad Bhargava v. Bhawani Shanker - AIR 1957 All 1
(FB) also.”
25. Keeping the said statutory provision in mind,
when we
consider the contents of Ex.A-17, which is in Tamil, is a letter
written by the first respondent himself on 24.06.1974. The said
letter was addressed to the third plaintiff Mr.Manickavasagam.
The contents of the said letter read as under:
“The second plaintiff Saravanamurthi, came to my house
the day before yesterday at around 09.30 p.m. He
stated that something should be immediately arranged,
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 13 of
24Page 14
as regards the house properties. He also asked what is
the justification in all the three house properties in my
name. I told him that you can be called and some
arrangement can be made. I am not able to explain
everything in this letter. He was in a very rash mood
and was behaving in an unruly manner. At one stage, I
was driven to the position that he can do whatever he
likes. At 10.00 clocks in the night, I told him what
arrangement could be made. But he was not in a sane
mood. However much I told him that it was not my fault
in purchasing all the three properties in my name and
that I am not keen to have all the three properties. I was
terribly upset by his behavior. At one stage, I asked him
to get out. While going out, he expressed that the
relationship cannot be continued thereafter. About this
you need not inform mother or murthi himself.”
26. While examining the contents of the said letter, the Trial
Court concluded that the three house properties, referred to
therein, only related to the suit scheduled properties. Going by
the statements made by the first respondent himself in the said
letter Ex.A-17, it was explicit and apparent that the first
respondent was fully aware that even though the properties were
in his name, he was not responsible for purchasing the same in
his name and that he was not interested in having all the three
properties for himself.
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 14 of
24Page 15
27. When we examine the said document, we find that the
conclusions arrived at by the trial Court based on the contents of
Ex.A-17, cannot be found fault with. In fact, Ex.A-17, came into
existence only on 24.06.1974. It is not as if the first respondent
disowned the said document. The contents of the said document
were also not disputed by the first respondent. It is not the case
of the first respondent that the three houses referred to in the
said document, related to any other properties other than the
suit-scheduled properties. It is also not his case that the name
and persons mentioned therein, related to somebody else other
than his own brother, the second plaintiff and his mother. The
first respondent had also not lead any evidence to disprove Ex.A-
17.
28. Keeping the above factors in mind, when we apply Section 17
of the Evidence Act, we find that Ex.A-17 is a statement and the
details contained therein, which pertains to the suit scheduled
properties, constituted a tacit admission at the instance of the
first respondent. If after Ex.A-3, release deed of 1959 and the
partition deed, Ex.A-28 of 1973, in 1974, the first respondent on
his own, came forward with the said letter to the third plaintiff
admitting in so many words as to the status of the suit scheduled
properties, vis-à-vis the concerned parties themselves, we fail to
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 15 of
24Page 16
understand as to what wrong was committed by the Trial Court in
placing reliance upon the same to decree the suit. If in reality,
the first respondent had his own reservations as to the ownership
of the suit scheduled properties, in particular items 1 and 2, no
one prevented him from stating so in uncontroverted terms, while
communicating the same in the form of writing, to one of his own
brothers. In fact, the grievance of the second plaintiff
Saravanamurthi, was that since the properties were purchased in
the name of the first respondent and he being the eldest son of
the family, was having an upper hand over all the others and was
trying to snatch away the properties. The tone and tenor of the
letter viz., Ex.A-17, authored by the first respondent, discloses
that he too was not very keen to grab all the three properties,
simply because those properties were purchased in his name. He
went to the extent of stating that he was not responsible for
purchasing all the three house properties in his name. He went
one step further and stated that he did not want to possess all
the three properties all time to come. If, such a clear-cut mindset
was expressed by the first respondent though Ex.A-17, it was
futile on his part to have come forward with any other story after
the suit came to be filed by the plaintiffs.
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 16 of
24Page 17
29. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the
appellants, the stand of the first respondent in his statement as
regards the second item of the suit schedule property, was that
the sale consideration of Rs.18,200/- was paid partly from a sum
of Rs.10,000/-, paid to him by his father-in-law and the remaining
sum by disposing of his wife’s jewels. The Trial Court has noted
that in support of the said stand, no piece of evidence was lead
before it. On the other hand, giving a go-by to the said stand
that the balance sale consideration was met by disposing of his
wife’s jewels, evidence was lead to show as though the remaining
sale consideration was paid by his father-in-law and brother-inlaw in installments. The above stand contained in the written
statement and lead by way of oral evidence, were fully
contradictory and, therefore, the one belied the other.
30. The specific case of the first respondent, as regards the
first item of the suit property was that his father gifted the said
property to him. Except for the said plea ipse dixit, there was
nothing on record to support the said stand. Reliance was
placed upon Exs.B1 to B6, which were the communications
between Nithyanandam and Little Flower Colony House
Building Society Ltd., Thanjavur in the year 1955-56. Ex.B4,
was a letter by the said Society dated 24.02.1955, which
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 17 of
24
informed Nithyanandam about the allotment of plot in his
favour and also asking him to deposit the sale value of
Rs.300/- and a sum of Rs.150 for reclamation and charges for
transfer of land in his favour. On the same day, under Ex.B5,
he wrote a letter expressing his acceptance. Under Ex.B6, he
deposited a sum of Rs.150/- towards charges for transfer of
the land in his favour.
31. P.W.1, the wife of Nithyanandam, the first plaintiff,
deposed that both of them discussed together and ultimately
decided to purchase the first item of the suit property in the
name of the first respondent. Through her, Exs.A1 and A2
were produced to show that the house tax were paid in the
year 1971-72, 1972-73 and 1973-74 by the family members, in
respect of the said property though it stood in the name of the
first respondent.
32. It has also come in evidence that at that point of time, the
first respondent was undergoing his graduation. There was no
gift deed by the late Nithyanandam in favour of the first
respondent. Till the lifetime of Nithyanandam, no evidence
was placed before the Court to demonstrate that
Nithyanandam gifted away the said property in favour of the
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 18 of
24Page 19
first respondent, absolutely and that the first respondent
expressed his acceptance of the said gift.
33. Keeping the above facts in mind, when we examine the
law relating to gift, under Section 122 of the Transfer of
Property Act, a “gift” is defined as ‘transfer of certain existing
movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without
consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another,
called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee”.
The section also mandates that “such acceptance must be
made during the lifetime of the donor and while he is still
capable of giving. If the donee dies before acceptance, the
gift is void.”
34. We are not concerned with the last part of the section.
Going by the facts placed before the Court as stated earlier,
except the ipse dixit statement made in the written statement,
that late Nithyanandam gifted away the first item of the suit
property in his favour, there was no other evidence lead in
support of the said claim of gift.
35. In fact, at that time, when the property was purchased, the
first respondent was a college going student. Merely because
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 19 of
24Page 20
the property was purchased in the name of the first
respondent, it cannot be held that there was a valid gift in his
favour, without any other evidence supporting the said claim.
36. Per contra, his own mother P.W.1, made it clear that since
her husband Nithyanandam, was in the service of the State
and was aware that a purchase of property would result in a
direct violation of the rules relating to his service, the husband
and wife viz., the father and mother of the first respondent,
discussed about it and after great deliberation, decided to
purchase it in the name of the first respondent. If the property
as contested by the first respondent had been gifted away to
him in the year 1955, then it was not known, as to why he was
not able to produce any other document connected with the
property, such as tax receipts or other revenue records to
show that he was enjoying the property absolutely, without
any hindrance from the other heirs of late Nithyanandam.
37. Per contra, Exs.A1 and A2, tax receipts, were produced by
the plaintiffs to show that the property was managed and
maintained by the family and not by the first respondent. That
apart, under Ex.A17, the first respondent himself admitted that
purchase of the said property, along with the other two
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 20 of
properties in his name, was not his fault. In the said document,
he also made it abundantly clear that he was not interested in
retaining the property, simply because the property stood in
his name. Therefore, the claim of gift relating to the first item
of the suit property was not proved to the satisfaction of the
Court, both on law as well as on facts.
38. Having regard to such a prevaricating stand taken by the first
respondent, as compared to his tacit admission made in Ex.A-17,
we are of the considered view that the Trial Court was fully
justified in holding that all the three items of the suit scheduled
properties, were joint family properties, in which the plaintiffs and the first respondent were entitled for equal share.
39. Having regard to our above conclusions, when we examine
the judgment of the Division Bench impugned in this appeal, we
find that the Division Bench has completely omitted to examine
the implications of Ex.A-17 which has relevance in respect of all
the three suit schedule properties. As noted by the Trial Court,
Ex.A-17 was a very crucial piece of evidence, in as much as, it
contains the tacit admission voluntarily made by the first
respondent, while also establishing as to why the veracity of it’s
nature was never questioned by him. Since, there was no contra
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 21 of
24Page 22
evidence to disprove Ex.A-17, the first respondent was totally
bound by the said document. Since every ingredient of Section 17
of the Evidence Act, relating to the said document, Ex.A-17 was
fully complied with, the non-consideration of the same by the
Division Bench of the High Court, in our considered opinion,
would certainly amount to total misreading of the evidence, while
interfering with the judgment of the trial Court. Similarly, the
Division Bench miserably failed to examine the issue relating to
gift as regards the first item of the suit scheduled properties.
Though, such a claim was made by the first respondent, there
was no iota of evidence to support the said claim.
The
ingredients of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act relating
to gifts were not shown to have been complied with in order to
support the said claim.
40. In fact, while considering the relevance of Ex.A-17 and its
application to the case on hand, the Trial Court noted the
contradictory statement of the first respondent made in his
written statement, vis-à-vis the oral evidence. The Trial Court
has specifically noted the funds, which were available with the
first respondent pursuant to his father’s demise, which was to the
tune of Rs.20,887.93/- and which was kept in deposit in two
accounts in the name of the first respondent himself. One
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 22 of
24Page 23
account was under Ex.A-25, which was a current account in which
a sum of Rs.10,919.44/- was available and the other one was
under Ex.A.26, which was a savings bank account, where a sum
of Rs.9,968.49/- was available. Both put together a sum of
Rs.20,887.93/- was available and therefore, even after the
purchase of the third item of the suit schedule property, the first
respondent had a further sum available with him. The trial Court
has also noted that except the ipse dixit of D.W.2 and 3 that a
sum of Rs.10,000/- was paid to the first respondent by way of gift
at the time of marriage of the first respondent with his daughter,
there was no other evidence to support and provide credence to
the said version. Unfortunately, the Division Bench of the High
Court completely omitted to examine the above material piece of
evidence, which was considered in detail by the trial Court, while
decreeing the suit.
41. In the light of our above conclusions, the judgment of the
Division Bench cannot be sustained. The appeal stands allowed
and the judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and the
judgment and decree of the Trial Court shall stand restored.
………….……….…………………………..J.
[Dr. B.S. Chauhan]
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 23 of
24Page 24
...……….…….………………………………J.
[Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim
Kalifulla]
New Delhi;
July 02, 2013.
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 24 of
Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1241 OF 2005
Vathsala Manickavasagam & Ors. ….
Appellants
VERSUS
N. Ganesan & Anr. …. Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the Division Bench judgment of
the Madras High Court dated 19.06.2003, in A.S.No.367 of 1985.
2. Originally the suit for partition was filed by one late
Mrs.Nagarathnam, along with her two sons late Manickavasagam
and Saravanamurthi as well as her daughter Sethulakshmi as
plaintiffs 3, 2 and 4.
The present first appellant is the wife of the
late Manickavasagam, the third plaintiff, along with her sons, the
second appellant and the third appellant. The fourth appellant is
the second plaintiff and the fifth appellant is the fourth plaintiff.
The first defendant who is the first respondent herein is also the
son of the first plaintiff. The second respondent was the second
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 1 of 24Page 2
defendant in the suit, who purchased the property from one
Barnabass Nadar, to whom the first defendant earlier sold the
suit property on 11.11.1978.
3. The suit was for partition. The plaintiffs claim 4/5th shares in
respect of three items of the suit properties, which was decreed
by the Trial Court, as against which, the first respondent/first
defendant, filed the first appeal before the High Court. The High
Court by the impugned judgment, modified the judgment and
decree of the Trial Court and held that the decree with reference
to item Nos.1 and 2 of the suit properties, cannot be sustained
and that the decree of the Trial Court for partition, was confirmed
only in respect of the third item of the suit property and that the
preliminary decree for partition in respect of the third item of the
suit property was alone granted.
It is against the said judgment
and decree of the Division Bench of the High Court, the
appellants have come forward with this appeal.
4. The simple case of the plaintiffs in the suit was that the
plaintiffs and the first defendant, are the descendants of the late
Nithyanandam, who died intestate on 22.09.1956.
They filed the
suit for partition for their 4/5th shares in respect of items 1 to 3.
The first item of the suit property was sold by the first defendant
to one Barnabass Nadar, on 11.11.1978, who in turn sold the
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 2 of 24Page 3
property to the second defendant/second respondent.
It was the
common case that the deceased Nithyanandam had no ancestral
property and that his wife, sons and daughter have got equal
share in the property.
Therefore, as regards the eligibility and
extent of share, there was no dispute.
According to the first
defendant/first respondent herein, out of the three items of the
suit properties, the first and second items of properties were the
exclusive properties of the first defendant and therefore, others
were not entitled for any share in it.
5. So far as the first item of the property was concerned,
according to the first defendant, the said property was gifted to
him by his father and that the second item of the property was
purchased by him by selling the jewels of his wife, as well as from
the money advanced by his father-in-law to him.
6. The trial Court framed as many as 8 issues for consideration.
Issue Nos.1 to 3 related to the stand of the first respondent
herein that the first item of the suit property was gifted in his
favour by his father and that the second item of the property was
purchased from the proceeds of the jewels belonging to his wife,
as well as, from the money advanced by his father-in-law. The
third issue related to the question as to whether items 1 to 3 of
the suit schedule properties, were the joint family properties, as
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 3 of 24Page 4
claimed by the plaintiffs. The question relating to limitation, with
regard to the claim of items 1 and 2 of the suit properties, was
the 4th issue. The 5th issue related to the question whether,
proper Court Fee was mentioned in the plaint. The sixth issue
related to the entitlement of equity claimed by the second
defendant/second respondent herein, as regards the first item of
the suit schedule property. The last two issues related to the
entitlement of the plaintiff for partition and the relief to be
granted.
7. The first item of the suit property is a house property, in a site
measuring 10,000/- sq.ft. in T.S.No.2951/3, at Arulananda Nagar,
Thanjavur. The said house site was allotted by a Housing Society
called Little Flower Colony House Building Co-operative Society,
and the same was purchased by late Nithyanandam, in the name
of his eldest son viz., the first defendant/first respondent herein.
8. The second item of the suit property is also a house site
bearing Door No.17/35, purchased in the name of the first
defendant on 21.10.1964, from one Visalakshmi Ammal, which is
located in Rajappa Nagar, Thanjavur.
The third item of the suit
property is also a house and since there is no dispute about the
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 4 of 24Page 5
status of the property as a joint family property, we need not deal
with the same in detail.
9. The trial Court while answering the issues, considered the
evidence both oral and documentary and reached a conclusion
that
even suit items 1 and 2 though were also purchased in the
name of the first defendant yet they were joint family properties
and therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to claim a share in all
the three items of the suit schedule properties.
10. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants, as well
as the respondents and having bestowed our serious
consideration to the judgments of the Division Bench of the High
Court, as well as that of the Trial Court and other material papers
placed before us, we feel that the controversy, which centers
around this appeal will have to be briefly stated to appreciate the
respective contentions of the parties.
11. The appellants and the first respondent are the descendants
of late Nithyanandham, who died intestate on 22.09.1956. His
wife, the first plaintiff, along with her deceased son
Manickavasagam, 4th and 5th appellants, filed a suit for partition,
as against the first respondent herein. During the pendency of
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 5 of 24Page 6
the litigation before the High Court, the first plaintiff viz., the wife
of the late Nithyanandham, as well as one of her sons, the third
plaintiff Manickavasagam also died. The wife and the children of
late Manickavasagam viz., appellants 1 to 3, therefore, came to
be impleaded along with appellants 4 and 5.
12. The suit was for partition in respect of three items of
properties. As far as the third item of the property is concerned,
the first respondent tacitly admitted the same to be a joint family
property and conceded for partition of 4/5th share of the
plaintiffs.
As far as the first item of the suit schedule property is
concerned, according to him, though funds were provided by the
late Nithyanandham for purchasing the same from a Co-operative Housing Society viz., Little Flower Colony House Building Cooperative Society,
it was gifted to him by his father and therefore,
it was purchased in his name.
The first respondent, therefore,
claimed that the suit property was his absolute property.
13. As far as the second item of the property is concerned, the
first respondent claims that the suit property was purchased from
out of the funds provided by his Father-in-law at the time of his
marriage, which he kept in a Fixed Deposit in a Co-operative
Bank, which got matured in 1964 and that the balance amount
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 6 of 24
was paid by disposing of his wife’s jewels.
The first respondent
therefore, claimed that the suit property was also his own
property and, therefore, the appellants were not entitled for any
share in the 1st and 2nd items of suit properties.
14. As already stated, the trial Court rejected the stand of the
first respondent and held that the appellants were entitled for
partition in respect of all the three properties, as they were joint
family properties. The High Court however, held that except the
suit third item of the property, the first and second items of
properties were exclusive properties of the first respondent
herein and therefore, the preliminary decree was restricted to the
third item of property and in other respects the judgment of the
trial Court was set aside.
15. The trial Court while granting the relief in favour of the
appellants, considered the oral evidence of P.W.1, the mother
and Ex.A-17 in particular.
The High Court while reversing the
judgment of the Trial Court placed reliance upon the release deed
executed by the first respondent in the year 1959 viz., Ex.A-3 and
partition deed of the year 1973, which was entered into between
the four plaintiffs in which document the first respondent affixed
his signature.
The High Court took the view that having regard to
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 7 of 24Page 8
the release deed of the year 1959 viz. Ex.A-3 and the partition
deed of the year 1973 viz., Ex.A-28, it was established that the
first and second items of the suit scheduled properties which
were purchased in the name of the first respondent were the
exclusive properties of the first respondent and therefore, the
appellants were not entitled for partition in those properties.
16. In light of the above factors, the question of law that arise for
consideration in this appeal is as to
“ whether there was total
misreading of evidence by the High Court by not considering or
referring to Ex.A-17 while interfering with the judgment of the
Trial Court and
whether legal principles of gift were established in
regard to the first item of the suit schedule property.”
17. Mr.S.Nanda Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants
vehemently contended that at the time when the first item of the
suit scheduled property was purchased, the first respondent was
only a student, that the evidence of the mother P.W.1, discloses
that the property was purchased in his name after due
deliberations by the husband and wife and in order to avoid any
violation of service conditions of the late Nithyanandham, who
was then working as a Joint Registrar of Co-operative Society.
The learned counsel contended that the Trial Court considered
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 8 of 24Page 9
the documents relating to the said properties as per Ex.No.A-10
produced by the plaintiffs, which persuaded the Trial Court to
hold that the first item of the suit scheduled property was
purchased by the late Nithyanandham in the name of his son only
to avoid any violation of the rules relating to his service
conditions and that the first respondent failed to show that it was
gifted to him by his father as claimed by him.
The learned
counsel contended that none of the ingredients relating to gift
was neither pleaded nor proved by the first respondent.
18. As far as the second items of the suit scheduled property is
concerned, the learned counsel contended that in the first place,
the trial Court had specifically found that the terminal benefits,
which were settled pursuant to the demise of late
Nithyanandham, were sufficient enough for the purchase of the
second item of the suit scheduled property, as well as, the third
item of the suit scheduled property and that the claim of the first
respondent that the same was purchased from the funds
provided by his father-in-law and from the sale proceeds of the
jewels of his wife, were not conclusively proved.
19. The learned counsel pointed out that while the first
respondent in his submission claimed that for purchasing the
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 9 of 24
second item of the suit schedule property, he utilized a sum of
Rs.10,000/- advanced by his father-in-law at the time of his
marriage and for the balance, he utilized the sale proceeds of his
wife’s jewels, in the oral evidence let in on his side was to the
effect that the balance sale consideration was paid by his fatherin-law and his brother-in-law in several installments, which was
contradictory to his earlier stand in the written statement.
20. The learned counsel further contended that having regard to
his prevaricating stand, one in the written statement and the
other in the oral evidence, the trial Court rightly rejected the
claim of the first respondent and chose to decree the suit. He
further pointed out that de hors the above glaring contradiction in
the written statement and the oral evidence let in by the first
respondent, there was a tacit admission in Ex.A-17, which was
relied upon by the Trial Court to conclude that all the three
properties of the suit schedule were the joint family properties in
which the plaintiffs and the first respondent were entitled for
equal share. The learned counsel further contended that the
High Court miserably failed to examine the above relevant
material piece of evidence namely Ex.A17, while reversing the
judgment of the trial Court.
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 10 of
24
21. As against the above submissions, Mr.A.T.M.Sampath,
learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that
the Division Bench of the High Court was well justified in relying
upon Exs.A-3 and A-28 apart from Ex B-11 viz. the sale deed
which stood in the name of the first respondent, to hold that
items 1 and 2 of the suit scheduled properties exclusively
belonged to the first respondent. The learned counsel pointed
out that if really items 1 and 2 of the suit scheduled properties
were also part of the joint family properties, it was not known as
to why they were not part of the release deed executed by the
first respondent under Ex.A-3 and also part of Ex.A-28 the
partition deed, as between the four plaintiffs, in which document,
the first respondent also affixed his signature.
22. The learned counsel further contended that the parties were
well aware by 1959, as well as by 1973 that items 1 and 2 of the
suit schedule properties, were the exclusive properties of the first
respondent and, therefore, the parties never intended to include
those two properties, either for the purpose of the release to be
executed by the first respondent nor for the purpose of partition,
as between the plaintiffs and the first respondent in the year
1973.
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 11 of
24Page 12
23. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties,
we are of the considered opinion that at the forefront, it will be
necessary to consider the effect of Ex.A-17, in as much as, the
said document is fully controlled by Section 17 of the Evidence
Act.
Section 17 of the Evidence Act reads as under:
“S.17. Admission defined:- An admission is a
statement, oral or documentary or contained in
electronic form, which suggests any inference as to
any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made
by any of the persons, and under the circumstances,
hereinafter mentioned.”
24. As far as the principle to be applied in Section 17 is
concerned, the Section as it reads is an admission, which
constitutes a substantial piece of evidence, which can be relied
upon for proving the veracity of the facts, incorporated therein.
When once, the admission as noted in a statement either oral or
documentary is found, then the whole onus would shift to the
party who made such an admission and it will become an
imperative duty on such party to explain it. In the absence of any
satisfactory explanation, it will have to be presumed to be true.
It is needless to state that an admission in order to be complete
and to have the value and effect referred to therein, should be
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 12 of
24Page 13
clear, certain and definite, without any ambiguity, vagueness or
confusion.
In this context, it will be worthwhile to refer to a
decision of this Court in Union of India Vs. Moksh Builders
and Financiers Ltd. and others - AIR 1977 SC 409 wherein it
is held as under:
“…It has been held by this Court in Bharat Singh
v. Bhagirath [1966] 1 SCR 606 = AIR 1966 SC 405 that
an admission is substantive evidence of the fact
admitted, and that admissions duly proved are
"admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party
making them appeared in the witness box or not and
whether that party when appearing as witness was
confronted with those statements in case it made a
statement contrary to those admissions."
In taking this
view this Court has noticed the decision in Ajodhya
Prasad Bhargava v. Bhawani Shanker - AIR 1957 All 1
(FB) also.”
25. Keeping the said statutory provision in mind,
when we
consider the contents of Ex.A-17, which is in Tamil, is a letter
written by the first respondent himself on 24.06.1974. The said
letter was addressed to the third plaintiff Mr.Manickavasagam.
The contents of the said letter read as under:
“The second plaintiff Saravanamurthi, came to my house
the day before yesterday at around 09.30 p.m. He
stated that something should be immediately arranged,
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 13 of
24Page 14
as regards the house properties. He also asked what is
the justification in all the three house properties in my
name. I told him that you can be called and some
arrangement can be made. I am not able to explain
everything in this letter. He was in a very rash mood
and was behaving in an unruly manner. At one stage, I
was driven to the position that he can do whatever he
likes. At 10.00 clocks in the night, I told him what
arrangement could be made. But he was not in a sane
mood. However much I told him that it was not my fault
in purchasing all the three properties in my name and
that I am not keen to have all the three properties. I was
terribly upset by his behavior. At one stage, I asked him
to get out. While going out, he expressed that the
relationship cannot be continued thereafter. About this
you need not inform mother or murthi himself.”
26. While examining the contents of the said letter, the Trial
Court concluded that the three house properties, referred to
therein, only related to the suit scheduled properties. Going by
the statements made by the first respondent himself in the said
letter Ex.A-17, it was explicit and apparent that the first
respondent was fully aware that even though the properties were
in his name, he was not responsible for purchasing the same in
his name and that he was not interested in having all the three
properties for himself.
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 14 of
24Page 15
27. When we examine the said document, we find that the
conclusions arrived at by the trial Court based on the contents of
Ex.A-17, cannot be found fault with. In fact, Ex.A-17, came into
existence only on 24.06.1974. It is not as if the first respondent
disowned the said document. The contents of the said document
were also not disputed by the first respondent. It is not the case
of the first respondent that the three houses referred to in the
said document, related to any other properties other than the
suit-scheduled properties. It is also not his case that the name
and persons mentioned therein, related to somebody else other
than his own brother, the second plaintiff and his mother. The
first respondent had also not lead any evidence to disprove Ex.A-
17.
28. Keeping the above factors in mind, when we apply Section 17
of the Evidence Act, we find that Ex.A-17 is a statement and the
details contained therein, which pertains to the suit scheduled
properties, constituted a tacit admission at the instance of the
first respondent. If after Ex.A-3, release deed of 1959 and the
partition deed, Ex.A-28 of 1973, in 1974, the first respondent on
his own, came forward with the said letter to the third plaintiff
admitting in so many words as to the status of the suit scheduled
properties, vis-à-vis the concerned parties themselves, we fail to
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 15 of
24Page 16
understand as to what wrong was committed by the Trial Court in
placing reliance upon the same to decree the suit. If in reality,
the first respondent had his own reservations as to the ownership
of the suit scheduled properties, in particular items 1 and 2, no
one prevented him from stating so in uncontroverted terms, while
communicating the same in the form of writing, to one of his own
brothers. In fact, the grievance of the second plaintiff
Saravanamurthi, was that since the properties were purchased in
the name of the first respondent and he being the eldest son of
the family, was having an upper hand over all the others and was
trying to snatch away the properties. The tone and tenor of the
letter viz., Ex.A-17, authored by the first respondent, discloses
that he too was not very keen to grab all the three properties,
simply because those properties were purchased in his name. He
went to the extent of stating that he was not responsible for
purchasing all the three house properties in his name. He went
one step further and stated that he did not want to possess all
the three properties all time to come. If, such a clear-cut mindset
was expressed by the first respondent though Ex.A-17, it was
futile on his part to have come forward with any other story after
the suit came to be filed by the plaintiffs.
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 16 of
24Page 17
29. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the
appellants, the stand of the first respondent in his statement as
regards the second item of the suit schedule property, was that
the sale consideration of Rs.18,200/- was paid partly from a sum
of Rs.10,000/-, paid to him by his father-in-law and the remaining
sum by disposing of his wife’s jewels. The Trial Court has noted
that in support of the said stand, no piece of evidence was lead
before it. On the other hand, giving a go-by to the said stand
that the balance sale consideration was met by disposing of his
wife’s jewels, evidence was lead to show as though the remaining
sale consideration was paid by his father-in-law and brother-inlaw in installments. The above stand contained in the written
statement and lead by way of oral evidence, were fully
contradictory and, therefore, the one belied the other.
30. The specific case of the first respondent, as regards the
first item of the suit property was that his father gifted the said
property to him. Except for the said plea ipse dixit, there was
nothing on record to support the said stand. Reliance was
placed upon Exs.B1 to B6, which were the communications
between Nithyanandam and Little Flower Colony House
Building Society Ltd., Thanjavur in the year 1955-56. Ex.B4,
was a letter by the said Society dated 24.02.1955, which
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 17 of
24
informed Nithyanandam about the allotment of plot in his
favour and also asking him to deposit the sale value of
Rs.300/- and a sum of Rs.150 for reclamation and charges for
transfer of land in his favour. On the same day, under Ex.B5,
he wrote a letter expressing his acceptance. Under Ex.B6, he
deposited a sum of Rs.150/- towards charges for transfer of
the land in his favour.
31. P.W.1, the wife of Nithyanandam, the first plaintiff,
deposed that both of them discussed together and ultimately
decided to purchase the first item of the suit property in the
name of the first respondent. Through her, Exs.A1 and A2
were produced to show that the house tax were paid in the
year 1971-72, 1972-73 and 1973-74 by the family members, in
respect of the said property though it stood in the name of the
first respondent.
32. It has also come in evidence that at that point of time, the
first respondent was undergoing his graduation. There was no
gift deed by the late Nithyanandam in favour of the first
respondent. Till the lifetime of Nithyanandam, no evidence
was placed before the Court to demonstrate that
Nithyanandam gifted away the said property in favour of the
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 18 of
24Page 19
first respondent, absolutely and that the first respondent
expressed his acceptance of the said gift.
33. Keeping the above facts in mind, when we examine the
law relating to gift, under Section 122 of the Transfer of
Property Act, a “gift” is defined as ‘transfer of certain existing
movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without
consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another,
called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee”.
The section also mandates that “such acceptance must be
made during the lifetime of the donor and while he is still
capable of giving. If the donee dies before acceptance, the
gift is void.”
34. We are not concerned with the last part of the section.
Going by the facts placed before the Court as stated earlier,
except the ipse dixit statement made in the written statement,
that late Nithyanandam gifted away the first item of the suit
property in his favour, there was no other evidence lead in
support of the said claim of gift.
35. In fact, at that time, when the property was purchased, the
first respondent was a college going student. Merely because
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 19 of
24Page 20
the property was purchased in the name of the first
respondent, it cannot be held that there was a valid gift in his
favour, without any other evidence supporting the said claim.
36. Per contra, his own mother P.W.1, made it clear that since
her husband Nithyanandam, was in the service of the State
and was aware that a purchase of property would result in a
direct violation of the rules relating to his service, the husband
and wife viz., the father and mother of the first respondent,
discussed about it and after great deliberation, decided to
purchase it in the name of the first respondent. If the property
as contested by the first respondent had been gifted away to
him in the year 1955, then it was not known, as to why he was
not able to produce any other document connected with the
property, such as tax receipts or other revenue records to
show that he was enjoying the property absolutely, without
any hindrance from the other heirs of late Nithyanandam.
37. Per contra, Exs.A1 and A2, tax receipts, were produced by
the plaintiffs to show that the property was managed and
maintained by the family and not by the first respondent. That
apart, under Ex.A17, the first respondent himself admitted that
purchase of the said property, along with the other two
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 20 of
properties in his name, was not his fault. In the said document,
he also made it abundantly clear that he was not interested in
retaining the property, simply because the property stood in
his name. Therefore, the claim of gift relating to the first item
of the suit property was not proved to the satisfaction of the
Court, both on law as well as on facts.
38. Having regard to such a prevaricating stand taken by the first
respondent, as compared to his tacit admission made in Ex.A-17,
we are of the considered view that the Trial Court was fully
justified in holding that all the three items of the suit scheduled
properties, were joint family properties, in which the plaintiffs and the first respondent were entitled for equal share.
39. Having regard to our above conclusions, when we examine
the judgment of the Division Bench impugned in this appeal, we
find that the Division Bench has completely omitted to examine
the implications of Ex.A-17 which has relevance in respect of all
the three suit schedule properties. As noted by the Trial Court,
Ex.A-17 was a very crucial piece of evidence, in as much as, it
contains the tacit admission voluntarily made by the first
respondent, while also establishing as to why the veracity of it’s
nature was never questioned by him. Since, there was no contra
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 21 of
24Page 22
evidence to disprove Ex.A-17, the first respondent was totally
bound by the said document. Since every ingredient of Section 17
of the Evidence Act, relating to the said document, Ex.A-17 was
fully complied with, the non-consideration of the same by the
Division Bench of the High Court, in our considered opinion,
would certainly amount to total misreading of the evidence, while
interfering with the judgment of the trial Court. Similarly, the
Division Bench miserably failed to examine the issue relating to
gift as regards the first item of the suit scheduled properties.
Though, such a claim was made by the first respondent, there
was no iota of evidence to support the said claim.
The
ingredients of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act relating
to gifts were not shown to have been complied with in order to
support the said claim.
40. In fact, while considering the relevance of Ex.A-17 and its
application to the case on hand, the Trial Court noted the
contradictory statement of the first respondent made in his
written statement, vis-à-vis the oral evidence. The Trial Court
has specifically noted the funds, which were available with the
first respondent pursuant to his father’s demise, which was to the
tune of Rs.20,887.93/- and which was kept in deposit in two
accounts in the name of the first respondent himself. One
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 22 of
24Page 23
account was under Ex.A-25, which was a current account in which
a sum of Rs.10,919.44/- was available and the other one was
under Ex.A.26, which was a savings bank account, where a sum
of Rs.9,968.49/- was available. Both put together a sum of
Rs.20,887.93/- was available and therefore, even after the
purchase of the third item of the suit schedule property, the first
respondent had a further sum available with him. The trial Court
has also noted that except the ipse dixit of D.W.2 and 3 that a
sum of Rs.10,000/- was paid to the first respondent by way of gift
at the time of marriage of the first respondent with his daughter,
there was no other evidence to support and provide credence to
the said version. Unfortunately, the Division Bench of the High
Court completely omitted to examine the above material piece of
evidence, which was considered in detail by the trial Court, while
decreeing the suit.
41. In the light of our above conclusions, the judgment of the
Division Bench cannot be sustained. The appeal stands allowed
and the judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and the
judgment and decree of the Trial Court shall stand restored.
………….……….…………………………..J.
[Dr. B.S. Chauhan]
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 23 of
24Page 24
...……….…….………………………………J.
[Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim
Kalifulla]
New Delhi;
July 02, 2013.
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 24 of
