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Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1334 OF 2013
[Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 2070 of 2012]
Rajendra Yadav .. Appellant
Versus
State of M.P. & Others .. Respondents
J U D G M E N T
K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Appellant, a Police Constable, while he was working in the
police station Rahatgarh, District Sagar along with A.S.I. Lakhan
Tiwari and Head Constable Jagdish Prasad Tiwari stated to have
received an amount of Rs.3,000 for not implicating certain
persons involved in Crime No. 4 of 2002 charged under
Sections 341, 294, 323, 506(B), 34 IPC. A complaint to that
effect was filed by one Kundan Rajak, a resident of VillagePage 2
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Sothia, PS Rahatgarh. Acting on that complaint, the appellant
was charge-sheeted, along with two others, vide proceedings
dated 6.5.2002 by the Superintendant of Police, Sagar. The
following are the charges levelled against the appellant:
(1) He demonstrated gross negligence and lack of
interest in discharge of his duty by not implicating all
the persons involved in the crime.
(2) He demonstrated misconduct by accepting Rs.3,000
from the complainant Kundan Rajak for lodging a report
in the police station.
3. Appellant filed a detailed reply to the charge-sheet by his
letter dated NIL and denied all the allegations.
4. A detailed inquiry was conducted through the Additional
Superintendant of Police, Sagar against the appellant and other
two persons – A.S.I. Lakhan Tiwari and H.C. Jagdish Prasad
Yadav. During the course of the inquiry, the charge against
Lakhan Tiwari was found not proved, but his role was found to
be doubtful. So far as appellant Rajendra Prasad Yadav is
concerned, it was held that one of the charges could not be
proved for want of evidence. The inquiry report datedPage 3
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8.9.2004, so far as the appellant is concerned, states as
follows:
“Against the delinquent No. 2, H.C. 1104
Rajendra Prasad, one of the charges imputed could not
be proved for want of evidence. During the course of
departmental inquiry, the inquiry has noted that the
charge No. 2 was also not proved from the statement of
prosecution witness and documents of the prosecution
but one cannot deny the participation of the delinquent
and his tacit approval.”
5. The Superintendant of Police, Sagar, however, vide his
proceedings dated 26.3.2004, disagreed with the remarks of
the Inquiry Officer and held that the charge No. 2 as against the
appellant was found to be proved. Consequently, a
supplementary charge-sheet was also given to the appellant.
Later, a final order was passed by the Deputy Inspector General
of Police, Sagar stating as follows:
“With respect to the delinquent HC No. 1104 Rajendra
Yadav, the Inquiry Officer has stated vide his said letter
that the delinquent HC was present in the police station
during the report of the Crime No. 4/02. As per the
evidence, the money was demanded by Ct. Arjun
Pathak. The report has been recorded by HC 1104
Rajendra Yadav whereas Rs.3,000/- was paid to Const.Page 4
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Arjun Pathak. Therefore, with regard to receiving
money, the participation of HC Rajendra Yadav and his
tacit approval are proved with respect to the charge No.
2. At the same time, he could not exercise his control
over his subordinate. The money was demanded by
Arjun Pathak and upon receipt of the money by Arjun
Pathak, HC 1104 Rajendra Yadav lodged the report.
Therefore, I am in disagreement with the view of the
Inquiry Officer given in the inquiry report of the
department inquiry that the charge is not proved
against the delinquent HC Rajendra Prasad Yadav. As
per the remark of the Inquiry Officer, the above
mentioned charge No. 2 imputed against HC No. 1104
Rajendra Prasad is found to be proved.”
6. On the basis of the above finding, Lakhan Tiwari was
demoted for three years from the post of A.S.I. to Head
Constable. But the appellant and Jagdish Prasad Tiwari were
dismissed from service.
7. Aggrieved by the same, appellant preferred an appeal
before the Inspector General of Police (appellate authority), who
dismissed the appeal vide his order dated 9.12.2004.
8. Appellant then filed a Writ Petition No. 10696 of 2007
before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur Bench,Page 5
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which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by his order
dated 3.5.2007, against which a Writ Appeal No. 11 of 2007 was
also preferred, which was also dismissed by the Division Bench
vide its impugned judgment dated 6.9.2011.
9. Mr. Rakesh Khanna, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, submitted that since both the charges levelled
against the appellant were not proved fully, the respondent
Department was not justified in dismissing him from the
service, which is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the
offence. Further, it was pointed out that there is nothing on the
record to show that the appellant had demanded or accepted
the alleged sum of Rs.3,000 and it was proved in the inquiry
that it was Constable Arjun Pathak who had demanded the
above mentioned amount and he was, even though, inflicted
with the punishment of compulsory retirement was, later,
reinstated by imposing punishment of reduction of increment
with cumulative effect for one year. The inquiry has clearly
established that it was Arjun Pathak who had demanded and
accepted the illegal gratification from the complainant, but he
has been given a lighter punishment while the appellant was
imposed a harsher punishment, which is clearly arbitrary andPage 6
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discriminatory. Learned counsel placed considerable reliance
on the judgment of this Court in Anand Regional Coop. Oil
Seedsgrowers’ Union Ltd. V. Shaileshkumr Harshadbhai
Shah (2006) 6 SCC 548 and claimed parity, if not fully
exonerated.
10. Shri Arjun Garg, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent State, submitted that there is no illegality in the
views expressed by the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench calling for any interference. Further, it was pointed out
that since the appellant, being a member of a disciplined force,
should not have involved in such an incident and his tacit
approval could not be brushed aside because it had taken place
in his presence.
11. We have gone through the inquiry report placed before us
in respect of the appellant as well as Constable Arjun Pathak.
The inquiry clearly reveals the role of Arjun Pathak. It was Arjun
Pathak who had demanded and received the money, though the
tacit approval of the appellant was proved in the inquiry. The
charge levelled against Arjun Pathak was more serious than the
one charged against the appellant. Both appellants and otherPage 7
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two persons as well as Arjun Pathak were involved in the same
incident. After having found that Arjun Pathak had a more
serious role and, in fact, it was he who had demanded and
received the money, he was inflicted comparatively a lighter
punishment. At the same time, appellant who had played a
passive role was inflicted with a more serious punishment of
dismissal from service which, in our view, cannot be sustained.
12. The Doctrine of Equality applies to all who are equally
placed; even among persons who are found guilty. The persons
who have been found guilty can also claim equality of
treatment, if they can establish discrimination while imposing
punishment when all of them are involved in the same incident.
Parity among co-delinquents has also to be maintained when
punishment is being imposed. Punishment should not be
disproportionate while comparing the involvement of codelinquents who are parties to the same transaction or incident.
The Disciplinary Authority cannot impose punishment which is
disproportionate, i.e., lesser punishment for serious offences
and stringent punishment for lesser offences.
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13. The principle stated above is seen applied in few
judgments of this Court. The earliest one is Director General
of Police and Others v. G. Dasayan (1998) 2 SCC 407,
wherein one Dasayan, a Police Constable, along with two other
constables and one Head Constable were charged for the same
acts of misconduct. The Disciplinary Authority exonerated two
other constables, but imposed the punishment of dismissal from
service on Dasayan and that of compulsory retirement on Head
Constable. This Court, in order to meet the ends of justice,
substituted the order of compulsory retirement in place of the
order of dismissal from service on Dasayan, applying the
principle of parity in punishment among co-delinquents. This
Court held that it may, otherwise, violate Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. In Shaileshkumar Harshadbhai Shah
case (supra), the workman was dismissed from service for
proved misconduct. However, few other workmen, against
whom there were identical allegations, were allowed to avail of
the benefit of voluntary retirement scheme. In such
circumstances, this Court directed that the workman also be
treated on the same footing and be given the benefit ofPage 9
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voluntary retirement from service from the month on which the
others were given the benefit.
14. We are of the view the principle laid down in the above
mentioned judgments also would apply to the facts of the
present case. We have already indicated that the action of the
Disciplinary Authority imposing a comparatively lighter
punishment to the co-delinquent Arjun Pathak and at the same
time, harsher punishment to the appellant cannot be permitted
in law, since they were all involved in the same incident.
Consequently, we are inclined to allow the appeal by setting
aside the punishment of dismissal from service imposed on the
appellant and order that he be reinstated in service forthwith.
Appellant is, therefore, to be re-instated from the date on which
Arjun Pathak was re-instated and be given all consequent
benefits as was given to Arjun Pathak. Ordered accordingly.
However, there will be no order as to costs.
............................................J.
(K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN)
............................................J.
(DIPAK MISRA)Page 10
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New Delhi,
February 13, 2013
