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Sunday, January 31, 2021

whether an Advocate on Record can have entry in Advocate On Record register in the form of his style of carrying on profession i.e. instead of “Siddharth Murarka” as “Law Chambers of Siddharth Murarka”?

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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.1107/2020

IN RE:

ADVOCATE ON RECORD

INCLUDES A PROPRIETARY FIRM ETC. Petitioner(s)

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.

1. The repeated emails of the petitioner, and not very palatable

at that, resulted in an administrative decision to take up the

issue on the judicial side. The question which we have formulated

by our order dated 12.10.2020 is, whether an Advocate on Record can

have entry in Advocate On Record register in the form of his style

of carrying on profession i.e. instead of “Siddharth Murarka” as

“Law Chambers of Siddharth Murarka”?. The plea of the petitioner

is based on doing similar filing in different High Courts but not

being permitted to do so in Supreme Court which, he claims, puts

him at a disadvantage against partnership firms since there is no

impediment in the constitution of a partnership firm of Advocates

where two or more Advocates on Record may constitute a firm.

2. In the course of proceedings today, at the inception itself,

we heard Mr. Siddharth Murarka to understand what his grievance

was. We also put to him clearly that the manner he has addressed

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the emails and the language used whether against the officers of

this Court or against other advocates is not acceptable. Mr.

Siddharth Murarka submits that he unconditionally withdraws all

emails addressed in this behalf which are already forming a part of

the compilation whether it be qua any alleged complaints against

the Registry or against Advocates or firms and would not repeat the

same conduct. It is specifically on the said being done that we

have considered appropriate to see if we can find a solution to the

problem which Mr. Murarka appears to face.

3. Mr. Kailash Vasdev, learned senior counsel/Amicus Curiae who

is the Vice-President of the Supreme Court Bar Association and a

former Advocate on Record has assisted us and taken us through the

history of how the Supreme Court Rules were formulated. In this

behalf he has emphasized that the Supreme Court of India on being

established under Article 124 of the Constitution of India framed

Rules in exercise of powers conferred by Article 145 of the

Constitution. These Rules owe their history to the Federal Court

Act, 1941 in terms of the Rules there under being formulated in

exercise of powers by Section 214 of the Government of India Act,

1935 and Section 3 of the Federal Court Act, 1941. He emphasized

that the expression used in the Rules historically and now is

“person” or “agent”. Similarly, the authorization is referred to

“him”.

4. It is, however, submitted that under Order IV Rule 15 to 29

and Rule 31(originally), the enrolment of Advocate on Record has

been dealt with and still do so in the amended form under the 2013

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Rules. What emerges is that there can be an Advocate on Record or a

firm of Advocates on Record. The relevant part of the Supreme Court

Rules, 2013 is extracted as under:

“Order IV – Advocates

Rule 13(1) An advocate-on-record or a firm of advocates

may employ one or more clerks to attend the registry for

presenting or receiving any papers on behalf of the said

advocate or firm of advocates:

Provided that the clerk has been registered with

the Registrar on an application in the prescribed form

made to the Registrar for the purpose:

Provided further that the said clerk gives an

undertaking that he shall attend the Registry regularly.

22. Two or more advocates on record may enter into a

partnership with each other, and any partner may act in

the name of the partnership provided that the

partnership is registered with the Registrar. Any change

in the composition of the partnership shall be notified

to the Registrar.

23. Two or more advocates not being senior advocates or

advocates on record, may enter into partnership and

subject to the provision contained in rule 1(b), any one

of them may appear in any cause or matter before the

Court in the name of the partnership.

Rule 1(b) reads as under:-

1.(b) No advocate other than the Advocate-on-Record for a

party shall appear, plead and address the Court in a

matter unless he is instructed by the Advocate-on-Record

or permitted by the Court.”

5. The aforesaid appears to be grievance of the petitioner who

submits that if the partnership firm can be registered and operate

he should be permitted to do as a sole proprietor.

6. On hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are in

agreement with the submission of learned Amicus Curiae that if

different styles of writing names are to be permitted for Advocates

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on Record, that can only by an exercise to amend the Rules. He

further submits that he says so as the legal profession is not a

business but a profession and this submission takes its roots from

that aspect. Thus, insofar as the larger issue is concerned, we

leave it to the Rule making authorities to examine whether they

would like to expand the registration of Advocates on Record

permitting persons to carry on the profession in any sole

proprietorship firms, styles or name. The Rules being sacrosanct,

we would not like to interfere with the same in the present

proceeding.

7. That brings us to the individual facts of the particular case

where Mr. Murarka says that all that he seeks to state in his

letter head and while filing the Vakalatnama is that “Law Chambers

of Siddharth Murarka sole proprietor Siddharth Rajkumar Murarka”

with his registration number given. It is this aspect alone which

we are examining.

8. The expression “Law Chambers” has a history from England and

also in India because we borrowed a considerable jurisprudence from

England where it is a reference to a particular lawyer in whose

chambers people may be working and carrying on the legal practice.

It appears that this is the style Mr. Murarka seeks to adopt by

reference to the Law Chamber with his name following suit. Effectively this style only records the practice of the chamber which is

a sole proprietorship of Mr.Siddharth Murarka. Mr. Siddharth

Rajkumar Murarka is the person who is registered as an Advocate on

Record with the Supreme Court. 

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9. We are thus, of the view that writing “Law Chambers of

Siddharth Murarka, Sole Proprietor Siddharth Rajkumar Murarka,

Advocate on Record, Supreme Court of India AOR NO.2151, M:

9324175774/1” is permissible style of putting on the letter head

and in the Vakalatnamas and thus, if said Vakalatnamas are filed

they will be treated as a Vakalatnama of Mr. Siddharth Rajkumar

Murarka, who is an Advocate on Record.

10. We close the present proceedings with the aforesaid order and

counsel Mr. Siddharth Murarka to concentrate more on his profession

now that his problem is solved rather than rake up issues which

caused angst both to the Registry and the other advocates.

…………………………………………..J.

[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]

…………………………………………..J.

 [DINESH MAHESHWARI]

……………………………………………J.

 [HRISHIKESH ROY]

NEW DELHI;

JANUARY 20, 2021

As and when it is found that order dated 17.08.2019 could not have been passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C., all subsequent proceedings thereto shall automatically come to an end. 12. The view of the High Court which is recorded in following words:- “…this court is of the view that no simultaneous challenge to the impugned order dated 17.08.2019 summoning the revisionists under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. would be tenable before this Court till the order dated 18.09.2019, passed in the proceedings at the behest of present revisionist, subsist.” cannot be said to be correct view.

 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.88 OF 2021

(arising out of SLP (Crl.)No.10247/2019)

AJAY KUMAR @ BITTU & ANR. ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ANR. ..RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.

 Leave granted.

2. This appeal has been filed against the judgment of the High Court of

Uttarakhand dated 27.09.2019, by which judgment High Court had

dismissed the Criminal Revision filed by the appellants. The Criminal

Revision was filed by the appellants against the order dated 17.08.2019

passed by Additional District Judge, Laksar, by which the appellants were

summoned by the Court under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

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3. Brief facts of the case necessary to be noted for deciding this appeal

are:-

i. The appellant was made an accused in FIR No.175/2015 at Police

Station Kotwali, Laksar, Haridwar, under Section 147, 148, 149,

323, 324, 307, 452, 504 and 506 IPC along with six other accused.

An FIR No.176/2016 was also registered in the same Police Station

under Section 147, 148, 149, 307, 452, 504, 506 IPC in which the

complainant with other accused were arrayed. The Police after

carrying out the investigation submitted a chargesheet exonerating

the appellants. Investigation officer after investigation expunged the

names of Bittoo and Jyoti, the appellants from the list of accused

from the chargesheet.

ii. The Trial began in case No.228 of 2016 in which informant Pahal

Singh was examined as PW-1. In his Statement, Pahal Singh

implicated all accused including the appellants but no specific role

was assigned to the appellants. Statement was also recorded by

PW-2, Monu, in which he implicated the appellants. An application

under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was filed by the informant before the

Session Judge praying that appellant be also summoned in the case.

Learned Session Judge after noticing in detail the statements made

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by PW-1 and PW-2 made in the Court rejected the application by

order dated 21.06.2018. Against the order dated 21.06.2018, Pahal

Singh, the informant, filed the Criminal Revision No.304 of 2018

before the High Court.

iii. The High Court relying on the judgment of this Court reported in

Rajesh and others versus State of Haryana, (2019) 6 SCC 368,

allowed the Revision and directed the application under Section 319

Cr.P.C. to be considered afresh. Following is the operative portion of

the order passed by the High Court in paragraph 7;

“7. After having considered the aforesaid ratio and also

the reasons which have been assigned by the Additional

Sessions Judge, Laksar, Haridwar, this Court is of the

view that the revision deserves to be allowed and the

same is consequently allowed. The order dated

21.06.2018 passed by the learned Additional Sessions

Judge, Laksar, District Haridwar in Sessions Trial No.228

of 2016, State v. Chandra Pal and others is quashed. The

matter is remitted back to the Additional Sessions Judge,

Laksar, District Haridwar, to reconsider the application

paper No.53 (ka/1) in the light of ratio as propounded by

the Hon’ble Apex Courts Judgment in Rajesh’ case

(Supra).”

iv. After the Order of the High Court dated 11.07.2019 in the Criminal

Revision, Learned Session Judge again considered the application

under Section 319 Cr.P.C. Learned Session Judge referring to the

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observations made by the High Court in paragraph 5 as well as the

judgment of this Court in Rajesh and others versus State of

Haryana(Supra) allowed the application and summoned the

appellants by Order dated 17.08.2019. The Trial Court issued a

bailable warrant against the appellants on 05.09.2019 and after

bailable warrant being served when they did not appear on

18.09.2019, Non-Bailable warrant was issued to the appellants and a

Notice under Section 446 Cr.P.C. was issued as to why the amount

of sureties being not realised from two sureties Arun Kumar and

Chandra Pal. The appellants filed Criminal Revision before the High

Court against the order dated 17.08.2019 of the Additional Session

Judge summoning them.

v. The High Court dismissed the Revision noticing a subsequent order

dated 18.09.2019 by which notice has been issued under Section

446 Cr.P.C. The High Court took the view that the Revision was filed

on 23.09.2019 but the order passed by the Court on 18.09.2019 has

not been brought on record, hence, there is concealment of not

placing the order on record. The High Court further observed that

since the proceeding in pursuance to allowing the application under

Section 319 Cr.P.C. has already been initiated, in which the

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revisionists have already invoked the jurisdiction of the Revisional

Court in which order dated 18.09.2019 has been passed, the

Revision is to be dismissed. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court

dated 27.09.2019, this appeal has been filed.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused

the record.

5. The principles for exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. by

Criminal Court are well settled. The Constitution Bench of this Court in

Hardeep Singh versus State of Punjab and others, (2014) 3 SCC 92,

has elaborately considered all contours of Section 319 Cr.P.C. This Court

has held that Power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is a discretionary and

extra-ordinary power which has to be exercised sparingly. This Court

further held that the test that has to be applied is one which is more than

prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short

of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would

lead to conviction. In paragraph 105 and 106, following has been laid

down: -

“105. Power under Section 319 CrPC is a discretionary

and an extraordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly

and only in those cases where the circumstances of the

case so warrant. It is not to be exercised because the

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Magistrate or the Sessions Judge is of the opinion that

some other person may also be guilty of committing that

offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs

against a person from the evidence led before the Court

that such power should be exercised and not in a casual

and cavalier manner.

106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is

to be established from the evidence led before the court,

not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it

requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of

his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which

is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of

framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent

that the evidence, if goes un-rebutted, would lead to

conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court

should refrain from exercising power under Section 319

CrPC. In Section 319 CrPC the purpose of providing if “it

appears from the evidence that any person not being the

accused has committed any offence” is clear from the

words “for which such person could be tried together with

the accused.” The words used are not “for which such

person could be convicted”. There is, therefore, no scope

for the court acting under Section 319 CrPC to form any

opinion as to the guilt of the accused.”

6. The Two-Judge Bench of this Court again reiterated the same ratio in

Rajesh and others versus State of Haryana (Supra) which judgment

has also been relied by the High Court in the impugned judgment.

7. Now we may notice the reason which persuaded the High Court to

reject the Revision. After noticing the facts of the case, the High Court

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proceeded to consider the revision and recorded its reason for dismissing

it in following words: -

“Although a reference has been made in paragraph

10 of the application filed in support of the revision to the

effect that the proceedings was taken by the present

revisionists before the Sessions Court and an order of

18.09.2019 has been passed, whereby, the notices have

been issued to the present revisionists under Section 446

of Cr.P.C.

This order passed by the Court below is that of

18.09.2019. the copy of the said order was received by

the revisionists on 21.09.2019, as would be apparent from

the folio annexed with the certified copy of the order dated

18.09.2019 as supplied by the learned counsel for the

revisionist during the course of arguments to this Court,

though it is not part of the Criminal Revision.

The revision itself was filed on 23.09.2019. The said

order passed by the Court under Section 446, has not

been brought on record. Hence, this Court is of the view

that apart from the fact that there is a concealment by not

placing the order on record, which otherwise has been

procured by the revisionist prior to the filing of the revision

and furthermore, since the proceedings in pursuance to

allowing the application under Section 319 CrPC has

already been initiated, in which the revisionist has already

invoked the jurisdiction of the Revisional court, in which

the order dated 18.09.2019 has been passed.

In view of the already ongoing proceedings before

the Sessions Court prior to the filing of the present

revision, this court is of the view that no simultaneous

challenge to the impugned order dated 17.08.2019

summoning the revisionists under Section 319 of CrPC

would be tenable before this Court till the order dated

18.09.2019, passed in the proceedings at the behest of

the present revisionist, subsist. 

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Consequently, this revision lacks merit and the

same is dismissed as it is not sustainable before this

Court.”

8. A perusal of the judgment of the High Court indicates that the High

Court did not examine the correctness of the order dated 17.08.2019 by

which the appellants were summoned by Additional District Judge under

Section 319 Cr.P.C., rather has dismissed the Criminal Revision on basis

of a subsequent fact i.e. order dated 18.09.2019 by which notice has been

issued under Section 446 Cr.P.C. The High Court further took the view that

since the proceedings in pursuance of Section 319 Cr.P.C. have already

been initiated and that no simultaneous challenge to the impugned order

dated 17.08.2019 summoning the revisionists under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

would be tenable before the High Court till the order dated 18.09.2019

passed in proceedings at the behest of revisionist subsist.

9. We may now notice the nature of the proceedings subsequent to the

order dated 17.08.2019 by which the appellants were summoned. The

appellant has brought on record the order sheet of the Court along with the

application for additional documents. The order sheet indicates that

although the summons was served on the appellants but they have not

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appeared, hence, bailable warrant of Rs.10,000/- was issued against the

appellants. Order dated 05.09.2019 is to the following effect:-

Sd/- illegible

Arun Kumar

Chandrapal

Singh

Jitender

Gautam

05.09.2019

Record is produced. Accused Sandeep

appearance dispensed through his

counsel Kashim Ansari. Allowed.

Remaining accused Arun, Chandrapal,

Jitender and Gautam are present.

Summon is duly served on accused

Jyoti and Bittu. Accused Jyoti and Bittu

are absent. The bailable warrant of

Rs.10,000/- be issue against Jyoti and

Bittu for 18.09.2019.

Sd/- illegible

Ambika Pant

Additional Session Judge Laksar,

District Haridwar.”

10. Subsequently on 18.09.2019 the case was again taken by the

Additional District Judge and following order was passed:-

Sd/- illegible

Arun Kumar

Chandrapal

Singh

Jitender

Gautam

18.09.2019

The file is produced. Accused

Chandrapal Gautam, Jitender and

Sandeep are present.

The Bailable warrants issued against

accused Jyoti and Bittu are returned

after being served. Accused Jyoti and

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Bittu are absent even after service of

Bailable warrants. Therefore, non

bailable warrants are issued against

Jyoti and Bittu to ensure their presence.

Accused Jyoti and Bittu are not being

produced before the Court inspite of

sureties given by the guarantors. The

surety of accused Bittu is Accused Arun

Kumar and the surety of accused Jyoti is

her father accused Chandrapal and the

another surety is accused Arun. Both of

them are present in the Court.

Therefore, the Bail bonds executed by

them are forfeited for not producing

Accused Bittu and Jyoti before the

Court. Therefore, notice under section

446 CrPC is being issued with the intent

that why the amount if surety be not

realized from them.

The case be produced for appearance

of accused Jyoti and Bittu and for the

explanation by the guarantors on

30.09.2019.

Sd/- illegible

Ambika Pant

Additional Session Judge Laksar,

District Haridwar.”

11. The proceedings which were taken on 05.09.2019 and 18.09.2019

are proceedings consequent to and subsequent to the order dated

17.08.2019. The subsequent proceeding in no manner can be a ground to

not consider the correctness and validity of order dated 17.08.2019. We

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are of the considered opinion that the High Court completely erred in

refusing to consider the correctness of the order dated 17.08.2019 on the

ground that on 18.09.2019 notice under Section 446 Cr.P.C. has been

issued. As and when it is found that order dated 17.08.2019 could not

have been passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C., all

subsequent proceedings thereto shall automatically come to an end.

12. The view of the High Court which is recorded in following words:-

“…this court is of the view that no simultaneous challenge

to the impugned order dated 17.08.2019 summoning the

revisionists under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. would be tenable

before this Court till the order dated 18.09.2019, passed

in the proceedings at the behest of present revisionist,

subsist.”

cannot be said to be correct view.

13. The order dated 18.09.2019 by which the Court has directed

appearance of the accused appellant is to be taken to its logical end but

that order cannot provide a shield of protection to earlier order dated

17.08.2019 by which appellant has been summoned.

14. The subsequent proceedings of the court which have been brought

on record indicate that the appellant no.2 and 1 have appeared before the

Court and have also been granted bail. .

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15. One of the grounds taken in this appeal is that appellant No.1 is

Juvenile at the date of incident, his Date of Birth being 01.04.2000. The

above ground also needs to be considered by the High Court.

16. We thus are of the view that the impugned judgment of the High

Court dated 27.09.2019 is unsustainable and deserves to be set aside. We

order accordingly. The Criminal Revision of the appellants be considered

afresh by the High Court in accordance with the law. The appeal is

allowed.

……………......................J.

( ASHOK BHUSHAN )

……………......................J.

 ( R. SUBHASH REDDY )

…………….......................J.

 ( M.R. SHAH)

New Delhi,

January 29, 2021.

Transfer Petition is disposed of to the following effect:­ (i) The prayer for transfer is rejected; (ii) The petitioner is permitted to move an application for reopening of her evidence before the family Court. The application may be allowed to be filed on line if such a facility is available. Else, it may be permitted to be filed through counsel without the petitioner having to undertake a travel. The Family Court may take a lenient view on the said application and have the evidence on the side of the petitioner restored. Thereafter the case may be posted for the cross examination of the petitioner. For facilitating the cross examination of the petitioner by the counsel for the respondent­husband, the Court may be granted a firm date. On the date so fixed, the petitioner shall appear before the Family Court. The respondent shall ensure that the cross 7 examination of the petitioner is carried out without fail by the counsel for the respondent. No request for any adjournment on behalf of the respondent shall be allowed; (iii) On all occasions except the date on which the petitioner is to be cross examined, the petitioner may be permitted by the Family Court to be represented by a counsel without being present. If Video Conferencing facility is available, the petitioner may be granted the said facility; (iv) On every occasion when the family Court wants the physical presence of the petitioner, the respondent shall pay a sum of Rs.10,000/­ to the petitioner, towards expenses for travel and stay. If the respondent fails to pay, the petitioner will be at liberty to approach this court Pending applications(s) if any shall also stand disposed of.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 2344 OF 2019

AMRUTA BEN HIMANSHU KUMAR SHAH            …  PETITIONER(S)

VERSUS

HIMANSHU KUMAR PRAVINCHANDRA SHAH     …RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R

V. Ramasubramanian, J.

1. The petitioner, who is the wife of the respondent, has come up

with the above petition seeking the transfer of Family Suit No. 33 of

2016 from the Family Court, Banaskantha, Palanpur, Gujarat, to a

competent court in Mumbai, Maharashtra.

2. I   have   heard   Mr.   Harsh   Desai,   learned   counsel   for   the

petitioner   and   Ms.   Ranu   Purohit,   learned   counsel   for   the

respondent.

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3. The petitioner and the respondent got married on 28.02.2002.

Two   children   were   born   in   the   wedlock   on   31.08.2007   and

27.01.2011.

4. Disputes arose, leading to the respondent filing a petition in

HMP No.11 of 2016 on the file of the Court of Senior Civil Judge,

Palanpur, Gujarat, under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, for

restitution of conjugal rights. The petition was transferred to the

Family Court Banaskantha, Palanpur, Gujarat and re­numbered as

Family suit No. 33 of 2016.

5. The petitioner earlier came up with a transfer petition in T.P.

(C) No.615 of 2016 seeking transfer of the said proceeding to a

competent court in Mumbai. But it was dismissed by this Court by

an order date 19.04.2016.

6. After three years of the dismissal of the said Transfer Petition,

the petitioner has come up with the present Transfer Petition on the

ground that there are change of circumstances warranting a fresh

look. The change of circumstances pleaded by the petitioner are:­

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(i) that her mother died on 02.02.2017 leaving an emotional

vacuum and also making it impossible to leave two minor

daughter in Mumbai to attend to the hearings at Palanpur;

and

(ii) that even the application filed by her before the Family

Court,   Palanpur   to   direct   the   respondent   to   provide   the

expenditure for her travel to Palanpur was dismissed and that

the Family Court at Palanpur has also made it difficult for her

to defend the case, by listing the case for hearing on 2 to 3

occasions   every   month   and   imposing   penalties   upon   the

petitioner whenever a request for adjournment is sought or

when the Legal Aid lawyer appointed on her behalf did not

attend the Court.

7. The respondent has filed a counter affidavit contending inter

alia  that the proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights have

already reached the stage of judgment and that once a request for

transfer   got   rejected   on   an   earlier   occasion,   a   second   petition

cannot be maintained.

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8. But   as   rightly   contended   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the

petitioner, the dismissal of a petition for transfer, may not operate

as  res   judicata,  when   a   fresh   petition   is   filed   on   change   of

circumstances. The first transfer petition in T.P.(C)No.615 of 2016

was dismissed in limine without even a notice being ordered to the

respondent.   The   order   dated   19.04.2016   dismissing   the   said

Transfer Petition reads as follows:­

“Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.

The transfer petitioner is dismissed.

Application for stay also stands disposed of.”

9. Therefore, the present petition for transfer cannot be opposed

solely on the ground that the earlier petition was dismissed. But at

the same time, the petitioner will have to satisfy the court that there

are change of circumstances and that there are sufficient grounds

made out.

10. It appears that after the first Transfer Petition was dismissed

on 19.04.2016, the pleadings in the proceedings for restitution of

conjugal rights got completed and the respondent­husband, who

was the petitioner before the Family Court examined himself in

chief on 11.07.2017 and 12.07.2017. He was cross examined by the

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counsel for the petitioner herein after more than 17 months, on

21.12.2018.

11. Thereafter   the   petitioner   herein,   who   was   the   respondent

before the Family Court filed an affidavit in lieu of examination in

chief   on   03.05.2019.   However,   the   Family   Court   discarded   the

evidence of the petitioner herein and struck off her right of evidence

by an order 22.07.2019. It is only thereafter that the petitioner has

come up with the above Transfer Petition. The petitioner’s  mother

also passed away in 2017 and she was obviously unable to defend

herself effectively in the court where the proceedings are pending.

12. While the hardship, both social and financial, pleaded by the

petitioner   deserves   favourable   consideration,   the   transfer   of   the

case at this stage of the proceeding may not be appropriate. As seen

from the print out of the history of the case, downloaded from the

website of the Family Court, Palanpur, the case was posted for final

arguments   on   02.08.2019,   14.08.2019,   27.08.2019   and

09.09.2019.   Thereafter,   the   case   was   posted   for   judgment   on

30.09.2019.  This Court granted stay of further proceedings only on

5

04.10.2019. The petitioner was fortunate that the judgment was not

pronounced on 30.09.2019.

13. When a case is at its final stage, this Court will be extremely

reluctant to order the transfer, as it may derail the entire process.

14. But at the same time, two major grievances of the petitioner

have to be addressed namely:­

(i) the expenses for her travel from Mumbai to Palanpur; and

(ii) the evidence of her side getting rejected.

It appears that the petitioner’s application for payment of travel

allowance   was   rejected   by   the   Family   Court   and   the   petitioner

moved the High Court by way of a special leave application. The fate

of   the   same   is   not   known.   Even   the   copy   of   the   order   dated

27.08.2018 passed by the Family Court rejecting the prayer for

travel allowance is not enclosed. However, it does not bar this Court

from passing appropriate orders in the interest of justice.

15. Similarly,   the   second   issue   can   also   be   taken   care   of   by

permitting the petitioner to move an application for reopening the

evidence on her side and directing the Court to allow the cross

6

examination of the petitioner. Once these 2 issues are addressed,

the case can be allowed to reach its logical end in the very same

court.  

16. Therefore in fine, the Transfer Petition is disposed of to the

following effect:­

(i) The prayer for transfer is rejected;

(ii) The petitioner is permitted to move an application for

reopening   of   her   evidence   before   the   family   Court.   The

application may be allowed to be filed on line if such a facility

is available. Else, it may be permitted to  be filed through

counsel without the petitioner having to undertake a travel.

The   Family   Court   may   take   a   lenient   view   on   the   said

application and have the evidence on the side of the petitioner

restored.   Thereafter   the   case   may   be   posted   for   the   cross

examination   of   the   petitioner.   For   facilitating   the   cross

examination   of   the   petitioner   by   the   counsel   for   the

respondent­husband, the Court may be granted a firm date.

On the date so fixed, the petitioner shall appear before the

Family   Court.   The   respondent   shall   ensure   that   the   cross

7

examination of the petitioner is carried out without fail by the

counsel for the respondent. No request for any adjournment

on behalf of the respondent shall be allowed; 

(iii) On all occasions except the date on which the petitioner

is to be cross examined, the petitioner may be permitted by

the Family Court to be represented by a counsel without being

present.   If   Video   Conferencing   facility   is   available,   the

petitioner may be granted the said facility;

(iv) On   every   occasion   when   the   family   Court   wants   the

physical presence of the petitioner, the respondent shall pay a

sum of Rs.10,000/­ to the petitioner, towards expenses for

travel and stay. If the respondent fails to pay, the petitioner

will be at liberty to approach this court

Pending applications(s) if any shall also stand disposed of.

……………………………..J.

(V. Ramasubramanian)

New Delhi

January 29, 2021

8

We find no merit in the contention of the Appellants that the Medical Council of India committed an error in not permitting admission of students for the academic year 2019-2020. Having found that the request made by the Appellants for permitting MBBS course for the academic year 2019-2020 had become infructuous, the High Court rightly considered the entitlement of the Appellant-College for the academic year 2020-2021. In accordance with the time schedule fixed in respect of permissions to be granted to the medical colleges for admission to students, the last date for granting permission for the academic year 2020-2021 was 31.08.2020. As per the schedule an application for renewal of permission should have been made by the Appellants on 07.07.2020. We find no fault committed by the High Court in refusing permission to the Appellant-College for making admissions for the academic year 2020-2021.

  Non-Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No. 155 of 2021

Chintpurni Medical College and Hospital & Anr.

.... Appellant(s)

Versus

Union of India & Anr.

…. Respondent (s)

J U D G M E N T

L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.

1. The Appellants requested the Medical Council of India

for permission to admit 150 students in MBBS course for the

academic year 2019-2020. The Board of Governors in

supersession of Medical Council of India rejected the request

on 21.05.2019. The Appellants filed a Writ Petition in the

High Court of Delhi questioning the correctness of the

proceeding dated 21.05.2019. The High Court dismissed the

Writ Petition by its judgment dated 09.12.2020. This Appeal

is filed challenging the said judgment.

2. The first Respondent granted letter of permission to the

first Appellant-College on 30.06.2011 for intake of 150

students in the MBBS course for the academic year 2011-

1 | P a g e

2012. As the inspections carried out by the assessors of the

Medical Council of India revealed gross deficiencies of the

teaching faculty, clinical material and the other physical

facilities in the medical college, the Board of Governors

recommended that the renewal of permission should not be

granted to the first Appellant-College for the academic years

2012-2013 and 2013-2014. The Writ Petition filed by the first

Appellant-College was dismissed by the Punjab and Haryana

High Court pursuant to which no admission could be made

for the academic years 2012-2013 and 2013-2014.

3. The first Appellant-College sought renewal of

permission for the academic year 2014-2015. In view of the

deficiencies in teaching faculty, clinical material and the

other physical facilities in the college, recommendation was

made by the Executive Committee of the Medical Council of

India not to renew the permission for the academic year

2014-2015 which was accepted by the first Respondent. The

first Respondent informed the Appellant-College on

15.07.2014 that the request for renewal of permission for

admitting 150 medical students for the academic year 2014-

2015 was rejected.

4. Orders were issued by this Court on 18.09.2014 and

20.09.2014 in Writ Petition (C) No.469 of 2014 titled as

2 | P a g e

“Hind Charitable Trust Shekhar Hospital Private

Limited v. Union of India & Ors.” by which private

medical colleges whose application for renewal of permission

was disapproved were permitted to make admissions, subject

to the undertaking by the President/Chairman and Secretary

of the Medical College that there is no deficiency existing in

the medical college. This Court held that if the undertaking

was found to be incorrect at the time of next physical

inspection of the medical college, the bank guarantee of

Rupees Ten Crores, furnished by the medical college shall be

forfeited by way of penalty. The second Appellant-College

submitted an undertaking on 28.09.2014 that there is no

deficiency existing in the facilities and that in the event of

any deficiency being found in the inspection, the bank

guarantee of Rs.9.5 Crores shall be forfeited. Consequent

upon the undertaking, the first Appellant-College was

permitted to admit students for the academic year 2014-

2015.

5. Renewal of permission for admission of 150 students for

the academic year 2015-2016 was rejected after an

inspection was conducted and it was found that there were

gross deficiencies of infrastructure, clinical material, teaching

faculty and other physical facilities. The first Respondent

3 | P a g e

accepted the recommendations of the Medical Council of

India and rejected the request of the Appellant College to

grant renewal of permission for admissions for the academic

year 2015-2016 by its letter dated 15.06.2015.

6. On 16.12.2015 physical assessment for grant of

recognition was carried out. Another physical assessment

was held on 25/26th February, 2016 as there were allegations

against the first Appellant-College relating to arranging fake

faculty doctors, residents, patients etc. only for the purpose

of Medical Council of India’s assessment. It was decided by

the Medical Council of India to conduct another surprise

physical inspection. In the surprise inspection which was

conducted on 16.03.2016, deficiencies were found on the

basis of which the Medical Council of India recommended to

the Central Government not to grant recognition to the

Appellant College under Section 11 (2) of the Indian Medical

Council Act, 1956. The first Respondent accepted the

recommendations made by the Medical Council of India and

decided not to renew the permission for admission for the

academic year 2016-2017.

7. The Over-Sight Committee recommended grant of

conditional recognitions to private medical colleges which

was accepted by the first Respondent by a notification dated

4 | P a g e

26.09.2016. Conditional recognition was granted to the

MBBS degree awarded to the students admitted in the first

Appellant College on the following two conditions:

I. “An undertaking on affidavit from the Dean/Principal

and the Chairman of the Trust affirming that the

deficiencies pointed out by the assessors of the Council

in the compliance verification assessment stands

rectified;

II. A bank guarantee for a sum of Rs.2 crores in favour of

the Council which shall be valid for a period of one year

or till such time the first renewal inspection takes place,

whichever is later.”

8. A verification assessment was held on 07.03.2017 to

verify the claims of the first Appellant College that they

have all the minimum requirements necessary for

recognition. In the verification, the following deficiencies

were found:

I. “Deficiency of faculty is 87.12% as detailed in the

report.

II. Shortage of Residents is 82.35% as detailed in the

report.

III. OPD attendance was 401 at 2 p.m. on day of

assessment against requirement of 1,200. Very few

patients were seen in OPD at the time of visit.

IV. Bed Occupancy was NIL on day of assessment. There

was NIL admitted patient seen during the round.

5 | P a g e

V. There was only 1 Major & NIL Minor Operation on day

of assessment.

VI. There was NIL Normal Delivery & NIL Caesarean

Section on day of assessment.

VII. CT Scan workload is NIL on day of assessment.

VIII. Histopathology workload is NIL on day of assessment.

IX. ICUs: Except 1 patient in SICU, there was NIL patient in

ICCU, MICU, PICU, NICU.

X. Labor Room: There was no woman in Labour Room. It

appears that data in the Register is falsified.

XI. Data of Number of Admissions & Discharge,

Radiological & Laboratory investigations as provided

by institute are grossly inflated.

XII. Casualty: There was NIL patient at time of round".

XIII. Speech Therapist is not available. Only space is

provided for Speech Therapy.

XIV. Nursing Staff: Very few Nurses were seen in the

hospital during the round.

XV. Paramedical Staff: Very few paramedical staff were

seen during the round.

XVI. Orthopaedics ward was locked during the round.

XVII. O.T.s : Some 0.Ts were locked during the round. Some

are not properly equipped.

XVIII. Examination Halls: These are temporary structures

without light & fan. Deficiency remains as it is.

XIX. Central Library: It is not air-conditioned. Capacity of

Students' reading Room (Outside) is only 32 against

requirement of 150. Available Internet Nodes are 32

against requirement of 40. Deficiency remains as it is.

6 | P a g e

XX. Students' Hostels: Available accommodation is for 453

students against requirement of 565. Ancillary

facilities are inadequate as detailed in the report.

XXI. Interns' Hostel: Available accommodation is for 42

Interns against requirement of 150.

XXII. Residents' Hostel: Total 40 rooms are available against

requirement of 85. They are partially furnished.

Deficiency remains as it is.

XXIII. Residential Quarters: Only 5 quarters are available for

faculty against requirement of 26. NIL quarters are

available for Non-teaching staff.”

9. The Medical Council of India recommended to the

Central Government that the first Appellant-College should

be debarred for two years i.e. 2017-2018 and 2018-2019

from admitting students and to encash the bank guarantee

furnished. A decision was also taken not to consider the first

Appellant for processing applications for Postgraduate

courses for the academic year 2017-2018. There was also a

recommendation to initiate proceedings for withdrawal of the

recognition of the courses pursuant to which a show cause

notice was given to the college on 24.03.2017. The first

Respondent accepted the recommendations of the Medical

Council of India and debarred the first Appellant-College from

making admissions to MBBS course for the academic years

2017-2018 and 2018-2019. The first Respondent also

7 | P a g e

permitted the Medical Council of India to encash the bank

guarantee.

10. Pursuant to a direction given by this Court by its order

dated 01.08.2017 the status of ratification of deficiencies in

the first Appellant-College was reconsidered and a decision

was taken by the Executive Committee of the Medical Council

of India not to recognise/approve the first Appellant-College

for the award of MBBS degree granted by Baba Farid

University of Health Sciences.

11. In the meanwhile, students who were admitted in the

first Appellant-College during the years 2011-2012, 2014-

2015 and 2016-2017 were shifted to other colleges.

12. Thereafter, the first Appellant requested the Medical

Council of India to permit admission of 150 students in the

MBBS course for the academic year 2019-2020. The Medical

Council of India rejected the request of the first AppellantCollege. According to the Medical Council of India, the

conditional recognition granted to the first Appellant-College

has become invalid in view of the failure of the first

Appellant-College to comply with the conditions stipulated

therein. It was mentioned in the letter dated 21.05.2019

that proceedings pursuant to the show cause notice dated

24.03.2017 are underway. The first Appellant-College was

8 | P a g e

advised to make an application/scheme under Section 10 (A)

of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 for grant of

permission to admit students for the academic year 2020-

2021. Aggrieved by the order dated 21.05.2019, the

Appellant filed a Writ Petition in the High Court of Delhi which

was dismissed.

13. The High Court held that there is no merit in the

contention of the Appellants that admissions for the

academic year 2019-2020 should be considered without any

further inspection as the debarment by the notification dated

26.09.2016 was only for a period of two years. As the relief

claimed by the Appellants for the year 2019-2020 cannot be

granted, the High Court rightly considered whether any relief

can be granted to the Appellants for the academic year

2020-2021. The High Court took note of the fact that there

are admittedly no students in the first Appellant-College as

those admitted for the academic years 2011-2012, 2014-

2015 and 2016-2017 have been shifted to the other colleges.

The request made by the Appellants that there should be a

direction for inspection was refused by the High Court as the

last date for granting permission for the academic year 2020-

2021 was 31.08.2020. As the recognition of the college has

9 | P a g e

not been cancelled, the Appellants were given liberty to

make an application for renewal of recognition.

14. We have heard Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior

Counsel for the Appellant, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned

Additional Solicitor General for the first Respondent and Mr. T.

Singhdev learned counsel for the second Respondent. The

contention of the Appellants that the ban for admitting

students imposed by the first Respondent on 26.09.2016 is

only for a period of two years i.e. 2017-2018 and 2018-2019

was rightly rejected by the High Court on the ground that

they were not entitled to make admissions for the academic

years 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 without any inspection.

Reliance placed by the Appellants on the order dated

10.05.2018 passed by this Court in Writ Petition (C) No.423 of

2017 is misplaced. In the said Writ Petition, request of the

Appellants that they should be permitted to make admission

for the years 2017-2018 and 2018-2019 was rejected. While

dismissing the Writ Petition, an observation was made that

the Appellants would be entitled to pursue their request for

permission for the academic years 2019-2020 and 2020-

2021. It does not mean that the Appellants are entitled to

admit students for the academic year 2019-2020 without an

inspection. A bare look of the inspections conducted from

10 | P a g e

the years 2011-2012 makes it clear that the Appellants have

not utilized the opportunities given to them to rectify the

deficiencies in the past. The Medical Council of India has

even recommended cancellation of the recognition granted

to the Appellants in view of lack of infrastructure, clinical,

teaching faculty and other facilities.

15. We find no merit in the contention of the Appellants

that the Medical Council of India committed an error in not

permitting admission of students for the academic year

2019-2020. Having found that the request made by the

Appellants for permitting MBBS course for the academic year

2019-2020 had become infructuous, the High Court rightly

considered the entitlement of the Appellant-College for the

academic year 2020-2021. In accordance with the time

schedule fixed in respect of permissions to be granted to the

medical colleges for admission to students, the last date for

granting permission for the academic year 2020-2021 was

31.08.2020. As per the schedule an application for renewal

of permission should have been made by the Appellants on

07.07.2020. We find no fault committed by the High Court in

refusing permission to the Appellant-College for making

admissions for the academic year 2020-2021.

11 | P a g e

16. We are in agreement with the High Court that the

Appellant-College is a recognised College and that it is open

to the second Respondent to take appropriate steps under

Section 19 of the Indian Medical Council Act. As the

recognition was for a period of five years which ends in the

year 2021, it is open to the Appellants to apply for renewal of

the recognition. Any application preferred by the Appellants

shall be considered in accordance with law by the second

Respondent. We make it clear that the Appellant-College

shall be entitled for admissions for the academic year 2021-

2022 only if renewal of the recognition is granted to the first

Appellant-College and it is found that there are no

deficiencies like infrastructure, clinical, teaching faculty and

other facilities.

17. For the above-mentioned reasons, we see no merit in

the Appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.

.................................J.

 [L. NAGESWARA RAO]

 ..............................J.

 [S. ABDUL NAZEER]

 ..............................J.

 [INDU MALHOTRA]

New Delhi,

January 28, 2021.

12 | P a g e

Any challenge to appointment after more than three years cannot be entertained as we have already held that respondent No.4 in his representation before the Chancellor never challenged the appointment of appellant as Assistant Professor and had filed representation only claiming seniority over appellant after he got promoted as Assistant Professor himself in the year 2007, High Court ought not to have entertained the challenge to the appointment of appellant in the writ petition and ought to have confined the consideration of claim of respondent No.4 for seniority over the appellant


 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.268-269 of 2021

(arising out of SLP(C)Nos.17665-17666 of 2019)

POORAN CHAND ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

CHANCELLOR & ORS. ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

Leave granted.

2. These appeals have been filed challenging the

Division Bench judgment of High Court of Judicature

at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench dated 12.04.2018 by which

writ petition filed by respondent No.4 has been

allowed and the order of the Chancellor dated

08.07.2009 rejecting the representation made by

respondent No.4 was set aside.

3. Brief facts of the case for deciding these

appeals are:

1

3.1 King George Medical University is a Medical

University under the by U.P. Act No.8 of 2002

namely the King George Medical University

Act, Uttar Pradesh Act, 2002. An

advertisement dated 15.03.2005 was issued by

U.P. King George’s University of Dental

Sciences, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as

“University”) inviting applications for the

post of Professors, Associate Professors,

Asstt. Professors and Lecturers.

3.2 The appellant made an application for

appointment on the post of Assistant

Professor whereas respondent No.4 made an

application for appointment on the post of

Lecturer. Both the appellant and respondent

No.4 were considered by the same Selection

Committee and recommendations of the

Selection Committee were approved by

Executive Council in its meeting dated

08.08.2005 approving the appointment of

appellant as Assistant Professor and that of

respondent No.4 as Lecturer. The appellant,

2

who was working as Assistant Professor in BRD

Medical College, Gorakhpur after obtaining

permission from State of U.P. joined as

Assistant Professor on 08.12.2005.

3.3 The respondent No.4 submitted his joining as

Lecturer on 08.08.2005. The respondent No.4

was promoted on the post of Assistant

Professor on 08.08.2007 after completing

three years experience. The representations

were submitted by respondent No.4 to the

University claiming seniority over the

appellant. A representation was addressed by

respondent No.4 to the Chancellor dated

13.02.2009 regarding the appointment and

claim of seniority as Assistant Professor in

the University. The respondent No.4 claimed

that his experience at the time of

appointment as Senior Research Fellow in

W.H.O. was not considered. His representation

to the Chancellor principally claimed

seniority over appellant based on his

experience claiming that he has also

3

completed requisite experience at the time of

his appointment on the post of Assistant

Professor.

3.4 The Chancellor vide his order dated

08.07.2009 rejected the representation made

by respondent No.4. The Chancellor in his

order referred to the report sent by the

University that experience of the appellant

as Senior Research fellow in W.H.O. cannot be

counted as experience. Aggrieved by the

order of the Chancellor dated 08.07.2009

rejecting his claim, the respondent No.4

filed a writ petition being Writ Petition

No.1350(SB) of 2009 praying for following

reliefs:-

“i. Issue a writ of certiorari

quashing the impugned order

dated 08.07.2009 passed by

Opp. Party No.1 and impugned

appointment order dated

08.08.2005 of OPP. Party no.4

as Asstt. Professor contained

in Annexure No.1 & 2 to the

writ petition.

ii. issue a writ of mandamus /

prohibition commanding the

OPP. Party No. 1 to 3 to

revert, back the OPP. Party

4

NO.4 from the post of Asstt.

Professor and post him in the

post Lecturer from the date of

joining forthwith.

iii. issue a writ of mandamus

commanding the Opp. Party No.1

to 3 to declare the petitioner

senior to the Opp. Party No.4

with all consequential service

benefits.

iv. issue a writ of mandamus

commanding the Opp. Parties to

count the period of Senior

Research Fellow as teaching

experience in promoting the

petitioner, as Asstt.

Professor.

v. any other writ, order or

direction which this Hon’ble

Court deem fit in the

circumstances of the case may

also be passed.

vi. Allow the Writ Petition with

cost.”

3.5 In the writ petition both the appellant as

well as University has filed their counter

affidavit and contested the claim of the

respondent No.4. Division Bench of the High

Court vide its impugned judgment dated

12.04.2018 allowed the writ petition. The

operative portion of the order of the High

5

Court is as follows:-

“The writ petition is

accordingly allowed. The order

dated 8.7.2009 passed by the

Chancellor is hereby quashed and

the University concerned is

directed to treat opposite party

no.4 having been appointed

initially on the post of Lecturer

in accordance with his

qualification. Consequences shall

follow accordingly. However, no

recovery shall be made from

opposite party no.4 from the

payment made to him on account of

said initial appointment on the

post of Assistant Professor.”

3.6 The appellant aggrieved by the judgment of

the High Court has come up in these appeals.

4. We have heard Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior

counsel for the appellant. Shri S.R. Singh, learned

senior counsel appearing for respondent No.4. Shri

Vishnu Shankar Jain, learned counsel has appeared for

respondent No.3.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that

the appellant had started working in the University

as Assistant Professor in BRD Medical College from

19.07.2003 to 07.12.2005. It is submitted that prior

to his deputation in BRD Medical College, Gorakhpur,

6

he was a member of Provincial Medical Services w.e.f.

01.09.1992 and had been working for more than a

decade as Dental Surgeon. It is submitted that

Selection Committee after considering the service

experience and working of the appellant found him

eligible for the post of Assistant Professor, and

recommended as Assistant Professor, who was appointed

as such. It is submitted that the respondent No.4

did not fulfil qualifications of Assistant Professor

since at the time of application, he had only one

year’s experience, hence, he rightly applied for the

post of Lecturer only. It is submitted that the

appointment of the appellant as Assistant Professor

was never challenged by respondent No.4 and it is

with regard to claim of seniority of respondent No.4

over the appellant he submitted his representation

both to the University and the Chancellor.

Representation to the Chancellor was also submitted

after more than three years from the appointment of

the appellant and representations were submitted by

respondent No.4 only when he was promoted as

Assistant Professor in the year 2007. It is

7

submitted that High Court committed error in

entertaining the challenge to the appointment of

appellant as Assistant Professor whereas appointment

was never challenged before the Chancellor or within

a reasonable period by the writ petition, which was

filed in the year 2009. The respondent No.4 cannot be

permitted to challenge the appointment of appellant

after a period of more than four years. It is

submitted that the appellant was senior to the

respondent No.4 right from the very beginning and the

claim of respondent No.4 regarding seniority of the

appellant was misconceived and the dispute was

initiated by respondent No.4 only for purpose of

claiming himself to be senior to the appellant. The

appellant fulfilled the qualifications for

appointment on the post of Assistant Professor and

has been working on his post since the date of

joining.

6. Shri S.R. Singh, learned senior counsel appearing

for the respondent No.4 submitted that the experience

of the appellant as member of Provincial Medical

Services was wholly irrelevant for the purpose of

8

appointment on the post of Assistant Professor. At

best, the appellant’s experience as Assistant

Professor in BRD Medical College, Gorakhpur in

Department of Dentistry from 19.07.2003 to 07.12.2005

can be taken into consideration, which is only two

years four months and 19 days, which was less than

three years, hence, he did not fulfil the eligibility

for the appointment on the post of Assistant

Professor. Shri S.R. Singh submitted that the

appellant, who did not fulfil the eligibility for the

post of Assistant Professor, his appointment on the

post of Assistant Professor was void and is nullity

and the decision of the High Court holding that

respondent No.4 not eligible is correct, which needs

no interference by this Court.

7. We have considered the submissions of the learned

counsel for the parties and have perused the records.

8. For the post of Assistant Professor and Lecturer

advertised by advertisement dated 15.03.2005

qualifications were referred to as qualifications

9

required as in the first Statute of Lucknow

University. Section 42 of the Act, 2002 provided for

first Statutes of the University. The Section

further provided that for so long as the First

Statutes are not so made, the Statutes of the Lucknow

University as in force immediately before the

appointed date in so far as they are not so

inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, 2002,

shall, subject to such adaptations and modifications,

continue in force. The relevant Statute of the

Lucknow University, which provides for qualification

for the post of Assistant Professor is Statute 11.02

B2, which is to the following effect:-

“11.02 B2. Assistant Professor: MDS or

equivalent degree as recognised by the

Dental Council of India in the subject

concerned with at least three years

teaching experience as Lecturer/Chief

Resident/Senior Resident/ Demonstrator /

Tutor or equivalent after obtaining MDS

degree in the subject concerned.

Provided that if suitable candidates

with requisite teaching experience are not

available the selection committee may

recommend candidates for appointment in

lower grade i.e. Lecturers.”

9. There is no dispute to the fact that in pursuance

10

of advertisement dated 15.03.2005 both appellant and

respondent No.4 had applied respectively for the post

of Assistant Professor and Lecturer and Selection

Committee recommended their appointment and Executive

Council in the meeting dated 08.08.2005 approved the

recommendations of Selection Committee appointing

appellant as Assistant Professor and respondent No.4

as Lecturer.

10. The University in its counter affidavit has

relied and referred to Section 53 of the U.P. Act No.

8 of 2002. Section 53 of the Act, 2002 is as

follows:-

“53- If any question arises whether

any person has been duly elected or

appointed as, or is entitled to be a

member of any authority or other body of

the University (including any question as

to the validity of a Statute, Ordinance or

Regulation, not being a Statute or

Ordinance made or approved by the State

Government or by the Chancellor) is in

conformity with this Act or the Statutes

or the Ordinances made thereunder, the

matter shall be referred to the

Chancellor, and the decision of the

Chancellor thereon shall be final:

Provided that no reference under this

section shall be made-

(a) more than three months

after the date when the question

11

could have been raised for the

first time,

(b) by any person other than

an authority or officer of the

University or a person aggrieved:

Provided further that the Chancellor

may in exceptional circumstances-

(a) act suo motu or entertain

a reference after the expiry of

the period mentioned in the

preceding proviso,

(b) where the matter referred

relates to a dispute about the

election, and the eligibility of

the persons so elected is in

doubt, pass such orders of stay as

he thinks just and expedient.”


11. Section 53 provides that if any question arises

whether any person has been duly elected or

appointed, the matter shall be referred to the

Chancellor, and the decision of the Chancellor

thereon shall be final. The Section also contains

proviso to the effect that no reference in this

Section shall be made more than three months after

the date when question could have been raised for the

first time. Although, by the second proviso,

Chancellor can entertain a reference after expiry of

the said period. There is an object and purpose for

12

entertaining any question regarding appointment of

member of any authority or body whether any person

has been duly appointed within a period of three

months. The members of the teaching faculty of the

University be it Lecturer or Assistant Professor are

entrusted with teaching, which is to be imparted

according to academic calendar. It is in the

interest of the University that all doubts regarding

appointment of teachers are raised within a period of

three months to have an early decision by Chancellor

to give quietus to the disputes in the University.

12. From the facts, which have been brought on

record, it is clear that the reference to the

Chancellor was made by respondent No.4 only on

13.02.2009, i.e., subsequent to he was promoted as

Assistant Professor. Chancellor in his order has

noticed the substance of claim of respondent No.4.

Respondent No.4 has claimed to include the experience

of Senior Research Fellow in W.H.O. The respondent

No.4 has complained non-consideration of experience

as Senior Research Fellow with the W.H.O. in his

13

experience for appointment on the post of Assistant

Professor. Chancellor noticed the stand of the

University with regard to claim of respondent No.4 to

include his experience as Senior Research Fellow in

W.H.O. and made following observations:-

“The University has informed that the

experience of Dr. Rao for his service with

the WHO as Senior Research fellow in the

teaching experience was not considered for

the appointment on the post of Assistant

Professor because there is no such scheme

in the bylaws. The applications sent by

Dr. Rao time to time had been disposed

off. The university has also informed

that case of Dr. Amit Nagar and Dr. G.K.

Singh has no similarity with the case of

the complainant and the case of Dr. Nagar

is different.

At the end the statement of the

university is that Dr. Rao has presented

applications without knowing the truth of

the facts mentioned therein and that

through unauthorised manner and since the

above case of Dr. Rao is meritless, having

no force and based on the false facts and

causing disillusion hence it has been

requested to reject the complaint.”

13. The Chancellor has further observed that the

respondent No.4 has mainly requested to establish his

seniority over the appellant. In the last paragraph

of the order, Chancellor has made following

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observations:-

“The respondent has mainly requested to

establish his seniority against the

respondent Dr. Puran Chand and has mainly

stated that his experience as Senior

Research Fellow with Government of India

and WHO has not been counted as experience

by the Medical University. In the report

sent by the vice chancellor of the

Chhatrapati Shahu Ji Maharaj Medical

University, Lucknow in this regard, it has

been clarified that in section 10.01 (A)

of the First bylaws of the Lucknow

University which has been currently made

applicable to the Medical University also

there is no provision for considering the

services done with WHO as Senior Research

Fellow. The reason given by the

university is as per the law and the

present application lacking force is

rejected.”

14. The copy of the complaint to the Chancellor which

was filed on behalf of respondent No.4 has not been

brought by the respondent No.4 on the record, but

after perusal of the order of the Chancellor, the

main grievance of the respondent No.4 was noninclusion of his teaching experience, as Senior

Research Fellow in W.H.O. and his claim of seniority

over the appellant. The respondent No.4 has filed a

counter affidavit in this appeal where in paragraph

No.9, following has been pleaded by respondent No.4:-

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“9. That in respect of the seniority

between the answering respondent and Dr.

Pooran Chand, a representation was

submitted by the answering respondent

before the University; but the same was

not considered and as such the answering

respondent approached the Hon’ble

Chancellor as per the provisions of

Section 68 of the State Universities Act,

1973.”

15. From the facts as noticed above and the pleadings

of the respondent No.4 in paragraph 9 of his counter

affidavit, it is clear that the respondent No.4 had

submitted his representation to the Chancellor

regarding seniority over the appellant and the

appellant’s appointment as Assistant Professor w.e.f.

08.08.2005 was not challenged. Respondent No.4

wanted that his experience as Senior Research Fellow

in W.H.O. be also included, which was not acceded to.

Section 53 of the Act, 2002 as noticed above when

provides that any dispute regarding appointment in

the University has to be raised within a period of

three months, the respondent No.4 could not have

raised any challenge to the appointment of appellant

after lapse of more than three years. The Chancellor

considered the representation of the respondent No.4

16

and decided it on merits, since the Chancellor was of

the view that the claim is essentially of seniority

by respondent No.4 over the appellant.

16. We, thus, are of the view that the appointment of

appellant as Assistant Professor, which is approved

on 08.08.2005 was not challenged or questioned by

respondent No.4 in accordance with provisions of the

Act, 2002. Although, in the writ petition filed by

respondent No.4, he has made a prayer for quashing

the appointment order dated 08.08.2005 of the

appellant as Assistant Professor but we are of the

view that the appointment of appellant as Assistant

Professor having not been challenged before the

Chancellor, he could not have been permitted to

challenge the appointment of appellant. Appointment

dated 08.08.2005 could not be allowed to be

challenged after four years in the writ petition.

17. Learned counsel for the appellant is right in her

submission that it was after respondent No.4 was

promoted as Assistant Professor, he submitted

representations and claimed before the Chancellor

17

seniority over the appellant. In the counter

affidavit filed by the University, details of the

representations, which were given by respondent No.4

to the Chancellor have also been mentioned in

paragraph 2.9, which are to the following effect:-

“2.9 That Dr. Jitendra Kumar Rao

preferred a representation to His

Excellency, the Chancellor of K.G.M.U. on

13.02.2009 with the following prayer:-

(a) My seniority in the department

as Assistant Professor may be

looked at.

(b) The seniority of Dr. Pooran

Chand may be reverted back as

per rules.

(c) If some conspiracy to hide the

facts in the appointment of

Dr. Pooran Chand is proved,

then an appropriate action

should be taken against

concern person.”

18. The prayer of the respondent No.4 that appellant

should be reverted on the post of Lecturer could not

have been entertained. There is no question of

reversion of the appellant on the post of Lecturer

when he was appointed as Assistant Professor on

08.08.2005.

18

19. Now, we may notice the judgments, which have been

relied by learned counsel appearing for respondent

No.4 in support of his submissions. Learned counsel

for the respondent No.4 has placed reliance on

judgment of this Court in Nagendra Chandra and Ors.

Vs. State of Jharkhand and Ors., (2008) 1 SCC 798.

The above case related to the appointment on the

vacancy for the post of Constables. The vacancies

were neither advertised through the Employment

Exchange nor in a newspaper, which was a requirement

of Rule 663(d) of Bihar Police Manual but was

displayed only on the notice board. The appellants

of the said case, who were appointed without

advertisement of the vacancy, were dismissed from

service. The writ petition was filed, which too was

dismissed. Challenging the order of the High Court,

the appeal was filed before this Court. Paragraph 3

of the judgment notices the submissions, which is to

the following effect:-

“3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the appellants submitted that though the

vacancies were neither advertised through

the employment exchange nor in any

19

newspaper, as required under Rule 663(d)

of the Bihar Police Manual, but as the

same were displayed on the noticeboard, it

cannot be said that there was infraction

of the said Rule; as such the services of

the appellants should not have been

terminated, more so when they have

continued in service for a period of

fourteen years. On the other hand, learned

counsel appearing on behalf of the State

of Jharkhand submitted that as the

appointments, being in infraction of Rule

663(d), were illegal, the competent

authority was quite justified in

terminating services of the appellants.”

20. In paragraph 9 of the said judgment, this Court

laid down following:-

“9. In view of the foregoing discussion,

we have no option but to hold that if an

appointment is made in infraction of the

recruitment rules, the same would be

violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the

Constitution and being nullity would be

liable to be cancelled. In the present

case, as the vacancies were not advertised

in the newspapers, the appointments made

were not only in infraction of Rule 663(d)

of the Bihar Police Manual but also

violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the

Constitution, which rendered the

appointments of the appellants as illegal;

as such the competent authority was quite

justified in terminating their services

and the High Court, by the impugned order,

was quite justified in upholding the

same.”

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21. There cannot be any dispute to the preposition

that when the appointment is made in infraction of

the recruitment rules, the same would be liable to be

cancelled. The present is not a case where

appointment of appellant was cancelled by any

competent authority. The appellant was appointed,

recommended by Selection Committee with due approval

of the Executive Council and the appointment was made

after due advertisement. The above judgment, thus,

is distinguishable and does not help the respondent

No.4.

22. Another judgment relied by learned counsel for

the respondent No.4 is Government of Andhra Pradesh

and Ors. Vs. K. Brahmanandam and Ors., (2008) 5 SCC

241, which was a case where management neither

obtained the prior permission of school authorities

nor advertised the vacancy in two newspapers and made

appointment. The appointees, i.e., Secondary Grade

Teachers filed representations for their salary,

which was rejected by the District Education Officer.

A writ petition was filed, which petition was allowed

21

directing for their continuance. In the appeal filed

by the State, the judgment of the High Court was set

aside. This Court held that the appointments made in

violation of the mandatory provisions of a Statute

would be illegal and, thus, void. There can be no

dispute to the above preposition but the above was a

case where the appointment of the teachers were

neither approved nor was made in accordance with the

statutory rules, hence, this Court took the view that

they are not entitled for any salary from the State

and it was school authorities to pay their salary.

23. Another judgment relied by the learned counsel

for the respondent No.4 is Pramod Kumar Vs. U.P.

Secondary Education Services Commission and Ors.,

(2008) 7 SCC 153, which was also a case of a teacher,

who had obtained B.Ed. degree from an institution,

which was not recognised. He was appointed by the

Management Committee and filed a writ petition for

his salary, his services were terminated. He filed a

writ petition, which was dismissed, against which

appeal was also dismissed. This Court in paragraph

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21 made following observations:-

“21. It is not in dispute that the said

institution was not recognised by any

university. A degree is recognised only if

it is granted by a university constituted

in terms of the University Grants

Commission Act, 1956 or under any State or

parliamentary Act. No university can be

established by a private management

without any statutory backing.”

24. This Court dismissed the appeal filed by the

teachers. The above case was also on different

premise and does not help the respondent No.4.

25. Appellant has also placed reliance on judgment

of this Court in State of Jammu and Kashmir Vs. R.K.

Zalpuri and Ors., (2015) 15 SCC 602 where writ petion

was filed challenging the dismissal order after six

year. The writ petitoin was allowed by the learned

Single Judge against which LPA by the State was also

dismissed. This Court allowed the appeal and held

that delay in approaching High Court under Article

226 was fatal in the above case. In paragraphs 26

and 27 following was laid down:-

“26. In the case at hand, the employee was

dismissed from service in the year 1999,

but he chose not to avail any departmental

23

remedy. He woke up from his slumber to

knock at the doors of the High Court after

a lapse of five years. The staleness of

the claim remained stale and it could not

have been allowed to rise like a phoenix

by the writ court.

27. The grievance agitated by the

respondent did not deserve to be addressed

on merits, for doctrine of delay and

laches had already visited his claim like

the chill of death which does not spare

anyone even the one who fosters the idea

and nurtures the attitude that he can

sleep to avoid death and eventually

proclaim “deo gratias”—“thanks to God”.”

26. As observed above, the Act which Governs the

appointment of Assistant Professors and Lecturers in

the University itself provides a mechanism for

questioning an appointment, i.e., by representation

to the Chancellor that too within a period of three

months. Any challenge to appointment after more than

three years cannot be entertained as we have already

held that respondent No.4 in his representation

before the Chancellor never challenged the

appointment of appellant as Assistant Professor and

had filed representation only claiming seniority over

24

appellant after he got promoted as Assistant

Professor himself in the year 2007, High Court ought

not to have entertained the challenge to the

appointment of appellant in the writ petition and

ought to have confined the consideration of claim of

respondent No.4 for seniority over the appellant.

When the appointment of appellant was not challenged

in reasonable time as per the provisions of the Act,

2002, it is not in the ends of justice to permit the

respondent No.4 to challenge such appointment in the

High Court in the writ petition for the first time,

after more than four years of the appointment.

27. We, thus, are of the considered opinion that High

Court committed an error in quashing the appointment

of respondent No.4 as Assistant Professor, quashing

the order of the Chancellor as well as direction to

treat the appellant as being appointed as a Lecturer.

There was no error in the order of the Chancellor

rejecting the representation made by the respondent

No.4, which representation was referable to Section

53 of Act No. 8 of 2002. High Court committed error

25

in quashing the order as well as issuing directions

as noted above.

28. In view of the foregoing discussions, we allow

the appeals and set aside the judgment of the High

Court dated 12.04.2018 and dismiss the writ petition

filed by respondent No.4.

......................J.

( ASHOK BHUSHAN )

......................J.

 ( R. SUBHASH REDDY )

......................J.

 ( M.R. SHAH )

New Delhi,

January 29, 2021.

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