When the plaintiff himself relinquished his right infavour of his mother, he can not ask for partition and declaration of sale deeds made by her. Suit for Declaration and partition 1) For a declaration that the plaint schedule properties are the family ancestral properties of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 10 and the plaintiff is entitled for � share in the plaint schedule properties. 2) For a further declaration that the alleged Will dated 15.7.1985 is a sham and void document incorporating false recitals and the rank forged document and not binding over to the plaintiff. 3) To further declare that the alleged sale deeds dated 4.1.1983 and 5.2.1983 are sham and void documents and not binding over to the plaintiff. 4) For a direction for partition of the suit schedule properties into 5 equal shares by metes and bound and also allotment of one such share to the plaintiff. 5) Refer the preliminary decree to the Dy. Commissioner, Kodagu, Madikeri under Section 54 C.P.C. for partition of the plaint A and B Schedule properties into 5 equal shares by metes and bounds and also allotment of share to the plaintiff. 6) Allot � share to the plaintiff in plaint �C�, �D� and �E� schedule properties and delivery of the same to the plaintiff through the process of the court. 7) For a direction to an enquiry under Order 20 Rule 12 and 18 of C.P.C., 1908. 8) To render accounts. 9) Award cost of the suit and grant such other and further suitable reliefs be granted in favour of the plaintiff under the circumstances of the case in the interest of justice and equity.= plaintiff himself by registered release deed dated 10.02.1960 has released all his rights in the Schedule �A� and �B� properties and other properties in favour of his mother. After execution of the release deed by which relinquishing all his rights in favour of the mother, the right of the plaintiff, which he would have got on the basis of the partition as observed by the High Court, shall not continue with him and shall vest in the mother and thereafter it was the mother who became the owner of the property. The fact that on 26.05.1977 the plaintiff himself purchased property bearing Survey No. 106/1 from the mother itself makes it clear that it was the mother who was the owner of the property. Defendant No. 1 has also, by two sale deeds dated 04.01.1983 and 05.02.1983, purchased the property from the mother on a valuable consideration.The sale deeds have not been held to be invalid on any reason. The plaintiff having relinquished his land by virtue of release deed, the High Court committed an error in holding that he shall be entitled to 1/6 share in the Schedule �A� and �B� properties. With regard to other Schedule �C� to �E� properties, the Will was executed by the mother on 15.07.1985. The High Court has not returned any finding that the Will was not valid. There being Will executed by Shanthaveeramma with regard to Schedule �C� to �E� properties, the beneficiaries under Will shall take their right as per the Will.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal  No(s).  414/2008
C.V.YOGENDRANATH                                   Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
C.V.PALAKSHAN & ORS.                               Respondent(s)
  O R D E R
We   have   heard   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant.
Notice has been issued to the all the respondents but no
one   is   present   on   behalf   of   respondent   Nos.   1   to   10   and
13 to 16.   Ms. Neetic Sharma, learned counsel is present
on behalf of respondent Nos. 11 and 12.
This   is   an   appeal   filed   by   the   appellant   (defendant
NO.1)   questioning   the   judgment   dated   12.09.2005   of   the
High Court in Regular First Appeal No. 964 of 2000.   The
High   Court   by   its   judgment   partly   allowed   the   Regular
First Appeal.   Aggrieved by the said judgment, defendant
No.1 has come up in this appeal.
Brief facts necessary for deciding this appeal are:
The   parties   shall   be   referred   to   hereinafter   as
described   in   the   plaint.     The   plaintiff   and   defendant
No.1   were   sons   of   C.S.   Veerappa   who   died   on   29.11.1959.
The   mother   of   the   plaintiff   and   defendant   No.1   -   Smt.
Shanthaveeramma   also   died   on   01.07.1992.     The   other
defendants were sons, daughters and grandchildren of C.S.
Veerappa.   In the lifetime of C.S. Verrappa, a partition
1

took place between him and his children.   That partition
was registered on 25.06.1958.  In Survey No. 34, 22 cents
were   allotted   to   plaintiff   and   remaining   45   cents   were
allotted to defendant No.1.
Defendant   No.1,   in   the   lifetime   of   his   father,   sold
an extent of 45 cents allotted to him in Survey No. 34 in
favour   of   C.S.   Veerappa   and   the   plaintiff   also   sold   an
extent of 22 cents which came into his share in partition
in Survey No.34 in favour of defendant No.1.
C.S.   Veerappa   died   on   29.11.1959.     Thereafter,   a
registered  release  deed  dated  10.02.1960  was  executed  by
the   plaintiff   in     favour   of   his   mother   -   Smt.
Shanthaveeramma   and   a   release   deed   was   also   executed   by
defendant   No.1   and   sisters   in   favour   of   their   mother.
The   plaintiff   purchased   the   property   bearing   Survey   No.
106/1   on   26.05.1977   from     Smt.   Shanthaveeramma   �   the
mother   of   the   plaintiff.     Defendant   No.1   also   purchased
Schedule   �B�   property   from     Smt.   Shanthaveeramma   for
Rs.20,000/-   on   04.01.1983.     Another   sale   deed   was
executed by   Smt. Shanthaveeramma in favour of defendant
No.1   on   05.02.1983   with   regard   to   Schedule   �A�   property
for  consideration  of  Rs.47,000/-.      Smt.  Shanthaveeramma
had   also   executed   Will   on   15.07.1985   with   regard   to   her
jewellery, movables and cash in favour of the defendants.
After   the   death   of     Smt.   Shanthaveeramma   i.e.
01.07.1992,  the  plaintiff  filed  Original  Suit  NO.  27/94.
In the suit filed by the plaintiff, there were properties
2

at   Schedule   �A�   and   �B�.     Schedule   �A�   (bearing   Survey
No.   34/2   measuring   0.37   acres),   Schedule   �B�   (bearing
Survey   No.   57/2   measuring   0.25   acres),   Schedule   �C�
contains   movables,   Schedule   �D�   contains   Fixed   Deposit
receipts and silver jewellery and articles of silver and
Schedule �E� contains gold jewellery. 
The   plaintiff   case   in   the   plaint   is   that   the
plaintiff   mother   was   keeping   ill   and   sale   deeds   dated
04.01.1983 and 05.02.1983 executed in favour of defendant
No.1 were sham transaction.   He further pleaded that the
plaintiff   has   share   in   all   the   plaint   Schedule
properties.   In   the   suit,   the   plaintiff   prayed   for   the
following reliefs:
1) For a declaration that the plaint schedule properties
are the family ancestral properties of the plaintiff and
defendants 1 to 10 and the plaintiff is entitled for �
share in the plaint schedule properties.
2) For a further declaration that the alleged Will dated
15.7.1985 is a sham and void document incorporating false
recitals   and   the   rank   forged   document   and   not   binding
over to the plaintiff.
3) To further declare that the alleged sale deeds dated
4.1.1983 and 5.2.1983 are sham and void documents and not
binding over to the plaintiff.
4) For   a   direction   for   partition   of   the   suit   schedule
properties   into   5   equal   shares   by   metes   and   bound   and
also allotment of one such share to the plaintiff.
3

5) Refer the preliminary decree to the Dy. Commissioner,
Kodagu, Madikeri under Section 54 C.P.C. for partition of
the   plaint   A   and   B   Schedule   properties   into   5   equal
shares by metes and bounds and also allotment of share to
the plaintiff.
6) Allot � share to the plaintiff in plaint �C�, �D� and
�E�   schedule   properties   and   delivery   of   the   same   to   the
plaintiff through the process of the court.
7) For a direction to an enquiry under Order 20 Rule 12
and 18 of C.P.C., 1908.
8) To render accounts.
9) Award   cost   of   the   suit   and   grant   such   other   and
further   suitable   reliefs   be   granted   in   favour   of   the
plaintiff   under   the   circumstances   of   the   case   in   the
interest of justice and equity.
A   written   statement   was   filed   by   defendant   No.1   and
other   defendants.     Defendant   No.1,   in   his   written
statement,   has   stated   that   sale   deeds   dated   04.01.1983
and   05.02.1983   were   legal   documents   executed   by     Smt.
Shanthaveeramma   for   a   valuable   consideration.     The   Will
dated   15.07.1985   was   also   validly   executed   by     Smt.
Shanthaveeramma.     The   allegation   in   the   plaint   that   she
was   ill   had   been   denied   and   it   was   pleaded   that   she   was
quite hale and hearty and was in a fit mental condition.
It   has   further   been   pleaded   that   the   plaintiff   under
Registered   Deed   of   Release   dated   10.02.1960   relinquished
all his rights to claim, title and interest in favour of
4

late     Smt.   Shanthaveeramma,   hence,   the   plaintiff   had   no
right to claim, title and interest in respect of Schedule
�A� and Schedule �B� properties.
It   is   further   pleaded   that   the   other   two   sons
including defendant No.1 also relinquished their right to
claim, title and interest in respect of Schedule �A� and
�B�   properties   in   favour   of     Smt.   Shanthaveeramma   under
registered  Release  Deed  dated  09.05.1963.    The  daughters
also   executed   registered   Release   Deed   dated   24.12.1973.
The parties led oral and documentary evidence.  The Trial
Court   vide   its   judgment   and   order   dated   13.10.2000
dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 
Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appeal was filed
before   the   High   Court.     The   High   Court   by   its   judgment
dated   12.09.2005     partly   allowed   the   Regular   First
Appeal.
Defendant   NO.1,   aggrieved   by   the   said   judgment,   has
come up in this appeal.
Shri   S.N.   Bhatt,   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant
contended   that   the   High   Court   committed   an   error   in
partly   decreeing   the   suit   to   the   extent   of   1/6   share
whereas   the   plaintiff   had   no   share   in   Schedule   �A�   and
�B�   properties   and   further,   by   Will   the   other   scheduled
properties   were   bequeathed   in   favour   of   the   other
defendants   to   which   the   plaintiff   has   no   right.     He
submits  that  the  plaintiff  having  relinquished  his  right
in   all   properties   by   registered   Release   Deed   dated
5

10.02.1960,   he   could   not   have   claimed   any   further   share
in any of the scheduled property.   The challenge to Will
executed   by   the   mother   was   unfounded.     He   submits   that
the High Court committed an error in relying on Sections
6   and   8   of   the   Hindu   Succession   Act,   1955     (for   short
�the Act�) by holding that the plaintiff will also get a
share   in   notional   partition   which   will   be   presumed   to
have taken place just before the death of C.S. Veerappa.
He submits that the High Court erred in not referring to
the   Release   Deed   dated   10.02.1960   executed   by   the
plaintiff.     Due   to   this   Release   Deed,   the   rights   of   the
plaintiff,   if   any,   are   extinguished   by   the   release   in
favour of the mother.  There were no grounds to challenge
the   sale   deed   executed   in   favour   of   defendant   NO.1.
Further,   the   plaintiff   having   himself   purchased   one
property   from   the   mother   in   the   year   1977,   he   was   well
aware that she was the owner of the scheduled properties.
We   have   considered   the   submissions   made   by   learned
counsel for the appellant and perused the record.
From the facts, as noted above, there was no dispute
between   the   parties   that   the   partition   was   effected   on
25.06.1958  by  Registered  Deed  between  C.S.  Veerappa,  the
plaintiff, defendant No.1, third son and the daughter.
After   the   partition,   the   share   was   allocated   to   the
plaintiff and defendant No.1, defendant NO.1 sold to the
extent   of   45   cents   in   favour   of   C.S.   Veerappa   and   the
plaintiff   sold   to   the   extent   of   22   cents   in   favour   of
6

defendant NO.1.
After the death of C.S. Veerappa i.e. 29.11.1959, the
plaintiff   executed   registered   release   deed   in   favour   of
the Smt. Shanthaveeramma on 10.02.1960.  The Release Deed
has been brought on record as Exhibit D-4 as Annexure P-
1.   It shall be useful to extract following portion from
the Release Deed which reads as follows:
�We,   all   of   us,   in   together   have   fixed   the   value
of immovable property i.e. House in Madikeri town,
movable   properties   and   money   lending   papers.
Since,   it   is   impossible   to   take   out   one   portion
from   these   properties;   I   am   releasing   all   my
rights over the property by this deed on receiving
the value of my share in the said property.
I   have   received   the   aforesaid   Rs.10,500/-   (Rupees
ten   thousand   five   hundred   only)   in   presence   of
Sub-Registrar, at the time of registration of this
deed.     Accordingly,   consideration   of   this   release
deed is paid by you all.   There is no balance due.
I   am   retiring   and   releasing   the   legal   rights   from
my   share   in   the   properties   and   money   lending
transactions which were in possession of aforesaid
Sr.   Late   C.S.   Veerappa.     From   now   onwards   I   will
have   no   rights   over   the   properties   and   money
lending transactions of Sr. C.S. Veerappa.
We   have   came   to   a   conclusion   that   that   the
approximate   value   of   schedule   property   mentioned
here   under   belonging   to   our   father   is   Rs.64,500/-
(Rupees   Sixty   four   thousand   five   hundred   only).
The   hand   loan   and   other   loan   made   by   my   father
should   be   cleared,   out   of   the   value   of   said
property.     Accordingly   one   portion   of   the   loan
amount of Rs.63,000/- (Sixty three thousand rupees
only)   works   out   to   be   Rs.10,500/-   (Rupees   ten
thousand   five   hundred)   only,   which   is   my   share.
As   explained   above   I   have   set   off   my   share   on   the
said amount.
Now   onwards   I   will   have   no   right   over   my   father�s
share   in   the   property.     The   immovable   properties
in my father�s share are:
After   the   partition   of   the   house   situated   at   the
center   of   0-01   �,   Sy.   No.   106/1,   Municipality
block   No.5,   Madikeri;   a   newly   constructed   house
situated   in   the   land   belonging   to   Karnangeri
village   at   0-42   cents,   Sy.   No.   34,   Municipality
Block   No.   24,   Madikeri   and   another   house   adjacent
7

to this house at Sy. No. 57, belonging to the same
village;   one   Asmin   car   worth   Rs.6,000/-   (Six
thousand   only);   one   Revolver,   one   old   typewriter,
one   Godrej   Steel   Stel   and   one   Battery   Recharger
and money lending papers.   Value of the Lease Deed
executed by Adem Saheb, Madikeri in favour of late
C.S.   Veerappa   Rs.2,500/-   (Two   Thousand   five
hundred   only);   trinote   executed   by   the   said   Adem
Saheb   Rs.1,000/-   (one   thousand   only)   and   fixed
deposit of Rs.14,300/- (Fourteen thousand) only at
The   Canara   Bank   Co-operation   Bank   in   the   name   of
said   Veerappa.     In   total   the   present   market   value
of   the   property   share   of   Veerappa   is   Rs.64,500/-
(Sixty four thousand five hundred only).
In   case,   necessity   of   my   signature   arises   in
future in respect of any transactions regarding my
father�s   property,   I   will   assure   of   providing   all
my   co-operation.     Accordingly,   an   amount   of
Rs.10,500/-   in   respect   of   my   share   in   my   father�s
share   is   received   in   cash   and   now   onwards   I   will
have   no   right   over   the   said   property.
Accordingly, I am executing this Release Deed.
SCHEDULE PROPERTIES
1. Tile roofed house in 0-01 � cents, Sy. No.
100/1, Municipality Block No.5, Madikeri.
2. all constructions of the new house in relayed
area, 0-42 cents, Sy. No. 34, block 24.
3. Rakeem   land   at   the   center   of   houses,   0-25
cents, Sy. No. 57, Block No.24.
4. Asteen   Car   bearing   No.   MYV233;   1   revolver,   1
typewriter   and   Godrej   Selt   and   1   Battery
recharger.
Registered   as   document   No.63   of   1960   of   Book   1,
volume 158, page 55/60; Registration fee 37-00 and
charge extra 2-1 in (39-OO) Sub-registrar.�
The Trial Court dismissed the suit relying on Section
14 of the Act and opined that by virtue of Section 14 of
the   Act,   the   mother   -   Smt.   Shanthaveeramma   became   the
sole owner.  The High Court, in this context, referred to
Sections   6   and   8   of   the   Act.     It   is   useful   to   extract
following   observation   of   the   High   Court   from   its
judgment:
�In   order   to   ascertain   the   share   of   heirs   in   the
property of a deceased co-parcener, it is necessary
in the very nature of things and as the very first
8

step, to ascertain the share of the deceased in the
co-parcenery   property.     For,   by   doing   that   alone
can   one   determine   the   extent   of   the   claimant�s
share.     Explanation   1   to   Section   6   of   the   Hindu
Succession   Act   resorts   to   the   simple   expedient,
undoubtedly fictional, that the interest of a Hindu
Mitakshara   co-parcener   shall   be   deemed   to   be   the
share in the property that would have been allotted
to   him   if   a   partition   of   the   property   had   taken
place   immediately   before   his   death�..   All   the
consequences   which   flow   from   a   real   partition   have
to   be   logically   worked   out   which   means   that   the
share of the heirs must be ascertained on the basis
that   they   had   separated   from   one   another   and   had
received   a   share   in   the   partition   which   had   taken
place   during   the   life   time   of   the   deceased.     The
allotment   of   a   share   is   not   a   processual   step
devised merely  for the  purpose of  working out  some
other conclusion.�
We are of the view that in so far as the view of the
High Court that Section 14 was relied upon by Trial Court
to   hold     Smt.   Shanthaveeramma   to   be   the   sole   owner   was
not applicable, is correct.  In so far as the observation
of the High Court that the interest in Mitakshara School
of   Coparcenery   shall   be   deemed   to   be   a   share   of   the
property   that   would   have   been   allotted   to   him,   had   the
partition   would   have   taken   place   immediately   before   his
death.     The   observations   are   based   on   Section   6   of   the
Act to which no exception can be taken.
In   the   property,   which   was   with   C.S.   Veerappa   who
died on 29.11.1959, a notional partition can be imagined
in   which   the   plaintiff   would   receive   share.     What   High
Court missed is that the plaintiff himself by registered
release deed dated 10.02.1960 has released all his rights
in   the   Schedule   �A�   and   �B�   properties   and   other
properties   in   favour   of   his   mother.     After   execution   of
9

the release deed by which relinquishing all his rights in
favour   of   the   mother,   the   right   of   the   plaintiff,   which
he   would   have   got   on   the   basis   of   the   partition   as
observed   by   the   High   Court,   shall   not   continue   with   him
and   shall   vest   in   the   mother   and   thereafter   it   was   the
mother   who   became   the   owner   of   the   property.     The   fact
that   on   26.05.1977   the   plaintiff   himself     purchased
property bearing Survey No. 106/1 from the mother itself
makes   it   clear   that   it   was   the   mother   who   was   the   owner
of   the   property.     Defendant   No.   1   has   also,   by   two   sale
deeds   dated   04.01.1983   and   05.02.1983,   purchased   the
property   from   the   mother   on   a   valuable   consideration.
The   sale   deeds   have   not   been   held   to   be   invalid   on   any
reason.     The   plaintiff   having   relinquished   his   land   by
virtue of release deed, the High Court committed an error
in holding that he shall be entitled to 1/6 share in the
Schedule   �A�   and   �B�   properties.     With   regard   to   other
Schedule �C� to �E� properties, the Will was executed by
the   mother   on   15.07.1985.     The   High   Court   has   not
returned any finding that the Will was not valid.   There
being   Will   executed   by     Shanthaveeramma   with   regard   to
Schedule   �C�   to   �E�   properties,   the   beneficiaries   under
Will   shall   take   their   right   as   per   the   Will.     The   High
Court came to the finding that the plaintiff was entitled
to share of the father after his death which was held by
Smt. Shanthaveeramma and that he will have 1/6th share in
the other scheduled properties.  The High Court committed
10

an error in holding that Will in favour of defendant No.
1   by     Smt.   Shanthaveeramma   is   not   binding   to   the   extent
of   the   plaintiff�s   right.     The   plaintiff   having
relinquished his right, there was no question of the Will
not   being   binding   on   the   plaintiff.     Whatever   were
bequeathed   by   the   mother   by   Will   were   properties   in
Schedule �C� to �E� which were her own property.  She was
fully   competent   to   bequeath   the   movables   belonging   to
her. 
In   view   of   the   aforesaid   conclusion,   we   are   of   the
view   that   the   High   Court   committed   an   error   in   partly
allowing   the   appeal   filed   by   the   plaintiff.     In   result,
the judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and
that of Trial Court is restored.
The civil appeal is allowed accordingly.
� ....................J.
[ ASHOK BHUSHAN ]
� ....................J.
[ K.M. JOSEPH ]
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 13, 2019.
11

ITEM NO.101               COURT NO.11               SECTION IV-A
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal  No(s).  414/2008
C.V.YOGENDRANATH                                   Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
C.V.PALAKSHAN & ORS.                               Respondent(s)
Date : 13-02-2019  This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHUSHAN
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.M. JOSEPH
For Appellant(s) Mr. S. N. Bhat, AOR
Mr. Priyank Jain, Adv.
Mr. D.P. Chaturvedi, Adv.
                 
For Respondent(s) Ms. Neetic Sharma, Adv.
For M/S.  M. V. Kini & Associates             
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The civil appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
(MEENAKSHI  KOHLI)                              (RENU KAPOOR)
  COURT MASTER                                   COURT MASTER
[Signed order is placed on the file]
12 

Locus Standi = plaintiffs are merely agnates and the question of succession could open only after the death of defendant No.1, hence they had no locus to file the suit. Customary law whether the parties are governed by the custom in matter of alienation and what that custom"? Trial Court returned a finding that there is a custom, as pleaded, but there is one exception to the custom that a person who has rendered service to the alienater and who has some special tie with him or has associated with him in the management of the property, alienation to him is permissible. the Trial Court further returned a finding that defendant No.2 was residing with defendant No.1 and because of that both had special tie with each other, hence exception to the custom was applicable, and the suit was dismissed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.4688 OF 2009
BHAGWANTI & ORS.                            APPELLANT(S)
                            VERSUS
ARJAN SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.             RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
This   appeal   has   been   filed   against   the   judgment   of
the   High   Court   dated   29.09.2005   by   which   the   High   Court
has   dismissed   the   R.S.A.   No.2258   of   1999   filed   by   the
appellant's   predecessor-in-interest.   The   predecessor-in-
interest   of   the   appellant   filed   a   Civil   Suit   No.484   of
1984   along   with   his   two   other   brothers   as   plaintiffs
No.1,   2   and   3   against   Banarsi   and   Arjan   Singh,   who   are
arrayed   as   defendant   Nos.1   &   2.   Suit   was   filed   for
declaration   to   the   effect   that   decree   dated   10.05.1984
obtained   by   defendant   No.2   against   defendant   No.1
regarding   the   ancestral   land   is   without   consideration,
legal   necessity   and   is   against   the   reversionary   interest
of   the   appellants/plaintiffs.   The   suit   was   contested   and
the  Trial   Court  framed   11  issues   and  after   answering  the
1

issues   dismissed   the   suit.   The   plaintiffs,   who   were
agnates   to   the   defendant   No.1   had   challenged   the   decree
alleging that it is in nature of alienation which is not
permissible   under   the   custom.   It   was   the   case   of   the
plaintiffs   that   under   customary   law   defendant   No.1   was
not   entitled   to   alienation.   One   of   the   issue   i.e.   issue
No.3   was   framed   by   the   Trial   Court   "as   to   whether   the
parties   are   governed   by   the   custom   in   matter   of
alienation   and   what   that   custom"?   Trial   Court   returned   a
finding that there is a custom, as pleaded, but there is
one   exception   to   the   custom   that   a   person   who   has
rendered   service   to   the   alienater   and   who   has   some
special   tie   with   him   or   has   associated   with   him   in   the
management   of   the   property,   alienation   to   him   is
permissible.
On   the   aforesaid   ground,   the   Trial   Court   further
returned   a   finding   that   defendant   No.2   was   residing   with
defendant   No.1   and   because   of   that   both   had   special   tie
with   each   other,   hence   exception   to   the   custom   was
applicable, and the suit was dismissed.
Against the said order, Civil Appeal was filed, which
was   also   dismissed   by   Additional   District   Judge,   Ambala
reaffirming   the   findings   returned   by   the   Trial   Court.
Aggrieved,   Regular   Second   Appeal   was   filed   by   the
plaintiffs   where   the   High   Court   took   the   view   that
2

plaintiffs   are   merely   agnates   and   the   question   of
succession   could   open   only   after   the   death   of   defendant
No.1, hence they had no locus to file the suit. The High
Court   further   noted   that   when   this   was   put   up   to   the
counsel   for   the   appellant,   an   argument   was   made   that
matter regarding customary law has been referred to five-
Judge Bench, hence the matter be deferred. The High Court
took the view that the present case was not a case where
the   decision   of   the   Full   Bench   be   awaited.   Consequently,
the appeal was dismissed.
Learned   counsel   for   the   appellants   challenging   the
judgment   of   the   High   Court   contends   that   High   Court
having   not   considered   the   matter   on   merits   the   matter
need   to   be   reconsidered   by   the   High   Court   on   merits.   He
further   submits   that   under   the   customary   law,   the
alienation   was   not   permissible.   He   has   also   referred   to
five-Judge   Bench   judgment,   which   was   under   reference   at
the  time   when  the   regular  second   appeal  was   decided.  The
judgment   is   reported   in   Mihan   and   another   Vs.   Inder   and
another ,   (2008)   3   R.C.R.(Civil)   124.   Learned   counsel   for
the   appellant   lastly   submitted   that   the   decree   was
collusive.
We have considered the submissions of counsel for the
appellants and perused the record.
3

The plaintiffs suit was based on the custom that sole
proprietor,   who   has   no   son,   has   no   right   of   alienation,
hence   the   decree   in   favour   of   the   defendant   No.2   was
unsustainable.   The   Trial   Court   has   properly   framed   the
issues and has answered the issue on customs, as pleaded,
but   held   that   there   is   an   exception   to   the   custom   that
for   person   who   has   special   tie   and   who   has   rendered
service,   there   can   be   alienation.   Those   findings   are
based on relevant materials and we do not find any ground
to   interfere   with   those   findings.   The   said   findings   were
also concurred by the First Appeal.
As   far   as   submission   of   learned   counsel   for   the
appellant   that   the   High   Court   did   not   enter   into   the
merits   of   the   case   and   decided   only   on   the   locus.   It   is
true  that   the  High   Court  noted   the  aforesaid   ground  that
succession   will   open   after   the   death   of   the   defendant
No.1,   hence   there   is   no   locus   to   the   plaintiffs   to   file
the  suit.   Even,  if   the  submission   of  learned   counsel  for
the   appellants   is   correct   that   the   High   Court   ought   to
have   consider   other   issues   on   the   merits   but   in   view   of
the   fact   that   two   Courts   i.e.   Trial   Court   and   the   First
Appellate   Court   has   concurrently   decided   the   matter   on
merits,   we   do   not   find   any   reason   to   remit   to   the   High
Court   to   reconsider   the   matter.   The   appellants,   who   are
plaintiffs, have to stand on their own legs and they have
to prove their own case. As found, the decree, passed by
4

defendant   No.1   in   favour   of   defendant   No.2,   was
permissible   even   on   custom.   As   far   as   submission
regarding   decree   was   collusive,   the   Trial   Court   did   not
accept   the   said   plea   and   we   also   do   not   find   any   good
ground to accept such plea.
We  do not  find any  ground in  this appeal.  The appeal
is, accordingly, dismissed.   
...................J.
 (ASHOK BHUSHAN)
...................J.
 (NAVIN SINHA)
New Delhi
July 24, 2019
5

ITEM NO.101               COURT NO.12               SECTION IV
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s).4688/2009
BHAGWANTI & ORS.                                   Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
ARJAN SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.                    Respondent(s)

Date : 24-07-2019 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHUSHAN
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA
For Appellant(s)
Mr. J.S. Chahal, Adv.
Mr. A. P. Mohanty, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s)
Mr. P. N. Puri, AOR
Mrs. Reeta Dewan Puri, Adv.
Mr. Abhishek Puri, Adv.
Ms. Seema Chettri, Adv.
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed order.
Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(ARJUN BISHT)                                   (RENU KAPOOR)
COURT MASTER (SH)                               BRANCH OFFICER
(signed order is placed on the file)
6 

Partition suit is barred by limitation filed by erstwhile minor , 12 years after becoming major against the purchaser The suit for partition and separate possession of 1/5 share was filed by the respondent No.1 (plaintiff) in respect of suit Properties. - The present appeal, however, is filed by the purchaser of property at Item No.6 in schedule of properties. -The appellant No.1 (defendant No. 8) had purchased the stated property from defendant Nos.1 and 4, brother and mother respectively of the plaintiff. The sale deed records that the property was sold for legal necessity of the family. Admittedly,respondent No.1 became major in 1981 but the suit came to be filed only in the year 1994.- The Trial Court opined that the suit in reference to property at Item No. 6 in respect of which the present appeal has been filed, was bared by limitation. - Additionally, the Trial Court opined that no relief had been claimed by the plaintiff to declare that the sale deed executed in favour of the appellants as illegal, void or not binding on the plaintiff. On that basis, the relief claimed by the respondent No.1 (plaintiff) came to be rejected by the Trial Court. - The High Court proceeded on the assumption that the property became available for partition by applying Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; and decreed the suit in favour of respondent No.1 by declaring that she was entitled to half share in all the scheduled properties. Apex court held that the High Court and the relevant material on record, we have no hesitation in taking the view that the High Court committed manifest error in reversing the decree passed by the Trial Court at least in respect of the suit property described as Item No.6 in the schedule of properties which was purchased by the appellants on 10.06.1981 by a registered sale deed and which sale deed has not been challenged. The suit came to be filed almost after a gap of 12 years therefrom and more so after 13 years from respondent No.1 (plaintiff) attaining majority in 1981. In such a situation, no relief can be granted to the plaintiff as the property already stood transferred and more so in light of the just finding recorded by the Trial Court that the transfer of the subject property in favour of the appellants was for legal necessity of the family, which fact has been mentioned in the registered sale deed itself and had remained unchallenged.

1
  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
    CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9984 OF 2011 
ASHOKA & ANR.                                       Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
M.C. SUJATA (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS.                   Respondent(s)
    O R D E R 
Heard learned counsel for the appellants.
This   appeal   emanates   from   the   judgment   and   decree   passed   by
the   High   Court   of   Karnataka   at   Bangalore   dated   21.04.2006   in   RFA
No. 886 of 2002.
This appeal is filed by the original defendant Nos. 8 and 13.
The   suit   for   partition   and   separate   possession   of   1/5   share   was
filed   by   the   respondent   No.1   (plaintiff)   in   respect   of   suit
properties. The present appeal, however, is filed by the purchaser
of   property   at   Item   No.6   in   schedule   of   properties.     This   appeal,
therefore, is confined to the said property being Survey No. 768/1A
� 0.20 gts. situated at Maddur Kassaba.
The appellant  No.1 (defendant  No. 8)  had purchased  the stated
property   from   defendant   Nos.1   and   4,   brother   and   mother

2
respectively   of   the   plaintiff.     The   sale   deed   records   that   the
property   was   sold   for   legal   necessity   of   the   family.   Admittedly,
respondent No.1 became major in 1981 but the suit came to be filed
only in the year 1994. The assertion made in the suit is that cause
of   action   had   arisen   on   20.12.1993   for   which   the   suit   came   to   be
filed in 1994.  The Trial Court framed 9 issues on the basis of the
pleadings   filed   by   the   parties.     The   Trial   Court   opined   that   the
suit in reference to property at Item No. 6 in respect of which the
present   appeal   has   been   filed,   was   bared   by   limitation.
Additionally,   the   Trial   Court   opined   that   no   relief   had   been
claimed by the plaintiff to declare that the sale deed executed in
favour   of   the   appellants   as   illegal,   void   or   not   binding   on   the
plaintiff.  On that basis, the relief claimed by the respondent No.
1 (plaintiff) came to be rejected by the Trial Court.
 
The   respondent   No.1   carried   the   matter   in   appeal   before   the
High   Court.     The   High   Court   proceeded   on   the   assumption   that   the
property   became   available   for   partition   by   applying   Section   14   of
the   Hindu   Succession   Act,   1956;   and   decreed   the   suit   in   favour   of
respondent No.1 by declaring that she was entitled to half share in
all the scheduled properties.
As   aforesaid,   the   challenge   in   the   present   appeal   to   the
decree passed by the High Court is limited to the suit property at
Item   No.   6   mentioned   hitherto.   During   the   pendency   of   the   present
appeal,   the   respondent   No.1   has   died.   The   appellants   moved   an
application   for   bringing     her   legal   heirs   on   record,   namely,   the

3
respondent   No.5   being   her   mother.   That   application   was   allowed   on
14.03.2011.     From   the   record,   it   appears   that   on   17.08.2011,   some
advocate   by   name   Mr.   N.K.   Verma   appeared   before   the   court   and
undertook to file appearance   on behalf of respondent No.5 who has
been   brought   on   record   also   as   the   legal   heir   of   respondent   No.   1
(plaintiff). However, no appearance has been filed so far.    As   a
result,   we   have   no   option   but   to   proceed   against   the   contesting
respondent exparte.
After having perused the judgment of the Trial Court and also
the   High   Court   and   the   relevant   material   on   record,   we   have   no
hesitation   in   taking   the   view   that   the   High   Court   committed
manifest error in reversing the decree passed by the Trial Court at
least in respect of the suit property described as Item No.6 in the
schedule   of   properties   which   was   purchased   by   the   appellants   on
10.06.1981   by   a   registered   sale   deed   and   which   sale   deed   has   not
been challenged. The suit came to be filed almost after a gap of 12
years   therefrom   and   more   so   after   13   years   from   respondent   No.1
(plaintiff)   attaining   majority   in   1981.   In   such   a     situation,   no
relief   can   be   granted   to   the   plaintiff   as   the   property   already
stood transferred and more so in light of the just finding recorded
by   the   Trial   Court   that   the   transfer   of   the   subject   property   in
favour   of   the   appellants   was   for   legal   necessity   of   the   family,
which   fact   has   been   mentioned   in   the   registered   sale   deed   itself
and had remained unchallenged.

4
Taking   any   view   of   the   matter,   the   impugned   judgment   and
decree   of   the   High   Court   qua   property   at   Item   No.6   of   the   suit
schedule,   cannot   be   sustained   and   the   same   is   set   aside.   Instead,
the   judgment   and   decree   passed   by   the   Trial   Court   rejecting   the
suit   for   partition   and   possession   in   respect   of   the   said   property
(at Item No.6) is affirmed. No order as to costs.
The Civil Appeal is allowed accordingly.
�...................J
(A.M. KHANWILKAR)
�...................J
(AJAY RASTOGI)
New Delhi
March 12, 2019

5
ITEM NO.102               COURT NO.9               SECTION IV-A
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal  No(s).  9984/2011
ASHOKA & ANR.                                      Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
M.C. SUJATA(DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS.                   Respondent(s)

Date : 12-03-2019 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.M. KHANWILKAR
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY RASTOGI
For Appellant(s)
                    Mr. K. V. Mohan, AOR
Mr. K.V. Balakrishnan, Adv.
Mr. Rahul Kumar Sharma, Adv.
                 
For Respondent(s)
                    Ms. Anjana Chandrashekar, AOR
                    Mr. V. N. Raghupathy, AOR
Mr. Parikshit P. Angadi, Adv.
Md. Apzal Ansari, Adv.
Mr. Manendra Pal Gupta, Adv.
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The Civil Appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(DEEPAK SINGH)                                  (VIDYA NEGI)
COURT MASTER (SH)                               COURT MASTER (NSH)
{Signed order is placed on the file} 

delay in filing the suit for specific performance Suit against the original defendant viz. P. Paramasiva Gounder for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 06.07.1990 and to deliver possession or in the alternative to direct the original defendant - P. Paramasiva Gounder to pay a sum of Rs.2,47,478/- (Rupees two lakhs forty seven thousand and four hundred seventy eight) to the appellant and respondent nos. 6 to 8.= High court reversed the decree and judgment of trial court and that of appellant court in second appeal= The High Court further observed that if there was a lessee, there would have been a reference of the said lessee even in the original agreement of sale and, therefore, on that ground the High Court did not accept the Exhibit A-11 endorsement as a ground for the appellant in delay in filing the suit for specific performance. The High Court held that the appellant and respondent nos. 6 to 8 having paid 90% of the amount under the agreement of sale would not have waited for six years in filing the suit for specific performance. Apex court held that Since the agreement is of the year 1990 and keeping in view the escalated price of the land and other facts and circumstances of the case, we deem it appropriate to direct respondent nos. 1 to 5 to pay a sum of Rs.17,50,000/- (Rupees seventeen lakhs fifty thousand) which is inclusive of the advance amount of Rs.1,40,000/- (Rupees one lakh forty thousand) to the appellant and respondent nos. 6 to 8. On deposit of the amount of Rs.17,50,000/- (Rupees seventeen lakhs fifty thousand), the said sale deed dated 02.03.2007 shall stand cancelled and respondents no. 1 to 5 are at liberty to register the decree and appropriate entry be made in the Registrar office in the Encumbrance Register reversing the entry of sale and also in the Revenue Register to enable respondent nos. 1 to 5 to have clear title.

1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
     CIVIL APPEAL NO.  11380 OF 2011
L.T.SOMASUNDARAM                                   ...APPELLANT(S)
                                VERSUS
P.SAMPOORNAM AND ORS    ...RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
1. The   appellant   and   the   proforma   respondent   nos.   6   to   8   have
filed   the   suit   against   the   original   defendant   viz.   P.   Paramasiva
Gounder   for   specific   performance   of   agreement   of   sale   dated
06.07.1990   and   to   deliver   possession   or   in   the   alternative   to
direct the original defendant -  P. Paramasiva Gounder to pay a sum
of   Rs.2,47,478/-   (Rupees   two   lakhs   forty   seven   thousand   and   four
hundred seventy eight) to the appellant and respondent nos. 6 to 8.
2. Based   upon   the   evidence   adduced   by   the   parties,   the   Trial
Court   held   that   the   appellant   and   respondent   nos.   6   to   8   are
entitled   to   the   decree   for   specific   performance   and,   accordingly,
decreed   the   suit   vide   judgment   dated   16.10.2003.   During   the
pendency of the suit, the original defendant- P. Paramasiva Gounder
died.   Respondent   Nos.   1   to   5   were   brought   on   record   as   the   Legal
representatives   of   deceased-   P.   Paramasiva   Gounder.   The   respondent
nos.   1   to   5   preferred   the   first   appeal   and   the   same   came   to   be
dismissed on 02.09.2005.
3. Being   aggrieved,   the   respondent   nos.   1   to   5   preferred   the

2
second   appeal   and   the   High   Court   reversed   the   concurrent   findings
and   allowed   the   second   appeal.   In   the   impugned   judgment,   the   High
Court   held   that   the   price   agreed   under   the   agreement   of   sale   was
Rs.1,50,000/-   (Rupees   one   lakh   fifty   thousand)   and   the   appellant
and   respondent   nos.   6   to   8   herein   had   paid   Rs.1,40,000/-   (Rupees
one   lakh   forty   thousand)   and   the   balance   payable   was   only
Rs.10,000/-   (Rupees   ten   thousand)   and   it   is   not   known   why   the
appellant   and   respondent   nos.   6   to   8   kept   quit   for   such   long   time
without   then   and   there   seeking   for   the   specific   performance.
Insofar as the alleged endorsement, Exhibit A-11 about the eviction
of   lessee   in   the   suit   property,   the   High   Court   did   not   accept   the
endorsement and held that Exhibit A-11 endorsement does not specify
a   particular   time   within   which   the   lessee   shall   be   evicted.   The
High Court further observed that if there was a lessee, there would
have   been   a   reference   of   the   said   lessee   even   in   the   original
agreement of sale and, therefore, on that ground the High Court did
not   accept   the   Exhibit   A-11   endorsement   as   a   ground   for   the
appellant in delay in filing the suit for specific performance. The
High   Court   held   that   the   appellant   and   respondent   nos.   6   to   8
having paid 90% of the amount under the agreement of sale would not
have   waited   for   six   years   in   filing   the   suit   for   specific
performance.   On   those   findings,   the   High   Court   reversed   the
concurrent   findings   of   the   Courts   below   and   allowed   the   second
appeal.
4. We   have   heard   Mr.   Senthil   Jagadeesan,   learned   counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant and respondent nos. 6 to 8 as
well   as   Mr.   Jayanth   Muth   Raj,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   on

3
behalf of respondent nos. 1 to 5 and perused the relevant material.
5. The relief  of specific  performance is  a discretionary  one. In
the   present   case,   the   agreement   of   sale   was   executed   way   back   in
the   year   1990.   Learned   senior   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of
respondent   nos.   1   to   5   has   submitted   that   the   respondents   are   in
possession   of   the   property   and   over   the   years   they   spent   lot   of
money in developing the property and at this distant point of time
if   the   suit   for   specific   performance   is   to   be   decreed,   it   will
cause   undue   hardship   to   respondent   nos.   1   to   5   and,   therefore,
submitted that the judgment of the High Court may not be interfered
with.     We   find   force   in   the   submission   of   the   learned   senior
counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   respondent   nos.   1   to   5.   Since   the
agreement is of the year 1990 it would cause undue hardship to the
respondents if at this distant point of time, respondents nos. 1 to
5 are directed to execute sale deed in favour of the appellant and
respondent   nos.   6   to   8   at   the   price   which   was   agreed   in   the   year
1990.
6. However,   when   the   High   Court   reversed   the   concurrent   findings
of   the   lower   Courts,   the   High   Court   should   have   considered   the
alternative   prayer   of   the   appellant   and   respondent   nos.   6   to   8   in
ordering refund of the advance payment of Rs.1,40,000/- (Rupees one
lakh   forty   thousand).   Since   the   agreement   is   of   the   year   1990   and
keeping in view the escalated price of the land and other facts and
circumstances   of   the   case,   we   deem   it   appropriate   to   direct
respondent   nos.   1   to   5   to   pay   a   sum   of   Rs.17,50,000/-   (Rupees
seventeen   lakhs   fifty   thousand)   which   is   inclusive   of   the   advance
amount   of   Rs.1,40,000/-   (Rupees   one   lakh   forty   thousand)   to   the

4
appellant   and   respondent   nos.   6   to   8.   The   respondent   nos.   1   to   5
shall   deposit   the   amount   of   Rs.17,50,000/-(Rupees   seventeen   lakhs
fifty   thousand)   to   the   credit   of   the   Court   of   Additional
Subordinate Court-II, Erode, Erode District within a period of four
months from today. The Supreme Court Registry is directed to draft
a decree to this effect. On such deposit being made, the amount of
Rs.17,50,000/-(Rupees   seventeen   lakhs   fifty   thousand)   shall   be
equally apportioned amongst the appellant and Respondent nos. 6 to
8.
7.   It   is   stated   that   after   the   dismissal   of   the   appeal   by   the
First Appellate Court, sale deed was executed by the proceedings of
the   Executing   Court   on   02.03.2007   in   favour   of   the   appellant   and
respondent nos. 6 to 8. On deposit of the amount of Rs.17,50,000/-
(Rupees   seventeen   lakhs   fifty   thousand),   the   said   sale   deed   dated
02.03.2007 shall stand cancelled and respondents no. 1 to 5 are at
liberty to register the decree and appropriate entry be made in the
Registrar office in the Encumbrance Register reversing the entry of
sale   and   also   in   the   Revenue   Register   to   enable   respondent   nos.   1
to 5 to have clear title.
8. The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of.
........................J.
[R.BANUMATHI]
NEW DELHI ........................J.
25TH JULY, 2019 [ A.S. BOPANNA]

5
ITEM NO.101               COURT NO.7               SECTION XII
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal  No(s).  11380/2011
L.T.SOMASUNDARAM                                   Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
P.SAMPOORNAM AND ORS                            Respondent(s)

Date : 25-07-2019 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE R. BANUMATHI
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. BOPANNA
For Appellant(s) Mr. Senthil Jagadeesan, AOR
Ms. Sonakshi Malhan,Adv.
Ms. Suriti Chowdhary,Adv.
Ms. Mrinal Kanwar,Adv.
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. Jayanth Muth Raj,Sr.Adv.
Mr. C.K.Sasi,Adv.
Mrs. Malavika Jayanth,Adv.
Mr. Sureshan P., AOR
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The appeal is disposed of in terms of the signed order.
Pending application(s), if any , shall stand disposed of.
(MADHU BALA)                                    (NISHA TRIPATHI)
COURT MASTER (SH)                                BRANCH OFFICER
(Signed order is placed on the file) 

whether plaintiff can take the plea of adverse possession in view of the interpretation of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

1
NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6111 OF 2009
KRISHNAMURTHY S. SETLUR (D)
THROUGH LRS.  …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
O.V. NARASIMHA SETTY (D) BY LRS. & ORS …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  12267  OF 2018
(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.2760 OF 2011)
NAGAR COUNCIL SIRHIND …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
BHAGAT RAM & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  10332  OF 2018
(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.10343 OF 2016)
M.E. MUNIRAJEGOWDA & ORS. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SRI UTHANALLAPPA @ UTHANALLIGA
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS. …RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
1. The   instant   appeals   involve   a   preliminary   issue   as   to   whether
plaintiff   can   take   the   plea   of   adverse   possession   in   view   of   the
interpretation of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963.  A Three­Judge
2
Bench of this Court in  Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. v. Manjit Kaur &
Ors.  (Civil Appeal No.7764 of 2014) has decided the similar issue on
7
th August, 2019, by holding as under:
“56. Possession is the root of title and is right like the property.
As ownership is also of different kinds of viz. sole ownership,
contingent ownership, corporeal ownership, and legal equitable
ownership.   Limited ownership or limited right to property may
be enjoyed by a holder.   What can be prescribable against is
limited to the rights of the holder.  Possession confers enforceable
right under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act.   It has to be
looked into what kind of possession is enjoyed viz. de facto i.e.,
actual, ‘de jure possession’, constructive possession, concurrent
possession over a small portion of the property.   In case the
owner is in symbolic possession, there is no dispossession, there
can   be   formal,   exclusive   or   joint   possession.     The   joint
possessor/co­owner possession is not presumed to be adverse.
Personal law also plays a role to construe nature of possession.
57. The   adverse   possession   requires   all   the   three   classic
requirements to co­exist at the same time, namely, nec­vi i.e.
adequate in continuity, nec­clam i.e., adequate in publicity and
nec­precario i.e. adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his
knowledge.  Visible, notorious and peaceful so that if the owner
does   not   take   care   to   know   notorious   facts,   knowledge   is
attributed to him on the basis that but for due diligence he would
have known it.  Adverse possession cannot be decreed on a title
which is not pleaded.  Animus possidendi under hostile colour of
title is required.   Trespasser’s long possession is not synonym
with adverse possession.  Trespasser’s possession is construed to
be on behalf of the owner, the casual user does not constitute
adverse   possession.     The   owner   can   take   possession   from   a
trespasser   at   any   point   in   time.     Possessor   looks   after   the
property, protects it and in case of agricultural property by and
the large concept is that actual tiller should own the land who
works by dint of his hard labour and makes the land cultivable.
The   legislature   in   various   States   confers   rights   based   on
possession.
58. Adverse possession is heritable and there can be tacking of
adverse   possession   by   two   or   more   persons   as   the   right   is
transmissible one.   In our opinion, it confers a perfected right
which cannot be defeated on reentry except as provided in Article
65   itself.     Tacking   is   based   on   the   fulfillment   of   certain
conditions,   tacking   maybe   by   possession   by   the   purchaser,
legatee   or   assignee,   etc.   so   as   to   constitute   continuity   of
3
possession, that person must be claiming through whom it is
sought to be tacked, and would depend on the identity of the
same property under the same right.   Two distinct trespassers
cannot tack their possession to constitute conferral of right by
adverse possession for the prescribed period.  
59. We hold that a person in possession cannot be ousted by
another person except by due procedure of law and once 12
years' period of adverse possession is over, even owner's right to
eject him is lost and the possessory owner acquires right, title
and interest possessed by the outgoing person/owner as the case
may   be   against   whom   he   has   prescribed.   In   our   opinion,
consequence is that once the right, title or interest is acquired it
can be used as a sword by the plaintiff as well as a shield by the
defendant within ken of Article 65 of the Act and any person who
has perfected title by way of adverse possession, can file a suit for
restoration of possession in case of dispossession. In case of
dispossession by another person by taking law in his hand a
possessory suit can be maintained under Article 64, even before
the ripening of title by way of adverse possession.  By perfection
of title on extinguishment of the owner’s title, a person cannot be
remediless.  In case he has been dispossessed by the owner after
having lost the right by adverse possession, he can be evicted by
the plaintiff by taking the plea of adverse possession. Similarly,
any   other   person   who   might   have   dispossessed   the   plaintiff
having perfected title by way of adverse possession can also be
evicted until and unless such other person has perfected title
against such a plaintiff by adverse possession. Similarly, under
other Articles also in case of infringement of any of his rights, a
plaintiff who has perfected the title by adverse possession, can
sue and maintain a suit.
60. When we consider the law of adverse possession as has
developed vis­à­vis to property dedicated to public use, courts
have been loath to confer the right by adverse possession.  There
are instances when such   properties are encroached upon and
then a plea of adverse possession is raised.  In Such cases, on
the land reserved for public utility, it is desirable that rights
should not accrue.   The law of adverse possession may cause
harsh consequences, hence, we are constrained to observe that it
would be advisable that concerning such properties dedicated to
public cause, it is made clear in the statute of limitation that no
rights can accrue by adverse possession.  
61. Resultantly, we hold that decisions of Gurudwara Sahab v.
Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala (supra) and decision relying on it
in  State of Uttarakhand v. Mandir Shri Lakshmi Siddh Maharaj
(supra) and Dharampal (dead) through LRs v. Punjab Wakf Board
(supra) cannot be said to be laying down the law correctly, thus
4
they are hereby overruled. We hold that plea of acquisition of title
by adverse possession can be taken by plaintiff under Article 65
of the Limitation Act and there is no bar under the Limitation
Act, 1963 to sue on aforesaid basis in case of infringement of any
rights of a plaintiff. 
62. Let the matters be placed for consideration on merits before
the appropriate Bench.”
2. The preliminary issue involved in the instant appeals is wholly
covered by the above decision.  In view of the answer, let the matters be
placed for consideration on merits before the appropriate Bench.
……………………..J.
(Arun Mishra)
New Delhi; .…………………….J.
August 08, 2019. (Vineet Saran)