CUSTODY OF CHILD - WELFARE OF THE CHILD

CUSTODY OF CHILD - WELFARE OF THE CHILD

18. It   is   well   settled   that   while   taking   a   decision
regarding   custody   or   other   issues   pertaining   to   a
child,   welfare   of   the   child   is   of   paramount
consideration. 
This Court in  Gaurav Nagpal vs. Sumedha
Nagpal, (2009) 1 SCC 42,  had occasion to consider the
parameters   while   determining   the   issues   of   child
custody   and   visitation   rights,   entire   law   on   the
subject   was   reviewed.   
This   Court   referred   to   English
Law, American Law, the statutory provisions of Guardian
and   Wards   Act,   1890   and   provisions   of   Hindu   Minority
and   Guardianship   Act,   1956,   this   Court   laid   down
following in paragraph Nos. 43, 44, 45, 46 and 51:
“43. The principles in relation to the custody
of   a   minor   child   are   well   settled.   In
determining the question as to who should be
given custody of a minor child, the paramount
consideration   is   the   “welfare   of   the   child”
and not rights of the parents under a statute
for the time being in force. 

45.  In   Saraswathibai   Shripad   Ved   v.   Shripad
Vasanji Ved, ILR 1941 Bom 455 : AIR 1941 Bom
103; the High Court of Bombay stated;
“....It is not the welfare of the father,
nor the welfare of the mother, that is the
paramount consideration for the Court. It
is   the   welfare   of   the   minor   and   of   the
minor   alone   which   is   the   paramount
consideration.....” 
   (emphasis supplied) 
46.   In   Rosy   Jacob   v.   Jacob   A.   Chakramakkal,
(1973) 1 SCC 840, this Court held that object
and   purpose   of   the   1890   Act   is   not   merely
physical   custody   of   the   minor   but   due
protection   of   the   rights   of   ward’s   health,
maintenance and education. The power and duty
of the Court under the Act is the welfare of
minor. In considering the question of welfare
of minor, due regard has of course to be given
to the right of the father as natural guardian
but   if   the   custody   of   the   father   cannot
promote the welfare of the children, he may be
refused such guardianship.
51. The word “welfare” used in Section 13 of
the Act has to be construed literally and must
be taken in its widest sense. The moral and
ethical welfare of the child must also weigh
with the Court as well as its physical wellbeing.   Though   the   provisions   of   the   special
statutes   which   govern   the   rights   of   the
parents   or   guardians   may   be   taken   into
consideration,   there   is   nothing   which   can
stand in the way of the Court exercising its
parens   patriae  jurisdiction   arising   in   such
cases. ”
19. Every   child   has   right   to   proper   health   and
education and it is the primary duty of the parents to
ensure that child gets proper education. The Courts in
exercise of  parens patriae  jurisdiction have to decide
such delicate question. It has to consider the welfare
of   the   child   as   of   paramount   importance   taking   into
consideration other aspects of the matter including the
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rights   of   parents   also.  In   reference   to  custody  of   a
minor, this Court had elaborated certain principles in
Thrity Hoshie Dolikuka vs. Hoshiam Shavaksha Dolikuka,
(1982)   2   SCC   544,  where   this   Court   again   reiterated
that welfare of the child is of paramount importance.
In paragraph No.17, following was laid down:
“17. The principles of law in relation to the
custody   of   a   minor   appear   to   be   wellestablished.   It   is   well­settled   that   any
matter   concerning   a   minor,   has   to   be
considered and decided only from the point of
view of the welfare and interest of the minor.
In dealing with a matter concerning a minor,
the Court has a special responsibility and it
is   the   duty   of   the   Court   to   consider   the
welfare   of   the   minor   and   to   protect   the
minor's interest. In considering the question
of   custody   of   a   minor,   the   Court   has   to   be
guided   by   the   only   consideration   of   the
welfare of the minor.”
20. In the above case, the issue of minor girl came for
consideration   in   the   context   of   custody.   The   mother,
who   was   school   teacher   wanted   to   send   the   child   to
boarding school, which was opposed by the father, who
wanted to have custody of the minor girl. It is to be
noted   that   in   the   said   case   the   minor   girl   has
expressed her wish not to go to boarding school. This
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Court held that in embittered relationship between the
parents   and   the   attempt   of   one   spouse   poisoning   the
mind   of   other   spouse   has   disastrous   effect.   In
paragraph Nos. 32 to 35 following was laid down:
“32.   The   effect   on   the   little   girl   of   the
embittered   relationship   between   her   parents
and the attempt of the father to poison the
mind of the daughter against her mother and to
alienate her from the mother has been simply
disastrous. The intelligent and sensible girl,
distressed   at   the   acrimony   between   her
parents,   who   wanted   to   spend   her   time   with
each of her parents as she is deeply attached
to   both,   as   recorded   by   Lentin,   J.   in   his
order dated June 28, 1979, was on the verge of
near   nervous   break­down   as   noted   by   the
Division Bench in its judgment dated July 31,
1981.   The   various   orders   passed   in   between
which we have set out at length also, indicate
what great mental strain and agony the little
girl had suffered because of the acrimonious
dispute   between   her   parents.   During   this
period of two years, the girl had been under
home influence, as she had been staying with
her   quarrelling   parents   in   terms   of   the
various orders of the High Court. The little
girl   also   had   been   compelled   to   make   her
appearances   in   Court   from   time   to   time.   The
facts and circumstances clearly establish that
the effect of home influence on the minor in
the present case has been to reduce a bright,
happy   and   sensible   child   to   a   state   of
complete   misery;   and,   the   extreme
psychological strain on the sensible mind of
the   little   girl   has   caused   almost   a   near
nervous   breakdown.   When   the   atmosphere   in   a
house,  vitiated and rendered  surcharged with
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tension   as   a   result   of   bitter   squabbles
between   husband   and   wife   causes   misery   and
unhappiness   to   a   child,   who   has   to   live   in
constant psychological strain in such a broken
home   in   view   of   the   bitter   relationship
between her parents for each of whom she has
great affection, the healthy and normal growth
of   the   child   is   bound   to   be   seriously
affected. In the interest and for the welfare
of   the   child   in   such   a   case,   the   child   is
necessarily to be removed from such unhealthy
environment of a broken home surcharged with
tension. In such a case, the proper and best
way of serving the interest and welfare of the
child will be to remove the child from such
atmosphere of acrimony and tension and to put
the   child   in   a   place   where   the   embittered
relationship   between   her   parents   does   not
easily and constantly effect her tender mind.
33. In   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the
present case the best way to serve the welfare
and interest of the child will be to remove
the   child   from   the   unhealthy   atmosphere   at
home which has caused a very great strain on
her   nerves   and   has   certainly   affected   her
healthy growth, to a place where she can live
a   normal   healthy   life   and   will   have   a   good
opportunity   of   proper   education   and   healthy
growth.   We   note   with   satisfaction   that   the
view that we have taken is fully supported by
the report of the Social Welfare Expert. The
report   of   the   Social   Welfare   Expert,   though
not   binding   on   the   Court   is   entitled   to
weighty   consideration.   In   the   instant   case,
the Expert has made a very careful study of
the   entire   matter   and   has   given   a   well
­reasoned report.
34. Pursuant   to   the   order   passed   by   the
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court the
mother   got   the   child   admitted   into   Kimmins
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Boarding  School at  Panchgani.  By  an interim
order   passed   by   this   Court   in   the   stay
application   in   this   appeal,   the   child   was
directed   to   continue   her   stay   in   the   said
Boarding   institution.   By   the   interim   order
passed by us on the conclusion of the hearing
we   directed   that   the   child   should   continue
her study in the Boarding School.
35. On a consideration of all the facts and
circumstances   of   this   case   and   bearing   in
mind   the   paramount   consideration   of   the
welfare of the child, we are of the opinion
that the child's interest and welfare will be
best   served   by   removing   her   from   the
influence of home life and by directing that
she should continue to remain in the Boarding
School.   It   is   not   in   dispute   that   Kimmins
Boarding   School   at   Panchgani   to   which   the
child   has   been   admitted   is   a   good
institution.”
21. In   the   above   case,   the   child   was   allowed   to
continue   in   the   boarding   school.   We   notice   one   more
decision   of   this   Court   in  Nutan   Gautam   vs.   Prakash
Gautam, (2019) 4 SCC 734, which was a case where appeal
was filed by mother of a child against the order of the
High Court passed in First Appeal. While decreeing the
divorce   petition   of   the   husband   ex   parte   the   trial
court   had   directed   the   son,   the   minor   boy,   to   be
admitted   in  a   boarding   school   at   New   Delhi.  Ex   parte
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order passed by the trial court was challenged by the
mother   in   the   High   Court,   which   matter   was   pending
before the High Court. The High Court by interim order
had  permitted   the   father   to  take   the   boy   to  boarding
school. The said interim order was challenged in this
Court. This Court interacted with the boy and took the
view that in the facts of the case, the child should
not be compelled to go to boarding school. This Court
allowed   the   child   to   continue   his   studies   at   Global
International   School,   Shahjahanpur,   where   he   was
earlier   studying   in   the   interest   of   the   child.   Every
case   where   issue   pertaining   to   custody   of   child   and
education   is   decided     depends   upon   the   facts   of  each
case. No hard and fixed formula can be found out which
can be applied to each and every case. Each case has to
be examined in its own facts. We may again refer to the
judgment in Thrity Hoshie Dolikuka (supra),  where also
this Court noticed that child has expressed his wishes
not to go to boarding school. This Court in the said
case took the view that the minor is not fit to form an
intelligent   preference,   which   may   be   taken   into
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consideration   in   deciding   her   welfare.   In   paragraph
No.26, following was laid down:
“26. In   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   this
case we are however, not inclined to interview
the minor daughter, as we are satisfied in the
present case that the minor is not fit to form
an intelligent preference which may be taken
into consideration in deciding her welfare. We
have   earlier   set   out   in   extenso   the   various
orders passed by the various learned Judges of
the Bombay High Court after interviewing the
minor   and   the   learned   Judges   have   recorded
their   impressions   in   their   judgments   and
orders.   The   impressions   as   recorded   by   the
learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, go to
indicate   that   the   minor   has   expressed
different kinds of wishes at different times
under   different   conditions.   It   also   appears
from the report of the Social Welfare Expert
that   these   interviews   cast   a   gloom   on   the
sensitive mind of the tender girl and caused a
lot   of   strain   and   depression   on   her.   Torn
between her love for both her parents and the
acrimonious dispute between them resulting in
the minor being dragged from court to court,
we can well appreciate that the sensitive mind
of   the   minor   girl   is   bound   to   be   sadly
affected. Though the girl is quite bright and
intelligent as recorded by the learned Judges
of the Bombay High Court in their orders after
their   interviews   with   the   girl   who   is   of   a
tender age and is placed in a very delicate
and   embarrasing   situation   because   of   the
unfortunate   relationship   and   litigation
between her parents for both of whom she has
great   deal   of   affection,   she   is   not   in   a
position to express any intelligent preference
which   will   be   conducive   to   her   interest   and
welfare.  Mature thinking  is indeed  necessary
in such a situation to decide as to what will
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enure   to   her   benefit   and   welfare.   Any   child
who is placed in such an unfortunate position,
can   hardly   have   the   capacity   to   express   an
intelligent preference  which  may  require  the
Court's consideration to decide what should be
the   course   to   be   adopted   for   the   child's
welfare. The letters addressed by the daughter
to her mother from Panchgani and also a letter
addressed by her to her aunt (father's sister)
also   go   to   show   that   the   minor   cannot
understand   her   own   mind   properly   and   cannot
form any firm desire. We feel that sending for
the minor and interviewing her in the present
case   will   not   only   not   serve   any   useful
purpose but will have the effect of creating
further depression  and  demoralisation  in  her
mind.”

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos.5388­5389 Of 2019 (arising out of SLP(C)Nos.15912­15913 of 2018) SHEOLI HATI            ... APPELLANT(S)  VERSUS SOMNATH DAS       ... RESPONDENT(S)

Or. 9 rule 13 of CPC - set aside exparte decree -Litigation should not be terminated by default - adjudication be done on merits.

Or. 9 rule 13 of CPC - set aside exparte decree -Litigation should not be terminated by default -  adjudication be done on merits.

8. Ordinarily, a litigation is based on adjudication on the merits of the contentions of the parties. Litigation should not be terminated by default, either of the plaintiff or the defendant. The cause of justice does require that as far as possible, adjudication be done on merits.

9. The disputed agreement is dated 18.04.2012. Summons was issued and it was received but according to the appellant, by his mother. The Trial Court has apparently accepted the case of the appellant that the mother did not bring the receipt of the summons to the notice of the appellant and that it was sometime in June, 2014 that the appellant can be credited with knowledge of the Suit

10. Order further appears to reveal that the plaintiff was present in person. The plaintiff has filed his proof affidavit. It was decided to proceed against the appellant ex parte. There is, however, a reference 4 to the application to engage an advocate by the appellant. The case stood posted for ex parte argument on 08.08.2014. As parties were not present on the said day, the case was posted to 15.09.2014. However, on 12.09.2014, the case stood transferred to another Court. No intimation was given under Rule 89A to the appellant

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4507 OF 2019 (@ S.L.P.(C) No.35428 of 2017) ROBIN THAPA … APPELLANT(S) VERSUS ROHIT DORA … RESPONDENT(

Whether for remanding the accused (appellant), Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. could have been resorted to by the Special Judge or remand could have been done only under Section 309(2) Cr.P.C. whether Section 309(2) of the Code stands in the way of a Court, which has taken cognizance of an offence, to authorise the detention of a person, who is subsequently brought before it by the police under arrest during further investigation, in police custody in exercise of its power under Section 167 of the Code.

  Whether for remanding the accused (appellant), Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. could have been resorted to by  the Special Judge or remand could have been done only under Section 309(2) Cr.P.C.


whether Section 309(2) of the Code stands in the way of a Court, which has taken cognizance of an offence, to authorise the detention of a person, who is subsequently brought before it by the police under arrest during further investigation, in police custody in exercise of its power under Section 167 of the Code.


56. This Court clearly held that Section 309(2) does  not refer to an accused, who is subsequently arrested in course of further investigation. 
This Court in paragraph No. 11, as noted above, clearly held that even after cognizance is taken of an offence the police has a power to investigate into it further and there is no reason why the provisions of Section 167 thereof would not apply to a person who comes to be later arrested by the police in course of such investigation.



in Dinesh Dalmia Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2007) 8 SCC 770, is relevant for the present case where this Court had occasion to interpret sub-Section (2) of Section 167 Cr.P.C vis-à-vis sub-Section (2) of Section 309 Cr.P.C. 
In paragraph No. 29, this Court laid down: - “29. The power of a court to direct remand of an accused either in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code or sub-section (2) of Section 309 thereof will depend on the stages of the trial. Whereas sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code would be attracted in a case where cognizance has not been taken, sub-section (2) of Section 309 of the Code would be attracted only after cognizance has been taken.”


Anupan J. Kulkarni(supra) and Dawood Ibrahim (Supra), this court laid down following in paragraph No. 39: - 
“39. The statutory scheme does not lead to a conclusion in regard to an investigation leading to filing of final form under subsection (2) of Section 173 and further investigation contemplated under sub-section (8) thereof. Whereas only when a charge-sheet is not filed and investigation is kept pending, benefit of proviso appended to subsection (2) of Section 167 of the Code would be available to an offender; once, however, a charge-sheet is filed, the said right ceases. Such a right does not revive only because a further investigation remains pending within the meaning of sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code.”

in Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel and Others Vs. State of Gujarat, (2009) 6 SCC 332. In paragraph No. 17, this Court made 65 following observations:- 
“17. The power of remand in terms of the aforementioned provision is to be exercised when investigation is not complete. Once the charge-sheet is filed and cognizance of the offence is taken, the court cannot exercise its power under sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code. Its power of remand can then be exercised in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 309 which reads as under: “309. Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings.— (1) * * * ” 

62. After having noticed, the relevant provisions of Section 167(2) and Section 309, Cr.P.C and law laid down by this Court, we arrive at following conclusions: - (i) The accused can be remanded under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C during investigation till cognizance has not been taken by the Court. (ii) That even after taking cognizance when an accused is subsequently arrested during 66 further investigation, the accused can be remanded under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. (iii) When cognizance has been taken and the accused was in custody at the time of taking cognizance or when inquiry or trial was being held in respect of him, he can be remanded to judicial custody only under Section 309(2) Cr.P.C. 63. We, thus, find substance in submission of learned counsel for the appellant that in the present case accused could have been remanded only under Section 309(2) Cr.P.C. The submission which was taken on behalf of the CBI before us was that the accused was remanded under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. Since he was produced before Special Judge during further investigation. The stand taken by the CBI is not correct. 
65. The special Judge in his order has neither
referred to Section 309 nor Section 167 under which
accused was remanded. When the Court has power to pass
a particular order, non-mention of provision of law or
wrong mention of provision of law is inconsequential.
As held above, the special Judge could have only
exercised power under Section 309(2), hence, the
remand order dated 25.06.2018 has to be treated as
remand order under Section 309(2) Cr.P.C. The special
Judge being empowered to remand the accused under
Section 309(2) in the facts of the present case, there 
is no illegality in the remand order dated 25.06.2018
when the accused was remanded to the judicial custody.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 816-817 OF 2019 (arising out of SLP(CRL.) Nos.10051-10052 of 2018) PRADEEP RAM .... APPELLANT(S) VERSUS THE STATE OF JHARKHAND & ANR. .... RESPONDENT(S)

in the absence of the counsel for the appellant-accused, the High Court should not have decided the appeal on merits and prayed for remitting the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits.

 K.S. Panduranga vs. State of Karnataka
(2013) 3 SCC 721 and submitted that in the absence of the counsel
for the appellant-accused, the High Court should not have decided
the appeal on merits and prayed for remitting the matter to the High
Court for fresh consideration on merits.
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8. The respondent-complainant though served, has not entered
appearance in this appeal. The Supreme Court Legal Services
Committee has nominated Col. Pahlad Singh Sharma, Advocate to
appear and argue on behalf of the respondent. We have heard
Col. Pahlad Singh Sharma appearing on behalf of the
respondent-complainant and perused the impugned judgment and
other materials on record.
9. Admittedly, the appellant-accused did not appear in the
criminal appeal before the High Court. When the accused has not
entered appearance in the High Court, in our view, the High Court
should have issued second notice to the appellant-accused or the
High Court Legal Services Committee to appoint an advocate or the
High Court could have taken the assistance of amicus curiae. When
the accused was not represented, without appointing any counsel
as amicus curiae to defend the accused, the High Court ought not
to have decided the criminal appeal on merits; more so, when the
appellant-accused had the benefit of the acquittal. The High Court
erred in reversing the acquittal without affording any opportunity tothe appellant-accused or by appointing an amicus curiae to argue
the matter on his behalf.
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10. In the result, the impugned orders of the High Court in Crl.A.
(MD) No. 608 of 2007 dated 06.07.2018 and 23.06.2018 are set
aside and these appeals are allowed and the Criminal Appeal (MD)
No. 608 of 2007 shall stand restored. The matter is remitted to the
Madurai Bench of Madras High Court to consider the matter afresh.
The appellant shall appear before the Madurai Bench of the Madras
High Court on 26.08.2019. The High Court shall issue notice to the
respondent-complainant viz. K. Vijayakumar informing him about
the date of hearing. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 986-987 OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.7717-7718 of 2018) CHRISTOPHER RAJ ...Appellant VERSUS K VIJAYAKUMAR ...Respondent

for relinquishment of share - circumstance can be taken in to considered in the absence of specific relinquishment deed

for relinquishment of share - circumstance can be taken in to considered in the absence of specific relinquishment deed

It is submitted that the High Court has materially erred in not accepting the same on the ground that there is no Deed of 9 Relinquishment executed by Triza Kalyani John @ A.S. Meenakshi and as such the Deed of Relinquishment is required to be registered.

 we are of the view that the High Court has completely erred in holding that the plaintiffs would   have   1/4th  share   in   the   suit   property   being  the   heirs   of deceased Triza Kalyani John @ Meenakshi –the daughter of John D.Abraham.  It was the specific case on behalf of defendant nos. 1 & 2that at the time of marriage of Triza Kalyani John @ Meenakshi withoriginal plaintiff no.1, she converted to Hinduism and her name was changed to A.S. Meenakshi.  

It was the specific case on behalf of 
defendant nos. 1 & 2 that at the relevant time when the said Triza Kalyani John @ Meenakshi had married to original plaintiff no.1 and converted to Hinduism, there was opposition.  
However, despite the same,   the   said   Triza   Kalyani   John   @  Meenakshi   converted   to Hinduism and married to original plaintiff no.1 and she was paid Rs.50,000/­ and some gold ornaments for relinquishing her right, if any, in the suit property belonging to John D. Abraham.   

The trial Court believed the case on behalf of defendant nos. 1 & 2, both on  appreciation of evidence as well as on conduct of Triza Kalyani John @ Meenakshi.  The trial Court also dismissed the suit on the ground of   limitation.     
It  is   to  be  noted  that   the  John   D.  Abraham  died intestate in the year 1964. Triza Kalyani John, the eldest daughter ofJohn D. Abraham married to original plaintiff no.1 in the year 1979.She died in the year 1986.  During her life time, she never claimed any   share/partition   in   the   suit   property   belonging   to   John   D. Abraham.  Only after the death of Triza Kalyani John @ Meenakshi, the   plaintiffs   claiming   to   be   the   heirs   of   Triza   Kalyani   John   @ Meenakshi instituted the suit for partition contending, inter alia, that Triza Kalyani John @ Meenakshi had 1/3rd share in the suit property belonging   to   John   D.   Abraham,   who   died   intestate.     Therefore, considering the aforesaid conduct on the part of Triza Kalyani John @ Meenakshi   during   her   life   time,   the   learned   trial   Court   rightly accepted the defence on behalf of original defendant nos. 1 & 2 that the said Triza Kalyani John @ Meenakshi was paid Rs.50,000/­ and some  gold   ornaments   at   the   time   of   her   marriage   with   original plaintiff   no.1   and   the   said   Triza   Kalyani   John   @   Meenakshi relinquished her share in the suit property. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 7207­7208/2008
Pharez John Abraham (Dead) By Lrs. …Appellants
Versus

Arul Jothi Sivasubramaniam K. & others …Respondents