Limitation is 12 years when the suit for declaration and for possession from the date when the possession of land becomes adverse to the plaintiff ; The Civil Court can grant lesser relief or smaller version of the relief claimed or prayed for can be granted. the plaintiffs had prayed that they were Inamdars and that the High Court had created a new case for the plaintiffs by declaring them to be Mutawalis.

Limitation is 12 years when the suit for declaration and for possession from the date when the possession of land becomes adverse to the plaintiff

    Admittedly, the possession of the land was handed over to the Trust only in the year 1978.  The suit was filed in the year 1987.  The appellants contend that the limitation for the suit is three years as the suit is one for declaration.  We are of the view that this contention has to be rejected.  We have culled out the main prayers made in the suit hereinabove which clearly indicate that it is a suit not only for declaration but the plaintiffs also prayed for possession of the suit land.   The limitation for filing a suit for possession on the basis of title is 12 years and, therefore, the suit is within limitation.  Merely because one of the reliefs sought is of declaration that will not mean that the outer limitation of 12 years is lost.   Reliance placed by the learned 7 counsel for the appellants on the judgment of this Court in L.C. Hanumanthappa   v.   H.B.   Shivakumar1   is   wholly   misplaced. That   judgment   has   no   applicability   since   that   case   was admittedly only a suit for declaration and not a suit for both declaration and possession.  In a suit filed for possession based on title the plaintiff is bound to prove his title and pray for a declaration that he is the owner of the suit land because his suit on the basis of title cannot succeed unless he is held to have some  title   over   the   land.     However,   the   main   relief   is  ofpossession and, therefore, the suit will be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963.   This Article deals with a suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on   title   and   the   limitation   is   12   years   from   the   date  when possession of the land becomes adverse to the plaintiff.




The Civil Court can grant lesser relief or smaller version of the relief claimed or prayed for can be granted. 
the plaintiffs had prayed that they were Inamdars and that the High Court had created a new case for the plaintiffs by declaring them to be  Mutawalis. 


since plaintiffs had not claimed the relief that they were  Mutawalis,  the  High  Court  could  not   have  granted  this relief.  Reliance has been placed on a judgment of this Court in the case of Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal2 .                        Para 22 of the said judgment reads as follows: “22.  The observation of the High Court that when a plaintiff sets forth the facts and makes a prayer for a particular relief in the suit, he is merely suggesting what the relief should be, and that it is for the court, as   a   matter   of   law,   to   decide   upon   the   relief   that should be granted, is not sound. Such an observation may   be   appropriate   with   reference   to   a   writ proceeding. It may even be appropriate in a civil suit while proposing to grant as relief, a lesser or smaller version of what is claimed. But the said observation is misconceived if it is meant to hold that a civil court may grant any relief it deems fit, ignoring the prayer.”      (emphasis supplied) 
In   our   view,   the   aforesaid   judgment   does   not   help   the appellants and, in fact, helps the respondents.   The judgment clearly lays down that the lesser relief or smaller version of the relief claimed or prayed for can be granted.  The plaintiffs claimed the status of  Inamdars  which is a higher position than that of Mutawalis.  The High Court has granted a lesser or lower relief and not a higher relief or totally new relief and, therefore, we reject this contention also. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4478  OF 2007 SOPANRAO & ANR. …APPELLANT(S) Versus SYED MEHMOOD & ORS.        …RESPONDENT(S)

whether the suit property was coparcenary property or self­acquired property of Dharam Singh;

(i) whether the suit property was coparcenary property or self­acquired property of Dharam Singh? 


With respect to the first issue, it is the admitted position that Inder Singh had inherited the entire suit property from his father Lal Singh upon his death. As per the Mutation Entry dated 16.01.1956 produced by Respondent No. 1, Lal Singh’s death took place in 1951.

Therefore, the succession in this case   opened   in   1951   prior  to   the   commencement   of   the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 when Inder Singh succeeded to his father Lal’s Singh’s property in accordance with the old Hindu Mitakshara law.

Mulla in his commentary on Hindu Law (22nd  Edition) has stated the position with respect to succession under Mitakshara law as follows: Page 129 “A son, a grandson whose father is dead, and a great­grandson   whose   father   and   grandfather are both dead, succeed simultaneously as single heir to the separate or self­acquired property of the deceased with rights of survivorship.” Page 327 “All property inherited by a male Hindu from his father, father’s father or father’s father’s father, is  ancestral property.  The  essential  feature of ancestral property according to Mitakshara law is that the sons, grandsons and great­grandsons of the person who inherits it, acquire an interest, and the rights attached to such property at the moment of their birth. A   person   inheriting   property   from   his   three immediate paternal ancestors holds it, and must hold it, in coparcenary with his sons, son’s sons, and   son’s   son’s   sons,   but   as   regards   other relations, he holds it, and is entitled to hold it as his absolute property.” (emphasis supplied) 7.2. In Shyam Narayan Prasad v. Krisha Prasad & Ors., 2 this Court has recently held that : “12. It is settled that the property inherited by a male Hindu from his father, father’s father or father’s father’s father is an ancestral property. The   essential   feature   of   ancestral   property, 2 (2018) 7 SCC 646. 14 according to Mitakshara Law, is that the sons, grandsons, and great grandsons of the person who inherits it, acquire an interest and the rights attached to such property at the moment of their birth. The share which a coparcener obtains on partition   of   ancestral   property   is   ancestral property   as   regards   his   male   issue.   After partition, the property in the hands of the son will continue to be the ancestral property and the natural or adopted son of that son will take interest in it and is entitled to it by survivorship.” (emphasis supplied) 7.3. Under  Mitakshara  law,   whenever   a   male   ancestor inherits any property from any of his paternal ancestors upto three degrees above him, then his male legal heirs upto three degrees below him, would get an equal right as coparceners in that property. 7.4. In Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar, 3  this Court held that : “11. This question has been considered by this Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur and Ors. v. Chander Sen and Ors. [1986] 161 ITR   370   (SC)   where   one   of   us   (Sabyasachi Mukharji, J) observed that under the Hindu Law, the moment a son is born, he gets a share in father's   property   and   become   part   of   the coparcenary. His right accrues to him not on the death of the father or inheritance from the father but   with   the   very   fact   of   his   birth.   Normally, therefore  whenever the  father gets  a property from whatever source, from the grandfather or 3 (1987) 1 SCC 204. 15 from any other source, be it separated property or not, his son should have a share in that and it will become part of the joint Hindu family of his son and grandson and other members who form joint Hindu family with him. This Court observed that this position has been affected by Section 8 of   the   Hindu   Succession   Act,   1956   and, therefore, after the Act, when the son inherited the   property   in   the   situation   contemplated   by Section 8, he does not take it as Kar of his own undivided family but takes it in his individual capacity.” (emphasis supplied) 7.5. After the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force, this position has undergone a change. Post – 1956, if a person   inherits   a   self­acquired   property   from   his paternal ancestors, the said property becomes his selfacquired  property,  and  does  not   remain  coparcenary property. 7.6. If succession opened under the old Hindu law, i.e. prior to   the   commencement   of   the   Hindu   Succession   Act, 1956, the parties would be governed by Mitakshara law. The   property   inherited   by   a   male   Hindu   from   his paternal male ancestor shall be coparcenary property in 16 his hands vis­à­vis his male descendants upto three degrees below him. The nature of property will remain as coparcenary property even after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 7.7. In the present case, the succession opened in 1951 on the   death   of   Lal   Singh.   The   nature   of   the   property inherited by his son Inder Singh was coparcenary in nature.   Even   though   Inder   Singh   had   effected   a partition of the coparcenary property amongst his sons in 1964, the nature of the property inherited by Inder Singh’s sons would remain as coparcenary property qua their male descendants upto three degrees below them.  7.8. The judgment in Uttam v. Saubhag Singh (supra) relied upon by the Respondents is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In Uttam, the appellant therein was claiming   a   share   in   the   coparcenary   property   of   his grandfather, who had died in 1973 before the appellant 17 was   born.   The   succession   opened   in   1973   after   the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force.       The   Court   was   concerned   with   the   share   of   the appellant’s grandfather in the ancestral property, and the impact of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In light of these facts, this Court held that after property is distributed in accordance with Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, such property ceases to be joint family property in the hands of the various persons who have succeeded to it. It was therefore held that the appellant was not a coparcener vis­à­vis the share of his grandfather. 7.9. In the present case, the entire property of Lal Singh was inherited   by   his   son   Inder   Singh   as   coparcenary property prior to 1956. This coparcenary property was partitioned between the three sons of Inder Singh by the court vide  a decree of partition dated 04.11.1964. The shares   allotted   in   partition   to   the   coparceners, 18 continued   to   remain   coparcenary   property   in   their hands qua their male descendants. As a consequence, the   property   allotted   to   Dharam   Singh   in   partition continued   to   remain   coparcenary   property  qua  the Appellant. 

7.10. With respect to the devolution of a share acquired on partition, Mulla on Hindu Law (22nd Edition) states the following: “§   339.   Devolution   of   share   acquired   on partition. – The effect of a partition is to dissolve the   coparcenary,   with   the   result,   that   the separating   members   thenceforth   hold   their respective   shares   as   their   separate   property, and the share of each member will pass on his death to his heirs. However, if a member while separating from his other coparceners continues joint with his own male issue, the share allotted to him on partition, will in his hands, retain the character of a coparcenary property as regards the male issue [§ 221, sub­§ (4)].” (emphasis supplied) 7.11. This Court in Valliammai Achi v. Nagappa Chettiar and Ors., 4 held that: “10. … It is well settled that the share which a co­sharer   obtains   on   partition   of   ancestral 4 AIR 1967 SC 1153. 19 property   is   ancestral   property   as   regards   his male issues. They take an interest in it by birth whether   they   are   in   existence   at   the   time   of partition or are born subsequently: [see Hindu Law by Mulla, Thirteenth Edition p. 249, para 223 (2)(4)]. If that is so and the character of the ancestral   property  does   not   change  so  far  as sons are concerned even after partition, we fail to  see how that  character can change  merely because the father makes a will by which he gives   the   residue   of   the   joint   family   property (after making certain bequests) to the son.” (emphasis supplied) 7.12. The   suit   property   which   came   to   the   share   of   late Dharam Singh through partition, remained coparcenary property  qua  his   son   –   the   Appellant   herein,   who became a coparcener in the suit property on his birth i.e. on 22.08.1985.

(ii) the validity of the Sale   Deeds   executed  on   01.09.1999   by   Dharam   Singh   in favour of Respondent No. 1, and the subsequent Sale Deed dated 30.10.2007 executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 & 3. 

Dharam Singh purportedly executed the two Sale Deeds on 01.09.1999 in favour of Respondent No. 1 after  the Appellant  became  a coparcener  in  the suit property. 8. The   second   issue   which   has   arisen   for   consideration   is whether the two Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999 executed by 20 Dharam Singh in favour of Respondent No. 1, were valid or not. 8.1. It   is   settled   law   that   the   power   of   a  Karta  to   sell coparcenary property is subject to certain restrictions viz. the sale should be for legal necessity or for the benefit   of   the   estate.5   The   onus   for   establishing   the existence of legal necessity is on the alienee.      In  Rani & Anr.  v.  Santa Bala Debnath & Ors., 6   this Court held that : “10.  Legal necessity to support the sale must however be established by the alienees. Sarala owned the land in dispute as a limited owner. She   was   competent   to   dispose   of   the   whole estate   in   the   property   for   legal   necessity   or benefit to the estate. In adjusting whether the sale   conveys   the   whole   estate,   the   actual pressure on the estate, the danger to be averted, and the benefit to be conferred upon the estate in the particular instance must be considered. Legal   necessity   does   not   mean   actual compulsion: it means pressure upon the estate which in law may be regarded as serious and sufficient. The onus of providing legal necessity may be discharged by the alienee by proof of actual necessity or by proof that he made proper and bona fide enquires about the existence of the   necessity   and   that   he   did   all   that   was 5 Vijay A. Mittal & Ors. v. Kulwant Rai (Dead) through LRs & Ors., (2019) 3 SCC 520; Mulla on Hindu Law (22nd Edition), Pg. 372. 6 (1970) 3 SCC 722. 21 reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of the necessity.” (emphasis supplied) 8.2. In the present case, the onus was on the alienee i.e. Respondent   No.   1   to   prove   that   there   was   a   legal necessity, or benefit to the estate, or that she had made bona fide enquiries on the existence of the same. 8.3. Respondent No. 1 has completely failed to discharge the burden of proving that Dharam Singh had executed the two Sale Deeds dated 01.09.1999 in her favour out of legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate. In fact, it has come on record that the Sale Deeds were without any consideration whatsoever.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.5124  OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 6788 of 2019) Arshnoor Singh              …Appellant versus Harpal Kaur & Ors.              …Respondents

Whether consumption of liquioror found in consumption position in Private Vehicle is an offence in Bihar State ?

Whether consumption of liquioror found in consumption position in Private Vehicle is an offence in Bihar State ?

When the word 'consumes' is followed by liquor, the action   denoted   by   verb   passes   over   from   the   doer   to object i.e.   liquor to constitute the offences within the meaning of Section 53(a). The action of consumption of liquor has to happen within the State of Bihar. A person who consumes liquor in a different State cannot be fastened with a penalty under Section 53(a) unless there   is   some   evidence   to   prove   that   consumption   of liquor by the accused has taken place in the State of Bihar.

As per Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 another
category of offences which has been included in Section
37 is Section 37 sub­section (b) which “is found drunk
or in a state of drunkenness at any place; or”,  thus,
as   per   Bihar   Prohibition   and   Excise  Act,   2016   even   a
person consumes liquor outside the State of Bihar and
enter into the territory of Bihar and is found drunk or

in   a   state   of   drunkenness,   he   can   be   charged   with
offences   under   Section   37(b).   But   no   offence   as   now
contemplated     by   Section   37(b)   was   provided   for   in
Bihar   Excise   (Amendment)   Act,   2016,   thus,   the
consumption of liquor has to be in the State of Bihar.

Whether   charge   that   consumption   of
liquor   has   taken   place   within   the   State   of   Bihar   is
made out in the facts of the present case are questions
which   need   to   be   decided   by   the   learned   Magistrate
after looking into the materials brought on record by
means   of   the   chargesheet. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.951   OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP(Criminal) No.4994 of 2018) SATVINDER SINGH @ SATVINDER SINGH SALUJA & ORS. … APPELLANT(S) VERSUS THE STATE OF BIHAR … RESPONDENT(S)

whether respondent No.2 ­ a company established under the laws of Belgium, having its principal place of business at Nijverheldsstraat 3, 2530 Boechout, Belgium, could be impleaded in the proposed arbitration proceedings despite the fact that it is a non­ 2 signatory party to the agreement dated 1st May, 2014, executed between the applicant and respondent No.1 ­ a company established under the Companies Act, 2013 ­ merely because it (respondent No.2) is one of the group companies of which respondent No.1 also is a constituent. ?

whether respondent No.2 ­ a company established under the laws of Belgium, having its principal   place   of   business   at   Nijverheldsstraat   3,   2530 Boechout,   Belgium,   could   be   impleaded   in   the   proposed arbitration   proceedings   despite   the   fact   that   it   is   a   non­ 2 signatory   party   to   the   agreement   dated   1st  May,   2014, executed   between   the   applicant   and   respondent   No.1   ­   a company established under the Companies Act, 2013 ­ merely because it (respondent No.2) is one of the group companies of which respondent No.1 also is a constituent. ?

The legal position as to when a non­signatory to an arbitration agreement can be impleaded and subjected to arbitration proceedings is no more res integra.   

In the case of  Chloro  Controls   India  Private Limited   Vs.   Severn   Trent   Water   Purification   Inc.   and Ors., 1   a   three­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   opined   that ordinarily, an arbitration takes place between the persons who have been parties to both the arbitration agreement as well as the substantive contract underlying it.  Invoking the doctrine of   “group   of   companies”,   it   went   on   to   observe   that   an arbitration agreement entered into by a company, being one within   a   group   of   corporate   entities,   can,   in   certain circumstances,   bind   its   non­signatory   affiliates.


whether it is manifest from the indisputable correspondence exchanged between the parties, culminating in the agreement dated   1st  May,   2014,   that   the   transactions   between   the applicant and respondent No.1 were essentially with the group of companies and whether there was a clear intention of the parties to bind both   the signatory as well as non­signatory parties (respondent No.1 and respondent No.2, respectively). In other words, whether the indisputable circumstances go to show that the mutual intention of the parties was to bind both 5 the signatory as well as the non­signatory parties, namely, respondent No.1 and respondent No.2, respectively, qua the existence of an arbitration agreement between the applicant and the said respondents. 

 Respondent No.1, however, through its counsel has urged that respondent No.2 has no concern with the subject agreement dated 1st May, 2014. That agreement is only between the applicant and respondent No.1 and   as   a   result   thereof,   it   would   give   rise   to   a   domestic commercial arbitration and not an international commercial arbitration. Respondent No.1 has also made it amply clear through its counsel that it will have no objection, whatsoever, 6 if the Court were to appoint a sole arbitrator for resolving the dispute   between   the   applicant   and   respondent   No.1,   who would conduct the arbitration proceedings in accordance with the   Act,   in   Delhi,   as   a   domestic   commercial   arbitration between the applicant and respondent No.1 alone. 

whether respondent No.2 can be said to have assented   or   had   an   intention   to   become   party   to   the arbitration   agreement   by   its   conduct,   without   being   a signatory to the agreement dated 1st May, 2014.

 the thrust of the claim of the applicant is  that Mr. Frederik Reynders was acting for and on   behalf   of   respondent   No.2,   as   a   result   of   which   the respondent No.2 has assented to the arbitration agreement. This   basis   has   been   completely   demolished   by   respondent 22 No.2 by stating, on affidavit, that Mr. Frederik Reynders was in no way associated with respondent No.2 and was only an employee   of   respondent   No.1,   who   acted   in   that   capacity during the negotiations preceding the execution of agreement. Thus,   respondent   No.2   was   neither   the   signatory   to   the arbitration agreement nor did have any causal connection with the process of negotiations preceding the agreement or the execution   thereof,   whatsoever.   If   the   main   plank   of   the applicant, that Mr. Frederik Reynders was acting for and on behalf of respondent No.2 and had the authority of respondent No.2,   collapses,   then   it   must   necessarily   follow   that respondent No.2 was not a party to the stated agreement nor had   it   given   assent   to   the   arbitration   agreement   and,   in absence  thereof,  even  if  respondent  No.2  happens  to  be  a constituent of the group of companies of which respondent No.1 is also a constituent, that will be of no avail. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
PETITION FOR ARBITRATION (CIVIL) NO. 65  OF 2016
Reckitt Benckiser (India) Private Limited      …..Petitioner(s)
:Versus:
Reynders Label Printing India 

Private Limited and Anr.     ....Respondent(s)

When the persons are not parties to the compromise - when the subject property is a joint family property - That compromise is not binding on them who are not the parties to the compromise.

When the persons are not parties to the compromise - when the subject property is a joint family property - That compromise is not binding on them who are not the parties to the compromise.

24. Indisputedly, respondent nos. 1 to 6 (original plaintiffs) were
not parties to the compromise dated 25th  March, 1976 and the
subject property at that time was joint family property and the
compromise entered into between the parties would not bind the
rights   of   respondent   nos.   1   to   6(grandsons   of   propositus
Chikkanna).
25. It   is   an   admitted   fact   on   record   that   the   property   was
purchased   by   Chikkanna   from   his   sister   Thayamma   and
respondent nos. 7 to 9(defendants nos. 2 to 4) have inherited the
property after death of propositus Chikkanna.  Respondent nos.
1 to 6 are children of respondent nos. 7 and 8(defendants nos. 2
and 3), it would be an ancestral property in their hands and
indisputedly respondent nos. 1 to 6 are neither parties to the
proceedings   nor   consented   when   the   compromise   decree   was
executed in Execution Appeal No. 2 of 1974 (Exhibit P­8) dated
7th March, 1974 and admittedly the same would not be binding
upon their share over the property.

IN THE SUPEME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION        CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 7141 OF 2008 DODDAMUNIYAPPA(DEAD) THROUGH LRS. ….Appellant(s) VERSUS MUNISWAMY & ORS. ….Respondent(s)