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Showing posts with label 1927. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1927. Show all posts

Thursday, March 13, 2014

Forest Act, 1927, Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 and Tamil Nadu Hill Stations Preservation of Trees Act and the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. - PIL - Apex court gave some directions in interlocutory application =T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad …Petitioner(s) VERSUS Union Of India & ORS. …Respondent(s) = 2014 (March. Part)judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41309

 Forest   Act,   1927,   Forest (Conservation)  Act,  1980  and   Tamil   Nadu   Hill   Stations  Preservation of Trees Act and the Environment (Protection)  Act, 1986. - PIL - Apex court gave some directions  in interlocutory application =

   Writ Petition (C) No. 202 of 1995  was  filed  as  a  PIL  under
           Article 32 of the Constitution of India for and on behalf of the
           people living in and around the Nilgiri Forest  on  the  Western
           Ghats.  The petitioner sought to challenge the legality and  the
           validity of  the  actions  of  the  State  of  Tamil  Nadu,  the
           Collector, Nilgiris District and the  District  Forest  Officer,
           Gudalur  and  the  Timber  Committee  represented  through   the
           Collector, Nilgiris (Respondent Nos. 2 to  5  respectively),  in
           destroying the tropical rain forest in the Gudalur  and  Nilgiri
           areas  in  violation   of   the   Forest   Act,   1927,   Forest
           (Conservation)  Act,  1980  and   Tamil   Nadu   Hill   Stations
           Preservation of Trees Act and the Environment (Protection)  Act,
           1986. This, according to the petitioner, has resulted in serious
           ecological imbalances affecting  lives  and  livelihood  of  the
           people living in the State of Tamil Nadu.=


Upon consideration of the entire  matter  at
        length, we accept the recommendations made by  the  CEC  reproduced
        above.  We, however, modify the direction 11(iv) as under:-
           The National CAMPA Advisory Council  (NCAC)  will  finalize  and
           issue guidelines before 1st May, 2014 regarding  the  activities
           for which the use of the CAMPA funds  will  not  be  permissible
           (such as foreign study tours) and the  activities  for  which  a
           ceiling on the use of  the  CAMPA  funds  will  apply  (such  as
           purchase of vehicles and construction of  residential  /  office
           buildings).
           These guidelines will be strictly followed by the State CAMPA.
           The same shall be treated as  directions  of  this  Court.   The
      order dated 10th July, 2009 is modified accordingly.
    32. The Ad-hoc CAMPA is permitted to release annual amount equal to 10%
        of the principal amount lying to the  credit  of  each  State/Union
        Territory, out of the interest receivable by it  with  effect  from
        financial year 2014-2015 onwards.  The  release  of  the  aforesaid
        funds shall be subjected to the conditions enumerated above.
    33. It is further directed that no money out of the  amounts  available
        with Ad-hoc CAMPA will be transferred or utilized without the leave
        of this Court. It is  further  directed  that  the  National  CAMPA
        Advisory Council will file a Status Report within a period of three
        months regarding the monitoring and evaluation of the  works  being
        undertaken, by utilizing the funds released by CAMPA.
    34. The Interlocutory Applications are disposed of with  the  aforesaid
        directions.

2014 (March. Part)judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41309            A.K. PATNAIK, SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA       

       REPORTABLE




                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION




    I.A. NOS. 2143 WITH 2283, 3088, 3461, 3479, 3693 IN 2143, 827, 1122,
                1337, 1473 AND 1620 AND 1693 IN 1473 AND 3618


                                     IN


                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 202 OF 1995


T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad                     …Petitioner(s)

                                   VERSUS

Union Of India & ORS.                         …Respondent(s)

                               J U D G M E N T
      SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.


        1. This order will dispose of the I. As. noted above.
        2. Writ Petition (C) No. 202 of 1995  was  filed  as  a  PIL  under
           Article 32 of the Constitution of India for and on behalf of the
           people living in and around the Nilgiri Forest  on  the  Western
           Ghats.  The petitioner sought to challenge the legality and  the
           validity of  the  actions  of  the  State  of  Tamil  Nadu,  the
           Collector, Nilgiris District and the  District  Forest  Officer,
           Gudalur  and  the  Timber  Committee  represented  through   the
           Collector, Nilgiris (Respondent Nos. 2 to  5  respectively),  in
           destroying the tropical rain forest in the Gudalur  and  Nilgiri
           areas  in  violation   of   the   Forest   Act,   1927,   Forest
           (Conservation)  Act,  1980  and   Tamil   Nadu   Hill   Stations
           Preservation of Trees Act and the Environment (Protection)  Act,
           1986. This, according to the petitioner, has resulted in serious
           ecological imbalances affecting  lives  and  livelihood  of  the
           people living in the State of Tamil Nadu.

        3. The petitioner has highlighted  that  the  respondents  have  in
           collusion with certain vested interests allowed  trespassers  to
           encroach and enter upon the  forest  land  for  the  purpose  of
           felling trees and conversion of forest  land  into  plantations.
           It was pointed out that the encroachers on the forest land  have
           been indiscriminately cutting  and  removing  valuable  Rosewood
           trees, Teak trees and Ayni trees, which are  immensely  valuable
           and are found exclusively  in  the  aforesaid  forest.   It  was
           pointed out that loss of  such  trees  would  be  permanent  and
           irreparable to the present and future generations to come.   The
           petitioner has  clearly  pleaded  that  the  value  attached  to
           Rosewood and Teak wood has resulted in  a  mad  rush  by  timber
           contractors in collusion with Government  agencies,  for  making
           quick profits without any regard to  the  permanent  damage  and
           destruction caused to the rain forest and to the  eco-system  of
           the region.  The petitioner also pointed out  that  cutting  and
           removing of trees is not limited only to the mature  trees.   In
           their anxiety to make huge profits the entire forest  areas  are
           being  cleared,  by  indiscriminate  felling  of   trees.    The
           petitioner also pointed out that the national policy adopted  in
           the year 1952 provided for the protection  and  preservation  of
           forests.  The existence of large areas  of  land  covered  under
           forest is recognized as  a  valuable  segment  of  the  national
           heritage.  The petitioner also pointed out that  the  protection
           from exploitation of forests, in particular natural forests,  is
           imperative as such forests once destroyed can not be regenerated
           to their natural state.  The petitioner  has  pleaded  that  the
           destruction  of  rain  forests  would   adversely   affect   the
           environment, eco-system, the plants and  animals  living  within
           the forests.  This would result in such destruction, which would
           ultimately result in drastic changes in the environment and  the
           quality of life of people living in and around the forests.  The
           petitioner also highlighted that although  the  national  policy
           has provided that 33% of the land mass of India shall be covered
           with forests, the present extent of the forest covered areas was
           below 15%.  The natural rain forest cover was  only  around  5%.
           Such meager forest cover had led to the enactment of the  Forest
           (Conservation) Act, 1980.  Statement of objects and  reasons  of
           the aforesaid Act is as follows:-
           (1)   Deforestation causes ecological  imbalance  and  leads  to
                 environmental deterioration. Deforestation had been  taking
                 place on a large scale in the country  and  it  had  caused
                 widespread concern.


           (2)    With  a  view  to  checking  further  deforestation,  the
                 President promulgated on the 25th October, 1980, the Forest
                 (Conservation) Ordinance,  1980.  The  Ordinance  made  the
                 prior approval of the Central government necessary for  de-
                 reservation of reserved forests and for use of  forest-land
                 for non-forest purposes. The Ordinance  also  provided  for
                 the constitution of an advisory committee to advise
                 the  Central  Government  with  regard  to  grant  of  such
                 approval.




        4. Apart from pointing out the provisions of the aforesaid Act, the
           petitioner also protested that  the  population  living  in  the
           areas mentioned above is being deprived of the right to live  in
           a clean and pollution free  environment  and,  therefore,  their
           fundamental  rights  protected   under   Article   21   of   the
           Constitution  of  India  are  being  violated.   The  petitioner
           pointed out that the preservation and protection of  forests  is
           recognized as essential for maintaining a  clean  and  pollution
           free environment.  He further pointed out that the rain forests,
           which are found only in the southern part of the  Western  Ghats
           contain several rarest species of plants and  animals  and  also
           the main source of water supply to the rivers flowing  from  the
           Ghats.  The large scale denuding  of  the  green  cover  on  the
           Western Ghats has resulted in shortage of water  in  the  rivers
           and has adversely  affected  the  people  living  on  the  water
           flowing from the rivers.

        5. This apart, it was pointed out that forests are the main  source
           of livelihood for a large number of people, who live within  and
           around the forests.  It was  also  pointed  out  that  the  rain
           forests are the source  of  life  and  the  plants  and  animals
           contained within it are useful  for  enhanced  quality  of  life
           enjoyed by mankind.  The bio-diversity of the  rain  forest,  it
           was emphasized, has to be preserved for  the  welfare  and  well
           being of future generations  of  mankind.   The  petitioner  was
           constrained to move this Court  in  the  present  writ  petition
           being so perturbed by the large scale destruction of the forests
           and other natural resources found in  the  three  States  namely
           Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Kerala.  It was lamented that all  the
           protective legislation enacted by Union  of  India  are  nothing
           more than statements in the statute books, in  as  much  as  the
           forest land and its wealth are  being  plundered  everyday.   He
           pointed out that it can no longer be denied that well  organized
           rackets  exist   between   the   forests   authorities,   timber
           contractors and the local authorities which are facilitating the
           cutting and removal of trees and timber in  gross  violation  of
           Forests Conservation Act.  The petitioner has given  details  of
           the manner in which  individuals,  contractors  and  firms  were
           clandestinely permitted to trespass and plunder the forest  area
           for the invaluable Rosewood trees.  It was stated that each tree
           commands a price of Rs.15 to 20 Lakhs in the market.   When  all
           the efforts of all the concerned  individuals,  NGOs  and  other
           social activists failed, the  petitioners  were  constrained  to
           knock on the doors of this Court by way of writ  petition  under
           Article 32 of the Constitution of India.  The  prayers  made  in
           the aforesaid writ petitions are as under:-
           (a)   issue an appropriate writ, order  or  direction  directing
                 the State of Tamil Nadu to take steps to stop  all  felling
                 and clearing activities in the forests of Nilgiris District
                 in the State of Tamil Nadu.


           (b)   issue an appropriate writ, order  or  direction  directing
                 the respondents 2 to 5 to stop conversion of  forest  lands
                 to plantation or other purposes.


           (c)    issue  an  appropriate  writ,  or   direction   directing
                 respondents 2 to 5 to take steps to remove all unauthorised
                 and  illegal  occupants  of  forest  land  in  the  Nilgiri
                 District of Tamil Nadu.


           (d)   issue  an  appropriate  writ,  order  direction  directing
                 respondent 2 to 5 to stop  the  transport  and  removal  of
                 timber from the forests in the Nilgiri District.


           (e)   issue an appropriate writ, order direction  to  appoint  a
                 committee for assessing the damage caused to the forest  in
                 the western ghats in the State of Tamil Nadu, Karntaka  and
                 Keral and in particular the hills of the Nilgiris mountain.


           (f)   Pass such other and further orders.


        6.  Understandably  disturbed  by  the  horrendous  fact  situation
           narrated in the writ petition, this Court issued notice  to  not
           only the concerned States but also to other States.  Thereafter,
           the writ petition is pending.

        7. In this writ  petition,  Interlocutory  Applications  have  been
           filed seeking either general or specific directions in  relation
           to various issues concerning the protection and  improvement  of
           environment. The subjects covered by Interlocutory  Applications
           at various stages ranged  from  protection  of  existing  forest
           cover; improvement in the forest  cover;  protection  of  lakes,
           rivers and wild life; and protection of flora and fauna and  the
           ecological  system  of  the  country.  This   Court   has   been
           continuously  monitoring  the  enforcement  of   the   protected
           measures directed to  be  taken  by  the  various  Central/State
           authorities on the basis of  the  recommendations  made  by  the
           relevant expert bodies.

        8. On 29th October, 2002, this  Court  considered  I.A.         No.
           566, in which this  Court  had  taken  suo-moto  notice  on  the
           Statement of Mr. K.N. Rawal, Additional Solicitor General to the
           effect that the amount collected by various States from the user
           agencies to whom permissions were granted for using forest  land
           for  non-forest  purposes,  was  not  being  utilized  for  such
           compensatory afforestation.  It was pointed out that moneys paid
           by  user  agencies  to  State   Governments   for   compensatory
           afforestation were utilized for such afforestation only  to  the
           extent of 63% of  the  funds  actually  realized  by  the  State
           Governments.  The shortfall even at that time was nearly Rs. 200
           crores.  This Court, therefore, recorded that on the next  date,
           it would consider as to how this shortfall was to be made  good.
           It was directed that the  Ministry  of  Environment  and  Forest
           should formulate a Scheme whereby, whenever  any  permission  is
           granted for  change  of  user  of  forest  land  for  non-forest
           purposes, and one of the conditions of the permission  is  that,
           there   should   be   compensatory   afforestation,   then   the
           responsibility for the same  is  that  of  the  user-agency  and
           should be required to set apart a sum of  money  for  doing  the
           needful.  It was further provided that in such a case, the State
           Governments concerned will have to  provide  or  make  available
           land on which forestation can take place.  This land may have to
           be made available either at the expense of the user-agency or of
           the State Governments, as the State Governments may decide.   It
           was further directed that the scheme which is framed by the MoEF
           should be such as to ensure that afforestation  takes  place  as
           per the permissions which are granted and  there  should  be  no
           shortfall in respect thereto.

        9. It was also brought to the notice of this Court on the basis  of
           the statement placed on record in I.A.Nos.419 and 420  that  the
           funds accumulated  for  diverting  forest  area  for  non-forest
           purposes,   compensatory   afforestation,   although    actually
           received, had not been appropriately utilized. The CEC  examined
           this question. The  report,  inter  alia,  provided  that  there
           should be a change in the manner in which the funds are released
           by the State Governments relating to Compensatory Afforestation.
           The CEC recommended that it  would  be  desirable  to  create  a
           separate fund for Compensatory Afforestation,  wherein  all  the
           money received from the user-agencies are to  be  deposited  and
           subsequently released directly to the implementing  agencies  as
           and when required. The funds received from  a  particular  State
           would be utilized in the same State.

       10. There was a consensus among the States and the Union Territories
           that such a fund be created. It was also  recommended  that  the
           funds should not be a part of general revenues of the  Union  or
           all the States or of the Consolidated Funds of India.   The  CEC
           Report also contemplated the involvement  of  user-agencies  for
           Compensatory Afforestation.

       11. The CEC in its report  dated  5th  September,  2002  made  eight
           recommendations which were accepted by the Union of India in  an
           affidavit filed in response to the aforesaid report.  The  Union
           of  India  further  stated,  in  the   affidavit,   that   major
           institutional reorganization of the present mechanism has to  be
           undertaken. It was proposed that  comprehensive  rules  will  be
           framed which  will  inter  alia  relate  to  the  procedure  and
           compensation.  It was also proposed that there shall be  a  body
           for the management of the Compensatory Afforestation Fund (CAF).
           The suggestion of the Union of  India  was  that  CAF  would  be
           composed of a Director General of Forest; Special Secretary, who
           would be  the  ex-officio  Chairman  and  Inspector  General  of
           Forest, who would be the ex-officio Member Secretary. The report
           of the CEC was  accepted  and  this  Court  made  the  following
           recommendations :-
           “(a) The Union of India shall  within  eight  weeks  from  today
           frame comprehensive rules with regard to the constitution  of  a
           body and management of the Compensatory Afforestation  funds  in
           concurrence with the Central Empowered  Committee.  These  rules
           shall be filed in this Court  within  eight  weeks  form  today.
           Necessary notification constituting this  body  will  be  issued
           simultaneously.


           (b) Compensatory Afforestation Funds which  have  not  yet  been
           realised as well as the unspent funds already  realised  by  the
           States shall be transferred to the said body within  six  months
           of its constitution by  the  respective  states  and  the  user-
           agencies.


           (c) In addition to above, while according transfer under  Forest
           Conservation Act, 1980 for change in user-agency from  all  non-
           forest purposes, the user agency shall also pay  into  the  said
           fund the net value of the forest land  diverted  for  non-forest
           purposes. The present value is to be recovered at  the  rate  of
           Rs. 5.80 lakhs per hectare to Rs.  9.20  lakhs  per  hectare  of
           forest land depending upon the quantity and density of the  land
           in question converted for non-forest use. This will  be  subject
           to upward revision by the Ministry of Environment &  Forests  in
           consultation  with  Central  Empowered  Committee  as  and  when
           necessary.


           (d) A 'Compensatory Afforestation  Fund'  shall  be  created  in
           which all the monies received  from  the  user-agencies  towards
           compensatory     afforestation,     additional      compensatory
           afforestation, penal  compensatory  afforestation,  net  present
           value of forest land, Catchment Area Treatment Plan Funds,  etc.
           shall be deposited. The rules, procedure and composition of  the
           body for management of the Compensatory Afforestation Fund shall
           be finalised by the Ministry of Environment & Forests  with  the
           concurrence of Central Empowered Committee within one month.


           (e) The funds received from the  user-agencies  in  cases  where
           forest land diverted falls  within  Protected  Areas  i.e.  area
           notified  under  Section  18,  26A  or  35  of  the  Wild   Life
           (Protection) Act, 1972, for undertaking  activities  related  to
           protection of  bio-diversity,  wildlife,  etc.,  shall  also  be
           deposited in this Fund. Such monies shall  be  used  exclusively
           for  undertaking  protection  and  conservation  activities   in
           protected areas of the respective States/Union Territories.


           (f) The amount received on account of compensatory afforestation
           but not spent or any balance amount lying with the  States/Union
           Territories or any amount that is yet to be recovered  from  the
           use-agency shall also be deposited in this Fund.


           (g) Besides  artificial  regeneration  (plantations),  the  fund
           shall  also  be  utilised  for  undertaking   assisted   natural
           regeneration,  protection   of   forests   and   other   related
           activities. For this purpose, site  .specific  plans  should  be
           prepared and implemented in a time bound manner.


           (h)  The  user  agencies  especially  the  large  public  sector
           undertaking such as Power Grid Corporation, N.T.P.C., etc. which
           frequently require forest land for their projects should also be
           involved   in   undertaking   compensatory   afforestation    by
           establishing Special Purpose Vehicle. Whereas the private sector
           user  agencies  may  be  involved   in   monitoring   and   most
           importantly,  in  protection  of   compensatory   afforestation.
           Necessary procedure for this purpose would be laid down  by  the
           Ministry of Environment & Forests with the  concurrence  of  the
           Central Empowered Committee.


           (i) Plantations must use  local  and  indigenous  species  since
           exotics have long term negative impacts on the environment.


           (j) An independent  system  of  concurrent  monitoring  and
           evaluation shall be evolved  and  implemented  through  the
           Compensatory Afforestation Fund  to  ensure  effective  and
           proper utilisation of funds.”


       12. Keeping in view the aforesaid representation, the MoEF issued  a
           notification on 23rd April, 2004  constituting  a  “Compensatory
           Afforestation Funds Management and Planning  Authority  (CAMPA)”
           as  an  authority  under  Section  3(3)   of   the   Environment
           (Protection) Act, 1986. This notification  provides  that  there
           shall be a governing body. Minister of Environment and  Forests,
           Government of India is the Chairman. Apart from the members  who
           are taken from the level of Secretary,  MoEF  to  the  level  of
           Inspector General of Forest, the governing body also includes an
           eminent professional ecologist, not being from the  Central  and
           the State Government for a period of 2 years of  time,  but  for
           two consecutive terms. The notification  also  provides  for  an
           executive body having seven members  with  Director  General  of
           Forests and Special Secretary, MoEF, Government of India as  the
           Chairman. The notification elaborately provides  the  power  and
           functions of the Governing Body;  power  and  functions  of  the
           Executive Body; Management of the Funds; Disbursement of  funds;
           monitoring and evaluation of works. It also provides that  every
           State or the Union Territory shall have a Steering Committee and
           a  Management  Committee.  It  also  provides  the  powers   and
           functions  of  the  State  Steering  Committee  and  the   State
           Management  Committee.  The  jurisdiction  of   the   CAMPA   is
           throughout India. Unfortunately, the aforesaid notification  has
           only remained on paper and it has not been made functional  till
           date by the MoEF.

       13. This Court again examined the entire issue in  relation  to  the
           decline in environment quality due to increasing pollution, loss
           of  vegetation  cover  and   biological   diversity,   excessive
           concentrations of harmful chemicals in  the  ambient  atmosphere
           and in food chains, growing risk of environmental accidents, and
           threats to life support system, for the protection of which  the
           Environment  (Protection)  Act,  1986  had   been   enacted.   A
           comprehensive  judgment  was  given   in         I.A.No.826   in
           I.A.No.566 in W.P. (C) No.202 1995 on            26th September,
           2005. The Court noticed the statutory  provisions  contained  in
           the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, Environment (Protection) Act,
           1986, and Water Prevention and Control of Pollution  Act,  1974.
           It also noticed that large sums of money which had been  payable
           by user-agencies in cases where approval had  been  granted  for
           diverting  forest  land   that   stipulated   for   compensatory
           afforestation were not being used. It is further noticed by this
           Court that certain rates had been fixed per  hectare  of  forest
           land depending on  the  quality  and  density  of  the  land  in
           question  converted  for  non-forestry   use.   After   detailed
           examination of the issues related to the payment of Net  Present
           Value (NPV)  and  Compensatory  Afforestation  Fund,  the  Court
           upheld the constitutional validity of the payment to CAMPA under
           the notification dated 23rd April, 2004. It was  held  that  the
           payment of NPV is for the  protection  of  environment.  It  was
           further held that the natural resources are not the ownership of
           any one State or individual, public at large is its beneficiary.
           Therefore, the contention that the amount of NPV shall  be  made
           over to the State Government was rejected.

       14. The Court also  constituted  a  Committee  of  Experts  (Kanchan
           Chopra Committee)  to  formulate  a  practical  methodology  for
           determining NPV payable for various categories of forest and the
           project which deserves to be exempted from payment of NPV.

       15. As noticed earlier, huge amount of money received from the user-
           agencies towards the NPV, Compensatory Afforestation  etc.  were
           lying with various authorities without any effective control and
           monitoring  as  the  CAMPA  notification  had  not   been   made
           operational by the MoEF.

       16. The Court reiterated the ratio of M.C.Mehta  Vs.  Kamal  Nath  &
           Ors.[1] that it is the duty of the State to preserve the natural
           resources in their pristine purity. The Doctrine of Public Trust
           was re-enforced. It was emphasized that the Doctrine  of  Public
           Trust is founded on the idea that certain common properties such
           as rivers, seashore,  forest  and  the  air  were  held  by  the
           Government trusteeship for the free and  unimpeded  use  of  the
           general public. It was reiterated that our legal system based on
           English Common Law which includes the Doctrine of  Public  Trust
           as part of its jurisprudence. The State is the  trustee  of  all
           natural resources which are by nature meant for public  use  and
           enjoyment.

       17.  Therefore,  this  Court  recognized  the  need  to   take   all
           precautionary measures  when  forests  land  are  sought  to  be
           diverted for non-forestry use, the creation of CAF was approved.
           In coming to the aforesaid  conclusions,  the  Court  took  into
           consideration intergenerational equity. The State  was  required
           to undertake short term as well as long term  measures  for  the
           protection of the environment.

       18. As noticed earlier, this Court by order dated 28th  March,  2008
           had fixed the rates at which NPV is payable for the non-forestry
           uses of forest land falling in different Eco-classes and density
           sub-classes. The rates vary from Rs.10.43 lakh  per  hectare  to
           Rs.4.38 lakh per hectare. For the use of forest land falling  in
           the National Parks and Wildlife Sanctuaries, the NPV is  payable
           at 10 times and 5 times respectively of the normal rates of NPV.
           By order dated 9th  May,  2008,  this  Court  has  exempted  the
           payment of NPV for non-forestry use of forest land (a) upto  one
           hectare for construction of schools, hospitals,  village  tanks,
           laying of underground pipe lines  and  electricity  distribution
           lines upto 22 KV, (b) for relocation of villages  from  National
           Parks/Wildlife Sanctuaries, (c) for collection of boulders/silts
           from river beds, (d) for laying  of  underground  optical  fibre
           cables and (e) for pre-1980 regularization of encroachments  and
           has granted 50% exemption for underground mining projects.

       19. Although huge sums of money had been received from user-agencies
           but  there  were  no  effective  checks  and  balances  for  its
           utilization. Therefore, by order dated 5th May, 2006, this Court
           accepted a suggestion made by the CEC submitted in I.A.  No.1473
           for  constitution  of  an  Ad-hoc  body   till   CAMPA   becomes
           operational.  All  State  Governments/Union   Territories   were
           directed to account for and pay the amount collected with effect
           from 30th October, 2002 in conformity with the order dated  29th
           October, 2002 to the aforesaid Ad-hoc body (Ad-hoc  CAMPA).  The
           following two suggestions made by the CEC were accepted:-
           “(a) ensure that all the  monies  recovered  on  behalf  of  the
           ‘CAMPA’ and which are presently lying with the various officials
           of the State Government are transferred to the  bank  account(s)
           to be operated by this body.


           (b) get audited all the monies received form the  user  agencies
           on behalf of the ‘CAMPA’ and the income earned  thereon  by  the
           various  State  Government  officials.  The  auditors   may   be
           appointed by the CAG. The audit may also examine whether  proper
           financial procedure has been following in investing the funds.”


       20. The Chief Secretaries of the State Governments/Administrators of
           Union Territories were directed to  cooperate  with  the  Ad-hoc
           CAMPA as well as the Comptroller and Auditor General. The Ad-hoc
           CAMPA under the Chairmanship of the Director General of  Forests
           and Special Secretary, MoEF and has  (a)  Inspector  General  of
           Forest (FC), MoEF (b) representative of Comptroller and  Auditor
           General of India (c) nominee of the Chairman of the CEC  as  its
           Members. In accordance with the directions of  this  Court,  the
           money already received as  well  as  the  money  being  received
           towards the NPV etc. have  been  transferred  to  the     Ad-hoc
           CAMPA and invested in the fixed deposit with National Banks. The
           money lying with the Ad-hoc CAMPA towards the NPV etc.  received
           from the States (principal amount) and the interest received  on
           the  fixed  deposit  (cumulative  interest)  has   substantially
           increased over a period of  time  and  is  presently  about  Rs.
           30,000 crores.

       21. On 2nd April, 2009, MoEF has issued  “the  guidelines  of  State
           Compensatory  Afforestation   Fund   Management   and   Planning
           Authority (State CAMPA)”. These guidelines have been prepared on
           the basis of the discussions held in the meeting  of  the  Chief
           Secretaries  that  the  objective  to  assist  the  States/Union
           Territories for setting up the requisite mechanism in consonance
           with the directions issued from time to time by this Court.  The
           guidelines are general in nature and can be moulded  keeping  in
           view the specific needs of any particular State/Union Territory.
           The State CAMPA has been set up as an instrument  to  accelerate
           activities for preservation of natural  forests,  management  of
           wildlife, infrastructure development in  the  sector  and  other
           allied works.   By  order  dated  10th  July,  2009  this  Court
           directed that the guidelines and structure of the State CAMPA as
           prepared by MoEF may be notified and implemented. The Court also
           permitted the Ad-hoc CAMPA to release about  Rs.1000  crore  per
           year for the next five  years,  in  proportion  of  10%  of  the
           principal  amount  pertaining  to  the  respective  States/Union
           Territories, inter alia, subject to the condition that the State
           Accountant General shall carry out, on annual basis,  the  audit
           of the expenditure incurred every year out of  the  State  CAMPA
           funds. It was further directed that an amount  upto  5%  of  the
           amount released to the State CAMPA, i.e., upto Rs.50  crore  per
           annum, may also be released and utilized by the  National  CAMPA
           Advisory Council constituted under the Chairmanship of  Ministry
           of Environment and Forest for monitoring and evaluation and  for
           the implementation of the various schemes as given in the  State
           CAMPA guidelines.

       22. The State  CAMPA  has  been  constituted  for  each  State/Union
           Territory.  It  has  a  three-tier  structure.   The   Executive
           Committee functions under  the  Chairmanship  of  the  Principal
           Chief Conservator of Forests is responsible for the  Annual Plan
           of Operation (APO) for various works planned  to  be  undertaken
           during each year. The Steering Committee under the  Chairmanship
           of Chief Secretary is responsible for approving the APO for each
           year. The Chief Minister is the Chairman of the  Governing  Body
           which is responsible for overall guidance and policy issues. The
           Ad-hoc CAMPA releases the funds to each of the State  CAMPAs  as
           per the approved APO. At present, a total sum of  Rs.1000  crore
           is permitted to be released to the State per  year.  The  State-
           wise accounts of the principal amounts and  cumulative  interest
           be maintained by the Ad-hoc CAMPA. The funds are  not  permitted
           to be utilized for any purpose other than  those  authorized  by
           the Court. The administrative expenses of CAMPA are incurred  by
           the CEC.
       23. With the establishment of the Ad-hoc CAMPA, huge sums  of  money
           have accumulated which can be released to the  State  CAMPA  for
           utilization, for protection  and  for  the  improvement  of  the
           national environment. Now the aforesaid applications  have  been
           filed by different States seeking  release  of  some  funds  for
           completing the task of compulsory afforestation, as directed  by
           this Court from time to time. The  relief  claimed  in  all  the
           applications is almost identical. We shall make a  reference  to
           the averments made in I.A.No.3618 of 2013  for  the  purpose  of
           deciding all the applications.

       24. I.A. No. 3618 of 2013 in Writ Petition (C) No. 202 of  1995  has
           been filed by the State of Gujarat with the following prayer:-
           “i.   To direct the Ad-hoc CAMPA to release minimum  of  10%  of
           principal amount deposited by the States/UTs with  Ad-hoc  CAMPA
           and the total amount accrued as interest on such deposits to the
           respective State/UT’s including to the State of Gujarat  without
           the ceiling of Rs.1,000 crore, in order to ensure effective  and
           timely  implementation  of  Compensatory  Afforestation  Scheme,
           Wildlife  Conservation  and  other   Forest   conservation   and
           Protection Measures as envisaged in the CAMPA guidelines;


           ii.   Pass any  other  directions  deemed  fit  by  the  Hon’ble
           Court.”


           Prayers made in other  applications  are  similar,  if  not
      identical.
       25. The aforesaid relief is claimed on the  basis  that  the  amount
           available with CAMPA is  substantially  higher  than  Rs.1,000/-
           crores, wherein the annual release from  the  Ad-hoc  CAMPA  has
           been restricted to Rs.1,000/- crores p.a. by the orders of  this
           Court.  It is further pointed out that only during the year 2009-
           10, 10% of the principal amount, i.e., Rs.24.96 crores has  been
           released  by  the  Ad-hoc  CAMPA  to  Gujarat   State.    During
           subsequent years, i.e., 2010-11 and 2011-12, the annual  release
           from ad-hoc CAMPA to Gujarat State had come down from 10% to  8%
           and then to 7%, respectively.  For the year 2012-13, the  amount
           released is only 6.5% of  the  principal  amount.   It  is  also
           submitted by the learned counsel  appearing  for  the  State  of
           Gujarat that at the time when these applications were  filed  in
           April, 2013, the total funds available  with  the  Ad-hoc  CAMPA
           were as follows:-
           a.    The Principal amount at the disposal of  ad-hoc  CAMPA  is
                 around Rs.28000 crores.
           b.    The accrued interest  on  it  is  of  the  order  of  over
                 Rs.4,000 crores.
           c.    The annual accrual of interest on the deposits is  of  the
                 order of Rs. 2200 crores.


       26. Relying on the aforesaid facts and figures, it is  submitted  by
           the learned counsel for all the States that the  funds  released
           to the State CAMPAs are only a fraction of the interest accruing
           in the Ad-hoc CAMPA accounts. It is further submitted  that  the
           value of the  compensatory  levies,  which  have  been  obtained
           against the diversion of forest land over a period of many years
           has eroded substantially.  This is added to  by  the  continuous
           inflationary trends, which has  made  the  task  of  undertaking
           Compensatory Afforestation very cost intensive.   Therefore,  it
           is imperative that the funds are made available to State  CAMPAs
           in a  substantial  ratio  to  the  amounts  collected  from  the
           State/Union  Territories.   To  illustrate  this  dilemma,   the
           applicant has relied on a chart, which is as under:-
                                                             (Rs. In Crores)
|Year          |Amount required|Amount released |Shortfall    |
|              |as per APO     |to Gujarat State|             |
|              |               |CAMPA           |             |
|1             |2              |3               |4            |
|2009-10       |43.16          |24.96           |18.20        |
|2010-11       |43.78          |29.16           |14.62        |
|2011-12       |55.08          |26.30           |28.78        |
|2012-13       |40.61          |32.41           |8.20         |
|Total         |182.63         |112.83          |69.80        |


       27. Relying on the aforesaid chart, it  is  submitted  that  due  to
           release of  insufficient  CAMPA  funds,  all  the  NPV  Projects
           approved by the Steering Committee could not be started.  In the
           year 2009-10, out of 24 NPV Projects only 4  projects  could  be
           implemented.  In the year 2011-12, out of 14 NPV  Projects  only
           12 Projects could be implemented.  In the year 2012-13,  out  of
           15 NPV Projects only 14 Projects could be  implemented.   It  is
           pointed out that even in relation to the  projects,  which  have
           been implemented; all the activities in support of the  projects
           could not be taken up due to want of funds. This has resulted in
           an overall shortfall in the Forest  and  Wildlife  Conservation,
           which is the prime objective of CAMPA funds.  Therefore, several
           State/Union Territory Governments  including  State  of  Gujarat
           have requested the Ministry of Environment & Forests to increase
           the annual release from the Ad-hoc CAMPA funds to a minimum  10%
           of the principal amount available with Ad-hoc CAMPA, without any
           ceiling of about Rs.1,000/- crores per annum.  However, since no
           response was received from the MoEF, the State  of  Gujarat  and
           other applicant States/Union  Governments  were  constrained  to
           file the IAs.
       28. These applications came up for hearing  on  26th  August,  2013,
           20th September, 2013 and 4th October, 2013.  Upon examination of
           the entire matter, a direction was issued on      9th  December,
           2013 to the Central Empowered Committee (hereinafter referred to
           as “CEC”) to submit its  report  on  the  applications  and  the
           prayers made by the applicant.  CEC  has  submitted  its  report
           dated 6th January, 2014.
       29. In response to the application filed by the  State  of  Gujarat,
           this Court by order dated 9th December, 2013  had  directed  the
           CEC to submit its report.
       30. In its report dated 6th January, 2014, CEC has recommended  that
           the prayer made in the application ought  to  be  accepted.  The
           relevant extract of the CEC Report is as under:
           “11. The CEC, in the  above  background,  recommends  that  this
           Hon'ble Court may in partial modification of its  earlier  order
           dated 10th July, 2009 consider permitting the  Ad-hoc  CAMPA  to
           annually release from the financial year 2014-2015 onwards,  out
           of the interest received / receivable by it, an amount equal  to
           10% of the principle (sic) amount lying to the credit of each of
           the State / UT at beginning of the year to the respective  State
           CAMPA subject to the following conditions:


           i)    the funds will be released by utilizing interest  received
                 / being received by the Ad-hoc CAMPA. The  principle  (sic)
                 amount lying with the Ad-hoc CAMPA will not be released  or
                 transferred or utilized;


                 ii)   the funds will  be  released  after  receipt  of  the
                 "Annual  Plan  of  Operation"  containing  details  of  the
                 afforestation  and  other  works  for   the   conservation,
                 protection and development of the forests and wildlife  and
                 approved by the Steering Committee of the respective  State
                 CAMPA;


                 iii)  the Ad-hoc CAMPA will be at liberty  to  release  the
                 funds to the State CAMPAs in one or more installments after
                 considering the utilization of funds earlier released;


                 iv)   the  National  CAMPA  Advisory  Council  (NCAC)  will
                 finalize and  issue  guidelines  before  31st  March,  2014
                 regarding the activities for which the  use  of  the  CAMPA
                 funds will not be permissible (such as foreign study tours)
                 and the activities for which a ceiling on the  use  of  the
                 CAMPA funds will apply (such as purchase  of  vehicles  and
                 construction of residential / office buildings).
                 These guidelines will be strictly  followed  by  the  State
                 CAMPA;


                 v)    the State CAMPAs and the MoEF will expeditiously take
                 necessary follow up action on the observations made in  the
                 "Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India  on
                 Compensatory Afforestation in India".


                 vi)   the back log of Compensatory Afforestation,  if  any,
                 will be tackled on priority basis and  for  which  adequate
                 provision will be made in  the  Annual  Plan  of  Operation
                 (APO) by the respective State CAMPAs; and


                 vii)  the annual release of funds  to  the  National  CAMPA
                 Advisory Counsel (NCAC) will continue to  be  upto  Rs.  50
                 crore and provided the amounts earlier released  are  found
                 to have been substantial utilized.”
           The aforesaid recommendations have been given by the  CEC  after
      setting out the background in which the CAMPA was set up.
    31. Mr. Salve learned Amicus Curiae on the  basis  of  the  record  has
        submitted that on the directions issued by this Court about Rs.6000
        crores are being received by CAMPA annually. This amount represents
        the total amount  collected  for  compensatory  afforestation  fund
        (principal  amount  Rs.3000  crores  annually)  and   approximately
        Rs.3000 crores by way of interest on fixed deposits annually.  This
        is in addition  to  the  accumulative  principal  amount  which  is
        already invested in fixed deposits. He submits that keeping in view
        the directions issued by this Court from time to time for  ensuring
        afforestation it would be appropriate to accept the  recommendation
        of the CEC. He submits that the scheme proposed  by  the  CEC  will
        gradually increase in the  release  of  funds  to  the  State/Union
        Territory over a period of time and on  a  sustainable  basis.  The
        learned Amicus Curiae has, however, suggested  that  certain  other
        safeguards ought to be incorporated to ensure efficient  management
        of the funds released. Upon consideration of the entire  matter  at
        length, we accept the recommendations made by  the  CEC  reproduced
        above.  We, however, modify the direction 11(iv) as under:-
           The National CAMPA Advisory Council  (NCAC)  will  finalize  and
           issue guidelines before 1st May, 2014 regarding  the  activities
           for which the use of the CAMPA funds  will  not  be  permissible
           (such as foreign study tours) and the  activities  for  which  a
           ceiling on the use of  the  CAMPA  funds  will  apply  (such  as
           purchase of vehicles and construction of  residential  /  office
           buildings).
           These guidelines will be strictly followed by the State CAMPA.
           The same shall be treated as  directions  of  this  Court.   The
      order dated 10th July, 2009 is modified accordingly.
    32. The Ad-hoc CAMPA is permitted to release annual amount equal to 10%
        of the principal amount lying to the  credit  of  each  State/Union
        Territory, out of the interest receivable by it  with  effect  from
        financial year 2014-2015 onwards.  The  release  of  the  aforesaid
        funds shall be subjected to the conditions enumerated above.
    33. It is further directed that no money out of the  amounts  available
        with Ad-hoc CAMPA will be transferred or utilized without the leave
        of this Court. It is  further  directed  that  the  National  CAMPA
        Advisory Council will file a Status Report within a period of three
        months regarding the monitoring and evaluation of the  works  being
        undertaken, by utilizing the funds released by CAMPA.
    34. The Interlocutory Applications are disposed of with  the  aforesaid
        directions.


                                                             …………………………….…J.
                                                               [A.K.Patnaik]

                                                            ………………………………….J.
                                                     [Surinder Singh Nijjar]


                                                         ……..……………………………….J.
                                          [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla]
      New Delhi;
      March 12, 2014.
-----------------------
[1]    1997 (1) SCC 388

-----------------------
35


Saturday, February 1, 2014

Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, Section 2(f)(iii) of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975, Section 24 of the Private Forests Act, and Salsette Estates (Land Revenue Exemption Abolition) Act, 1951 and Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,1976 -Godrej purchased a kowl land and obtained decree against the government when action was intiated action under Salsette Estates Act - and also obtained exemption under Urban land ceiling also and with the approval raised multi storied buildings for the staff and after the lapse of half century , it came to the light that the forest department issued notice under sec.35 to the Godrej - but there is no evidence that it was served on the Godrej nor it was published in Gazette claiming that the land was forest land and like wise there is no evidence that it was acted upon - hence the claim of forest to demolish the buildings and to deliver the vacant possession of land for developing forest under private forest Act - Apex court set aside the Bombay High court order and held that silence of Forest the word "issue" interpreted in chintamani case was over ruled - and held that The silence of the State in all the appeals before us led the appellants and a large number of citizens to believe that there was no patent illegality in the constructions on the disputed land nor was there any legal risk in investing on the disputed land. -Apex court allowed the appeals = Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. & Anr. ..….Appellants Versus The State of Maharashtra & Ors. …..Respondents = 2014 (January part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41193

  Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest  Act, 1927, Section  2(f)(iii)  of  the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975, Section  24  of  the  Private Forests Act, and Salsette Estates (Land Revenue Exemption  Abolition)  Act,  1951 and Urban Land  (Ceiling  and  Regulation)  Act,1976 -Godrej purchased a kowl land and obtained decree against the government when action was intiated action under Salsette Estates Act - and also obtained exemption under Urban land ceiling also and with the approval raised multi storied buildings for the staff and after the lapse of half century , it came to the light that the forest department issued notice under sec.35 to the Godrej - but there is no evidence that it was served on the Godrej nor it was published in Gazette claiming that the land was forest land and like wise there is no evidence that it was acted upon - hence the claim of forest to demolish the buildings and to deliver the vacant possession of land for developing forest under private forest Act - Apex court set aside the Bombay High court order and held that silence of Forest the word "issue" interpreted in chintamani case was over ruled - and held that The silence of the State in  all  the  appeals before us led the appellants and a large number of citizens to believe  that there was no patent illegality in the constructions  on  the  disputed  land nor was there any legal risk in  investing  on  the  disputed  land.   -Apex court allowed the appeals = 

whether the mere  issuance
of a notice under the provisions of Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest  Act,
1927 is sufficient for any land being declared  a  “private  forest”  within
the meaning of that expression  as  defined  in  Section  2(f)(iii)  of  the
Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975.  In  our  opinion,  the
question must be answered  in  the  negative.  Connected  therewith  is  the
question
whether the word “issued” in Section 2(f) (iii) of the  Maharashtra
Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975 read with Section  35  of  the  Indian
Forest Act, 1927 must be given a literal interpretation or a broad  meaning.
 In our opinion the word must be given a broad meaning  in  the  surrounding
context in which it is used.

3.    A tertiary question that arises is, assuming the  disputed  lands  are
forest  lands,  can  the  State  be  allowed   to   demolish   the   massive
constructions made thereon over the last half a  century. 
Given  the  facts
and circumstances of these appeals, our answer to this question is  also  in
the negative. =
We have no option, under these circumstances,  but  to  hold  that  to
this extent, Chintamani was incorrectly decided and it is overruled to  this
extent. 

 The application of the principle laid down by this  Court,  therefore,
depends on the independent facts found in a case. 
The remedy  of  demolition
cannot be applied per se with a broad brush to all cases.   
The  State  also
seems to have realized this and that is perhaps the reason why it moved  the
application that it did in Godavarman.

81.   Looking at the issue from point of view of the citizen  and  not  only
from the point of view of the State or a well  meaning  pressure  group,  it
does appear that even though the basic principle is that  the  buyer  should
beware and therefore if  the  appellants  and  purchasers  of  tenements  or
commercial  establishments  from  the   appellants   ought   to   bear   the
consequences of unauthorized construction,  the  well-settled  principle  of
caveat emptor would  be  applicable  in  normal  circumstances  and  not  in
extraordinary circumstances as these appeals  present,  when  a  citizen  is
effectively led up the  garden  path   for  several  decades  by  the  State
itself.  
The present appeals do not relate to a stray or a few instances of  unauthorized
constructions and, therefore, fall in a class of their own. 
In a  case  such
as the present, if  a  citizen  cannot  trust  the  State  which  has  given statutory permissions and provided municipal facilities, whom should  he  or she trust?

82.   Assuming the disputed land was a private forest,  the  State  remained
completely inactive when construction was going on over acres and  acres  of
land and of a very large number of buildings thereon and for a few  decades.
The State permitted the construction through the development  plans  and  by
granting exemption under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)  Act,  1976
and providing necessary  infrastructure  such  as   roads   and   sanitation
on  the disputed land and the surrounding area.  When  such  a  large  scale
activity involving the State is being carried  on  over  vast  stretches  of
land exceeding a hundred acres, it is natural for a  reasonable  citizen  to
assume that whatever actions are being taken  are  in  accordance  with  law
otherwise the State would certainly step in to prevent such  a  massive  and
prolonged breach of the law.  
The silence of the State in  all  the  appeals
before us led the appellants and a large number of citizens to believe  that
there was no patent illegality in the constructions  on  the  disputed  land
nor was there any legal risk in  investing  on  the  disputed  land.   
Under
these circumstances, for the State or the Bombay  Environment  Action  Group
to contend  that  only  the  citizen  must  bear  the  consequences  of  the
unauthorized construction may  not  be  appropriate.  
 It  is  the  complete inaction of the State, rather  its  active  consent  that  has  resulted  in
several citizens being placed in a precarious position where  they  are  now
told that their investment is actually in unauthorized  constructions  which
are liable to be demolished any time even after several  decades.  
There  is
no reason why these citizens should be the only victims of such a  fate  and
the State be held not responsible for this state of affairs;  
nor  is  there
any reason why under such circumstances this Court should not  come  to  the
aid of victims of the  culpable  failure  of  the  State  to  implement  and
enforce the law for several decades.

83.   In none of these cases is there  an  allegation  that  the  State  has
acted arbitrarily or irrationally so as to voluntarily benefit  any  of  the
appellants.  
On  the  contrary,  the  facts  show  that the appellants
followed the due legal process in making the  constructions  that  they  did
and all that can be said of the State is that its Rip Van Winkleism  enabled
the appellants to obtain valid permissions from  various  authorities,  from
time to time, to make constructions over a  long  duration.  The  appellants
and individual citizens cannot be faulted or punished for that.
84.    These  appeals  raise  larger  issues  of  good  administration   and
governance and the State has, regrettably, come out in poor  light  in  this
regard.  It is not necessary for us to say  anything  more  on  the  subject
except to conclude that even if the State  were  to  succeed  on  the  legal
issues before us, there is no way, on the facts and circumstances  of  these
appeals, that it can reasonably put the clock back and ensure that  none  of
the  persons  concerned  in  these  appeals  is  prejudiced  in  any  manner
whatsoever.
Conclusion:
85.   Accordingly, for the reasons given, all these appeals are allowed  and
the impugned judgment and order of the Bombay High Court  is  set  aside  in
all of them and the notices impugned in  the  writ  petitions  in  the  High
Court are quashed.



2014  (January part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41193
   
R.M. LODHA, MADAN B. LOKUR, KURIAN JOSEPH

                                                       REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.1102 OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.10677 of 2008)


Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. & Anr.                         ..….Appellants

                            Versus

The State of Maharashtra & Ors.                          …..Respondents

                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.1103  OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 10760 of 2008)


                                    WITH

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1104  OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11055 of 2008)


                                    WITH

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.1105   OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11057 of 2008)








                                    WITH

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.1106   OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11393 of 2008)


                                    WITH

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1107   OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11398 of 2008)


                                    WITH

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1108   OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11401 of 2008)


                                    WITH

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1109   OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11509 of 2008)


                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.1110  OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11622 of 2008)


                                    WITH

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1111  OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11634 of 2008)


                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.1112  OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 11640 of 2008)





                                    WITH

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1113   OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 12408 of 2008)

                                    WITH

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1114  OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 21389 of 2008)


                                    WITH

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1115   OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 15791 of 2008)


                                    WITH

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1116  OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 16470 of 2008)


                                    WITH

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1117  OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 24149 of 2008)


                                    WITH

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1118  OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 10730 of 2008)


                                    WITH

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1119  OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 25747 of 2010)







                                    WITH

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1120  OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 25748 of 2010)

                                     AND

                       SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No. 34691 of 2011


                               J U D G M E N T
Madan B. Lokur, J.

1.    Leave granted.
2.    The principal question for consideration is
whether the mere  issuance
of a notice under the provisions of Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest  Act,
1927 is sufficient for any land being declared  a  “private  forest”  within
the meaning of that expression  as  defined  in  Section  2(f)(iii)  of  the
Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975.  In  our  opinion,  the
question must be answered  in  the  negative.  Connected  therewith  is  the
question
whether the word “issued” in Section 2(f) (iii) of the  Maharashtra
Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975 read with Section  35  of  the  Indian
Forest Act, 1927 must be given a literal interpretation or a broad  meaning.
 In our opinion the word must be given a broad meaning  in  the  surrounding
context in which it is used.

3.    A tertiary question that arises is, assuming the  disputed  lands  are
forest  lands,  can  the  State  be  allowed   to   demolish   the   massive
constructions made thereon over the last half a  century.  Given  the  facts
and circumstances of these appeals, our answer to this question is  also  in
the negative.
4.    This is a batch of 20 appeals and they were argued  on  the  basis  of
the facts as in the appeal of Godrej. In each  appeal,  the  minute  details
would, of course, be different but the legal issues are  the  same  and  all
the appeals were argued by learned counsel  on  the  basis  that  the  legal
issues and questions of law are the same. For  convenience,  we  have  taken
into consideration the facts in the appeal of Godrej.
Facts
5.    Godrej acquired land in Vikhroli in Salsette taluka in Maharashtra  by
a registered deed of conveyance dated 30th July 1948 from Nowroji  Pirojsha,
successor in interest of Framjee Cawasjee Banaji  who,  in  turn,  had  been
given a perpetual lease/kowl for the land by the  Government  of  Bombay  on
7th July 1835.

6.    The land was described in the perpetual  lease/kowl  as  “waste  land”
and one of the purposes of the lease was to cultivate  the  waste  land.
We
are concerned in this appeal with an area of 133 acres  and  38  gunthas  of
land bearing Old Survey Nos. 117,118 and 120 (New Survey Nos. 36 (Part),  37
and 38).  For convenience this land is hereafter referred as  the  “disputed
land”.
Consent decree in the Bombay High Court
7.    On 27th August 1951 the Legislative Assembly of the  State  of  Bombay
passed the Salsette Estates (Land Revenue Exemption  Abolition)  Act,  1951.
This statute was brought into force on 1st March 1952.   Section  4  of  the
Salsette Estates Act provided that waste lands  granted  under  a  perpetual
lease/kowl not appropriated or brought under cultivation before 14th  August
1951 shall vest in and be the property of the State.[1]

8.    According to the State, the disputed  land  was  not  appropriated  or
brought under cultivation before 14th August 1951 and, therefore, it  vested
in or was the property of the State by virtue of Section 4 of  the  Salsette
Estates Act.
9.    This factual position was  disputed  by  Godrej  and  to  resolve  the
dispute, Suit No. 413 of 1953 was filed by Godrej in the Bombay  High  Court
praying, inter alia, for  a  declaration  that  it  was  the  owner  of  the
disputed land in village Vikhroli as  the  successor  in  title  of  Framjee
Cawasjee Banaji; that the provisions of the  Salsette  Estates  Act  had  no
application to the disputed land  and,  that  the  disputed  land  had  been
appropriated  by  Godrej  before  14th  August  1951  for   its   industrial
undertaking.
10.   The suit was contested by the State by filing a written statement  but
eventually the Bombay High Court passed a  consent  decree  on  8th  January
1962 to the effect that except for an area of 31 gunthas,  all  other  lands
were appropriated and  brought  under  cultivation  by  Godrej  before  14th
August 1951 and are the property of Godrej. The consent decree reads,  inter
alia, as follows:-


           “AND THIS COURT by and with such  consent  DOTH  FUTHER  DECLARE
           that it is agreed by and between the parties  of  the  following
           lands namely
           S. No.                            Area
                                             A.G.A.
           15 Part                           0-21-0
           16 Part                           0-10-0
                                             0-31-0

           in the village of Vikhroli vest in Government under Section 4(c)
           of the said Act” [Salsette Estates Act].


           “AND THIS COURT by and with such consent  DOTH  FURTHER  DECLARE
           that it is agreed by and  between  the  parties  that  save  and
           except the lands mentioned above all other lands in the  village
           of Vikhroli  were  appropriated  or  brought  under  cultivation
           before the fourteenth day of August one  thousand  nine  hundred
           and fifty-one and are the property of the Plaintiff….”

11.   These events establish two facts: (i) Even  according  to  the  State,
the disputed land was ‘waste land’ and not a ‘forest’. This  is  significant
since the Indian Forest Act, 1927 did not apply to ‘waste land’ (due to  the
Indian Forest (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1948) with effect  from  4th  December
1948. (ii) It was acknowledged by the State that the disputed land (even  if
it was a forest) was appropriated or brought  under  cultivation  by  Godrej
before 14th August 1951.



Development Plan for the City of Bombay

12.   A development  plan  for  the  City  of  Bombay  (and  Greater  Bombay
including  Vikhroli)  was  published  on  7th  January  1967  and  the  next
development plan was published in  1991.  In  both  development  plans,  the
disputed land was designated as ‘R’ or ‘Residential’. On publication of  the
first development plan, Godrej applied for and was  granted  permission,  on
various dates, by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay  to  construct
residential buildings  on  the  disputed  land.   Godrej  is  said  to  have
constructed four such buildings on the basis  of  permissions  granted  from
time to time and these building were occupied for  residential  purposes  by
its staff.
13.   On 17th February 1976 the Urban Land  (Ceiling  and  Regulation)  Act,
1976 came into force.
Since the disputed land was in excess of  the  ceiling
limit, Godrej filed statements (under Section  6  of  the  Act)  and  sought
exemption from the Competent  Authority  for  utilizing  the  excess/surplus
vacant lands for industrial and residential purposes (under  Section  20  of
the Act).
Pursuant to the request made by Godrej, it was  granted  exemption
by the State Government, as prayed for and  subject  to  certain  conditions
which included (both  initially  and  subsequently  by  a  corrigendum)  the
construction of tenements for the benefit of its employees  to  be  used  as
staff quarters.
14.   Pursuant to the  grant  of  exemption,  Godrej  applied  for  and  was
granted permission  by  the  Municipal  Corporation  of  Greater  Bombay  to
construct multi-storeyed  buildings  on  the  disputed  land.  According  to
Godrej, over a period of time,  it  has  constructed  more  than  40  multi-
storeyed residential buildings (ground+4 and ground+7), one club  house  and
five electric sub-stations. It is  said  that  over  a  couple  of  thousand
families are occupying these buildings and  that  further  construction  has
also been made, pursuant to permission granted, of  a  management  institute
and other residential buildings.
Amendments to the Indian Forest Act, 1927
15.   Chapter V of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 relates to the  control  over
forests and lands not being the property of government.  It was amended  (as
far as we are concerned) on three  occasions  by  the  State  of  Bombay  or
Maharashtra, as the case may be.[2]
16.   The first amendment was by the Indian Forest (Bombay  Amendment)  Act,
1948 being Bombay Act No. 62 of 1948. 
By this  amendment  (which  came  into
force on 4th December 1948), the  three  significant  changes  that  we  are
concerned with were:
(i) Insertion of  Section  34A  in  the  Forest  Act[3]
whereby an  inclusive  definition  of  “forest”  was  incorporated  for  the
purposes of the chapter;
(ii) Substitution of Section 35(1)  of  the  Forest
Act[4] dealing with protection of forests for  special  purposes,  including
regulatory and prohibitory  measures;
(iii)  The  words  ‘waste  lands’  or
‘land’ occurring in sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section  35  of  the  Forest
Act[5] were deleted.   Therefore,  ‘waste  lands’  were  taken  out  of  the
purview of the Forest Act (as  applicable  to  the  State  of  Bombay)  with
effect from 4th December 1948.
17.   The next amendment was made by the Indian  Forest  (Bombay  Amendment)
Act, 1955 being Bombay Act No. 24 of 1955.  
The  three  significant  changes
that we are concerned with were: (i) Amendment  to  Section  35(3)  of   the
Forest Act;[6]
(ii) Insertion  of sub-sections (4),

(5) and (6) in Section 35 of the Forest Act;[7]
 (iii) Insertion  of  Section
36A (manner of serving notice and order under  Section  36)  in  the  Forest
Act.[8]
18.   The next amendment was by the Indian Forest  (Maharashtra  Unification
and Amendment) Act, 1960 being Maharashtra  Act  No.  6  of  1961.
The  two
changes brought about were:
(i) The words “six months”  in  sub-section  (4)
of Section 35 of  the  Forest  Act  were  substituted  by  the   words  “one
year”;[9]
(ii) Sub-sections (5A) and  (7) were inserted in  Section  35  of
the Forest Act.[10]
Notice issued to Godrej
19.   Completely unknown to Godrej and not disclosed by the  State  in  Suit
No. 413 of 1953 even till 8th January  1962  when  the  consent  decree  was
passed by the Bombay High Court, a Notice bearing No. WT/53 had been  issued
to Godrej under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act (as amended)  and  published
in the Bombay Government Gazette of 6th September 1956  in  respect  of  the
disputed land in village Vikhroli.
Godrej subsequently learnt of the  notice
from a search in the records of  the  Department  of  Archives.
The  search
revealed that the notice, as published in the  Gazette,  bore  no  date  and
according to Godrej,  the  notice  was  not  served  upon  it  and,  it  was
submitted, that the notice was never acted upon. Indeed,  subsequent  events
cast a doubt on whether the notice  was  at  all  issued  to  or  served  on
Godrej. 
Notice No. WT/53 reads as follows:-
                                  “Notice.
                                  No.WT/53
                 In pursuance of sub-section  (3)  of  section  35  of  the
           Indian Forest Act, 1927 (XVI of 1927), read with rule 2  of  the
           rules published  in  Government  Notification,  Agriculture  and
           Forests Department,  No.5133/48513-J,  dated  the  19th  day  of
           September, 1950,  I,  J.V.  Karamchandani,  the  Conservator  of
           Forests, Western Circle, hereby given notice to –
                 The Manager, Godrej Boyce & Manufacture  Factory,  at  and
           post Vikhroli, B.S.D.


           calling on him to appear within two  months  from  the  date  of
           receipt of this notice before  the  Divisional  Forest  Officer,
           West Thana, to show  cause  why  the  accompanying  notification
           (hereinafter referred to as “the notification”)  should  not  be
           made by the Government of Bombay under sub-section  (1)  of  the
           said section 35 in  respect  of  the  forest  specified  in  the
           Schedule hereto appended and belonging to him.


           2. If  the  said  The  Manager,  Godrej  Boyce  and  Manufacture
           Factory, at and post Vikhroli, B.S.D., fails to comply with this
           notice, it shall be assumed that the said  The  Manager,  Godrej
           Boyce and Manufacture Factory, at and post Vikhroli, B.S.D., has
           no objection to the making of the notification.


           3. I further require that for a period of six months or till the
           date of the making of the notification,  whichever  is  earlier,
           the said The Manager, Godrej Boyce and Manufacture  Factory,  at
           and post Vikhroli, B.S.D. and all  persons who are  entitled  or
           permitted to do, therein, any or all of the things specified  in
           clause (1) of sub-section (1) of the said section 35, whether by
           reason of any right, title or interest or under any  licence  or
           contract, or otherwise, shall not after the date of this notice,
           and for the period or until the date aforesaid, as the case  may
           be, do any of the following things specified in  clause  (1)  of
           sub-section (1) of the said section 35, namely :-


           (a) the cutting and removal of trees and timber
           (b) the firing and clearing of the vegetation.


                                  Schedule
                District Thana, taluka Salsette, village Vikhroli
           S.No.118; area, 63 acres 23 gunthas, Boundaries:- North-Boundary
           of Pavai;   East-Boundary  of  Haralayi;  South-S.No.117;  West-
           Boundary of Ghatkopur.
           S.No.117;  area,  36  acres,  35  gunthas,  Boundaries:-  North-
           S.No.118;  East-S.No.120;   South-S.No.112;   West-Boundary   of
           Ghatkopur.
           S.No.120;  area,  33  acres,  13  gunthas.  Boundaries:-  North-
           Boundary of  Haralayi;  East-Agra  Road;  South-S.No.115;  West-
           S.Nos.116, 117.”


 Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975

 20.  Sometime in 1975 the State Legislature passed the Maharashtra  Private
Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975. The Private Forests Act came into force  on
30th August 1975 when it was published  in  the  Official  Gazette.  We  are
concerned with the definition of “forest” and “private forest” as  contained
in Section 2(c-i) and Section 2(f) respectively in the Private Forests  Act.
These definitions read as follows:
“2(c-i)  "forest"  means  a  tract  of  land  covered  with  trees  (whether
standing, felled, found or otherwise), shrubs, bushes, or woody  vegetation,
whether of natural growth or planted by human agency and existing  or  being
maintained with or without human effort, or such  tract  of  land  on  which
such growth is likely to have an effect  on  the  supply  of  timber,  fuel,
forest  produce,  or  grazing  facilities,  or  on  climate,  stream   flow,
protection of land from erosion, or other such matters and includes,--

(i) land covered with stumps of trees of forest;

(ii) land which is part of a forest or lies within it or was part of a
forest or was lying within a forest on the 30th day of August 1975;

(iii) such pasture land, water-logged or cultivable or non-cultivable land,
lying within or linked to a forest, as may be declared to be forest by the
State Government;

(iv) forest land held or let for purpose of agriculture or for any purposes
ancillary thereto;

(v) all the forest produce therein, whether standing, felled, found or
otherwise;”

“2(f) "private forest" means any forest which is not the property of
Government and includes,--

(i) any land declared before the appointed day to be a forest under section
34A of the Forest Act;

(ii) any forest in respect of which any notification issued under sub-
section (1) of section 35 of the Forest Act, is in force immediately before
the appointed day;

(iii) any land in respect of which a notice has been issued under sub-
section (3) of section 35 of the Forest Act, but excluding an area not
exceeding two hectares in extent as the Collector may specify in this
behalf;

(iv) land in respect of which a notification has been issued under section
38 of the Forest Act;

(v) in a case where the State Government and any other person are jointly
interested in the forest, the interest of such person in such forest;

(vi) sites of dwelling houses constructed in such forest which are
considered to be necessary for the convenient enjoyment or use of the
forest and lands appurtenant thereto;”



21.   We are also concerned with Section 3 (vesting of  private  forests  in
State Government), Section 5 (power  to  take  over  possession  of  private
forests) and Section 6 (settlement of disputes) of the Private Forests  Act.
These provisions read as follows:
           “Section 3 - Vesting of private Forests in State Government

            (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the  time
           being in force or in any settlement,  grant,  agreement,  usage,
           custom or  any  decree  or  order  of  any  Court,  Tribunal  or
           authority or any other document, with effect  on  and  from  the
           appointed day, all private forests  in  the  State  shall  stand
           acquired and vest, free from all encumbrances, in, and shall  be
           deemed  to  be,  with  all  rights  in  or  over  the  same   or
           appertaining thereto, the property of the State Government,  and
           all rights, title and interest of the owner or any person  other
           than Government subsisting in any such forest on  the  said  day
           shall be deemed to have been extinguished.

           (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to so  much
           extent of land comprised in a private forest as in  held  by  an
           occupant or tenant and is  lawfully  under  cultivation  on  the
           appointed day and is not in excess of the ceiling area  provided
           by section 5 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands  (Ceiling  on
           Holdings) Act, 1961 (Mah. XXVII of 1061), for the time being  in
           force  or  any  building  or  structure  standing   thereon   or
           appurtenant thereto.

           (3) All private forests vested in the State Government under sub-
           section (1) shall be deemed to be reserved  forests  within  the
           meaning of the Forest Act.”













           “Section 5 - Power to take over possession of private forests

           Where any private forest stands acquired and vested in the State
           Government  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  the   person
           authorised by the State Government or by the Collector  in  this
           behalf, shall enter into and take over possession  thereof,  and
           if any person resists the taking over  of  such  possession,  he
           shall without prejudice to any other action to which he  may  be
           liable, be liable to be removed by the use or such force as  may
           be necessary.”

           “Section 6 - Settlement of disputes

           Where any question arises as to whether or not any forest  is  a
           private forest, or whether or not any private forest or  portion
           thereof has vested in the State Government or whether or not any
           dwelling house constructed in a  forest  stands  acquired  under
           this Act, the Collector  shall  decide  the  question,  and  the
           decision of the Collector shall, subject to the decision of  the
           Tribunal in appeal which may be preferred to the Tribunal within
           sixty days from the date of the decision of  the  Collector,  or
           the order of the State Government under section 18, be final.”



22.   Finally, it may be  mentioned  that  by  Section  24  of  the  Private
Forests Act, Sections 34A, 35 and 36A of the Forest Act were repealed.[11]

 23.  The narrative of the events discloses that Notice No. WT/53 after  its
publication in the Gazette was not acted upon either  under  the  provisions
of the Forest Act as amended from time to time or under the Private  Forests
Act.  Admittedly, no attempt was made by the State to take  over  possession
of the disputed land at any point of  time.   On  the  contrary  permissions
were granted to Godrej from time to time for the construction  of  buildings
on the disputed land, which permissions were availed of by  Godrej  for  the
benefit of thousands of its employees.
Judgment in the case of Waghmare
24.   The constitutional validity of  the  Private  Forests  Act  (including
Section 3 thereof) was challenged in the Bombay High Court on the ground  of
legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact the  statute.  This
issue was referred to a Bench of five Judges and the decision  of  the  High
Court is reported as Janu Chandra  Waghmare  v.  State  of  Maharashtra.[12]
During the course of hearing, the Bench also considered as to  “what  is  it
that the State  legislature  has  intended  to  include  in  the  expression
‘forest  produce’  for  the  purpose  of  vesting  the  same  in  the  State
Government under -
Section 3 of the Act.” While answering this question, the  High  Court  felt
it necessary to “consider the true effect of the artificial  definitions  of
the two expressions ‘forest’ and ‘private forest’ given  in  Section  2(c-i)
and Section 2(f) read with Section 3 of the impugned Act”.
25.   In doing so, the High Court held  that  a  land  owner  who  had  been
issued a notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act (but  was  not  heard)
has an opportunity to contend that his or her land is not a ‘forest’  within
the meaning of Section 2(c-i) of the Private Forests Act and that  the  land
does not vest automatically in the State by  virtue  of  Section  3  of  the
Private Forests Act. This  position  was  not  contested,  but  conceded  by
learned counsel appearing for the State of Maharashtra in the High Court.
26.   The High Court held in paragraph 30 of the Report as follows:-
           “It is thus clear that Sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) of Section
           2(f) deal with declared, adjudicated or  admitted  instances  of
           forests. Sub-clause (iii) of Section  2(f)  no  doubt  seeks  to
           cover land in respect of which merely a notice has  been  issued
           to the owner of a private forest under  Section  35(3)  and  his
           objections may have remained unheard till 30-8-1975  as  Section
           35 has  stood  repealed  on  the  coming  into  force   of   the
           Acquisition Act. Here also, as in the case  of  owners  of  land
           falling  under  Sub-clause  (iii)   of   Section   2(c-i),   his
           objections, if any, including his objection that his land cannot
           be styled as forest at all can be heard and  disposed  of  under
           Section 6 of the Acquisition Act, and this position was conceded
           by Counsel appearing for the State  of  Maharashtra.  Sub-clause
           (v)  includes  within  the  definition  of  private  forest  the
           interest of another person who along with Government is  jointly
           interested in a forest, while Sub-clause (vi) includes sites  of
           dwelling houses constructed in such forest which are  considered
           to be necessary for the convenient enjoyment or  use  of  forest
           and lands appurtenant thereto.”

      It was further held in paragraph 32 of the Report as follows:


           “In the first place, the scheme [of  the  Private  Forests  Act]
           clearly shows that under Section 3 all private forests  vest  in
           the State Government and since both the expressions  -  'forest'
           as well as 'private forest' - have been defined in the Act  what
           vests in the State Government is 'private forest' as per Section
           2(f) and in order to be 'private forest' under Section  2(f)  it
           must be 'forest' under Section 2(c-i) in the first instance  and
           read in this manner the expression  'all  the  private  forests'
           occurring in Section 3 will include 'forest produce.' It is  not
           possible to accept the argument that the word 'forest' occurring
           in the composite expression 'private forest' should not be given
           the meaning which has  been  assigned  to  it  in  Section  2(c-
           i)…………….. Definitions in  Interpretation  Clauses  may  have  no
           context (though this may not be true  of  all  definitions)  but
           therefore, all the more reason, why the  word  'forest'  in  the
           composite expression 'forest-produce' in Section 2(f) should  be
           given the meaning assigned to it in Section 2(c-i). Moreover, as
           stated earlier, the scheme itself suggests that  what  vests  in
           the State under Section 3 are  private  forests  as  defined  by
           Section 2(f) but such private forests must in the first instance
           be 'forests' as defined by  Section  2(c-i)  and  read  in  that
           manner the forest produce would vest  in  the  State  Government
           along with the private forest under Section 3 of the Act.”


27.   The view of  the  High  Court  has  been  accepted  by  the  State  of
Maharashtra and has not been challenged and has now attained finality.
28.   It is important to note that the High Court was  not  concerned  with,
nor did it advert to the right of a land  owner  to  object  to  the  notice
under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act before the Private  Forests  Act  came
into force on the ground that his land was not a forest  as  defined  in  or
notified under Section 34A of the Forest  Act.   This  will  be  dealt  with
below.
Judgment in the case of Chintamani Velkar
29.   The right to file objections to a notice under Section  35(3)  of  the
Forest Act came up for consideration in Chintamani Gajanan Velkar v.   State
of Maharashtra.[13]
In that case, Chintamani  was  issued  a  notice  under
Section 35(3) of the Forest Act on 29th August 1975.  The notice was  served
on him on 12th September 1975.
In the meanwhile, the  Private  Forests  Act
came into force on 30th August 1975.   Chintamani  raised  a  dispute  under
Section 6 of the Private Forests Act (as postulated in Waghmare)  contending
that his land was not a forest and did not vest in the  State  in  terms  of
Section 3 of the Private Forests Act.
30.   The only question that arose for  consideration  was  whether  or  not
Chintamani’s land was a forest within the meaning of that  word  as  defined
in Section 2(c-i) of the Private Forests Act.  That issue had  already  been
decided, as a matter of fact, by the Maharashtra  Revenue  Tribunal  against
Chintamani and it was held that his land was a forest. The matter  ought  to
have rested there.  However,  this  Court  went  into  a  further  question,
namely, whether the mere issuance of a notice under  Section  35(3)  of  the
Forest Act per se attracted Section 2(f)(iii) of the  Private  Forests  Act.
This Court noticed (in paragraph 18  of  the  Report)  that  where  a  final
notification is issued under Section 35(1)  of  the  Forest  Act  (obviously
after hearing the objections of  the  land  owner  in  compliance  with  the
requirements of Section 35(3) thereof), the entire land of  the  land  owner
would automatically vest in the State on the appointed date, that  is,  30th
August 1975 when the Private Forests Act came into force. In  such  a  case,
the land owner would, ex hypothesi have an opportunity  of  showing  in  the
objections to the Section 35(3) notice that the land is not  a  ‘forest’  as
defined under Section 34A of the Forest Act.  If the  land  owner  succeeded
in so showing, then clearly a final notification under Section 35(1) of  the
Forest Act could not be issued. But if the land owner did not succeed in  so
showing, only then could a final notification under  Section  35(1)  of  the
Forest Act be issued. It must be recalled, at this  stage,  that  the  words
“or land” under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act  had  been  deleted  by  the
Indian Forest (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1948 being Bombay Act  No.62  of  1948
and, additionally therefore, such  an  objection  could  validly  have  been
raised.
31.   Consequently, the situation that presented itself  in  Chintamani  was
that though a notice was issued to the land owner  under  Section  35(3)  of
the Forest Act before 30th August 1975, it could not be decided before  that
date when the Private Forests Act  came  into  force.  (Such  a  notice  was
referred to as a ‘pipeline notice’  by  Mr.  F.S.  Nariman).   Clearly,  the
recipient of a pipeline notice would be entitled to the benefit of  Waghmare
but this seems  to  have  been  overlooked  by  this  Court  in  Chintamani.
However, to mitigate the hardship to a pipeline noticee  who  is  not  given
the benefit of Waghmare this Court read Section  2(f)(iii)  of  the  Private
Forests Act and observed (perhaps as a sop  to  the  land  owner)  that  the
“Maharashtra Legislature thought that the entire  property  covered  by  the
notice in the State need not vest but it excluded  2  hectares  out  of  the
forest land held by the landholder.  That  was  the  consideration  for  not
allowing the benefit of an inquiry under Section 35(3) and for not  allowing
the notification to be issued under Section 35(1) of the 1927 Act”.
32.   It is in this background that this Court narrowly construed the  words
“a notice has been issued under sub-section (3) of section 35 of the  Forest
Act” occurring in Section 2(f)(iii)  of  the  Private  Forests  Act  as  not
requiring “service of such notice before 30-8-1975, nor for an  inquiry  nor
for a notification under Section 35(1).”[14]
33.   In a sense, therefore,  not  only  is  there  a  difference  of  views
between Waghmare and Chintamani but Chintamani  has  gone  much  further  in
taking away the right of a landholder.
Proceedings in the High Court
34.   On or about 24th May  2006,  Godrej  received  six  stop-work  notices
issued  by  the  concerned  Assistant  Engineer  of  the  Bombay   Municipal
Corporation stating that the Deputy Conservator  of  Forests,  Thane  Forest
Division, by a letter dated 8th May 2006  had  informed  that  the  disputed
land was “affected” by the reservation of a private forest and therefore  no
construction could be carried out therein  without  the  permission  of  the
Central Government under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980.
35.   On enquiries made by Godrej subsequent to the  receipt  of  the  stop-
work notices, it came to be known that the Bombay High  Court  had  given  a
direction on 22nd June 2005 in PIL No. 17/2002  (Bombay  Environment  Action
Group v. State of Maharashtra) on the claim of the petitioner  therein  that
in the entire State of Maharashtra the land records were  incomplete  and  a
large number of problems were encountered because of not updating  the  land
records  which  in  any  event  is  also  an  obligation   on   the   State.
Accordingly, the High Court gave a direction granting time to the  State  of
Maharashtra up to 31st May 2006 to complete the entire land records  in  the
State and further directed that quarterly reports regarding the progress  of
the work be filed before the Registrar General of the High Court.
36.   Godrej learnt that this triggered an ex parte mutation of the  revenue
records by the State to show that the disputed land was  ‘affected’  by  the
provisions of the Private Forest Act. Godrej also  learnt  that  the  Notice
No. WT/53 (referred to above) had been published in  the  Bombay  Government
Gazette of 6th September 1956, but not served on it.
37.   On these broad facts, Godrej filed Writ Petition No. 2196 of  2006  in
the Bombay High Court praying, inter alia, for a declaration that the  lands
owned by it in village Vikhroli are not forest land; that the  letter  dated
8th May 2006 issued by the Deputy Conservator of Forest as well as six stop-
work notices dated 24th May 2006 be declared as illegal, ab initio null  and
void and that the mutation in the revenue records be also declared  illegal.

38.   During the proceedings in the High Court it  came  to  be  known  that
about 170 notices similar to notice No. WT/53 had  been  issued  to  various
parties in 1956-57, including to the Bhabha Atomic Energy  Complex  and  the
Employees State Insurance Scheme Hospital.  However,  the  lands  of  Bhabha
Atomic Energy Complex and the  Employees  State  Insurance  Scheme  Hospital
were not touched by the State.
39.   The writ petition (along with several other  similar  writ  petitions)
was contested by the State and it was submitted inter alia that in  view  of
the judgment of this Court in Chintamani, the disputed land stood vested  in
the State in terms of  Section  3  of  the  Private  Forests  Act.  
By  the
impugned order dated 24th March 2008, the High Court dismissed all the  writ
petitions. Among other things, it was held in paragraph 152 of the  impugned
judgment:
           “In the light of the authoritative pronouncement in Chintamani's
           case we see no substance in the argument that  the  construction
           activities on the land being in accordance with  the  sanctioned
           plans and  approvals  so  also  the  lands  being  part  of  the
           development plan and affected by Urban Land Ceiling Act, State's
           action impugned in these petitions is without  any  jurisdiction
           or authority in law. All arguments with regard to  the  user  of
           the  land  today  has  no  legal  basis.  User  today  is  after
           development or continuing development. Once  development  is  on
           private forest, then, the same could not have been permitted  or
           carried out. Mere omission or inaction of the  State  Government
           cannot  be  the  basis  for  accepting  the  arguments  of   the
           petitioners.”

40.   The High Court rejected  the  contention  that  “mere  issuance  of  a
notice under Section 35(3) without any notification being published  in  the
official gazette within the meaning of Section 35(1)  would  not  mean  that
the land is excluded from the purview of the  Private  Forest  (Acquisition)
Act enacted by the Maharashtra Government.”[15]
      It was also held that:
           “Once the State Government issues  such  notice  [under  Section
           35(3) of the Forest Act], then, the intention is  apparent.  The
           intention is to regulate  and  prohibit  certain  activities  in
           forest. Merely because such a notice is issued by it in 1957 and
           1958 but it did not take necessary steps in furtherance thereof,
           does not mean that the notices have been abandoned as  contended
           by the petitioners. There  is  no  concept  of  "abandonment  or
           disuse" in such case. Apart from the fact  that  these  concepts
           could not be imported in a modern statute, we are  of  the  view
           that they cannot be  imported  and  read  into  statute  of  the
           present nature. Statutes which  are  meant  for  protecting  and
           preserving forests and achieve larger public interest, cannot be
           construed narrowly as contended. The interpretation,  therefore,
           if at all there is any ambiguity or scope for  construction  has
           to be wider and sub-serving this public  interest  so  also  the
           intent and object in enacting them. The  reason  for  the  State
           Government not being able to pursue the measures for  preserving
           and protecting the forest wealth is obvious.”[16]

      Further, it was held that:

           “The Development Plan proposal and designation so also the  user
           cannot conflict with the character of  the  land  as  a  private
           forest. To accept the arguments of the  petitioners  would  mean
           that despite vesting the private  forest  continues  as  a  land
           covered by the development plan and being within  the  municipal
           limits it loses its character as a  private  forest.  A  private
           forest is a forest and upon its vesting in the State  Government
           by virtue of the Private Forest (Acquisition) Act  would  remain
           as such. Therefore, we see no conflict because of any change  in
           the situation. Vesting was complete on  30th  August,  1975.  On
           30th August, 1975 the lands with regard to which the notice  was
           issued under Section 35(3), being a private forest vested in the
           State, it was a private forest always and, therefore,  there  is
           no question of the development  plan  or  any  proposal  therein
           superimposing itself on its status.”[17]


 41.  Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petitions in the Bombay
High Court, Godrej and other aggrieved writ petitioners preferred  petitions
for special leave to appeal in this Court.
Proceedings in this Court
42.   During the pendency of these appeals, the State filed I.A. Nos.  2352-
2353 of 2008 in W.P. No. 202 of 1995 [T.N.  Godavarman  v.  Union  of  India
(Forest Bench matters)] in which it was prayed, inter alia, as follows:
              1) The lands coming under the provisions  of  the  Maharashtra
                 Private Forests (Acquisition) Act 1975 which  were  put  to
                 non forestry use prior  to  25th  October  1980  [when  the
                 Forest (Conservation) Act,1980 came into force] by  way  of
                 having  been  awarded  Approval  of   Plans,   Commencement
                 Certificates, IODS or Non Agriculture  Permissions  by  the
                 Competent Authorities be treated deleted from the  category
                 of forests and the non forestry activity be allowed on such
                 lands without charging CA, NPV  or  equivalent  non  forest
                 land or any charges whatsoever.


              2) -
              3) The Collectors of all the districts  be  directed  to  pass
                 appropriate  orders  under  section  6  or   22A   of   the
                 Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975  either
                 on an application or suo motu as provided for it under  the
                 Act,  for  all  the  pieces  of  lands  coming  under   the
                 provisions of the Act under their  jurisdiction  within  30
                 days.

              4) For the lands restored under the Act on  which  residential
                 complexes  have  come  up/are   coming   up   wherein   Non
                 Agriculture Permissions (N.A.)  and  buildings  were  fully
                 constructed  and  completion  certificate  and   occupation
                 certificate were issued by the Competent Authorities  after
                 25th October, 1980 but before 18th May 2006 when the  “stop
                 construction work” notices were issued, only  afforestation
                 charges be  collected  for  afforesting  equivalent  forest
                 land. Neither  equivalent  non  forest  land  nor  the  Net
                 Present Value be charged to them, as these areas are  their
                 own private lands.”

Significantly, it was stated in the applications as follows:-

           “26. As stated earlier since the records  did  not  reveal  that
           these are acquired Private Forests the erstwhile owners went  on
           selling these lands to several persons who also in turn went  on
           selling them to the strangers without there being any  fault  on
           their part.  Subsequently developers purchased these  lands  and
           after getting requisite permissions from the Planning  Authority
           carried on constructions thereon.   Thereafter  individuals  and
           members of the  public  who  wanted  accommodation  for  housing
           probably invested their lifetime savings  and/or  raising  loans
           entered into transactions of purchasing the flats constructed on
           these lands  without  their  fault.   In  some  of  these  areas
           commercial activities have also come up with due permission from
           the Government authorities.  In such cases, injustice  is  being
           alleged by the subsequent purchasers who claimed to be  bonafide
           purchasers.  This has necessitated the State of  Maharashtra  to
           come  out   with   the   present   application.    Abstract   of
           constructions made on private forest lands  in  Mumbai  Suburban
           and Thane City makes it very clear  that  the  problem  is  more
           severe for the common man.  Errors  were  also  committed  while
           declaring the lands as having been acquired  by  the  Government
           under the Maharashtra Private Forest  (Acquisition)  Act,  1975.
           Some of the lands/properties owned by the Government like Bhabha
           Atomic Energy  complex  and  Employees  State  Insurance  Scheme
           hospital  also  came  to  be  declared  as  acquired  under  the
           Maharashtra Private Forest (Acquisition) Act, 1975.”


 43.  The  Forest  Bench  referred  the  matter  to  the  Central  Empowered
Committee which, in its Report dated 13th July 2009 noted in  paragraphs  25
and 26 as follows:-
           “25. It is thus clear that after  the  issue  of  notices  under
           Section 35(3) or Notification under 35(1) of the  Indian  Forest
           Act, no follow-up action was taken  by  the  State  Govt.   Even
           after the Private Forest Act came into force,  neither  physical
           possession of the land was taken nor were the areas recorded  as
           ‘forest’. A  substantial  part  of  such  area  falls  in  urban
           conglomerations  and  have  been  used  for  various  non-forest
           purpose  including   construction   of   buildings   for   which
           permissions have been granted by the concerned State  Government
           authorities.  Sale/purchase and  resale  have  taken  place  and
           third party interests have been generated.  People are  residing
           for last 30-40 years in hundreds of buildings  constructed  with
           the then valid approvals.  It was only  after  the  order  dated
           26.5.2005 of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court, that these areas are
           now being treated as falling in category of “forest”.   Many  of
           such areas are surrounded all  around  by  other  buildings  and
           within  metropolitan  areas  and  are  no  longer  suitable  for
           afforestation or to be managed as ‘forest’.


           “26. In the above complex background, at this belated stage,  it
           is neither feasible nor  in  public  interest  to  demolish  the
           existing   buildings/structures,    re-locate    the    existing
           occupants/owners and physically convert such area  into  forest.
           The CEC in these circumstances considers  that  the  balance  of
           convenience  lies  in  granting  permission  under  the   Forest
           (Conservation) Act for de-reservation and non-forest use of such
           area  on  a  graded  scale  of  payment   depending   upon   the
           category/sub-category in which such land falls.”


44.   The Central Empowered Committee made certain other recommendations  as
a result of which Godrej paid an amount of Rs.14.7 crores  towards  NPV  and
this has been recorded in the order passed by the Forest Bench in its  order
dated 17th February 2010.  The relevant extract  of  the  order  dated  17th
February 2010 passed by the Forest Bench reads as under:-
           “Pursuant to the report filed by the C.E.C. regards the property
           owned and possessed by the Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd., a sum
           of Rs.14,71,98,590/- was deposited as NPV  and  the  deposit  of
           this amount has been confirmed by the learned counsel  appearing
           for the State.


           We have passed an interim order of status  quo  restraining  the
           petitioners from further construction on the lands and also  not
           to create third party rights.  That interim  order  is  vacated.
           The petitioners are at liberty to go on  with  the  construction
           and complete it.  The direction of not  to  create  third  party
           rights is also vacated. This order is subject to the  order,  if
           any, to be passed by MOEF in this regard and also subject to the
           final outcome of this matter.


           Learned counsel for the petitioner states that he will not claim
           any refund of the amount so deposited. ”


 45.  When the present set of appeals came up for hearing before this  Court
on 9th February 2011, the correctness of Chintamani was doubted  by  learned
counsel on the question whether the word “issued” as  occurring  in  Section
2(f)(iii) of the Private Forest Act in the context of “any land  in  respect
of which a notice has been issued under sub-section (3)  of  section  35  of
the Forest Act” should be interpreted literally  or  whether  it  postulates
service of notice on the landholder. It is under  these  circumstances  that
these appeals were listed before us.
The primary question
46.   The initial question is whether the disputed land is at all  a  forest
within the meaning of Section 2(c-i) of the Private Forests Act.
47.   It is quite clear from a reading  of  Waghmare  that  the  “means  and
includes” definition of forest in Section 2(c-i) of the Private Forests  Act
does not detract  or  take  away  from  the  primary  meaning  of  the  word
‘forest’.  We are in agreement with this view.
48.   In Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar[18] the interpretation  of  the  word
“owner” in Section 2(d) of  the  Bihar  Taxation  on  Passengers  and  Goods
(Carried  by  Public  Service  Motor  Vehicles)  Act,  1961  came   up   for
consideration. While interpreting  “owner”  which  ‘means’  and  ‘includes’,
this Court held:
           “The definition of the term “owner” is exhaustive  and  intended
           to extend the meaning of the term by including within its  sweep
           bailee of a public carrier vehicle  or  any  manager  acting  on
           behalf of the owner. The intention of the legislature to  extend
           the meaning of the term by the definition given by  it  will  be
           frustrated if what is intended to be inclusive is interpreted to
           exclude the actual owner.”


49.    The  proposition  was  more  clearly  articulated  in  Black  Diamond
Beverages v. Commercial Tax Officer[19] wherein this  Court  considered  the
use of the words ‘means’ and ‘includes’ in the definition  of  “sale  price”
in Section 2(d) of the W.B. Sales Tax Act, 1954. It was held in paragraph  7
of the Report:
           “The first part of the definition defines  the  meaning  of  the
           word “sale price” and must, in our view, be given its  ordinary,
           popular or natural meaning. The interpretation thereof is in  no
           way controlled or affected by the second part  which  “includes”
           certain other things in the definition. This is  a  well-settled
           principle of construction.”

50.   In coming to this conclusion, this Court referred to  a  passage  from
Craies on Statute Law[20] which in turn referred to  the  following  passage
from Robinson v. Barton-Eccles Local Board[21]:
           “An interpretation clause of this kind is not meant  to  prevent
           the word receiving its  ordinary,  popular,  and  natural  sense
           whenever that would be properly applicable, but  to  enable  the
           word as used in the Act … to be applied to something to which it
           would not ordinarily be applicable.”

51.   In the case of Godrej, the  admitted  position,  as  per  the  consent
decree dated 8th January 1962 is that the disputed  land  was  not  a  waste
land nor was it a forest.
In so far as the other appeals are concerned,  the
disputed lands were built upon, from time to  time,  either  for  industrial
purposes or for commercial purposes or for residential purposes.
Under  the
circumstances, by no stretch of imagination can  it  be  said  that  any  of
these disputed lands are ‘forest’ within the primary meaning of  that  word,
or even within the extended meaning given in Section 2(c-i) of  the  Private
Forests Act.
52.   The next question is whether the notice said to have  been  issued  to
Godrej being Notice No. WT/53 can  be  described  as  a  ‘pipeline  notice’.
Again, the answer must be in the  negative  in  as  much  as  it  cannot  be
reasonably  said  that  the  pipeline  extends  from  1956-57  up  to  1975.
Assuming that a notice issued in 1956-57 is a pipeline notice even in  1975,
the question before us  would,  nevertheless,  relate  to  the  meaning  and
impact of “issued” of Section 2(f)(iii) of  the  Private  Forests  Act  read
with Section 35 of the Forest Act.  This is really the meat of  the  matter.


53.   Undoubtedly, the first rule of interpretation is that the words  in  a
statute must be interpreted literally. But at the same time if  the  context
in which a word is used and the provisions of a statute  inexorably  suggest
a subtext other than literal, then the context becomes important.
54.   In R.L. Arora v. State of U.P.[22] it was  observed  that  “a  literal
interpretation is not always the only interpretation of  a  provision  in  a
statute and the court has to look at the setting  in  which  the  words  are
used and the circumstances in which the law came  to  be  passed  to  decide
whether there is something implicit behind the  words  actually  used  which
would control the literal meaning of the words used in a  provision  of  the
statute.”
      Similarly, in Tata Engg. & Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. State  of  Bihar[23]
it was held:
           “The method suggested for adoption, in cases of doubt as to  the
           meaning of the words used is to explore  the  intention  of  the
           legislature through the  words,  the  context  which  gives  the
           colour,  the  context,  the  subject-matter,  the  effects   and
           consequences or the spirit and reason of the  law.  The  general
           words  and   collocation   or   phrases,   howsoever   wide   or
           comprehensive in their literal sense are  interpreted  from  the
           context and scheme underlying in the text of the Act.”

      Finally, in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal[24] it was held:
           “It is true that ordinary rule of construction is to assign  the
           word a meaning which it ordinarily carries. But the  subject  of
           legislation and the context in which a  word  or  expression  is
           employed may require  a  departure  from  the  rule  of  literal
           construction.”


55.   Applying the law laid down by this Court  on  interpretation,  in  the
context of these appeals, we may be missing the wood  for  the  trees  if  a
literal meaning is given  to  the  word  “issued”.  To  avoid  this,  it  is
necessary to also appreciate the scheme of Section  35  of  the  Forest  Act
since that scheme needs to be kept in mind  while  considering  “issued”  in
Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act.
 56.  A notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is intended to give  an
opportunity to the owner of a forest  to  show  cause  why,  inter  alia,  a
regulatory or a prohibitory measure be not made in respect of  that  forest.
It is important to note that such a notice pre-supposes the existence  of  a
forest. The owner of the forest is expected  to  file  objections  within  a
reasonable time as specified in the notice and is also given an  opportunity
to  lead  evidence  in  support  of  the  objections.  After   these   basic
requirements are met, the owner of the forest is entitled to  a  hearing  on
the objections. This entire procedure obviously cannot be  followed  by  the
State and the owner of the forest  unless  the  owner  is  served  with  the
notice. Therefore, service of a notice issued under  Section  35(3)  of  the
Forest Act is inherent in the very language used in the  provision  and  the
very purpose of the provision.

57.   Additionally, Section 35(4) of the Forest Act provides that  a  notice
under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act may provide  that  for  a  period  not
exceeding six months (extended to one year in 1961) the owner of the  forest
can be obliged to adhere to one or more of  the  regulatory  or  prohibitory
measures mentioned in Section 35(1) of the Forest Act.  
On  the  failure  of
the owner of the forest to abide by the said measures, he/she is  liable  to
imprisonment for a term upto six months and/or a fine  under  Section  35(7)
of the Forest Act. Surely, given the penal consequence of  non-adherence  to
a Section 35(4) direction in a Section  35(3)  notice,  service  of  such  a
notice must be interpreted to be mandatory. On the  facts  of  the  case  in
Godrej, such a direction was in fact given and Godrej was  directed,  for  a
period of six months, to refrain from the cutting and removal of  trees  and
timber and  the  firing  and  clearing  of  vegetation.  Strictly  speaking,
therefore, despite not being  served  with  Notice  No.  WT/53  and  despite
having no knowledge of it, Godrej was liable to be  punished  under  Section
35(7) of the Forest Act if it cut or removed any tree or timber or fired  or
cleared any vegetation.

58.   This interplay may be looked at from another point  of  view,  namely,
the need to issue a direction under Section 35(4) of the Forest  Act,  which
can be only to prevent damage to or destruction of a forest. If  the  notice
under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is not served  on  the  owner  of  the
forest, he/she may continue to damage the forest defeating the very  purpose
of the Forest Act. Such an interpretation cannot be given to Section  35  of
the Forest Act nor can  a  limited  interpretation  be  given  to  the  word
“issued” used in the context of Section 35 of  the  Forest  Act  in  Section
2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act.

59.   Finally, Section 35(5) of the Forest Act mandates not only service  of
a notice issued under that provision “in the manner provided in the Code  of
Civil Procedure, 1908, for the service of summons” (a  manner  that  we  are
all familiar with) but also its publication “in  the  manner  prescribed  by
rules”. This double pronged receipt and confirmation  of  knowledge  of  the
show cause notice by the owner of a  forest  makes  it  clear  that  Section
35(3) of the Forest Act is not intended to end the  process  with  the  mere
issuance of a notice but it also requires service of a notice on  the  owner
of the forest. The need for ensuring  service  is  clearly  to  protect  the
interests of the owner of the forest who may have valid reasons not only  to
object to the issuance of regulatory or prohibitory directions, but to  also
enable him/her to raise a jurisdictional issue that the land in question  is
actually not a forest. The need for ensuring  service  is  also  to  prevent
damage to or destruction of a forest.

60.  Unfortunately, Chintamani missed these finer  details  because  it  was
perhaps not brought to the notice of this  Court  that  Section  35  of  the
Forest Act as applicable  to  the  State  of  Maharashtra  had  sub-sections
beyond sub-section (3). 
This Court proceeded on the basis of Section  35  of
the Indian Forest Act, 1927  as  it  existed  without  being  aware  of  the
amendments made by the State of  Maharashtra  and  the  erstwhile  State  of
Bombay. This, coupled with the factually incorrect view  that  two  hectares
of forest land[25] were excluded for the benefit of the landholder led  this
Court to give a restrictive meaning to “issue”.

61.   In Chintamani this Court relied on the decision  rendered  in  CIT  v.
Bababhai Pitamberdas (HUF)[26] to conclude that a word has to  be  construed
in the context in which it is used in a statute  and  that,  therefore,  the
decisions rendered in Banarsi Debi v. ITO[27] and CWT v. Kundan  Lal  Behari
Lal[28] to  the  effect  that  “the  word  ‘issue’  has  been  construed  as
amounting to ‘service’ are not relevant for interpreting the  word  ‘issued’
used in Section 2(f) [of the Private Forests Act].” It is true, as  observed
above, that a word has to be construed in the context in which  it  is  used
in a statute. By making a reference in  Section  2(f)(iii)  of  the  Private
Forests Act to ‘issue’ in Section 35 of the Forest Act,  it  is  clear  that
the word is dressed in borrowed robes. Once that is appreciated (and it  was
unfortunately  overlooked  in  Chintamani)  then  it  is  quite  clear  that
‘issued’ in Section 2(f)(iii)  of  the  Private  Forests  Act  must  include
service of the show cause notice as postulated in Section 35 of  the  Forest
Act.

62.   We have no option, under these circumstances,  but  to  hold  that  to
this extent, Chintamani was incorrectly decided and it is overruled to  this
extent.
We may add that in Chintamani the land in  question  was  factually
held to be a private forest and therefore the subsequent discussion was  not
at all necessary.

63.   Assuming that the word ‘issued’ as occurring in Section  2(f)(iii)  of
the Private Forests Act must be literally and strictly construed, can it  be
seriously argued that it also has reference to a show  cause  notice  issued
under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act at any given time (say in 1927  or  in
1957)? Or would it be more reasonable to hold that it  has  reference  to  a
show cause notice issued in somewhat closer proximity  to  the  coming  into
force of the Private Forests Act, or a  ‘pipeline  notice’  as  Mr.  Nariman
puts it?

64.   In the absence of any time period having been specified  for  deciding
a show cause notice issued under Section 35 of the Forest Act,  it  must  be
presumed that it must be decided within a reasonable time.  Quite  recently,
in Ramlila Maidan Incident, In re[29] it was held: “It is a settled rule  of
law that wherever provision of a statute does not  provide  for  a  specific
time, the same has to be done within a  reasonable  time.  Again  reasonable
time cannot have a fixed connotation. It must  depend  upon  the  facts  and
circumstances of a given case.”

65.   Similarly, in Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak[30] it was held: “But  when  the
power is conferred to effectuate a purpose, it has  to  be  exercised  in  a
reasonable manner. Exercise of power in  a  reasonable  manner  inheres  the
concept of its exercise within a reasonable time.”

      So  also,  in  Santoshkumar  Shivgonda  Patil  v.  Balasaheb   Tukaram
Shevale[31] it was held:
           “It seems to be fairly  settled  that  if  a  statute  does  not
           prescribe the time-limit for exercise of  revisional  power,  it
           does not mean that such power can  be  exercised  at  any  time;
           rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so
           because the law does not expect a settled thing to be  unsettled
           after a long lapse of  time.  Where  the  legislature  does  not
           provide for any  length  of  time  within  which  the  power  of
           revision is to be  exercised  by  the  authority,  suo  motu  or
           otherwise, it is  plain  that  exercise  of  such  power  within
           reasonable time is inherent therein.”

66.   According to the State, a show cause notice was issued  to  Godrej  in
1957 (and assuming it was served) but no decision  was  taken  thereon  till
1975 that is for about 18 years.  
This  is  an  unusually  long  period  and
undoubtedly much more than a reasonable time had elapsed  for  enabling  the
State to take a decision on the show cause notice.
Therefore, following  the
law laid down by this Court, the show cause notice  must,  for  all  intents
and purposes be treated as having become a dead letter and the seed  planted
by the State yielded nothing.
67.   The entire problem may also be looked at from the perspective  of  the
citizen rather than only from the perspective of the State. 
No  citizen  can
reasonably be told after almost half a century  that  he/she  was  issued  a
show cause notice (which was probably not served)  and  based  on  the  show
cause notice his/her land was declared a private forest about three  decades
ago and that it vests in the State.
Is it  not  the  responsibility  of  the
State to ensure that its laws are implemented with reasonable  dispatch  and
is it not the duty of the State to appreciate that  statute  books  are  not
meant to be thrown at a citizen whenever and wherever some official  decides
to do so?
Basic principles of good governance  must  be  followed  by  every
member of the Executive branch  of  the  State  at  all  times  keeping  the
interests of all citizens in mind as also the larger public interest.
68.   In our opinion, the failure of the State to take any decision  on  the
show cause notice for several decades (assuming it was served on Godrej)  is
indicative of its desire to not act on it.
This opinion is  fortified  by  a
series of events that have taken place  between  1957  and  2006,  beginning
with the consent decree of 8th January 1962 in Suit No. 413 of 1953  whereby
the disputed land was recognized as not being  forest  land;  permission  to
construct a large number of buildings (both residential  and  otherwise)  as
per the Development Plans of 1967 and then of 1991;
exemptions  granted  by
the Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and  Regulation)  Act,
1976 leading to Godrej making unhindered but permissible constructions;  and
finally, the absence of any attempt by the State to take possession  of  the
‘forest land’ under Section 5 of the Private Forests Act  for  a  couple  of
decades.
The  subsequent  event  of  the  State  moving  an  application  in
Godavarman virtually denying the  existence  of  a  private  forest  on  the
disputed land also indicates that the State had come to terms  with  reality
and was grudgingly prepared to accept that, even if the  law  permitted,  it
was now too late  to  remedy  the  situation.  This  view  was  emphatically
reiterated by the Central Empowered Committee in its report dated 13th  July
2009.
69.   In its written submissions, the Bombay Environment  Action  Group  has
alleged collusion between Godrej and  other  appellants  and  the  State  of
Maharashtra to defeat the purpose of the Private Forests Act.
It  is  stated
that prior to the said Act coming into force, the Secretary in  the  Revenue
and Forests Department of the State Government had written to the  Collector
on 27th August 1975 enclosing a copy of the  said  Act  and  informing  that
under Section 5 thereof,  the  Range  Forest  Officers  and  the  Divisional
Forest Officers will  be  authorized  to  take  possession  of  the  private
forests from the land owners.
It is stated that the  letter  was  issued  to
enable the Collector to coordinate with the Divisional  Forest  Officers  to
ensure that the large private forests are taken over physically as early  as
-
possible.
Subsequently, by another letter (variously described as dated  3rd
February 1977, 14th February 1977 and 3rd February 1979)  the  Secretary  in
the Revenue and Forests Department advised the Conservator of Forests to  go
slow with the taking over of possession of private forests in Thane,  Kulaba
and Ratnagiri districts.
70.   It is difficult at this distant point of time to conclude, one way  or
the other, whether there was or  was  not  any  collusion  (as  alleged)  or
whether it was simply a case of poor  governance  by  the  State.
The  fact
remains that  possession  of  the  disputed  land  was  not  taken  over  or
attempted to be taken over for decades and the issue was never  raised  when
it should have been.
To raise it now after a lapse of  so  many  decades  is
unfair to Godrej, the other appellants, the institutions, the State and  the
residents of the tenements that have been constructed in the meanwhile.
71.   Given this factual scenario, we agree that Section  2(f)(iii)  of  the
Private Forests Act is not intended to apply  to  notices  that  had  passed
their shelf-life and that  only  ‘pipeline  notices’  issued  in  reasonably
close proximity to the coming into force of the  Private  Forests  Act  were
‘live’ and could be acted upon.
72.   In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius  Shapur  Chenai[32]  this
Court dealt with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act  and  held  that
the legislation being an expropriatory legislation, it ought to be  strictly
construed since it deprives a person of  his/her  land.
In  this  decision,
reliance was placed on State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad  Sharma[33]  and  Khub
Chand v. State of Rajasthan.[34] The same rationale would apply  to  Section
2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act since it seeks to take  away,  after  a
few decades, private land on the ostensible ground  that  it  is  a  private
forest. Section 2(f)(iii) of the  Private  Forests  Act  must  not  only  be
reasonably construed but also strictly so as not to discomfit a citizen  and
expropriate his/her property.
73.   The fact that the Private Forests Act repealed some  sections  of  the
Forest Act, particularly Sections 34A and 35 thereof  is  also  significant.
Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act is in a sense a  saving  clause
for pipeline notices issued under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act but  which
could not, for want of adequate time be either  withdrawn  or  culminate  in
the issuance  of  a  regulatory  or  prohibitory  final  notification  under
Section 35(1) of the Forest Act, depending on the objections raised  by  the
land owner. Looked at from any point  of  view,  it  does  seem  clear  that
Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private  Forests  Act  was  intended  to  apply  to
‘live’ and not stale notices issued under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act.
The second question:
74.   The next question is whether at  all  the  unstated  decision  of  the
State  to  take  over  the  so-called  forest  land  can   be   successfully
implemented. What the decision implies is the  demolition,  amongst  others,
of  a  large  number  of  residential   buildings,   industrial   buildings,
commercial buildings, Bhabha Atomic Energy Complex and the  Employees  State
Insurance Scheme Hospital and compulsorily rendering homeless  thousands  of
families, some of  whom  may  have  invested  considerable  savings  in  the
disputed lands. What it also implies is  demolition  of  the  municipal  and
other public infrastructure works already undertaken and  in  use,  clearing
away the rubble  and  then  planting  trees  and  shrubs  to  ‘restore’  the
‘forest’ to an acceptable condition. According to learned  counsel  for  the
State, this is  easily  achievable.   But  it  is  easier  said  than  done.
According to  the  Bombay  Environment  Action  Group  a  patent,  incurable
illegality has been committed  and  the  natural  consequences  (demolition)
must follow.  Reliance was placed, inter  alia,  on  K.  Ramadas  Shenoy  v.
Chief Officer[35], M.I. Builders v. Radhey  Shyam  Sahu[36],  Pleasant  Stay
Hotel v. Palani Hills Conservation Council[37] and  Pratibha  Coop.  Housing
Society Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra[38]  to suggest that  no  party  should
be allowed to take the benefit or advantage of their own wrong and a  patent
illegality cannot be cured.
75.   The broad principle laid down by  this  Court  is  not  in  doubt.  An
unauthorized construction, unless compoundable in law,  must  be  razed.  In
question are the circumstances leading to the application of  the  principle
and the practical application of the principle. More  often  than  not,  the
municipal authorities and builders conspiratorially join hands in  violating
the law but the victim is an innocent purchaser or  investor  who  pays  for
the maladministration. In such a case, how is the victim to  be  compensated
or is he or she expected to be the only  loser?  If  the  victim  is  to  be
compensated, who will do so? These issues have not  been  discussed  in  the
decisions cited by the Bombay Environment Action Group.
76.   In so far as the practical application of the principle is  concerned,
in Shenoy permission was granted to  convert  a  Kalyana  Mantap-cum-Lecture
Hall into a cinema  hall.  A  reading  of  the  decision  suggests  that  no
construction was made and it is not clear whether  any  money  was  actually
spent on the project.  The question  of  compensation,  therefore,  did  not
arise.
77.    M.I. Builders was an extreme case in  which  partial  demolition  was
ordered since the agreement between the Lucknow  Nagar  Mahapalika  and  the
builder was not only unreasonable for  the  Mahapalika,  but  atrocious.  In
paragraph 59 of the Report, this Court said,
           “The agreement defies logic. It is outrageous.  It  crosses  all
           limits of rationality. The Mahapalika has certainly acted  in  a
           fatuous manner in entering into such an agreement.”

      It was further held in paragraph 71 of the Report that,

           “The  agreement  smacks   of   arbitrariness,   unfairness   and
           favouritism. The agreement was opposed to public policy. It  was
           not in public interest. The whole process of law  was  subverted
           to benefit the builder.”


 78.  Pleasant Stay Hotel was a case of deliberately flouting the law.   The
Hotel was granted sanction for the construction of two  floors  but  despite
the rejection of its revised plan,  it  went  ahead  and  constructed  seven
floors. This Court noted that, therefore, five floors had  been  constructed
illegally and unauthorisedly. Under  these  circumstances,  and  subject  to
certain clarifications, the demolition order passed by the  High  Court  was
upheld.  Payment of compensation in a case  of  knowingly  and  deliberately
flouting the law does not arise.
 79.  In Pratibha the eight unauthorized floors were  constructed  in  clear
and flagrant violation and disregard of the FSI. The  demolition  order  had
already  attained  finality  in  this  Court  and  thereafter  six  of   the
unauthorized floors had  been  demolished  and  the  seventh  was  partially
demolished. This Court found no justification to -
 interfere with the demolitions.  
Again, the issue of compensation does not
arise in such a situation.

80.   The application of the principle laid down by this  Court,  therefore,
depends on the independent facts found in a case.
The remedy  of  demolition
cannot be applied per se with a broad brush to all cases.  
The  State  also
seems to have realized this and that is perhaps the reason why it moved  the
application that it did in Godavarman.

81.   Looking at the issue from point of view of the citizen  and  not  only
from the point of view of the State or a well  meaning  pressure  group,  it
does appear that even though the basic principle is that  the  buyer  should
beware and therefore if  the  appellants  and  purchasers  of  tenements  or
commercial  establishments  from  the   appellants   ought   to   bear   the
consequences of unauthorized construction,  the  well-settled  principle  of
caveat emptor would  be  applicable  in  normal  circumstances  and  not  in
extraordinary circumstances as these appeals  present,  when  a  citizen  is
effectively led up the  garden  path   for  several  decades  by  the  State
itself.  
The present appeals do not relate to a stray or a few instances of  unauthorized
constructions and, therefore, fall in a class of their own. 
In a  case  such
as the present, if  a  citizen  cannot  trust  the  State  which  has  given statutory permissions and provided municipal facilities, whom should  he  or she trust?

82.   Assuming the disputed land was a private forest,  the  State  remained
completely inactive when construction was going on over acres and  acres  of
land and of a very large number of buildings thereon and for a few  decades.
The State permitted the construction through the development  plans  and  by
granting exemption under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)  Act,  1976
and providing necessary  infrastructure  such  as   roads   and   sanitation
on  the disputed land and the surrounding area.  When  such  a  large  scale
activity involving the State is being carried  on  over  vast  stretches  of
land exceeding a hundred acres, it is natural for a  reasonable  citizen  to
assume that whatever actions are being taken  are  in  accordance  with  law
otherwise the State would certainly step in to prevent such  a  massive  and
prolonged breach of the law.  The silence of the State in  all  the  appeals
before us led the appellants and a large number of citizens to believe  that
there was no patent illegality in the constructions  on  the  disputed  land
nor was there any legal risk in  investing  on  the  disputed  land.   Under
these circumstances, for the State or the Bombay  Environment  Action  Group
to contend  that  only  the  citizen  must  bear  the  consequences  of  the
unauthorized construction may  not  be  appropriate.
 It  is  the  complete
inaction of the State, rather  its  active  consent  that  has  resulted  in
several citizens being placed in a precarious position where  they  are  now
told that their investment is actually in unauthorized  constructions  which
are liable to be demolished any time even after several  decades.  
There  is
no reason why these citizens should be the only victims of such a  fate  and
the State be held not responsible for this state of affairs;  
nor  is  there
any reason why under such circumstances this Court should not  come  to  the
aid of victims of the  culpable  failure  of  the  State  to  implement  and
enforce the law for several decades.

83.   In none of these cases is there  an  allegation  that  the  State  has
acted arbitrarily or irrationally so as to voluntarily benefit  any  of  the
appellants.  On  the  contrary,  the  facts  show  that the appellants
followed the due legal process in making the  constructions  that  they  did
and all that can be said of the State is that its Rip Van Winkleism  enabled
the appellants to obtain valid permissions from  various  authorities,  from
time to time, to make constructions over a  long  duration.  The  appellants
and individual citizens cannot be faulted or punished for that.
84.    These  appeals  raise  larger  issues  of  good  administration   and
governance and the State has, regrettably, come out in poor  light  in  this
regard.  It is not necessary for us to say  anything  more  on  the  subject
except to conclude that even if the State  were  to  succeed  on  the  legal
issues before us, there is no way, on the facts and circumstances  of  these
appeals, that it can reasonably put the clock back and ensure that  none  of
the  persons  concerned  in  these  appeals  is  prejudiced  in  any  manner
whatsoever.


Conclusion:
85.   Accordingly, for the reasons given, all these appeals are allowed  and
the impugned judgment and order of the Bombay High Court  is  set  aside  in
all of them and the notices impugned in  the  writ  petitions  in  the  High
Court are quashed.

Orders in Interlocutory Applications

Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos.25747/2010 and 25748/2010

86.   Delay condoned.

SLP (C) No.34691/2011

87.   Permission to file the special leave petition  is  declined.  However,
the petitioner is at liberty to take  such  appropriate  action  as  is  now
permissible under the law.
Civil Appeals arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 10677 of 2008, 10760  of  2008,
11509 of 2008 and 11640 of 2008

88.   Applications for impleadment/intervention stand allowed.

Civil Appeals arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 10760 of 2008   and   11509  of
2008

89.   Applications for modification  of  the order dated 5th May, 2008





in these appeals and the applications for directions in  all  other  appeals
are disposed of in terms of the judgment pronounced.



                                                           ...….……………………..J.
                                                (R.M.Lodha)


                                                            ..….……………………..J.
                                                   (Madan B. Lokur)




                                                          ......……………………..J.
                                                    (Kurian Joseph)
New Delhi;
January 30, 2014









-----------------------
[1]

      [2] Section 4 - Waste lands, etc.. to vest in Government
      (a) All waste lands in any estate which under the terms  of  the  kowl
are not the property of the estate-holder,
      (b) all waste lands in any estate which under the terms  of  the  kowl
are the property of the estate-holder but  have  not  been  appropriated  or
brought under cultivation before the 14th August 1951, and
      (c) all other kinds of property referred to in Section 37 of the  Code
situate in an estate which is not the  property  of  any  individual  or  an
aggregate of persons legally capable of  holding  property  other  than  the
estate-holder and except  in  so  far  as  any  rights  of  persons  may  be
established in or over the same and except as may be otherwise  provided  by
any law for the time being in force, together with all  rights  in  or  over
the same or appertaining thereto,
      and are hereby declared to be the property of the State and  it  shall
be lawful to dispose of and sell the same by the  authority  in  the  manner
and for the purposes prescribed in Section 37 or 38  of  the  Code,  as  the
case may be.



[3]

      [4] Changes brought about by the Government of  India  (Adaptation  of
Indian Laws) Order, 1937 and the Adaptation of Laws  Order,  1950  have  not
been incorporated in the narration of facts.


[5]

      [6] 34A. Interpretation.- For the purposes of this Chapter 'forest'
  includes any land containing trees and shrubs, pasture, lands and any
  other land whatsoever which the Provincial Government may, by
  notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a forest.




[7]

      [8] Section 35 - Protection of forests for special purposes

      (1) The Provincial Government may, by notification in the Official
  Gazette,-

      (i) regulate or prohibit in any forest -

      (a) the breaking up or clearing of the land for cultivation;

      (b) the pasturing of cattle;

      (c) the firing or clearing of the vegetation;

      (d) the girdling, tapping or burning of any tree or the stripping off
  the bark or leaves from any tree;

      (e) the lopping and pollarding of trees;

      (f) the cutting, sawing, conversion and removal of trees and timber;
  or

      (g) the quarrying of stone or the burning of lime or charcoal or the
  collection or removal of any forest produce or its subjection to any
  manufacturing process;

      (ii) regulate in any forest the regeneration of forests and their
  protection from fire;

      when such regulation or prohibition appears necessary for any of the
  following purposes :-

      (a) for the conservation of trees and forests;

      (b) for the preservation and improvement of soil or the reclamation
  of saline or water-logged land, the prevention of land-slips or of the
  formation of ravines and torrents, or the protection of land against
  erosion, or the deposit thereon of sand, stones or gravel;

      (c) for the improvement of grazing;

      (d) for the maintenance of a water supply in springs, rivers and
  tanks;

      (e) for the maintenance increase and distribution of the supply of
  fodder, leaf manure, timber or fuel;

      (f) for the maintenance of reservoirs or irrigation works and hydro-
  electric works;

      (g) for protection against storms, winds, rolling stones, floods and
  drought;

      (h) for the protection of roads, bridges, railways and other lines of
  communication; and

      (i) for the preservation of the public health.




[9]

      [10] Section 35 - Protection of forests for special purposes

      (2) The State Government may, for any such purpose, construct at its
  own expense, in any forest, such work as it thinks fit.

      (3) No notification shall be made under sub-section (1) nor shall any
  work be begun under sub-section (2), until after the issue of a notice to
  the owner of such forest calling on him to show cause, within a
  reasonable period to be specified in such notice, why such notification
  should not be made or work constructed, as the case may be, and until his
  objections, if any, and any evidence he may produce in support of the
  same, have been heard by an officer duly appointed in that behalf and
  have been considered by the State Government.




[11]

      [12] Section 35 - Protection of forests for special purposes

      (3) No notification shall be made under sub-section (1) nor shall any
  work be begun under sub-section (2), until after the issue by an officer
  authorised by the State Government in that behalf of a notice to the
  owner of such forest calling on him to show cause, within a reasonable
  period to be specified in such notice, why such notification should not
  be made or work constructed, as the case may be, and until his
  objections, if any, and any evidence he may produce in support of the
  same, have been heard by an officer duly appointed in that behalf and
  have been considered by the State Government.





[13]

      [14]Section 35 - Protection of forests for special purposes

      (4) A notice to show cause why a notification under subsection (1)
  should not be made, may require that for any period not exceeding six
  months, or till the date of the making of a notification, whichever is
  earlier, the owner or such forest and all persons who are entitled or
  permitted to do therein any or all of the things specified in clause (i)
  of sub-section (1), whether by reasons of any right, title or interest or
  under any licence or contract or otherwise, shall not, after the date of
  the notice and for the period or until the date aforesaid, as the case
  may be, do any or all the things specified in clause (i) of sub-section
  (1), to the extent specified in the notice.

      (5) A notice issued under sub-section (3) shall be served on the
  owner of such forest in the manner provided in the Code of Civil
  Procedure, 1908, for the service of summons and shall also be published
  in the manner prescribed by rules.

      (6) Any person contravening any requisition made under sub-section
  (4) in a notice to show cause why a notification under sub-section (1)
  should not be made shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment
  for a term which may extend to six months or with fine or with both.




[15]

      [16]36-A. Manner of serving notice and order under  section  36.-  The
notice referred to in sub-section (1) of section 36 and the order,  if  any,
made placing a forest under the control of a Forest Officer shall be  served
on the owner of such forest in the manner provided  in  the  Code  of  Civil
Procedure, 1908, for the service of summons.



[17]

      [18] Section 35 - Protection of forests for special purposes

      (4) A notice to show cause why a notification under subsection (1)
  should not be made, may require that for any period not exceeding one
  year, or till the date of the making of a notification, whichever is
  earlier, the owner or such forest and all persons who are entitled or
  permitted to do therein any or all of the things specified in clause (i)
  of sub-section (1), whether by reasons of any right, title or interest or
  under any licence or contract or otherwise, shall not, after the date of
  the notice and for the period or until the date aforesaid, as the case
  may be, do any or all the things specified in clause (i) of sub-section
  (1), to the extent specified in the notice.





[19]

      [20]Section 35 - Protection of forests for special purposes

      (5-A) Where a notice issued under sub-section (3) has been served on
  the owner of a forest in accordance with subsection (5), any person
  acquiring thereafter the right of ownership of that forest shall be bound
  by the notice as if it had been served on him as an owner and he shall
  accordingly comply with the notice, requisition and notification, if any,
  issued under this section.

      (7) Any person contravening any of the provisions of a notification
  issued under sub-section (1) shall, on conviction, be punished with
  imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or
  with both.




[21]

      [22] Section 24 - Repeal of sections 34A to 37 of Forest Act
      (1) On and from the appointed day, sections 34A,  35,  36,  36A,  36B,
36C and 37 of the Forest Act shall stand repealed.
      (2) Notwithstanding anything contained  in  sub-section  (1),  on  and
from  the  date  of  commencement  of  the   Maharashtra   Private   Forests
(Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, 1978 (Mah. XIV of 1978),  sections  34A,  35,
36, 36A, 36B, 36C and 37 of the Forest Act, shall, in respect of  the  lands
restored under section 22A, be deemed to have been  reenacted  in  the  same
form and be deemed always to have been in force and  applicable  in  respect
of such lands, as if they had not been repealed.



[23]

      [24] AIR 1978 Bombay 119


[25]

      [26] (2000) 3 SCC 143


[27]

      [28] Paragraph 19 of Chintamani


[29]

      [30] Paragraph 123


[31]

      [32] Paragraph 126


[33]

      [34] Paragraph 149


[35]

      [36] (1976) 2 SCC 942


[37]

      [38] (1998) 1 SCC 458


[39]

      [40] 7th Edition 1.214


[41]

      [42] (1883) 8 AC 798


[43]

      [44] (1964) 6 SCR 784


[45]

      [46] (2000) 5 SCC 346


[47]

      [48] (2002) 5 SCC 397


[49]

      [50] The correct factual position is that  Section  2(f)(iii)  of  the
Private Forests Act excluded “an area not exceeding two hectares”.


[51]

      [52] 1993 Supp (3) SCC 530


[53]

      [54] (1964) 7 SCR 539


[55]

      [56] (1975) 4 SCC 844


[57]

      [58] (2012) 5 SCC 1 paragraph 232


[59]

      [60] (1984) 1 SCC 125


[61]

      [62] (2009) 9 SCC 352


[63]

      [64] (2005) 7 SCC 627


[65]

      [66] (1966) 3 SCR 557


[67]

      [68] (1967) 1 SCR 120


[69]

      [70]  (1974) 2 SCC 506


[71]

      [72] (1996) 6 SCC 464


[73]

      [74] (1995) 6 SCC 127


[75]

      [76] (1991) 3 SCC 341