A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (Repealed) — A.P. Residential and Non-Residential Premises Tenancy Act, 2017 (Act No. 10 of 2018) — Jurisdiction of Rent Controller — Preliminary Issue.
Landlord and Tenant — Jurisdiction:
Whether the Rent Controller constituted under the repealed Act, 1960 retains jurisdiction to entertain a fresh eviction petition (R.C.C. No. 4 of 2020) filed after the commencement of the new Act No. 10 of 2018 (which repealed the 1960 Act).
Held: A fresh petition filed after the repeal of the Act, 1960 is not a pending proceeding saved by Section 47(2) of the Act No. 10 of 2018. The mere fact that the new specialized forum (Rent Court/Tribunal) under the Act No. 10 of 2018 has not yet been constituted does not automatically revive or confer jurisdiction on the repealed Rent Controller, especially when the new Act expressly bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court (Section 40). The Rent Controller lacks jurisdiction over the fresh matter.
Civil Procedure Code (CPC) — Preliminary Issue (Order XIV Rule 1):
Whether the Rent Controller was justified in rejecting an application (I.A. No. 833 of 2023) to decide the issue of "landlord and tenant relationship" as a preliminary issue.
Held: The existence of a landlord-tenant relationship is foundational to the Rent Controller's jurisdiction. When this relationship is denied and challenged, the issue must be tried as a preliminary issue under Order XIV Rule 1(2) CPC, as the entire proceeding is predicated upon this jurisdictional fact.
Conclusion: The impugned order of the Rent Controller rejecting the application (I.A. No. 833 of 2023) is set aside as the Rent Controller erred in both finding that it had jurisdiction and in refusing to decide the jurisdictional fact (landlord-tenant relationship) as a preliminary issue.
1
* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
+C.R.P.No.3018 OF 2024
% 09.05.2025
# Smt Akella Surya Kumari
……Petitioner
And:
$ Nidavolu Thammiraju
….Respondent.
!Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri A. Radha Krishna
^Counsel for the respondent : Nil
<Gist:
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1.2019 (5) ALD 1
2.1994(TLS) SCC 10653
3.2019 SCC OnLine AP 272
4.(2022) 2 SCC 161
5.2023 SCC OnLine SC 1378
6.2024 sCC OnLine AP 5739
7.(2006) 5 Superme Court Cases 638
8.(2022) 7 SCC 644
9.(2022) 11 SCC 572
2025:APHC:18792
2
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
* * * *
C.R.P.No.3018 OF 2024
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED:09.05.2025
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
Yes/No
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals
Yes/No
3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the
fair copy of the Judgment?
Yes/No
____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
2025:APHC:18792
3
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
C.R.P.No.3018 OF 2024
JUDGMENT:
1. Heard Sri A. Radha Krishna, learned counsel for the
petitioner. None appeared for the respondent.
I. Facts:
2. This civil revision petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner/defendant
challenging the order dated 08.07.2024, passed in R.C.C.No.4 of
2020 (in short, R.C.C), pending in the court of Rent Controllercum-IV Additional Junior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, (learned
Court) rejecting I.A.No.833 of 2024 filed by the petitioner under
Order XIV Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure (for short, C.P.C) read
with Section 151 C.P.C, to decide land lord and tenant
relationship and the jurisdiction of the Court as a preliminary
issue as the Rent Court/Rent Tribunal under the Andhra
Pradesh/Telangana Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control
Act, 1960 (for short, “the Act, 1960”) was not constituted.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the title
of the C.R.P as also the impugned order, it is wrongly mentioned
that the petitioner is the plaintiff and the respondent is the
2025:APHC:18792
4
defendant. The correct fact is that the petitioner is the defendant
and the respondent is the plaintiff in the Rent Control Case. He
submitted that a memo to that effect has also been filed.
4. The respondent is the plaintiff. He filed R.C.C.No.4 of 2020
under Section 10(i)(ib) 3(iii)(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings
(Lease, Rent And Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short, the Act,
1960) against the petitioner to vacate the petition schedule
premises and deliver the vacant possession, on the plea of, the
petitioner being the tenant and the respondent being the landlord.
5. In R.C.C, the petitioner filed I.A.No.833 of 2023 to decide
the issue of “landlord and tenant relationship” and the jurisdiction
of the IV Additional Junior Civil Judge-Rent Controller court as
preliminary issues. It was submitted inter alia that there was no
relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The
execution of the rent agreement dated 06.09.2018 was denied.
The same was said to be forged and fabricated document.
6. The jurisdiction of the court was also challenged on the
plea that, the Act, 1960 had been repealed. New Act namely A.P.
Residential and Non Residential Premises Tenancy Act, 2017
(Act No.10 of 2018) (for short, the Act, 2018), came into force with
effect from 28.03.2018 under which jurisdiction had been
2025:APHC:18792
5
conferred on the Rent Court/Tribunal. The remedy of the
respondent was pleaded to be to file a regular suit in the civil
court as under the Act No.10 of 2018, the Rent Court/Tribunal
had not been constituted. Plea was taken that the remedy could
not be under the Act, 1960. The Court of Rent Controller, as
such, had no jurisdiction.
7. The respondent filed counter to I.A No.833 of 2023,
submitting inter alia that the I.A. had no merit. It was liable to be
dismissed. The R.C.C was coming up for cross-examination of
P.W.1 and to delay the proceedings, the I.A was filed. As the
Rent Court/Tribunal had not been constituted under the Act,
2018, the Rent Control Court constituted under the Act, 1960 had
the jurisdiction.
II. Order of the Court of Rent Controller dated 08.07.2024:
8. The learned Court of Rent Controller rejected the
I.A.No.833 of 2023, holding that the Rent Court/Tribunal was not
constituted under the Act No.10 of 2018. So, under the existing
mechanism as per the Act, 1960, the dispute could be entertained
and adjudicated. It referred to the judgment in Devathi
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6
Ramachandra Rao vs. Kella Dhanalakshmi1
, and
Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Dhadi Sahu2
.
III. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner:
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
question of jurisdiction had been incorrectly decided. The learned
court of Rent Controller had no jurisdiction. Under the Act No.10
of 2018, the jurisdiction was conferred on the Rent Court/Rent
Tribunal which had not been constituted. Further, in view of the
repeal of the Act, 1960, the Rent Controller could not have
jurisdiction, even if the Rent Court/Rent Tribunal had not been
constituted under the Act No.10 of 2018.
10. Placing reliance in Mara Venkata Lingam vs. State of
Andhra Pradesh, rep. by its Principal Secretary, Law
Department and others3
, learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that the Courts which are vested with the jurisdiction to
entertain the civil suit can also entertain the suits filed by the
lessees stating injustice and for relevant reliefs.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that there
was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the
1
2019 (5) ALD 1
2
1994(TLS) SCC 10653
3
2019 SCC OnLine AP 272
2025:APHC:18792
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respondent and the petitioner. So, there was no jurisdiction in the
court of Rent Controller. He submitted that the question of
relationship deserved to be decided as a preliminary issue, but
had not been decided by the Rent Controller.
IV. Points for determination:
12. Following points arise for consideration and determination
by this Court:
(A) Whether the court of the Rent Controller-cumIV Additional Junior Civil Judge-Rent Controller
Court, Visakhapatnam had no jurisdiction in the
matter? and
(B) Whether the question of relationship of landlord
and tenant between the respondent and the
petitioner was required to be decided as a
preliminary issue?
(C) Whether the impugned order is legal and justified or
it calls for interference?
V. Analysis:
13. I have considered the submissions advanced by the
learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material on
record.
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8
Point-A:
14. This Court would first refer to Dhadi Sahu (supra), which
has been referred in the impugned order and some later
pronouncements of Hon’ble the Apex Court.
14.1. In Dhadi Sahu (supra), a change in forum came to be
made during pendency of the proceedings before one forum,
Inspecting Assistant Commissioner which initially had the
jurisdiction, under the Income Tax Act when the matter was
referred. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the general principle is
that a law which brings about a change in the forum does not
affect pending actions, unless intention to the contrary is clearly
shown. One of the modes by which such an intention is shown is
by making a provision for change-over of proceedings, from the
court or the tribunal where they are pending to the court or the
tribunal which under the new law gets jurisdiction to try case.
14.2. The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that, no litigant has
any vested right in the matter of procedural law, but where the
question is of change of forum it ceases to be a question of
procedure only. The forum of appeal or proceedings is a vested
right as opposed to pure procedure to be followed before a
particular forum. The right becomes vested when the proceedings
2025:APHC:18792
9
are initiated in the tribunal or the court of first instance and unless
the legislature has by express words or by necessary implication
clearly so indicated, that vested right will continue, in spite of the
change of jurisdiction of the different tribunals or forums. With
respect to forum being vested right as opposed to pure procedure
and change of forum ceasing to be a question of procedure only
as held in Dadhi Sahu (supra), the same was recently considered
and discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Neena Aneja and
another vs. Jai Prakash Associates Limited4
.
14.3 Paras 41 to 44 of Neena Aneja (supra) deserve to be
reproduced as under:
“41. Now, in this backdrop, it becomes necessary to consider
the 1992 decision of a two judge Bench of this Court in
Dhadi Sahu (supra) and several decisions which adverted to
it. This was a case where the assessee had preferred
appeals to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal
allowed the appeals and set aside the penalties holding that
in view of the amendment made to Section 274(2) of the
Income Tax Act 1961 with effect from 1 April 1971, the
Inspecting Assistant Commissioner34 lost his jurisdiction.
The power of the Income Tax Officer to impose a penalty
under Section 271 was subject to Section 274. As a result of
the amending Act which came into force on 1st April 1971,
the amount of income allegedly concealed had to exceed
4
(2022) 2 SCC 161
2025:APHC:18792
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twenty- five thousand rupees. The effect of this amendment
was that the Assistant Commissioner did not have
jurisdiction over the assessee as the concealed “Dhadi
Sahu”; “IAC” PART-C amount was lesser than the minimum
amount prescribed by the subsequent amendment.
42. Yogeshwar Dayal, J speaking for the two judge
Bench premised the judgment on "the general principle of
law" that a change of forum does not affect pending actions
unless a contrary intent is shown:
“18. It may be stated at the outset that the general principle
is that a law which brings about a change in the forum does
not affect pending actions unless intention to the contrary is
clearly shown. One of the modes by which such an intention
is shown is by making a provision for change-over of
proceedings, from the court or the tribunal where they are
pending to the court or the tribunal which under the new law
gets jurisdiction to try them.”
43. This Court held that the amending Act did not make
any provision that references validly pending before IAC
shall be returned without passing any final order if the
amount of income in respect of which particulars have been
concealed did not exceed rupees twenty five thousand. This,
in the view of the Court, supported the inference that the IAC
continued to have jurisdiction to impose a penalty on
pending references. The previous operation of Section
274(2) as it stood before 1 April 1971 and anything done
under it, continued to have effect under Section 6(b) for
the General Clauses Act enabling the IAC to pass orders
imposing a penalty in a pending reference. If the reference
was made before 1 April 1971, it would be governed by
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11
Section 274(2) as it stood before that date and the IAC
would continue to have jurisdiction. However, in paragraph
21 of the decision, this Court observed:
“21. It is also true that no litigant has any vested right in the
matter of procedural law but where the question is of change
of forum it ceases to be a question of procedure only. The
forum of appeal or proceedings is a vested right as opposed
to pure procedure to be followed before a particular forum.
The right becomes vested when the proceedings are
initiated PART-C in the tribunal or the court of first instance
and unless the legislature has by express words or by
necessary implication clearly so indicated, that vested right
will continue in spite of the change of jurisdiction of the
different tribunals or forums.”
44. This Court in Dhadi Sahu (supra) then adverted to the
decision in Manujendra Dutt(supra) and Mohd. Idris(supra)
and observed that "amending an Act does not show that the
pending proceedings before the court on reference
abate". Therefore, the decision of the two judge Bench in
Dhadi Sahu(supra) held that a litigant had a crystallized right
to a forum when proceedings have been initiated and are
pending. Such a right vested, in the view of the Court, is
distinct from a pure procedure to be followed before the
forum concerned. In taking this view, the two judge Bench in
Dhadi Sahu(supra) did not consider a three judge bench
decision in New India Assurance(supra) as well as a
previous co-ordinate Bench decision in Maria
Cristina(supra), which relied on common law jurisprudence
and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act to hold that a
change in forum is purely a procedural matter which
2025:APHC:18792
12
operates retrospectively in the absence of a contrary
legislative mandate. The latter principle has since been
followed in the decisions in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur
(supra); Sudhir G Angur (supra).”
14.4. In Neena Aneja (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court concluded
on the position of law with respect to change of Forum in
paragraphs 72 and 73 which reads as under:-
“72. In considering the myriad precedents that have interpreted
the impact of a change in forum on pending proceedings and
retrospectivity- a clear position of law has emerged: a change
in forum lies in the realm of procedure. Accordingly, in
compliance with the tenets of statutory interpretation
applicable to procedural law, amendments on matters of
procedure are retrospective, unless a contrary intention
emerges from the statute. This position emerges from the
decisions in New India Assurance(supra), Maria
Cristina(supra), Hitendra Kumar Thakur(supra), Ramesh Kumar
Soni(supra) and Sudhir G Angur(supra). More recently, this
position has been noted in a three judge Bench decision of this
Court in Manish Kumar v. Union of India51. However, there was a
deviation by a two judge bench decision of this Court in Dhadi
Sahu(supra), which overlooked the decision of a larger three
judge bench in New India Assurance(supra) and of a co-ordinate
two judge bench in Maria Cristina(supra). The decision in Dhadi
Sahu(supra) propounded a position that “no litigant has any
vested right in the matter of procedural law but where the question
is of change of forum it ceases to be a question of procedure only.
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The forum of appeal or proceedings is a vested right as opposed
to pure procedure to be followed before a particular forum.
The Writ Petition (C) No. 26 of 2020, decided on 19 January 2021
(Supreme Court of India) PART C right becomes vested when the
proceedings are initiated in the tribunal.” In taking this view, the
two judge bench did not consider binding decisions. Dhadi
Sahu(supra) failed to consider that the saving of pending
proceedings in Mohd. Idris(supra) and Manujendra Dutt(supra)
was a saving of vested rights of the litigants that were being
impacted by the repealing acts therein, and not because a right to
forum is accrued once proceedings have been
initiated. Thereafter, a line of decisions followed Dhadi
Sahu(supra), to hold that a litigant has a crystallized right to a
forum once proceedings have been initiated. A litigant’s vested
right (including the right to an appeal) prior to the amendment or
repeal are undoubtedly saved, in addition to substantive rights
envisaged under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. This
protection does not extend to pure matters of procedure. Repeals
or amendments that effect changes in forum would ordinarily
affect pending proceedings, unless a contrary intention appears
from the repealing or amending statute.
73. It is relevant to note in this context that the decision
in Ambalal Sarabhai (supra) saved proceedings in relation to a
benefit which although not vested, accrued to the landlord to evict
the tenant by virtue of a proviso to a Section which accorded
protection to the tenant from ejectment. This Court reasoned that
since the right of the landlord flows from a Section which protects
the tenant, it cannot be enlarged into a vested right. However,
Ambalal Sarabhai(supra) did not enunciate an absolute
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proposition that the right to institute proceedings at a particular
forum is an accrued right, let alone a vested right. The dictum
that a change of forum is a procedural matter is not altered
by the decision of this Court in Ambalal Sarabhai(supra)
which sought to PART C differentiate between vested rights
and accrued rights, the latter being protected under Section
6(c) of the General Clauses Act, the proceedings in relation to
which are protected under Section 6(e).
14.5 In Mumtaz Yarud Dowla Wakf vs. Badam Balakrishna
Hotel Pvt., Limited and others5
, the Hon’ble Apex Court
considered the issue of retrospective application and change of
Forum. It was held that when a statute is amended on an issue
pertaining to a forum for adjudication, it being procedural, takes
effect retrospectively. A party to a lis does not have any vested
right of forum as against action. In the absence of any substantive
right being subsumed by a particular forum, one has to give
retrospective application.
14.6. In Mumtaz Yarud Dowla Wakf (supra), the Hon’ble Apex
Court observed that there was a subtle difference in dealing with
a case involving quorum non judicie. The principle governing lack
of jurisdiction to a forum might differ from a case where two or
more forums deal with the same issue along with the rights and
5
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1378
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liabilities of the parties. To make the position clear, one had to
see as to whether there was any change in the rights and
liabilities of the parties by choosing one forum as against the
other. As an example, taking the case of eviction of a tenant, it
was held that if he was to be evicted only under the Rent Control
Act which extended a certain right to the tenant, who could not be
evicted otherwise than under the provisions contained therein, a
common law remedy could not be invoked by way of a suit as
against a proceeding before the Rent Controller. Para 17 of
Mumtaz Yarud Dowla Wakf (supra) deserves to be reproduced
which reads as under:-
“17. There is a subtle difference when we deal with a
case involving coram non-judice.
The principle governing lack of jurisdiction to a forum
may differ from a case where two or more forums
deal with the same issue along with the rights and
liabilities of the parties. To make the position clear,
one has to see as to whether there is any change in
the rights and liabilities of the parties by choosing one
forum as against the other. As an example, we can
take the case of eviction of a tenant. If he is to be
evicted only under the Rent Control Act which
extends a certain right to the tenant, who cannot be
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evicted otherwise than under the provisions contained
therein, a common law remedy cannot be invoked by
way of a suit as against a proceeding before the Rent
Controller. In that view of the matter, certainly the
question of prejudice would arise. However, in a case
involving same rights and liabilities but the question is
only with respect to the forum being judicial or quasijudicial, the issue of jurisdiction would pale into
insignificance when it is sought to be raised as a last
straw at a very belated stage. Therefore, when the
process becomes the same for both parties who
undertake the said route willingly, the question of
jurisdiction cannot be put against each other after it
has attained finality, unless it is demonstrated that the
rights of the party who suffered the decree are
obliterated.”
15. The law, therefore, is well settled that a change in Forum
lies in the realm of procedure. Amendments on matters of
procedure are retrospective unless a contrary intention emerges
from the statute. The repeals or amendments that effect changes
in forum would ordinarily affect pending proceedings, unless a
contrary intention appears from the repealing or amending
statute.
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(1)The Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction)
Control Act, 1960 is hereby repealed.
(2)Notwithstanding such repeal and subject to the provisions
of this Act all cases and other proceedings under the said Act
pending, at the commencement of this Act, shall be continued
and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the said
Act, as if the said Act had continued in force and this Act had
not been passed :Provided that the plaintiff within a period of
180 days of coming into force of this Act shall be entitled to
withdraw any suit or appeal or any other proceeding pending
under the repealed Act with liberty to file fresh application in
respect of the subject-matter of such suit or appeal or any
other proceeding under and in accordance with the provisions
of this Act, and for the purposes of limitation, such application
if it is filed within a period of 270 days from the
commencement of this Act be deemed to have been filed on
the date of filing of the suit which was withdrawn and in case
of withdrawal of appeal or other proceedings on the date on
which the suit was filed out of which such appeal or
proceeding originated.”
17. Section 47 of the Act No.10 of 2008 which repeals the Act,
1960, provides that notwithstanding such repeal and subject to
the provisions of the Act or cases and other proceedings under
16. Section 47 in Andhra Pradesh Residential and NonResidential Premises Tenancy Act, 2017
“47. Repeal and savings.
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the Act, 1960, pending at the commencement of the Act of 2018
shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the
provisions of the said Act, as if the said Act had continued in force
and the Act, 2018 had not been passed.
18. So, with respect to the pending matter, under the Act of
1960, pending on the date of enforcement of the Act No.10 of
2018, care has been taken with respect to the forum, i.e that,
those shall be continued in the same forum, as if the Act No.10 of
2018 had not been enacted and the Act of 1960 had not been
repealed. Further, under Section 47(2), option has been given to
the plaintiff within the specified period of 180 days of the, Act
No.10 of 2018 coming into force, permitting him to withdraw the
suit or proceeding under the Act, 1960, with opportunity to file
fresh application in respect of the subject matter under the Act
No.10 of 2018.
19. However, with respect to the fresh proceedings Act No.10
of 2018 provides for new forum of Rent Court under Section 2(h)
to be constituted under Section 30 and for the appeal to Rent
Tribunal under Section 2(j), constituted under Section 31 of the
Act 10 of 2018.
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20. Section 2(h),(j), 30 and 31 of the Act No.10/2018 are as
under:-
“2(h) “Rent Court” means a Rent Court constituted under
Section 30;
2(j) “Rent Tribunal” means Rent Tribunal constituted under
Section 31;”
“30. Constitution of Rent Court. –
(1) The State Government may, by notification, constitute
such number of Rent Courts in as many urban areas as
may be deemed necessary by it.
(2) Where two or more Rent Courts are constituted for
any urban area, the State Government may, by general
or special order, regulate the distribution of business
among them.
(3) A Rent Court may consist of one person only
(hereinafter referred to as the Presiding Officer) to be
appointed by the State Government in consultation with
the High Court.
(4) No person shall be eligible to be appointed as
Presiding Officer of the Rent Court unless he is member
of the State Higher Judicial Service.
(5) The State Government may, in consultation with the
High Court, authorize the Presiding Officer of one rent
2025:APHC:18792
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Court to discharge the functions of the Presiding Officer
of another Rent Court also.”
“31. Constitution of Rent Tribunal. –
(1) The State Government may, by notification, constitute
such number of Rent Tribunals at such places as may be
deemed necessary by it.
(2) Where two or more Rent Tribunals are constituted for
any area, the State Government may, by general or
special order, regulate the distribution of business among
them.
(3) The Rent Tribunal shall consist of one person only
(hereafter referred to as the presiding officer of the rent
Tribunal) to be appointed by the State Government in
consultation with the High Court.
(4) No person shall be eligible to be appointed as the
presiding officer of the Rent Tribunal unless he has been
High Court Judge.”
21. So, far the Rent Court/Tribunal under Act No.10 of 2018
have not been established.
22. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) provides as
under:
“The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained)
have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which
their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
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Explanation [I ].-A suit in which the right to property or to an office
is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right
may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or
ceremonies.
[ Explanation II .-For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial
whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in
Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular
place.]”
23. It is well settled in law that exclusion of the jurisdiction of
the civil Court is not to be readily inferred. But it can be excluded
by specific provision or may also follow by necessary implication.
In the present case, Act 10/2018 exclusively bar the jurisdiction of
the Civil Court in respect of the matter under the Act 10/2018.
24. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is also barred. Section 40
of the Act No.10 of 2018 reads as under:-
“40. Jurisdiction of civil Courts barred in respect of certain
matters. – (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no
civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding insofar
as it relates to the provisions of this Act.”
25. A perusal of Section 40 of the Act No.10 of 2018, clearly
shows that save as otherwise provided, no civil court shall
entertain any suit or proceedings in so far as it relates to the
provisions of the Act No.10 of 2008. So, Section 40 clearly bars
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the jurisdiction of the civil court with respect to the matters relating
to the provisions of the Act No.10 of 2008.
26. The Hon’ble Apex Court held in Mumtaz Yarud Dowla
Wakf (supra) that When a specialized forum is made available
under a statute, a civil court should normally entertain a dispute
which would otherwise not be amenable before the said Forum.
Therefore, rights and liabilities of the parties arising from an
enactment ought to be adjudicated upon in tune with the
mechanism provided thereunder. The reason being that the
provisions of the enactment ought to be given effect to through
such forums and therefore to the exclusion of a civil court whose
jurisdiction is otherwise to be inferred. Para 27 is reproduced as
under:
“27. When a specialized forum is made available under a
statute, a civil court should normally entertain a dispute which
would otherwise not be amenable before the said forum.
Therefore, rights and liabilities of the parties arising from an
enactment ought to be adjudicated upon in tune with the
mechanism provided thereunder. The reason being that the
provisions of the enactment ought to be given effect to
through such forums and therefore to the exclusion of a civil
court whose jurisdiction is otherwise to be inferred. J. Willes
in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford
2025:APHC:18792
23
[1859] 6 C.B. (NS) 336, “One is where there was a liability
existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed by a
Statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy
different from the remedy which existed at common law:
there, unless the Statute contains words which expressly or
by necessary implication exclude the common law remedy
the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the
statutory remedy. The second class of cases is, where the
Statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides, no
particular form of remedy: there, the party can only proceed
by action at common law. But there is a third class, viz.,
where a liability not existing at common law is created by a
Statute which at the same time gives a special and particular
remedy for enforcing it ........ The remedy provided by the
Statute must be followed and it is not competent to the party
to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class.”
(emphasis supplied)”
27. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Mumtaj Yarud Dowla Wakf
(supra) further held that as a principle of law, the powers of the
civil court, being plenary in nature, the onus lies on the party who
contends that it lacked jurisdiction and further that, would not
take away the duty of the civil court to check its own jurisdiction,
more so when a specialized forum had come into being as a
creature of a statute. Para 28 is reproduced as under:
“28. As a principle of law, the powers of the civil court, being
plenary in nature, the onus lies on the party who contends
2025:APHC:18792
24
that it lacks jurisdiction. However, this does not take away the
duty of the civil court to check its own jurisdiction, more so
when a specialized forum has come into being as a creature
of a statute. Of course, there may be certain exceptions when
fundamental principles governing common law, including the
one pertaining to the principle of natural justice, stand
violated. To deal with the said issue one has to take into
consideration the objective behind the enactment, along with
the provisions contained thereunder. Dhulabhai etc. v. State
of Madhya Pradesh and Another, (1968) 3 SCR 662 : AIR
1969 SC 78, “32. Neither of the two cases of Firm of Illuri
Subayya, 1964-1 SCR 752 = (AIR 1964 SC 322) or Kamla
Mills, 1966 1 SCR 64 = (AIR 1965 SC 1942) can be said to
run counter to the series of cases earlier noticed. The result
of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed in this Court
may be stated as follows:
(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the
special tribunals the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to
be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil
courts would normally do in a suit.
Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases
where the provisions of the particular Act have not been
complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in
conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial
procedure.
(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the
court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to
find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided
2025:APHC:18792
25
may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction
of the civil court.
Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the
remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the
intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry
may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the
statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for
the determination of the right or liability and further lays down
that all questions about the said right and liability shall be
determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether
remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are
prescribed by the said statute or not.
xxxxx (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is
not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set
down apply.”
28. In such a situation, in Devathi Ramachandra Rao (supra),
where the suit for eviction was filed in the court of the Principal
Junior Civil Judge, Tenali and the plaint was returned for
presentation before the proper Forum, considering that the Act
No.10 of 2018 came into force with effect from 28.03.2018, which
contained, express bar to entertain the suit by the civil court,
under Section 40(1) and Section 32, also provided that only the
Rent Control Court and no civil court shall have jurisdiction to
hear and decide the applications relating to disputes between the
2025:APHC:18792
26
landlord and the tenant, and the matters connected with and rent
ancillary thereto, covered under the Act No.10 of 2018, this court
observed that the provisions of Sections 40 and 32 created
express bar to entertain any suit by the civil court, but under the
Act No.10 of 2018, no Tribunal was constituted. This Court
referring to the judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra
Pradesh at Hyderabad, in W.P.No.9681 of 2008 dated
11.11.2008,( Sri Udasin Mutt rep by its Mahant Sri Arundas
Udasin, R/o Udasin Mutt H No 203311 Hussaini Alam
Hyderabad and The Deputy Commissioner of Endowments,
Endowments Department Hyderabad Andhra Pradesh)
allowed the revision and directed the learned court of Principal
Junior Civil Judge to entertain the suit.
29. The relevant part of para 6 in Devathi Ramachandra Rao
(supra), reads as under:
“Learned Counsel for the petitioner for the purpose
guiding this Court has submitted the ruling of the
erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh, at
Hyderabad in Writ Petition No. 9681 of 2008,
dated11.11.2008, wherein this Court in the similar
situation held as follows by relying on the judgment
of the Honourable Apex Court.”
2025:APHC:18792
27
"If is not uncommon that the Tribunal or
agencies are constituted to adjudicate the
disputes arising under the relevant enactments,
While in some cases, the arrangement is made
at the initial stage itself, in the other cases, they
are made by way of amendment. Wherever the
adjudicatory procedure or process is amended,
the known principle is that till the agency
contemplated under the law becomes functional,
the existing arrangement must continue. In fact,
that is the purport of the relevant provisions of
the General Clauses Act,
1897. In COMMISSIONER Of INCOME TAX v
DHADI SAHU [1994 (TLS)SCC 10853] , the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if) the
adjudicatory machinery contemplated under an
enactment is brought into existence, the
arrangement that has been functional prior to it
would continue, Similar view was taken in the
earlier judgments also."
30. Similarly in Mara Venkata Lingam (supra), also the
question was when the Rent Court/Tribunal as envisaged in
Section 30 of the Act No.10 of 2018 was not constituted, what
would be the remedy, and whether the civil court could entertain
the suit for injunction till such rent court was constituted. There
2025:APHC:18792
28
also, the suit was filed by the plaintiff contending that he was a
statutory tenant and could not be evicted from the shop in
tenancy, without following the due process of law. The plaint was
returned referring to Section 40 of the Act 10 of 2018.
Challenging the said order, the petition was filed. This Court
observed that the Act 10 2018, repealed the Act of 1960. The Act
No.10 of 2018 came into force from 28.03.2018 vide
G.O.Ms.No.118 (Municipal Administration and Urban
Development) Department dated 28.03.2018, issued as per
Section 1(3) of the Act 10 of 2018. It was observed that in view of
Section 40, the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred, in respect
of the matters relating to the provisions under the Act No.10 of
2010. However, this court held that since the Rent
Court/Tribunals were not constituted in terms of Section 30 of the
Act No.10 of 2018, the citizens could not be left remediless, in the
interregnum period. Referring to W.P.No.9681 of 2008 (supra)
Mara Venkata Lingam (supra) was also disposed of setting aside
the order of the civil court of return of plaint holding that, the civil
courts were vested with the jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
31. The relevant part of para 8 from Mara Venkata Lingam
(supra) reads as under:
2025:APHC:18792
29
“8. In W.P.No.9681 of 2008, the learned single in
this regard referred the judgment of the Hon'ble
Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax's
case referred supra, wherein it was held by the
Apex Court that till the adjudicatory machinery
contemplated under an enactment is brought into
existence, the arrangement that has been
functional prior to it would continue.”
32. In both the aforesaid judgments, Devathi Ramachandra
Rao (supra) and Mara Venkata Lingam (supra), this Court
referred to the order dated 11.11.2008 in W.P.No.9681 of 2008.
33. In W.P.No.9681 of 2008 vide order dated 11.11.2008
(Sri Udasin Mutt, represented by its Mahant Sri Arundas
Udasin vs. Deputy Commissioner of Endowments,
Endowments Department, Hyderabad and others, a
Coordinate Bench of this Court observed that It is not uncommon
that the Tribunal or agencies are constituted to adjudicate the
disputes arising under the relevant enactments. While in some
cases, the arrangement is made at the initial stage itself, in the
other cases, they are made by way of amendment. Wherever the
adjudicatory procedure or process is amended, the known
principle is that till the agency contemplated under the law
2025:APHC:18792
30
becomes functional the existing arrangement must continue. It
was further observed that whatever be the reason, the hiatus
could not permitted to continue.
34. The relevant part in W.P.No.9681 of 2008, reads as under:-
“It is not uncommon that the Tribunal or agencies are
constituted to adjudicate the disputes arising under the relevant
enactments. While in some cases, the arrangement is made at
the initial stage itself, in the other cases, they are made by way of
amendment. Wherever the adjudicatory procedure or process is
amended, the known principle is that till the agency contemplated
under the law becomes functional, the existing arrangement must
continue. In fact, that is the purport of the relevant provisions of
the General Clauses Act, 1897. In Dhadi Sahu (supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that till the adjudicatory machinery
contemplated under an enactment is brought into existence, the
arrangement that has been functional prior to it would continue.
Similar view was taken in the earlier judgment also.”
35. The Act, 10 of 2018 came into force on 28, March, 2018.
The jurisdiction under the said Act has been conferred on the
Rent Courts and the Rent Tribunal. Those should have been
2025:APHC:18792
31
constituted immediately. This Court finds that In Mara Venkata
Lingam (supra), para 5, it was observed and recoded as under:
“5. Sri Syed Khader Mastan, counsel representing the
Advocate General Office, on instructions would submit
that steps are now under afoot for establishment of the
Rent Courts as laid down under Section 30 of the Act
and within a reasonable time the Rent Courts will be
established in consultation with Hon'ble High Court.”
The aforesaid shows that way back on 18.06.2019, the statement
was made, that within a reasonable time the Rent Courts will be
established. Since then, almost six years are about to elapse but
the rent courts/Tribunals have not come into existence, giving rise
to a situation that there are no Rent Courts/Tribunals constituted
under the Act 10 of 2018. The Civil Courts jurisdiction is barred
under Sections 32 and 40 of the Act 10/2018. The Act also does
not provide for the mechanism to be followed till the constitution
of such rents courts/rent tribunal.
36. The party having the right to take recourse, under the Act,
2018 has not been provided the Forum. The Executive by its
inaction cannot take away the right conferred by the statute on
the landlord seeking redressal against the tenant or on the tenant
2025:APHC:18792
32
to enforce certain obligations of the landlord. It cannot be that
though the party aggrieved has the remedy provided by the
statute, but not the Forum to approach for redressal of grievance
and seek such remedy. This Court is of the view that, therefore,
under the circumstances, the Forum constituted under the Act,
1960, for redressal of the grievance of the landlord or/and tenant,
which are almost of the same nature under the Act 10/2018, can
very well address the grievances, till constitution of the Forum as
provided under the Act No.10/2018. For the grievance under the
Act No.10/2018 and its redressal, the land lord or/and tenant can
approach under the existing Forum created under the Act, 1960,
which still continues and shall have jurisdiction to decide the
disputes under the Act No. 10/2018 as well. It is provided that the
orders passed by such forum shall not be treated as without
jurisdiction on that count.
Point-B:
37. So far as the submission of the petitioner’s counsel that the
learned court has not decided the issue of landlord and tenant
relationship as a preliminary issue, this Court is of the view that
such issue could not be decided as a preliminary issue. Any
2025:APHC:18792
33
provision under the Act, 1960 or Act No. 10/2018 could not be
shown about the applicability of Order 14 Rule 2 C.P.C, nor any
independent provision under the aforesaid Act like Order 14 Rule
2 CPC.
38. However, this Court proceeds to deal with the aforesaid
submission considering the scope of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC.
39. Order 14 Rule 2 CPC reads as under:
“2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues.
(1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on preliminary issue, the
Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all
issues.
(2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is
of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of
law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to-
(a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or
(b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in-force.
and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other
issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in
accordance with the decision on that issue.”
40. In Kandregula Rama Babu and others vs. Kondapalli
Venkata Lakshmi and others6
, this Court held in paragraphs
13,14,15, 16, 18 and 19 as under:
6
2024 sCC OnLine AP 5739
2025:APHC:18792
34
“13. In Ramesh B.Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta7
, the
Hon’ble Apex Court held that the Code confers no
jurisdiction upon the court to try a suit on mixed issues of
law and fact as a preliminary issue and where the decision
on issue of law depends upon decision of fact, it cannot be
tried as a preliminary issue.
14. Para No.13 of Ramesh B.Desai (supra), reads as
under:
.. “13. Sub-rule (2) of Order XIV Rule 2 CPC lays down that
where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and
the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be
disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if
that issue relates to (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) a bar
to the suit created by any law for the time being in force. The
provisions of this Rule came up for consideration before this
Court in Major S.S. Khanna vs. Brig. F.J. Dillon AIR 1964 SC
497, and it was held as under:-
"Under O. 14 R. 2 where issues both of law and of fact
arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case
or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law
only, it shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it
thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until
after the issues of law have been determined. The jurisdiction
to try issues of law apart from the issues of fact may be
exercised only where in the opinion of the Court the whole
suit may be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but the
Code confers no jurisdiction upon the Court to try a suit
on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary issues.
7
(2006) 5 Superme Court Cases 638
2025:APHC:18792
35
Normally all the issues in a suit should be tried by the Court:
not to do so, especially when the decision on issues even of
law depends upon the decision of issues of fact, would result in
a lop-sided trial of the suit."
Though there has been a slight amendment in the language of
Order XIV Rule 2 CPC by the Amending Act, 1976, but the
principle enunciated in the above quoted decision still
holds good and there can be no departure from the principle
that the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the Court to try a suit
on mixed issue of law and fact as a preliminary issue and
where the decision on issue of law depends upon decision of
fact, it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue.
41. In Sathyanath v. Sarojamani8
, the Hon’ble Apex Court
observed and held as under:
“21. The provisions of Order 14 Rule 2 are part of the
procedural law, but the fact remains that such procedural law
had been enacted to ensure expeditious disposal of the lis and
in the event of setting aside of findings on preliminary issue,
the possibility of remand can be avoided, as was the language
prior to the unamended Order 14 Rule 2. If the issue is a
mixed issue of law and fact, or issue of law depends upon
the decision of fact, such issue cannot be tried as a
preliminary issue. In other words, preliminary issues can
be those where no evidence is required and on the basis
of reading of the plaint or the applicable law, if the jurisdiction
of the court of the bar to the suit is made out, the court may
decide such issues with the sole objective for the expeditious
8
(2022) 7 SCC 644
2025:APHC:18792
36
decision. I Thus, if the court lacks jurisdiction or there is a
statutory bar, such issue is required to be decided in the first
instance so that the process of civil court is not abused by the
litigants, who may approach the civil court to delay the
proceedings on false pretext
23. The different judgments of the High Court referred to above
are in consonance with the principles laid down by this Court
in Ramesh B. Desai(2006(5) SCC 638) that not all issues of
law can be decided as preliminary issues. Only those
issues of law can be decided as preliminary issues which
fell within the ambit of clause (a) relating to the
"jurisdiction of the Court" and (b) which deal with the bar
to the suit created by any law for the time being in force".
The reason to substitute Rule 2 is to avoid piecemeal trial,
protracted litigation and possibility of remand of the case,
where the appellate court differs with the decision of the trial
court on the preliminary issues upon which the trial court had
decided.”
42. In Mongia Realty and Buildwell Private Limited v. Manik
Sethi9
, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that when issues in both
law and facts arise in the same suit, the court may dispose of the
suit by trying the issue of law first. For this purpose, the provision
specifies two questions of law, which are 1) jurisdiction of the
court; and 2) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time
being in force. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the issue
9
(2022) 11 SCC 572
2025:APHC:18792
37
of limitation can also be determined as a preliminary issue under
Order XIV Rule 2 CPC, if the issue of limitation is based on
admitted fact. However, if the facts surrounding the issue of
limitation are disputed, it cannot be decided as a preliminary
issue.
43. It is thus well settled in law that it is only the pure questions
of law, that can be decided as preliminary issues and not the
questions of fact or even mixed questions of law and fact. Those
require the determination on the basis of the evidence adduced
during trial/proceedings.
44. It is also settled in law that in case of dispute as to facts, it is
necessary to be determined, to give a finding on a question of
law, such question cannot be decided as a preliminary issue. In a
case, where the facts are disputed and the question of law is
dependent upon the outcome of the investigation of facts, such
question would not be a pure question of law and cannot be
decided as preliminary issue.”
45. In view of the aforesaid, the question of relationship of
landlord and tenant which is a factual dispute, has rightly not
been decided at this stage of proceedings as a preliminary issue.
2025:APHC:18792
38
Point-C:
46. In view of the consideration made in Points A & B above,
the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality and calls
for no interference.
Result:
47. In the result, the civil revision petition is dismissed. No
order as to costs.
48. Let the copy of this judgment be sent to the Chief Secretary
to the Government, Government of Andhra Pradesh, to the
Secretary Law to Government of Andhra Pradesh and to the
learned Advocate General for the State of Andhra Pradesh for
necessary action, for constitution of Rent Court and Rent Tribunal
under the Andhra Pradesh Residential and Non-Residential
Premises Tenancy Act, 2017 (Act No.10 of 2018) also
considering para 35 and 36 of this judgment.
2025:APHC:18792
39
Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this matter, shall
also stand closed.
___________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI,J
Date:09.05.2025.
Note:L.R copy to be marked.
B/o.Gk.
2025:APHC:18792
40
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
C.R.P.No.3018 OF 2024
Date:09.05.2025.
Gk
2025:APHC:18792
