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Court Fees — Partition Suit — Joint Possession — Exclusion — Pleadings — Determination based solely on plaint averments — Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, S.37(1), S.37(2). Held: Court fee payable in a suit must be determined solely with reference to the averments in the plaint as a whole, and not on the basis of the written statement or the eventual findings on merits. (Paras 10–11, 26)

Court Fees — Partition Suit — Joint Possession — Exclusion — Pleadings — Determination based solely on plaint averments — Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, S.37(1), S.37(2).

Held:

1. Court fee payable in a suit must be determined solely with reference to the averments in the plaint as a whole, and not on the basis of the written statement or the eventual findings on merits.
   (Paras 10–11, 26)

2. In a partition suit, mere averment that the plaintiff was not paid income or could not ‘remain in joint possession’ does not amount to a clear plea of exclusion from possession.
   (Paras 12–14, 27–28)

3. Where the plaint consistently asserts joint possession, valuation under S.37(2) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act is proper; S.37(1) applies only where there is a clear and specific averment of exclusion.
   (Paras 15–18, 29–31)

4. In law, possession of one co-owner is possession of all, unless ouster or exclusion is specifically pleaded and established; actual physical possession or receipt of income is not determinative.
   (Paras 30–32)

5. Daughters succeeding to coparcenary interest under proviso to S.6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, are entitled to claim partition while being deemed in joint possession in the absence of exclusion.
   (Paras 33–34)

Appeal allowed. Direction to pay court fee under S.37(1) set aside; valuation under S.37(2) restored. 

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Governing Principle for Court Fee Determination

The Supreme Court reiterates the settled rule that court fee must be assessed strictly on plaint allegations, read as a whole, and cannot be influenced by:

• the defence version, or

• findings after trial.

This principle, reaffirmed from S. Rm. Ar. S. Sathappa Chettiar, is applied decisively (Paras 10–11, 26).

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B. Scope and Interpretation of Section 37

• S.37(1) applies only when the plaintiff pleads exclusion from possession.

• S.37(2) governs cases where the plaintiff asserts joint possession, even if not in actual enjoyment.

The Court draws a sharp distinction between:

• non-receipt of income / non-enjoyment, and

• legal exclusion or ouster.

Absence of income ≠ exclusion (Paras 27–31).

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C. Meaning of “Joint Possession” in Law

The Court emphasizes classical co-ownership doctrine:

• Physical possession is unnecessary.

• Receipt of income is unnecessary.

• Legal entitlement and absence of ouster are sufficient.

Unless a clear and specific averment of exclusion appears in the plaint, the presumption of joint possession continues (Paras 30–32).

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D. Error of the High Court

The High Court erred by:

• Isolating one sentence (“could not remain in joint possession”) from Para 12,

• Treating it as an admission of dispossession,

• Ignoring repeated assertions of joint possession in other paragraphs.

The Supreme Court holds that paragraphs must be read harmoniously, not selectively (Paras 12–18).

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

1. The plaint consistently pleaded:

   • Joint family property,

   • Succession as daughters,

   • Joint possession,

   • Demand for partition to convert joint possession into separate possession.

2. The statement that plaintiffs were not paid income was held to be at best a grievance of management, not exclusion.

3. Even the written statement acknowledged that the suit was framed on joint possession, disputing it only by way of defence — reinforcing that no admission of exclusion existed in the plaint itself.

4. The Trial Court’s reliance on evidence of non-enjoyment was legally irrelevant for court-fee determination.

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LEGAL POSITION EMERGING

• Partition suits must be valued under S.37(2) unless exclusion is expressly pleaded.

• Courts must resist post-trial reasoning to re-characterize plaint averments for court-fee purposes.

• Non-receipt of income or non-occupation does not equal dispossession.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXII Rules 3 & 9 Abatement of appeal — Death of sole appellant Where the sole appellant dies and no application for substitution of legal representatives is filed within the prescribed period, the appeal abates automatically by operation of law — Setting aside abatement requires strict compliance with Order XXII Rule 9 CPC read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act. [Paras 2, 7, 17–18]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXII Rules 3 & 9

Abatement of appeal — Death of sole appellant

Where the sole appellant dies and no application for substitution of legal representatives is filed within the prescribed period, the appeal abates automatically by operation of law — Setting aside abatement requires strict compliance with Order XXII Rule 9 CPC read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
[Paras 2, 7, 17–18]

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Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5

Condonation of delay — “Sufficient cause” — Strict scrutiny

Burden lies on the applicant to establish sufficient cause for condonation of delay — Vague, inconsistent or false explanations, negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot constitute sufficient cause.
[Paras 4–6, 13, 17]

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Abatement — Accrued rights of opposite party

Once appeal abates, a valuable right accrues in favour of the respondents — Such right cannot be lightly taken away unless delay is satisfactorily and bona fide explained.
[Paras 7, 13, 16]

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Liberal approach — Limits

Though courts may adopt a liberal approach in applications to set aside abatement, liberal construction does not mean condonation as a matter of course — Liberal approach cannot be extended to cases of deliberate inaction, negligence or want of bona fides.
[Paras 11, 13–16]

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Pleadings — Clean hands — Contradictory averments

An applicant seeking discretionary relief must approach the Court with clean hands — Contradictory stands and incorrect statements in applications disentitle the applicant from equitable relief of condonation.
[Paras 6, 17]

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Counsel reliance — No blanket excuse

Ignorance of pendency of appeal or failure to inform counsel of death of appellant, without plausible explanation, is not a sufficient cause — Litigant cannot absolve himself of responsibility by merely blaming counsel.
[Paras 6, 17]

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Precedents — Distinguishing liberal condonation cases

Judgments condoning delay on peculiar facts (e.g., illiteracy or bona fide mistake) cannot be treated as precedents for condoning inordinate delay lacking bona fide explanation.
[Paras 11–12]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Automatic Abatement and Statutory Scheme

The Court reiterates that abatement under Order XXII CPC is automatic on expiry of limitation for substitution. Once abatement occurs, the appeal comes to an end unless abatement is set aside in accordance with Order XXII Rule 9 CPC read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act (Paras 7, 13).

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B. Meaning of “Sufficient Cause”

The judgment gives a strict and structured meaning to “sufficient cause”:

• The explanation must be true, plausible and bona fide.

• It must disclose why the applicant was prevented from acting within time.

• Mere assertions of ignorance or vague excuses are insufficient.

The Court emphasises that sufficiency is judged not by sympathy but by judicial satisfaction (Paras 4–6, 13).

---

C. Liberal Approach — Not Unfettered

While recognising that courts are generally liberal in applications to set aside abatement, the Court draws a clear boundary:

• Liberal approach is intended to prevent injustice due to unintended lapses.

• It does not apply where delay is the result of negligence, callousness or falsehood.

• Liberal construction cannot render limitation provisions redundant (Paras 13–16).

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D. Clean Hands and Credibility of Explanation

A decisive factor in this case is the lack of bona fides:

• Applicants took inconsistent stands regarding residence and knowledge.

• One legal representative had actively participated in trial proceedings.

• No document (such as counsel’s alleged letter) was produced.

• No explanation was given for prolonged silence even after knowledge.

Such conduct, the Court holds, disentitles the applicants from discretionary relief (Paras 6, 17).

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E. Accrued Rights and Balance of Justice

The Court balances two competing considerations:

1. Preference for adjudication on merits, and

2. Protection of accrued rights of the opposite party.

It holds that where applicants are grossly negligent and dishonest, justice to the vigilant party must prevail (Paras 7, 13, 16).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Sole appellant died on 28-11-2007 (Para 2).

• Applications for substitution and condonation filed only in April 2010, after 778 days delay (Paras 2–4).

• Explanation offered: ignorance of pendency of appeal and late intimation by counsel (Para 5).

• Court found:

  • contradictory averments regarding residence and knowledge,

  • participation of one LR in trial as witness,

  • absence of documentary support,

  • no explanation for prolonged inaction (Paras 6, 17).

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IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• No sufficient cause made out for condonation of delay.

• Application under Order XXII Rule 9 CPC dismissed.

• Appeal held to have abated and dismissed.

• No order as to costs.
  [Paras 17–18]

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Ratio (Concise)

Though courts adopt a liberal approach in setting aside abatement, inordinate delay caused by negligence, contradictory pleadings and lack of bona fides cannot be condoned; valuable rights accrued on abatement cannot be defeated on vague or false explanations.

Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 Condonation of delay — Second appeal — Knowledge of decree Where appellant pleads lack of knowledge of the appellate decree and explains delay on that basis, rejection of condonation application without proper enquiry into such explanation is unsustainable — Delay of 650 days condoned in the interest of justice. [Paras 5, 14–15]

Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5

Condonation of delay — Second appeal — Knowledge of decree

Where appellant pleads lack of knowledge of the appellate decree and explains delay on that basis, rejection of condonation application without proper enquiry into such explanation is unsustainable — Delay of 650 days condoned in the interest of justice.
[Paras 5, 14–15]

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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Section 100

Second appeal — Dismissal at threshold on limitation

Second appeal cannot be dismissed mechanically on the ground of limitation when explanation for delay raises triable issues — High Court required to examine whether sufficient cause exists before foreclosing statutory remedy.
[Paras 13–16]

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Ex parte decree — Appellate stage

Lack of opportunity of hearing

Where decree for specific performance is passed ex parte at appellate stage, denial of opportunity to contest on merits is a relevant factor while considering condonation of delay.
[Paras 7, 12, 15]

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Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 16

Specific performance — Discretionary relief

Decree for specific performance being discretionary in nature, courts should be slow to deny opportunity of hearing on technical grounds of limitation, particularly when serious factual and legal issues arise.
[Paras 7, 12, 15]

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Limitation — Appeals pending at appellate stage

Liberal approach

In matters pending at appellate stage, particularly where appeals are not listed periodically, courts should adopt a liberal approach in condoning delay, following principles laid down in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom.
[Paras 8, 15]

---

Natural justice — Substantial justice over technicality

Procedural law should not be applied in a manner that defeats substantial justice — Technical dismissal on limitation, without examining bona fides of explanation, is liable to be interfered with.
[Paras 14–16]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Scope of “Sufficient Cause” under Section 5

The Court reiterates that while limitation law must be applied, condonation of delay depends on acceptability of explanation, not merely length of delay. Explanation based on lack of knowledge of decree warrants judicial scrutiny and cannot be rejected summarily (Paras 5, 14).

---

B. Liberal Approach at Appellate Stage

Relying on Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, the Court emphasises that when matters are pending at appellate stage:

• litigants often rely on counsel for intimation;

• appeals may not be listed for long periods;

• strict standards applied at institution stage are diluted.

Hence, a lenient and justice-oriented approach is required (Paras 8, 15).

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C. Ex parte Decree for Specific Performance

The Court places weight on the fact that:

• specific performance is discretionary;

• decree was passed ex parte in first appellate court;

• appellant was denied effective opportunity of hearing.

Such circumstances justify condonation to enable adjudication on merits (Paras 7, 12, 15).

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D. Error in High Court’s Approach

The Supreme Court finds fault with the High Court for:

• disbelieving explanation of change of address without enquiry;

• giving overriding importance to accrued rights of respondent;

• dismissing appeal solely on limitation.

This approach was held contrary to settled principles governing condonation of delay (Paras 13–15).

---

E. Balance between Limitation and Justice

While acknowledging long pendency and accrued rights, the Court holds that substantial justice must prevail, especially where refusal to condone delay results in irreversible consequences (Paras 14–16).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Suit for specific performance filed in 2001 based on agreement dated 18-02-1998 (Paras 3, 12).

• Trial Court partly decreed suit only for refund (Para 3).

• First appellate court decreed specific performance ex parte (Para 4).

• Appellant filed second appeal with 650 days delay, explaining lack of knowledge due to non-service and change of address (Paras 5, 14).

• High Court rejected condonation solely on limitation (Paras 6, 13).

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IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• Impugned judgment of High Court set aside.

• Delay in filing second appeal condoned.

• High Court directed to consider second appeal for admission expeditiously and dispose of it on merits.

• Observations not to affect merits of appeal.
  [Paras 15–18]

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Ratio (Concise)

In second appeals, particularly where an ex parte decree for specific performance is involved, delay attributable to lack of knowledge of decree should be examined liberally; dismissal on limitation without proper enquiry defeats substantial justice.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXII Rules 4, 9, 10-A & 11 Abatement of appeal — Death of respondent — Ignorance of death Abatement occurs by operation of law on expiry of limitation for substitution — However, ignorance of the death of a respondent constitutes sufficient cause for setting aside abatement, particularly when appeal is pending without periodic listing and no notice of death is given. [Paras 4.2–4.5, 5, 14–15]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXII Rules 4, 9, 10-A & 11

Abatement of appeal — Death of respondent — Ignorance of death

Abatement occurs by operation of law on expiry of limitation for substitution — However, ignorance of the death of a respondent constitutes sufficient cause for setting aside abatement, particularly when appeal is pending without periodic listing and no notice of death is given.
[Paras 4.2–4.5, 5, 14–15]

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Limitation Act, 1963 — Sections 5, Articles 120 & 121

Condonation of delay — Liberal approach in abatement matters

Applications for setting aside abatement and substitution of legal representatives must be considered liberally — Length of delay is immaterial; sufficiency and acceptability of explanation is decisive — Courts are more liberal in abatement cases than in cases of delay in filing appeals.
[Paras 6, 8(ii), 8(iii)]

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“Sufficient cause” — Meaning and scope

Section 5, Limitation Act

Expression “sufficient cause” must receive a pragmatic, practical and justice-oriented interpretation — Delay not attributable to negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides ought to be condoned to advance substantial justice.
[Paras 6, 8(i)]

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Duty of counsel — Order XXII Rule 10-A CPC

Counsel for a deceased party has a statutory duty to inform the Court of the death — Failure to report death is a relevant factor while considering condonation of delay and setting aside abatement.
[Paras 4.5, 11, 15]

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Pending appeals — High Courts — No duty of constant vigilance

Where an appeal is admitted and remains pending for years without being listed, appellant is not expected to make periodic enquiries about the life or death of respondents — Want of diligence cannot be imputed in such circumstances.
[Paras 8(v), 10, 14]

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Institutions / Bodies — Change of management — Ignorance of proceedings

Where appellant is an institution acting through a managing committee, change of management resulting in ignorance of pending appeal and death of respondent constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay.
[Paras 3, 15]

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Abatement — Preference for adjudication on merits

Courts should ordinarily set aside abatement and decide matters on merits rather than terminate proceedings on technical grounds, unless deliberate negligence or mala fides is shown.
[Paras 8(ii), 14]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Nature of Abatement

The Court clarifies that abatement under Order XXII CPC:

• occurs automatically by operation of law on expiry of limitation;

• does not require a formal judicial declaration to take effect;

• nevertheless requires judicial cognizance to close proceedings (Paras 4.2–5).

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B. Liberal Approach in Abatement Matters

The judgment draws a clear distinction between:

• delay in filing an appeal, and

• delay in taking steps in a pending appeal.

Courts are required to be far more liberal in the latter category, as refusal would foreclose adjudication on merits (Paras 6, 8(ii)).

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C. Ignorance of Death as Sufficient Cause

By reference to Order XXII Rule 4(5) CPC, the Court holds that:

• ignorance of the death of a respondent is a statutorily recognised ground;

• such ignorance, if bona fide and uncontradicted, constitutes sufficient cause;

• no diligence can be expected where the appellant is unaware of the death (Paras 4.4–4.5, 12–15).

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D. Role of Rule 10-A CPC

The Court emphasises that:

• counsel for the deceased party has a duty to inform the Court of death;

• failure to discharge this duty weighs in favour of the appellant seeking condonation;

• delay effectively runs from date of knowledge, not date of death (Paras 11, 15).

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E. High Court Appeals — Practical Realities

A significant jurisprudential contribution of this judgment is recognition of ground realities:

• appeals in High Courts often remain unlisted for years;

• litigants are not expected to keep constant vigil;

• expecting periodic enquiry into life status of respondents is unrealistic (Paras 8(v), 10).

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F. Balancing Accrued Rights vs Substantial Justice

While acknowledging that abatement confers a valuable right on legal representatives, the Court holds that:

• such right should not defeat adjudication on merits where delay is bona fide;

• procedural law is a handmaid of justice, not its mistress (Paras 8(ii), 14).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Second appeal admitted in 1993 and not listed for hearing for several years (Paras 2, 10).

• Sole respondent died on 17-04-2002 (Para 2).

• Death was not reported by counsel or LRs to the High Court (Paras 11, 15).

• Appellant institution underwent change of management; new committee unaware of appeal (Paras 3, 15).

• Applications for substitution and setting aside abatement filed promptly after knowledge (Para 3).

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IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• Delay held satisfactorily explained.

• Orders of High Court refusing condonation and setting aside abatement set aside.

• Delay condoned; abatement set aside.

• Legal representatives permitted to be brought on record.

• High Court directed to hear the appeal on merits.
  [Para 16]

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Ratio (Concise)

In appeals pending without periodic listing, bona fide ignorance of the respondent’s death—especially where counsel failed to report it—constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay and setting aside abatement; courts must prefer adjudication on merits over technical termination.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 Condonation of de...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 Condonation of de...: advocatemmmohan Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 Condonation of delay — “Sufficient cause” — Scope Delay can be condoned only on proof of ...

Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5

Condonation of delay — “Sufficient cause” — Scope

Delay can be condoned only on proof of “sufficient cause” — The expression means an adequate and enough reason which prevents a party from approaching the Court within limitation — Negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot constitute sufficient cause.
[Paras 9, 11, 15]

Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5

Condonation of delay — “Sufficient cause” — Scope

Delay can be condoned only on proof of “sufficient cause” — The expression means an adequate and enough reason which prevents a party from approaching the Court within limitation — Negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot constitute sufficient cause.
[Paras 9, 11, 15]

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Limitation — Inordinate delay — Discretion of Court

Where delay is gross and unexplained, Court has no jurisdiction to condone the same — Discretion under Section 5 must be exercised judiciously and not on sympathetic or equitable considerations.
[Paras 6, 15, 16]

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Equality — Article 14 — Negative equality

Article 14 does not permit perpetuation of illegality — Erroneous or illegal orders passed in other cases cannot be relied upon to claim similar relief — Doctrine of negative equality is impermissible.
[Para 8]

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Limitation — Conditional condonation — Illegality

Condoning delay by imposing conditions (such as denial of interest for the delay period) without recording satisfaction of “sufficient cause” is impermissible — Such orders are contrary to statutory mandate.
[Paras 7, 15]

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Limitation law — Mandatory application

“Dura lex sed lex”

Law of limitation must be applied with full rigour — Courts have no power to extend limitation on equitable or sympathetic grounds — Hardship is irrelevant where statute is clear.
[Paras 12, 13]

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Public policy — Limitation statutes

Limitation statutes are founded on public policy to ensure certainty, suppress stale claims, and compel diligence — Courts cannot dilute legislative intent by judicial discretion.
[Paras 12, 13]

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Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Section 54

Appeal — Delay

Appeals under Section 54 are governed strictly by limitation — Inordinate delay of more than five years, without satisfactory explanation, is fatal.
[Paras 1–6, 16]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Meaning of “Sufficient Cause”

The Court undertakes an authoritative exposition of the expression “sufficient cause” and holds that:

• It must be adequate, bona fide, and reasonable;

• It excludes negligence, inaction, or casual conduct;

• The applicant must establish that delay was unavoidable despite due diligence (Paras 9–11).

The Court reiterates that while interpretation may be liberal, it cannot be elastic to the point of defeating limitation law.

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B. Judicial Discretion under Section 5

The discretion to condone delay is not unfettered. The Court stresses that:

• Discretion must be exercised strictly within statutory parameters;

• Courts cannot substitute sympathy for legal standards;

• Absence of sufficient cause ousts jurisdiction to condone delay (Paras 15–16).

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C. Rejection of “Parity” Argument

A central issue addressed is the plea that other similarly placed litigants had obtained condonation. The Court unequivocally holds:

• Article 14 does not envisage negative equality;

• Illegal or erroneous orders cannot form the basis for claiming similar relief;

• Illegality cannot be multiplied by judicial endorsement (Para 8).

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D. Conditional Condonation — Disapproved

The Court strongly disapproves the practice of condoning delay by imposing conditions such as:

• Denial of interest for the delay period.

Such orders, without first establishing sufficient cause, are held to be illegal and jurisdictionally flawed (Paras 7, 15).

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E. Limitation as Public Policy

The judgment reiterates the foundational rationale of limitation law:

• To prevent uncertainty and stale litigation;

• To ensure diligence and repose;

• To protect settled rights.

Courts are reminded that they cannot dilute statutory limitation on equitable grounds (Paras 12–13).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Land acquisition awards were passed between 1997–2002 (Paras 1–2).

• Appeals under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act were filed in 2007, with a delay of about 5½ years (Para 6).

• Sole explanation offered was illness of one appellant (Paras 3, 6).

• High Court rejected applications for condonation of delay (Para 2).

• Appellants relied on earlier High Court orders condoning delay conditionally (Para 7).

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IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• No sufficient cause shown for inordinate delay.

• Article 14 plea rejected.

• Conditional condonation practice disapproved.

• Appeals dismissed; High Court order affirmed.
  [Para 16]

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Ratio (Concise)

Condonation of delay is a matter of jurisdictional discretion confined strictly to proof of “sufficient cause”; courts cannot condone inordinate delay on equitable grounds, impose conditions in lieu of statutory compliance, or perpetuate illegality by invoking Article 14.

Criminal defamation — Ingredients — Publication based on public record Publication based substantially on public records and official documents, without embellishment, does not per se constitute defamation — Truthful reporting of facts drawn from public records, if made in good faith, attracts the protection of the First Exception to Section 499 IPC. [Paras 5.2, 18, 52–55, 60–64]

 

Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 499, 500

Criminal defamation — Ingredients — Publication based on public record

Publication based substantially on public records and official documents, without embellishment, does not per se constitute defamation — Truthful reporting of facts drawn from public records, if made in good faith, attracts the protection of the First Exception to Section 499 IPC.
[Paras 5.2, 18, 52–55, 60–64]

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Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Sections 202, 204, 482

Quashing of process — Scope

High Court can quash criminal proceedings where the complaint, even if taken at face value, does not disclose the essential ingredients of the offence — Criminal law should not be permitted to be used as a tool for harassment or intimidation.
[Paras 9.4–9.9, 55–57, 99–103]

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Defamation — Per se defamatory statements — Test

Statements are not defamatory per se merely because they are critical or uncomfortable — To constitute defamation, imputations must lower the moral or intellectual character of the complainant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society.
[Paras 5.2, 56–58]

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Defamation — Mens rea — Requirement

Mens rea is a necessary ingredient of criminal defamation — Absence of malice, coupled with bona fide journalistic conduct, negatives the offence under Section 499 IPC.
[Paras 5.5, 61–63, 71–73]

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Journalism — Questionnaire — Fair opportunity

Issuance of a questionnaire seeking the version of the person concerned prior to publication, and publication of substantial portions of the reply, evidences bona fides and militates against allegation of malice.
[Paras 5.5, 62–64]

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Defamation — Public figures — Higher threshold

Public figures and persons connected with public life must tolerate a higher degree of scrutiny — Criminal defamation cannot be invoked to stifle investigative journalism on matters of public interest.
[Paras 5.3, 66–69, 74–76]

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Editors / Publishers — Vicarious liability

Criminal liability for defamation cannot be mechanically fastened on editors and persons connected with publication without specific averments of their role and intent — Vicarious liability is unknown to criminal law except where statutorily provided.
[Paras 56, 78–83]

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Abuse of process — Chilling effect on free speech

Allowing prosecution to continue in absence of prima facie defamation would have a chilling effect on free speech and investigative reporting — Courts must prevent misuse of criminal process.
[Paras 97–103]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Essential Ingredients of Criminal Defamation

The Court reiterates that for an offence under Sections 499–500 IPC, the following must coexist:

1. Making or publishing an imputation;

2. Concerning a person;

3. With intention, knowledge or reason to believe that such imputation will harm reputation.

Absent mens rea or defamatory imputation, criminal prosecution cannot survive (Paras 56–58, 61).

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B. Public Record, Truth, and Good Faith

A central legal finding is that:

• The article was substantially based on publicly available records (ROC filings, financial statements).

• Truthful reporting of such records, without distortion, falls within Exception 1 to Section 499 IPC.

• Public good and good faith are evident from the nature and source of information (Paras 60–64).

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C. Role of Mens Rea

The Court gives significant weight to:

• Sending a questionnaire;

• Receiving a detailed reply;

• Publishing substantial portions of the response.

This conduct negates deliberate intent to defame and demonstrates journalistic fairness (Paras 62–64).

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D. Public Figures and Democratic Accountability

Relying on constitutional jurisprudence, the Court holds that:

• Individuals connected with public power or political families cannot claim insulation from scrutiny.

• Criminal defamation should not be used to silence critical reporting on matters having public ramifications (Paras 66–76).

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E. Limits of Magistrate’s Power at Section 202 Stage

Although the scope of inquiry under Section 202 CrPC is limited, the Magistrate must still ensure that:

• The complaint discloses a prima facie offence;

• The essential ingredients are made out.

Mechanical issuance of process, without applying mind to the statutory exceptions, amounts to legal error (Paras 9.4–9.9, 99–101).

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F. Abuse of Criminal Process

The Court strongly cautions that:

• Criminal defamation must not become a weapon of vendetta.

• Continuation of proceedings in the absence of offence would be an abuse of process warranting interference under Section 482 CrPC (Paras 97–103).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Impugned article titled “The Golden Touch of Jay Amit Shah” was published on The Wire (Paras 4.1–4.2).

• Article relied on ROC data and financial disclosures (Paras 5.2, 60).

• Prior to publication, a questionnaire was sent and a reply received (Paras 5.5, 62).

• Substantial portions of the reply were published (Paras 62–64).

• Magistrate issued process under Sections 500/114 IPC after inquiry under Section 202 CrPC (Para 4.7).

• Petitioners invoked Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing (Para 3).

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IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• Complaint and order issuing process quashed.

• Continuation of criminal proceedings held to be abuse of process of law.

• Article held not per se defamatory and protected by exceptions to Section 499 IPC.

• Criminal law cannot be invoked to suppress investigative journalism.
  [Paras 101–109]

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Ratio (Concise)

Truthful publication based on public records, made in good faith after seeking the affected party’s version, does not constitute criminal defamation; criminal process cannot be used to stifle investigative journalism or public scrutiny of matters of public interest.

Comparative Advertising — Disparagement — Generic disparagement Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC Calling an entire class of rival products “dhoka / deception” amounts to generic disparagement — Even without naming a specific competitor, denigration of a product category is impermissible — Market leader within the disparaged class is entitled to protection. [Paras 24.9–24.16, 28–29, 35–39]

 

Comparative Advertising — Disparagement — Generic disparagement

Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC

Calling an entire class of rival products “dhoka / deception” amounts to generic disparagement — Even without naming a specific competitor, denigration of a product category is impermissible — Market leader within the disparaged class is entitled to protection.
[Paras 24.9–24.16, 28–29, 35–39]

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Commercial Speech — Limits of Article 19(1)(a)

Commercial advertising is protected speech, but protection does not extend to false, misleading, unfair or deceptive representations — Freedom of speech does not include the right to disparage or defame competitors.
[Paras 25.2–25.5, 30–33]

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Puffery vs Disparagement — Legal distinction

Exaggeration of one’s own product is permissible — Attributing inferiority, deception, fraud or lack of efficacy to rival products crosses from puffery into disparagement — The distinction between “my product is better” and “others are bad/deceptive” must be maintained.
[Paras 24.13–24.17, 29–33]

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Generic Disparagement — Identification not necessary

Disparagement of a class or genre of products, without specifically identifying a competitor, is actionable — Clever advertising cannot escape liability merely by avoiding brand names.
[Paras 24.14–24.16, 39]

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Medicinal / Ayurvedic Products — Statutory compliance

Where a product is manufactured in accordance with authoritative texts recognised under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, it cannot be portrayed as deceptive — Calling such products “dhoka” is ex-facie false and misleading.
[Paras 24.2, 24.9–24.12, 34–37]

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Endorsements — Influence of spokesperson

Impact of an advertisement must be assessed considering the stature and influence of the endorser — Statements made by a person projected as an expert are likely to be taken as statements of fact by consumers.
[Paras 38, 35–36]

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Interim Injunction — Balance of convenience — Irreparable harm

Where a prima facie case of disparagement is made out, balance of convenience lies in restraining the offending advertisement — Continuing broadcast would cause irreparable harm to goodwill and reputation.
[Paras 40–41]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Generic Disparagement as an Independent Wrong

The Court reiterates settled law that generic disparagement is as actionable as specific disparagement. Denigrating an entire category of goods necessarily harms competitors within that category, especially the market leader. The absence of brand reference is not decisive (Paras 24.14–24.16, 39).

B. Commercial Speech and Constitutional Limits

While acknowledging that advertising is protected under Article 19(1)(a), the Court emphasises that:

• Falsehoods, deception and denigration fall outside constitutional protection.

• Article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions where public interest and fair competition are affected (Paras 25.2–25.5, 30).

C. Puffery Distinguished from Disparagement

The judgment carefully delineates the boundary:

• Permissible: claiming superiority, highlighting additional features.

• Impermissible: stating or implying that rival products deceive consumers or lack efficacy.
  The use of the word “dhoka” is held to cross this boundary (Paras 24.13, 29–33).

D. Statutory Context — Ayurvedic Medicines

A crucial legal finding is that all Chyawanprash manufactured as per recognised Ayurvedic texts and licensed under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act are statutorily valid medicines. Branding such products as deceptive undermines the statutory framework itself (Paras 34–37).

E. Role of the Average Consumer

The test applied is that of an ordinary reasonable consumer with imperfect recollection. From such a perspective, the impugned advertisement conveys that all non-defendant Chyawanprash are fake or ineffective, which is misleading (Paras 35–36).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Plaintiff Dabur India Limited is the market leader in Chyawanprash with over 61% market share (Paras 24.1–24.4).

• Defendants Patanjali Ayurved Limited and Patanjali Foods Limited released the impugned advertisement in October 2025 (Paras 24.5–24.7).

• Advertisement repeatedly used the word “dhoka” to describe Chyawanprash other than defendants’ product (Paras 24.6–24.13).

• Prior Division Bench order had permitted comparison with “ordinary Chyawanprash” provided it did not deride or refer to the plaintiff’s product (Para 24.8).

• Court found the impugned advertisement contrary to that liberty and prima facie disparaging (Paras 28–39).

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IV. OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS / RESULT

• Ad-interim injunction granted.

• Defendants restrained from issuing, broadcasting or disseminating the impugned advertisement or any advertisement referring to Chyawanprash as “dhoka / deceptive”.

• Defendants directed to take down / disable the advertisement from all media platforms within 72 hours.

• Replies and rejoinders directed; matter listed for further hearing.
  [Paras 42–44]

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Ratio (Concise)

Generic denigration of an entire class of products as deceptive, even without naming a competitor, constitutes actionable disparagement; commercial speech does not protect false or misleading attacks on rival goods, particularly in the case of medicinal products.

Defamation — Internet publication — Hyperlinking Whether hyperlinking amounts to republication Hyperlinking to an allegedly defamatory article does not ipso facto amount to republication — Hyperlink is content-neutral and only provides a reference unless the manner of hyperlinking itself conveys, endorses, or adopts the defamatory content — Each case must be examined on facts. [Paras 2, 35–36, 66–70]

 

Defamation — Internet publication — Hyperlinking

Whether hyperlinking amounts to republication

Hyperlinking to an allegedly defamatory article does not ipso facto amount to republication — Hyperlink is content-neutral and only provides a reference unless the manner of hyperlinking itself conveys, endorses, or adopts the defamatory content — Each case must be examined on facts.
[Paras 2, 35–36, 66–70]

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Defamation — Republication — Fresh cause of action

Article 75, Limitation Act, 1963

Every republication of a libel constitutes a fresh libel and gives rise to a fresh cause of action — Limitation of one year runs from the date of each republication — However, mere continued online availability is not republication.
[Paras 49–58]

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Hyperlinking — Distinction between reference and publication

A hyperlink by itself does not communicate the defamatory content — It requires an independent act of the reader to access the content — Hyperlinking is akin to a reference or footnote, unless accompanied by contextual endorsement.
[Paras 69–70]

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Order VII Rule 11 CPC — Rejection of plaint

Cause of action — Limitation — Order II Rule 2 CPC

Plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC when hyperlinking and repeated references give rise to a triable issue on republication and limitation — Order II Rule 2 CPC does not apply to continuing or recurring causes of action.
[Paras 36–41, 59–65]

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Defamation — Online publication — Continuing tort

Defamation through repeated acts of publication or republication constitutes a continuing tort — Each fresh act gives rise to a fresh cause of action under Section 22 of the Limitation Act.
[Paras 52–55, 58, 63]

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Interim injunction — Defamation — Media reporting

Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC

Pre-trial injunction in defamation suits must be granted sparingly — Where defence of truth, fair comment, and public interest is raised and requires evidence, injunction cannot be granted mechanically.
[Paras 25–33, 34]

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Freedom of speech vs right to reputation

Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21

Right to reputation is an intrinsic facet of Article 21 — At the same time, investigative journalism and source protection are integral to Article 19(1)(a) — Courts must balance both at the interim stage.
[Paras 3, 30–33]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Concept of Publication in Defamation

The Court reiterates that publication is the sine qua non of defamation. Publication means communication of the defamatory matter to at least one person other than the plaintiff. Mere existence of content on the internet is insufficient unless there is an act of communication or republication (Paras 44–48).

B. Republication and Limitation

Relying on common-law principles and Indian precedent, the Court holds:

• Every republication is a fresh libel.

• Limitation under Article 75 runs from the date of such republication.

• Section 22 of the Limitation Act applies to continuing torts (Paras 49–58).

However, the Court draws a clear distinction between:

• Republication, and

• Passive continued availability of content online.

C. Hyperlinking — Jurisprudential Clarification

This judgment is a landmark exposition on hyperlinking in Indian defamation law. The Court holds:

• A hyperlink does not reproduce content.

• It merely points to where content exists.

• Hyperlinking becomes actionable only if it conveys endorsement, adoption, or contextual defamatory meaning (Paras 66–70).

The Court draws persuasive guidance from comparative jurisprudence (including Canadian law) while grounding its conclusion in Indian constitutional principles.

D. Order II Rule 2 CPC and Continuing Cause

The Court exhaustively analyses Order II Rule 2 CPC and reiterates that:

• It applies only when the cause of action is identical.

• In cases of continuous or recurring causes of action, the bar does not operate.

• Hyperlink-based republication, if established, creates distinct causes of action (Paras 59–65).

E. Interim Injunction in Defamation

Applying the principles of Bonnard v. Perryman and Indian precedent, the Court holds that:

• Pre-trial injunctions in defamation are exceptional.

• Where defendants raise plausible defences of truth, fair comment, and public interest, the matter must ordinarily proceed to trial (Paras 25–33).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS PER RECORD)

• Plaintiffs are founders and entities associated with OFB Tech Private Limited and Oxyzo Financial Services Ltd., claiming high reputation and valuation (Paras 4–5).

• Defendant Slowform Media Pvt. Ltd. publishes The Morning Context (Para 6).

• Allegedly defamatory article was first published on 17-05-2023 and later hyperlinked in articles dated 08-11-2023, 29-12-2023, and 07-10-2024 (Paras 7–8, 14).

• Earlier suit concerning a different article dated 07-10-2024 was pending (Paras 9–14).

• Defendants raised objections of limitation and Order II Rule 2 CPC (Paras 16–17).

• Plaintiffs asserted fresh cause of action due to hyperlinking (Paras 18–22).

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IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC dismissed — plaint discloses triable issues on republication and limitation.

• Hyperlinking does not automatically amount to republication; issue requires factual examination.

• Interim injunction declined at this stage — defences of truth, fair comment, and public interest require trial.

• Both applications directed to proceed in accordance with law.
  [Paras 64–65 and concluding directions]

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Ratio (Succinct)

Hyperlinking to allegedly defamatory content does not per se constitute republication; only when hyperlinking conveys endorsement or defamatory meaning can it give rise to a fresh cause of action, and such determination is fact-dependent.

Defamation — Television broadcast — Continuing tort Repeated telecast of allegedly defamatory programmes constitutes a continuing wrong — Each subsequent broadcast gives rise to a fresh cause of action — Subsequent suit maintainable notwithstanding earlier proceedings on distinct broadcasts. [Paras 26, 28, 30, 31]

 

Defamation — Television broadcast — Continuing tort

Repeated telecast of allegedly defamatory programmes constitutes a continuing wrong — Each subsequent broadcast gives rise to a fresh cause of action — Subsequent suit maintainable notwithstanding earlier proceedings on distinct broadcasts.
[Paras 26, 28, 30, 31]

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Civil Procedure — Suppression of facts — Clean hands doctrine

Litigant approaching Court for discretionary relief is required to disclose all relevant facts — Non-disclosure of prior proceedings, criminal complaints, or interim orders is improper — However, where no interim benefit has accrued, opportunity to amend plaint may be granted in the interest of justice.
[Paras 3–11, 32–33]

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Multiple Suits — Same relief — Distinct cause of action

Reliefs claimed may appear similar, but maintainability depends on sameness of cause of action — Different programmes, different dates, and different factual foundations constitute distinct causes of action — Bar does not operate merely because relief clauses overlap.
[Paras 17–21, 27–30]

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Defamation — Media trial — Presumption of guilt

Broadcasts giving impression that a person has been sentenced or adjudged guilty, when trial is pending, are in bad taste and prima facie defamatory — Failure to obtain version of the affected person aggravates the issue.
[Para 31]

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Election-related broadcasts — Public interest vs reputation

Even under the guise of public interest or political reporting, media cannot pronounce guilt or prejudice pending judicial proceedings — Balance between freedom of speech and right to reputation must be maintained.
[Paras 22, 31]

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Pleadings — Amendment — Opportunity

Where plaint suffers from omission of relevant background facts, Court may permit amendment or fresh filing instead of outright rejection, particularly at pre-summons stage.
[Paras 32–34]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Continuing Tort in Defamation

The Court reiterates the settled principle that defamation by repeated publication is a continuing tort. Each telecast constitutes an independent wrong, giving rise to a fresh cause of action and a fresh period of limitation (Paras 26, 30).

B. Distinction Between Cause of Action and Relief

The judgment draws a clear distinction between:

• Cause of action (facts giving rise to the right to sue), and

• Relief claimed (consequence sought).

Similarity in relief clauses does not bar a subsequent suit if factual substratum differs (Paras 17–21, 28).

C. Suppression of Facts — Not an Automatic Dismissal

While reaffirming the doctrine that a litigant must approach the Court with clean hands, the Court adopts a balanced approach:

• Acknowledges non-disclosure of earlier proceedings and criminal complaint;

• Holds that such facts ought to have been disclosed;

• However, since no interim relief had been granted, dismissal was not automatic.
  Opportunity to amend plaint was considered appropriate (Paras 32–33).

D. Media Trial and Defamation

The Court expresses disapproval of broadcasts which:

• Convey a finding of guilt before trial concludes;

• Fail to obtain the version of the affected person;

• Create prejudice in the public mind.

Such conduct is prima facie defamatory and legally unsustainable (Para 31).

E. Judicial Restraint at Threshold Stage

The Court consciously refrains from deciding merits of defamation allegations at the admission stage, limiting itself to procedural propriety and maintainability (Paras 16, 26).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Plaintiffs Subhash Chandra and Zee Media Corporation Limited alleged repeated defamatory broadcasts by defendant TV channels (Paras 1–2).

• Defendants objected on ground of suppression of:

  • Bombay High Court suit,

  • Criminal complaint,

  • Interim stay order (Paras 3–11, 32).

• Court found Bombay suit related to a different press conference and programme (Paras 27–28).

• Present suit concerned different broadcasts on different dates, some occurring even after the Bombay suit (Paras 28–31).

• No interim injunction had been granted till date (Para 33).

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IV. FINAL DIRECTIONS / RESULT

• Court declined to dismiss the suit at threshold.

• Plaintiffs granted liberty:

  • to amend plaint, or

  • to file a fresh suit incorporating all relevant facts.

• Objections of defendants kept open to be decided on merits.

• Matter directed to be listed before Roster Bench.
  [Paras 33–34]

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Ratio (Concise)

Repeated defamatory broadcasts constitute a continuing tort giving rise to fresh causes of action; non-disclosure of prior proceedings is improper but, absent accrued advantage, may be cured by amendment rather than outright dismissal.

Defamation — Commercial Reputation — Interim Protection Circulation of communications suggesting subsisting injunctions, infringement or legal disability against a business entity, when such issues are sub judice or disputed, may prima facie affect goodwill and reputation and justify interim directions to prevent further damage. [Paras 10–16, 22]

 

Tortious Interference — Business Relations — Injunction

Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC

Unlawful interference with contractual and business relations by communicating misleading or incorrect information to clients and potential clients of a competitor can constitute tortious interference warranting interim restraint.
[Paras 2, 10–18, 22]

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Defamation — Commercial Reputation — Interim Protection

Circulation of communications suggesting subsisting injunctions, infringement or legal disability against a business entity, when such issues are sub judice or disputed, may prima facie affect goodwill and reputation and justify interim directions to prevent further damage.
[Paras 10–16, 22]

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Competing Businesses — Limits of Legitimate Competition

While parties are entitled to protect and promote their business interests, they cannot indulge in negative marketing, false propaganda or communications calculated to dislodge an established competitor by inducing fear or uncertainty among its clients.
[Paras 10–18, 21–22]

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Pending Intellectual Property Litigation — Misuse of Court Orders

Court orders passed in one proceeding cannot be selectively or misleadingly projected to third parties to suggest final adjudication or automatic application against entities not expressly bound by such orders.
[Paras 9–14, 20–22]

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Interim Relief — Balancing of Equities

At the interlocutory stage, the Court may mould relief to maintain commercial fairness by restraining parties from conveying personal views and limiting communications strictly to reproduction of court orders.
[Para 22]

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Damages — Proof at Trial

Claim for damages arising out of tortious interference and defamation must be established by evidence during trial; interim stage is confined to preventing further prejudice.
[Para 23]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Tortious Interference in Commercial Context

The Court recognises that direct communications to a rival’s clients, particularly suggesting illegality, injunctions, or infringement, can cross the line from legitimate competition into tortious interference if such communications are misleading or designed to disrupt existing business relationships (Paras 10–18).

B. Defamation of Business Reputation

The order treats commercial goodwill and reputation as protectable interests. Statements implying subsisting court restraints or legal risk, if not accurately stated, are capable of causing reputational harm even without final adjudication on merits (Paras 10–16).

C. Use and Misuse of Pending Litigation

A key legal concern addressed is the misrepresentation of pending court proceedings. The Court cautions against portraying interim or disputed orders as conclusive findings, especially when the scope of such orders vis-à-vis a party is itself contested (Paras 9–14, 20–22).

D. Controlled Interim Remedy

Instead of granting a blanket injunction, the Court adopts a balanced and proportionate approach:

• restraining parties from expressing personal or subjective views;

• permitting only factual communication of court orders;

• directing corrective communication to recipients of earlier letters.

This approach preserves fairness without prejudging merits (Para 22).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Plaintiff Perpetuuiti Technosoft Service Pvt. Ltd. alleged loss of business and reputation due to defendants’ communications to its clients (Paras 2–5, 10–18).

• Defendants Sanovi Technologies (India) Pvt. Ltd. relied upon a pending copyright suit and interim orders therein (Paras 7–9, 20).

• Communications to clients such as IBM suggested that injunction orders operated against the plaintiff (Paras 12–14).

• Plaintiff disputed such portrayal and alleged loss of contracts and goodwill (Paras 15–18).

• Issues relating to infringement and impleadment were still pending adjudication (Paras 20–22).

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IV. FINAL DIRECTIONS / OPERATIVE PART

• Parties restrained from communicating personal views to clients or third parties.

• Defendants directed to circulate only copies of court orders to recipients of earlier communications.

• Compliance affidavit directed.

• Claim for damages left open to be proved at trial.

• Application disposed of with protective interim directions.
  [Paras 22–23]

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Ratio (Concise)

In commercial rivalry, dissemination of disputed or misleading legal positions to a competitor’s clients may amount to tortious interference and reputational harm; courts may impose calibrated interim restraints limiting communications strictly to factual court orders pending trial.