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the principle of equal pay for equal work cannot be applied merely on basis of designation. While dealing with the 5th Pay Commission recommendations with respect to functional requirements, it was held that there was no question of any equivalence on that basis. The said case dealt with Stenographers of the Geological Survey of India. While observing that as a general statement it was correct to state that the basic nature of work of a Stenographer remained by and large the same whether they were working for an officer in the Secretariat or for an officer in a subordinate office; it was held that Courts ought not to interfere if the Commission itself had considered all aspects and after due consideration opined that absolute equality ought not to be given. 7(2003) 11 SCC 658. [18] 20. In the end we would like to reiterate that the aspect of disparity between the Secretariat and the field offices was a matter taken note of by the Commission itself while making the recommendations. Yet to some extent, a separate recommendation was made qua Secretariat Organizations and non-Secretariat Organizations. Once these recommendations are separately made, to direct absolute parity would be to make the separate recommendations qua non-Secretariat Organizations otiose. If one may say, there would have been no requirement to make these separate recommendations if everyone was to be treated on parity on every aspect.In view of the aforesaid reasons, we find the impugned judgment, which in turn relies upon other orders passed by different Tribunals and Courts unsustainable, and is accordingly set aside.

REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 913-914 OF 2021

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. … APPELLANTS

VERSUS

MANOJ KUMAR & ORS. …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.

1. Indian Railways is the largest civilian employer in the country

comprising of six production units and eighteen zones, with each zone

having three to six divisions.1

 The total number of employees as on

31.03.2005 was stated to be about 14 lakh with the following distribution

of staff strength:

Group In position

A 8285

B 7247

1Indian Railways Annual Report and Accounts 2019-20 pg. 6.

[1]

C 873536

D 521578

Total 1410646*

* As per the Indian Railways Annual Report and Accounts 2019-20, the

current strength is about 12,53,592 as on 31.03.2020.

2. The Sixth Central Pay Commission (“6

th CPC”) report in chapter

7.36 deals with the Ministry of Railways and shows that it has fourteen

departments, including the Railway Board. The report examined the

demands of these different departments seeking higher pay-scales and

allowances for various categories in different departments. We are

concerned in the present matter with claims made by Private Secretaries

(Grade-II) (“PS-II”) employed in the Eastern Central Railways (Field

Office/Zonal Railways),for parity in pay with their counterparts working

in the Central Secretariat Stenographers Service (“CSSS”)/Railway

Board Secretariat Stenographers Service (“RBSSS”)/Central

Administrative Tribunal (“CAT”). We may note at this stage itself that

there have been conflicting judicial views on the claim for such parity

which we will come to later.

[2]

3. We may notice that the 6th CPC referred to the demands made by

common category posts relating to certain cadres in the Ministry of

Railways in para 7.36.95.One of the common category posts is that of

“Typists and Stenographers”. Thereafter, in para 7.36.96, it was observed

that these common categories have been covered by the Commission

elsewhere in the report. It was stated that the recommendations made

therein shall apply in respect of the common category posts in the

Ministry of Railways as well, there being no separate recommendations

made for this category. In the aforesaid conspectus we have to turn to

Chapter 3.1 of the report of the 6th CPC, which deals with “Headquarters

Organisations in Government of India & Office Staff in field offices”.

The disparity between Secretariat and Field offices is set out in clauses

3.1.2 and 3.1.3, which read as under:

“Disparity between Secretariat and field offices

3.1.2 The senior administrative posts in the Secretariat are mainly

filled by officers of All India Services and Central Group A

services on deputation under the Central Staffing Scheme. Some of

the posts in the middle level are also held by officers of the Central

Secretariat Services, Railway Board Secretariat Service in Ministry

of Railways, Defence Forces Headquarters Services in Ministry of

Defence and by Indian Foreign services (B) in Ministry of External

Affairs. Historically, various services in the Secretariat have been

given an edge over analogous posts in the field offices. This was

[3]

done on the ground that office staff in the Secretariat performs

complex duties and are involved in analyzing issues with policy

implications whereas their counter parts in field offices perform

routine work relating to routine matters concerning personnel and

general administration, etc. Another argument that is used to justify

the edge for various posts in Secretariat is that in Secretariat, level

jumping occurs and personnel in the grade of Assistant etc. submit

files directly to decision making levels of Under Secretary, Deputy

Secretary, etc.”

3.1.3Higher pay scales in the Secretariat offices may have been

justified in the past when formulation of proper policies was of

paramount importance. The present position is different. Today, the

weakest link in respect of any Government policy is at the delivery

stage. This phenomenon is not endemic to India. Internationally

also, there is an increasing emphasis on strengthening the delivery

lines and decentralization with greater role being assigned at

delivery points which actually determines the benefit that the

common citizen is going to derive out of any policy initiative of

the Government. The field offices are at the cutting edge of

administration and may, in most cases, determine whether a

particular policy turns out to be a success or a failure in terms of

actual benefit to the consumer. Accordingly, the time has come to

grant parity between similarly placed personnel employed in field

 offices and in the Secretariat. This parity will need to be absolute

till the grade of Assistant. Beyond this, it may not be possible

or even justified to grant complete parity because the

hierarchy and career progression will need to be different

taking in view the functional considerations and relativities

across the board.”

(emphasis supplied)

[4]

4. The recommendations in para 3.1.9 have been made for various

posts from the LDC to the Director including Section Officer, with a

caveat that in the case of Sections Officers having pay scale of Rs. 8000-

13500, the scale would only be available to such of these

organizations/services which have had a historical parity with CSS/CSSS.

We, however, note that before setting forth in a tabular form the revised

pay-scales of the different posts, it has been observed in para 3.1.9 that:

“these recommendations shall apply mutatis-mutandis to post of Private

Secretary/equivalent in these services as well.”

5. We may note that the submission of the respondents is that it is this

clause which ought to govern; and that it recommends parity between the

post of Private Secretaries/equivalent and the post of a Section Officer.

We now turn to clause 3.1.14 which deals with recommendations for nonSecretariat Organizations. According to the appellants, the aspects sought

to be raised before us are specifically dealt with under this paragraph; and

thus, the respondent’s claim that their pay-scale ought to be governed by

para 3.1.9 is misplaced. These paragraphs read as under:

“Recommendations

[5]

3.1.9 Accordingly, the Commission recommends upgradation of

the entry scale of Section Officers in all Secretariat Services

(including CSS as well as nonparticipating

ministries/departments/organizations) to Rs.7500-12000

corresponding to the revised pay band PB 2 of Rs.8700-34800

along with grade pay of Rs.4800. Further, on par with the

dispensation already available in CSS, the Section Officers in other

Secretariat Offices, which have always had an established parity

with CSS/CSSS, shall be extended the scale of Rs.8000-13500 in

Group B corresponding to the revised pay band PB 2 of Rs.8700-

34800 along with grade pay of Rs.4800 on completion of four

years service in the lower grade. This will ensure full parity

between all Secretariat Offices. It is clarified that the pay band PB

2 of Rs.8700-34800 along with grade pay of Rs.4800 is being

recommended for the post of Section Officer in these services

solely to maintain the existing relativities which were disturbed

when the scale was extended only to the Section Officers in CSS.

The grade carrying grade pay of Rs.4800 in pay band PB-2 is,

otherwise, not to be treated as a regular grade and should not be

extended to any other category of employees. These

recommendations shall apply mutatis-mutandis to post of Private

Secretary/equivalent in these services as well. The structure of

posts in Secretariat Offices would now be as under:-

Post Pre revised pay scale Corresponding

revised pay band and

grade pay

LDC Rs.3050-4590 PB-1 of Rs.4860-

20200 along with

grade pay of Rs.1900

UDC Rs.4000-6000 PB-1 of Rs.4860-

20200 along with

grade pay of Rs.2400

Assistant Rs.6500-10500 PB-2 of Rs.8700-

[6]

34800 along with

grade pay of Rs.4200

Section Officer Rs.7500-12000

Rs.8000-13500*

(on completion of

four years)

PB-2 of Rs.8700-

34800 along with

grade pay of Rs.4800.

PB-2 of Rs.8700-

34800 along with

grade pay of Rs.5400*

(on completion of four

years)

Under Secretary Rs.10000-15200 PB-3 of Rs.15600-

39100 along with

grade pay of Rs.6100

Deputy Secretary Rs.12000-16500 PB-3 of Rs.15600-

39100 along with

grade pay of Rs.6600

Director Rs.14300-18300 PB-3 of Rs.15600-

39100 along with

grade pay of Rs.7600

* This scale shall be available only in such of those

organizations/services which have had a historical parity with

CSS/CSSS. Services like AFHQSS/AFHQSSS/RBSS and

Ministerial/Secretarial posts in Ministries/Departments

organizations like MEA, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, CVC,

UPSC, etc. would therefore be covered.”

“Recommendations for non - Secretariat Organizations

3.1.14 In accordance with the principle established in the earlier

paragraphs, parity between Field and Secretariat Offices is

recommended. This will involve merger of few grades. In the

Stenographers cadre, the posts of Stenographers Grade II and

Grade I in the existing scales of Rs.4500-7000/Rs, 5000-8000 and

Rs.5500-9000 will, therefore, stand merged and be placed in the

higher pay scale of Rs.6500-10500. In the case of ministerial post

in non- Secretariat Offices, the posts of Head Clerks, Assistants,

[7]

Office Superintendent and Administrative Officers Grade III in the

respective pay scales of Rs.5000-8000, Rs.5500-9000 and

Rs.6500-10500 will stand merged. The existing and revised

structure in Field Organization will, therefore, be as follows:-

Designation Present

Pay Scale

Recommended

Pay Scale

Corresponding Pay

Band and Grade Pay

Pay

Band

Grade Pay

LDC 3050-4590 3050-4590 PB-1 1900

UDC 4000-6000 4000-6000 PB-1 2400

Head Clerk/

Assistants/ Steno

GradeII/equivalent

4500-

7000/

5000-8000

6500-10500 PB-2 4200

Office

Superintendent/

Steno Grade

I/equivalent

5500-9000

Superintendent/

Asst. Admn.

Officer/ Private

Secretary/

equivalent

6500-

10500

Administrative

Officer Grade

II /Sr. Private

Secretary/equ.

7500-

12000

7500-12000

entry grade for

fresh recruits)

8000-13500

(on completion

of four years)

PB-2 4800

(5400 after

4 years)

Administrative

Officer Grade I

10000-

15200

10000-15200 PB-2 6100

[8]

A perusal of paragraph 3.1.14 would show that Steno (Grade-II) has

specifically been mentioned under this paragraph and it deals with the

aspect of parity between field and Secretariat offices.

6. We consider it appropriate to settle the aforesaid issue which is on

a plain reading of the recommendations of the 6th CPC as a lot of other

arguments and claims of parity will flow from which clause would

govern.

7. There is no doubt, in our considered view, that though there is an

observation that the recommendations shall apply mutatis mutandis to

Private Secretaries and posts equivalent thereto in the service under para

3.1.9; the subsequent paragraph 3.1.14 has specifically dealt with the

aspect of parity between the field and Secretariat offices, which is really

the subject matter of the claim before us.

8. The plea of the respondents is that para 3.1.9 of the

recommendations of the 6th CPC has been issued pursuant to paras

7.36.95 and 7.36.96. No separate recommendations for Stenographers in

zonal offices of Railways have been made. Para 3.1.9, which relates

specifically to Section Officers also provides that it applies mutatis

mutandis to private secretaries in these services. The premise of this plea

is therefore that para 3.1.14 deals with the recommendations for non-

[9]

Secretariat Organizations other than the Railways, and that they should

be treated as Secretariat organizations. In our view this becomes a

crucial issue. In the spectrum of conflicting views of different Central

Administrative Tribunals, the view of the CAT, Bangalore in Original

Application Nos. 640-649 and 1001-1030 of 2014 seek to favour the case

of the appellants.

9. If we turn to that judgment (V.N. Narayanappa & Ors. v. The

Secretary, Railway Board Etc.) decided on 13.04.2016, the factual

matrix deals with a case of similarly situated Private Secretaries (Grade

II) in the Southern Railways. In considering this plea, the Tribunal took

note of a different view in O.A. No.658/2010 decided on 05.06.2012 by

the Madras Bench of the Tribunal, which the applicants therein sought to

rely upon. That judgment in turn was based on an earlier view of the

Principal Bench of the CAT at Delhi in the case of OA No.164/2009

decided on 19.02.2009 (S.R. Dheer & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.), in

respect of Private Secretaries (Grade-II) of the CAT. At this juncture, it

may be important to note that the respondents herein in their OA before

the CAT Patna, also claimed parity with the aforementioned decision of

the CAT Madras. The Madras Bench of the CAT had noticed that no

recruitment rules had been placed on record by the Government while

[10]

stating that different standards of academic and professional

qualifications, etc. exist. Thus, the view of the Madras Bench of the

Tribunal was based on absence of material and on a reason of parity with

the Principal Bench at Delhi, even though the Principal Bench at Delhi

dealt with the case of CAT Stenographers (Grade II) officers and had

allowed the OA on the basis of historical parity.

10. We may add here that the views of the Madras CAT have not been

interfered with by this Court. Both an SLP challenging the decision and a

subsequent Review Petition met with a summary dismissal and

resultantly, the question to be decided in this case has not been

specifically dealt with by this Court. This has resulted in the

implementation of different orders in different matters, which are really

contradictory in nature.

11. The Bangalore Bench of the CAT in seeking to determine the issue

on merits sought strength from an earlier decision of the Principal Bench

(Delhi) in OA No.2102/2010 in Rabindra Nath Basu & Ors. v. Union of

India & Ors. and other connected matters decided on 16.05.2011 dealing

with the case of the Assistant Staff Officers of the Ordnance Factory

Board. The CAT therein opined that the applicants belonged to a non-

[11]

Secretariat organization and would therefore be covered by the pay-scale

prescribed in para 3.1.14 of the 6th CPC.

12. If we notice the discussion in V.N. Narayanappa & Ors.2

,

historical parity is one of the aspects which has been examined. The

factual matrix in the present case is that there was such historical parity

under the first and second Pay Commissions’ recommendations.

However, the third and fourth Pay Commissions did not give parity and

the fifth Pay Commission gave parity to a limited extent. Thus, there is

no continued history of parity insofar the present case is concerned, i.e.,

sometimes parity was given and sometimes not. The history as available

from the brief note submitted by the respondents and is as under:

Central Pay

Commission

RBSS Zonal Railways/Field

Officers

1

st Pay Commission Rs.160-450/- Rs.160-450/-

2

nd Pay Commission Rs.210-530/- Rs.210-530/-

3

rd Pay Commission Rs.650-1200/- Rs.650-960/-

4

th Pay Commission Rs.2000-3500/- Rs.2000-3200/-

5

th Pay Commission Rs.6500-10500/- Rs.6500-10500/-

6

th Pay Commission

(Grade Pay)

Rs.4800 Rs.4200 (Later

Rs.4600/-)

13. We now turn to the aspect of whether the post in the case in hand

can be said to be that of a Secretariat or non-Secretariat organization.

2(supra)

[12]

This aspect, once again, has been dealt with in the judgment in V.N.

Narayanappa & Ors.3

, taking note of Swamy’s Compilation of 6th CPC

Report Part I (pages 141 to 147) and Swamy’s Manual on Office

Procedure 2006 and 2009. In the definition Chapter at entry 53,

Secretariat Offices are said to have been defined as those which are

responsible for formulation of the policies of the Government and also

for the execution and review of those policies. Relying on this definition,

it was opined that the organizations where the applicants in V.N.

Narayanappa & Ors.4 were working, were not Secretariat Organizations,

but were non-Secretariat Organizations or attached offices or subordinate

offices thereto. The meaning of subordinate offices is stated to signify

their function as field establishments or as agencies responsible for the

detailed execution of the policies of Government. They function under

the direction of an attached office or directly under a department. In that

context, it was opined that there exists a distinction in the works,

functions and responsibilities between Secretariat and non-Secretariat

organizations. As such, it was noted that if there are functional

dissimilarities between the cadres, there are bound to be financial

3(supra)

4(supra)

[13]

disparities in pay and allowances. It would be useful to reproduce paras

38 and 39 of the judgment in V.N. Narayanappa & Ors.5

, which read as

under:

“38. As it would be evident from the discussions in the preceding

paras, there is a significant difference in the recruitment rules,

promotional hierarchy etc. between the applicants who are Private

Secretaries Grade-II in the Zonal Railways with that of Private

Secretaries in the Railway Board/Central Secretariat

Services/CSSS or CAT. There also no case of any historical parity

between the applicants and their counterparts in CSSS or CAT or

RBSS. Therefore the applicants cannot claim the benefits of pay

scales allowed to CSSS in the ratio of judgments in OA

No.164/2009 in S.R. Dheer & Ors. v. Union of India wherein the

Private Secretaries in the CAT were granted the benefit on the

basis of establishment of a historical parity with CSS.

39. In this context, we also note the submission made by the

respondents about the consequential implications on various other

categories/groups under the respondents if such benefit is granted

to the applicants even though they do not have any parity with

RBSS and CSSS and are not entitled to the same. The Railways is

a vast organization where there are many cadres/category of

employees having identical pay scales and equal parity with that of

Private Secretaries Grade-II in the Zonal Railways. A list of such

groups has been highlighted in the reply statement. Therefore,

grant of benefit which the applicants are otherwise not entitled to

will also have an effect on the other cadres of Railways as

contended.”

5(supra)

[14]

14. We do believe in the conspectus of the aforesaid discussion that the

correct perspective has been taken in V.N. Narayanappa & Ors.6

 insofar

as which clause of the 6th CPC recommendations would be applicable.

We find that once we come to the conclusion that the regional offices of

the Railways are to be treated as non-Secretariat Organizations, then the

specific recommendations in para 3.1.14 relating to such non-Secretariat

Organizations will apply. The observations made in para 3.1.9 which are

qua Secretariat offices giving parity between the Private

Secretary/equivalent to a Section Officer cannot be said to be mutatis

mutandis applicable even to non-Secretariat Organizations. If we were to

opine otherwise and equate everybody there would have been no purpose

in the 6th CPC making separate recommendations for non-Secretariat

Organizations in their wisdom. It is not as if the Commission was

unaware of the plea of disparity between the Secretariat and field offices

as that was dealt with in paras 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 but despite having taken

note of the same some difference was sought to be made between

Secretariat and non-Secretariat offices.

15. The Pay Commission is a specialized body set up with the

objective of resolving anomalies. It is relevant to note that the anomaly in

6(supra)

[15]

question was referred to the Pay Commission at the request of candidates

similarly situated to the respondents and thus, the 6th CPC was aware of

the claim for parity and the requirement of making a recommendation in

that regard. In its wisdom while giving better scales it has still sought to

maintain a separate recommendation for non-Secretariat Organizations.

16. We may also notice another aspect. There is a plea by the

respondents that the recruitment process for the two cadres was common

and persons used to be transferred from one to the other. Some

illustrations have been given of this. In fact, the plea of the respondents

is that there have been times when a common competitive exam was

conducted and sometimes the exams were conducted separately. In this

regard, it has been explained by the learned Additional Solicitor General

on behalf of the appellants that the cadres are separate and the rules

governing them are also separate. The Stenographers under the Railway

Board are governed by the RBSS Rules, 1971, the Central Secretariat

Stenographers are governed by the CSS Rules, 1969 and the CSSS Rules,

2010 and the Stenographers in the Central Administrative Tribunal are

governed by the CATSS Rules, 2013. These are the posts with which the

respondents sought parity. On the other hand, the respondents working in

the Zonal Railways were governed by Rule 107 of the Indian Railway

[16]

Establishment Code. The avenue and channel of promotion of

stenographers in the Railway Board and the Zonal Railways, it has been

stated, are entirely different.

17. Learned counsel for the appellants did accept that there were some

cases of transfer, but those were persons who were brought to the

Railway Board for exigency of work – it was not as if they were absorbed

in the Railway Board. There were also cases where transfers took place

from the Railway Board to the Zonal Railway offices, but that was on the

specific request of such officers and considered on a case-to-case basis

and they had to take then seniority at the bottom of the list.

18. Para 3.1.3 which dealt with the disparity between the Secretariat

and field offices has canvassed a case for parity between similarly placed

persons employed in field offices and the Secretariat; in view of the field

offices being at the cutting edge of administration. However, it came to

the conclusion that parity would need to be absolute till the grade of

Assistant. It was clearly stipulated that beyond that “it may not be

possible or even justified to grant complete parity because the hierarchy

and career progression will need to be different taking in view the

functional considerations and relativities across the board.” If this

principle is observed, the benefit cannot accrue to the respondents and we

[17]

cannot accept the plea that as a result of parity being given up to the level

of Assistant (which would put them in the grade of Rs.4200 (later

Rs.4600)), the respondents, being one post higher, would automatically

have to get one higher grade.

19. We are fortified in the view we are seeking to adopt in interpreting

the aforesaid paragraphs of the Pay Commission by the observations in

Union of India v. Tarit Ranjan Das,

7 where it was opined that the

principle of equal pay for equal work cannot be applied merely on basis

of designation. While dealing with the 5th Pay Commission

recommendations with respect to functional requirements, it was held

that there was no question of any equivalence on that basis. The said

case dealt with Stenographers of the Geological Survey of India. While

observing that as a general statement it was correct to state that the basic

nature of work of a Stenographer remained by and large the same

whether they were working for an officer in the Secretariat or for an

officer in a subordinate office; it was held that Courts ought not to

interfere if the Commission itself had considered all aspects and after due

consideration opined that absolute equality ought not to be given.

7(2003) 11 SCC 658.

[18]

20. In the end we would like to reiterate that the aspect of disparity

between the Secretariat and the field offices was a matter taken note of by

the Commission itself while making the recommendations. Yet to some

extent, a separate recommendation was made qua Secretariat

Organizations and non-Secretariat Organizations. Once these

recommendations are separately made, to direct absolute parity would be

to make the separate recommendations qua non-Secretariat Organizations

otiose. If one may say, there would have been no requirement to make

these separate recommendations if everyone was to be treated on parity

on every aspect.

21. In view of the aforesaid reasons, we find the impugned judgment,

which in turn relies upon other orders passed by different Tribunals and

Courts unsustainable, and is accordingly set aside.

22. The appeals are accordingly allowed.

23. We hope this puts to rest this controversy which has been agitated

before different forums without receiving a final reasoned view of this

Court.

...……………………………J.

[Sanjay Kishan Kaul]

[19]

...……………………………J.

[Hrishikesh Roy]

New Delhi.

August 31, 2021.

[20]

issuing an oral direction restraining the arrest of the first respondent was irregular.-Oral directions of this nature by the High Court are liable to cause serious misgivings. Such a procedure is open to grave abuse. Most High Courts deal with high volumes of cases. Judicial assessments change with the roster. Absent a written record of what has transpired in the course of a judicial proceeding, it would set a dangerous precedent if the parties and the investigating officer were expected to rely on unrecorded oral observations. 25. We are conscious of the fact that in civil proceedings, Counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting parties do in certain cases mutually agree before the court to an ad interim arrangement and agree among themselves to record the terms of the arrangement by an exchange of correspondence between the advocates. This can typically happen when civil disputants are attempting an amicable settlement. Civil cases involve disputes between two private contestants.

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No. 884 of 2021

Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.4617 of 2021

Salimbhai Hamidbhai Menon …Petitioner

Versus

Niteshkumar Maganbhai Patel & Anr. …Respondents

O R D E R

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

1. This appeal arises from a judgment dated 31 March 2021 of a Single Judge of

the High Court of Gujarat.

2. On 10 October 2010, the appellant and the first respondent entered into a

deed of partnership under which a firm by the name of Calla Associates was

constituted. The share of the first respondent in the profit / loss is alleged to be 55

per cent while the share of the appellant, 45 per cent. On 21 June 2017, a document 

2

styled as ‘’sammati-lekh’’ was allegedly entered into by the appellant consenting to

the execution of a sale deed in favour of a third party and the appellant agreed not to

make any claim in the amount of Rs 3.89 crores from his capital investment.

3. On 23 August 2017, an addendum to the “sammati-lekh” is alleged to have

been executed in terms of which certain amounts were to be adjusted and an

amount of Rs 5.03 crores was to be paid by the first respondent to the appellant. It

has been alleged that under the terms of the addendum, a sale deed of certain land

situated at Mouje Samiyala was to be executed in favour of the appellant.

4. It has been alleged that on 4 September 2017, a document was prepared and

notarised on 8 September 2017 pertaining to record the relinquishment of rights by

the appellant from a parcel of land belonging to the firm. The allegation of the

appellant is that under the terms of the original document, the appellant agreed to

relinquish rights only in certain land situated at Akota, Vadodara. However, it is

alleged that the first respondent forged the internal pages of the document and

added additional survey numbers of land, over and above what was agreed to be

relinquished.

5. On 1 November 2017, an advocate’s notice was issued by the appellant to

the first respondent which was followed by a public notice on 2 January 2018

alleging misappropriation of the amount invested by the appellant. In a reply dated 5

January 2018, the respondent suggested that partnership had been mutually

dissolved and documents had been executed to that effect. 

3

6. On 25 January 2018, a legal notice was issued by the appellant complaining

of the dishonour of a cheque of Rs 1.47 crores and on 7 January 2018, of another

cheque in the amount of Rs 81.31 lacs.

7. On 31 January 2018, the appellant addressed a communication to the

bankers to cease all transactions in the account of the partnership firm due to

disputes between the parties.

8. On 22 February 2018, the appellant received a communication from HDFC

Bank recording that the bank had received a document allegedly executed on 8

September 2017 by which the appellant had relinquished all his rights in the firm in

favour of the first respondent. The appellant alleges that it was then that he came to

know that the first respondent has fabricated the deed of dissolution of partnership

dated 10 February 2018. This forged deed allegedly contained a reference to

another forged document dated 8 September 2017. According to the appellant, his

signature on the deed of dissolution of partnership is forged and another copy of the

document without his signature was notarised on 23 February 2018.

9. On 25 February 2018, the investigating officer at JP Road Police Station

conducted a preliminary enquiry into a complaint lodged by the appellant, which is

stated to have been disposed of on the ground that the first respondent was ready to

settle the accounts in the presence of a mediator and that the allegations were of a

civil nature. 

4

10. On 12 March 2018, a settlement was arrived at between the appellant and the

first respondent in terms of which it was agreed that the partnership be dissolved

and a sum of Rs 26.03 crores be paid to the appellant. Post-dated cheques were

issued to the appellant. One of Rs 50 lacs was honoured while the remaining

cheques were dishonoured, leading to the initiation of proceedings under the

Negotiable Instruments Act 1881.

11. On 20 June 2018, the appellant instituted a complaint before the Gotri Police

Station against the first respondent making allegations of forgery and cheating.

12. On 24 December 2018, a fresh MoU was entered between the appellant and

the first respondent which acknowledged that an amount of Rs 50 lacs was paid,

while a balance of Rs 25.52 crores remained due. The terms of the MoU envisaged

that certain lands would be transferred to the appellant in lieu of the outstanding

amount. The appellant has alleged that fresh cheques issued to him also returned

unpaid on 6 March 2020 and the sale deeds which were executed by the first

respondent were in respect of lands whose title was not marketable. The complaint

filed by the appellant was disposed of by the Gotri Police Station on 25 August 2019

in view of the settlement dated 24 December 2018 on the ground that despite

repeated requests, the appellant had not come forth to record his statement and it

appeared that the matter involved monetary transactions for which the appellant

would have to seek redressal before the appropriate court. 

5

13. On 9 July 2020, the first respondent got an FIR registered before the

Vadodara City Police Station alleging an act of forgery on the part of the appellant.

On 9 October 2020, the investigating officer filed a ‘B’ summary report recording that

the alleged document dated 8 September 2017 had not been forged by the appellant

but by the first respondent.

14. On 6 December 2020, the FIR which forms the basis of the present

proceedings was registered, alleging the commission of offences punishable under

Sections 405, 420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 of the Penal Code. The gravamen of the

allegations in the FIR is that:

a. The deed of relinquishment which was prepared in relation to certain lands

situated at Akota had been interpolated and forged by the first respondent;

b. The deed of dissolution of partnership has been fabricated; and

c. Despite the settlement dated 24 December 2018, the amount due to the

appellant had not been paid and the title to the lands which were purported to

be transferred in favour of the appellant is in dispute.

15. The first respondent instituted proceedings under Section 482 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure 1973 (“CrPC”) for quashing the FIR, being Criminal Misc.

Application No 19358 of 2020.

16. On 23 December 2020, when the proceedings were initially moved before the

High Court, an order was passed by the Single Judge recording that :

“ The matter is between the partners and there appears

allegation that some of the partners have taken advantage 

6

and siphoned away amount as well as also made falsification

of documents. “

Counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent urged that he was willing to offer

a settlement. Since Counsel for the parties sought time to explore the possibility of a

settlement, the proceedings were adjourned to 10 February 2021. On 8 March 2021,

the first respondent was arrested. When the proceedings were taken up by the

Single Judge on 9 March 2021, the Court recorded the submission of the first

respondent that on 23 December 2020, an oral direction had been issued by the

Court restraining the arrest of the first respondent. Recording that this statement

was not disputed on behalf of the appellant, the Single Judge directed that the first

respondent should forthwith be released by the Vadodara Police Station if he was

arrested in connection with the FIR which was the subject matter of the petition for

quashing. The proceedings were adjourned to 15 March 2021. On 15 March 2021,

the proceedings were adjourned to 22 March 2021 with a direction that no steps

should be taken against the first respondent till 23 March 2021. Eventually, on 31

March 2021, the Single Judge recorded that:

“5. … prima facie it appears that the complaints are with

respect to business transactions between both the parties. It

further appears that there are some dues which are payable

by the present applicant and FIR came to be filed against

applicant. On 6.12.2020 by the respondent No.2 which is

subject matter of present petition. It is alleged that the

documents dated 8.9.2017 and 10.2.2018 are forged

documents. There was one complaint filed by the present

application against respondent No.2 on 9.7.2020 wherein B

Summary report was filed which is at pages 38 to 57. The

said report has culminated in a proceedings before the

learned Magistrate Court, Vadodara. Those proceedings are

also pending.” 

7

The Single Judge noted that previously the appellant had filed a similar complaint

which was disposed of by the investigating officer and it was then that a new

settlement was arrived at which, formed the basis of the FIR in question. After

extracting the earlier orders dated 23 December 2020 and 9 March 2021, the Single

Judge issued the following directions in paragraph 9 of the impugned order:

“9. At this juncture when the proceedings are clearly pending

between the parties and both of them have set the criminal

machinery in action, to strike a balance between both the

parties the investigation is required to be proceeded, however

the present applicant be not arrested till next date of hearing,

S.O. to 28.4.2021.”

17. This order has given rise to the appeal before this Court.

18. We have heard Mr Anshin H Desai, Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of

the appellant, Mr Manoj Swarup, Senior Counsel for the first respondent and Mr

Kanu Agrawal, Counsel for the State of Gujarat.

19. Mr Desai, Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that:

(i) An FIR was lodged on 6 December 2020 containing serious allegations

involving:

a. Interpolation of the deed of relinquishment executed by the appellant

with the consequence that whereas the interest in only one property at

Akota was relinquished, several additional properties have been

included and the nature of the interpolation would be obvious on a bare

perusal of the documents which have been annexed to the paper book;

8

and

b. The deed of dissolution of partnership is purported to have been

executed on a day when the appellant was not present in India but was

traveling to Dubai;

(ii) The FIR has been registered on the basis of the above allegations

implicating the commission of offences punishable under Sections 405,

420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 of the Penal Code;

(iii) On the representation made by the first respondent, successive

Memorandum of Understandings (“MoU” or “MoUs”) were entered into

between the appellant and the first respondent; and

(iv) Pursuant to the settlement, the cheques which were issued by the first

respondent have been dishonoured and the title to the lands which were

purported to be transferred to the appellant is under a cloud and is not

marketable.

In this backdrop, it was urged that in view of the consistent position in law laid down

by this Court, the High Court was not justified in issuing a direction restraining the

arrest of the first respondent till the next date of listing without reasons .

20. On the other hand, Mr Manoj Swarup, learned Senior Counsel appearing on

behalf of the first respondent submitted that:

(i) In terms of the MoU several parcels of land have been transferred to the

appellant, details of which have been tabulated as followed in the Counter

Affidavit:

9

(ii) These parcels of land have been transferred to the appellant in terms of

the MoUs executed on 12 March 2018 and 24 December 2018 in addition

to which a payment of Rs 50 lacs has been made by cheque. As a result,

out of the agreed payment of Rs 26.02 crores to be made to the appellant,

10

25.52 crores have been paid or value has been received;

(iii) The appellant has received the benefit of the settlements which have been

arrived at between the parties and lands have been transferred to him;

(iv) On the earlier complaint lodged by the appellant, a ‘B’ summary was filed

by the Gotri Police Station recording that the appellant had not come forth

to record his statement and the transaction between the parties appeared

to be of a monetary nature;

(v) By August 2019, these parcels of land were transferred to the appellant in

pursuance of the settlements dated 12 March 2018 and 24 December

2018; and

(vi) The order of the High Court dated 31 March 2021 continued to remain in

operation due to the general orders operating during the second wave of

the pandemic.

21. Mr Kanu Agrawal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State of

Gujarat has submitted that the impugned order of the High Court refers to the

submission of the police report by the APP which was taken on the record and that

the police report has adverted to the forgery of two valuable documents namely, the

deeds of relinquishment and dissolution of partnership.

22. After the High Court was moved in proceedings under Section 482 of the

CrPC for quashing the FIR, an order was initially passed on 23 December 2020,

recording the statement of Counsel for the first respondent that he was ready and

willing to offer a settlement. Since Counsel for the parties desired to explore the 

11

possibility of a settlement, the proceedings were adjourned to 10 February 2021.

The text of the order of the High Court did not contain any direction restraining the

arrest of the first respondent. But it appears from the subsequent order dated 9

March 2021 that an oral direction was issued by the Single Judge not to arrest the

first respondent. In its order dated 9 March 2021, the High Court adverted to the

submission of Counsel for the first respondent that such a direction was previously

issued, which was not disputed by the appellant. Since the first respondent was

arrested on 8 March 2021, he was directed to be released forthwith.

23. The procedure followed by the High Court of issuing an oral direction

restraining the arrest of the first respondent was irregular. If after hearing the parties

on 23 December 2020, the High Court was of the view that an opportunity should be

granted to Counsel for the appellant and the first respondent to explore the

possibility of a settlement and, on that ground, an interim protection against arrest

ought to be granted, a specific judicial order to that effect was necessary. Oral

observations in court are in the course of a judicial discourse. The text of a written

order is what is binding and enforceable. Issuing oral directions (presumably to the

APP) restraining arrest, does not form a part of the judicial record and must be

eschewed. Absent a judicial order, the investigating officer would have no official

record emanating from the High Court on the basis of which a stay of arrest is

enforced. The administration of criminal justice is not a private matter between the

complainant and the accused but implicates wider interests of the State in

preserving law and order as well as a societal interest in the sanctity of the criminal 

12

justice administration. Though in a different context, the principle was set down by

this Court in Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v State of Gujarat1 :

“35. This Court has often emphasized that in a criminal case

the fate of the proceedings cannot always be left entirely in

the hands of the parties, crimes being public wrongs in

breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect

the whole community as a community and are harmful to the

society in general. The concept of fair trial entails familiar

triangulation of interests of the accused, the victim and the

society and it is the community that acts through the State

and prosecuting agencies. Interests of society are not to be

treated completely with disdain and as persona non grata.

Courts have always been considered to have an overriding

duty to maintain public confidence in the administration of

justice — often referred to as the duty to vindicate and uphold

the “majesty of the law”…..”

24. Oral directions of this nature by the High Court are liable to cause serious

misgivings. Such a procedure is open to grave abuse. Most High Courts deal with

high volumes of cases. Judicial assessments change with the roster. Absent a

written record of what has transpired in the course of a judicial proceeding, it would

set a dangerous precedent if the parties and the investigating officer were expected

to rely on unrecorded oral observations.

25. We are conscious of the fact that in civil proceedings, Counsel appearing on

behalf of the contesting parties do in certain cases mutually agree before the court

to an ad interim arrangement and agree among themselves to record the terms of

the arrangement by an exchange of correspondence between the advocates. This

can typically happen when civil disputants are attempting an amicable settlement.

Civil cases involve disputes between two private contestants. In criminal

 1 (2004) 4 SCC 158

13

proceedings, apart from the accused and the complainant, there is a vital interest of

the State and of society in the prosecution of crime. The procedure which was

followed by the Single Judge must therefore be eschewed in the future. Judges

speak through their judgments and orders. The written text is capable of being

assailed. The element of judicial accountability is lost where oral regimes prevail.

This would set a dangerous precedent and is unacceptable. Judges, as much as

public officials over whose conduct they preside, are accountable for their actions.

26. The Single Judge, by the impugned order dated 31 March 2021 issued an ad

interim protection against arrest till the next date of listing. The only reasons which

are to be found in the order of the Court are that:

(i) Proceedings are pending between the parties; and

(ii) Both of them have set the criminal machinery in action.

27. Having recorded this, the Single Judge has granted a stay of arrest “to strike”

a balance between both the parties while observing that the investigation may

proceed. How this would strike a balance between both the parties is unclear from

the reasons which have been adduced. The FIR contains grave allegations

involving:

(i) The interpolation of a deed of relinquishment so as to cover a significantly

larger number of properties than the sole property which was agreed to be

relinquished; and

(ii) The fabrication of a deed of dissolution of partnership. 

14

28. The offences which are alleged to be involved are punishable under the

provisions of Sections 405, 420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 of the Penal Code. These

offences are of a serious nature. The APP had evidently apprised the Single Judge

of the police report dated 31 March 2020, to which a reference has been made by

the Counsel of the State of Gujarat, as noted earlier. While an order granting a stay

of arrest in a proceeding under Section 482 of the CrPC lies within the jurisdiction of

the High Court, the grant of such relief must be after a judicious application of mind,

which must emerge from the reasons which are recorded by the Judge. The

formulation of reasons in a judicial order provides the backbone of public confidence

in the sanctity of the judicial process. While directing that the proceedings are to be

listed on a future date, the High Court is undoubtedly not expected to deliver a

detailed judgment elaborating upon reasons why a stay of arrest has been granted.

But the reasons recorded by the Court must reflect an application of mind to relevant

facts and circumstances, including:

(i) The nature and gravity of the allegations;

(ii) The seriousness of the alleged offence(s);

(iii) The position of the accused and the likelihood of their availability for

investigation; and

(iv) The basis on which a stay of arrest has been granted till the next date.

29. The High Court has not alluded to the allegations made in the FIR. This

constitutes a serious deficiency. The petition before the High Court is for quashing

the FIR under section 482. While determining whether to grant ad-interim relief in 

15

such a case, involving a stay of arrest, the High Court must bear in mind the

parameters for the exercise of the jurisdiction for quashing, which has been invoked.

The interim order of a stay of arrest is in aid of the final relief which is sought in the

petition. Hence, the considerations germane to the exercise of the jurisdiction to

quash an FIR must be present to the mind while deciding whether an interim stay of

arrest is warranted. What is present to the mind must emerge from the text of the

order. In the recent judgment in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt Ltd. v. State of

Maharashtra2

, this Court through one of us (Justice MR Shah) formulated the

principles which have to be borne in mind by the High Court, when its intervention is

sought under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash an FIR. After setting out the

principles, the Court observed:

“59. Before passing an interim order of staying further

investigation pending the quashing petition under Section 482

Cr.P.C. and/or Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the

High Court has to apply the very parameters which are

required to be considered while quashing the proceedings in

exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in exercise of

its inherent jurisdiction, referred to hereinabove.”

30. Expressing a caution, which requires the High Courts to be circumspect in

interfering with investigation, the Court noted:

“60. In a given case, there may be allegations of abuse of

process of law by converting a civil dispute into a criminal

dispute, only with a view to pressurize the accused. Similarly,

in a given case the complaint itself on the face of it can be

said to be barred by law. The allegations in the FIR/complaint

may not at all disclose the commission of a cognizable

offence. In such cases and in exceptional cases with

circumspection, the High Court may stay the further

investigation. However, at the same time, there may be

genuine complaints/FIRs and the police/investigating agency

 2 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315

16

has a statutory obligation/right/duty to enquire into the

cognizable offences. Therefore, a balance has to be struck

between the rights of the genuine complainants and the FIRs

disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and the

statutory obligation/duty of the investigating agency to

investigate into the cognizable offences on the one hand and

those innocent persons against whom the criminal

proceedings are initiated which may be in a given case abuse

of process of law and the process. However, if the facts are

hazy and the investigation has just begun, the High Court

would be circumspect in exercising such powers and the High

Court must permit the investigating agency to proceed further

with the investigation in exercise of its statutory duty under

the provisions of the Code. Even in such a case the High

Court has to give/assign brief reasons why at this stage the

further investigation is required to be stayed. The High Court

must appreciate that speedy investigation is the requirement

in the criminal administration of justice.”

This Court observed that while there may be some cases where the initiation of the

criminal proceedings may be an abuse of law, it is in cases of an exceptional nature,

where it is found that absence of interference would result in a miscarriage of justice,

that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC and Article

226 of the Constitution. This Court has disapproved of interim orders of High Courts

which grant stay of arrest or which direct that no coercive steps must be taken

against the accused, without assigning reasons. The impugned order of the High

Court cannot be sustained on the touchstone of the principles which have been

consistently laid down by this Court and reiterated in the above decision.

31. In Parbatbhai Aahir alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur v. State of

Gujarat3

, this Court formulated the governing principles to guide the exercise of

powers under Section 482 of the CrPC. Speaking for the three judge Bench, one of

 3 (2017) 9 SCC 641

17

us (Dr DY Chandrachud) observed:

“(1) Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the

High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or

to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer

new powers. It only recognise and preserves powers which

inhere in the High Court.

(2) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to

quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on

the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the

offender and the victim is not het same as the invocation of

the jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence.

While compounding an offence, the power of the court is

governed by the provisions of Section 320 CrPC. The power

to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is

non-compoundable.

(3) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding

or complain should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction

under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the

ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent

power.

(4) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide

ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the

ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of

any court.

(5) The decision as to whether a complaint or first information

report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and

victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the

facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive

elaboration of principles can be formulated.

(6) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and

while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled,

the High Court must have due regard to the nature and

gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving

mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and deceit

cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the

family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences

are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious

impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in

such cases is founded on the overriding element of public

interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

(7) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be

criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant

element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing

insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is

concerned. 

18

(8) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from

commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar

transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in

appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have

settled the dispute.

(9) In such a case, the High Court may quash the

criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the

disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the

continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression

and prejudice; and

(10) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in

Propositions (8) and (9) above. Economic offences involving

the financial and economic well-being of the State have

implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute

between private disputants. The High Court would be justified

in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an

activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or

misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of

upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the

balance.”

32. We are conscious of the fact that in the present case the petition for quashing

is still pending before the High Court. At the same time, the High Court was moved

for the grant of ad interim relief in a petition for quashing the FIR. The considerations

which ought to weigh in whether or not to exercise the jurisdiction to quash must be

present in the mind of the Judge while determining whether an interim order should

be made. That these considerations have been borne in mind can only be evident

from the reasons, however brief, which have been indicated in the order of the High

Court. This does not emerge from the impugned order of the High Court. 

19

33. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order of the

High Court dated 31 March 2021. The High Court, it is clarified would be at liberty to

proceed to deal with the petition under Section 482 of the CrPC which is pending

consideration. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.

34. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

…………...…...….......………………........J.

 [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

…..…..…....…........……………….…........J.

 [MR Shah]

New Delhi;

August 31, 2021.

the Residents’ Welfare Association of Emerald Court Group Housing Society -By its judgment, the High Court directed: (i) The demolition of Towers -164 and 175 by the third respondent, New Okhla Industrial Development Authority6 , in Emerald Court situated on Plot No 4, Sector 93A, NOIDA constructed by the appellant, Supertech Limited7 ; (ii) The cost of demolition and removal would be borne by the appellant, failing which NOIDA shall recover it as arrears of land revenue;(iii)Sanction for prosecution under Section 49 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Development Act 19738 , as incorporated by Section 12 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act 19769 , shall be granted for the prosecution of the officials of the appellant and the officers of NOIDA for possibleviolations of the UPIAD Act 1976 and Uttar Pradesh Apartment (Promotion of Construction, Ownership & Maintenance) Act 201010; and (iv)Refund by the appellant of amounts invested by purchasers who had booked apartments in T-16 and T-17, with interest at fourteen per cent, compounded annually.The correctness of these directions is challenged before this Court in the present appeals.

1

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No. 5041 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 11959 of 2014)

Supertech Limited ...Appellant

Versus

Emerald Court Owner Resident

Welfare Association & Ors. ...Respondents

With

Civil Appeal No. 5042 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 14314 of 2014)

With

Civil Appeal No. 5043 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12470 of 2014)

With

Civil Appeal No. 5044 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 14262 of 2014)

With

Civil Appeal No. 5045 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 21035 of 2014)

With

Civil Appeal No. 5046 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 31117 of 2014)

With

Civil Appeal No. 5047 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12427 of 2015)

2

With

Civil Appeal No. 5048 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12947 of 2015)

With

Civil Appeal No. 5049 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12948 of 2015)

With

Civil Appeal No. 5050 of 2021

Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12191 of 2021

(Diary No. 28571 of 2018)

With

Contempt Petition (C) No. 380 of 2021

In

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 14314 of 2014

With

Contempt Petition (C) No. 381 of 2021

In

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 14314 of 2014

With

Contempt Petition (C) No. 382 of 2021

In

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 14314 of 2014

With

Contempt Petition (C) No. 383 of 2021

In

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 14314 of 2014

And With

Contempt Petition (C) No. 384 of 2021

In

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 14314 of 2014 

3

J U D G M E N T

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

INDEX

A Factual and procedural history

A.1 The appeals

A.2 The Emerald Court project

A.3 First Revised Plan

A.4 Second Revised Plan

A.5 Third Revised Plan

A.6 Complaints against the Revised Plans

A.7 Proceedings before the Allahabad High Court

A.8 Proceedings before this Court

B Submissions by Counsel

C Prefatory observations

D Violation of distance requirement under Building Regulations

D.1 Violation of NBR 2006 and 2010

D.1.1 Interpretation of “building blocks”

D.1.2 Interpretation of “dead end sides of buildings”

4

D.2 Violation of NBC 2005

D.3 Violation of Fire Safety Norms

E Consent of the RWA

E.1 Applicability of UP 1975 Act

E.2 Applicability of the UP Apartments Act 2010

E.3 Requirement of RWA’s Consent

F Collusion and Illegal Construction

G Conclusion

H Interlocutory Applications

PART A

5

1 Leave granted.

A Factual and procedural history

A.1 The appeals

2 These appeals have arisen from a judgment of a Division Bench of the High

Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 11 April 2014, upon a writ petition1 instituted

by the first respondent, the Residents’ Welfare Association2 of Emerald Court Group

Housing Society3

.

3 By its judgment, the High Court directed:

(i) The demolition of Towers -164 and 175 by the third respondent, New Okhla

Industrial Development Authority6

, in Emerald Court situated on Plot No 4,

Sector 93A, NOIDA constructed by the appellant, Supertech Limited7

;

(ii) The cost of demolition and removal would be borne by the appellant, failing

which NOIDA shall recover it as arrears of land revenue;

(iii)Sanction for prosecution under Section 49 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban

Development Act 19738

, as incorporated by Section 12 of the Uttar Pradesh

Industrial Area Development Act 19769

, shall be granted for the prosecution

of the officials of the appellant and the officers of NOIDA for possible

 1 Writ Petition (Civil) No 65085 of 2012 2 “RWA” 3 “Emerald Court” 4 “T-16”/“Ceyane” 5 “T-17”/“Apex” 6 “NOIDA” 7 “Supertech” 8 “UPUD Act 1973” 9 “UPIAD Act 1976”

PART A

6

violations of the UPIAD Act 1976 and Uttar Pradesh Apartment (Promotion of

Construction, Ownership & Maintenance) Act 201010; and

(iv)Refund by the appellant of amounts invested by purchasers who had booked

apartments in T-16 and T-17, with interest at fourteen per cent, compounded

annually.

4 The correctness of these directions is challenged before this Court in the

present appeals.

A.2 The Emerald Court project

5 On 23 November 2004, NOIDA allotted to the appellant a plot of land

admeasuring 48,263 sq. mtrs., which was a part of Plot No 4 situated in Sector 93A.

This plot of land was allotted for the development of a group housing society, by the

name of Emerald Court.

6 The first deed of lease was executed on 16 March 2005 between the

appellant and NOIDA. A possession certificate was issued on 17 March 2005.

7 On 20 June 2005, NOIDA sanctioned the building plan for the construction of

Emerald Court consisting of fourteen towers, each with ground and nine floors

(G+9). This sanction was granted under the New Okhla Industrial Development Area

 10 “UP Apartments Act 2010”

PART A

7

Building Regulations and Directions 198611. The construction commenced for these

fourteen towers.

A.3 First Revised Plan

8 On 21 June 2006, a supplementary lease deed was executed by NOIDA in

favour of the appellant for an additional land area of 6556.51 sq. mtrs. in the same

plot of land in Plot No 4. Adding to the existing holding allotted under the first lease

deed, the total leased area allotted to the appellant increased to 54,819.51 sq. mtrs.

The supplementary lease deed noted that:

(i) The demised premises shall be deemed to be part of Plot No 4, Sector 93A,

NOIDA as already leased to the appellant;

(ii) All other conditions of the original lease deed and allotment shall remain

unchanged and would be applicable to the newly demised premises, and bind

the appellant;

(iii)The period of lease shall commence from 16 March 2005; and

(iv)The total area of Plot No 4, Sector 93A, NOIDA is 54,819.51 sq. mtrs.

The possession certificate in respect of the additional land was issued to the

appellant on 23 June 2006.

9 On 5 December 2006, the New Okhla Industrial Development Area Building

Regulations and Directions 200612 were notified. Under the NBR 2006, the Floor-

 11 “NBR 1986” 12 “NBR 2006”

PART A

8

Area-Ratio13 was increased from 1.5 to 2 for new allottees after 2006. Regulation

33.2.3(i) provided as follows:

“33. 'Floor area ratio' Floor Area Ratio. Ground coverage and

height limitations.

[…]

33.2.3 Any other utilities as decided by Chief Executive

Officer depending on its requirement.

i. Distance between two adjacent building blocks shall not be

less than half of the height of the tallest building.”

10 On 29 December 2006, NOIDA sanctioned the first revised plan for Emerald

Court under the NBR 2006, by which two additional floors were envisaged in

addition to the already sanctioned G+9 floors in the original fourteen towers, thereby

bringing all of them to ground and eleven floors (G+11). Furthermore, additional

buildings were also sanctioned, namely: (i) Tower-15 (comprising of ground and

eleven floors (G+11)); (ii) T-16 (comprising of a cluster of wings including 1 wing of

ground and eleven floors (G+11) and 3 wings of ground and four floors (G+4)); and

(iii) a shopping complex (comprising of ground and first floor (G+1)). As a

consequence, under the first revised plan, NOIDA permitted a total of sixteen towers

(G+11) (which would each be 37 mtrs. in height) and one shopping complex (G+1).

It is important to note that the appellant was able to have this additional construction

due to the area that was made available to it under the supplementary lease deed,

and further, when the appellant had allotted flats to the purchasers, only a small

 13 “FAR”

PART A

9

building on the additional leased area was sanctioned. Pertinently, it is also

necessary to highlight that the first revised plan contemplated a green area in front

of Tower- 114. According to the purchasers, when the flats were sold, the brochure of

the appellant contained information in accordance with the first revised plan dated

29 December 2006, which shows the area in front of T-1 as a green area.

11 On 10 April 2008, a completion certificate was granted in relation to the first

eight towers (G+11). Thereafter, various owners of flats were granted possession by

the appellant. Crucially, the completion map also indicated a green area in front of T1, where currently T-16 and T-17 are being constructed.

A.4 Second Revised Plan

12 On 28 February 2009, a notification was issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh

enhancing the FAR from 2 (as provided under the NBR 2006) to 2.75 for new

allottees. Further, the notification also provided for “purchasable FAR”, according to

which old allottees (such as the appellant) could purchase FAR to the maximum

extent of thirty-three per cent of their base existing FAR of 1.5.

13 On 3 July 2009, NOIDA decided that the stipulation to purchase thirty-three

per cent FAR of the existing base FAR for old allotees under the notification dated

28 February 2009, should be brought at par with other allotees. As a consequence,

the purchasable FAR for old allotees would be enhanced to 2.75. However, the

notification by the State of Uttar Pradesh in this regard was still awaited. The

 14 “T-1”/ “Aster 2”

PART A

10

appellant states that, in any case, based on the decision of NOIDA, it planned the

construction of T-16 and T-17 in a way that catered to the additional FAR which may

be available for purchase at a later date.

14 On 19 November 2009, relying on the notification dated 28 February 2009,

the appellant purchased thirty-three per cent of its existing base 1.5 FAR at the cost

of Rs eight crores, increasing its available FAR to 1.995.

15 However, it appears from the record that the appellant had already started

construction of the disputed towers – Apex and Ceyane – prior to the grant of this

sanction by NOIDA. On 16 July 2009, the appellant informed the flat owners that:

“1. That we have bought two separate plots measuring

approximately 48000 square meter and 6500 square meter

and got them registered separately in March 2005 & May

2006 respectively.

2. That the new towers which are being constructed will have

altogether separate entry, exit, swimming pool, club & basic

infrastructure. We will also construct boundary wall separating

two structure i.e. existing 15 towers & Apex Ceyane.”

16 The above communication of the appellant indicates that:

(i) The construction of T-16 and T-17 had already commenced on 16 July 2009;

(ii) According to the appellant, these new towers would have separate entry-exit,

amenities and infrastructure; and

(iii)The new towers would be separated from the existing fifteen towers by the

construction of a boundary wall. 

PART A

11

The appellant represented to the flat-owners that a revised building plan for

replacing the existing T-16 (G+11) and the shopping complex (G+1) was sanctioned,

with twin towers T-16 and T-17, each of G+24 floors and a height of 73 mtrs.,

replacing them.

17 On 11 September 2009, the Chief Fire Officer of Gautam Budh Nagar15, the

fourth respondent, issued a report to the In-charge (Building Cell) NOIDA, Sector 6

for the grant of the provisional Non-Objection Certificate16 for T-16 and T-17. The

provisional Fire NOC was made subject to compliance with the requirements of the

National Building Code, 200517.

18 On 16 September 2009, a completion certification was granted in relation to

another six towers (G+11). The completion map accompanying this certificate again

showed the green area in front of T-1, where presently T-16 and T-17 are being

constructed.

19 On 26 November 2009, NOIDA sanctioned the second revised plan for

Emerald Court under the NBR 2006. In this plan, the earlier T-16 (G+11) was

replaced with a T-16 consisting of ground and twenty-four floors (G+24). Similarly,

the shopping complex (G+1) was replaced with T-17 consisting of ground and

twenty-four floors (G+24). T-16 and T-17 would each be of a height of 73 mtrs.

According to the plan, T-17 was to be at a distance of 9 mtrs. from T-1, and there

 15 “CFO” 16 “NOC” 17 “NBC 2005”

PART A

12

was a provision for their connection through a space-frame at the upper level. This

plan was sanctioned by NOIDA on the basis of the appellant having purchased

thirty-three per cent of the purchasable FAR (27,135.657 sq. mtrs.), in addition to the

permissible 1.5 FAR (82,229.265 sq. mtrs.), totalling to 1.995 FAR (1,09,364.922 sq.

mtrs.). The second revised plan expressly provided for the following, among other

conditions:

“2. Due to this sanction of the building plan, the right and

ownership of any government authority like (municipality,

NOIDA) any other person will not get affected.

[…]

8. A set of sanctioned building plan shall be kept at the

construction site so that it can be checked at the site at

any time and the construction work shall be done as per

the sanctioned building plans specifications as per the

rules of Noida Building Rules. The allottee shall start the

construction work of the ground floor only after getting the

inspection of the basement done upon completion of the work

of basement from building section department, Noida.

Otherwise sanctioned map deemed to be cancelled.”

(emphasis supplied)

A.5 Third Revised Plan

20 On 20 February 2010, a notification was issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh

enabling old allotees to purchase FAR of up to 2.75 and, as a consequence, the limit

of a maximum purchasable FAR of thirty-three per cent of the existing base FAR

was removed. The notification contemplated that “the purchasable FAR shall be 

PART A

13

allowed up to the maximum limit of applicable FAR”. The notification also amended

the NBR 2006, which expressly provided that:

“Purchasable FAR is an enabling provision. It shall not be

allowed to any allottee as a matter of right.”

21 On 19 March 2010, the UP Apartments Act 2010 came into force. Section

4(4) and Section 5 of this Act provide for the consent of the owners of flats before

any change in the sanctioned plans is effected and also envisage that the

percentage of undivided common interest of the owners of the flats cannot be

changed without their consent.

22 On 30 November 2010, the New Okhla Industrial Development Area Building

Regulations 201018 came into force. Regulation 24.2.1.(6) contains the following

stipulations:

“(6). Distance between two adjacent building blocks

Distance between two adjacent building blocks shall be

minimum 6 mtrs. to 16 mtrs, depending on the height of

blocks. For building height up to 18 mts., the spacing shall be

increased by 1 metre for every addition of 3 mtrs. as per

National Building Code 2005. If the blocks have dead-end

sides facing each other, than the spacing shall be maximum 9

mtrs. instead of 16 mtrs. Moreover, the allottee may provide

or propose more than 16 mtrs space between two blocks.”

 18 “NBR 2010”

PART A

14

23 On 18 August 2011, the CFO granted a temporary NOC in respect of T-16

and T-17, for a height of 121.5 mtrs. with proposed ground and thirty-eight floors

(G+38). It was noted that once the buildings were constructed and proper fire safety

equipment was installed, they would be inspected in order to assess whether a

permanent NOC should be granted.

24 On 25 October 2011, in view of the notification dated 20 February 2010, the

appellant purchased an additional FAR at a cost of Rs 15 crores, so as to enhance

the available FAR from 1.995 to 2.75 (1,50,753.652 sq. mtrs.). On the same date,

NOIDA issued a letter to the appellant in relation to the purchase of the FAR,

imposing several requirements, including compliance with the provisions of the UP

Apartments Act 2010.

25 On 2 March 2012, the third revised plan was sanctioned by NOIDA for

Emerald Court. Through this sanction, the height of T-16 and T-17 was permitted to

be raised from 24 floors to 40 floors (i.e., G+40), resulting in the building’s height

being 121 mtrs. Further, T-16 and T-17 would also consist, inter alia, of two

basements and open space for parking beneath the towers. The third revised plan

also contained a requirement of compliance with the UP Apartments Act 2010, along

with similar requirements which were present in the second revised plan.

A.6 Complaints against the Revised Plans

26 On 9 March 2012, the appellant addressed a communication to the first

respondent intimating that the flat purchasers of T-16 and T-17, which were under 

PART A

15

construction, would have altogether separate entry-exit, amenities and

infrastructure.

27 On 29 March 2012, the office of the CFO, on the basis of a complaint by the

first respondent, issued a notice to the appellant in regard to certain deficiencies and

violations in complying with fire safety requirements.

28 On 24 April 2012, the CFO, on the basis of another complaint by the first

respondent, addressed a communication to NOIDA in regards the violation of the

minimum distance between T-1 and T-17. The letter, inter alia, states:

“When record was perused in respect of the above, it was

found that:

[…]

2. There should be a minimum distance of half of the height of

building in between two building blocks as per Clause No.

33.2.3. of Building Construction Regulations, 2006 and there

should be a distance of 16 meters in between the buildings

whose height is more than 50 meters as per Noida

Regulations, 2010.

3. There should be a distance of 16 meter in between two

buildings situated side by side as per National building Code

of India – 2005.

Therefore, you are requested that in the light of above kindly

inform that license was granted for construction of building

after providing relaxation to the building in question in Special

Category or construction is being carried out by the

concerned is contrary to the standards.”

29 On 3 May 2012 and 22 May 2012, the first respondent filed an RTI application

with NOIDA for obtaining the sanctioned plans in relation to Plot No 4 of Sector 93A.

Though under the terms of the sanctioned plans the appellant was required to 

PART A

16

display the sanctioned map at its site, NOIDA still wrote to the appellant to verify

whether the sanctioned plans and maps could be made available to the first

respondent. The appellant in response refused to grant its consent to release

sanctioned plans and maps to the first respondent. Hence, NOIDA refused to

provide the sanctioned plans to the first respondent.

30 On 19 June 2012, a show cause notice was issued by NOIDA to the appellant

stating that: (i) the construction was not in accordance with the third revised plan

since, inter alia, T-1 and T-16/17 were not joined by a space frame; and (ii) a copy of

the plan had not been exhibited at the site office. The appellant replied to the show

cause notice on 26 June 2012 stating that T-16 and T-17 were still under

construction and the space frame would be built at the time of construction.

31 On 26 June 2012, NOIDA issued a completion certificate to the appellant in

respect of Tower-15 (G+11).

32 On 28 June 2012, the first respondent addressed a communication to NOIDA

complaining of violations and misrepresentations made to the owners by the

appellant, and sought cancellation of the layout plan of the two new towers, T-16

and T-17. The first respondent followed up its earlier communication with letters

dated 9 and 29 August 2012 demanding information, and intimating that the

construction was being carried out by the appellant in violation of the norms.

PART A

17

A.7 Proceedings before the Allahabad High Court

33 On 10 December 2012, the first respondent filed a writ petition under Article

226 of the Constitution before the High Court seeking inter alia the following reliefs:

“i. Issue a writ, order or direction quashing the revised plan

approved by respondent 2 for construction of new towers

namely Tower 'APEX' and 'CEYANE' in plot no. 4, Sector 93-

A, and issue further directions for demolishing of aforesaid

towers, the approval and construction being in complete

violation of provisions of U.P. Apartments Act of 2010.

ii. Issue a writ, order or direction directing the Respondent 2

not to sanction amendments to any further building plans in

respect of the Group Housing Society being developed by

respondent 5 without obtaining consent of all the residents.

iii. Issue a writ, order or direction quashing the permission

granted to respondent 5 to link Tower T-1 and T 'APEX' /

'CEYANCE' through space frame.

iv. Issue a writ, order or direction directing respondents 2 and

3 to ensure that fire safety equipment and infrastructure is

installed at the expenses of respondent 5 within a specified

period.

v. Issue a writ, order or direction directing respondent 2 to

demolish illegal construction made in the basement and

setback area as per notice dated 19.06.2012 and 17.07.2012.

vi. Issue a writ or direction directing respondent no. 2and 5 to

provide car parking spaces (both aboveground and in the

basement) as per the provisions of the NBC 2005 to all the

legal allottees/residents of Supertech Emerald Court

Complex, plot 4, Section 93-A NOIDA.”

34 The first respondent only pressed reliefs i and iii, seeking a direction to quash

the revised plan which approved the construction of T-16 and T-17, and to demolish

them. The first respondent also sought the quashing of the permission granted to

link T-1 and T-16/T-17 though a space frame. During the pendency of the writ 

PART A

18

proceedings, in pursuance of a specific order of the High Court, the RWA was

provided with the sanctioned maps together with related information and documents

in respect of the construction at the site. Pleadings were subsequently exchanged

between the parties.

35 The appellant filed a counter affidavit on 27 January 2013 submitting that:

(i) The first respondent is not recognised by the appellant under the UP

Apartments Act 2010;

(ii) The first respondent should have first approached the Chief Executive Officer

of NOIDA, who is the competent authority under the UP Apartments Act 2010,

and then the State Government, before approaching the High Court under the

writ jurisdiction;

(iii)Construction of T-16 and T-17 was approved on 26 November 2009, but the

writ petition had been filed after three years in December 2012, when the

building is in an advanced stage of construction. Hence, the writ petition is

barred by delay and laches; and

(iv)T-16 and T-17 were sanctioned in 2009 under the NBR 2006. The final

sanction given on 2 March 2012 only increased the height of the towers from

twenty-four floors to forty floors, after the appellant purchased the additional

FAR. Under the NBR 2006, there is no provision with regard to the minimum

distance between two “building blocks”. Since the NBR 2006 did not

incorporate the NBC 2005, the mandatory requirement of 16 mtrs. between

two building blocks for buildings higher than 55 mtrs. need not be followed. 

PART A

19

The distance requirement between two building blocks was only mandated by

NBR 2010, which is not applicable since the initial sanction for T-16 and T-17

was given under NBR 2006.

36 NOIDA in its counter affidavit dated 7 February 2013 stated that:

(i) It allotted the plot to the appellant by complying with the NBR 2010. The

sanction was also given with the specific condition that the UP Apartments

Act 2010 must be complied with;

(ii) Plot No 4 is not divided into two projects. It is unified and belongs to a single

project; and

(iii) The permission for the construction of a space frame connecting T-1 with T16/T-17 was granted only after the design was approved by IIT Roorkee.

37 The High Court allowed the writ petition on 11 April 2014 and directed the

demolition of T-16 and T-17, with the expenses of the demolition being borne by the

appellant. It further directed the Competent Authority to grant sanction for the

prosecution of NOIDA’s officials as required under the UPUD Act 1973, within a

period of three months. The High Court also directed the appellant to refund the

consideration received from flat purchasers who had booked apartments in T-16 and

T-17, with fourteen per cent interest compounded annually. While allowing the writ

petition, the High Court made the following observations:

(i) The first respondent had the locus to institute proceedings under Article 226

of the Constitution. The flats were handed over to the purchasers by 

PART A

20

September 2009. The RWA was formed and registered with the Registrar of

Societies in the same year. The Model Bye-Laws under the UP Apartments

Act 2010 were notified by the Government on 16 November 2011. However,

the Deputy Registrar Firms, Societies and Chits, Meerut, Uttar Pradesh

issued a letter on 14 December 2012 stating that pending instructions from

the Registrar, no decision could be taken in respect of the Model Bye-Laws

and registration. The Registrar by a circular dated 5 December 2013 issued

instructions for registration of the first respondent under the UP Apartments

Act 2010. On 20 October 2013, the first respondent by its resolution adopted

the Model Bye-Laws and conducted its elections. Further, in any case, the

appellant had recognized the first respondent since its inception and had

corresponded with it continuously. The appellant had never raised objections

on its competence to represent the flat purchasers. The grant of sanction by

NOIDA in violation of the relevant building regulations affects the rights of

every apartment owner, who is represented through the first respondent.

Hence, the first respondent is a ‘person aggrieved’ and was entitled to initiate

the writ proceedings;

(ii) The first respondent under Article 226 was not barred by the available remedy

of approaching either the CFO, NOIDA under the UP Apartments Act 2010 or

the State under Section 27 of the UPIAD Act 1976. Though the first

respondent raised its grievance before NOIDA, no notices were issued and

there was no follow up. Only if NOIDA had issued an order, could the first

respondent have approached the State Government under Section 27 of the 

PART A

21

UPIAD Act 1976. Thus, there was no other alternative remedy that was

available to first respondent but to initiate writ proceedings;

(iii) The appellant must have submitted a declaration in the office of the

competent authority with regard to the construction of the building under the

UP Apartments Act 2010. Rule 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Apartment (Promotion

of Construction, Ownership and Maintenance) Rules 2011 states that when

the competent authority receives an application for amendment of the

declaration, it shall issue a written notice to the association of the building

owners and an order shall be passed by the competent authority only after the

association is given the opportunity of being heard. Since no such notice was

given to the association, it is an ‘aggrieved person’ and thus has the locus to

initiate writ proceedings;

(iv) The original building plan was sanctioned when NBR 2006 was in force.

However, the approval for purchase of additional FAR was made in 2011. It is

a settled principle of law that the rules and regulations applicable on the date

of the sanction would determine the rights of the parties. The sanction given

on 2 March 2012 further imposed a condition of applicability of the UP

Apartments Act 2010. Therefore, both the NBR 2010 (and NBC 2005, since

NBR 2010 makes it applicable) and the UP Apartments Act 2010 shall be

applicable;

(v) The contention of appellant that the project was in two phases is not borne

out from the record since NOIDA has permitted the purchase of additional

FAR and granted the subsequent sanction treating the project as a single 

PART A

22

project. The plans submitted and sanctioned were for a single project, and an

attempt has been made by the appellant to mislead the court;

(vi) Regulation 24.2.1(6) of the NBR 2010 states that for buildings up to the height

of 18 mtrs., the spacing between two adjacent building blocks shall be 6 mtrs.

and the spacing shall be increased by 1 mtr. for every 3 mtrs. above 18 mtrs.,

but subject to a maximum distance of 16 mtrs. Para 8.2.3.1 of the NBC 2005

states that for buildings higher than 55 mtrs., 16 mtrs. open space must be left

in the sides and rear.. Since the height of T-17 is 121 mtrs., the distance

between the building blocks must at least be 16 mtrs. However, the distance

is only 9 mtrs. and is deficient by 7 mtrs.;

(vii) The appellant, in collusion with NOIDA, obtained sanctions for the layout map

in violation of the mandatory requirement for space to be maintained between

building blocks and clear space;

(viii) The provisions of the UP Fire Prevention and Fire Safety Act 200519 were

required to be complied with, according to which the minimum distance of 7.5

mtrs. between building blocks and a clear space must be provided, which has

been violated in the third revised plan of 2012;

(ix) The submission of the appellant that the expression ‘building blocks’ having

not been defined in the NBR 2010, would mean the entire set of buildings on

Plot No 4 is contrary to the NBR 2006 and NBR 2010. The sanctioned plans

show that the appellant got the layout approved, consisting of separate

 19 “Fire Safety Act”

PART A

23

blocks. The nomenclature of the blocks was subsequently changed in each

successive plan, and finally the buildings were numbered as T-1 to T-17. The

sanctioned plans clearly show that T-1 and T-16/17 are separate building

blocks; and

(x) The plan sanctioned by NOIDA was contrary to: (a) the building regulations;

(b) the mandatory distance between building blocks; and (c) the movement

space required, as a result of which the rights of the apartment owners and

the safety of their apartment blocks have been seriously affected.

A.8 Proceedings before this Court

38 The appellant filed a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the

Constitution on 28 April 2014 assailing the judgment of the High Court. On 5 May

2014, this Court directed the maintenance of status quo in respect of T-16 and T-17,

directing that neither the builder nor the purchaser shall alienate the property or

create third party rights. During the course of the hearings on 19 July 2016 and 27

July 2016, the appellant and NOIDA submitted that the Court may have the view of

an expert agency on the issue and engage an expert for this purpose. On the

submission of the Additional Solicitor General, the National Buildings Construction

Corporation Limited20, a government owned enterprise, was appointed to examine

various facts in relation to the dispute, particularly those having a bearing on

whether the two towers (T-1 and T-17) have dead-end sides facing each other. By

its report dated 13 October 2016, the NBCC concluded that the two towers are not

 20 “NBCC” 

PART A

24

compliant with Regulation 24.2.1.6 of the NBR 2010. Apart from the report which

has been submitted by the NBCC, the first respondent had commissioned IIT Delhi

and IIT Roorkee to report on the disputed issue of ‘dead ends’. Reports by them

have been placed on the record.

39 By its interim orders dated 6 September 2016 and 11 January 2017, this

Court directed that a group of applicants be given ten per cent per month towards

return of investment21. On 22 September 2017, this Court directed Mr Gaurav

Agarwal, Amicus Curiae, to create a portal link to coordinate with the appellant and

the flat purchasers on issues relating to refund. Further, this Court directed that the

principal amount along with interest of fourteen per cent shall be provided to the flat

purchasers who have opted not to wait for the decision of this Court in the present

Special Leave Petition.

40 By an order dated 30 July 2018, this Court with the assistance of the Amicus

Curiae classified the home buyers into the following groups, based on the refund

option chosen by them:

(i) Refund of principal amount along with twelve per cent simple interest per

annum (one hundred and one home buyers);

(ii) Home buyers who still insist on getting interest at the rate of fourteen per cent

(twenty-four home buyers) - since a substantial number of home purchasers

 21 “ROI”

PART B

25

have agreed to twelve per cent interest, these twenty-four purchasers were

also directed to accept the twelve per cent interest rate;

(iii) Home buyers through the Subvention Scheme – in such cases, the EMIs shall

be paid by the appellant until the possession is handed over; and

(iv) Disputed cases - Mr Sanjeev Agrawal and Ms Rashmi Arora have paid Rs

38,51,009 and Rs 17,43,162 respectively by cheque. The said amount shall

be refunded with a simple interest at twelve per cent per annum.

B Submissions by Counsel

41 Mr Vikas Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant

urged the following submissions:

(i) The sanction and construction of T-16 and T-17 is not violative of the distance

rule under NBR 2010:

a. NBR 2010 does not apply to T-16 and T-17, since they were first

sanctioned in the second revised plan issued under the NBR 2006. Under

the NBR 2006, the distance provision in Regulation 33.2.3(i) was not

mandatory and it was open to the CEO to stipulate the distance

requirement depending upon the exigencies of a lay out plan. In any case,

the Regulation applies to the distance between two building blocks and

does not govern the distance between the T-1 and T-17, which form a part

of the same block. Further, if this provision was mandatorily applied, then it

would also affect the first revised plan, in which the heights of the fifteen 

PART B

26

other towers is 37.5 mtrs. while the distance with the adjacent blocks was

less than half the height, i.e., less than 18.75 mtrs.;

b. Even if NBR 2010 was to apply, T-16 and T-17 are part of the same

building block consisting of T-1, Tower-2, Tower-3 and T-17, which is

connected by a space frame to T-1. Hence, Regulation 24.1.2(6) of the

NBR 2010, which provides for a distance to be maintained between

“adjacent building blocks” (“Bhawan Samuh”/cluster of buildings), is not

applicable in respect of the distance between T-17 and T-1;

c. The concept of a building block has been explained in a note submitted by

NOIDA to the High Court. While using the FAR, the only requirement is to

maintain a certain percentage as an open/green area. Instead of scattering

the buildings over the total project area, group housing projects can

envisage adjacent towers or even a block of towers so as to ensure a

large open green space rather than scattered small spaces all over the

project;

d. In the alternative, even if the they are not part of the same building block,

T-17 being a “tower like structure”, para 8.2.3.2 of the NBC 2005 is

attracted in terms of Regulation 24.2.1(6). In accordance with para 8.2.3.2,

the minimum distance for buildings of a height of less than 37.5 mtrs. is 9

mtrs., while for buildings of a greater height, it is 12 mtrs. Further, in

accordance with para 8.2.3.2(d), the deficiency of this distance at the

ground level can be made good at the upper levels. Hence, maintaining a 

PART B

27

minimum distance of 16 mtrs. between “tower like structures” is not an

inviolable requirement;

e. In the present case, the minimum distance between T-1 and T-17 varies

from 9.88 mtrs (at the ground level) to 25.75 mtrs (at the upper level),

since the total height of T-1 is 27.61 mtrs. while that of T-17 is 84.5 mtrs.

As such, it is in compliance with NBC 2005; and

f. The Model Bye-Laws 2016 issued by the Ministry of Urban Development,

Government of India prescribe a 9 mtrs. space around any building

irrespective of the height beyond 40 mtrs.;

(ii) The sanction to construct T-16 and T-17 is not violative of the UP Apartments

Act 2010:

a. T-16 and T-17 were sanctioned on 26 November 2009, and hence the

requirement of prior consent did not arise, since the Act was not in force

then;

b. The flat owners of T-1 to T-15 who already had possession of their flats

would not be “intended purchasers” under the proviso to Section 4(4) of

UP Apartments Act 2010, and their consent was not required for the

construction of additional floors in T-16 and T-17;

c. The consent of all flat owners would be impractical, and at best the

consent of the RWA would suffice. On 2 March 2012, when the third

revised plan was sanctioned, the RWA was not functional and it was only 

PART B

28

on 20 October 2013 that the RWA adopted the Model Bye-Laws under the

UP Apartments Act 2010;

d. There has been no violation of the common area facilities of the flat

owners of T-1 to T-15 by the creation of T-16 and T-17, since they have

been planned with separate entries and exit facilities together with

infrastructure; and

e. A majority of the flat owners of T-1 to T-15 was fully aware of the sanction

to construct T-16 and T-17 since: (i) 245 flats were booked till the first

revised plan in 2006; (ii) between 2006 and until the second revised plan

in 2009, 141 flats were booked; (iii) after the second revised plan and until

the third revised plan in 2012, 114 flats were booked; and (iv) after the

third revised plan in 2012 till 2 August 2021, 159 flats have been

purchased;

(iii) There has been no violation of fire safety norms:

a. A provisional Fire NOC was received on 11 September 2009, prior to the

sanction on 26 November 2009. The fire department thereafter granted

another temporary NOC for T-16 and T-17 on 18 August 2012, prior to the

sanction dated 2 March 2012; and

b. Under NBR 1986 and NBR 2006, buildings were required to be compliant

with fire safety norms prescribed in Part-IV of the NBC 2005. Para 4.6(b)

of the NBC 2005 provides that for high rise buildings, open spaces on all

sides up to a width of 6 mtrs. shall be available for free movement of fire 

PART B

29

tenders. In the present case, there is a clear space of 9 mtrs. between T-1

and T-17, which allows a free movement of fire tenders;

(iv) The Uttar Pradesh Ownership of Flats Act 197522 is not applicable:

a. Under Section 2, the Act applies only to properties, the owners of which

submit to the provisions of the Act by executing a declaration. As such, the

Act does not automatically apply to all properties and none of the flat

owners have made executed any such declaration presently;

b. Clause II(h) of the lease deed dated 26 March 2005 deals with

maintenance, and cannot be construed to incorporate the application of

the UP 1975 Act; and

c. If the contention of the first respondent is accepted, the changes made by

the first revised plan in T-1 to T-15, involving an increase in the height of

all towers from nine to eleven floors, would also to be illegal;

(v) There is no green area violation in the sanctioning of T-16 and T-17:

a. A triangular green space in the first revised plan was planned for the newly

proposed T-16 (G+11) and shopping complex (G+1). This area was over

and above the mandatory green area (soft landscape) required to be

maintained on the plots under the NBR 2006;

b. The central green area was sanctioned in the original plan of 2005. The

required green area under Regulation 38 of the NBR 2006 was twenty-five

per cent of the open area, which would be 11,538,02 sq. mtrs. whereas

 22 “UP 1975 Act”

PART B

30

the appellant had provided a green area of 12,064.91 sq. mtrs. in the form

of a central park;

c. T-1 was not sold on the promise of a green space area in front of it and

none of the buyers were charged preferential location charges; and

d. Only eleven flats in T-1, out of a total of 44, were booked after the

sanctioning of first revised plan and before the second revised plan. Out of

these eleven, only seven flats were facing towards T-17. Even in these

seven, there were no windows/balconies facing T-17, but only small

bathroom windows;

(vi) The sanction of T-16 and T-17 is based on a valid certificate as regards the

structural design of the towers;

(vii) The appellant has not collected the entire lease rent payable to NOIDA only

from the flat owners of T-1 to T-15. It has only collected around Rs 7.5 crores,

while it itself has paid around Rs 14 crores; and

(viii) The order for demolition of T-16 and T-17 is liable to be set aside on ground

of equity:

a. The construction was carried out with the sanction of the authorities;

b. 600 persons had purchased flats in these towers;

c. Construction began in December of 2009, and third-party rights in favour

of the purchasers have been crystalized;

d. The petition was filed before the High Court in December 2012; and

PART B

31

e. 28 floors in T-17 and 26 floors in T-16 were constructed as on 20

December 2013 when arguments were concluded before the High Court,

and by the time that the judgment was delivered, 32 floors had been

constructed.

Hence, the order of demolition would be harsh and inequitable.

42 Supplementing the submissions of Mr Vikas Singh, Mr Ravindra Kumar,

learned Counsel appearing on behalf of NOIDA, made the following submissions:

(i) Para 8.2.3.2 of NBC 2005 provides that for buildings of heights between 24

mtrs. to 37.5 mtrs. with one setback, the open space at the ground level shall

not be less than 9 mtrs. Since the height of the existing tower Aster-2 (T-1) is

less than 37.5 mtrs., the minimum space required between this tower and T17 is only 9 mtrs. Further, the deficiency of open space can be made good

through set-backs at the upper level. However, since the height of T-1 is not

proposed to be increased and the tower is open from all three sides, this

requirement need not be fulfilled;

(ii) The various NOIDA Building Regulations have not been violated as they do

not prescribe the minimum distance between two towers. It only refers to the

distance between ‘building blocks’, with reference to the NBC 2005;

(iii) If building blocks have dead end sides facing each other, then the space

between two building blocks shall be a maximum of 9 mtrs. as per the NBR

2010. Similar provisions are found in other building bye-laws such as Delhi 

PART B

32

Building Bye Laws, Bhubaneshwar Development Authority Building Byelaws,

and Model Building Byelaws prepared by the Ministry of Urban Development;

(iv) The Fire Safety Act has also been adhered to, as it requires a minimum

distance of 6 mtrs. between two towers to provide space for movement of fire

tenders;

(v) The construction of the buildings was not stayed by the High Court, which has

now jeopardized the rights of third-parties, who will now be aggrieved by the

order of demolition;

(vi) At the time of sanction of the second revised plan dated 26 November 2009,

the UP Apartments Act 2010 had not been enacted. With respect to grant of

sanction to the third revised plan, the power to sanction the plans or revisions

vests with NOIDA and is not curtailed by the UP Apartments Act 2010;

(vii) UP Apartments Act 2010 does not mandate the taking of any consent or NOC

from the RWA prior to sanction of plans. In spite of this, an obligation was

placed on the appellant to abide by the provisions of UP Apartments Act

2010, while sanctioning the third revised plan dated 2 March 2012;

(viii) While sanctioning the third revised plan, there was no change in the ground

coverage area of T-16 and T-17 and only their proposed heights were

increased; and

(ix) There is no factual foundation to conclude that there had been any collusion

between the appellant and NOIDA.

PART B

33

43 Mr Jayant Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of RWA

urged that the members of the RWA purchased their flats after being shown a layout

which included a limited number of flats and gardens, including a garden in front of

T-1. Many of the allottees are retired persons who have suffered as a result of the

unilateral changes made by the appellant, which resulted in an increase in the

number of flats from 689 to 1573. The garden area in front of T-1 has been

completely removed and instead of a complex of 11 storeyed buildings, two long and

tall structures have been sanctioned without the consent of the existing allottees

obliterating their right to light, air, view and garden area, thereby endangering their

safety. Mr Bhushan submitted that:

(i) The sanctions of 2009 and 2012 are in violation of the minimum distance

criteria required to be maintained between two buildings. Under Regulation

32.3.1(i) of the NBR 2006, the distance required is half the height of the tallest

building. The tallest building, T-17, under the second revised plan of 2009 is

73 mtrs. and hence, the minimum distance of 36.5 mtrs. was required

between T-1 and T-17. Even the existing T-1 is of 37 mtrs. height and

therefore, even a building smaller than T-1 could come up only at a distance

of at least 18.5 mtrs from T-1;

(ii) Regulation 24.2.1(6) of the NBR 2010 requires a minimum distance of 16

mtrs. between T-1 and T-17, as opposed to 9 mtrs. at the side;

(iii) Under para 8.2.3.1 of NBC 2005, the distance required between buildings

would be 16 mtrs. plus ten per cent of the building length minus 4 mtrs. The 

PART B

34

length of the proposed tower is 84.5 mtrs., and hence the distance required

would be (16 + (10 per cent of 84.5) – 4), which is equal to 20.45 mtrs.;

(iv) The requirement of complying with NBC 2005 is prescribed by NBR 2010 and

the NOC issued by the CFO in 2009. In this regard, on 24 April 2012, the

CFO inquired from NOIDA how the new buildings were sanctioned in violation

of the distance criteria prescribed in NBR 2006 and 2010, and NBC 2005,

which was not responded to by NOIDA;

(v) NBCC, which was appointed by this Court at the request of the appellant, has

stated in its report that the distance requirement has been violated;

(vi) In response to the argument of the appellant that T-1, T-16 and T-17 form part

of one building block, obviating the requirement of minimum distance, it was

submitted that:

a. NBC 2005 refers to the distance between buildings and not building

blocks;

b. The expression “building block” though used in NBR 2006 and 2010, has

not been defined in either of the regulations. The rationale for the distance

between building blocks is to ensure fire safety evacuation, light and

ventilation. It cannot be left to the builder to designate groups of buildings

as one building block since the purpose of maintaining the minimum

distance would be seriously compromised. The expression must take its

colour from NBC 2005 and every building must be a building block; and

c. The reports submitted by the IITs of Delhi and Roorkee specify functional

requirements of distance between buildings including:

PART B

35

i. fire separation to avoid transmission between buildings;

ii. safe escape and rescue during fire;

iii. ventilation; and

iv. daylight access.

These requirements have been severely compromised due to the lack of

the minimum distance between T-1 and T-17;

d. Regulation 24.2.1(6) of NBR 2010 refers to NBC 2005 as the source of the

distance requirement. The interpretation of the phrase ‘building block’ in

NBR 2010 and 2006 must be consistent with NBC 2005;

e. The first revised plan of 2006 shows that each building was intended to be

a separate block;

f. The initial argument of the appellant was that T-1 and T-17 are on

separate plots and were never intended as the same block. Subsequently,

the appellant claimed that they were constructed in separate phases and

were to have separate facilities. Later, it introduced a false and

unapproved map showing T-1, T-2, T-3, T-16 and T-17 as one block;

g. The affidavit of the appellant dated 4 August 2021 before this Court states

that T-16 and T-17 will have separate facilities including entry and exit;

h. T-1, T-16 and the shopping complex as sanctioned in the first revised plan

of 2006 were distanced and were different blocks altogether;

PART B

36

i. The construction of T-1 was completed in April 2008 and possession was

granted to allottees. It was not legally possible to construct T-17 in 2008

since it was first sanctioned only in November 2009;

j. The road between T-1 and T-17 is the main road for the society and leads

into the basement and parking;

k. The basement of T-1 has one level while T-17 has two levels;

l. The foundation of T-1 is made to bear a load of only eleven floors. The

appellant has claimed that though the foundation of T-17 was laid in 2009,

when only twenty-four floors were sanctioned, it was meant to bear a load

of forty floors, which were sanctioned only in 2012;

m. The connection of two building blocks with the space frame would not

make it one building block; and

n. The appellant itself was unconvinced by the building block argument and

raised the ‘dead end’ side issue, which led to the appointment of NBCC by

this Court to verify the facts. After a negative report from NBCC, the

appellant has once again fallen back on the building block argument to

assert that blocks can be defined at the discretion of the developer;

(vii) In response to the submission of the appellant that the buildings are “tower

like structures” under the NBC 2005 and thus, meet the minimum distance

mandated, it was submitted that:

PART B

37

a. Requirements of NBR 2006 and 2010 and NBC 2005 are independent and

hence, the defence of a tower like structure under the NBC 2005 cannot

cure violations of the NBRs;

b. T-17 does not have any set-backs and has the same width throughout;

c. At least 12 mtrs. distance is required at the ground level even for tower like

structures; and

d. The deficiency of the mandated open space of 16 mtrs. under the NBC

2005 in tower-like structures can be cured by set-backs on upper levels.

However, the distance of 12 mtrs. at the ground level is still mandatory;

(viii) Possession of flats in T-1 was given to purchasers in 2008. The second and

third revised plans of 2009 and 2012 respectively proposed a space frame

connecting T-1 and T-17 when the residents had already started living in T-1.

This is illegal and a safety hazard;

(ix) Under the lease, the undivided interest in common areas stood transferred to

the respective allottees. The owners of the existing flats had paid the entire

lease amount and more. While the appellant paid Rs 13 crores as onetime

lease rent, the buyers of existing flats (other than those in T-16 and T-17)

were charged over Rs 16 crores;

(x) Consent of flat owners was required under UP Apartments Act 2010 before

an alteration in the sanctioned plan:

a. Sections 4(4) and Section 5(3) of the UP Apartments Act 2010 requires

the consent of all allottees before a change in the sanctioned

PART B

38

plan/undivided interest in the common area is made. The removal of the

green area reduced the common areas and, with an increase in the flats

from 689 to 1573, the proportionate undivided interest in the common

areas has been reduced substantially;

b. The UP Apartments Act 2010 is applicable irrespective of whether or not a

society is formed. The rights are vested with the apartment owners and not

the association; and

c. Gardens as well as land are included in the definition of common areas

over which all residents have rights;

(xi) Consent of flat owners ought to have been obtained before obtaining an

alteration of the sanctioned plan, under UP 1975 Act:

a. Under Sections 5(2) and 5(3), undivided interest cannot be altered without

the consent of all owners of flats;

b. Clause II(h) of the lease deed stipulates the applicability of the UP 1975

Act. This is not confined only to maintenance. The tripartite sub-lease

between NOIDA, the appellant and the allotees also mandates the

applicability of the UP 1975 Act; and

c. The appellant was responsible to ensure that the declaration under the UP

1975 Act was made. It cannot take advantage of its own wrong in failing to

submit a declaration;

(xii) The appellant and NOIDA have colluded to by-pass the Building Regulations:

PART B

39

a. Despite the revised plans violating the distance criteria, NOIDA granted

sanction to the said revisions. The plans were not cancelled despite

repeated reminders from the RWA;

b. Despite the letter of the CFO dated 24 April 2012 highlighting the violation

of the distance criteria, NOIDA did not take any action;

c. The appellant was aware in advance that its plan would be sanctioned in

the future, and hence built a stronger foundation in 2009 to support forty

storey buildings for T-16 and T-17, which received sanction only in 2012;

d. Under the terms of approval, the sanctioned plan had to be kept at the site

for display. In spite of this, there was a failure of the appellant to display

the plans. When a request was made by the RWA to NOIDA to provide a

copy of the plans, NOIDA asked the appellant whether it could supply the

plans. Upon the refusal by the appellant, NOIDA declined to provide the

plans; and

e. No action was taken by NOIDA after issuing a show cause notice for

violation of the minimum distance requirement to the appellant based on a

complaint by the flat owners;

(xiii) No part of the second revised plan of 2009 can be saved as it is in violation of

the distance criteria contained in the NBR 2006, and is also contrary to the

UP 1975 Act;

(xiv) The appellant cannot make any further constructions without the consent of

the existing flat owners under the UP Apartments Act 2010 and the Real

Estate Regulation and Development Act 2016;

PART C

40

(xv) There is no equity in favour of the flat buyers in the new buildings (T-16 and

T-17) who have decided to retain their flats, particularly when this Court had

through several orders granted an opportunity to the purchasers to seek

refund;

(xvi) T-16 and T-17 can safely be demolished; and

(xvii) False and misleading statements have been made by the appellant in the

course of its pleadings before the High Court and this Court.

C Prefatory observations

44 At the outset, it must be noted that:

(i) The area which was originally leased to the appellant admeasured 48,263 sq.

mtrs.; and

(ii) As a result of the supplementary lease, the area stood increased to 54,816

sq. mtrs.

In order to bring clarity to the issues raised, the dates of sanction and details of the

construction are tabulated below:

Title Date of Sanction Buildings Details

Original Plan 20 June 2005 Towers 1-14 G+9 floors

First Revised Plan 29 December 2006

Towers 1-15

G+11 floors, height of each

tower is 37 mtrs.

Tower 16

T-16 was to comprise of a

cluster of wings comprising 

PART C

41

of 1 (G+11 floors) and 3

(G+4 floors) with a height of

37 mtrs.

Shopping Complex G+1 floor

Second Revised Plan 26 November 2009

Towers 1-15

G+11 floors, height of each

tower is 37 mtrs.

Towers 16-17∗

G+24 floors, height of each

tower increased to 73 mtrs.

Third Revised Plan 2 March 2012

Towers 1-15

G+11 floors, height of each

tower is 37 mtrs.

Towers 16-17φ

G+40 floors, height of each

tower is increased to 121

mtrs.

The plan for the construction was originally sanctioned on 20 June 2005. Thereafter,

three revisions were sanctioned on 29 December 2006, 26 November 2009 and 2

March 2012.

45 The sanctioning of the revised plans and the construction of T- 16 and T- 17

have been challenged on the ground of a violation of:

(i) NBR 2006;

 ∗ The earlier G+1 shopping complex is numbered as T-16, while the original T-16 is numbered as T-17. Further, T-1

and T-17 were to be connected by a space frame at the upper level.

φ As per the third revised plan dated 2 March 2012, the proposed floors for T-16 and T-17 were G+40. We note

however, that in the details of sanctioned plans submitted by Mr Vikas Singh, learned Senior Counsel, the number of

floors envisaged for T-17 were G+39 and T-16 were G+40. Further, as per the provisional Fire NOC dated 18 August

2011, the proposed construction for T-16 and T-17 was for G+38 floors. 

PART C

42

(ii) NBR 2010;

(iii)NBC 2005;

(iv)UP 1975 Act;

(v) UP Apartments Act 2010; and

(vi)Fire safety norms.

The appellant disputes the applicability of the UP 1975 Act. This will be considered

in the course of the judgment.

46 It becomes necessary to clear the ground in regard to the reliefs which were

sought before the High Court. The reliefs sought before the High Court in the petition

were for:

(i) Quashing the revised plan for the construction of T-16 (Ceyane) and T-17

(Apex) and the demolition of the structures constructed pursuant to the plan;

(ii) Directing NOIDA to not sanction any further building plans in respect of

Emerald Court without obtaining the consent of all residents;

(iii) Quashing the permission granted to link T-1 with T-16/ T-17;

(iv) Directing the installation of fire safety equipment and infrastructure;

(v) Directing the demolition of the illegal construction in the basement and the

setback area; and

(vi) Directing NOIDA and the appellant to provide car parking spaces in

accordance with NBC 2005.

PART C

43

Of the above reliefs, the High Court recorded that only prayers (i) and (iii) were

pressed.

47 The above narration establishes that there was a challenge to the revised

plans by which the construction and increase in the height of T-17 (Apex) and T- 16

(Ceyane) were envisaged. As the tabulation set out above indicates, in the first

revised plan of 29 December 2006, T-16 was to partially comprise of G+11, the rest

being G+4. A shopping complex was envisaged comprising of G+1 floors. A

triangular green area is indicated in the first revised plan of 29 December 2006 in

front of T-1. In the second revised plan of 26 November 2009, T-17 (Apex) and T-16

(Ceyane) came to be envisaged with twenty-four floors and of a height of 73 mtrs.

each. In the third revised plan of 2 March 2012, the number of floors of T-16 and T17 was increased further from twenty-four to forty floors (for T-16) and thirty-nine

floors (for T-17), and the height of each of the towers was increased from 73 mtrs. to

121 mtrs. In this backdrop, the relief which was sought in prayer (i) was for quashing

the revised plan for the construction of the two new towers – T-17 (Apex) and T-16

(Ceyane). This clearly implicates a challenge both to the second revised plan of 26

November 2009 as well as the third revised plan of 2 March 2012.

48 A brazen attempt at stonewalling the first respondent was made by the

appellant and NOIDA before the High Court. The sanctioned plans incorporate the

condition that a copy of each plan would be made available at the site. Despite this,

when the first respondent sought copies of the sanctioned plans and other

information, NOIDA wrote to the appellant asking for their consent to provide the

PART D

44

plans to the first respondent. When the appellant refused, NOIDA’s refusal to the

RWA followed suit. It was only pursuant to the interim directions of the High Court

that the sanctioned plans and documents were provided to the first respondent. The

reliefs which have been sought encompass a challenge to the validity of the second

and third revised plans, under which the two towers, T- 17 (Apex) and T-16

(Ceyane), were being constructed.

D Violation of distance requirement under Building Regulations

49 The first issue we shall address is whether the sanction for the construction of

T-16 and T-17 by NOIDA is in violation of the distance requirement under applicable

building regulations.

Original sanction dated 20 June 2005

50 When the plan was originally sanctioned on 20 June 2005, the NBR 2006 was

yet to come into force. The sanction of 20 June 2005 was under the regime of the

NBR 1986. NBR 1986 envisaged a 15 mtrs. set back from the front and 9 mtrs. on

all sides. Since the original plan did not envisage construction of T-16 and T-17, the

said plan is not under challenge for violation of the relevant building regulations.

First revised sanction dated 29 December 2006

51 NBR 2006 came into force on 16 December 2006. The sanctioned plan for

the project was first revised on 29 December 2006, and it covered a total area of

54,819 sq. mtrs., leased to the appellant under the Lease Deed and the 

PART D

45

Supplementary Lease Deed. The first revised plan provided for the construction of

two additional towers (T-15 and T-16) and one shopping complex (G+1 floors). All

16 towers were to comprise of G+11 floors and were to be 37 mtrs. in height.

52 The first revised plan was governed by the NBR 2006. Regulation 33 provided

for permissible FAR, ground coverage and height of buildings. Regulation 33.2 dealt

with the group housing. The table appended to it is as follows:

“33.2 Group Housing

GROUP HOUSING

Max Ground

Coverage

FAR Height

1 Coverage 30 200 No limit

2 Density As mentioned in the section layout plan

or scheme

Regulation 32 deals with set-backs, which is defined as the line parallel to the plot

boundaries, beyond which nothing can be constructed towards the plot boundaries.

Regulation 32.3 stipulates that where a plot size exceeds 40,000 sq. mtrs., there has

to be a front setback of 25 mtrs., while setbacks on the rear and on all sides will be 9

mtrs. Regulation 33.2.3 is relevant for the dispute in the present case and it

stipulates as follows, insofar as is relevant:

“i. Distance between two adjacent building blocks shall

not be less than half of the height of tallest building.”

(emphasis supplied)

PART D

46

Second revised sanction dated 26 November 2009

53 The second revision to the original plan was sanctioned on 26 November

2009, under the NBR 2006. The second revised plan envisaged that instead of the

construction of T-16 (comprising of G + 11 floors and G+4 floors), and a shopping

complex (G + 1 floor), two towers, T- 16 and T-17, would be constructed, each

comprising of G+24 floors and of 73 mtrs. height. According to the revision, a 9 mtrs.

distance was to be maintained between T-17 and T-1 at the ground level, and T-1

and T-17 were to be connected through a space frame at the upper level. The

second revised plan provided that a front set back of 15 mtrs., and a rear and side

set-back of 9 mtrs. each was approved.

54 The issue is whether the second revised plan for construction of T-16 and T17 each of a height of 73 mtrs. and at a distance of 9 mtrs. from T-1, is in

compliance with the applicable regulation at the time, that is NBR 2006. We shall

advert to this in the next section.

Third revised sanction dated 2 March 2012

55 The third revision to the plan was sanctioned on 2 March 2012, by which the

height of T-16 and T-17 was increased from 73 mtrs. to 121 mtrs., and the number

of floors in T-16 and T-17 was increased from twenty-four to forty floors.

56 At the time of the sanction of the third revised plan, the NBR 2010 had come

into force. Regulations 1.6 and 1.7 of the NBR 2010 are in the following terms: 

PART D

47

“1.6 The plot on which map has already been sanctioned and

construction has already started or completed, the allottee

may be allowed to revise the same building plan or

submit the new plan as per the prevailing regulations for

that part of the building where construction has not

started or any new addition is required in the building.

1.7 F.A.R, Ground coverage, setbacks and density as

indicated in the regulations shall not be applicable in respect

of those plots which were allotted on auction or tender basis

and group housing prior to the coming into operation of these

regulations. However, the calculation of FAR and Ground

Coverage in the new buildings in such plots shall be

done as per these regulations. The purchasable F.A.R and

Ground coverage as per applicability may be allowed.”

(emphasis supplied)

57 Under Regulation 24.2, the following stipulations have been provided for

Group Housing:

(II) Maximum permissible-

(i) Ground coverage 35 per cent to 40000 sq. mtrs

and 40% above 40000 sq.

mtrs

(ii) Floor Area Ratio 2.75

(iii) Height No limit. For buildings above

30 metres in height, clearance

from Airport Authority shall

have to be taken.

(iv) Density (Family size

4.5)

As mentioned in the sector

Layout Plan or decided by the

Authority for a particular

scheme.

Table No 2 of the NBR 2010 prescribes the set-back requirement in relation to

Regulation 24. For all plots measuring above 40,000 sq. mtrs., the set-backs in the

front are 16 mtrs. and at the rear and on the sides are 12 mtrs.

PART D

48

58 Regulation 24.2.1(1)(vi) provides that a distance of 6 mtrs. is to be left open

for fire tenders. The said regulation is extracted below:

“The following features shall be permitted after leaving

minimum 6 mtrs. open corridor for fire tenders.

(a) Meter room as per norms of Electricity Authority.

(b) Open transformers without any permanent enclosure

keeping in view the necessary safety requirements.

(c) Other features as mentioned in Table 3.

(d) Rockery, well and well structures, water pool, swimming

pool (if uncovered), uncovered platform around tree, tank,

fountain, bench, chabutra With open top and unenclosed by

side walls, compound-wall, gate, slide- swing, culverts on

drains.

(e) Any other feature, primarily ornamental in nature, not

enclosing or covering space of commercial use may be

permitted by the Chief Executive Officer on case to case

basis.

(f) Open generator set, filtration plant, Electrical distribution

equipment, feeder pillars, telephone distribution equipments

may be permitted in open setback as a service utility provided

after leaving clear space for fire tender.”

With respect to the distance between two adjacent building blocks, Regulation

24.2.1.6 provides:

“Distance between two adjacent building blocks

Distance between two adjacent building blocks shall be

minimum 6 mtrs. to 16 mtrs. depending on the height of

blocks. For building height up to 18 mtrs, the spacing shall be

6 mtrs and thereafter the spacing shall be increased by 1

metre for every addition of 3 mtrs in height of building subject

to a maximum spacing of 16 mtrs as per National Building

Code – 2005. If the blocks have dead-end sides facing each

other, th[e]n the spacing shall be maximum 9 mtrs. instead of 

PART D

49

16 mtrs. Moreover, the allottee may provide or propose more

than 16 mtrs. space between two blocks.”

59 The above regulation indicates that:

(i) The distance between two “adjacent building blocks” is to be a minimum of 6

mtrs. going up to 16 mtrs., depending upon the height of the blocks;

(ii) For a building height upto 18 mtrs., the spacing would be 6 mtrs., to be

increased by 1 mtr. for every addition of 3 mtrs. to the height of the building

(subject to a maximum spacing of 16 mtrs. under the NBC 2005);

(iii) If the blocks have dead-end sides facing each other, the spacing shall be a

maximum of 9 mtrs. instead of 16 mtrs.; and

(iv) The allottee may, however, propose more than a 16 mtrs. space between two

blocks.

60 Regulation 24.2.1.6 of NBR 2010 refers to the NBC 2005 for the minimum

distance requirement. The NBC 2005 contains the following stipulations in para

8.2.3.1:

“8.2.3.1 For buildings of height above 10 m, the open spaces

(side and rear) shall be as given in Table 2. The front open

spaces for increasing heights of buildings shall be governed

by 9.4.1(a).

Table 2 Side and Rear Open Spaces for Different Heights

of Buildings

(Clause 8.2.3.1)

Si

No.

Height of Buildings Side and Rear Open

Spaces to be Left Around

the Building 

PART D

50

(1)

m

(2)

m

(3)

i) 10 3

ii) 15 5

iii) 18 6

iv) 21 7

v) 24 8

vi) 27 9

vii) 30 10

viii) 35 11

ix) 40 12

x) 45 13

xi) 50 14

xii) 55 and above 16

NOTES

1 For buildings above 24 m in height, there shall be a

minimum front open space of 6 m.

2 Where rooms do not derive light and ventilation from the

exterior open space, the width of such exterior open space as

given in col 3 may be reduced by 1 m subject to a minimum of

3 m and a maximum of 8 m. No further projections shall be

permitted.

3 If the length or depth of the building exceeds 40 m, add

to col (3) 10 percent of length or depth of building minus

4.0 m.”

(emphasis supplied)

Para 8.2.3.2 provides as follows:

“8.2.3.2 For tower like structures, as an alternative to

8.2.3.1, open spaces shall be as below:

(a) Up to a height of 24 m, with one set-back, the open

spaces at the ground level shall be not less than 6 m;

PART D

51

(b) For heights between 24 m and 37.5 m with one set-back,

the open spaces at the ground level, shall be not less than 9

m.

(c) For heights above 37.5m with two set-backs, the open

spaces at the ground level, shall be not less than 12m;

and

(d) The deficiency in the open spaces shall be made good

to satisfy 8.2.3.1 through the set-backs at the upper

level;: these set-backs shall not be accessible from

individual rooms/flats at these levels.”

(emphasis supplied)

61 Para 8.2.3.1 of NBC 2005 indicates that where the height of the building is 55

mtrs. and above, the side and rear open spaces to be left around the building must

be 16 mtrs. Note 3 indicates that if the length or the depth of the building exceeds 40

mtrs., in addition to the height which is specified in column 3, ten per cent of the

length and the depth of the building minus 4 mtrs. has to be added to the distance

required. Thus, in the case of a height (as in the present case) of 55 mtrs. and

above, an additional 8.45 mtrs. (10 per cent of 84.5 mtrs.) is added to the 16 mtrs.

and 4 mtrs is to be deducted, arriving at a 20.45 mtrs. distance requirement.

However, an alternative is provided by para 8.2.3.2 for “tower like structures”. For

heights above 37.5 mtrs., open spaces at the ground level shall not be less than 12

mtrs. Further, deficiencies in open space as required under Para 8.3.2.1, can be met

through set-backs at the upper levels, subject to the condition that the set-back shall

not be accessible from the individual rooms/flats at these levels.

PART D

52

D.1 Violation of NBR 2006 and 2010

D.1.1 Interpretation of “building blocks”

62 The first aspect which needs to be considered is whether T-17 and T-1 are

two adjacent building blocks or form part of a single building block as claimed by the

appellant. Regulation 33.2.3 of the NBR 2006 stipulates that the distance between

the two adjacent building blocks shall not be less than half of the height of the tallest

building.

63 The submission of Mr Vikas Singh, learned Senior Counsel, as well as of Mr

Ravindra Kumar, appearing on behalf of NOIDA, is that Regulation 33.2.3 of the

NBR 2006, which was in force when the second revised plan was sanctioned on 26

November 2009 (contemplating the construction of T-16 and T-17), stipulates a

distance between “two adjacent building blocks”. Mr Vikas Singh submitted that it is

entirely the discretion of the developer to determine as to whether one or more

buildings should be treated as a building block, there being no definition of the

expression “building blocks” in NBR 2006. It has been urged that the appellant is

entitled to assert that the sanctioned plan consists of building blocks, and that T-16

and 17 are part of a building block along with T-1, T-2, and T-3. Thus, it has been

submitted that all these towers (T-1, T-2, T-3, T-16 and T-17) constitute one single

building block. To buttress this submission, the space frame connecting T-1 and T17 is referred to. It has been urged that there is no necessity of maintaining the

minimum distance provided by Regulation 33.2.3, which applies only to the distance 

PART D

53

between two adjacent building blocks, and since T-1 was to be connected to T-17 by

a space-frame, the two new towers (T-17 and T-16) would constitute a part of the

same building block, thus obviating the need of maintaining a minimum distance

between them. This argument was sought to be supported by adverting to the

original Hindi version of Regulation 33.2.3, which uses the expression “दो भवन समूहोंके

बीच की दू री”. In this context, it has been submitted that after the NBR 2010 came into

force, there was an increase in the height of T-16 and T-17 from twenty-four to forty

floors. Regulation 24.2.1.(6) of the NBR 2010 has also used the expression “two

adjacent building blocks”. Thus, based on both the NBR 2006 and 2010, it has been

urged that the appellant was entitled to treat T-16 and T-17 as forming a part of a

cluster which would include T-1. Therefore, the submission is that since all of them

constitute a single building block, the minimum distance requirement need not be

maintained.

64 The submission which has been urged on behalf of the the appellant finds

support in the arguments of Mr Ravinder Kumar, learned Counsel appearing on

behalf of NOIDA. The submissions which have been made on behalf of NOIDA

highlight the following features:

(i) Apart from the English version of Regulation 24.2.1.(6) of the NBR 2010,

which uses the expression building blocks, the Hindi version uses the terms

“भवन समूह”, which emphasises the concept of a cluster of buildings;

PART D

54

(ii) When the Regulations speak of a “भवन समूह”, it is not the distance between

the towers but the distance between blocks which is implicated;

(iii) T-1, T-16 and T-17 form part of one cluster or block and hence there is no

need of maintaining a distance between buildings forming part of a block;

(iv) The absence of a minimum distance between the T-1 and T-7 would be of no

consequence;

(v) Apart from the alleged breach of the minimum distance requirement, all

parameters have been maintained, in terms of:

a. Ground coverage;

b. FAR;

c. Open area; and

d. Green area; and

(vi) An explanatory note was submitted by NOIDA before the High Court,

concerning the issue of building blocks, and is extracted below:

“Building Block in a Group Housing Project

Main Points:

1. Noida Building Regulations, 2010: A “Bhavan Samuh”

which is translated in English as a “Building block” is the

combination or a group of buildings in any given

area/Plot.

2. The Section 3(g) of The Uttar Pradesh Apartment

(Promotion of Construction, Ownership, Maintenance)

Act, 2010 defines building. As per the Act, “building”

means a building constructed on any land, containing four

or more apartments, or two or more buildings in any area

designated as a block, each containing two or more

apartments with a total of four or more apartments in all

such buildings; Provided that an independent house 

PART D

55

constructed in a row with independent entry and exit,

whether or not adjoining to other independent houses,

shall not constitute a building.

Therefore, it is clear that the Block is designated as “two

or more buildings in any area” and the building is defined

as “four or more apartments on any land”.

3. As per Zoning Glossary of New York City Planning; "A

Block" is defined as a tract of land bounded on all sides

by streets by a combination of streets, public parks,

railroad rights of way, pierhead lines or airport

boundaries. Building is defined as a structure that has

one or more floors and a roof, is permanently affixed to

the land and is bounded by open areas or the lot lines of

a zoning lot.

4. The buildings in a block may not be connected, may be

partially connected or may be fully connected, as is clear

from the aforesaid provisions.

5. It is a common practice in all the metropolitan cities of

India and all over the world to construct high rise buildings

for different purposes to make optimum utilization of land.

In any given area, more open & green space can be

provided only with a provision of high rise buildings which

enable to accommodate high density comparatively with

less ground coverage and more open space. Large size

projects generally have many buildings which are

planned, arranged & designed, keeping in view the

requirement of common space, common facility &

amenities, natural light, ventilation, open space and

maximum possible exit routes for early evacuation in

event of any emergency. In view of all these

considerations generally different building blocks or

groups of buildings having interconnected accessibility,

facilities and services are designed, which give better

living environment than having a system of all buildings

situated in isolation within the project area. It is common

practice in all the metropolitan cities of India and over

world to construct high-rise building for different purpose

to make optimum utilization of land. In any given area

more open & green space can be provided only within a

provision of high-rise building which enable to 

PART D

56

accommodate high density comparatively within less

ground coverage and more open space. Large size

projects generally have many building which are planned,

arranged & designed, keeping in view the requirement of

common space, common facility & amenities, natural

light, ventilation, open space and maximum possible exit

routes for early evacuation in the event of any

emergency. In view of all these considerations generally

different building blocks or cluster of building having inter

connected accessibilities & facilities are decided, which

give better living environment than having a system of all

building situated in isolation within the project area.

6. Isolated buildings are more prone to safety, security,

provision and maintenance of common services related

problems. In case of a fire accident in any isolated

building having no extra exit routes, chances of danger to

human lives is more.

7. Generally, a group of buildings in a project is constructed

with the provision of common basement i.e. One

basement for all the buildings. This is done for better

accessibility and movement and provision of common

facilities. It is also a very common practice in India and

abroad to connect the high rise buildings by way of space

frame bridges giving additional exit routes for early

evacuation in the event of emergency. This practice has

increased after the occurrence of incident of fire in Gopal

tower in Connaught Place, New Delhi and the temporary

space frame was made connecting the said tower at the

Height with nearby tower for evacuation of cornered

persons saving many lives.

8. NBC OF INDIA OF 2005: Side and rear open space for

different height of building is governed as per Para 8.2.3.1

of NBC 2005 which states that for height of building.

Height Side and Rear Open Space

35 Mtr 11 Mtr

40 Mtr 12 Mtr 

PART D

57

55 Mtr & above 16 Mtr

But as per Para 8.2.3, tower like structures as an

alternative to Para 8.2.3.1 open space as below:

For height between 24 Mtr nd 37.50 Mtr with one set back

the open space

At the ground level, shall not be less than 9 Mtr.

9. It is stated that NOIDA Building Regulations intends to

provide the distance between two adjacent building

blocks to be between 6 meter to 16 meter depending

upon the height of the building blocks. It does not provide

any specific requirement of distance between two

buildings. The concept of minimum distance required

between two High Rise building of a block may not

necessarily be the same as required between the two

building blocks. For Example a building block may have

three or four stories for the entire block area and few

towers of different height and different upper stories

designed at different places in the same block.

10. The concept of minimum distance between the two

building blocks is for the purpose of free fire tender

movement (Minimum 6 meters setback as per regulation),

air ventilation, sunlight etc. The minimum distance

requirement is in no way connected with the structural

safety of the building.

11. It is stated here that the new building under construction

is having perimeter of approx. 230 meter the entire

building is surrounding by enough open area i.e. more

than 16 meter except at one place where the building is

made a part of block of adjoining building by way off a

proposed connecting bridge to provide an extra exit route

for the purpose of emergency evacuation. Here also the

minimum gap between old building and new building is 9

meter for 6.80 meter length with satisfies the

requirements of fire safety provisions. It does not violate

any provision with regards to fire safety and air

circulation.”

PART D

58

65 Essentially, the plea both on behalf of the appellant and NOIDA is that the

requirement of maintaining a minimum distance applies only to adjacent building

blocks, which is not equivalent to adjacent buildings. To put it differently, the

arguments proceed on the basis that where there is a cluster of buildings the

requirement of a minimum distance cannot be observed as between buildings

forming part of the cluster, but only as between two adjacent building

blocks/clusters. Each building block in this line of argument may consist of a

collection of buildings, and it is argued that neither NBR 2006 nor NBR 2010

mandates the maintenance of a minimum distance as between buildings in a cluster.

66 The expression ‘building block’ has not been defined either in NBR 2006 or in

NBR 2010. The construction which is placed upon the content of the expression

must advance the object and purpose of the said Regulations. The purpose of

stipulating a minimum distance is a matter of public interest in planned development.

The residents who occupy constructed areas in a housing project are entitled to

ventilation, light and air and adherence to fire safety norms. The purpose of

stipulating a minimum distance comprehends several concerns. These include

safeguarding the privacy of occupants and their enjoyment of basic civic amenities

including access to well-ventilated areas where air and light are not blocked by the

presence of close towering constructions. Access to these amenities is becoming a

luxury instead of a necessity. The prescription of a minimum distance also has a

bearing on fire safety. In the event of a fire, there is a danger that the flames would

rapidly spread from one structure to adjoining ones. Moreover, the presence of 

PART D

59

structures in close proximity poses serious hurdles to fire-fighting machinery which

has to be deployed by the civic body.

67 If a developer is left with the unbridled discretion to define the content of the

expression “building block”, this will defeat the purpose of prescribing minimum

distances, leaving the health, safety and quality of life of flat buyers at the mercy of

developers. Before this Court, an argument has been advanced that four towers out

of the seventeen towers in the plot are a part of one “building block” and do not

require maintenance of a minimum distance. Before the High Court, the appellant

attempted to argue that all the buildings (that is all seventeen towers) on Plot No 4 of

Sector 93A NOIDA would comprise of one “building block”. The inconsistency of the

appellant’s argument on building blocks before the High Court and this Court points

out the obvious flaw in it – that the designation of how many buildings constitute a

“building block” by the developer would undermine the requirements prescribed by

Building Regulations. As a matter of first principle, we are not inclined to adopt the

construction proposed by the appellant. It will deprive the residents of urban areas of

the amenities of light, air and ventilation which are essential to maintaining a basic

quality of life. It will also have serious ramifications on fire safety. The developer

cannot be allowed to subvert the requirement of maintaining minimum distances

prescribed in the Building Regulations by unilaterally designating independent

towers as building blocks, in the manner which the appellant has suggested before

this Court. Setting up a space frame or providing for a common entry or exit would

not make two otherwise separate buildings as one consolidated block. 

PART D

60

68 Regulations 33.2.3 of the NBR 2006 refers to the distances between adjacent

‘building blocks’ which shall not be less than half of the height of the tallest building.

The purpose of this regulation is not to apply it only as between building blocks as

distinguished from buildings within a block. Clause (1) of Regulation 33.2.3 has used

the expression ‘building blocks’ and ‘height of tallest building’ in the same sentence.

These expressions must be given a meaning which accords with common sense

and in furtherance with the object and the purpose of the said Regulation. The plain

meaning of the expression is that when there are two adjacent blocks, the height of

the tallest building will determine the distance required to be observed, with the

distance being not less than half the height of the tallest building. Consequently,

when two or more buildings exist in proximity together, they comprise of a building

block within the meaning of Clause (1) of Regulation 33.2.3. In such an eventuality,

the distance between each of the buildings comprised in the block shall also not be

less than half of the height of the tallest building. The reference to the height of the

tallest building is evidently made because this kind of a building will likely

overshadow the buildings of a lesser height in a cluster of proximate construction.

Therefore, the regulation has defined the minimum distance required with reference

to half the height of the tallest building. Any other construction will defeat the

purpose of Regulation 33.2.3 and cannot be accepted.

69 Applying the NBR 2006 to the facts of the present case, the construction of T16 and T-17 was envisaged in the second revised plan dated 26 November 2009.

The height of the said towers was to be 73 mtrs., while the height of other towers, 

PART D

61

including T-1, was to be 37 mtrs. Thus, as per Regulation 33.2.3 of the NBR 2006,

the minimum distance between T-17 and T-1, should be half of the height of the

tallest building, that is, half of the height of T-17 which is 36.5 mtrs. It is evident from

the record that the distance between T-1 and T-17 is 9 mtrs. only. Thus, clearly the

second revised plan was violative of the NBR 2006.

70 We shall now come to the NBR 2010. Regulation 24.2.1(6) has prescribed the

requirement of maintaining varying distances between two adjacent blocks from a

minimum of 6 mtrs. extending up to 16 mtrs., depending on the height of blocks. The

content to the first sentence of this regulation is further amplified by what follows it.

The next part of the regulation stipulates that for a building of height up to 18 mtrs.,

“spacing” shall be 6 mtrs. The expression “spacing” in its plain terms means the

observance of a stipulated distance. Where the height of the building is up to 18

mtrs., “the spacing” shall be 6 mtrs. Thereafter, for a height above 18 mtrs., the

minimum distance has to be increased by one meter for an additional height of three

mtrs. subject to a maximum distance or spacing of 16 mtrs. “as per National Building

Code – 2005”.

71 Mr Ravindra Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of NOIDA, has

particularly laid emphasis on the Hindi version of the NBR 2010 to argue that it used

the term “भवन समूह”, which must mean that a separate meaning is accorded to it

than the term “भवन”. The Hindi text of Regulation 24.2.1.(6) (Regulation 24.2.1 (V) in

the Hindi version) is as follows: 

PART D

62

As is evident, the Hindi version of the NBR 2010, uses three different terms “भवन

खंडो”, “भवन समूह”, and “भवन”. A purely textual interpretation, as is suggested by Mr

Ravindra Kumar, would lead us to ascribe three different meanings to each of these

terms. Extending this argument would then imply that the first sentence, which

states that two adjacent building blocks require a minimum distance of 6 mtrs. to a

maximum distance of 16 mtrs., will depend on the height of the blocks. The second

sentence, which in English simply reads, “for building height upto 18 mtrs, the

spacing shall be 6 mtrs…”, does not clarify what the term “spacing” denotes – does

it imply spacing between buildings inter se the block, or spacing between adjacent

‘building blocks’. Mr Ravindra Kumar suggests that it implies the latter. However,

looking at the Hindi version of the Regulations from a purely textual standpoint, it

would appear that it states that the spacing between the buildings of height 18 mtrs.

should be 6 mtrs., that is, “18.00 मीटर ऊँ चेभवनों की बीच की दू री 6.00 मीटर रखी जाएगी

…”. The term used here is “भवनों” and not ““भवन खंडो” or “भवन समूह”. Thus,

overemphasis on the text of the NBR 2010, while losing sight of the context and the

purpose of the regulation, would lead to an absurd interpretation. Where the initial 

PART D

63

part of Regulation 24.2.1.6 provides for distance between building blocks, the latter

part stipulates the distance between buildings of height above 18 mtrs. Accordingly,

we reject the argument of Mr Ravindra Kumar that Regulation 24.2.1.6 only provides

for the distance between ‘building blocks’ and not buildings within the blocks.

72 The latter part of Regulation 24.2.1.6 of the NBR 2010 provides that the

maximum spacing between buildings of a height above 18 mtrs. shall be 16 mtrs. as

per the NBC 2005. In the third revised plan dated 2 March 2012, the height of T-16

and T-17 was increased to 121 mtrs. In accordance with Regulation 24.2.1.6, the

spacing between a building of height 121 mtrs. and another building would be 16

mtrs. (the maximum limit as per NBC 2005). Thus, the distance between T-1 and T17 should have been 16 mtrs., as opposed to 9 mtrs. Consequently, we find that the

third revised plan dated 2 March 2012 was in violation of NBR 2010.

73 NOIDA, before it granted sanction for enhancing the height of T-16 and T-17

from G+24 to G+40 (or 39, as the case may be), was duty bound to apply its mind to

whether there was a compliance with the provisions of Regulation 24.2.1.6. The third

revised plan which was sanctioned on 2 March 2012 has evidently glossed over the

clear deficiency of open space with reference to the NBR 2010, the consequence of

which would have been to reject the proposal for a further increase in the height of

the towers from twenty-four floors to forty floors. Yet NOIDA has chosen to lend its

support to the appellant in clear defiance of the provisions of law. 

PART D

64

74 The issue as to whether T-1, together with T-16 and T-17, form one cluster

can be looked from another perspective to test the hypothesis of Mr Vikas Singh.

The original sanctioned plan dated 20 June 2005 provided that:

“Total area of plot : 48263.00 Sq. mt

Permissible coverage 35 % : 16892.05 Sq. mt

Sanctioned coverage 14.03% : 6773.25 sq. mt

Permissible FAR 1.50 : 72394.50 Sq. mt

Sanctioned FAR 134.28 : 64810.04 Sq. mt.

Sanctioned height of building : 30.00 meter

SET BACK

SET BACK OF BUILDING

Permissible · Sanctioned

Front 9.66 Mt 15.00 Mt

Back 9.66 Mt 09.70 Mt.

Side 9.66 Mt 09.70 Mt.

Side 9.69 Mt 09.70 Mt.”

75 The original sanctioned plan covered a total plot area of 48,263 sq. mtrs.

Subsequently, an additional area of 6556.61 sq mtrs. was leased out to the

appellant by a Supplementary Lease Deed dated 21 June 2006, so as to enhance

the total area of the plot to 54,819.51 sq. mtrs. As a consequence, the first revised

plan was sanctioned on 29 December 2006, where the sanctioned area was

enhanced from 64,810.04 sq. mtrs. to 81,943.216 sq. mtrs., the calculations being

as follows:

“Sanctioned area

Total area of plot : 54819 Sq. Mt

Floor Existing Addition Total

PART D

65

Ground

Floor

6773.25 Sq. Mt. 1025.313 Sq Mt 7798.563 Sq. Mt

First Floor 6672.17 Sq. Mt 1010.673 Sq Mt 7682.843 Sq. Mt

Second

Floor

6672.17 Sq. Mt 1010.673 Sq Mt 7682.843 Sq. Mt

Third Floor 6672.17 Sq. Mt 1010.673 Sq Mt 7682.843 Sq. Mt

Fourth

Floor

6672.17 Sq. Mt 778.737 Sq Mt 7450.907 Sq.

Mt.

Fifth Floor 6672.17 Sq. Mt - 177.574 Sq

Mt

6494.596 Sq. Mt

Sixth Floor 6672.17 Sq. Mt - 177.574 Sq

Mt

6494.596 Sq. Mt

Seventh

Floor

6672.17 Sq. Mt - 177.574 Sq

Mt

6494.596 Sq. Mt

Eighth Floor 6522.89 Sq. Mt - 28.294 Sq Mt 6494.596 Sq. Mt

Ninth Floor 4808.71 Sq. Mt 1685.886 Sq Mt 6494.596 Sq. Mt

Tenth Floor 6312.410 Sq Mt 6312.410 Sq.

Mt.

Eleventh

Floor

4448.677 Sq Mt 4448.677 Sq Mt

Commercial 411.15 Sq Mt. 411.15 Sq Mt.

Total 64810.04 17133.176 81943.216

Basement : 32352.71 + 8189.67 = 40542.38

Total 97162.75 25528.41 122485.60

76 The first revised plan dated 29 December 2006 relating to 6556.61 sq. mtrs.

indicates that in the south-west corner of the plot, an additional construction

comprising of one tower and a shopping facility would be put up and directly

opposite T-1 was a green area, which has been depicted on the sanctioned plan.

77 On 26 November 2009, there was a second revised sanction, consequent

upon the acquisition of purchasable FAR of thirty-three per cent of the permissible

1.5 FAR. The area calculations of the second revised sanction were indicated as

follows: 

PART D

66

“Area of plot : 54819.510 Sq. Mt.

Permissible FAR 1.50% : 82229.265 Sq. Mt.

Purchasable FAR 33% : 27135.657 Sq. Mt

Total FAR 82229.265 + 27135.657 = 109364.922 Sq. Mt

Area of utilization issued earlier: 78019.956 Sq. Mt

Area of upper basement issued earlier:

40542.380 sq Mt. (3397.0990 with demolished upper basement)

Floor Permissible area

(Sq. Mt.)

Proposed Area (Sq.

Mt.)

Ground

Floor

19186.82 1751.320

First Floor Rest FAR 228.230

Second

Floor

2249.220

Third Floor 2249.220

Fourth Floor ……. 2249.220

Fifth Floor ……. 2249.220

Sixth Floor ……. 2249.220

Seventh

Floor

……. 2249.220

Eighth Floor ……. 2249.220

Ninth Floor ……. 2249.220

Tenth Floor ……. 1358.786

Eleventh

Floor

……. 1186.914

Twelfth

Floor

……. 740.162

Thirteenth

Floor

……. 740.162

Fourteenth

Floor

……. 740.162

Fifteenth

Floor

……. 740.162

Sixteenth

Floor

……. 447.955

Seventeenth

Floor

……. 447.955

Eighteenth

Floor

……. 447.955

PART D

67

Nineteenth

Floor

……. 447.955

Twentieth

Floor

……. 447.955

Twenty first

Floor

……. 383.168

Twenty

second

Floor

……. 383.168

Twenty third

Floor

……. 383.168

Twenty

fourth Floor

……. 383.168

TOTAL FAR ……. 31312.081

Upper

basement

……. 3397.090

Lower

basement

40542.38 3397.090

Total Area 43939.470

Set back Permissible Sanctioned

Front 15.00 Mt 15.00 Mt

Back 9.00 Mt 9.00 Mt

Side 9.00 Mt 9.00 Mt

Side 9.00 Mt 9.00 Mt

78 As the second revised plan indicates, the existing towers now envisaged

twenty-four floors instead of eleven floors. The third revised plan of 2 March 2012

further envisaged an enhancement in the constructed area consequent upon a

purchasable FAR, together with the sanctioned FAR of 2.75. The number of floors

was further increased to forty floors in T-16 and T-17, the relevant calculations being

as follows:

“Total area of plot : 54819.510 Sq. mt

Permissible coverage 35% : 19186.828 Sq. mt

Sanctioned coverage 14.03% : 6773.25 sq. mt

PART D

68

Permissible FAR @ 1.5% : 82229.265 Sq. mt

at the time of allotment

Purchasable FAR on 25.10.10: 150753.652 Sq. mt

With Sanctioned FAR @ 2.75

Floor wise Description of Proposed area of different floors are

as under

Floor Permissibl

e area

(Sq. Mt.)

Built up

area

(tower 1 to

14) on

16.10.09

utility

certificate

issued.

Sq. Mt

Previous

sanctioned

area tower

15, 16 &

17 date

26.11.09

Proposed

FAR tower

15, 16 &

17 (Sq.

Mt.)

Revised

area tower

15, 16 &

17 (Sq.

Mt.)

(3 +4)

Total area

(Sq. Mt.)

(2 +5)

1 2 3 4 5

Space

frame

-- -- -- 24.00 24.00 24.00

Podium

(T-1 to T14)

-- 288.983 -- -- -- --

Ground

Floor

19186.825 6823.429 1751.320 1125.302 2876.622 9700.051

1st Floor Rest FAR 6722.349 2288.230 78.075 2366.305 9088.654

2nd Floor -- 6722.349 2249.220 58.555 2307.775 9030.124

3rd Floor -- 6722.349 2249.220 58.555 2307.775 9030.124

4th Floor -- 6722.349 2249.220 38.400 2287.620 9009.969

5th Floor -- 6722.349 2249.220 38.400 2287.620 9009.969

6th Floor 6722.349 2249.220 -12.397 2236.823 8959.172

7th Floor 6722.349 2249.220 -12.397 2236.823 8959.172

8th Floor 6722.349 2249.220 -12.397 2236.823 8959.172

9th Floor 6722.349 2249.220 -12.397 2236.823 8959.172

10th Floor 6423.737 1358.786 878.037 2236.823 8660.560

11th Floor 3982.669 1186.94 910.301 2097.215 6079.884

12th Floor 740.162 851.205 1591.367 1591.367

13th Floor 740.162 851.205 1591.367 1591.367

14th Floor 740.162 851.205 1591.367 1591.367

15th Floor 740.162 851.205 1591.367 1591.367

16th Floor 447.995 1162.568 1610.523 1610.523

18th Floor 447.995 1162.568 1610.523 1610.523

PART D

69

19th Floor 447.995 1162.568 1610.523 1610.523

20th Floor 447.995 1165.568 1610.523 1610.523

21st Floor 383.168 1610.523 1610.523 1610.523

22nd Floor 383.168 1610.523 1610.523 1610.523

23rd Floor 383.168 1610.523 1610.523 1610.523

24th Floor 383.168 1610.523 1610.523

25th Floor 1610.523 1610.523 1610.523

26th Floor 1610.523 1610.523 1610.523

27th Floor 1610.523 1610.523 1610.523

28th Floor 1610.523 1610.523 1610.523

29th Floor 1610.523 1610.523 1610.523

30th Floor 1610.523 1610.523 1610.523

31st Floor 1610.523 1610.523 1610.523

32nd Floor 1610.523 1610.523 1610.523

33rd Floor 1610.523 1610.523 1610.523

34th Floor 1610.523 1610.523 1610.523

35th Floor 1610.523 1610.523 1610.523

36th Floor 1610.523 1610.523 1610.523

37th Floor 1610.523 1610.523 1610.523

38th Floor 1610.523 1610.523 1610.523

39th Floor 859.055 859.055 859.055

40th Floor 439.106 439.106 439.106

Total FAR 150753.65

2

78019.956 31312.105 41132.600 72444.705 150464.66

4

Basement

Upper

basement

Lower

basement

Total area

After

leaving set

back, rest

area (for

parking,

services)

40542.38

40542.38

3397.09

3397.09

1511.144

41.680

1552.824

42053.524

3438.770

45942.294

Services 15%

services

Zero Zero 6396.896 6396.896

Total area

(including

118562.33

6

34709.195 49082.32 83791.515 202353.85

4

PART D

70

basement

and

services)

Proposed land coverage area = 10648.503 Sq. Mt. (19.425%)

Revised FAR (Built + Revised) = 150464.664 Sq Mt.”

79 On 24 April 2012, the CFO drew the attention of the In-Charge of the Building

Cell, NOIDA to the violation of the minimum distance which was required to be

maintained in the construction which was being carried out by the appellant. The

subject of the letter reads thus:

“Regarding distance between the under construction (Tower

No. 17) situated at Plot No. 4, Sector-93A NOIDA being

constructed by M/s Supertech Limited and old constructed

buildings”

The letter (which has been extracted above para 28 of Part A.5) has a crucial

bearing on these proceedings. The CFO made a clear reference to the distance

requirements which were to be observed in terms of NBR 2006, NBR 2010 and NBC

2005. The CFO queried NOIDA as to whether the license for construction was

granted after granting a relaxation to the builder in a “special category” or whether

the construction was being carried out contrary to the standards. This letter evinced

no response from NOIDA.

80 When the construction of two towers in the newly acquired leasehold area

commenced in July 2009, a communication dated 16 July 2009 was addressed on

behalf of the appellant (by its Director) to the Group Co-coordinator of Emerald

Court (the letter has been extracted in para 15 of Part A.4). Evidently, the residents 

PART D

71

were concerned about the construction of the new towers. The said letter clearly

demonstrates that in 2009, the appellant was of the view that the new towers which

were being constructed would have separate entries and exits, amenities and

infrastructure and that the developer would construct a boundary wall separating the

existing 15 towers from Apex and Ceyane. This representation was reiterated in a

letter dated 9 March 2012 from the appellant to the President of the RWA.

81 The first paragraph of the above letter indicates that the appellant had

obtained two separate plots admeasuring approximately 48,650 sq. mtrs. and

6556.61 sq mtrs., and had got them registered separately in March 2005 and May

2006. The representation to the residents that these were separate plots which were

leased out to the developer was clearly contrary to the provisions of the

supplementary lease deed which stipulated that the newly demised area of 6556.61

sq. mtrs would form a part of the original plot which had been allotted to the

appellant. The supplementary lease deed contains the following covenants:

“[…]

That the Lessor has agreed to demise on lease in additional

place of land measuring 6556.61 Sq. mtrs. Against

consideration of Rs.14,48,98,871/- (Rupees Fourteen Crores

forty eight lacs ninety eight thousand eight hundred seventy

one only) which has been already been paid by the lessee to

the lessor and also in consideration of the yearly lease rent

@1 % of the total premium per year Rs.1,59,38,876 for

enhanced area has been paid by the Lessee to the Lessors

as one time lease rent (equal to 11 year's lease rent). That

the demised premises shall be deemed to be part of the Plot

No.04, Sector 93-A, Noida already leased to the lessee.

That all other conditions of the original lease deed and

allotment shall remain unchanged and shall be equally 

PART D

72

applicable to this demised ·premises and binding upon the

lessee.

That the period of 90 years lease shall commence

from16.03.2005.

That the demised premises shall be part of the original

allotted Plot No. 04 Sector Noida. Necessary addition or

alterations in the structure can be subject to the building

byelaws of the lessor and terms of the transfer lease deed.

That total area of Plot No. 94, Sector 93-A, Noida is 54819.51

Sq. mtrs.

That the total premium of Plot No. 04, Sector 93-A is Rs.1,21,

15,11,171/- (Rupees One hundred Twenty one crores fifteen

lacs eleven thousand and one hundred and seventy one only)

instead of Rs.1,06,66,12,000/-.(Rupees One hundred six

crores sixty six lacs twelve thousand and three hundred).

The lessee shall construct the building on the demised

premises according to the building bye laws of the Lessor.”

Despite the clear terms of the supplementary lease deed in terms of which the

additional land allotted under it is to form a part of the original plot, the

communication addressed to the flat buyers of the existing towers was that the new

towers were completely disconnected from and independent of the earlier developed

fifteen towers. This letter cannot be glossed over because a similar position was

affirmed before the High Court in paragraph 32 of the counter affidavit filed by the

appellant, which reads as follows:

“32. That the contents of para 12 so far it relates to matter

of record are need no reply and other contents are wrong and

denied. The letter dated 16.07.2009 and 09.03.2012 given by

respondent no. 5 contains the same stand, that “Apex and

Ceyane" is Phase II of the project as in the present counter

affidavit. Similarly, letter dated 31.01.2012 and 13.02.2012

filed by respondent no.5 before police authorities can be

relied upon in support of the stand of respondent no.5.”

PART D

73

82 The only reasonable hypothesis which emerges from the above disclosures is

that the argument which has now sought to be advanced – that Towers 1, 16 and 17

are part of a cluster of buildings comprised within a block, thus obviating the need to

maintain the minimum distance between them – is an afterthought. It is contrary to

the stated position which has been adopted by the appellant in its affidavit before the

High Court. The record before this Court also indicates that the appellant has taken

liberties with the truth in making the submission that a cluster of towers in the project

constitutes a block which allows the appellant to subvert the minimum distance

requirement.

83 The above conclusion is clearly evident from the record from IA No 54807 of

2021 for the production of additional documents. Annexures A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4

are:

(i) A true copy of the first revised plan dated 29 December 2006 showing various

blocks as sanctioned by NOIDA;

(ii) A true copy of an allotment letter dated 17 March 2007 issued by the

appellant in favour of a flat purchaser;

(iii) A true copy of the completion map dated 10 April 2008 in relation to T- 1 to 8;

and

(iv) A true copy of the completion map dated 16 September 2009 in relation to T9 to 14.

PART D

74

84 Annexure A1 above, which is part of the first revised plan of 2006, clearly

indicates that each block comprises of a cluster of two buildings. Annexure A2,

which is the letter of allotment, makes it clear that what is meant by a block was the

Tower comprised of Aster II. Moreover, the letter also indicates the recovery of lease

rent at Rs 190 per sq. foot. Annexure A-3, the completion drawing of 2008, indicates

that each tower is depicted to have four wings. In other words, the tower itself is a

block comprising of four wings and the towers have been specified distinctly with

reference to numbers. During the course of the proceedings before the High Court,

the appellant filed a document purported to be the second revised plan of 2009

where a depiction of several blocks was made. The plan which was filed before the

High Court bears no signature of the competent officer of NOIDA. In the counter

affidavit filed by the appellant in the High Court, it was stated that:

“3. That Noida Building Bye-laws talks about building

blocks. Even the mandatory distance is provided only

between the two building blocks in the said bye-laws. It is

stated that Cluster of buildings from one building block,

provided these buildings are connected with each other to

form one building block. Further number of buildings within

one building block depends upon various factors like the

theme of the project its Architecture features surrounding, plot

dimensions etc.

4. The Emerald Court (phase I) has five building block

each comprising of three buildings. After acquisition of

additional land, admeasuring 6556 sq.mt. Apex & Ceyane

(phase II) was envisaged and the same was sanctioned by

NOIDA. With the provision of space frame between tower

Apex and Aster-2 as per sanction plan dated 26.11.2009 by

NOIDA, the Apex & Ceyane were connected within the

existing building block comprising of towers Aster-2, Aspire-1

and Aster-1 as per Architecture feature of the project. The

sanction dated 26.11.2009 was granted by NOIDA only after

structural safety certificate was issued by the IIT-Roorkee. 

PART D

75

Copy of the sanctioned plan showing the Building block

is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE SCA-1.”

(emphasis supplied)

85 In the rejoinder filed to the above affidavit on behalf of the RWA, the contents

of the above plan were seriously disputed and it was averred:

“5. That the contents of paragraph 4 of the

supplementary counter affidavit are incorrect as Aster Type-A

was already envisaged on the additional land measuring 6556

sq. mtrs. along with certain green area as is evident in the

plan approved by NOIDA in Dec. 2006 (Annexures 2 of WP)

on total area of the plot viz. 54800sq. mt.

The respondent has submitted a document marked as

SCA-1 which is called the sanctioned building plan. This

is altogether a new document submitted by respondent 5

and is a shocking surprise to the petitioner as this has

never ever been disclosed nor advertised in the past. The

documents has glaring deviations as compared to the

document shared and submitted in the past. For the first

time respondent 5 has submitted a plan which contains

reference to “BLOCKS”. In the past such a document

was never shared. Also now each tower is given only a

tower number and the nomenclature used in title

documents and popular usage has been deleted viz

Aspire/Aster/ Emperor etc. This is an alarming misnomer

being created by respondent 5. Also, nowhere this bears

the sanctioning endorsement by NOIDA (Respondent No.

2) terming as BLOCK 1 to 5. It is amply clear that

respondent 5 is using false representation and

documents and trying to create confusions on flimsy

ground. They are trying to buy time and attention of this

Court and using these as delaying tactics, which is against

the interest of petition. With the delaying tactics respondent 5

is rapidly proceeding with unauthorized construction of APEX

and CYNE towers day and night, especially after filing of writ

petition by the petitioners, as no injunction has been issued

so far. Respondent 5 has been and will be using the public

interest plea of investors and financial institutions/banks to 

PART D

76

cover up illegal and unauthorized construction as is evident

from Para 19 of the supplementary counter affidavit.”

(emphasis supplied)

86 Significantly, it must be noted that the second revised plan of 2009, which has

been placed on record, does not show the existence of blocks and is duly endorsed

by NOIDA. Similarly, the third revised plan of 2012, which is also on the record, does

not embody any description of blocks. Therefore, we have no manner of doubt in

finding that the argument sought to be developed in the course of these proceedings

that there were separate blocks in the plan is an afterthought. It is contrary to the

stated position which has been adopted by the appellant on affidavit before the High

Court. It is contrary to the sanctioned plans. What is worse is that an effort was

made to place on the record before the High Court a purported plan of dubious

origin by seeking to pass it of as the second revised plan of 2009.

87 In its affidavit before the High Court, the appellant stated that:

“9. That it is pertinent to mention here that the Phase II of

the project by the name of “Apex and Ceyane” has been

planned to have provision of altogether separate facilities

like swimming pool, gymnasium, separate power backup,

separate L.T. Panels and separate entry and exits gates

etc. Therefore the members of petitioner society of Emerald

Court (Phase I) does not have any locus to challenge any

issue relating to the towers of “Apex and Ceyane” (Phase II).”

(emphasis supplied)

PART D

77

88 The above averments would belie the submission sought to be advanced

before this Court that Apex and Ceyane are parts of a cluster of buildings comprised

within one block. The High Court, while rejecting the submission, observed:

“Learned counsel for the respondent-company finally made

an attempt to argue that the phase “building blocks” is not

defined under the byelaws and according to the learned

senior advocate building blocks would mean the entire

building on plot no. 4 of Sector 93A NOIDA. The said

argument is farfetched and against the provisions of the

Building Regulation of 2006 as well as 2010. Building blocks

means group of building on the plot/site. The sanctioned

maps clearly shows that the respondent company has got the

layout approved consisting of separate blocks. The

nomenclature of the blocks was subsequently changed by the

respondent company, in each successive plan and finally the

buildings were numbered as towers (1-17). The maps

sanctioned clearly shows that the buildings in dispute Aster II

(tower 1) and Apex and Ceyane (tower 16 and 17) are

separate building blocks. The argument has been advanced

without there being any foundation in the pleadings. Without

pleadings argument cannot be advanced.”

89 Based on the interpretation of ‘building blocks’ in the Building Regulations as

discussed above, and the inconsistency in fact and in the argument of the appellant,

we affirm the above conclusion of the High Court.

D.1.2 Interpretation of “dead end sides of buildings”

90 An alternative argument has been advanced by Mr Ravindra Kumar, counsel

for NOIDA, that Regulation 24.2.1.6 of the NBR 2010 provides for an exception to

the 16 mtrs. minimum distance requirement if the building blocks have dead-end

sides facing each other. It stipulates that if the blocks have dead-end sides facing

each other, then the spacing shall be a minimum of 9 mtrs. instead of 16 mtrs. Mr 

PART D

78

Ravindra Kumar submitted that T-1 and T-17 have dead-end sides facing each other

and thus, the distance requirement of 16 mtrs. was not applicable. The “dead-end”

argument has met a dead-end in the submissions of the appellant as during the

proceedings. Mr Vikas Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, has

specifically clarified that he is not pressing the submission. We will however deal

with it as the counsel appearing for NOIDA has raised it before this Court.

91 Regulation 24.2.6 of the NBR 2010 stipulates that if the blocks have dead-end

sides facing each other, then the spacing shall be a maximum of 9 mtrs. instead of

16 mtrs. The question of dead-end sides arises only between blocks, in which case

the minimum distance required is 9 mtrs.

92 This Court on 27 July 2016 directed the NBCC to ascertain if the dead-end

sides of T-1 and T-17 are facing each other, in order to decide if the towers can be

brought within the exception in Regulation 24.2.1(6) of NBR 2010. The terms of

reference were as follows:

“To ascertain whether the two towers- Tower-1 (Aster 2) and

Tower-17 have dead end sides facing each other for the

purpose of Reg. 24.2.1(6) of Noida Building Regulations

2010.”

NBCC was tasked with the job of determining the meaning of the phrase ‘dead end

sides facing each other’, and whether T-1 and T-17 could be brought within the

exception. This Court also specifically directed that NBCC shall not travel beyond

the issue that was referred to it.

PART D

79

93 The appellant filed its submissions before NBCC on the meaning of the

phrase ‘dead end side of a building’. It was submitted that:

(i) Model Bye-Laws 2004, Model Bye-Laws 2016 and the Delhi Development

Authority Building Byelaws 2016 have relaxed the 16 mtrs. distance rule to 9

mtrs. if there are ‘no habitable rooms in the front’, irrespective of the height of

the building. A similar provision has been incorporated in NBR 2010 as well.

However, instead of using the phrase “no habitable rooms in the front”, the

phrase “dead end” has been used. Therefore, the phrase “dead end” must

take color from the bye-laws and will have to be interpreted to mean absence

of ‘habitable rooms’; and

(ii) Clause 3.46 of NBR 2006 defines ‘habitable room’ as “a room occupied or

designed for occupation by one or more persons for study, living, sleeping,

eating, kitchen if it is used as a living room but not including bathrooms, water

closet, compartments laundries, serving and storage pantries, corridors,

cellars, attics and spaces that are not used frequently or during extended

periods”.

94 The term ‘dead-end sides of a building’ has not been defined in NBR 2006,

NBR 2010, and NBC 2005. Regulation 3 of NBR 2010 states that words that are not

defined in the Regulations shall have the meanings assigned to them in the UPIAD

1976. If no meaning is assigned to the word in UPIAD 1976, then the meaning

assigned to the word in the Master Plan/Development Plan, Development Plan,

National Building Code, Indian Standard Institution Code shall be referred to. 

PART D

80

However, none of the above mentioned authorities define the phrase ‘dead end

sides of a building’. Though, NBC 2005 uses the phrase in reference to dead end

situation of road, corridor, water supply etc., no reference with respect to ‘dead end

sides of a building’ is made.

95 Therefore, NBCC wrote to the Bureau of Indian Standards23 and NOIDA on 3

September 2016 and 30 August 2016 respectively, seeking a clarification on the

meaning of the phrase ‘dead end sides of a building’. BIS through a letter dated 9

September 2016 stated that the phrase was only used in NBR 2010 and not the

NBC 2005 that was brought by BIS, and therefore, it was not best suited to provide

an interpretation on the phrase. NOIDA vide a letter dated 30 August 2016 stated

that it refers to “[a]n area/side of a building or a residence having no

access/entrance or exit becomes a dead end area/side of the building, though it may

have openings for ventilation”.

96 NBCC submitted its report on 13 October 2016. The report discusses the

structure of T-1 and T-17, the meaning of the phrase ‘dead end side of a building’

and concludes that the sides of T-1 and T-17 facing each other are not dead end

sides of the buildings. NBCC made the following observations on the structure of T-1

and T-17 after site verification:

(i) The ground floor of T-17 is allocated for commercial shops. The remaining

floors in T-17 will have residential flats with windows/balconies/ventilators on

 23 “BIS”

PART D

81

all sides. Except for one opening for a fire exit, there will be no opening on the

ground floor on the side that faces T-1. However, all other floors (i.e., except

the ground floor) will have an opening on the side that faces T-1;

(ii) The entry to T-17 is on the side that is perpendicular to the side that is facing

T-1;

(iii) The entry to the residential flats of T-1 is from the side facing T-17;

(iv) T-1 has offsets. Therefore, the space between T-1 and T-17 varies from 9.3

mtrs. to 25 mtrs.;

(v) The habitable rooms with balconies in T-1 and T-17 face each other; and

(vi) T-1 and T-17 do not taper at the higher floor. None of the tower wings have

different heights.

97 Since there is no clarity on the meaning of ‘dead end side of a building’,

NBCC interpreted the phrase by referring to the use of the phrase ‘dead end’ in NBC

2005 in the context of roads, water supply network etc. where the passage is limited.

The report stated that “a dead end exists in the corridor or passageway where there

is only one direction to travel to an exit”. Using this meaning as a reference, NBCC

interpreted the phrase of ‘dead end side of building’ to hold that T-1 and T-17 do not

have dead end sides facing each other. Further, NBCC also observed that the

distance between T-1 and T-17 does not comply with the distance rule specified in

NBC 2005:

“6. The dead end sides, as per regulation 24.2.1 (6) of NBR

2010 would mean where habitable rooms of the building

do not face each other and the distance between two 

PART D

82

adjacent building blocks shall be 9 mtrs and otherwise it shall

be 16 mtrs as per NBC 2005. In the present case both the

buildings i.e T-1 & T-17 have habitable rooms (with

balconies) facing each other so these are not dead

ends”.

7. Whether the side of T-17 which is facing T-1 is its deadend side:

(a) The T-17 has entry & exit routes on the sides

perpendicular to the side facing T-1. Therefore, the side of

tower T-17 which faces T-1 is not the front-side, and

therefore, the ‘Building Separation’ between T-1 & T-17

should be guided by those clause(s) in NBC 2005 that

guide(s) open spaces to the sides of a building.

(b) On the ground floor, tower T-17 has commercial

space/shops which would be always busy/occupied with

people for most of the time during a normal dat.

(c) On higher floors it has balconies & terraces anchored to

habitable rooms on all sides.

Inference: From (i), (ii) & (iii) above, the side of T-17 which

faces T-1 would naturally have frequent human use & activity

both during daytime and nighttime, every day of the year, for

however short the durations, both on ground and on higher

floors (balconies & terraces anchored to habitable rooms) on

any normal day. Therefore, it may be safe to conclude it is not

a dead-end side of T-17.

8. Whether the side of T-1 which faces T-17 is its dead-end

side: The side of T-1 facing T-17 has three sections, and its

middle section is offset further away from Tower T-17 while

the two sections at the ends are in the same line. However,

that section is the main entry/exist to the Tower. The

remaining portion of the side facing Tower T-17 is also

not inactive since it has balconies & terraces anchored to

habitable rooms and/or toilets.

Inference: The entry to tower T-1 is from the side facing

Tower-17. This the side of tower 1 facing tower-17 cannot be

treated as dead end side of tower-1.”

(emphasis supplied)

PART D

83

98 The appellant filed its objections to the report of NBCC, contending the

following:

(i) The scope of enquiry was restricted by this Court to the issue whether T-1

and T-17 have dead end sides facing each other for the purpose of

Regulation 24.2.1(6) of the NBR 2010. However, NBCC has widened the

scope of enquiry and determined if the sanction is in compliance with the

distance rule in NBC 2005;

(ii) The entry to the ground floor of T-17 is provided on both sides. For the

commercial shops, the entry is on the side perpendicular to the side facing T1, and for the other facilities it is on the other side opening towards the side of

T-16 and the open space;

(iii) The passage between T-1 and T-17 is used only to enter into the parking

space allotted for the houses in T-1 toT-15. To enter the parking space of T17, another passage is used;

(iv) Four out of the five external sides of the apartments in T-1 facing T-17 are

dead ends (two plumbing shafts, toilet dead wall, bedroom dead wall). Only

the fifth external side of T-1, which is a balcony attached to the living room,

faces towards T-17;

(v) Though the entry in T-1 is facing T-17, the entry is 20 mtrs. away from T-17;

(vi) NBCC has failed to consider the different line positions with respect to T-1

and T-17. There are sixteen line positions of the sides of T-1 and T-17 that 

PART D

84

are facing each other and they are predominantly dead end sides. Of the

sixteen line positions:

a. Eleven line positions have dead walls facing each other;

b. Two line positions have dead walls of T1 facing windows of T-17.

However, there is a 16 mtrs. open space between them;

c. Two line positions have the railings of common lift lobbies of T-1 facing the

bed room window of T-17. However, there is a 3 mtrs. open space

between them; and

d. One line position where the dead wall of shaft of T-1 faces the railing of

balcony in T-17, there is 9.30 mtrs. of open space between them. The

open space between the walls of both the buildings in this line space is

10.80 mtrs.

99 The first respondent also sought an expert opinion on whether T-1 and T-17

have dead end sides facing each other from IIT Delhi. The report was submitted on

6 September 2016 to this Court, and concluded that the sides of T-1 and T-17 that

face each other cannot be considered as ‘dead end sides of the building’. It was

observed that when balconies and windows (or any other egress) are provided, the

functional performance will be compromised if the minimum distance as prescribed

is not adhered to. Elaborating further, it was stated that the minimum distance can

be reduced when there is no egress on the concerned side of the building because

then there would be no possibility of a functional compromise. The reasoning in the

report is summarized below: 

PART D

85

(i) The dictionary meaning of ‘dead end’ is ‘“no exit”, i.e., no egress or without

openings. Therefore, the presence of any opening in the form of windows of

balconies renders the building side not a dead end;

(ii) The purpose of prescribing a minimum distance requirement between two

buildings is to prevent transmission of fire for safe escape during calamities,

minimum ventilation, and to receive natural day light. In case the minimum

distance requirement between buildings with egress facing another building is

not complied with, then the function of the egress (through window or

balcony) will be compromised due to the following reasons:

a. To avoid transmission of fire: According to NBC 2005, fire separation is

defined as the distance from the ‘external wall’ of a building to the ‘external

wall’ of another building. There is an increased possibility for fire to be

transmitted to the adjacent building through windows. However, if the walls

have no openings, then the distance between the buildings can be less

since there is a lesser chance for transmission of fire;

b. Safe escape and rescue: As the height of the building increases, there is

an increased difficulty to rescue residents in case of emergency situations.

In such cases, open balconies can be used to facilitate rescue operations

provided that the street has sufficient width. As the height of the building

increases, for maximum safe inclination of the ladder, the street has to be

wider;

PART D

86

c. Minimum ventilation: Minimum natural ventilation is required for hygienic

ventilation (i.e., the removal of CO2, body odour, etc.), for heat exchange

and cooling of the building; and

d. Natural day light: When the distance between two buildings is high, the

building receives direct sunlight;

(iii) The main entry/exit of T-1 is facing T-17. This entry is the only one that abuts

the road and will in all probability be used for rescue operations if the need

arises. The balconies of habitable rooms in T-1 and T-17 also face each

other. Therefore, the concerned building sides (of T-1 facing T-17 and vice

versa) cannot be considered as dead ends since the sides have egress.

Moreover, a reduction in the minimum distance requirement would severely

compromise the purpose of providing such egress.

100 The first respondent by a letter dated 6 October 2016 also sought an expert

opinion from IIT Roorkee on whether T-1 and T-17 have dead end sides facing each

other. A report was submitted in October 2016 to this Court holding that the building

sides of T-1 and T-17 facing each other cannot be termed as ‘dead ends’ for the

following reasons:

(i) The scientific basis of providing the distance requirement is to enhance fire

safety, provide sufficient day light and ventilation, visual privacy and air flow;

(ii) The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines ‘Dead End’ as a street that ends

instead of joining with another street so that there is only one way in and out

of it. ‘Dead wall’ is defined as a wall without openings such as doors, windows

PART D

87

and ventilators. Therefore, evidently, openings for fenestration and the

presence of balconies and windows would mean that the ‘side’ is not a dead

end side;

(iii) When the side of the building facing another building has egress, the

minimum distance specified under the Regulations must be complied with.

Otherwise, the functional performances of the egress (i.e., balcony, window,

etc.) will be compromised; and

(iv) The main entry, the doors, windows, and balconies of T-1 face T-17. Since

the side of T-1 facing T-17 has egress, it is not a ‘dead end side’.

101 The appellant approached Design Forum International24, an architectural and

design firm, requesting their assistance in the ongoing case. DFI through its report

made the following observations on NBCC’s report regarding the dead end issue:

(i) T-1 and T-17 vary in design. T-17 has nearly three times the length when

compared to T-1. Moreover, the portion of T-17 that overlaps T-1 is not

constant along the whole length. Therefore, it is necessary that the sides of

the towers facing each other are examined in a more detailed manner;

(ii) The entry of T-1 and T-17 is perpendicular to each other;

(iii) The sides of T-1 and T-17 can be classified into the following three

categories: (a) dead end facing dead end (i.e., a wall facing a wall); (b) dead

end facing a non-dead end (i.e., a wall facing a window); and (c) non-dead

end facing a non-dead end (i.e., a window facing a window);

 24 “DFI”

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(iv) The position is clear under Regulation 24.2.1(6) of NBR 2010 that for cases

falling under (a), the distance between the buildings must be 9 mtrs. and for

cases falling under (c), the distance must be 16 mtrs. However, for cases that

fall under (b), there is no clarity on the distance that must be maintained

between the buildings;

(v) There are thirteen unique line positions between T-1 and T-17. Of the thirteen

line positions, in six line positions the dead end side of T-1 faces the dead

end side of T-17 (Type (a)); in four line positions, the dead end side of T1/T17 faces the non- dead end side of the other (Type (b)); in three line positions,

the non-dead end side of T-1 and T-17 face each other (Type (c));

(vi) For the line positions falling under type (a), the distance varies from 9.88

mtrs. to 15.11 mtrs. complying with the 9 mtrs. requirement; for the line

positions falling under type (b), the distance varies from 10.8 mtrs. to 15.3

mtrs.; for the line positions falling under type (c), the distance varies between

14.62 mtrs. to 15.5 mtrs., which is ‘very slightly lesser’ than the required 16

mtrs.;

(vii) Since the distance between the sides of T-1 and T-17 facing each other differ

widely and is not uniform, this Court will have to undertake an in depth

analysis of the issue keeping in mind the unique situation; and

(viii) The minute deficiency in case of type (c) and type (b) (if this Court declares

the distance to be deficient) can be rectified by making structural alterations in

the buildings by shifting the position of the egresses. 

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102 The NBR 2010 does not provide any definition of the phrase ‘the dead end

side of the block.’ NBR 2006, NBC 2005 and the UPIAD Act 1976 also do not define

the phrase. The Court while interpreting the expression will have to attribute a

contextual meaning to the phrase ‘dead end side of the block’. The above reports

adopt two different meanings of the phrase. The NBCC report and the appellant in

its objections before the NBCC state that the dead end sides of the building would

mean where ‘habitable rooms’ of a building do not face each other. Though it is not

specified that only habitable rooms with ‘windows/balconies’ will not be considered

as dead ends, it is evident that the argument is that it is only if a habitable room with

egress faces the side of the adjacent building, that it should not be considered as a

dead end side. The corollary is that if the store room or the bathroom or corridor with

a window/vent faces the side of the adjacent building it must still be considered as a

dead end. Whereas, the reports by IIT Delhi and IIT Roorkee take another approach

by defining a dead end side of a building as a side with egress (i.e., windows,

balconies or vents) without any reference to ‘habitable rooms’.

103 Two other contentions on the interpretation of the phrase have also been

raised. It is contended that the phrase is ambiguous to the extent that it does not

provide clarity on whether an egress of a building facing a dead wall of the adjacent

building would fall within the exception. It is also contended that since the height of

T-1 and T-17 is not the same, two egresses in adjacent buildings face each other

only in a few line positions, and the requirement of minimum distance between the 

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adjacent buildings must differ with each line position depending upon whether those

specific line positions are dead ends.

104 We are therefore faced with three questions while interpreting the phrase

‘dead end sides of the buildings’:

(i) whether only habitable rooms with egress in any part of the building must be

excluded from the ambit of the phrase ‘dead end sides of the buildings’;

(ii) whether both sides of the buildings must be dead end sides, or whether it is

sufficient if one side of the building is a dead end side; and

(iii) whether the direct line position must be used for the determination of ‘dead

end sides of the building’ and the distance between two adjacent buildings.

105 We are unable to accept the contention that only habitable rooms with egress

(that is, windows or balconies) will fall outside the ambit of ‘dead end side of the

buildings’. ‘Dead end’ in common parlance means no exit or absence of access.

NBR 2010 does not provide any indication to classify between habitable and nonhabitable rooms in the context of the phrase ‘dead end side’. The argument that the

classification between habitable and non-habitable rooms has been made in the

Model Bye-Laws with specific reference to the distance requirement and therefore, it

must be imported for the interpretation of the phrase ‘dead end sides of the building’

is unsatisfactory. It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that words must be

given their plain and ordinary meaning unless such an interpretation leads to an

ambiguity or absurdity or when the object of the statute indicates otherwise. The use

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of the phrase ‘dead end side of the building’ in NBR 2010, in spite of the other bye

laws using the phrase ‘habitable rooms’, makes it evident that the intent was to

restrict the ambit of the exception. Interpreting the phrase in the context of the

ordinary meaning of the word ‘dead end’ does not lead to any ambiguity; rather it is

in pursuance of the intent and purpose behind the provision. As stated by the reports

submitted by IIT Delhi and IIT Roorkee, the purpose of prescribing a higher

minimum distance between adjacent buildings in case the side of the building facing

another has egress is so that the functional utility of the egress (either a window or

balcony) is not diminished. Windows/balconies, irrespective of whether they are

attached to a habitable or a non-habitable room, perform functions which will be

greatly diminished if the adjacent building is closer and thereby restricting the air

flow and increasing the chance of transmissibility in the event of a fire. Moreover, the

privacy of the flat dwellers would be severely compromised. The expansion of the

meaning of the phrase ‘dead end side of the building’ to include non-habitable rooms

with windows would thus amount to rewriting the regulation, when no such indication

can be construed from NBR 2006 or NBR 2010.

106 The contention that the dead end exception will be applicable, even if one

side of the two adjacent buildings has a dead end is erroneous. Regulation 24.2.1(6)

of NBR 2010 states “If the blocks have dead end sides facing each other, then the

spacing shall be maximum 9 meters instead of 16 meters”. The words ‘blocks’ and

‘sides’ in the plural form find place in Regulation 24.2.1(6) of NBR 2010. The

Regulation does not state ‘if the block having a dead end side’. When the phrases or 

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words are free from ambiguity and when there is only one meaning that the phrase

would take when fairly construed, it will have to be literally construed, and courts

must not resort to a liberal interpretation which will defeat the intent, purpose and

object of a provision in a planning regulation.

107 The report submitted by DFI refers to the variant heights of T-1 and T-17. The

contention is that since the structure of T-1 and T-17 are different, and since the

towers horizontally overlap with each other only to the extent of the height of the

shorter tower (T-1), the distance between T-1 and T-17 must be measured in the

direct line positions. These direct line positions are then classified into three

categories (Category (a) - dead end facing dead end; Category (b) - dead end facing

a non-dead end; Category (c) - a non-dead end facing a non-dead end). The

distances between T-1 and T-17 with respect to each of these types have been

measured to argue that for lines falling in category (a), it is enough if the distance is

9 mtrs; for those falling under category (b), there is no clarity on the distance

required; and for lines in category (c), a minimum distance of 16 mtrs. is required.

This argument rests on two premises: (i) the minimum distance requirement

prescribed under Regulation 24.2.1(6) of NBR 2010 is not the distance between two

buildings but is rather the distance between the different direct line positions

between two adjacent buildings; and (ii) it is necessary for the entire adjacent blocks

to have non-dead end sides facing each other for the 16 mtrs. distance rule to be

applied uniformly. 

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108 The phrase which is used in Regulation 24.2.1(6) of NBR 2010 is ‘block’ and

not ‘flat’/‘unit’. The unit of consideration is thus not individual ‘units’ in the block but

the entire block itself. The side of the block would not be a dead end side if there are

even few egresses. If the direct line position argument is accepted, then the intent

behind providing the minimum distance requirement would become nugatory. The

purpose of imposing the minimum distance requirement as stated in the reports of

IIT Delhi and IIT Roorkee is to provide ventilation, direct sun light, means of rescue

and prevent the spread of fire. If particular ‘flats’/‘units’ in the block have a vent

according to the construction plan, the minimum distance would have to be complied

with, not just with respect to the direct line but with respect to the ‘entire block’.

109 The reports of IIT Delhi and IIT Roorkee clearly elucidate the difficulty in

evacuation of occupants in high rise buildings. The report states that the distance

between adjacent buildings needs to be greater for taller buildings since the street

has to be wider for the maximum safe inclination of the ladder. The reports also

mention the reduction in ventilation, sunlight and privacy in case the distance

between the buildings is less. Therefore, irrespective of whether all or some of the

units in the block have an egress facing the adjacent building, the minimum distance

of 16 mtrs. will have to be complied with, otherwise the purpose of providing the vent

would be functionally compromised

110 In view of the above discussion, the principles that would guide the

interpretation of the phrase ‘dead end sides of the blocks’ are as follows: 

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(i) The phrase ‘dead end side of the block’ would mean that any building does

not have an egress;

(ii) An egress in a non-habitable room like the bathroom or the storeroom will be

considered as a non-dead end side;

(iii) For the ‘dead end’ exception to be applicable, it is necessary that the sides of

both the buildings facing each other must not have any egress;

(iv) It is not necessary that all the units in the building facing the other building

must have an egress. Even if some of the units have an egress, that side of

the block will not be considered as a ‘dead end side’; and

(v) The minimum distance required between two adjacent blocks must not be

measured through direct line positions of the units but along the ground.

111 On application of the principles deduced above on the interpretation of the

expression ‘dead end side of the building’, the sides of T-1 and T-17 facing each

other are held not to be dead end sides for the following reasons:

(i) The windows/corridors of T-17 on all floors except the ground floor have an

opening on the side that faces T-1. Though this is contested by the appellant,

it has been conceded that there are at least a few windows/balconies in T-1

facing T-17 and vice versa;

(ii) The entries of T-1 and T-17 do not face each other but are perpendicular to

each other. However, the entry to T-1 is from the side facing T-17;

(iii) Four out of five external sides of T-1 that face T-17 are dead end sides.

However, the fifth side is a balcony of the living room facing T-17. The 

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distance between points of the buildings cannot be selectively measured to

argue its compliance with the distance rule; and

(iv) Even though the entry of T-1 facing T-17 is 20 mtrs. away, the distance rule

is not complied with since a selective measurement from the dead end points

cannot be undertaken. The distance must be measured along the ground.

Thus, we find that the revised plans were in violation of NBR 2010 and do not fall

under the exception provided in Regulation 24.2.1.6 for blocks having dead end

sides.

D.2 Violation of NBC 2005

112 We shall now address the question of whether the third revised plans violated

the NBC 2005. As we have seen above, NBC 2005 is referenced in Regulations

24.2.1.6 of the NBR 2010. NBC 2005 has two parts in regard to the maintenance of

open spaces – para 8.2.3.1 and para 8.2.3.2. Para 8.2.3.1 provides for open spaces

for buildings above the height of 10 mtrs., which are specified in Table 2. Table 2

indicates that the side and rear open spaces correspond to the height of the building

and increase accordingly, beginning with 3 mtrs. for a building of a height of 10 mtrs.

and up to 16 mtrs., where the height of the building is 55 mtrs. and above. In

addition, Note 3 clarifies that where either the length and depth of the building

exceeds 40 mtrs., the minimum distance which is prescribed must be further

increased by ten percent of the length and depth of the building minus 4 mtrs. Thus, 

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the calculation for the side and rear open spaces to be left around the building would

be as follows:

(third revision) (second revision)

Height of the Building 84.5 m25 73 m

Minimum distance

prescribed in Col 3 of

Table 22 (for buildings

above 55 mtrs)

16 m 16 m

Distance to be

maintained as per Note

3:

Distance in col (3) + 10%

of the length or depth of

building – 4.0 mtrs

16 + 10% (84.5) – 4 =

20.45 mtrs

16 + 10% (73) – 4 = 19.3

mtrs

Thus, according to the NBC 2005, the spacing between T-1 and T-17 should be

20.45 mtrs. Evidently then, the second and third revised plans were not in

accordance with the NBC 2005. This conclusion is fortified by the report of the

NBCC, which in para 5 reaches the conclusion that the minimum open space around

T-17 is to be 20.45 mtrs. and thus, the distance between T-1 and T-17 does not

comply with para 8.2.3.1 of the NBC 2005.

113 An alternative to para 8.2.3.1 has been provided in para 8.2.3.2 for ‘tower like

structures’. Para 8.2.3.2 stipulates that for a structure of a height up to 24 mtrs. with

one set-back, the open spaces at the ground level should not be less than 6 mtrs.; if

 25 The total actual length of T-17 as noted in the NBCC Report is 84.5 m as against the envisaged 121 m. 

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the height is between 24 mtrs. and 37.5 mtrs. with one set-back, the open space at

the ground level must be not less than 9 mtrs.; and for heights above 37.5 mtrs. with

two set-backs, the open space at the ground level should not be less than 12 mtrs.

Additionally, under (d) of para 8.2.3.1, the deficiency in open spaces of tower like

structures (as compared to all building of height above 10 mtrs. in para 8.2.3.1) can

be made good by providing set-backs at the upper levels, so long as the set-backs

are not accessible from individual rooms or flats at these levels.

114 A reading of para 8.2.3.2 indicates that this exception is only applicable if the

deficiency in open spaces can be made good by set-backs at the upper level.

Clause (d) of para 8.2.3.2 of the NBC 2005 is ex facie not attracted for the reason

that there are no set-backs at the upper levels within the contemplation of the

disputed constructions. In any case, even para 8.2.3.2 provides that for tower like

structures higher than 37.5 mtrs. with two setbacks, the open space should be not

less than 12 mtrs. Thus, the exception is of no aid to the appellant and NOIDA which

has issued the third revised plan envisaging a distance of 9 mtrs. between T-1 and

T-17.

D.3 Violation of Fire Safety Norms

115 The appellant requested for a fire NOC for the construction of T-16 and T-17.

On 11 September 2009, a report was submitted to the CFO observing that the road

is wide enough for vehicles of the Fire Brigade Department to reach the spot in case

of emergency situations. However, clause 10 of the report states that Part III and 

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Part IV of NBC 2005 will have to be complied with during the construction of the

building and in case of non-compliance, the NOC shall stand cancelled. Para 8.2.3.1

of NBC 2005 prescribes a minimum of 16 mtrs. for the side and rear open spaces of

buildings which are 55 mtrs. high and above.

116 On 18 August 2011, the CFO issued a temporary fire NOC for the

construction of T-16 and T-17. This letter also stated that the applicant will have

make arrangements for fire safety compliant with the NBC 2005. On 29 March 2012,

the CFO issued a notice to the appellant highlighting various shortcomings in fire

security provisions. On 24 April 2012, the CFO wrote to NOIDA stating that the

distance between T-1 and T-17 is only 9 mtrs. which is violative of NBR 2006, NBR

2010 and NBC 2005 and asking if NOIDA had provided any exemption to the

distance rule to appellant. The CFO issued a show cause notice to the appellant on

17 July 2012 directing that T-16 and T-17 that are under construction be physically

separated from the ‘old towers’.

117 A complaint was made by the first respondent to the CFO on the noncompliance of the conditions stipulated for the grant of the NOC for the complex (for

T1 to T-15). A committee was constituted to look into the complaint and the following

observations were made by the committee:

(i) A show cause notice was issued for the construction of a second staircase.

The stair case has still not been built;

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(ii) People are living in quarters constructed in the basement which is not in

accordance with the NBC 2005 provisions;

(iii) Set back is used as a parking, so the effective set back in certain places is

reduced by 2 mtrs. and is thus less than the required 9 mtrs.;

(iv) On the rear side of the tower, 6 mtrs. set back is not available.

118 These suggestions given by the committee were required to be complied with

within six months. Since they were not complied with, a show cause notice was

issued on 30 May 2014 for not remedying the deficiencies.

119 Regulation 76 of NBR 2006 states that the building must be planned and

constructed in accordance with Part IV of National Building Code 1970, amended as

of that day. Para 4.6 of NBC 2005 states that the approach to the building and the

open spaces on all the sides of a high rise building shall be 6 mtrs. and that the

layout of the building must be made in consultation with the CFO. However, para

8.2.3.1 of NBC 2005 prescribes a minimum of 16 mtrs. side and rear spaces for

buildings that are higher than 55 mtrs. Therefore, on reading NBC 2005 as a whole,

the side and rear space around the building must be 16 mtrs. The distance between

T-1 and T-17 is only 9 mtrs., which is less than the required 16 mtrs.

120 The temporary NOC that was given by the CFO clearly states that the NBC

2005 must be complied with. However, as shown above, the provisions of NBC 2005

have not been complied with. Therefore, given that the rear distance requirement

under NBC 2005 has not been complied with, the NOC given by the CFO stands

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automatically cancelled in terms of the report dated 11 September 2009 and letter

dated 18 August 2011.

E Consent of the RWA

121 Having held above that the sanction for the construction of T-16 and T-17

were given by NOIDA in contravention of the minimum distance requirement

provided by the Building Regulations, we will advert to the next issue. It has been

contended by RWA that the sanction could not have been revised without the

consent of the flat purchasers in the original fifteen towers. While analyzing this

issue, it is first important to consider the appellant’s preliminary objection that the UP

1975 Act is not applicable to the present case. After addressing the preliminary

objection, we shall analyze whether the consent was actually required under the UP

1975 Act and UP Apartments Act 2010.

E.1 Applicability of UP 1975 Act

122 The UP 1975 Act has been described in its long title as “an Act to provide for

matters connected with the ownership and use of individual flats in buildings

consisting of four or more flats”. Section 2 of the Act states that the Act shall apply

only to owners who submit to the provisions of the Act by executing a declaration.

Section 2 reads as follows:

“2. Application of the Act. — This Act applies only to

property, the sole owner or all the owners of which submit the

same to the provisions of this Act by duly executing and

registering a Declaration setting out the particulars referred to

in section 10:

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Provided that no property shall be submitted to the provisions

of this Act, unless it is actually used or is proposed to be used

for residential purposes:

Provided further that the sole owner or all the owners of the

land on which building is situated may submit such land to the

provisions of this Act with a condition that he or they shall

grant a lease of such land to the owners of the flats, the terms

and conditions of the lease being disclosed in the declaration

either by annexing a copy of the instrument of lease to be

executed to the declaration or otherwise.”

123 Section 3(d)26 contains the definition of common area and facilities. Section

427 stipulates that a flat shall be transferable and heritable property. Each owner of a

flat is entitled to exclusive ownership and possession of their flat in accordance with

the declaration. Moreover, a flat together with its undivided interest in the common

areas and facilities shall be heritable and transferable immoveable property. Further,

a flat together with its undivided interest in the common areas and facilities shall not

be partitioned or sub-divided for any purpose.

 26“ (d) “common areas and facilities” includes—

(1) the land on which the building is located and all easements, rights and appurtenances belonging to the land and

the building;

(2) the foundations, columns, girders, beams, supports, main wall, roofs, halls, corridors, lobbies, stairs, stair-way,

fire-escapes and entrances and exits of the building;

(3) the basements, cellars, yards, gardens, parking areas and storage spaces;

(4) the premises for the lodging of janitors or persons employed for the management of the property;

(5) installations of common services, such as power, light, gas, hot and cold water, heating, refrigeration, air

conditioning and sewerage;

(6) the elevators, tanks, pumps, motors, expressors, pipes and ducts and in general all apparatus and installations

existing for common use;

(7) such other common facilities as may be specially provided for in the Declaration;

(8) all other parts of the property necessary or convenient to its existence, maintenance and safety or normally in

common use;”

27 “4. Flat to be transferable and heritable property.—(1) Each owner of a flat shall be entitled to the exclusive

ownership and possession of his flat in accordance with the Declaration.

(2) Subject to the provisions of the second proviso to section 2, a flat, together with its undivided interest in the

common areas and facilities, shall constitute heritable and transferable immovable property within the meaning of any

law for the time being in force:

Provided that no flat and the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appurtenant to such

flat shall be partitioned or sub-divided for any purpose whatsoever.”

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124 Section 5 provides for common areas and facilities in the following terms:

“5. Common areas and facilities. — (1) Each owner of a flat

shall be entitled to an undivided interest in the common areas

and facilities in the percentage expressed in the Declaration.

(2) The percentage of the undivided interest of each

owner of a flat in the common areas and facilities as

expressed in the Declaration shall not be altered without

the consent of all the owners of the flats expressed in an

amended Declaration duly executed and registered as

required by this Act.

(3) The percentage of the undivided interest in the common

areas and facilities shall not be separated from the flat to

which it appertains, and shall be deemed to be conveyed or

encumbered with the flat even though such interest is not

expressly mentioned in the conveyance or other instrument.

(4) The common areas and facilities shall remain undivided,

and no suit shall lie at the instance of any owner of the flat or

other person for partition or division of any part thereof,

unless the property have been withdrawn from the provisions

of this Act.

(5) Each owner of a flat may use the common areas and

facilities for the purpose for which they are intended without

hindering or encroaching upon the lawful rights of the owners

of other flats.

(6) The work relating to the maintenance, repair and

replacement of the common areas and facilities and the

making of any additions or improvement thereto shall be

carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Act and

the bye-laws.

(7) The Association of Owners of flats shall have irrevocable

right to be exercised by the Manager or the Board of

Managers on behalf of the Association with such assistance

as the Manager or the Board of Managers, as the case may

be, considers necessary to have access to each flat from time

to time during reasonable hours, for the maintenance, repair

and replacement of any of the common areas and facilities

therein or accessible therefrom or for making emergency 

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repairs therein to prevent any damage to the common areas

and facilities or to other flats.”

(emphasis supplied)

Under sub-Section (2) of Section 5, the percentage of the undivided interest of each

owner of a flat in the common areas and facilities, as expressed in the Declaration,

shall not be altered without the consent of all the owners of the flats expressed

through an amended Declaration which shall be executed and registered under the

Act. Section 1028 provides for the contents of such a Declaration. Further, Section

1129 envisages that all the owners of flats may withdraw a property from the

provisions of the Act by an instrument executed to that effect, following which it shall

be deemed to be owned in common by the owners of flats wherein the share of each

 28 “10. Contents of Declaration.—(1) The declaration referred to in section 2 shall be submitted in such form and in

such manner as may be prescribed and shall contain the following particulars, namely:—

(a) description of the property, namely the description of the land on which the building is or is to be located, whether

the land is freehold or leasehold and whether any lease of the land is to be granted in accordance with the second

proviso to section 2, and description of the building or proposed building stating the number of storeys and

basements and the number of flats;

(b) nature of interest of the owner or owners in the property;

(c) existing encumbrance, if any, affecting the property;

(d) description of each flat containing its location, approximate area, number of rooms, immediate common area to

which it has access, and any other data necessary for its proper identification;

(e) description of the common areas and facilities;

(f) description of the limited common areas and facilities, if any, stating to which flats their use is reserved;

(g) value of the property and of each flat, and the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities

appertaining to each flat and its owner for all purposes, including voting.”

29 “11. Withdrawal from the provisions of the Act.— (1) All the owners of flats may withdraw a property from the

provisions of this Act by an instrument executed to that effect.

(2) Upon the property being withdrawn from the provisions of this Act, it shall be deemed to be owned in common by

the owners of flats and the share of each such owner in the property shall be the percentage of undivided interest

previously owned by such owner in the common areas and facilities.

(3) Any encumbrance affecting any of the flats shall be deemed to be transferred in accordance with the existing

priority to the percentage of the undivided interest of the owner of the flat in the property as provided therein.

(4) The withdrawal provided for in sub-section (1) shall in no way bar the subsequent resubmission of the property to

the provisions of this Act.”

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such owner shall be the percentage of undivided interest previously owned in the

common areas and facilities.

125 The submission urged on behalf of the appellant is that the UP 1975 Act has

no application to the present case, in view of the provisions of Section 2. Section 2,

as we have seen, specifies that the Act applies only to a property, the sole owner or

all the owners of which, submit it to the provisions of the Act by duly executing and

registering a Declaration setting out the particulars as contained in Section 10.

126 Undoubtedly, in this case there was no declaration in terms of Section 2.

However, significantly, the lease deed which was executed by NOIDA in favour of

the appellant on 16 March 2005, contains a stipulation in clause II(h) in the following

terms:

“II) AND THE LESSEE DOTH HEREBY DECLARE AND

COVENANTS WITH THE LESSOR IN THE MANNER

FOLLOWING:

[…]

h) The Lessee/sub-lessee shall make such arrangement as

are necessary for maintenance of the building and common

services and if the building is not maintained properly the

Chief Executive Officer, Noida or any officer authorized by

him will have the power to get the maintenance done through

the Authority and recover the amount so spent from the

Lessee/Sub-Lessee. The Lessee/Sub-Lessee will be

individually and severally liable for payment of the

maintenance amount. The rule/regulation of U.P. Flat

Ownership Act, 1975 shall be applicable on the

lessee/sub-lessee.” (emphasis supplied)

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127 Mr Ravindra Kumar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of NOIDA,

advanced a submission that the last sentence of clause II(h) must be read together

with the entirety of the clause, which relates to the maintenance of the building and

common services. Clause II(h) states that in the event the building or common

services are not maintained properly, NOIDA would be entitled to ensure the

maintenance and recover the amount from the lessee/sub-lessee.

128 However, the application of clause II(h) cannot be brushed away on this

basis, particularly since the sentence imposing the application of the UP 1975 Act on

the lessee/sub-lessee must bear some meaning and content. In this context, during

the course of his submissions, Mr Jayant Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel

appearing on behalf of the RWA, has placed on the record a copy of the registered

sub-lease executed on a tripartite basis by NOIDA, with the appellant as the lessee

and the flat buyer as the sub-lessee. Some important provisions of this deed of sublease are:

(i) Clause 16 contemplates that the occupant of the ground floor would be

entitled to use a “sit-out area but the right of user shall be subject to the

provisions of the UP Ownership Flat Act 1975”;

(ii) Clause 17 recognizes the right to user of the occupant of the dwelling unit on

the top floor, subject to the provisions of the same enactment; and

(iii) Clause 27 envisages that all clauses of the lease executed by NOIDA in

favour of the appellant on 16 March 2005 shall be applicable to the sub-lease

deed as well. 

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129 In the backdrop of this provision, more particularly, clause II(h) of the lease

deed which was executed by NOIDA in favour of the appellant on 16 March 2005,

the appellant was duty bound to comply with the provisions of the UP 1975 Act. By

submitting before this Court that it is not bound by the terms of its agreement or the

Act for want of a declaration under Section 2, the appellant is evidently attempting to

take advantage of its own wrong.

E.2 Applicability of the UP Apartments Act 2010

130 In 2010, the State legislature enacted the UP Apartments Act 2010. The long

title describes the legislation as:

“An Act to provide for the ownership of an individual

apartment in a building of an undivided interest in the

common areas and facilities appurtenant to such apartment

and to make such apartment and interest heritable and

transferable and for matters connected therewith or incidental

thereto”

131 Section 2 of the Act is in the following terms:

“2. Application.- The provisions of this Act shall apply to all

buildings having four or more apartments in any building

constructed or converted into apartment and land attached to

the apartment, where freehold, or held on lease excluding

shopping malls and multiplexes.”

Thus, in contrast with Section 2 of the UP 1975 Act, the corresponding provision of

the UP Apartments Act 2010 stipulates that the Act shall apply to all buildings with

four or more apartments in any building and land attached to the apartment whether 

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freehold or held on lease. Further, unlike Section 2 of the UP 1975 under which the

Act was to apply only when a declaration in terms of Section 10 was submitted, this

Act does not require a declaration for it to apply.

132 The expression ‘apartment owner’ is defined by Section 3(d) of the Act as

follows:

“(d) “apartment owner” means the person or persons owning

an apartment or the promoter or his nominee in case of

unsold apartments to and an undivided interest in the

common areas and facilities appurtenant to such apartment in

the percentage specified in the Deed of Apartment and

includes the lessee of the land on which the building

containing such apartment has been constructed, where the

lease of such land is for a period of thirty years or more;”

133 The Act contains a definition of common areas in Section 3(i) and of limited

common arears in Section 3(s):

“(i) “common area and facilities” means—

(i) the land on which the building is located and all

easements, rights and appurtenances belonging to the land

and the building;

(ii) the foundations, columns, girders, beams, supports, main

walls, roofs, halls, corridors, lobbies, stairs, stairways, fireescapes and entrances and exits of the building;

(iii) the basements, cellars, yards, parks, gardens, community

centers and parking areas of common use;

(iv) the premises for the lodging of janitors or persons

employed for the management of the property;

(v) installations of central services, such as power, light, gas,

hot and cold water, heating, refrigeration, air conditioning,

incinerating and sewerage;

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(vi) the elevators, tanks, pumps, motors, fans, cable pipe line

(TV, gas, electricity etc.) rain water harvesting system,

compressors, ducts and in general all apparatus and

installations existing for common use;

(vii) such other community and commercial facilities as may

be specified in the bye-laws; and

(viii) all other parts of the property necessary or convenient to

its existence, maintenance and safety, or normally in common

use;

[…]

(s) “limited common areas and facilities” means those

common areas and facilities which are designated in writing

by the promoter before the allotment, sale or other transfer of

any apartment as reserved for use of certain apartment or

apartments to the exclusion of the other apartments;”

134 The general liabilities which have been cast upon promoters intending to sell

an apartment are set out in Section 4(1), which reads as follows:

“4. General liabilities of promoter.— (1) Any promoter who

intends to sell an apartment, shall make a full and true

disclosure in writing of following to an intending purchaser

and the Competent Authority:

(a) rights and his title to the land and the building in which the

apartments have been or proposed to be constructed;

(b) all encumbrances, if any, on such land or building, and

any right, title, interest or claim of any person in or, over such

land or building;

(c) the plans and specifications approved by or submitted for

approval to the local authority of the entire building of which

such apartment forms part;

(d) detail of all common areas and facilities as per the

approved lay-out plan or building plan;

(dd) built-up area and common area of an apartment.

(e) the nature of fixtures, fittings, and amenities, which have

been or proposed to be provided;

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(f) the details of the design and specifications of works or and

standards of the material which have been or are proposed to

be used in the construction of the building, together with the

details of all structural, architectural drawings, layout plans,

no objection certificate from Fire Department, external and

internal services plan of electricity, sewage, drainage and

water supply system etc. to be made available with the

Association;

(g) all outgoings, including ground rent, municipal or other

local taxes, water and electricity charges, revenue

assessments, maintenance and other charges, interest on

any mortgage or other encumbrance, if any, in respect of

such land, building and apartments;

(h) such other information and documents as may be

prescribed.”

Sub-Section (4) of Section 4 contains the following stipulations:

“(4) After plans, specifications and other particulars specified

in this section as sanctioned by the prescribed sanctioning

authority are disclosed to the intending purchaser and a

written agreement of sale is entered into and registered with

the office of concerned registering authorities. The promoter

may make such minor additions or alterations as may be

required by the owner or owners, or such minor changes or

alterations as may be necessary due to architectural and

structural reason's duly recommended and verified by

authorized Architect or Engineer after proper declaration and

intimation to the owner:

Provided that the promoter shall not make any alterations in

the plans, specifications and other particulars without the

previous consent of the intending purchaser, project Architect,

project Engineer and obtaining the required permission of the

prescribed sanctioning authority, and in no case he shall

make such alterations as an not permissible in the building

bye-laws.”

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Under clause (c) of sub-Section (1) of Section 4, a promoter who intends to sell an

apartment is required to make a full disclosure in writing to an intending purchaser

and to the competent authority of the plans and specifications approved or submitted

for approval to the local authority, of the building of which the apartment is a part.

Similarly, under clause (d), a disclosure has to be made in regard to the common

areas and facilities in accordance with the approved lay-out plan or building plan.

Once such a disclosure has been made, sub-Section (4) stipulates that upon the

execution of a written agreement to sell, the promoter may make minor additions or

alterations as may be required or necessary due to architectural and structural

reasons duly authorized and verified by authorized Architects or Engineers. Apart

from these minor additions or alterations which are contemplated by sub-Section (4),

the proviso stipulates that the promoter shall not make any alterations in the plans,

specifications and other particulars “without the previous consent of the intending

purchaser”. Mr Vikas Singh’s submission, that this provision will apply to intending

purchasers of Apex and Ceyane and not to the persons who had purchased

apartments in the existing fifteen towers, cannot be accepted. The above proviso is

evidently intended to protect persons to whom the plans and specifications were

disclosed when they were the “intending purchasers”. Further, a construction to the

contrary will run against the grain of the intent and purpose of the statute as well its

express provisions.

135 Section 5 of the Act provides for the rights of apartment owners in the

following terms, insofar as is relevant:

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“5. Rights of Apartment Owners.— (1) Every person to

whom any apartment is sold or otherwise transferred by the

promoter shall subject to the other provisions of this Act, be

entitled to the exclusive ownership and possession of the

apartment so sold or otherwise transferred to him.

(2) Every person who becomes entitled to the exclusive

ownership and possession of an apartment shall be entitled to

such percentage of undivided interest in the common areas

and facilities as may be specified in the Deed of Apartment

and such percentage shall be computed by taking, as a basis,

the area of the apartment in relation to the aggregate area of

all apartments of the building.

(3)(a) The percentage of the undivided interest of each

apartment owner in the common areas and facilities shall

have a permanent character, and shall not be altered without

the written consent of all the apartment owners and approval

of the competent authority.

(b) The percentage of the undivided interest in the common

areas and facilities shall not be separated from the apartment

to which it appertains and shall be deemed to be conveyed or

encumbered with apartment, even though such interest is not

expressly mentioned in the conveyance or other instrument.”

136 It is important to clarify at this stage that the UP Apartments Act 2010 will not

apply with retrospective effect to the second revised plan, which was sanctioned on

26 November 2009. However, the legislation, which came into force upon

publication in the UP Gazette on 19 March 2010, will have consequences for the

third revised plan sanctioned on 2 March 2012, as analysed below.

E.3 Requirement of RWA’s Consent

137 In terms of the third revised plan which was sanctioned on 2 March 2012, the

height of T-16 and T-17 was sought to be increased from twenty-four to forty (or

thirty-nine, as the case may be) floors. As a result, the total number of flat 

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purchasers would increase from 650 to 1500. The clear implication of this would be

a reduction of the undivided interest of the existing purchasers in the common areas.

As a matter of fact, it has also been submitted on behalf of the first respondent that

the additional lease rent paid to NOIDA was also sought to be collected from the

existing flat purchasers at the rate of Rs 190 per sq. foot. A statement to that effect

was also contained in an affidavit filed before the High Court on behalf of the first

respondent. The purchase of additional FAR by the appellant cannot be used to

trample over the rights of the existing purchasers.

138 Flats were sold on the representation that there would be a garden area

adjacent to T-1. The garden adjacent to T-1 is clearly depicted in the first revised

plan of 29 December 2006. It is this garden area which was encroached upon when

the second revised plan was sanctioned on 26 November 2009.

139 However, according to the appellant, T-16 and T-17 form part of Phase II of

Emerald Court, which had not encroached on any part of the common areas of

Phase I, under which all the other towers fell. In this context, it would be material to

note a letter dated 13 February 2012 addressed to the Circle Officer, City 3rd NOIDA,

Gautam Buddh Nagar, by the Director of the appellant, in which it has been stated

that:

“Kindly, refer to your Letter Dt. 10.02,2012, received by us on

11.02.2012, regarding which written statement on behalf of

M/s. Supertech Limited is presented as under:

1. That, [A]pex and [Ceyane] multi storey residential tower is

being constructed over plot measuring nearly 6500 sq. meter

which was acquired by the Company M/s. Supertech Limited 

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from NOIDA Development Authority in the year 2006,

regarding which its supplementary lease deed was registered

in the office of Sub-Registrar, Second, Gautam Buddh

Nagar…

2. That, right from the beginning there was a pan for

constructing separate complex viz. Apex and [Ceyane]

and provisions have been separately made in both

towers viz. swimming pool, car, club, parking and gym

etc. The facilities of other old towers as shown in the

brochure have been published by mistake, but concerned

amendment was made in the brochure upon the company

being informed by the residents residing in old towers…

[…]

4. That, company has erected wall for the expansion of

basement and above wall was erected by the company over

its land and this basement area was not sold to any resident

of old tower over which company has complete ownership.

No adverse effect is there on the interests of any resident in

erecting above wall, rather the residents of old tower have

been removed from the allotted basement area by it.

Company has full right to make construction over its land.

5. That, construction carried out earlier or being carried out by

the company is completely legal and in accordance with

Rules and company has not affected the interest of anybody

and no fraud was committed by the company with anybody.

Therefore, it appears that the complainant having presented

this false complaint inspired by mala fides wants to harass the

company and wants to earn undue advantage by not making

payment of an amount which is payable to the company.

Therefore, it is requested that complaint presented by the

complainant is liable to be dismissed. In addition, it is also

requested that any personal name be not used in any

correspondence or inquiry, rather name of company through

its Director be used.”

(emphasis supplied)

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The above letter puts forth the case that T-16 and T-17 have been constructed as a

separate project over the area which was obtained under the supplementary lease

deed, and that it has separate provisions for all amenities and infrastructure. In fact,

it indicates that the facilities of the older buyers were shown in the brochure but that

representation was ‘clarified’ to be a ‘mistake’, which had been amended.

140 As such, it becomes important to refer to the supplementary lease deed,

which was granted in favour of the appellant on 21 June 2006. The supplementary

lease deed makes it clear that the demised premises admeasuring 6556.51 sq. mtrs.

would form a part of the originally allotted plot. In the course of its affidavit before the

High Court, the appellant contended that:

“7. The Office bearers/members of the petitioners society has

the right title & interest only in its flat and undivided interest in

the common areas of the Emerald Court (phase I). He has the

right to challenge if somebody is trying to encroach in his flat

or in the Common area are intended to be used for the

purpose of the residents. However, here this is not the case.

It is stated that the “Apex & Ceyane” (Phase II) comprising of

two towers has not encroached any area of the common of

the Emerald Court (Phase I). Therefore the petitioner society

does not have the locus to challenge the issues related with

“Apex & Ceyane” (Phase- II).”

In other words, the case which was sought to be set up was that the flat purchasers

had an undivided interest in the common areas of Phase I of the Emerald Court, but

since T-16 and T-17 formed a part of Phase II, it did not affect the rights of the

original flat purchasers of T-1 to T-15. This contention is expressly contrary to the

clear terms governing the supplementary lease deed, which indicates that the area 

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comprising of the demised premises would form part of the original plot.

Furthermore, the appellant having utilized the FAR of the entire plot, including the

area which forms the subject matter of the original lease and the supplementary

lease, cannot be allowed to assert to the contrary.

141 Hence, it is abundantly clear that the construction of T-16 and T-17 in

accordance with the second revised plan and the third revised plan reduced the

value of the undivided interest held by each individual flat owner in the common

areas and facilities, thereby violating Section 5 of the UP 1975 Act and Section 5 of

the UP Apartments Act 2010, since the flat owners’ consent was not sought. Further,

the third revised plan encroached upon the garden area in front of T-1, thereby

resiling from the representation that had been made to the flat owners at the time

when they purchased the apartments in T-1, without their consent. Therefore, it

constituted a violation of Section 4(1) read with the proviso to Section 4(4) of the UP

Apartments Act 2010.

142 Finally, the appellant has also tried to argue that: (i) the consent of each

individual flat owner could not be taken and it had to be taken from the RWA, as a

collective body; (ii) the RWA only came into existence on 20 October 2013, when it

adopted the Model Bye-Laws under the UP Apartments Act 2010l (iii) that this was

after the third revised plan was sanctioned; and (iv) hence, there existed no

association to take consent from. The High Court has dealt with this argument in the

impugned judgment by observing:

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“As per the averments of the respondent/company, the flats

were handed over to the apartment owners by September

2009. The owners immediately formed Resident Welfare

Association (RWA) and got it registered with the Registrar

Societies, in the very same year. Adopting the model byelaws, did not arise, as it was not enforced until 2011. After

notification of Model bye-laws, the Deputy Registrar Firm,

Societies and Chits, Meerut vide letter dated 14.12.2012

informed, that pending instructions from the Registrar Firm

Societies and Chits Uttar Pradesh, no decision in the matter

can be taken in respect of Model bye-laws and its registration.

The Registrar Firm, Societies and Chits Uttar Pradesh vide

circular dated 5.2.2013 addressed to all Deputy

Registrars/District Registrars issued instructions for

registration under Apartment Act, 2010 and directed that bye

laws of existing RAW be accordingly amended. The

petitioner/society vide resolution dated 20.10.2013 adopted

the Model bye-laws and conducted elections and thereafter

informed the Deputy Registrar.

The respondent/company has recognized the petitioners

society as RWA of the Apartment owners since inception and

has continuously corresponded with the petitioner society as

RWA. Letter dated 9.10.2012, 27.9.2012, 4.9.2012 and

January, 2013 addressed to the petitioner society regarding

redressal of their grievance is on record…”

Therefore, it is clear that: (i) the RWA came into existence in 2009 itself, when the

first lot of apartment owners moved in; (ii) the appellant was communicating with the

RWA ever since; and (iii) the RWA adopted the Model Bye-Laws under the UP

Apartments Act 2010, as soon as it was practicable. These averments have not

been challenged before this Court during the oral submissions by the appellant, and

hence, it will be held bound by its own conduct. In any case, rights under the UP

1975 Act and UP Apartments Act 2010 have been provided to individual flat owners,

and not to collective bodies like the RWA. Hence, even the non-constitution of the

RWA will not extinguish the rights of individual flat owners. Indeed, however, when

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such RWAs do exist, developers may use them to seek a common consent from all

the flat owners instead of approaching them all individually.

F Collusion and Illegal Construction

143 The record of this case is replete with instances which highlight the collusion

between the officers of NOIDA with the appellant and its management. The case

has revealed a nefarious complicity of the planning authority in the violation by the

developer of the provisions of law. The complicity of NOIDA has emerged, inter alia,

from the following instances:

(i) The sanctioning of the second revised plan on 26 November 2009 in clear

breach of the NBR 2006;

(ii) The refusal by NOIDA to disclose the building plans to the first respondent, in

spite of a clear stipulation consistently in all the sanctioned plans that the plan

would have to be displayed at the construction site of the appellant;

(iii) NOIDA’s referral of RWA’s request to access the sanctioned plans to the

appellant to seek its consent and upon the refusal of the latter, a continuous

failure to disclose them to the RWA;

(iv) Even when the CFO addressed a communication to NOIDA in regard to the

violation of the minimum distance requirements in Emerald Court, it evinced

no response and no investigation from them;

(v) In pursuance of the second revised plan of 26 September 2009, the appellant

would appear to have built a foundation to support two buildings of forty and 

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thirty-nine floors, while the sanction for the extension from twenty-four to forty

or thirty-nine floors came about only on 2 March 2012 through the third

revised plan; and

(vi) The construction for T-16 and T-17 commenced in July 2009 by the appellant,

five months before the sanction was received for the second revised plan on

26 November 2009, in spite of which NOIDA chose to take no action.

144 The High Court has dealt with the collusion between the officials of NOIDA

and the appellant. This is writ large from the facts as they have emerged before this

Court as well. The High Court has in these circumstances correctly come to the

conclusion that there was collusion between the developer and the planning

authority.

145 Condition 15 of the third revised plan dated 2 March 2012 stipulated that:

“15. Compliance of provisions of Uttar Pradesh Apartment

(promotion of construction, ownership & maintenance) Act

2010, and directions issued thereunder shall be ascertained.

Sanctioned site plan/map is enclosed with this letter.

Application for utility certificate would be made after

completion of building work within validity of map/site plan,

and without permission and certification building shall not be

used…”

In spite of this condition, NOIDA made no effort to ensure compliance of the UP

Apartments Act 2010, as a result of which the rights of the flat purchasers have been

brazenly violated. This cannot point to any conclusion, other than the collusion

between NOIDA and the appellant to avoid complying with the provisions of the 

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applicable statutes and regulations for monetary gain, at the cost of the rights of the

flat purchasers.

146 The rampant increase in unauthorized constructions across urban areas,

particularly in metropolitan cities where soaring values of land place a premium on

dubious dealings has been noticed in several decisions of this Court. This state of

affairs has often come to pass in no small a measure because of the collusion

between developers and planning authorities.

147 From commencement to completion, the process of construction by

developers is regulated within the framework of law. The regulatory framework

encompasses all stages of construction, including allocation of land, sanctioning of

the plan for construction, regulation of the structural integrity of the structures under

construction, obtaining clearances from different departments (fire, garden, sewage,

etc.), and the issuance of occupation and completion certificates. While the

availability of housing stock, especially in metropolitan cities, is necessary to

accommodate the constant influx of people, it has to be balanced with two crucial

considerations – the protection of the environment and the well-being and safety of

those who occupy these constructions. The regulation of the entire process is

intended to ensure that constructions which will have a severe negative

environmental impact are not sanctioned. Hence, when these regulations are

brazenly violated by developers, more often than not with the connivance of

regulatory authorities, it strikes at the very core of urban planning, thereby directly

resulting in an increased harm to the environment and a dilution of safety standards. 

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Hence, illegal construction has to be dealt with strictly to ensure compliance with the

rule of law.

148 The judgments of this Court spanning the last four decades emphasize the

duty of planning bodies, while sanctioning building plans and enforcing building

regulations and bye-laws to conform to the norms by which they are governed. A

breach by the planning authority of its obligation to ensure compliance with building

regulations is actionable at the instance of residents whose rights are infringed by

the violation of law. Their quality of life is directly affected by the failure of the

planning authority to enforce compliance. Unfortunately, the diverse and unseen

group of flat buyers suffers the impact of the unholy nexus between builders and

planners. Their quality of life is affected the most. Yet, confronted with the economic

might of developers and the might of legal authority wielded by planning bodies, the

few who raise their voices have to pursue a long and expensive battle for rights with

little certainty of outcomes. As this case demonstrates, they are denied access to

information and are victims of misinformation. Hence, the law must step in to protect

their legitimate concerns.

149 In K. Ramadas Shenoy v. Chief Officer, Town Municipal Council30, Chief

Justice AN Ray speaking for a two judge Bench of this Court observed that the

municipality functions for public benefit and when it “acts in excess of the powers

conferred by the Act or abuses those powers then in those cases it is not exercising

 30 (1974) 2 SCC 506

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its jurisdiction irregularly or wrongly but it is usurping powers which it does not

possess”. This Court also held:

“27…The right to build on his own land is a right incidental to

the ownership of that land. Within the Municipality the

exercise of that right has been regulated in the interest of the

community residing within the limits of the Municipal

Committee. If under pretence of any authority which the law

does give to the Municipality it goes beyond the line of its

authority, and infringes or violates the rights of others, it

becomes like all other individuals amenable to the jurisdiction

of the courts. If sanction is given to build by contravening a

bye-law the jurisdiction of the courts will be invoked on the

ground that the approval by an authority of building plans

which contravene the bye-laws made by that authority is

illegal and inoperative. (See Yabbicom v. King [(1899) 1 QB

444]).”

This Court held that an unregulated construction materially affects the right of

enjoyment of property by persons residing in a residential area, and hence, it is the

duty of the municipal authority to ensure that the area is not adversely affected by

unauthorized construction.

150 These principles were re-affirmed by a two judge Bench in Dr G.N. Khajuria

v. Delhi Development Authority31 where this Court held that it was not open to the

Delhi Development Authority to carve out a space, which was meant for a park for a

nursery school. Justice BL Hansaria, speaking for the Court, observed:

“10. Before parting, we have an observation to make. The

same is that a feeling is gathering ground that where

unauthorised constructions are demolished on the force of the

order of courts, the illegality is not taken care of fully

 31 (1995) 5 SCC 762

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inasmuch as the officers of the statutory body who had

allowed the unauthorised construction to be made or make

illegal allotments go scot free. This should not, however, have

happened for two reasons. First, it is the illegal action/order of

the officer which lies at the root of the unlawful act of the

citizen concerned, because of which the officer is more to be

blamed than the recipient of the illegal benefit. It is thus

imperative, according to us, that while undoing the mischief

which would require the demolition of the unauthorised

construction, the delinquent officer has also to be punished in

accordance with law. This, however, seldom happens.

Secondly, to take care of the injustice completely, the officer

who had misused his power has also to be properly punished.

Otherwise, what happens is that the officer, who made the

hay when the sun shined (sic), retains the hay, which tempts

others to do the same. This really gives fillip to the

commission of tainted acts, whereas the aim should be

opposite.”

151 In Friends Colony Development Committee v. State of Orissa32, this Court

dealt with a case where the builder had exceeded the permissible construction

under the sanctioned plan and had constructed an additional floor on the building,

which was unauthorized. Chief Justice RC Lahoti, speaking for a two judge Bench,

observed:

“24. Structural and lot area regulations authorise the

municipal authorities to regulate and restrict the height,

number of storeys and other structures; the percentage of a

plot that may be occupied; the size of yards, courts and open

spaces; the density of population; and the location and use of

buildings and structures. All these have in our view and do

achieve the larger purpose of the public health, safety or

general welfare. So are front setback provisions, average

alignments and structural alterations. Any violation of zoning

and regulation laws takes the toll in terms of public welfare

and convenience being sacrificed apart from the risk,

 32 (2004) 8 SCC 733

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inconvenience and hardship which is posed to the occupants

of the building.”

Noting that the private interest of land owners stands subordinate to the public good

while enforcing building and municipal regulations, the Court issued a caution

against the tendency to compound violations of building regulations:

“25…The cases of professional builders stand on a different

footing from an individual constructing his own building. A

professional builder is supposed to understand the laws

better and deviations by such builders can safely be assumed

to be deliberate and done with the intention of earning profits

and hence deserve to be dealt with sternly so as to act as a

deterrent for future. It is common knowledge that the builders

enter into underhand dealings. Be that as it may, the State

Governments should think of levying heavy penalties on such

builders and therefrom develop a welfare fund which can be

utilised for compensating and rehabilitating such innocent or

unwary buyers who are displaced on account of demolition of

illegal constructions.”

152 In Priyanka Estates International (P) Ltd. v. State of Assam33, Justice

Deepak Verma, speaking for a two judge Bench, observed:

“55. It is a matter of common knowledge that illegal and

unauthorised constructions beyond the sanctioned plans are

on rise, may be due to paucity of land in big cities. Such

activities are required to be dealt with by firm hands otherwise

builders/colonisers would continue to build or construct

beyond the sanctioned and approved plans and would still go

scot-free. Ultimately, it is the flat owners who fall prey to such

activities as the ultimate desire of a common man is to have a

shelter of his own. Such unlawful constructions are definitely

against the public interest and hazardous to the safety of

occupiers and residents of multistoreyed buildings. To some

extent both parties can be said to be equally responsible for

 33 (2010) 2 SCC 27

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this. Still the greater loss would be of those flat owners whose

flats are to be demolished as compared to the builder.”

The Court lamented that the earlier decisions on the subject had not resulted in

enhancing compliance by developers with building regulations. Further, the Court

noted that if unauthorized constructions were allowed to stand or are “given a seal of

approval by Court”, it was bound to affect the public at large. It also noted that the

jurisdiction and power of Courts to indemnify citizens who are affected by an

unauthorized construction erected by a developer could be utilized to compensate

ordinary citizens.

153 In Esha Ekta Apartments Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn.

of Mumbai34, Justice GS Singhvi, writing for a two judge Bench, reiterated the

earlier decisions on this subject and observed:

“8. At the outset, we would like to observe that by rejecting

the prayer for regularisation of the floors constructed in

wanton violation of the sanctioned plan, the Deputy Chief

Engineer and the appellate authority have demonstrated their

determination to ensure planned development of the

commercial capital of the country and the orders passed by

them have given a hope to the law-abiding citizens that

someone in the hierarchy of administration will not allow

unscrupulous developers/builders to take law into their hands

and get away with it.”

The Court further observed that an unauthorized construction destroys the concept

of planned development, and places an unbearable burden on basic amenities

 34 (2013) 5 SCC 357

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provided by public authorities. The Court held that it was imperative for the public

authority to not only demolish such constructions but also to impose a penalty on the

wrongdoers involved. This lament of this Court, over the brazen violation of building

regulations by developers acting in collusion with planning bodies, was brought to

the fore-front when the Court prefaced its judgment with the following observations:

“1. In the last five decades, the provisions contained in

various municipal laws for planned development of the areas

to which such laws are applicable have been violated with

impunity in all the cities, big or small, and those entrusted with

the task of ensuring implementation of the master plan, etc.

have miserably failed to perform their duties. It is highly

regrettable that this is so despite the fact that this Court has,

keeping in view the imperatives of preserving the ecology and

environment of the area and protecting the rights of the

citizens, repeatedly cautioned the authorities concerned

against arbitrary regularisation of illegal constructions by way

of compounding and otherwise.”

Finally, the Court also observed that no case has been made out for directing the

municipal corporation to regularize a construction which has been made in violation

of the sanctioned plan and cautioned against doing so. In that context, it held:

“56…We would like to reiterate that no authority administering

municipal laws and other similar laws can encourage violation

of the sanctioned plan. The courts are also expected to

refrain from exercising equitable jurisdiction for regularisation

of illegal and unauthorised constructions else it would

encourage violators of the planning laws and destroy the very

idea and concept of planned development of urban as well as

rural areas.”

PART F

126

154 These concerns have been reiterated in the more recent decisions of this

Court in Kerala State Coastal Zone Management Authority v. State of Kerala35,

Kerala State Coastal Zone Management Authority v. Maradu Municipality,

Maradu36 and Bikram Chatterji v. Union of India37.

155 In the present case, once this Court has determined that the sanctioned plan

for Apex and Ceyane (T-16 and T-17) breached the NBR 2006, NBR 2010, NBC

2005, UP 1975 Act and the UP Apartments Act 2010, it becomes its duty to take

stock of the violations committed by the appellant in collusion with NOIDA. The

appellant has raised false pleas and attempted to mislead this Court, while the

officials of NOIDA have not acted bona fide in the discharge of their duties. The

appellant has stooped to the point of producing a fabricated sanctioned plan.

Therefore, we confirm the directions of the High Court including the order of

demolition and for sanctioning prosecution under Section 49 of the UPUD Act, as

incorporated by Section 12 of the UPIAD Act 1976, against the officials of the

appellant and the officers of NOIDA for violations of the UPIAD Act 1976 and UP

Apartments Act 2010.

 35 (2019) 7 SCC 248 36 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3352 37 (2019) 19 SCC 161

PART G

127

G Conclusion

156 To summarize our findings, the documentary materials referred to and

analyzed in this judgment indicate that:

(i) The land allotted to appellant under the original lease agreement and the

supplementary lease deed constitute one plot;

(ii) The land which was allotted through the supplementary lease deed forms a

part of original Plot No 4, and would be governed by the same terms and

conditions as the original lease deed;

(iii) The sanction given by NOIDA on 26 November 2009 and 2 March 2012 for

the construction of T-16 and T-17 is violative of the minimum distance

requirement under the NBR 2006, NBR 2010 and NBC 2005;

(iv) An effort was made to get around the violation of the minimum distance

requirement by representing that T-1 together with T-16 and T-17 form one

cluster of buildings in the same block. This representation was sought to be

bolstered by providing a space frame between T-1 and T-17. The case that T1, T-16 and T-17 are part of one block is directly contrary to the appellant’s

stated position in its representations to the flat buyers as well as in the

counter affidavit before the High Court. The suggestion that T-1, T-16 and T17 are part of one block is an after-thought and contrary to the record;

(v) After realizing that the building block argument would not pass muster,

another false case was sought to be set up with the argument that T-1 and T17 are dead end sides, thereby obviating the need to comply with the 

PART G

128

minimum distance requirements. This argument is belied by the

comprehensive report submitted by NBCC. The sides of T-1 and T-17 facing

each other are not dead end sides since both the sides have vents/egresses

facing the other building;

(vi) By constructing T-16 and T-17 without complying with the Building

Regulations, the fire safety norms have also been violated;

(vii) The first revised plan of 29 December 2006 contained a clear provision for a

garden area adjacent to T-1. In the second revised plan of 26 November

2009, the provision for garden area was obliterated to make way for the

construction of Apex and Ceyane (T- 16 and T – 17). The common garden

area in front of T-1 was eliminated by the construction of T-16 and T-17. This

is violative of the UP Apartments Act 2010 since the consent of the flat

owners was not sought before modifying the plan promised to the flat owners;

and

(viii) T-16 and T-17 are not part of a separate and distinct phase (Phase–II) with

separate amenities and infrastructure. The supplementary lease deed

stipulates that the they are part of the original project. Hence, the consent of

the individual flat owners of the original fifteen towers, individually or through

the RWA, was a necessary requirement under the UP Apartments Act 2010

and UP 1975 Act before T-16 and T-17 could have been constructed, since

they necessarily reduced the undivided interest of the individual flat owners in

the common area by adding new flats and increasing the number from 650 to

1500; and

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129

(ix) The illegal construction of T-16 and T-17 has been achieved through acts of

collusion between the officers of NOIDA and the appellant and its

management.

157 For the reasons which we have indicated above, we have come to the

conclusion that:

(i) The order passed by the High Court for the demolition of Apex and Ceyane

(T-16 and T-17) does not warrant interference and the direction for demolition

issued by the High Court is affirmed;

(ii) The work of demolition shall be carried out within a period of three months

from the date of this judgment;

(iii) The work of demolition shall be carried out by the appellant at its own cost

under the supervision of the officials of NOIDA. In order to ensure that the

work of demolition is carried out in a safe manner without affecting the

existing pleadings, NOIDA shall consult its own experts and experts from

Central Building Research Institute Roorkee38;

(iv) The work of demolition shall be carried out under the overall supervision of

CBRI. In the event that CBRI expresses its inability to do so, another expert

agency shall be nominated by NOIDA;

(v) The cost of demolition and all incidental expenses including the fees payable

to the experts shall be borne by the appellant;

 38 “CBRI”

PART H

130

(vi) The appellant shall within a period of two months refund to all existing flat

purchasers in Apex and Ceyane (T-16 and T -17), other than those to whom

refunds have already been made, all the amounts invested for the allotted

flats together with interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum payable

with effect from the date of the respective deposits until the date of refund in

terms of Part H of this judgment; and

(vii) The appellant shall pay to the RWA costs quantified at Rs 2 crore, to be paid

in one month from the receipt of this judgment.

H Interlocutory Applications

158 Mr Vikas Singh, learned Senior Counsel, has during the course of the hearing

tendered an additional affidavit to indicate the following position:

(i) The contention of RWA that the appellant has collected the onetime lease

rent at the rate of Rs 190 per sq. foot from all the flat owners in T-1 to T-15

and that though an amount of Rs 16.75 crores was collected, only Rs 13.32

crores was payable to NOIDA is incorrect;

(ii) The appellant did not collect the lease rent payable to NOIDA from all allotees

of T-1 to T-15. An amount of Rs 7.54 crores was received from some allotees;

(iii) The lease rent paid to NOIDA was in the amount of Rs 14.49 crores;

(iv) A total of 659 units were booked in T-1 to T-14; and

(v) Of these units 245 flats were booked till 28 December 2006; 141 flats were

booked between 29 December 2006 and 25 November 2009, 114 flats were 

PART H

131

booked between 26 November 2009 and 1 March 2012, while 159 units were

booked after 2 March 2012.

On this basis, it has been submitted that 518 units were booked either before 28

December 2006 (before the first revised plan) or after 26 November 2009 (after the

second revised plan). The figures which have been indicated by the appellant

demonstrate that between the first revised plan on 29 December 2006 and the

second revised plan on 25 November 2009, 141 flat purchasers had booked flats.

They did so on the clear representation contained in the sanctioned plans.

159 During the pendency of these proceedings, two interim orders were passed

by this Court on 6 September 2016 and 22 September 2017. By the order dated 6

September 2016, this Court directed the appellant to pay a return of ten per cent to

those flat purchasers who continue to stay in the project. By the order dated 22

September 2017, an exit option was granted to those who sought refunds to take the

amounts invested with interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum.

160 The position as indicated to this Court by Mr Ravindra Kumar, learned

Counsel, in respect of flats in Apex and Ceyane (T-16 and 17) is as follows:

(i) Number of flats: 915;

(ii) Number of shops: 21

(iii) Number of bookings: 633;

(iv)Persons who have reinvested in other projects of the developer: 133;

(v) Purchasers to whom refund has been granted: 248; and

PART H

132

(vi)Remaining purchasers: 252.

161 The above position indicates that following the opt-out which was provided in

terms of the order of this Court, 248 purchasers have opted for refunds while 252

purchasers in T-16 and T-17 remain committed to the project.

162 Mr Gaurav Agarwal, learned Amicus Curiae has rendered comprehensive

assistance to the Court. Apart from urging his submissions in an objective and

dispassionate manner, the Amicus Curiae has painstakingly complied the pleadings,

documents and statutory provisions to facilitate the convenience of arguing Counsel

and the Court. We record our appreciation for the assistance which has been

rendered by the Amicus Curiae. The Amicus Curiae has also prepared a note for the

purpose of segregating the applications which have been filed by home buyers into

distinct categories, and suggesting reliefs to each category based on the outcome of

the proceedings. These categories are:

Category I

163 Buyers who have received ROI payments:

(i) By its orders dated 6 September 2016 and 11 January 2017, this Court

directed that those home buyers who have chosen to stay on with the project

and do not desire refund should be paid ROI at ten per cent per annum; and

(ii) Thirteen persons filed applications before this Court claiming that ROI

payments were not made by the appellant. The appellant has intimated the

payments which are due till July 2021. Though, the home buyers claim higher 

PART H

133

amounts, the Amicus Curiae has proceeded on the figures furnished by the

appellant which are tabulated as follows:

Sr.

No.

Name IA no. Interest due till 1st

July, 2021 as per

email received

from Supertech

Name of AOR

1 Aarti Puri 55556/2021 Rs. 16,78,720 Nishe Rajen

Shonker

2 Divay Puri 80599/2021 Rs. 16,78,548 Do

3 Jatin Vardi 55562/2021 Rs. 11,65,686 Do

4 Amit Khanna 56228/2021 Rs. 11,65,686 Do

5 Narinder Thakur 55550/2021 Rs. 10,41,578 Do

6 Manju Kohli 142969/2014 Rs. 6,78,524 Do

7 Namrata Tuli 142975/2018 Rs. 8,26,616 do

8 Mahesh Jaura 80916/2019 Rs.1,11,160 do

9 Kavita Jaura 80875/2019 Rs. 2,01,299 do

10 Hemendra Varshney 80879/2019 Rs. 1,33,980 do

11 Shachi Varshney 80881/2019 Rs. 1,31,988 do

12 Bandana Kedia 80918/2019 Rs. 1,31,700 do

13 Sapna Ahluwalia 43555/2021 Rs. 19,87,020 do

164 The submission of the Amicus Curiae is that if the buildings were to stand, the

home buyers may be paid the above ROI. On the other hand, if the buildings are to

be demolished, the home buyers should receive refund with interest and the

amounts would be subsumed in the interest to be paid. Since this Court has come to

the conclusion that the buildings are to be demolished, the general directions in

regard to refund together with interest will subsume the claims of the above home

buyers.

Category 2

165 Homebuyers to whom principal has been paid but interest payments have

remained:

PART H

134

(i) By an order dated 30 July 2018, this Court directed that homebuyers who had

registered on the portal and were willing to take twelve per cent simple

interest per annum from the date of deposit till the date of payment towards

full and final payment would be refunded the principal sum together with

interest at the above rate on filing affidavits to that effect; and

(ii) The registry has refunded the principal sum to thirteen homebuyers but since

their affidavits were not received by the Amicus Curiae within time, interest

remained to be paid. The details have been tabulated by the Amicus Curiae

as follows:

Sr.

No.

Name Interest payable IA no. Name of AOR

1 Anuj Goyal Rs. 31,40,704 69916-69917 of

2019

Abhijeet Sinha

2 Sumit Goel Rs. 28,97,199

3 Priya Goel Rs. 28,97,199

4 Mukta Jain Rs. 30,10,253

5 Subhash Chand

Jain

Rs. 29,05,957

6 Abhishek Jain Rs. 30,42,129

7 Abhishek Jain Rs. 30,22,785

8 Herbinder Singh Rs. 32,84,789

9 Vineet Kapoor Rs. 28,90,491

10 Vishal

Maheshwari

Rs. 22,45,399 24823/2020 Nishe Rajen

Shonker

11 Shipli

Maheshwari

Rs. 15,30,585 24834/2020 do

12 Poonam Lata

Kushwaha

Rs. 29,22,513 120666/2019

&

120669/2019

Sweta Rani

13 Paramita Ray Rs. 40,65,228 In-person

166 The Amicus Curiae has submitted that irrespective of the fate of the

pleadings, the appellant should be directed to refund the interest as computed

above since the above homebuyers have exited from the project. We accept the

PART H

135

submission and direct the appellant to refund interest payments to the thirteen

homebuyers as tabulated above within two months.

Category 3

167 Home buyers under a ‘subvention scheme’:

(i) Under the subvention scheme, a home loan is taken in the name of the

homebuyer but EMIs are to be paid by appellant till possession is granted.

Certain homebuyers are governed by the subvention scheme. There is a

default by the appellant in paying the EMIs;

(ii) By an order dated 30 July 2018, this Court directed the appellant to continue

paying the EMIs. Sixteen homebuyers have moved this Court for a direction

for payment of the balance EMIs due;

(iii) The Amicus Curiae has tabulated the interest payable to the homebuyers (as

computed by them and by the appellant separately):

Sr.

No.

Name Interest as

indicated by

homebuyer

Interest as

indicated by

Supertech

IA no. Name of AOR

1 Parvinder

Singh

Rs. 11,71,110 Rs. 8,81,847 24814,

24825,

24839,

24848,

24972,

24973,

24974,

24978,

24984,

24985,

24989,

24992,

24996,

Khaitan & Co.

2 Amit Mangla Rs. 12,09,052 Rs. 12,09,052

3 Binod Kumar Rs. 11,73,902 Rs. 8,43,073

4 Shailesh Kr

Singh

Rs. 11,69,640 Rs. 8,51,310

5 Dev Verma Rs. 11,73,919 Rs. 8,58,311

6 Naveen

Kumar

Rs. 16,08,467 Rs. 11,07,792

7 Vaibhav

Mishra

Rs. 11,66,778 Rs. 8,37,666

8 Mandar

Hastekar

Rs. 11,66,826 Rs. 8,53,381

PART H

136

9 Ashish

Sharma

Rs. 11,73,092 Rs. 8,25,030 24997, 29374

&

10 Hrisikesh- 29386/2020

Kshitiza

Bawa

Rs. 11,73,919 Rs. 8,39,984

11 Babneet

Singh

Rs. 11,74,308 Rs. 8,40,383

12 Romit

Agarwal

Rs. 11,66,182 Rs. 8,59,768

13 BhupinderPuran Das

Pruthi

Rs. 11,51,855 Rs. 9,43,782

14 Nilay Ashmi Rs. 11,67,529 Rs. 8,29,579

15 Manoj Kr

Pamneja (*)

Rs. 8,10,866 Nil 25950/18 Krishnamohan

K

16 Sandeep Jain

(*)

Rs. 8,10,866 nil 67854 &

67856/2020

Arjun Garg

The Amicus Curiae submits that the amounts calculated above be paid.

168 The Amicus Curiae submitted that if the buildings are ordered to be

demolished, the appellant may close the home loans and refund the amounts

contributed by the homebuyers with such interest as this Court may determine. On

the other hand, if the buildings stand, the appellant may be directed to clear the

outstanding EMIs and continue paying them until possession. Since the buildings

have been ordered to be demolished under the directions of this Court in the present

judgment, the appellant shall close the home loans and refund the amounts

contributed by each of the above home buyers with interest at the rate of twelve per

cent per annum within two months.

PART H

137

Category 4

169 There are two IAs in which the homebuyers have a dispute with the appellant

relating to the amounts due to the homebuyers:

(i) In IA No 56187/2021, Mr DP Tripathi was allotted Flat No 1105 in Apex. A

total amount of Rs 31,70,410 was paid for the flat. Out of this amount, Rs.

14,25,000 was funded by loan. The appellant paid the loan pursuant to an

order of this Court. However, the applicant has paid the balance amount of Rs

17,45,410 out of his own funds towards the flat, and Rs 6,58,700 as loan

repayments before it was ultimately settled by the appellant. ROI payments

for 27 months amounting to Rs 5,20,315 have been received from the

appellant. Thus, the case of the applicant is that a sum of Rs 18,83,795

remains invested by the applicant, which may be ordered to be refunded. In

contrast, the appellant has stated that this dispute has been settled by the

Debt Recovery Tribunal and nothing is payable; and

(ii) In IA No 67028/2017, Mr Raj Kishore had purchased Flat No 3507, in respect

of which the amount has been refunded along with interest. A cheque of Rs

67,319 bearing no 213233 for the last payment remained to be encashed due

to oversight. The Amicus Curiae has suggested that the appellant may be

directed to issue a fresh cheque pertaining to this payment.

170 With regards to IA No 56187/2021, since the underlying dispute regarding

payment is pending in this IA, it is de-linked and will be heard separately. In IA No 

PART H

138

67028/2017, the appellant is directed to provide a fresh cheque for an amount of Rs

67,319 to the applicant within one month.

Category 5

171 Application of homebuyers which have been rendered infructuous. The

Amicus Curiae has tabulated applications which have been rendered infructuous,

indicating the reasons for the same:

Applications of home buyers which are rendered infructuous

Sr.

No.

Name of homebuyers IA no. Name of AOR Reasons

1 Leo VIII Films Pvt.

Ltd.

18211/2018

18217/2018

Nitish Massey Refund received

with interest

2 Raj Kishore 67028/2017 Mahima Gupta Refund received

with interest

3 Sajeev Katarya 24785/2017 Rajeev Singh Refund received

with interest

4 Girish Arun Singpote 175122 & 175124

of 2018

UNUC Legal LLP Applicants have

not applied in

portal

5 Darpan Bhargav 137549/2018 Gopal Jha Applicant has not

applied in portal

6 1)Arvind Kaur Sodhi

2) Amarjit Singh

Rana & Jasjit Kaur

18064-18066/2020 Gopal Jha Applicants have

not applied in

portal

7 Poonam Kulbir

Krishnan

6919/2018 Aparna Bhat This does not

relate to this

project, but it

relates to the

project in

Gurgaon

8 Sanjay Bahl 24785/17 Rajeev Singh Refund already

paid @12%

9 Mini Kohli & Ors. 68049/17 PK Jain Refund already

paid with interest

10 Vibhav Bindal 96289/17 Pinky Behera Refund already

paid with interest

11 Sayed Asad Ahmad 11/15 in SLP Shantanu Applicant has not 

PART H

139

14314/14 Krishna applied in portal

12 Vivek Sharma &

others

12/2015 in SLP

14314/14

Rajeev Singh Applicant has not

applied in portal

13 Usha Rani & others 14/16 in SLP

14314/14

Rajeev Singh There are

number of

applicants in this

application.

Some of them

got refund with

interest. Others

did not apply.

14 Vishal Raj Singh IA 15/2016 in SLP

14314/14

Rajeev Singh Applicant has not

applied in portal

15 Ishwar Kumar Singh IA 16/2016 Amit Anand

Tiwari

Refund already

paid with interest

16 Sanjeev Katariya IA 17/2016 in SLP

14314/14

Rajeev Singh Refund already

paid with interest

17 Ms. Raj Kishore &

another

IA 18/2016 in SLP

14314/14

Mahima Gupta One applicant

has already paid

refund with

interest and other

did not apply in

portal

18 Mini Kohli & others IA 21/17 in SLP

14314/14

PK Jain Some applicants

have already

paid refund with

interest and other

did not apply in

port.

19 Rashmi Arora 121826,121828/17 MC Dhingra Refund already

paid with interest

20 Jitendra Kumar

Sabharwal & others

IA 121085/17 Rajeev Singh Some applicants

have already

paid refund with

interest and other

did not apply in

port.

21 Poonam Kulbir

Krishan

14898/18 Aparna Bhat This does not

relate to present

project.

22 Usha Rani & others 35845/21 Avjit Mani

Tripathi

Most of the

applicants have

get refund of with

12%. Now they

want 14%

interest.

23 Manprit Kaur IA 20/18 &

95793/16 in SLP

Anupam Lal Das Refund already

paid with interest

PART H

140

14314/14

24 Sajeev Aggrawal IA 121841/17 &

121842/17

MC Dhingra Refund already

paid with interest

172 The above applications are disposed of as infructuous.

173 The appeals shall stand disposed of in the above terms. The contempt

petitions are disposed of accordingly.

174 Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

…………………..…………………………J

 [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

………..………….…………………………J

[MR Shah]

New Delhi;

August 31, 2021