Coming back to factual aspects of this case, on the basis of the above confession of Chanchal Bhaskar [A-3], the only recovery which was made was one Rope, which was used in committing the offence, which the counsel rightly pointed, is a common material or thing which is available anywhere in the market or at every household. Further, we may note that, there is no investigation to link the rope recovered with the crime as no report concerning the forensic aspects of the fiber or any recovered strands are part of the record. Therefore, the major condition for application of Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not fulfilled. Accordingly, we cannot append any value to the confession of Chanchal Bhaskar [A-3].

1
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1691-1692 OF 2010
KUSAL TOPPO AND ANOTHER …APPELLANTS
 VERSUS
STATE OF JHARKHAND …RESPONDENT
 O R D E R
1. These appeals by special leave are directed against the
judgment and order dated 12.1.2009 passed by the High Court
of Judicature of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Criminal Appeal No.
240 of 2002 with Criminal Appeal No. 302 of 2002.
2. These appeals have been filed by Accused No.1 and Accused
No.4 questioning the conviction and sentence passed by the
trial Court on 17 and 18th May, 2002 wherein the accused were
convicted for the offence under Section 392 and were
sentenced to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine of
Rs.1000/- each and in default of payment, to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year each and also convicted for the
2
offence under Section 302 and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.5000/- each and in
default of payment to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
term of 2 years each.
3. The judgment passed by the trial Court was subsequently
challenged before the High Court. The High Court also
confirmed the sentence and conviction passed by the trial
Court.
4. In the present case there were as many as five accused. A-5
was acquitted by the trial Court itself. The other two accused
A-2 and A-3 had filed Special leave Petition (Criminal) No(s).
2572-2573 of 2009 against the judgment and order of the High
Court, which were dismissed by this Court at the time of
admission itself. In criminal cases, it is well settled that a
dismissal of a SLP in limine, would neither mean that the lower
court judgment stands affirmed nor the principle res judicata
would be applicable [refer Kunhayammed and Anr. v. State
of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC 2587; State of Punjab v. Devinder
Pal Singh Bhullar, AIR 2012 SC 364]. Therefore, the
dismissal of the SLP of the co-accused will not have any effect
accordingly.
3
5. In the instant special leave petitions filed by the accused A-1
and A-4, leave was granted by this Court on 30.8.2010.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
7. The prosecution story in brief is that on 3.12.1999, Truck No.
BR-24-M-8171 had gone to Balrampur having loaded the lac
of one Adit Sah of Latehar. The truck was returning from
Balrampur after unloading the lac in question on 4.12.1999
and reached Ranchi at 4 P.M. The aforesaid truck had picked
up its owner Sita Devi from Seva Sadan, Ranchi and proceeded
for Latehar. When the truck did not reach Latehar till the
morning of 5/12/1999, PW-2, Binod Agrawal (the joint owner
of the truck and brother-in-law of Sita Devi, and the informant
in this case) tried to search for the truck; in the course of his
search he went to the Line Hotel, owned by PW-1, Bindeshwar
Sah, situated at Ranchi Road, Kuru where the truck usually
used to stop for refreshment for its staff. The informant learnt
from the aforesaid hotel owner that his truck had stopped at
the hotel on 4.12.1999 at about 6.45 p.m. The driver, Suresh
Singh @ Bulet Singh, and the Khalasi (i.e., cleaner of the
truck), Jitendra Thakur, had taken four cups of special tea,
one for their employer Sita Devi, two for themselves and one
4
for a third person in the truck, but the third person did not
take tea and the same was returned. The driver was heard to
say that A-2, Mahendra, the third person inside the truck,
would not take tea. Thereafter, the truck proceeded for its
destination, having taken the owner Sita Devi, the Khalasi
Jitendra Thakur, and the third person, Mahendra (apart from
the driver himself). The informant also came to know from the
hotel owner that an unknown person aged about 25 years had
also come to the hotel at 5.00 p.m. on 4.12.1999, who had
enquired from the hotel owner whether Suresh Singh @ Bulet
Singh, the driver, had come to the hotel with the truck. The
hotel owner had replied to the unknown person that the truck
had not reached yet. Subsequently, the informant gathered
information from others at Kuru that the truck had crossed
Kuru Chowk for its destination (i.e. Latehar), but it was
hijacked by some criminals near Kuru P.S. and taken away
towards the forest. He further came to know that the truck
was lying abandoned in Aamjharia Valley with two dead bodies
lying near the truck and one dead body of a woman lying inside
the cabin of the truck. On such information, he went to
Aamjharia Valley and found the truck, where he found the
dead body of Sita Devi inside the truck, with her hands tied
5
and neck slit, and the bodies of the driver and Khalasi thrown
outside. The informant then went to Kuru P.S. to lodge an FIR,
but the police of Kuru P.S. did not entertain his information.
He then went to Lohardaga to approach the S.P., who was not
available, but the reader of the S.P. told him that the FIR had
to be lodged in the Police Station in the jurisdiction of which
the dead bodies had been recovered. Therefore, the informant
lodged the FIR at Chandwa Police Station on 7.12.1999 at 10
A.M., which is the basis of the case.
8. Mr. Annam D.N. Rao, learned Amicus Curiae appearing on
behalf of the accused mainly contended that the trial Court as
well as the High Court had convicted the accused by relying
upon the extra-judicial confessions made by Mahendra Prasad
and Chanchal Bhaskar (A-2 and A-3). Mr. Rao contended that
the accused could not be convicted merely on the basis of
extra-judicial confessions, relying upon the settled proposition
of law that an extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of
evidence, and an accused cannot be convicted on such basis
in the absence of other reliable evidence establishing guilt. He
placed reliance on the decisions of this Court to this effect in
6
Gopal Sah v. State of Bihar1 and Pancho v. State of
Haryana.
2
9. Learned counsel, while arguing, has taken us through the
depositions of various witnesses. PW-1 is Bindeshwar Sah, the
hotel owner, who according to PW-2, Binod Agrawal, first
revealed the information to him that the truck party had come
to his hotel on the date of the incident, and left the place after
taking some tea. Based on the said information, PW-2 further
inquired about the matter. PW-2 also deposed that PW-1 had
told him that A-2 Mahendra was inside the truck, and that A2
had confessed to him (i.e. PW-1) that the accused had
committed the murder of the three persons and further
committed theft of a gold bangle and chain belonging to Sita
Devi, an amount of Rs. 2 Lac and a demand draft for Rs.
32,000/-. PW-2 admitted so in his cross-examination as well
as stated so before the police. At the time of trial, however, PW1,
the owner of the Line Hotel, turned hostile. He denied saying
anything to PW-2 as alleged.
10. Thus, according to PW-2, A-2 made a confession to PW-1. In
addition, the confessions of A-2 and A-3 were also recorded by

1(2008) 17 SCC 128.
2(2011) 10 SCC 165.
7
the police. As per the testimony of PW-6, the investigating
officer in the case, on the basis of the confession of A-3, a rope
was recovered from the place of occurrence.
11. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that rope is a
common material or thing which is available anywhere in the
market and in every household.
12. Apart from this, learned counsel for the State is unable to show
any other material indicating the guilt of the appellants.
13. Learned Counsel for the State argued in support of the
impugned judgment.
14. The evidence relating to the extra-judicial confession made by
the accused Mahendra is found in two places in the evidence
of PW-2, i.e., in paragraphs 8 and 27. If we read both the
paragraphs, it is clear that PW-2 got the information from PW1
(the owner of the Line Hotel, Bindeshwar Sah) about the
factum of confession made by the accused Mahendra before
PW-1. In other words, PW-2 has not deposed in so many words
and clearly that the accused Mahendra made a confession
before him. On the other hand, it is the specific deposition of
PW-2 that the accused Mahendra confessed before PW-1, and
in turn PW-1 told about the same fact to PW-2. This means
8
that the information received by PW-2 from PW-1 about the
extra-judicial confession is hearsay, inasmuch as there is no
confession made by the accused Mahendra before PW-2
directly. Hence, such hearsay evidence of PW-2 relating to the
so-called confession cannot be relied upon. Even otherwise,
PW-1, who had allegedly informed PW-2 about the confession
allegedly made before him by the accused Mahendra, has
turned hostile. Thus, there is no supporting material to
corroborate the evidence of PW-2 regarding the extra-judicial
confession.
15. However, the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court,
probably relying upon the version of PW-2 in paragraphs 29 to
30 of his deposition, concluded that the accused Mahendra did
confess before PW-2 directly. Even if we take it that the
accused Mahendra did confess before PW-2 directly, the same
may not further or better the case of the prosecution,
inasmuch as this is the solitary piece of material against the
accused Mahendra, and that too in the form of an extrajudicial
confession.
16. As argued by the learned amicus curiae appearing for the
accused, an extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of
9
evidence, and an accused cannot be convicted on its basis in
the absence of other reliable evidence establishing the guilt of
the accused. It will be pertinent to advert to the decisions relied
upon by the learned amicus curiae at this juncture, i.e., Gopal
Sah (supra) and Pancho (supra).
17. In Gopal Sah (supra), the Court held that an extra-judicial
confession is, on the face of it, a weak piece of evidence and
should not be relied upon to record a conviction, in the absence
of a chain of cogent circumstances. In Pancho (supra) as well,
the Court refused to convict the accused on the basis of an
extra-judicial confession, in the absence of other evidence of
sterling quality on record, establishing his involvement. In
the Pancho (supra), the Court discussed the evidentiary value
of an extra-judicial confession, as laid down by a
Constitutional Bench of this Court in Haricharan
Kurmi v. State of Bihar.
3In this case, referring to S. 3 and S.
30 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Court came to the
conclusion that an extra-judicial confession cannot be treated
as a substantive piece of evidence against the co-accused,
holding that the proper judicial approach is to use it only to

3AIR 1964 SC 1184.
10
strengthen the opinion formed by the Court after perusing
other evidence placed on record. It is pertinent to refer to the
observations of in Pancho (supra) in this regard-
“26. In Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar [AIR
1964 SC 1184 : (1964) 2 Cri LJ 344] the
Constitution Bench of this Court was again
considering the same question. The
Constitution Bench referred to Section 3 of the
Evidence Act, 1872 and observed that
confession of a co-accused is not evidence
within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence
Act. It is neither oral statement which the court
permits or requires to be made before it as per
Section 3(1) of the Evidence Act nor does it fall
in the category of evidence referred to in Section
3(2) of the Evidence Act which covers all
documents produced for the inspection of the
court. This Court observed that even then
Section 30 provides that a confession may be
taken into consideration not only against its
maker, but also against a co-accused. Thus,
though such a confession may not be evidence
as strictly defined by Section 3 of the Evidence
Act, “it is an element which may be taken into
consideration by the criminal court and in that
sense, it may be described as evidence in a nontechnical
way”. (Haricharan case [AIR 1964 SC
1184])
27. This Court in Haricharan case [AIR 1964 SC
1184 : (1964) 2 Cri LJ 344] further observed that
Section 30 merely enables the court to take the
confession into account. It is not obligatory on
the court to take the confession into account.
This Court reiterated that a confession cannot
be treated as substantive evidence against a coaccused.
Where the prosecution relies upon the
confession of one accused against another, the
proper approach is to consider the other
evidence against such an accused and if the
11
said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the
court is inclined to hold that the said evidence
may sustain the charge framed against the said
accused, the court turns to the confession with
a view to assuring itself that the conclusion
which it is inclined to draw from the other
evidence is right.
28. This Court in Haricharan case [AIR 1964 SC
1184 : (1964) 2 Cri LJ 344] clarified that though
confession may be regarded as evidence in
generic sense because of the provisions of
Section 30 of the Evidence Act, the fact remains
that it is not evidence as defined in Section 3 of
the Evidence Act. Therefore, in dealing with a
case against an accused, the court cannot start
with the confession of a co-accused; it must
begin with other evidence adduced by the
prosecution and after it has formed its opinion
with regard to the quality and effect of the said
evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the
confession in order to receive assurance to the
conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is
about to reach on the said other evidence.”
18. Furthermore, in Sahadevan v. State of T.N.,
4 this Court
culled out certain principles regarding the reliability of an extra
judicial confession, which have also been relied upon in
Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab,
5 Tejinder Singh v. State
of Punjab,
6 and Vijay Shankar v. State of Haryana.
7 The

4(2012) 6 SCC 403.
5(2012) 11 SCC 768.
6(2013) 12 SCC 503.
7(2015) 12 SCC 644.
12
principles as stated in Sahadevan (supra) are reproduced
below:
“16. Upon a proper analysis of the abovereferred
judgments of this Court, it will be appropriate to
state the principles which would make an extrajudicial
confession an admissible piece of
evidence capable of forming the basis of
conviction of an accused. These precepts would
guide the judicial mind while dealing with the
veracity of cases where the prosecution heavily
relies upon an extra-judicial confession alleged
to have been made by the accused:
(i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak
evidence by itself. It has to be examined by the
court with greater care and caution.
(ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be
truthful.
(iii) It should inspire confidence.
(iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater
credibility and evidentiary value if it is
supported by a chain of cogent circumstances
and is further corroborated by other prosecution
evidence.
(v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the
basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any
material discrepancies and inherent
improbabilities.
(vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved
like any other fact and in accordance with law.”
The proposition that extra judicial confessions are a weak type
of evidence and should not be relied upon in the absence of
corroborative evidence has also been affirmed by this Court in
13
several other decisions, such as Pakkiriswamy v. State of
Tamil Nadu,
8 Makhan Sigh v. State of Punjab,
9 Baldev
Singh v. State of Punjab,
10 and even recently in Satish v.
State of Haryana.
11
19. Taking into consideration all the facts and position of law,
discussed supra, we are of the opinion that the appellants
herein cannot be convicted on the basis of only two extrajudicial
confessional statements of the co-accused which were
not corroborated by any cogent or reliable evidence. Needless
to say, that the confessions of A-2 and A-3 made before the
police are inadmissible. Now coming to the limited aspect
concerning appending weightage to their recovery of rope in
furtherance of the statement of A-3, before the Police under
Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act.
20. The law under, Section 27, Indian Evidence Act is well settled
now, wherein this court in Geejaganda Somaiah v. State of
Karnataka, (2007) 9 SCC 315, has observed as under:
“As the section is alleged to be frequently
misused by the police, the courts are required
to be vigilant about its application. The court
must ensure the credibility of evidence by police

8(1997) 8 SCC 158.
9(1988) Supp SCC 526.
10(2009) 6 SCC 564.
11(2018) 11 SCC 300.
14
because this provision is vulnerable to abuse. It
does not, however, mean that any statement
made in terms of the aforesaid section should be
seen with suspicion and it cannot be discarded
only on the ground that it was made to a police
officer during investigation. The court has to be
cautious that no effort is made by the
prosecution to make out a statement of the
accused with a simple case of recovery as a case
of discovery of fact in order to attract the
provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act”
21. The basic premise of Section 27 is to only partially lift the ban
against admissibility of inculpatory statements made before
police, if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the
information received from the accused. Such condition would
afford some guarantee. We may additionally note that, the
courts need to be vigilant while considering such evidences.
This Court in multiple cases has reiterated the aforesaid
principles under Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act and only
utilized Section 27 for limited aspect concerning recovery [refer
Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor, 76 I.A. 65; Jaffar
Hussain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1970 SC
1934]. As an additional safeguard we may note that reliance
on certain observations made in certain precedents of this
court without understanding the background of the case may
not be sustainable. There is no gainsaying that it is only the
15
ratio which has the precedential value and the same may not
be extended to an obiter. As this Court being the final forum
for appeal, we need to be cognizant of the fact that this Court
generally considers only legal aspects relevant to the facts and
circumstances of that case, without elaborately discussing the
minute hyper-technicalities and factual intricacies involved in
the trial.
22. Coming back to factual aspects of this case, on the basis of the
above confession of Chanchal Bhaskar [A-3], the only recovery
which was made was one Rope, which was used in committing
the offence, which the counsel rightly pointed, is a common
material or thing which is available anywhere in the market or
at every household. Further, we may note that, there is no
investigation to link the rope recovered with the crime as no
report concerning the forensic aspects of the fiber or any
recovered strands are part of the record. Therefore, the major
condition for application of Section 27 of the Evidence Act is
not fulfilled. Accordingly, we cannot append any value to the
confession of Chanchal Bhaskar [A-3].
23. In light of the discussion above, we set aside the orders passed
by the trial Court as well as by the High Court and acquit the 
16
accused from all charges and the appeals are, accordingly,
allowed.
24. We appreciate the assistance given by Mr. Annam D.N. Rao,
learned Amicus Curiae in disposing of these appeals.


........................J.
 (N.V. RAMANA)

 ........................J.
 (MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)
New Delhi,
August 07, 2018

Armed Forces Medical Services (AFMC) - Promotion - no material to indicate that he was granted two years study leave to join two years structured training program. The certificate dated 11.12.1995 as claimed by appellant does not fulfill the essential conditions as laid down in paragraph 11 of the Order dated 22.05.2006 to make appellant eligible for one mark. We thus do not find any error in the Promotion Board (Medical) not allocating one mark for two years training program. Armed Forces Tribunal did not commit any error in rejecting the above claim also. We thus do not find any error in the judgment of Armed Forces Tribunal warranting interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.8047 Of 2018
(@ C.A.Diary No.34810/2015)
COL. IVS GAHLOT ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.     ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.
This   appeal   has   been   filed   questioning   the
judgment dated 20.07.2015 of Armed Forces Tribunal,
Principal   Bench,   Delhi   by   which   O.A.   No.   428/2013
filed   by   the   appellant   has   been   dismissed.   The
appellant   was   commissioned   in   the   army   in   Armed
Forces   Medical   Services   (AFMC)   on   06.04.1984,
received   his   promotion   to   the   rank   of   Colonel   with
effect from 01.01.2007. On 15.11.2011 the appellant
was considered for promotion to the rank of Brigadier
2
by   Promotion   Board   (Medical)   but   could   not   be
selected   for   promotion.   Appellant   had   filed   a
statutory complaint against the non­promotion by the
Board.   The   competent   authority   duly   examined   the
statutory complaint and by decision dated 08.04.2013
granted   partial   redress   by   expunsion   of   the   entire
assessment   of   the   SRO   in     CR   2010.   On   19.06.2013,
appellant   was   considered   for   promotion   by   Review
Promotion Board (Medical) but could not be selected.
Being   aggrieved   by   non­promotion,   appellant   filed
O.A.No.428/2013. The O.A. has been dismissed by the
Armed Forces Tribunal vide judgment dated 20.07.2015
aggrieved   by   said   judgment   this   appeal   has   been
filed.
2. The   appellant's   case   before   the   Tribunal   was
that in his consideration for promotion he was denied
marks   for   Ph.D.   degree   in   Anthropology   (Science)
awarded  to   him   by   Berhampur  University   in   1998.  He
further  questions   non   granting   of   any   mark   for   his
Post   Graduate   training   qualification   obtained   from
G.S.V.M. Medical College, Kanpur and further no marks
3
were   awarded   on   his   Master   degree   in   Personnel
Management in 2005 obtained from Pune University. The
Tribunal although accepted the claim of grant of mark
for   Master   degree   in   Personnel   Management   but
rejected the claim of the appellant for grant of any
mark   for   Ph.D.   degree   as   well   as   Post   Graduate
training in Pediatrics.
3. Shri Yashank P. Adhyaru, learned senior advocate
appearing for the appellant contends that the Ph.D.
degree   awarded   by   Berhampur   University,   which
university was competent to award Ph.D. degree, was
fully entitled to be awarded marks by Promotion Board
(Medical). He submits that the grant of Ph.D. degree
was   not   dependent   on   any   recognition   by   Medical
Council   of   India.   Relying   on   a   letter   dated
15.12.2017   addressed   by   Government   of   India   to   the
Director (Medical), Central Organisation ECHS, Delhi
Cantt.,   where   it   has   been   clarified   that   Medical
Council   of   India   has   informed   that   recognition   of
Ph.D.   degree   does   not   come   under   the   purview   of
Medical  Council  of   India,   it   is  submitted   that   the
4
denial   of   marks   to   the   appellant   was   illegal.   He
further submits that Post Graduate training obtained
from   a   recognised   medical   institution   by   the
appellant was also entitled to be awarded marks. He
further submits that the promotion policy which was
earlier issued in the year 2004 could not have been
reviewed   before   five   years   as   was   contemplated   by
policy dated 14.01.2004. The amendment of policy by
subsequent policy dated 22.05.2006 was not valid. He
submits that had the appellant been granted the marks
by   Promotion   Board   (Medical)   on   the   aforesaid   two
counts he would have surely been promoted to the rank
of   Brigadier.   Non   promotion   had   adversely   affected
him which needs to be redressed by this Court.
4. Learned   counsel   appearing   for   Union   of   India
refuting   the   above   submission   contends   that   Ph.D.
degree obtained by appellant by Berhampur University
is not recognised by Medical Council of India as per
Medical Council of India Act, 1956, hence, no error
has been committed by the Promotion Board (Medical)
5
in not rewarding any marks to the appellant. It is
further   contended   that   the   Post   Graduate   Training
which is relied by the appellant is also not training
of   any   integrated   course   obtained   by   the   appellant
after   taking   study   leave,   nor   any   certificate   of
passing   the   training   course   has   been   filed   by   the
appellant to make him eligible to award of any mark
on   the   Post   Graduate   training.   He   submits   that
promotion policy can be changed from time to time and
there was no error in modification of the promotion
policy in the year 2006.
5. We   have   considered   the   submissions   of   the
learned   counsel   for   the   parties   and   perused   the
records.
6. The   right   to   be   considered   for   promotion   in
accordance with the rules for promotion is right of
every officer and employee. In the present case there
is   no   denial   that   appellant   was   considered   by
Promotion   Board   (Medical)   on   15.11.2011   and
6
thereafter again by Review Promotion Board (Medical)
on 19.06.2013. Appellant's case is that had he been
granted one mark each for the Ph.D. degree and Post
Graduation   training   course,   he   could   have   been
definitely in the list of promoted officer and denial
of marks on aforesaid two counts was illegal.   The
Tribunal committed error in not considering the above
claim in accordance with law.
7. We  need  to  first  consider the promotion  policy
under which the appellant's claim was considered. The
consideration of each officer has to be in accordance
with   the   promotion   policy   as   in   existence   and
applicable   to   Armed   Forces   Officers   (Medical).   The
promotion   policy   dated   14.01.2004   is   brought   on
record as Annexure A­5.
8. In   the   present   case,   we   are   concerned   with
paragraphs   11,   12   and   last   line   of   paragraph   18.
Paragraph   11   deals   with   allocation   of   marks   on
different qualifications. Two year full time training
program is mentioned as item No.(d) in table of the
7
qualifications. It is useful to extract the aforesaid
item No.(d) of the aforesaid table:
“Qualifications:   Officers   in   possession
of the following academic will be awarded
marks, as mentioned against each:­
1 Qualification Marks
(d) Two­year   full   time
training   program   during
study   leave   in
India/Abroad   in   a
medical   field   from   an
institution/university
recognized   by   a
statutory body
2
”
9. Paragraph   12   refers   to   various   academic
achievements   which   includes   Doctor   of
Philosophy(Ph.D.) which is to the following effect:
“12. Marks will be awarded for possessing
any   one   of   the   academic   achievements   as
given below:­
(a) Master of Chirurgery(M.Ch.)        ­3
(b) Doctorate in Medicine(DM)          ­3
(c) Doctor of Philosophy(Ph.D)         ­3
(d) Diplomate of National  Board       ­3
   (DNB)(Super­Speciality subject)
 (e) Two years training during study    ­3
  leave in a specialized field
8
  of medical sciences/certificate
       of training from an institute/
   university recognized by a
   statutory body.
Note: ­ If an officer is having more than
one   of   the   above­mentioned
qualifications,   marks   for   only   one
qualification will be credited.”
10. The above policy was issued on 14.01.2004 and in
paragraph   18   following   was   stipulated  "the   policy
will be reviewed after five years".
11. The   above   policy   was   amended   by   Order   dated
22.05.2006   heading   of   which   itself   mentioned
"amendment   to   promotion   policy   dated   14th  January
2004:AFMS Officers.”
12. Amendments   were   made   in   paragraph   11   and
paragraph 12 which are relevant in the present case.
For   existing   paragraph   11,   new   paragraph   11   was
substituted   which   provided   in   clause   (d)   that   for
"two­year   full   time   structured   training   program
during study leave in India/Abroad in a medical field
9
from   an   institution/university   recognized   by   a
statutory   body,   one   mark   shall   be   allocated.   For
existing paragraph 12, new paragraph was substituted
which is to the following effect:
“12.  Officers  in  possession of  any  one  of
the following academic achievements will be
awarded one (1) mark.
(a)   Master   of   Chirugury(M.Ch)   recognized   by
MCI
(b)   Doctorate   in   Medicine(DM)   recognized   by
MCI
(c)   Doctor   of   Philosphy(Ph.D)   recognized   by
MCI
 (d) Diplomate of National Board(DNB)
      (Super­speciality subject)”
13. At   the   outset,   we   may   consider   the   submission
raised by the appellant that since the policy dated
14.01.2004   contemplated   that   the   policy   will   be
reviewed after five years, there was no occasion for
the review of the policy after two years only. There
cannot be any dispute that it is the authority of the
employer to frame promotion policy for promotion of
its   officers   and   employees.   When   an   employer   has
power to frame policy it has inherent power to change
10
the policy from time to time. This Court in  Hardev
Singh Vs. Union of India and another, (2011) 10 SCC
121  laid down that it is always open to an employer
to change its policy in relation to giving promotion
to the employees. The above case was also a case of
promotion of officers of Indian Army. A new promotion
policy dated 31.12.2008 with regard to promotion was
issued changing the criteria for promotion where in
place of value judgment weightage were to be given on
different   aspects,   repelling   the   challenge   to   new
policy following was laid down in paragraphs 25 & 26,
which is to the following effect:
“25. In our opinion, it is always open to
an   employer   to   change   its   policy   in
relation   to   giving   promotion   to   the
employees. This Court would normally not
interfere   in   such   policy   decisions.   We
would like to quote the decision of this
Court   in  Virender   S.Hooda   Vs.   State   of
Haryana,   (1999)   3   SCC   696  where   this
Court had held in para 4 of the judgment
that:
  "4....When a policy has been declared
by   the   State   as   to   the   manner   of
filling up the post and that policy is
declared   in   terms   of   rules   and
instructions   issued   to   the   Public
Service   Commission   from   time   to   time
11
and so long as these instructions are
not   contrary   to   the   rules,   the
respondents ought to follow the same.”
26.Similarly,   in  Balco   Employees'   Union
Vs. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333  it
has been held that a court cannot strike
down   a   policy   decision   taken   by   the
Government   merely   because   it   feels   that
another policy would have been fairer or
wiser   or   more   scientific   or   logical.   It
is not within the domain of the court to
weigh the pros and cons of the policy or
to test the degree of its beneficial or
equitable disposition.”
14. The   stipulation   in   the   policy   dated   14.01.2004
that policy will be reviewed after five years was in
no   manner   a   fetter   on   right   of   the   Government   to
review the policy as and when occasion arose. There
was no statutory restriction on the Government from
reviewing the policy even before five years. We fully
approve   the   view   of   the   Tribunal   that   the   policy
dated 14.01.2004 could have rightly been amended in
the year 2006.
15. Furthermore,   the   earlier   policy   was   issued   on
14.01.2004 and in accordance with the appellant, it
could   have   been   reviewed   only   after   five   years.
12
Admittedly   the   appellant   came   for   consideration   by
the   Promotion   Board   on   15.11.2011   i.e.   much   after
five   years   from   the   issue   of   the   policy   on
14.01.2004. At the time when appellant was considered
the   amendment   dated   22.05.2006   was   in   force.   An
officer has to be considered in accordance with the
policy as prevalent at the time of his consideration.
Hence, we do not find any error in consideration of
the claim of the appellant as per the amended policy
dated 22.05.2006.
16. Now, we come to the claim of the appellant on the
basis   of   Ph.D.   degree   obtained   from   Berhampur
University   in   Anthropology   (Science).   Berhampur
University   like   any   other   university   as   per
University   Grants   Commission   Act,   1956   was   fully
competent   to   institute   any   degree   including   Ph.D.
degree. In the policy which was issued on 14.01.2004,
on   any   Ph.D.   degree   a   candidate   was   eligible   for
grant of three marks. Amendment made by Order dated
22.05.2006   the   eligibility   has   been   restricted   to
"Doctor   of   Philosophy(Ph.D.)   recognised   by   Medical
13
Council of India". No exception can be taken to the
amendment   by   which   only   those   Ph.D.   degrees   are
eligible for one mark which are recognised by Medical
Council   of   India.     There   is   a   rational   for
restricting  the  award   of   marks   only  on   those   Ph.D.
degrees which are recognised by the Medical Council
of   India.     Medical   Council   of   India   recognises
medical degrees awarded by different universities and
institutions under the Medical Council of India Act,
1956.   The Promotion Policy dated 22.05.2006 is for
promoting officers belonging to Armed Forces Medical
Services (AFMS), hence restricting the award of marks
to those Ph.D., which have been recognised by Medical
Council of India has object and purpose.   
17. Learned counsel for the appellant had submitted
that the Medical Council of India does not recognise
any Ph.D. degree for which he has placed reliance on
the   letter   dated   15.12.2017   addressed   by   the
Government   of   India,   Ministry   of   Health   &   Family
Welfare   to   the   Director   (Medical),   Central
Organisation   ECHS,   Delhi   Cantt.   This   Court   on
14
06.04.2018   directed   the   respondent   to   obtain
instructions   with   regard   to   the   aforesaid   letter
dated   15.12.2017.   By   letter   dated   15.12.2017
addressed to the appellant, a copy of reply received
from   the   Medical   Council   of   India   dated   07.12.2017
was forwarded. A Joint Secretary to Medical Council
of India issued the letter dated 07.12.2017 which is
to the following effect:
“The Secretary to the
Govt. of India,
Ministry of Health & Family Welfare,
Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi
Kind   Atten:­Sh.D.V.K.Rao,   Under
Secretary(ME­I)
Subject:  Recognition   of   Ph.D.   Degree
­request of Col. Indra Veer Singh Gahlot
– Regarding
Sir,
  Please   refer   to   your   letter
No.Z.20015/15/2015­ME­I(FST143472)   dated
01.11.2017, on the subject noted above.
         In this regard, this is to inform
you   that   the   matter   with   regard   to
recognition of Ph.D. Degree does not come
under   the   purview   of   Medical   Council   of
India.
                         Yours faithfully
Sd/­x­x­x­x­x
15
(Dr. Rajendra Wabale)
Joint Secretary”
18. Learned counsel for the respondent has referred
to   Indian   Medical   Council   Act,   1956.   Section   11  of
the   Medical   Council   of   India   Act   pertains   to
recognition   of   medical   qualifications   granted   by
universities   or   medical   institutions   in   India.
Section 11 is as follows:
“11.Recognition   of   medical
qualifications   granted   by   Universities
or medical institutions in India.­
(1) The medical qualifications granted by
any   University   or   medical   insitution   in
India   which   are   included   in   the   First
Schedule   shall   be   recognised   medical
qualifications   for   the   purposes   of   this
Act.
(2) Any University or medical institution
in   India   which   grants   a   medical
qualification   not   included   in   the   First
Schedule   may   apply   to   the   Central
Government   to   have   such   qualification
recognised,   and   the   Central   Government,
after   consulting   the   Council,   may,   by
notification   in   the   Official   Gazette,
amend the First Schedule so as to include
such qualification therein, and any such
notification   may   also   direct   that   an
entry shall be made in the last column of
the   First   Schedule   against   such   medical
qualification declaring that it shall be
16
a   recognised   medical   qualification   only
when granted after a specified date.”
19. Section   11  of   the   Act   refers   to   the   First
Schedule.   The   heading   of   the   First   Schedule   is
"recognized   medical   qualifications   granted   by
universities or medical institutions in India". The
First Schedule contains list of various universities
or   medical   institutions   of   India   which   contains   a
column "recognised medical qualifications". Berhampur
University is also one of the universities mentioned
in the Schedule. The perusal of Schedule A indicates
that   although   various   medical   degrees   have   been
mentioned   in   the   column   "recognised   medical
qualifications"   but   qualification   of   Ph.D.   in
Anthropology(Science)   is   not   included   in   the
recognised   medical   qualifications   for   Berhampur
University.
20. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   referring   to
the   letter   dated   15.12.2017   read   with   letter   dated
07.12.2017 of the Medical Council of India contends
17
that   since   Medical   Council   of   India   does   not
recognise   Ph.D.   Degree,   Ph.D.   Degree   awarded   by
Berhampur   University   could   not   have   been   ignored.
Section 11 of the Medical Council of India Act, 1956,
as noticed above, provides for recognition of medical
qualifications   granted   by   universities   or   medical
institutions   in  India   in   First   Schedule  to   the   Act
contains   list   of   universities   and   medical
institutions. Berhampur University is also one of the
universities,   which   finds   place   in   the   First
Schedule.   Various   medical   courses   of   Berhampur
University find place in the First Schedule but there
is   no   mention   of   any   Ph.D.   degree.     The   list   of
recognised medical courses of Berhampur University is
as follows:­
University   or
Medical
Institution
Recognised
Medical
Qualification
Abbreviation   for
Registration
Berhampur
University
Bachelor   of
Medicine   and
Bachelor   of
Surgery
Diploma   in
Orthopaedics
M.B.B.S.,
Berhampur
D.Orth.,
Berhampur
18
Diploma   in   Child
Health
Doctor   of
Medicine
(Physiology)
Master of Surgery
(Orthopaedics)
Doctor   of
Medicine
(Paediatrics)
Master of Surgery
(General Surgery)
Doctor   of
Medicine (General
Medicine)
Doctor   of
Medicine
(Pharmacology)
Doctor   of
Medicine
(Pathology)
Master of Surgery
(Anatomy)
Master of Surgery
(E.N.T.)
Doctor   of
Medicine
(Forensic
Medicine   and
Toxicology)
D.C.H., Berhampur
M.D. (Physiology)
M.S.
(Orthopaedics)
M.D.
(Paediatrics)
M.S.   (General
Surgery)
M.D.   (General
Medicine)
M.D.
(Pharmacology)
M.D. (Pathology)
M.S. (Anatomy)
M.S. (E.N.T.)
M.D.   (Forensic,
Medicine   and
Toxicology)
19
Doctor   of
Medicine   (Social
and   Preventive
Medicine)
Doctor   of
Medicine
(Anaesthesiology)
Doctor   of
Medicine
(Obstetrics   and
Gynaecology)
Doctor   of
Medicine
(Microbiology)
Doctor   of
Medicine
(Dermatology,
M.D.   (S.P.M.)
(M.K.C.G.)
Medical   College,
Berhampur granted
from 1­12­1974).
M.D. (Anaes.)
M.D.   (Obst.   And
Gynae)
(This shall be a
recognised
qualification
when   granted   in
or after 1975)
M.D.
(Microbiology)
(This shall be a
recognized
medical
qualification
when   granted   by
Berhampur
University   in
respect   of   the
students   being
trained   at
M.K.C.G.   Medical
College,
Berhampur, Orissa
on   or   after
1990.)
M.D. (D.V.L.)
(This shall be a
recognized
20
Venerology   and
Leprosy)
medical
qualification
when   granted   by
Berhampur
University   in
respect   of
students   being
trained   at
M.K.C.G.   Medical
College,
Berhampur, Orissa
on   or   after
1991.)
21. Whereas   with   regard   to   various   medical
institutions   like   All   India   Institute   of   Medical
Sciences   and   Sree   Chitra   Thirunal   Institute   for
Medical   Science   and   Technology,   Thiruvananthapura,
there are mention of various Ph.D. courses.   It is
useful   to   refer   to   relevant   extract   from   First
Schedule   with   regard   to   the   few   Ph.D.   courses
recognised in All India Institute of Medical Sciences
and   Sree   Chitra   Thirunal   Institute   for   Medical
Science and Technology, Thiruvananthapura, which are
as follows:­
21
University   or
Medical
Institution
Recognised
Medical
Qualification
Abbreviation   for
Registration
All   India
Institute   of
Medical Sciences
Doctor   of
Philosophy
(Anatomy)
Doctor   of
Philosophy
(Biochemistry)
Doctor   of
Philosophy
(Microbiology)
Doctor   of
Philosophy
(Pathology)
Doctor   of
Philosophy
(Physiology)
and   38   other
fields.
Ph.D. (Anat.)
Ph.D. (Biochem.)
Ph.D. (Micro.)
Ph.D. (Patho.)
Ph.D.
(Physiology)
Sree   Chitra
Thirunal
Institute   for
Medical   Science
and   Technology,
Thiruvananthapura
Doctor   of
Philosophy
(Biochemistry)
Doctor   of
Philosophy
(Microbiology)
Doctor   of
Philosophy
(Pathology)
Ph.D. (Biochem.)
Ph.D. (Micro.)
Ph.D. (Patho.)
22.  There being Ph.D. degree courses recognized for
22
medical   institutions   in   the   First   Schedule   of   the
Medical  Council  of   India   Act,   1956,  we   cannot   find
any fault in the restriction imposed by policy dated
22.05.2006   restricting   award   of   marks   only   to   the
Ph.D. degrees recognized by Medical Council of India.
Coming to the letter dated 15.12.2017 which in turn
refers   to   the   letter   dated   07.12.2017   of   Medical
Council   of   India,   the   letter   mentions   that
recognition of Ph.D. degree does not come under the
purview   of   Medical   Council   of   India.    The   Medical
Council   of   India   in   its   First   Schedule   recognizes
medical   courses   which   also   contains   various   Ph.D.
courses. It may be true that Ph.D. degree awarded to
a   candidate   needs   no   recognition   from   the   Medical
Council of India but for the purposes of this case,
the marks can be claimed by a candidate in promotion
only when the Ph.D. course is recognized by Medical
Council   of   India.   Thus   the   letter   dated
15.12.2017/07.12.2017   cannot   help   the   appellant   in
the present case. Moreover, any communication issued
by Joint Secretary of Medical Council of India cannot
23
be   given   any   precedence   on   the   clear   statutory
provisions   contained   in   Section   11   read   with   First
Schedule of Medical Council of India Act, 1956.
23. Now,   we   come   to   the   Post   Graduate   training
program   on   which   the   appellant   is   also   claiming
allocation   of   marks.     Two   year   full   time   training
program to be eligible for award of one mark required
to fulfill following conditions:
a)    full time structured training program.
b)   during study leave in India/abroad.
c)   in   a   medical   field   from   an
institution/university         recognised
by statutory body.
24. The appellant has filed certificate as Annexure
A­1   dated   11.12.1995   issued   by   Professor   and   Head,
Department   of   Pediatrics,   G.S.V.M.   Medical   College,
Kanpur, which is to the following effect:
“         Department of Pediatrics
Children's   hospital:   G.S.V.M.   Medical
College: Kanpur – 208002
24
                         Dated:11.12.1995
              CERTIFICATE
Certified   that   Indra   Veer   Singh   Gahlot
had   been   working   in   Pediatrics   from
March,   1991   till   November,   1993.   The
Department   of   pediatrics   is   recognized
for M.D. Pediatrics and Diploma Courses.
The   department   is   maintaining   studentteacher
ratio of 1:1 including Dr. Indra
Veer Singh Gahlot.   During the period of
stay   of   Dr.   Gahlot,   Prof.G.P.Mathur   was
the Head of the Department.
       During the period of his stay, Dr.
Gahlot   was   doing   emergency   duties
independently. He had chances to perform
exchange­blood   transfusions   in   the
premature   Baby   Nursery.   He   also
participated   in   the   P.G.teaching
programme.
Sd/­(Illegible)
Sarla Mathur
Prof.& Head”
25. The   above   certificate   does   not   indicate   that
appellant   completed   full   time   structured   training
programme.
26. The   appellant   contended   that   he   was   granted
permission to attend the training program but there
25
is no material to indicate that he was granted two
years   study   leave   to   join   two   years   structured
training program. The certificate dated 11.12.1995 as
claimed by appellant does not fulfill the essential
conditions as laid down in paragraph 11 of the Order
dated 22.05.2006 to make appellant eligible for one
mark. We thus do not find any error in the Promotion
Board (Medical) not allocating one mark for two years
training   program.   Armed   Forces   Tribunal   did   not
commit any error in rejecting the above claim also.
We   thus   do   not   find   any   error   in   the   judgment   of
Armed Forces Tribunal warranting interference by this
Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136
of the Constitution of India.
27. The Civil Appeal is dismissed.
..........................J.
( A.K. SIKRI )
..........................J.
    ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
NEW DELHI,
AUGUST 06,2018.

High Court wrongly allowed the petition filed by respondent No.1 herein and directed the State Government to issue notification in the official gazette for release of the acquired land from acquisition on the basis of the Revenue Minister’s order dated 10.06.2004 passed under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).= the filing of the writ petition by the landowners itself was an abuse of judicial process. It was for the simple reason that the earlier litigation, which travelled up to this Court thrice having ended against the landowners, it was binding on the parties. It prevented the landowners to again raise the same issue. = Indeed, the release of part of the land in landowners’ favour and retention of the remaining land for accomplishing the project vide notification dated 20.08.1994 was in the nature of a bargain. It disentitled the landowners to seek further release of the remaining land. This is apart from the fact that consequent upon obtaining the possession of the land by the State, the release of the remaining land under Section 48 of the Act was otherwise not legally possible.

      REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7649 OF 2018
[Arising out of SLP (C) No.20188 of 2017]
Pimpri Chinchwad New Township
Development Authority            .. Appellant(s)
Versus
Vishnudev Cooperative Housing
Society & Ors.                         .. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) This appeal is filed against the final judgment
and   order   dated   28.02.2017  passed   by   the   High
Court   of   Judicature   at   Bombay   in   Writ   Petition
1
No.5783 of 2006 whereby the High Court allowed
the   petition  filed  by  respondent   No.1  herein  and
directed the State Government to issue notification
in the official gazette for release of the acquired land
from   acquisition   on   the   basis   of   the   Revenue
Minister’s   order   dated   10.06.2004   passed   under
Section   48   of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act,   1894
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).
3) In order to appreciate the issues involved in
the appeal, it is necessary to set out the factual
background   of   the   case   in   detail.   The   facts
mentioned   hereinbelow   are   taken   from   the   SLP
paper books and its List of Dates.
4) Survey No. (Gat. No.210 ­ measuring around
39 H 26 R and Survey No. 211 measuring around 1
H 23 R­Total land 40 H 49 R) situated at Mauje
Wakad, Tehsil Mulshi, District Pune (Maharashtra)
2
was originally owned by the members of one  "Deo"
family.
5) On   12.03.1970,   the   State   Government
acquired this land by issuing a notification under
Section 4 of the Act. It was followed by publication
of   declaration   under   Section   6   of   the   Act.   The
acquisition   was   for   a   public   purpose,   namely,
"planned   development   and   utilization   of   lands   in
Pimpri   Chinchwad   Township   Area   for   industrial,
commercial   and   residential   purposes”.   The
development   project   for   which   the   land   was
acquired   was   to   be   executed   through   Pimpri
Chinchwad New Township Development Authority
(for short, called "PCNTDA “) ­ appellant herein.
6) The Special Land Acquisition Officer (for short,
called "SLAO“) then initiated the proceedings under
Section   11   of   the   Act   for   determination   of   the
3
compensation   payable   to   the   landowners   and
accordingly passed an award dated 23.09.1986. The
SLAO   then   issued   notices   to   the   landowners   as
required under Section 12 (2) of the Act.  Since the
landowners did not accept the compensation, the
entire amount of compensation was deposited by
the SLAO in Revenue Deposit Account of Treasury.
7) The members of “Deo family” (landowners) felt
aggrieved by the award dated 23.09.1986 and filed
writ petition being W.P. No. 3719/1987 in the High
Court at Bombay. This writ petition was dismissed
by the High Court by order dated 18.07.1989. The
writ petitioners felt aggrieved by the dismissal of
their   writ   petition   filed   review   petition   (R.P.   No.
3751/1989) before the High Court, which was also
dismissed as withdrawn on 08.09.1989. Aggrieved
by the dismissal of the writ petition and the review
4
petition,   the   landowners   filed   SLP   (c)
No.12889/1989 in this Court. It was also dismissed
as withdrawn on 27.11.1989.
8) In the meantime, on 19.09.1989, the members
of “Deo Family” filed an application under Section
48(1) of the Act to the Revenue Minister of the State
of Maharashtra and prayed therein for release of
their   acquired   land.   During   pendency   of   this
application,   the   landowners   filed   writ   petition
(No.36/1990) in the High Court and prayed therein
for   a   direction   to   the   State   for   deciding   their
application. By order dated 12.01.1990, the High
Court disposed of the writ petition and directed the
State   to   decide   the   landowners'   application   in
accordance with law.
9) By   order   dated   07.07.1992,   the   State
Government   partly   allowed   the   landowners'
5
application and while releasing the land measuring
29 H 98 R retained the remaining land measuring10
H 51 R for execution of the development project for
which   the   entire   land   had   been   acquired.   The
details   of   the   land   retained   and   released   are
mentioned hereinbelow:
Survey
No.
Area
covered
under
SLAO
H:R
Area deleted
from
acquisition
H:R
Area
remained
under
acquisition
to be given
to PCNTDA
210 39 H 26 R 28 H 93 R 10 H 33 R
211 1 H 23 R 1 H 5 R 0 H 18 R
Total 40 H 49 R 29 H 98 R 10 H 51 R
10) It appears from the record of the proceedings
that after the dismissal of the review petition, the
landowners (members of “Deo family”) transferred
the acquired land in question to the members of one
Co­operative Housing Society called, "Vishnudev Co6
operative Housing Society" (for short called "VCHS")­
respondent No.1 herein on or about 25.10.1993.
11) Respondent  No.1 (VCHS) claiming to  be the
owner of the land in question felt aggrieved and filed
writ  petition  (1116/1993)  questioning therein  the
legality of the order of the State dated 07.07.1992 to
the extent it declined to release the remaining land
measuring 10 H 51 R.   The High Court, by order
dated 23.03.1993, dismissed the writ petition and
upheld the order of the State.   Respondent No.1
(VCHS) carried the matter in this Court by filing SLP
(C) No.10056/1993.   By order dated 26.11.1993,
this   Court   dismissed   the   SLP.   The   Divisional
Commissioner   then   passed   a   final   order   dated
20.08.1994 under Section 48 (1) of the Act directing
therein for deletion of 29 H 98 R from Survey No.
210 and retaining of 10 H 33 R as acquired land for
7
completion of development project.  This is how, out
of total acquired land, the land measuring 29 H 98
R was released in favour of landowners from the
acquisition proceedings and the land measuring 10
H 33 R was retained to enable the State to execute
the development project on the said land through
the agency of the appellant.
12) Notwithstanding the termination of two rounds
of litigation up to this Court, the landowners­VCHS
again   started   third   round   and   filed   fresh   writ
petition  (3200/1994) in   the  High  Court  and  this
time prayed therein for deletion of 10 H 55 R from
Survey No. 210/1. By order dated 07.09.1994, the
High Court dismissed the writ petition. Again the
said order, the VCHS filed SLP (C) No.22907/1994
in this Court and the same was dismissed by order
dated 10.02.1995.
8
13) On 30.05.2000, the SLAO took possession of
the land bearing Gat. No. 210 (10 H 33 R) and
executed panchanama in support thereof. The name
of the State Government was accordingly entered in
the revenue records at Mutation Entry No. 8212(File
No.  7/12)  on  21.07.2000.  The  State  Government
then   handed   over   the   possession   of   the   land   in
question to PCNTDA on 08.11.2005 to enable them
to start the work on the land. It was followed by
entry of name of PCNTDA in the revenue records on
19.11.2005.
14) Despite losing the battle in the first, second
and   third   round   of   litigation,   as   detailed   above,
VCHS   again   renewed   their   efforts   and   filed   an
application under Section 48 (1) of the Act to the
Revenue Minister of the State of Maharashtra to
start another round of litigation on 20.01.2004. The
9
Revenue Minister on 10.06.2004, however, noted in
the file that the land in question be deleted from the
acquisition proceedings.
15) It is pertinent to mention here that when the
order dated 10.06.2004 was passed, the Code of
Conduct was in force in the State of Maharashtra as
the assembly elections were to be held in September
2004   in   the   State   of   Maharashtra.   It   is   also
pertinent to mention that the order of the Revenue
Minister   ordering   deletion   of   the   land   was   never
communicated to the landowners. On 04.11.2004,
the State Government directed that all the matters
where   the   orders   were  not   communicated   to   the
parties concerned be placed for fresh consideration
for passing appropriate orders. The present being a
case where the order was not communicated to the
landowners, the new Revenue Minister, who took
10
over the charge from the earlier Minister, directed
that the matter relating to the land in question be
considered afresh. The VCHS then wrote a letter to
the   State   Government   on   06.06.2006   insisting
therein   for   issuance   and   implementation   of   the
order dated 10.06.2004 passed by the then Revenue
Minister but since the Government did not yield to
the VCHS insistence, a writ petition (5783/2006)
was filed by VCHS on 21.06.2006  in the High Court
praying   for   issuance   of   mandamus   directing   the
State Government to give effect to the order dated
10.06.2004 passed by the then Revenue Minister
and issue appropriate notification in that behalf by
releasing the remaining land measuring 10 H 55 R.
16) In this writ petition, the VCHS arrayed only
the State Government as party respondent but did
not   implead   PCNTDA   (appellant   herein).   The
11
PCNTDA then filed an application for intervention in
the said writ petition which was allowed by directing
the VCHS to implead PCNTDA as party respondent
in the writ petition.
17) The   State   and   PCNTDA   contested   the   writ
petition inter alia on the ground that firstly, the writ
petition is not maintainable inasmuch as the entire
issue in relation to the land in question has already
attained   finality   thrice   in   favour   of   the   State,
therefore,   nothing   now   remains   for   further
adjudication;     Secondly,   since   possession   of   the
land in question has already been taken over by the
State long back on 30.05.2000, the provisions of
Section 48 of the Act were not applicable to the case
and nor Section 48 could be used for further release
of   the   land   from   acquisition;   and   lastly,   the   socalled
order dated 10.06.2004 passed by the then
12
Revenue Minister was not an order much less a
legal   one   and   more   so   when   it   was   not
communicated to the landowners, it did not create
any kind of right in favour of  the landowners.
18) By impugned order, the High Court allowed
the   landowners'   writ   petition   and   issued   a
mandamus directing the State to give effect to the
order dated 10.06.2004 passed by the then Revenue
Minister. The effect of issuance of mandamus is to
release the remaining land measuring 10 H 33 R
from the acquisition proceedings in favour of the
landowners. It is against this order, PCNTDA filed
this appeal by way of special leave in this Court.
19) The question, which arises for consideration in
this appeal, is whether the High Court was justified
in allowing the writ petition filed by the landowners
(VCHS­respondent   No.1   herein)   and,   in
13
consequence, was justified in issuing directions to
the State in relation to the land in question.
20) Heard     Mr.   Arvind   Datar,   learned   senior
counsel for the appellant,   Ms. Meenakshi Arora,
learned senior counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr.
Nishant   R.   Katneshwarkar,   learned   counsel   for
respondent Nos. 2 & 3.
21) Mr.   Arvind   Datar,   learned   senior   counsel
appearing   for   the   appellant   (PCNTDA)   while
assailing   the   legality   and   correctness   of   the
impugned order has mainly urged six points.
22) In the first place, learned counsel urged that
the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the
High Court in allowing the landowners' writ petition
is, on the face of it, legally unsustainable and being
wholly perverse deserves to be set aside.
14
23) In   the   second   place,   learned   counsel   urged
that an issue as to whether the land in question
was   capable   of   being   released   or   not   from   the
clutches   of   the   acquisition   proceedings   in   the
context of Section 48 (1) of the Act had attained
finality in the earlier rounds of litigation against the
landowners up to this Court, the same could not
have   been   again   agitated   by   filing   another
application by respondent No.1(landowners) under
Section 48 of the Act.
24) According to learned counsel, it was not legally
permissible to empower the then Revenue Minister
to entertain such application.
25) In the third place, learned counsel contended
that   when   the   State   had   admittedly   taken
possession of the land in question long back on
30.05.2000 strictly in accordance with law as laid
15
down by this Court in Balwant Narayan Bhagde vs.
M.D.   Bhagwat   &   Ors.  (1976)   1   SCC   700,   the
provisions   of   Section   48   of   the   Act     had   no
application to the facts of the case at hand and
neither the then Revenue Minister nor the State had
any power to invoke the provisions of Section 48 of
the Act to release any part of the land on or after
30.05.2000.
26) In the fourth place, learned counsel contended
that  the  then  Revenue   Minister,  who   passed  the
order dated 10.06.2004 had no power to entertain
any such application because admittedly during the
relevant time, due to announcement of date of the
State   Assembly   elections   (September   2004),   the
Code of Conduct had come in force which did not
permit any Minister to exercise such power. 
16
27) In the fifth place, learned counsel contended
that even otherwise, the so called noting made by
the then Revenue Minister in the file on 10.06.2004
directing release of the land in question from the
acquisition proceedings could never be construed as
an “order" within the meaning of Section 48 of the
Act and nor such noting had any attribute of a legal
order.
28) It was his submission that firstly, such noting
remained   only   a   noting   of   the   then   Revenue
Minister,   which   was   never   communicated   to   the
landowners   as   per   the   procedure   prescribed   and
secondly, before it could take the shape of an order
within   the   meaning   of  Section   48  of  the  Act   for
being giving effect to, the noting was ordered to be
considered afresh by the State Government by order
dated 04.11.2004.
17
29) In this way, according to learned counsel, the
so called noting never saw the light of the day and
died its own death in the files creating no right and
interest of any kind in favour of the landowners.
30) In the fifth place, learned counsel contended
that the then Revenue Minister had passed similar
orders alike the one in question in relation to other
survey   numbers   by   directing   release   of   the   land
from the clutches of the acquisition proceedings but
all such orders were quashed by the High Court in
the writ petition and those orders were also upheld
by this Court.  Learned counsel gave the list of the
cases.
31) In the sixth place, learned counsel contended
that while releasing part of the land vide order dated
20.08.1994 (Annexure­P­24) it was made clear to
the landowners that they would not be entitled to
18
claim any compensation for the said land. It was,
therefore,   urged   that   reading   of   the   order   dated
20.08.1994 would clearly indicate that the releasing
of   the   part   of   the   land   and   retaining   of   the
remaining   land   was   in   the   nature   of   a   bargain
between   the   State   and   the   landowners   and,
therefore, there did not arise any occasion to further
release of the remaining land in question which was
undoubtedly needed for accomplishing the public
purpose for which it was acquired.
32) In   other   words,   the   submission   was   that
release   of   part   of   the   land   vide   order   dated
20.08.1994   disentitled   the   landowners   to   claim
further   release   of   the   remaining   land   from
acquisition proceedings.   It is apart from the fact
that the release of the land due to obtaining its
19
possession under Section 16 was not possible under
Section 48 of the Act.         
33) It   is   essentially   these   submissions,   learned
counsel elaborated in his arguments by referring to
the   record of   the  case  and   the  decisions   of  this
Court.
34) In reply, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior
counsel   supported the impugned order including
its   reasoning.   It   was   her   submission   that   the
impugned order is based on proper reasoning and
hence it does not call for any interference. Learned
counsel elaborated her submission by referring to
the documents to support the reasoning of the High
Court.
35) Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
20
find force in the submissions of the learned senior
counsel for the appellant.
36) The   main   questions   which   arise   for
consideration in this appeal are first,  whether the
then Revenue Minister,  who was purporting to act
for and on behalf of the State, had the power, in the
background   facts   of   this   case,   to   invoke   the
provisions of Section 48 of the Act for release of the
acquired   land   in   question   from   the   acquisition
proceedings; Second, whether the State had taken
possession   of   the   acquired   land   in   question   on
30.05.2000 and, if so, its effect;  and lastly,  what is
the true nature of the order dated 10.06.2004.
37) Sections 16 and 48, which are relevant for this
case read as under:
“Section 16
16.  Power   to   take   possession­   When   the
Collector  has  made   an   award  under   section
21
11,   he   may   take   possession   of   the   land,
which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the
Government, free from all encumbrances.
Section 48
48.  Completion   of   acquisition   not
compulsory, but compensation to be awarded
when   not   completed­(1)   Except   in   the   case
provided   for   in   section  36,  the  Government
shall   be   at   liberty   to   withdraw   from   the
acquisition  of   any   land  of  which  possession
has not been taken.
(2)   Whenever   the   Government   withdraws
from any such acquisition, the Collector shall
determine  the  amount  of  compensation  due
for   the   damage   suffered   by   the   owner   in
consequence   of   the   notice   or   of   nay
proceedings   thereunder,   and   shall  pay   such
amount   to   the   person   interested,   together
with all costs reasonably incurred by him in
the prosecution of the proceedings under this
Act relating to the said land.
(3) The provisions of Part III of this Act shall
apply, so far as may be, to the determination
of   the   compensation   payable   under   this
section.”
38) Section 48 of the Act gives liberty to the State
to withdraw from the acquisition of any land "of
22
which  possession  has  not  been  taken" except in
the cases which fall in Section 36. In other words,
once the possession of the acquired land is taken,
the   State   has   no   power   to   withdraw   from   the
acquisition because as a result of taking over of the
possession, the acquired land vests with the State
absolutely free from all encumbrances.
39) A fortiori so long as the possession is not taken
of   the   acquired   land,   the   State   is   at   liberty   to
withdraw from the acquisition either partly or fully
depending upon the facts of each case.
40) Section 16 of the Act empowers the Collector
to take possession of the acquired land on passing
of an award under Section 11 of the Act. Once the
Collector takes possession, the acquired land vests
absolutely   in   the   Government   free   from   all
encumbrances as provided therein.
23
41) The question arose before a Bench  of three
Judges of this Court in  Balwant  Narayan  Bhagde
(supra) as to how and in what manner possession of
the   acquired   land   is   required   to   be   taken   as
provided under Section 16 of the Act. The majority
view speaking through Bhagwati J. (as His Lordship
then was) dealt with this issue succinctly in Para 28
thus:
“28………We think it is enough to state that
when   the   Government   proceeds   to   take
possession  of  the   land  acquired  by   it  under
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it must take
actual   possession   of   the   land,   since   all
interests   in   the   land   are   sought   to   be
acquired  by   it.  There  can  be  no  question  of
taking   “symbolical”  possession   in  the   sense
understood   by   judicial   decisions   under   the
Code   of   Civil   Procedure.   Nor   would
possession merely on paper be enough. What
the   Act   contemplates   as   a   necessary
condition   of   vesting   of   the   land   in   the
Government   is   the   taking   of   actual
possession of the land. How such possession
may be taken would depend on the nature of
the   land.  Such  possession  would  have  to  be
taken   as   the  nature   of   the   land   admits   of.
There   can   be   no   hard   and   fast   rule   laying
24
down   what   act   would   be   sufficient   to
constitute   taking   of   possession   of   land.  We
should   not,   therefore,   be   taken   as   laying
down   an   absolute   and   inviolable   rule   that
merely   going   on   the   spot   and   making   a
declaration   by   beat   of   drum   or   otherwise
would   be   sufficient   to   constitute   taking   of
possession of land in every case. But here, in
our  opinion,  since  the   land  was   lying  fallow
and there  was no crop  on  it  at the  material
time, the act of the Tehsildar in going on the
spot and inspecting the land for the purpose
of   determining   what   part   was   waste   and
arable   and   should,   therefore,   be   taken
possession of and determining its extent, was
sufficient to constitute taking of possession.
It appears that the appellant was not present
when this was done by the Tehsildar, but the
presence of the owner or the occupant of the
land is not necessary to effectuate the taking
of possession. It is also not strictly necessary
as a matter of legal requirement that notice
should be given to the owner or the occupant
of the land that possession would be taken at
a particular time, though it may be desirable
where   possible,   to   give   such   notice   before
possession   is   taken   by   the   authorities,   as
that   would   eliminate   the   possibility   of   any
fraudulent or  collusive  transaction  of  taking
of   mere   paper   possession,   without   the
occupant or the owner ever coming to know
of it.”
42) Keeping in view the law laid down in Balwant
Narayan   Bhagde  (supra), we proceed to examine
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the question as to whether the possession of   the
remaining  acquired  land  was  taken   by  the  State
and, if so, whether it was done in accordance with
the test laid down by this Court.
43) Having perused the Panchanama (Annexure­P4)
dated 30.05.2004, Mutation Entry No. 8212 (file
7/12)   (Annexure­P­5),   possession   receipt
(Annexure­P­12) and   Mutation Entry of PCNTDA
(Annexure ­P­28/29) relied upon by the State,  we
have no hesitation in holding that the State did take
possession   of   the   acquired   land   in   question   on
30.05.2000 as per the test laid down by this Court
in  Balwant   Narayan Bhagde (supra). This we say
for  the following reasons.
44) First, the State gave notice to all the co­owners
of   the   land   in   question   and   informed   them   to
remain present at the time of taking possession by
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the SLAO;   Second, out of all the co­owners, two,
namely,   Chandra   Kant   Gajanan   Dev   and
Bhalchandra Chintaman Dev were present at the
time   of   taking   possession.   It   was   sufficient
compliance;   Third,   possession   was   taken   in   the
presence of two witnesses by   the SLAO; Fourth,
panchanama   evidencing   taking   of   the   possession
was duly signed by the witnesses; Fifth, the name of
the   State   Government   was   duly   entered   in   the
revenue records after obtaining possession as an
owner;     Sixth,   the   Government,   in   turn,   handed
over  the  possession  of  the  land  to  the  appellant
(PCNTDA);  and Seventh, the name of PCNTDA was
also entered in the revenue records of the land in
question.
45) Once we hold that the possession of the land
in question was taken by the State in accordance
27
with law on 30.05.2004 from the landowners, we
have no hesitation in holding that the provisions of
Section 48 of the Act were not applicable to the case
at hand. In other words, once it is held that the
possession of the acquired land was with the State,
the land stood vested in the State disentitling the
State   to   release   the   land   from   the   acquisition
proceedings by taking recourse to the provisions of
Section 48 of the Act.
46) A fortiori, the then Revenue Minister had no
power   to   deal   with   the   land   in   question   in   any
manner   whatsoever   and   nor   had   any   power   to
invoke the provisions of Section 48 of the Act for
release of the land in question from the clutches of
the acquisition proceedings.
47) This   takes   us   to   examine   another   question
though in the light of our finding on the issue of
28
possession, it is not necessary for us to examine
this question in detail.
48) The   question   is   whether   the   order   dated
10.06.2004 passed by the then Revenue Minister
directing release of the acquired land in question
has the attributes of an order within the meaning of
Section 48 of the Act or, in other words, whether the
order in question created any right in favour of the
landowners   so   as   to   enable   them   to   claim
mandamus for enforcement of such order against
the State
49) Our answer to the question is "no". It is for the
reasons that First, a mere noting in the official files
of the Government while dealing with any matter
pertaining to any person is essentially an internal
matter of the Government and carries with it no
legal sanctity;  Second, once the decision on such
29
issue   is   taken   and   approved   by   the   competent
authority   empowered   by   the   Government   in   that
behalf, it is required to be communicated to the
person concerned by the State Government.
50) In other words, so long as the decision based
on such internal deliberation is not approved and
communicated by the competent authority as per
the   procedure   prescribed   in   that   behalf   to   the
person concerned, such noting does not create any
right   in   favour   of   the   person   concerned   nor   it
partake the nature of any legal order so as to enable
the person concerned to claim any benefit of any
such  internal  deliberation.  Such noting(s) or/and
deliberation(s) are always capable of being changed
or/and   amended   or/and   withdrawn   by   the
competent authority.
30
51) Third, though Section 48 of the Act, in terms,
does not provide that release of the land from any
acquisition proceedings is required to be done by
issuance of the notification by the State but, in our
view, having regard to the scheme of the Act, which
begins with the process of issuance of notification
under Section 4 of the Act for acquisition of any
land, the release of land from such acquisition is
complete only when a notification is issued by the
State in that behalf.     
52) Indeed, the aforementioned issue remains no
more res integra and was decided by this Court in
several   decisions,   such   as  State   of   Punjab   vs.
Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, AIR 1961 SC 493, State of
Bihar   vs.   Kripalu   Shankar,   (1987)   3   SCC   34,
Rajasthan Housing Board vs. Shri Krishan, (1993)
2 SCC 84,  Sethi  Auto  Service  Station  vs.  DDA,
31
(2009) 1 SCC 180 and Shanti Sports Club & Anr.
Vs. Union of India & Ors., (2009) 15 SCC 705.
53) In  Shanti   Sports  (supra)   a   Bench   of   two
Judges of this Court, speaking through Singhvi, J.,
took note of all the previous case law on the subject
noted above and held as under:
“37…………..Although,   the   plain   language   of
Section 48(1) does not give any indication of
the   manner   or   mode   in   which   the
power/discretion   to   withdraw   from   the
acquisition   of   any   land   is   required   to   be
exercised,   having   regard   to   the   scheme   of
Parts   II   and   VII   of   the   1894   Act,   which
postulates   publication   of   notification   under
Section 4(1), declaration under Section 6 and
agreement   under   Section   42   in   the   Official
Gazette as a condition for valid acquisition of
the   land   for   any   public   purpose   or   for   a
company,   it   is   reasonable   to   take   the   view
that  withdrawal  from  the  acquisition,  which
may   adversely  affect   the  public  purpose   for
which,  or  the  company  on  whose  behalf  the
acquisition is proposed, can be done only by
issuing a notification in the Official Gazette.
39. The requirement of issuing a notification
for   exercise  of  power  under Section  48(1) of
the  Act  to  withdraw  from  the  acquisition  of
the   land   can   also   be   inferred   from   the
32
judgments   of   this   Court   in  Municipal
Committee,   Bhatinda   v.   Land   Acquisition
Collector   and   others (1993)  3  SCC  24   , U.P.
State Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. State of U.P.
and  others (1995)  Supp  3  SCC  538, State  of
Maharashtra   and   another   v.   Umashankar
Rajabhau   and   others (1996)   1   SCC   299
and State  of   T.N.  and  others  v.  L.  Krishnan
and others (1996) 7 SCC 450.
43. A noting recorded in the file is merely a
noting   simpliciter   and   nothing   more.   It
merely   represents   expression   of   opinion   by
the   particular   individual.   By   no   stretch   of
imagination, such noting can be treated as a
decision   of   the   Government.   Even   if   the
competent   authority   records   its   opinion   in
the   file   on   the  merits   of   the  matter   under
consideration, the same cannot be termed as
a   decision   of   the   Government   unless   it   is
sanctified and acted upon by issuing an order
in  accordance  with  Articles  77(1)  and   (2)  or
Articles 166(1) and (2). The noting in the file
or   even   a  decision   gets   culminated   into   an
order affecting right of the parties only when
it is expressed in the name of the President
or   the   Governor,   as   the   case  may   be,   and
authenticated   in   the   manner   provided   in
Article   77(2)   or   Article   166(2).   A   noting   or
even   a   decision   recorded   in   the   file   can
always   be   reviewed/reversed/overruled   or
overturned   and   the   court   cannot   take
cognizance  of  the  earlier  noting  or  decision
for exercise of the power of judicial review.”
33
54) In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are
of the considered opinion that the then Revenue
Minister, who passed the order dated 10.06.2004
had no power to deal with the matter relating to
release of the land in question. He simply usurped
the power under Section 48 of the Act, which he
never   possessed.   It   was   an   abuse   of   exercise   of
power   by   him   while   dealing   with   the   State's
largesse.
55) That apart, in our view, the filing of the writ
petition by the landowners itself was an abuse of
judicial process. It was for the simple reason that
the   earlier   litigation,   which   travelled   up   to   this
Court thrice having ended against the landowners,
it   was   binding   on   the   parties.     It   prevented   the
landowners to again raise the same issue. 
34
56) Indeed,   the   release   of   part   of   the   land   in
landowners’ favour and retention of the remaining
land for accomplishing the project vide notification
dated 20.08.1994 was in the nature of a bargain. It
disentitled the landowners to seek further release of
the remaining land. This is apart from the fact that
consequent upon obtaining the possession of the
land by the State, the release of the remaining land
under   Section   48   of   the   Act   was   otherwise   not
legally possible.    
57) In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are
of the considered view that the High Court failed to
examine the issues arising in the case in its correct
perspective. We cannot, therefore, concur with the
reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High
Court   which   wrongly   upheld   the   order   dated
35
10.06.2004   passed   by   the   concerned   Revenue
Minister. 
58) The appeal thus succeeds and is accordingly
allowed.   Impugned   order   is   set   aside.   As   a
consequence, the writ petition filed by respondent
No.1   stands   dismissed   with   costs   quantified   at
Rs.25,000/­ to be payable by respondent No.1 to
the appellant.
………………………………..J.
(ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
            …..………………………………J.
     (UDAY UMESH LALIT)
New Delhi,
August 03, 2018
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