the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 = suit for injunction and declaration not maintainable against Univerisity = KLR Act not applicable to University lands and as such certificate of occupancy rights not valid = It is clear from the aforesaid provisions that any land belonging to or held on lease by a University established by law is not subject to the provisions of the KLR Act. The said Act is also not applicable to the land belonging to the Government. In the instant case, the land in question belongs to the University. The registered gift deed dated 12.8.1999 at Annexure P-1 executed by Maharaja of Mysore in favour of the President of India and the lease deed dated 30.11.1970 executed by the President of India in favour of the University clearly establishes the said fact. Therefore, assuming that Rajaiah and Nanjaiah had made applications for grant of occupancy right in respect of the schedule property, the said applications were not maintainable and the order at Annexure P-3 has been passed without jurisdiction. Therefore, the private respondents cannot claim any right in respect of the schedule lands on the basis of the order at Annexure P-3.; non -joinder of necessary parties = neither the University nor the Government of India was made a party to the proceedings before the Land Tribunal. Though Mysore Palace was made a party, it has nothing to do with the lands in question - The lands in question did not vest in the State Government on the appointed date, namely, 1.03.1974 as it belongs to University. It is only when the Deputy Commissioner informed the University that some persons are trying to get the records changed in their names on the basis of the order of the Land Tribunal, the University took steps to challenge the said order. The records produced before us clearly establishes that the University has taken steps to challenge the said order diligently thereafter. We are of the view that the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petitions on the ground of delay and latches. ;appreciation of evidence = The order dated 20.1.2012 of the Assistant Commissioner at Annexure R-6 clearly shows that the University is in possession of the said land. It is submitted at the Bar that the said order of the Assistant Commissioner has been challenged by the private respondents before the High Court by filing a writ petition and that the said writ petition is pending. It is also evident that the criminal case filed by the jurisdictional police against the private respondents is also pending before the 3rd JMC Court, Mysore. The concerned courts are requested to dispose of these cases expeditiously in accordance with law. In our view, the High Court was not justified in holding that the private respondents are in possession of the lands in question. They do not have title or are in possession of the said lands. It is also clear that the University is in lawful possession of the said lands.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.170-173 OF 2011
UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE ….. APPELLANT
 VERSUS
RAJAIAH (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. ….. RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
S.ABDUL NAZEER, J.
1. The appellant-University of Mysore has filed these appeals challenging the
common judgment and order passed by the High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore, in
RSA Nos.456 of 2000, 457 of 2000, and in W.P. Nos. 1649 of 2001 and 4302 of
2001 dated 25.06.2004, whereby the High Court has dismissed the appeals and the
writ petitions.
2. Rajaiah since deceased by his LRs and Chamundi (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘private respondents’) both sons of late Nanjaiah Thavarekatte, filed two suits,
2
being OS No. 20/1995 and OS No.21/1995, on the file of the Second Munsiff and
JMFC at Mysore against the University of Mysore (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
University’) for injunction restraining the University, their officials, subordinates
or anybody acting on their behalf from interfering with their possession and
enjoyment of the suit schedule properties. The suit schedule property in OS No.
20/1995 is as under:-
“Patta land bearing Sy. No.4, situated at
Kurubarahalli, Mysore Taluk, measuring 4.00
acres, and kharab land 4.00 acres of the same Sy.
Number, abutting to the same land, situated at
Kurubarahalli, Mysore Taluk, bounded on –
East : by Main road.
West : By Holla.
South : By Bull road
North : By Private land.”
The suit schedule property in OS No. 21/1995 is as under:-
“Patta land bearing Sy. No.4 measuring 4.00 acres,
situated at Kurubarahalli, Mysore taluk, and land
measuring 4.00 acres of kharab land, situated in
the same number, abutting to the said land, situated
at Kurubarahalli, Mysore, bounded on the
East : By Halla & Property of Rajaiah
West : By property of R.K. Muthu
South : By Bull road.
North : By land of Narayanappa.”
3
3. In O.S. No. 20/95 the case pleaded by the private respondent-Rajaiah is that
he was the tenant of 4 acres of land in Sy. No.4 of Kurubarahalli village, Mysore,
and the landlord was Maharaja of Mysore. On coming into force the Karnataka
Land Reforms Act, 1961 (for short ‘the KLR Act’) he filed a declaration seeking
occupancy right in respect of the said land. After contest, the Land Tribunal
granted occupancy right in respect of the said land in his favour. He has been in
possession and enjoyment of the said property.
4. The case put forth by the private respondent-Chamundi in OS No.21/95 is
that his father late Nanjaiah was an agricultural tenant in respect of 4 acres of patta
land abutting 4 acres of Kharab land situated in Sy. No.4 of Kurubarahalli village,
Mysore under Maharaja of Mysore. On enforcement of the Act, the schedule
property vested in the Government. His father had filed a declaration seeking
grant of occupancy right in respect of the aforesaid 4 acres of land. After contest,
the occupancy right had been conferred upon his father on 5.6.1981. After the
death of his father the khata of the said property was transferred to his name and
that he has been in possession and enjoyment of the said property.
5. In both the suits, private respondents have further contended that the
defendant-University has got no manner of right, title and interest over the said
property and that the officers of the University are interfering with their possession
and enjoyment of said property.
4
6. University filed written statement in both the suits denying the plaint
averments. It was contended that the President of India had executed a deed of
lease dated 30.11.1970 in respect of 22 acres of land in Survey No.4 of
Kurubarahalli, Kasaba Hobli, Mysore Taluk bounded on the North by remaining
portion of Sy No.4, South by road, East by road and West by remaining portion of
Serial No.4 of Kurubarahalli in its favour. The lease was for a period of 99 years.
Based on the lease deed, University has been in absolute possession and enjoyment
of the aforesaid land. The suit scheduled property is part and parcel of this land. It
was contended that the private respondents have no manner of right, title or interest
whatsoever in respect of the said property.
7. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed relevant
issues. The parties have let in evidence in support of their respective contentions.
On appreciation of materials on record, the trial court dismissed the suits by
judgment and decree dated 5.2.1998.
8. The private respondents challenged the said judgment and decree by filing
RA Nos.87/98 and 88/98 before the II Addl. Civil Judge (Senior Division),
Mysore. After hearing, the First Appellate Court allowed the appeals on 6.3.2000
and the suits filed by the private respondents were decreed only insofar as 4 acres
of patta land is concerned. Both the suits in respect of kharab land to an extent of 4
acres each were dismissed.
5
9. University challenged the said decree of the First Appellate Court by filing
RSA No. 456 of 2000 and RSA No.457 of 2000 before the High Court.
10. During the pendency of these appeals, University filed WP No.1649 of 2001
and WP No. 4302 of 2001, challenging the legality and correctness of the order
dated 5.6.1981 passed by the Land Tribunal, Mysore, in KL/RF/4480/79-80 and
4481/79-81 (Annexure P-3) whereby occupancy right in respect of 4 acres of land
each has been granted in favour of the private respondent Rajaiah, and Nanjaiah,
father of the other private respondent Chamundi. It was contended that by a deed
of gift dated 12.8.1965, Maharaja of Mysore had gifted 22 acres of land in Survey
No.4 of Kurubarahalli village, Kasaba Hobli, Mysore Taluk, in favour of the
President of India and the President of India leased the said land in favour of
University by executing a lease deed dated 30.11.1970. The land in question did
not belong to the Maharaja of Mysore, when Rajaiah and Nanjaiah had made
applications for grant of occupancy right. Having regard to Section 107 of the KLR
Act, the application filed by Rajaiah and Nanjaiah was not maintainable. It was
further contended that the order passed by the Land Tribunal granting occupancy
right was without jurisdiction. It was also contended that the University was not
made party to the proceedings before the Land Tribunal. Mysore Palace was made
a party to the proceedings which has nothing to do with the land in question at the
6
relevant point of time. University has assigned cogent reasons for the delay in
filing the writ petitions challenging the order of the Land Tribunal.
11. The High Court by a common judgment dated 25.6.2004 dismissed the
appeals as well as the writ petitions.
12. The State of Karnataka has filed objections to these appeals on 13.4.2012
contending that the private respondents have managed to create certain bogus
documents to their advantage and produced the same before the civil court so as to
establish their claim over the lands in question contending that the occupancy right
has been granted in their favour. It was further contended that on verification of
the records, it was noticed that K.L.R.M. No. 4480/79 is in respect of Survey
No.42 of Dadadahalli village, Mysore Taluk, which is to an extent of 2 acres and
the occupancy right as per Form No.10 was granted to one Sri Siddaiah, son of
Madaiah. K.L.R.M. No.4481/79 is in respect of Survey No.39 of Dadadahalli
village, Mysore Taluk, which is to an extent of 2 acres, and the occupancy right has
been granted in favour of Sri Shivanna, son of Nanjegowda. On perusal of the
Declaration Register pertaining to Kurubarahalli village, Mysore Taluk, it was
noticed that there is no entry for having filed declaration in Form No.7 by the
private respondents. The K.L.R.F. bearing No. 4480/79 and 4481/79 is in respect
of lands pertaining to Dadadahalli village, Jayapura Hobli which has been
fraudulently made use of by the private respondents, creating Form No.10 in their
7
favour just to claim rights illegally over the land belonging to the University. The
private respondents have not filed any application in Form No.7 in respect of the
suit schedule property as per the register maintained with respect to Kurubarahalli
village. It is also stated that the respondents-plaintiff have not come to the court
with clean hands. Therefore, Tahsildar, Mysore Taluk, has filed a complaint to the
jurisdictional police vide letter dated 23.1.2012 and the jurisdictional police have
filed an FIR before the 3rd JMFC Court, Mysore, wherein the case has been
registered against the LRs of the Rajaiah and Nanjaiah under Sections 465, 466,
468. 471,120(B) and 420 of IPC and Section 192(a) of the Karnataka Land
Revenue Act, 1964.
13. Shri Guru Krishna Kumar, learned senior advocate, appearing for the
appellant-University, submits that the title set up by the private respondents over
the subject land is fraudulent and based on forged documents. Rajaiah and
Nanjaiah had not filed applications for grant of occupancy right in respect of the
schedule lands. The applications have been filed by Sri Siddaiah and Sri Shivanna
in respect of some other land in Dadadahalli village. The reference numbers for
applications for another village have been unscrupulously used while forging the
Land Tribunal’s order dated 5.6.1981.
14. Alternatively, it is submitted that Maharaja of Mysore had granted 22 acres
of land in Survey No.4 of Kurubarahalli, Kasaba Hobli, Mysore Taluk of
8
Kurubarahalli in favour of President of India by a registered gift-deed dated
12.8.1965 (Annexure P-1) and that the said land was leased in favour of the
University by the President of India by a deed of lease dated 30.11.1970 (Annexure
P-2). The land did not belong to the Maharaja of Mysore on the appointed date.
Neither the University nor the Government of India was made party to the
proceedings before the Land Tribunal. But, Mysore Palace was made a party
which has nothing to do with the land when the alleged application was made for
grant of occupancy right. The KLR Act has no application to the lands belonging
to the Government or held on lease by a University having regard to Section 107 of
the said Act.
15. It is further argued that the private respondents are not in possession of the
schedule property. Possession of the land is and has been with the University.
Upon discovery of the fraud perpetuated by the private respondents, the University
by way of I.A Nos.12-15 of 2010 and the State of Karnataka by way of written
statement along with the affidavit, placed the relevant documents on record before
this Court as far back as in the years 2010-12. The private respondents have not
placed on record any rebuttable documents. It is argued that the University has also
assigned justifiable reasons for the delay in approaching the High Court for
quashing the order of the Land Tribunal. The High Court has, however, failed to
accept the said reasons.
9
16. Shri Devadatt Kamat, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for
the respondent-State of Karnataka, has supported the stand taken by the
appellant-University. He has produced the original records in relation to the lands
in question. He has pointed out that the land did not belong to the Mysore Palace
when the applications said to have been made by Rajaiah and Nanjaiah for grant of
occupancy right. The order dated 5.6.1981 at Annexure P-3 is a forged document.
17. Shri Nagmohan Das, learned senior counsel appearing for the private
respondents, supported the judgment of the High Court. It is submitted that the
Land Tribunal has rightly granted the occupancy right in respect of the said lands
in favour of the private respondents. When the appellant-University tried to
interfere with their possession, they filed the suits for injunction which were
decreed by the First Appellate Court. The High Court has rightly dismissed the
second appeal filed by the University. Learned counsel prays for dismissal of
these appeals.
18. We have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel for the
parties made at the Bar and carefully perused the materials placed on record.
19. Having regard to the contentions urged, the first question for our
consideration is whether the University is a lessee of the schedule property. It is
clear from the materials placed on record that originally the property in question
belonged to the Maharaja of Mysore. He gifted the said property to the President
10
of India for starting Logopedics Institute in Mysore as per registered gift-deed at
Annexure P-1, dated 12.8.1965. Since the land was not suitable for the said
purpose, Union of India requested the University of Mysore to give some other
land and accordingly the University gave 32 acres of its land. In lieu of the same,
the Union of India leased 22 acres of the said land for 99 years commencing from
30.11.1997 in favour of the University. This is evident from the registered lease
deed at Annexure P-2 dated 30.11.1970. It was a vacant land. The schedule
properties are a part and parcel of the said land. It is thus clear that the University
was the lessee of the said land.
20. This takes us to the next question as to whether Rajaiah and Nanjaiah had
made applications for grant of occupancy right in respect of the schedule lands and
whether the order of the Land Tribunal at Annexure P-3 dated 5.6.1981 is in
respect of the said lands. The University and the State Government have
contended that the contesting respondents have managed to create bogus
documents to their advantage in relation to the land in question. In order to test the
correctness of this submission, we have verified the original records produced by
the learned Additional Advocate General representing the State Government in
relation to the properties in question. The order dated 5.6.1981 of the Land
Tribunal at Annexure P-3 shows that the Land Tribunal passed the order granting
occupancy right at Annexure P-3 in KL/RF/4480/79-80 and 4481/79-80. A perusal
11
of the records reveals that K.L.R.M. No.4480/1979 is in respect of Sy. No.42 of
Dadadahalli village, Mysore Taluk to an extent of 2 acres of land and occupancy
right in the said case was granted to one Sri Siddaiah, son of Madaiah. K.L.R.M.
No.4481/79 is in respect of Sy. No.39 of Dadadahalli village, Mysore Taluk to an
extent of 2 acres of land and the occupancy right in the said case was granted in
favour of Sri Shivanna, son of Nanjegowda. The Declaration Register maintained
by the Land Tribunal pertaining to Kurubarahalli, Mysore Taluk does not contain
any entry for having filed declaration form in Form No.7 by Rajaiah and Nanjaiah.
As noticed above, K.L.R.F. No. 4480/79 and 4481/79 is in respect of lands
belonging to Dadadahalli village, Jayapura Hobli which has been used by Rajaiah
and Nanjaiah for creating Form No.10 in their favour in respect of schedule land.
21. The University has filed IA Nos.12-15 of 2010 narrating the aforesaid facts
along with the supporting documents. The State Government has also given the
aforesaid particulars in their statement of objections. IA Nos. 12-15/2010 have
been filed in the year 2010 and the State Government has filed objections in the
year 2012. Respondents have not filed any rebuttal documents or additional
written statement. It is clear that the order of the Land Tribunal at Annexure P-3 is
a fabricated document.
22. Now let us consider the alternative submission of the University that the
alleged application of Rajaiah and Nanjaiah for grant of occupancy right was not
12
maintainable and the alleged order at Annexure P-3 has been passed without
jurisdiction. Section 44(1) of the KLR Act, 1961 which came into force w.e.f.
1.3.1974 provides for vesting of the land in the State Government. It reads as
under:
“44. Vesting of lands in the State Government.—(1)
All lands held by or in the possession of tenants
(including tenants against whom a decree or order for
eviction or a certificate for resumption is made or issued)
immediately prior to the date of commencement of the
Amendment Act, other than lands held by them under
leases permitted under Section 5, shall, with effect on and
from the said date, stand transferred to and vest in the
State Government.”
23. The KLR Act is not made applicable to certain lands. This is clear from
Section 107 of the Act. The relevant provisions for the purpose of this case are
sub-Section (1)(i) and (iii) of Section 107, which is as under:
“107. Act not to apply to certain lands.—(1) Subject to
the provisions of Section 110, nothing in this Act, except
Section 8, shall apply to lands,—
(i) belonging to Government;
 [(ii) * * * * *];
(iii) belonging to or held on lease by or from a local
authority, an Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee
constituted under the Karnataka Agricultural Produce
Marketing Regulation Act, 1966 (Karnataka Act No. 27
of 1966), a University established by law in India, [a
research institution owned or controlled by the State
Government or the Central Government or both] [an
13
Agricultural Research Institution recognised by the State
Government or the Central Government], the Karnataka
Bhoodhan Yagna Board established under the Karnataka
Bhoodhan Yagna Act, 1963 (Karnataka Act No. 34 of
1963).”
24. It is clear from the aforesaid provisions that any land belonging to or held on
lease by a University established by law is not subject to the provisions of the KLR
Act. The said Act is also not applicable to the land belonging to the Government.
In the instant case, the land in question belongs to the University. The registered
gift deed dated 12.8.1999 at Annexure P-1 executed by Maharaja of Mysore in
favour of the President of India and the lease deed dated 30.11.1970 executed by
the President of India in favour of the University clearly establishes the said fact.
Therefore, assuming that Rajaiah and Nanjaiah had made applications for grant of
occupancy right in respect of the schedule property, the said applications were not
maintainable and the order at Annexure P-3 has been passed without jurisdiction.
Therefore, the private respondents cannot claim any right in respect of the schedule
lands on the basis of the order at Annexure P-3.
25. There is also no merit in the contention of the learned senior counsel
appearing for the private respondents that the writ petitions are highly belated. As
has been stated above, neither the University nor the Government of India was
made a party to the proceedings before the Land Tribunal. Though Mysore Palace
was made a party, it has nothing to do with the lands in question at the relevant
14
point of time. The lands in question did not vest in the State Government on the
appointed date, namely, 1.03.1974 as it belongs to University. It is only when the
Deputy Commissioner informed the University that some persons are trying to get
the records changed in their names on the basis of the order of the Land Tribunal,
the University took steps to challenge the said order. The records produced before
us clearly establishes that the University has taken steps to challenge the said order
diligently thereafter. We are of the view that the High Court was not justified in
dismissing the writ petitions on the ground of delay and latches.
26. The order dated 20.1.2012 of the Assistant Commissioner at Annexure R-6
clearly shows that the University is in possession of the said land. It is submitted at
the Bar that the said order of the Assistant Commissioner has been challenged by
the private respondents before the High Court by filing a writ petition and that the
said writ petition is pending. It is also evident that the criminal case filed by the
jurisdictional police against the private respondents is also pending before the 3rd
JMC Court, Mysore. The concerned courts are requested to dispose of these cases
expeditiously in accordance with law.
27. In our view, the High Court was not justified in holding that the private
respondents are in possession of the lands in question. They do not have title or
are in possession of the said lands. It is also clear that the University is in lawful
possession of the said lands. We are further of the view that the High Court was
15
not justified in dismissing the writ petitions filed by the University challenging the
order of the Land Tribunal at Annexure P3. The High Court was also not justified
in dismissing the Regular Second Appeals filed by University.
28. For the afore-stated reasons, the judgment and the decree, of the High Court
in R.S.A Nos. 456/2000 and 457/2000, as also of the First Appellate Court in RA
Nos. 87 and 88 of 1998 are set aside. The judgment and decree dated 5.2.1998
passed by the Trial Court in OS Nos. 20/95 and 21/95 is restored. The order
of the High Court in W.P. Nos.1649/2001 and 4302/2001 is set aside and the writ
petitions filed by the University are allowed. The order dated 5.6.1981 of the
Land Tribunal, Mysore (at Annexure P-3) in No. KL/RF/4480/79-80 and
4481/79-80 is hereby quashed.
29. The appeals are accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

……………………………J.
 (N.V. RAMANA)
 ……………………………J.
(S. ABDUL NAZEER)
New Delhi;
March 23, 2018.

It is a well settled principle of criminal law that some minor contradiction or inconsistency in evidence cannot affect the material evidence and such contradiction or inconsistency cannot be made basis to discard the whole evidence as unreliable.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1032 OF 2007
Gorusu Nagaraju
s/o Apparao ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
State of Andhra Pradesh ….Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. This appeal is filed by the accused from jail
through the Supreme Court Legal Services
Committee against the final judgment and order
dated 15.12.2006 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in
Criminal Appeal No.955 of 2005 whereby the High
1
Court affirmed the judgment and order dated
10.06.2005 passed by the IInd Additional District
and Sessions Judge, East Godavari at Rajamundary
in Sessions Case No.193 of 2000 by which the
appellant(A-1) was convicted for the offences
punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as
"IPC") and under Section 235(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as
"the Cr.P.C.") and sentenced him to undergo
imprisonment for life under Section 302 IPC with a
fine of Rs.200/-, in default, to further undergo
simple imprisonment for one month and for the
offence under Section 201 IPC, he was sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years with
a fine of Rs.100/- in default to further undergo
simple imprisonment for one month. Both the
sentences were directed to run concurrently.
2
2. For the disposal of the appeal, few relevant
facts need to be mentioned hereinbelow.
3. The appellant (A-1) along with four accused
persons (A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-5) were prosecuted for
commission of the offence punishable under Section
302 read with Section 201 of IPC for committing
murder of one - Desineedi Venkateswararao @
Venkatesh. The IInd Additional District & Sessions
Judge by his judgment and order dated 10.06.2005,
convicted the appellant (A-1) and sentenced him to
undergo imprisonment for life under Section 302
IPC and further to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for three years under Section 201 IPC and acquitted
three accused, namely, A-2, A-3 and A-5. So far as
A-4 is concerned, since he was absconding, his trial
was separated.
3
4. Against the said order, the appellant filed an
appeal in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
challenging his conviction and sentence. The State,
however, did not file any appeal questioning the
order in respect of acquittal of A-2, A3 and A-5 and,
therefore, the acquittal order became final.
5. The High Court, by impugned judgment,
dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant(A-1) and
upheld the appellant's conviction and sentence,
which has given rise to filing of this appeal by way
of special leave by the appellant before this Court.
6. The question arises for consideration in this
appeal is whether any case is made out to interfere
in the impugned judgment.
7. At the outset, we may consider it apposite to
state that the Sessions Judge and the High Court,
on appreciation of entire oral evidence, held the
appellant guilty of the offences. In other words,
4
both the Courts on appreciation of oral evidence
adduced by the prosecution, recorded a finding of
guilt against the appellant for commission of the
offences in question and accordingly convicted him.
8. It is a case where the findings of conviction are
concurrent in nature and based on appreciation of
evidence, therefore, such findings are usually
binding on this Court. However, if the appellant is
able to show any perversity, arbitrariness, absurdity
or illegality in any such concurrent findings then, in
such circumstances, the findings though
concurrent are not binding on this Court. This
Court, therefore, usually does not take upon itself to
again appreciate the evidence de novo third time in
the appeal subject to the exception pointed out
above.
9. We have perused the entire record including
the evidence adduced by the prosecution. The
5
prosecution examined 33 witnesses and the defense
examined only one witness. We also find that the
Sessions Judge and the High Court relied on the
evidence of PW-8, PW-11, PW-12, PW-14, PW-28
and PW-31 for sustaining the conviction of the
appellant (A-1). It is also noticed that the conviction
is largely based on circumstantial evidence.
10. The High Court, in Para 5 of the impugned
judgment, has taken note of the circumstances that
led to the death of the deceased and how the
appellant was connected with the crime in question.
The circumstances noticed are first, the deceased
was last seen in the company of the appellant (A-1);
Second, the appellant and the deceased, both went
together to a liquor shop to purchase bottle of
whisky; Third, recovery of the body from the heap of
hay of PW-18 with bleeding injuries; Fourth, the
appellant's fingerprints found on the Whisky bottle
6
(McDowell) and glass and on other seized articles at
the scene of occurrence by the Handwriting &
Fingerprint Expert; Fifth, the recovery of all the
seized articles was made at the instance of the
appellant; Sixth, the appellant was having some
grudge against the deceased because the appellant
had requested the deceased to sort out some issues
between him and PW-6 but the deceased failed to do
so for some reasons; Seventh, the appellant failed
to explain any of the circumstances noticed above
and kept mum when asked to explain.
11. The prosecution with the aid of 33 witnesses
proved the aforementioned seven circumstances. It
is true that out of 33 witnesses, some turned hostile
but those, who did not turn hostile and maintained
consistent version of the aforementioned seven
circumstances, in our opinion, their evidence was
rightly relied on for sustaining the conviction.
7
12. That apart, in our considered opinion, the
seven circumstances noticed and relied on by the
prosecution were material circumstances and,
therefore, rightly made basis to connect the
appellant with the commission of the crime in
question. Indeed, the chain of events which led to
death of the deceased was established without any
break implicating the appellant with the chain of
events.
13. Learned counsel for the appellant wanted to go
through the entire evidence and he actually did it
but could not point out any material contradiction
or inconsistency in evidence. It is a well settled
principle of criminal law that some minor
contradiction or inconsistency in evidence cannot
affect the material evidence and such contradiction
or inconsistency cannot be made basis to discard
the whole evidence as unreliable. It is much more
8
so when the two Courts below took note of the said
evidence and discarded it being wholly immaterial.
14. We are, therefore, not impressed by the
submissions urged by the learned counsel of the
appellant as it did not make out any case of
acquittal of the appellant from the offences in
question.
15. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no
merit in the appeal. The appeal thus fails and is
accordingly dismissed.
………...................................J.
[R.K. AGRAWAL]


…...……..................................J.
 [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi;
March 23, 2018
9

Trade Union = whether such a Trade Union which primarily has the membership of the worker of particular Establishment or industry can broaden its scope by opening the membership even to those who are not the employees of the Establishment in respect of which the said Trade Union has been formed. = Once we find that all the workmen of Yamaha are members of the intervenor Union, obviously the appellant-Union is not in a position to comply with the provisions of Section 9A read with Section 22 of the Act. 11) For these reasons, the applications praying for recall of the findings recorded in paragraphs No. 24 and 25 of the judgment dated September 14, 2017 passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 12843-12844 of 2017, are dismissed.

1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
M.A. NOS. 1744-1745 OF 2017
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 12843-12844 OF 2017
ALL ESCORTS EMPLOYEES UNION .....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. .....RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
A.K. SIKRI, J.
Application for intervention is allowed.
2) Appeals filed by All Escorts Employees Union were dismissed by this
Court vide judgment dated September 14, 2017. Appellant is a
registered Trade Union which was representing the employees of
Escorts Group of Industries and is duly recognised by the employers as
well. One of the group companies was Escorts Yamaha Ltd. which was
a joint venture of Escorts Management and Yamaha Motor Company,
Japan. The employees of Escorts Yamaha Ltd. were also members of
the employees-Union. However, in the year 2001, Escorts Yamaha Ltd.
was taken over by Yamaha Motor Company, Japan and its name was
2
changed to Yamaha Motor India Private Limited (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘Yamaha’).
3) Appellant-Union has its Constitution. Clause 4 thereof deals with
‘Membership’. This clause as it stood prior to the year 2001, inter alia,
mentioned that any member who leaves the job of any Escorts concern
at Faridabad will cease to be the member of the Union. By virtue of this
clause, all the workmen working in Yamaha ceased to be the members
of appellant-Union as they no longer remained the employees of any
Escorts concern. In order to overcome this difficulty and to allow the
workmen of Yamaha also to become members of the appellant-Union,
clause 4 was amended. This amendment was sent to Registrar, Trade
Union, Haryana for its record and approval. However, the Registrar,
Trade Union refused to approve this amendment. This decision was
challenged before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by the
appellant-Union by filing a writ petition. This writ petition was dismissed
by the High Court vide judgment dated April 20, 2015. It is this judgment
on the aforesaid issue as to whether the amendment could be allowed
or not, was the subject matter of Civil Appeal Nos. 12843-12844 of 2017.
While dismissing these appeals on September 14, 2017, this Court inter
alia stated as under:
“23) The moot question here is as to whether such a Trade
Union which primarily has the membership of the worker of
particular Establishment or industry can broaden its scope by
opening the membership even to those who are not the
3
employees of the Establishment in respect of which the said
Trade Union has been formed.
24) At this juncture, it becomes pertinent to note that the
workers of Yamaha have formed their own separate Union,
known as Yamaha Motor Employees Union. This Union is
duly registered by the Registrar, Trade Union, Kanpur (Uttar
Pradesh) having Registration No. 7179. It is this Union which
now stands recognised by the Management of Yamaha. In
these circumstances, the very purpose in amending Clause 4
in the manner it seeks to do stands frustrated. In any case,
Clause 4 was amended in the year 2007 and that amendment
has been approved by the Registrar, Trade Union. Therefore,
issue of amendment in Clause 4, as carried out in June, 2001,
becomes a non-issue.
25) In view of the aforesaid, it is not necessary to deal with
the issue raised in these appeals as the issue does not
survive. Civil Appeal Nos. 12843-12844 of 2017 Page 20 of
23 (arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 27020-27021 of 2015) Thus,
leaving the question of law open, these appeals are
dismissed.”
4) From the reading of para 24 extracted above, it can be discerned that
this Court took the view that since the workers of Yamaha had formed
their own separate Trade Union which is also duly registered with the
Registrar, Trade Union and stands recognised by the managment of
Yamaha, the very purpose of amending clause 4 stands defeated. It is
further mentioned that, in any case, clause 4 was amended in the year
2007 and since that amendment has been approved by the Registrar,
Trade Union, the issue of amendment in clause 4, as carried out in June,
2001, becomes a non-issue and, therefore, it is not necessary to deal
with the issue.
5) In these applications filed by the appellant, it is submitted that the
4
observation in para 24 to the effect that amendment to clause 4 carried
out in the year 2007 has been approved by the Registrar, Trade Union is
factually incorrect. It is stated that the Additonal Registrar, Trade Union,
Haryana in his counter affidavit has mentioned that the order dated
October 21, 2015 was passed whereby the amendment approved vide
letter dated November 24, 2007 was withdrawn/cancelled by invoking
clause 4 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Therefore, amendment to
clause 4 carried out in the year 2007 also does not exist. On that basis,
the prayer made in the applications is that findings given in paragraphs
24 and 25 of the judgment dated September 14, 2017 be recalled and
the issue that arises for consideration should be decided on merits.
6) Insofar as factual error that has occurred in the judgment dated
September 14, 2017 as pointed out in these applications is concerned,
the appellant/applicant is correct in its submission. Though amendment
to clause 4 of the Constitution of the appellant in November, 2007 was
initially approved by the Registrar, however, the said approval was
withdrawn by the Registrar vide order dated October 21, 2015. It was
stated in the counter affidavit filed by the Additional Registrar that initially
the amendment was approved inadvertently, which had occasioned
because of the concealment of the material facts about the rejection of
the earlier application by the Registrar. However, after this fact came to
the notice of the Registrar, the amendment was withdrawn vide order
5
dated October 21, 2015 after following due procedure.
7) After hearing counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that
notwithstanding the aforesaid factual error, the end result remains
unaltered. In case, the amendment to clause 4 which was initially
approved by the Registrar, but later on withdrawn, vide order dated
October 21, 2015, this decision of the Registrar would furnish a fresh
cause of action to the appellant. It has not come on record whether this
order was challenged at all or not.
8) Be that as it may, main reason in our judgment dated September 14,
2017 to dismiss the appeals was that the workers of Yamaha have
formed their own separate Union which is duly registered and also
recognised by the managment of Yamaha. Therefore, the very purpose
of amending clause 4 stands frustrated.
9) In this behalf, it would be pertinent to mention that All India Yamaha
Motor Employees Sabha has filed intervention application. In this
application, it is, inter alia, stated that intervenor Trade Union is formed
for the exclusive benefit for the workmen of Faridabad Plant of Yamaha.
It is further stated that all the workers of the said Faridabad Plant are the
members of the intervenor Union and they are not being represented by
the appellant-Union. These workers have elected the office-bearers of
the intervenor Union and it is this Union which is now representing 100%
6
workers working in the said Union and is negotiating with the employers.
Insofar as appellant-Union is concerned, this Union represents the
workers of Escorts Group of Companies. As per Section 6 of the Trade
Unions Act, 1926 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), it is necessary for
the Trade Union to provide for the matters enumerated in the said
Section. Clause (e) thereof deals with admission of ordinary members
and provide as under:
“(e) the admission of ordinary members who shall be persons
actually engaged or employed in an industry with whihc the
Trade Union is connected, and also the admission of the
number of honorary or temporary members as office-bearers
required under section 22 to form the executive of the Trade
Union;”
10) As per this clause, ordinary members should be those who are
actually engaged or employed in an industry in whcih the Trade Union is
connected. It is also significant to note that a Union in a particular
establishment should have representative character. For this reason,
Section 9A of the Act, which was inserted by Act 31 of 2001 w.e.f.
January 9, 2002 mandates that a registered Trade Union of workmen
shall at all times continue to have not less than ten per cent or one
hundred of the workmen, whichever is less, subject to a minimum of
seven, engaged or employed in an establishment or industry with which
it is connected, as its members. Section 22 of the Act contains another
stipulation, namely, not less than one-half of the total number of the
office-bearers of every registered Trade Union in an unrecognised sector
7
shall be persons actually engaged or employed in an industry with which
the Trade Union is connected. Section 22 in the aforesaid form came to
be substituted by Act 31 of 2001 w.e.f. January 9, 2002. Once we find
that all the workmen of Yamaha are members of the intervenor Union,
obviously the appellant-Union is not in a position to comply with the
provisions of Section 9A read with Section 22 of the Act.
11) For these reasons, the applications praying for recall of the
findings recorded in paragraphs No. 24 and 25 of the judgment dated
September 14, 2017 passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 12843-12844 of 2017,
are dismissed.
.............................................J.
(A.K. SIKRI)
.............................................J.
(ASHOK BHUSHAN)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 23, 2018.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - whether by virtue of Section 357(2) Cr.P.C., the said fine which was part of sentence automatically was stayed till the decision of the appeal and would not have been directed by the High Court to be deposited by the appellant.= We, however, make it clear that Appellate Court while exercising power under Section 389 Cr.P.C. can suspend the sentence of imprisonment as well as of fine without any condition or with conditions. There are no fetters on the power of the Appellate Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 389 Cr.P.C.. The Appellate Court could have suspended the sentence and fine both or could have directed for deposit of fine or part of fine.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.406 OF 2018
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.)NO.1994 OF 2018)
SATYENDRA KUMAR MEHRA
@ SATENDERA KUMAR MEHRA                      … PETITIONER
VERSUS
THE STATE OF JHARKHAND         … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
This appeal has been filed against an order of the High
Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Criminal Appeal NO.176 of 2018
by which High Court by allowing I.A.No. 892 of 2018 filed by
the appellant, has   directed to grant suspension of sentence
of   the   appellant.   The   High   Court   further   directed   that   the
appellant should also deposit the fine amount awarded before
the court below. The appellant is aggrieved only against that
part of the order by which the High Court directed the deposit
of fine amount.
2. The   appellant   was   an   accused   in   R.C.   Case   No.68(A)   of
1996­State (through CBI) vs. Lalu Prasad @ Lalu Prasad Yadav
and   others.   Accused   were   tried   for   the   offence   punishable
under Sections 120­B/ read with 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 and
2
477­A of the IPC read with Section 13(1)(c) & (d) and 13(2) of
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The trial court by order
dated 24.01.2018 convicted the accused and awarded sentence.
The appellant,  who  was  one  of  the  accused,  was  awarded  the
following sentence by the trial court:
   "44.   Satyendra   Kumar   Mehra   convicted   for
offence   punishable   U/s   120­B/420,   120­B/467,
120­B/468 and 120­B/471 IPC:
U/s 120­B/420 IPC R.I. of Five(05) Years with
fine of Rs.25,000/­ and in default of payment
of fine S.I. for Three (03) Months.
U/s   120­B/467   IPC   R.I.   of   Five   (05)   Years
with   fine   of   Rs.25,000/­   and   in   default   of
payment of fine S.I. for Three (03) Months.
U/s 120­B/468 IPC R.I. of Five(05) Years with
fine of Rs.25,000/­ and in default of payment
of fine S.I. for Three (03) Months.
U/s 120­B/471 IPC R.I. of Five(05) Years with
fine of Rs.25,000/­ and in default of payment
of fine S.I. for Three (03) Months.
All the sentences shall run concurrently and
the period undergone shall be set off.”
3. Aggrieved against the above conviction and sentence order
the appellant filed Criminal Appeal No.176 of 2018 before the
High   Court.   The   appellant   also   filed   application   praying
suspension of sentence. After hearing, the High Court allowed
the   application   granting   the   privilege   of   suspension   of
sentence   to   the   appellant   and   directing   the   appellant   be
released on bail on furnishing  bail bond of Rs.50,000/­ with
two sureties. However, while allowing the application the High
3
Court  passed the following direction:
"Appellant should also deposit the fine amount
awarded before court below.”
4. The appellant aggrieved by the aforesaid direction of the
High Court to deposit the fine amount awarded by the court
below has come up in this appeal.
5. We   have   heard   Shri   Sunil   Kumar,   learned   senior   counsel
appearing   for   the   appellant   and   Shri   Aman   Lekhi,   learned
Additional   Solicitor   General   for   India   appearing   for   the
respondent­State.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant relying on Section 357
sub­Section (2) of Criminal Procedure Code submits that since
the   appellant   has   already   filed   an   appeal   before   the   High
Court,   the   amount   of   fine   imposed   by   the   trial   court
automatically stands stayed till the decision of the appeal.
He submits that in the present case sentence of fine was also
imposed by the trial court which is the subject of the appeal,
hence Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. is attracted in the present case
and the High Court should not have directed the appellant to
deposit   the   fine   amount   awarded   by   the   trial   court   which
direction   is   in   the   teeth   of   provisions   of   Section   357(2)
Cr.P.C. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of his
submission   placed   reliance   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court
4
reported   in    Dilip   S.   Dahanukar   vs.   Kotak   Mahindra   Co.Ltd.
And another, (2007) 6 SCC 528.
7. Shri Aman Lekhi, learned Additional Solicitor General for
India   refuting   the   submission   of   learned   counsel   for   the
appellant contends that the High Court did not commit error in
directing the appellant to deposit the fine amount awarded by
the court below. He submits that provisions of Section 357(2)
Cr.P.C. is not attracted in the present case. He submits that
what is contemplated by sub­Section (2) of Section 357 Cr.P.C.
is “payment of the compensation as envisaged in Section 357(1)
Cr.P.C.”. He submits that stay of payment of compensation is
entirely different from the stay of fine which is a part of
sentence imposed on accused.
8. He   submits   that   this   Court   in  Stanny   Felix   Pinto   vs.
Jangid Builders Pvt. Ltd. and another, (2001) 2 SCC 416,  has
also upheld a similar order passed by the High Court where the
High   Court   directed   payment   of   rupees   four   lakhs   as   a
condition to suspend the sentence which was part of the fine
imposed as part of sentence.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that judgment
of this Court in  Stanny Felix Pinto(supra) cannot be pressed
into service with regard to interpretation of Section 357(2)
Cr.P.C. which section is neither referred to nor adverted to
5
by this Court in above case.
10.   We   have   considered   the   submissions   of   the   learned
counsel for the parties and perused the records.   From  the
facts brought on record, it is clear that the sentence awarded
to the appellant was a sentence of R.I. of five years with
payment of fine of Rs.25,000/­ and in default S.I. of three
months. The said sentence was recorded in four cases and all
sentences were to run concurrently. Thus, the fine was part of
the   sentence.   The   question   which   is   to   be   answered   in   the
present   case   is   as   to   whether   by   virtue   of   Section   357(2)
Cr.P.C.,   the   said   fine   which   was   part   of   sentence
automatically was stayed till the decision of the appeal and
would not have been directed by the High Court to be deposited
by the appellant.
11. For answering the question we need to reflect upon the
statutory   scheme   as   delineated   by   Section   357(2)   Cr.P.C.
Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. is part of Chapter XXVII­”THE JUDGMENT”
of   the       Criminal   Procedure   Code,   1973.   Section   353   deals
about   the   judgment,   its   pronouncement,   signatures,   delivery
and   other   aspects.   Section   354   deals   with   language   and
contents   of   judgment.   Section   355   refers   to   Metropolitan
Magistrate's   judgment.   Section   356   deals   with   order   for
notifying   address   of   previously   convicted   offender   and   then
6
Section 357 bears heading “Order to pay compensation”. Order
to pay compensation, thus, is a part of judgment where Court
directs payment for compensation.
12. Section 357(1) Cr.P.C. contemplates that when a Court
imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence of which fine forms a
part, the Court may, while passing judgment, order the whole
or any part of the fine recovered to be applied. Section 357
is to the following effect:­
“357. Order to pay compensation.
(1) When  a  Court  imposes a sentence of fine
or a sentence (including a sentence of death)
of   which   fine   forms   a   part,   the   Court   may,
when passing judgment order the whole or any
part of the fine recovered to be applied(a)
in   defraying   the   expenses   properly
incurred in the prosecution;
(b) in   the   payment   to   any   person   of
compensation for any loss or injury caused by
the   offence,   when   compensation   is,   in   the
opinion   of   the   Court,   recoverable   by   such
person in a Civil Court;
(c) when   any   person   is   convicted   of   any
offence   for   having   caused   the   death   of
another   person   or   of   having   abetted   the
commission   of   such   an   offence,   in   paying
compensation   to   the   persons   who   are,   under
the Fatal  Accidents Act,  1855  (13  of  1855),
entitled   to   recover   damages   from   the   person
sentenced for the loss resulting to them from
such death;
7
(d) when   any   person   is   convicted   of   any
offence   which   includes   theft,   criminal
misappropriation,   criminal   breach   of   trust,
or   cheating,   or   of   having   dishonestly
received   or   retained,   or   of   having
voluntarily assisted in disposing of, stolen
property knowing or having reason to believe
the   same   to   be   stolen,   in   compensating   any
bona fide purchaser of such property for the
loss of the same if such property is restored
to   the   possession   of   the   person   entitled
thereto.”
(2) If the fine is imposed in a case which is
subject to  appeal,  no  such  payment  shall  be
made before the period allowed for presenting
the appeal has elapsed, or, if an appeal be
presented, before the decision of the appeal.
(3) When a Court imposes a sentence, of which
fine   does   not   form   a   part,   the   Court   may,
when   passing   judgment   order   the   accused
person  to  pay,  by  way  of  compensation,  such
amount   as   may   be   specified   in   the   order   to
the   person   who   has   suffered   any   loss   or
injury   by   reason   of   the   act   for   which   the
accused person has been so sentenced.
(4) An order under this section may also be
made   by   an   Appellate   Court   or   by   the   High
Court or Court of Session when exercising its
powers of revision.
(5) At  the time of awarding compensation  in
any   subsequent   civil   suit   relating   to   the
same   matter,   the   Court   shall   take   into
account   any   sum   paid   or   recovered   as
compensation under this section.”
13. All the circumstances in sub­section (1) of Section 357
8
refer   to   direction   to   pay   compensation   out   of   the   fine
imposed. Thus, all the circumstances are circumstances where
fine   imposed   and   recovered   is   to   be   applied   in   the   above
circumstances.
14. The   fine   is   thus   contemplated   to   be   utilised   for
compensating different circumstances as enumerated in Section
357(1) Cr.P.C. Sub­Section (2) of Section 357 Cr.P.C. has been
engrafted  in reference to what was stated in sub­Section (1)
of Section 357 Cr.P.C.  Crucial words used in sub­Section (2)
of   Section   357   Cr.P.C.   are   “no   such   payment   shall   be   made
before   the   period   allowed  for   presenting   the   appeal   has
elapsed, or if an appeal be presented, before the decision of
the   appeal”.   Thus,   what   is   prohibited   under   Section   357(2)
Cr.P.C. is that payment of compensation utilising the fine be
not paid till the period allowed for presenting the appeal has
elapsed, or if an appeal is filed then before the decision of
the   appeal.     It   does   not   involve   any   concept   of   stay   of
sentence.
15. Chapter XXIX deals with the appeals. In the said Chapter
Section   389   deals   with   the   subject   “suspension   of   sentence
pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail”. Section
389(1) Cr.P.C. empowers the Appellate Court to order that the
execution   of   the   sentence   or   order   appealed   against   be
9
suspended   and,   also,   if   he   is   in   confinement,   that   he   be
released on bail. Thus, the power of suspension of sentence
emanates   from   Section   389   Cr.P.C.   where   Appellate   Court   is
empowered to pass such an order. Sections 357 and 389 Cr.P.C.
operate in two different fields. Section 357 Cr.P.C. contains
an embargo that on passing a judgment of sentence of fine, the
fine   be   not   utilised   for   payment   of   compensation   till
contingency as mentioned therein does not occur. The sentence
awarded by the Court including sentence of fine is in no way
affected by embargo contained in Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. The
operation of Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. is restricted to payment
of   compensation   as   contemplated   by   Section   357(1)   and   (3)
Cr.P.C. The heading of the Section 357 Cr.P.C. i.e. “Order to
pay compensation” as well as contents of the Section lead to
only   one   conclusion   that   the   entire   provision   has   been
engrafted regarding payment of compensation out of the fine
imposed or when Court imposes sentence the fine is not part of
which, the Court may by way of compensation direct payment of
such amount to a person who has suffered the injury. We, thus,
are of the view that Section 357 Cr.P.C. has nothing to do
with suspension of sentence awarded by the trial court and the
sentence of fine imposed on the accused is in no way affected
by   Section   357(2)   Cr.P.C.   The   present   is   not   a   case   where
10
trial court has directed payment of any compensation to anyone
out   of   fine   imposed.   There   is   no   direction   for   payment   of
compensation in the order of the trial court nor present case
is covered by the circumstances mentioned in sub­clauses (a)
to (d) of Section 357(1) Cr.P.C. Present is also not a case of
Section   357(3)   Cr.P.C.   Hence,   there   is   no   question   of
applicability of Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. The heading of Section
357 Cr. P.C. throws considerable light in finding the object
and   purpose   of   the   Section.   Section   357   Cr.P.C.   is   only
attracted   when   Court   orders   for   payment   of   compensation.
Section 357 is not attracted in any other case. It is well
settled that heading of the Section plays a role when there is
any   doubt   in   interpretation   of   the   Section.   This   Court   in
Bhinka  and  others  vs.  Charan  Singh, AIR 1959  SC 960,  while
examining the role of a heading of section while interpreting
a section noticed the following principle;
“15......Section   180   provides   for   the
eviction of a person who but for the eviction
would become a hereditary tenant by efflux of
the   prescribed   time.   If   there   is   any
ambiguity — we find none — it is dispelled by
the heading given to the section and also the
description of  the  nature  of  the  suit  given
in the Schedule. The heading reads thus:
“Ejectment of person occupying land
without title.”
“Maxwell On Interpretation of Statutes, 10th
11
Edn., gives the scope of the user of such a
heading in the interpretation of a section
thus, at p. 50:
“The headings prefixed to sections or sets
of   sections   in   some   modern   statutes   are
regarded   as   preambles   to   those   sections.
They cannot control the plain words of the
statute   but   they   may   explain   ambiguous
words.”
If  there  is any doubt  in  the  interpretation
of   the   words   in   the   section,   the   heading
certainly   helps   us   to   resolve   that
doubt.......”
16. The   similar   proposition   was   again   reiterated   by
three­Judge Bench of this Court in  N.C. Dhoundial vs. Union
of India and others, (2004) 2 SCC 579, where in paragraph 15
following has been held:
“15......The   language   employed   in   the
marginal heading is another indicator that
it is a jurisdictional limitation. It is a
settled   rule   of   interpretation   that   the
section   heading   or   marginal   note   can   be
relied upon to clear any doubt or ambiguity
in the interpretation of the provision and
to   discern   the   legislative   intent   (vide
Uttam   Das   Chela   Sunder   Das   v.   Shiromani
Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, (1996) 5 SCC
71 and Bhinka v. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC
960).”
17. Now we come to the judgment which has been relied on by
the   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant,   i.e.,  Dilip   S.
Dahanukar (supra).  In the above case this Court had occasion
to   interpret   Section   357   Cr.P.C.   The   appellant   therein   was
accused   No.2,   who   was   directed   to   pay   compensation   to   the
12
complainant of Rs.15 lakh apart from the simple imprisonment.
The facts have been noted in paragraph 3 of the judgment which
is to the following effect:
“3.  Accused   1,   M/s   Goodvalue   Marketing
Co.   Ltd.,   a   company   registered   and
incorporated   under   the   Companies   Act,   1956
and   Accused   2,   the   appellant   herein   were
convicted   for   commission   of   an   offence
involving   Section   138   of   the   Act   by   a
judgment   of   conviction   and   sentence   dated
23­2­2006 holding:
“Accused   1   company,   M/s   Goodvalue
Marketing   Co.   Ltd.   stands   convicted   for
the offence punishable under Section 138
read   with   Section   141   of   the   Negotiable
Instruments Act.
Accused 1 company is sentenced to pay a
fine   of   Rs   25,000   (Rupees   twenty­five
thousand only). In default of payment of
fine,   Accused   2   Mr   Dilip   Dahanukar,   the
Chairman of Accused 1 and representative
at   the   trial,   shall   suffer   SI   for   1
month.
Accused   2   Mr   Dilip   S.   Dahanukar,   stands
convicted   for   the   offence   punishable
under   Section   138   read   with   Section   141
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Accused 2 is sentenced to suffer SI for 1
month.
Accused 2 is also directed to pay compensation
to   the   complainant,   quantified   (sic)   at   Rs
15,00,000 (Rupees fifteen lakhs only),  under
Section 357(3) CrPC. Accused 2 is entitled to
pay   the   amount   of   compensation   in   two   equal
monthly instalments of Rs 7,50,000 each. The
first instalment of Rs 7,50,000 shall be paid
on   or   before   23­3­2006   and   the   second
13
instalment of Rs 7,50,000 shall be paid on or
before 24­4­2006; in default of payment of the
amount of compensation Accused 2 shall suffer
further SI for 2 months.”
18. An appeal was preferred against the conviction order. The
Appellate   Court   while   admitting   the   appeal   directed   the
accused to deposit a sum of Rs.5 lakh each within four weeks
from the said date. Writ petition was filed questioning the
legality of the said order of the Appellate Court which was
dismissed and thereafter the matter was taken to this Court. A
submission was raised before this Court that having regard to
the   provisions   of   Section   357(2)   of   the   Code,   the   impugned
judgment is wholly unsustainable inasmuch as in terms thereof
the amount of fine imposed would automatically be suspended.
19. In the above case this Court considered sub­Sections (1),
(2)  and  (3)  of   Section    357  of   the   Code  and  observed   that
sub­Section   (2)   shall   be   applicable   both   in   regard   to
compensation as well as direction under sub­Section (3). In
paragraphs 43, 44 and 45 following has been laid down:
“43.  It   does   not   appeal   to   us   that
although   a   compensation   payable   out   of   the
quantum   of   fine   would   remain   stayed   under
sub­section (2) of Section 357 of the Code, if
a   compensation   is   directed   to   be   paid   under
sub­section   (3)   thereof,   the   same   would   not
attract   the   said   provision.   (See  P.   Suresh
Kumar v. R. Shankar, [(2007) 4 SCC 752].)
14
44. Magistrates cannot award compensation
in addition to fine. When a fine is imposed,
however,   the   private   party   has   no   right   to
insist   that   compensation   may   be   awarded   to
him out of the amount of fine. The power to
award   compensation   under   Section   357(3)   is
not an ancillary power. It is an additional
power. (See Balraj v. State of U.P., [(1994)
4 SCC 29].)
45.  Clause   (b)   of   sub­section   (1)   of
Section   357   and   sub­section   (1)   of   Section
357 and sub­section (3) of Section 357 seek
to   achieve   the   same   purpose.   What   is
necessary   is   to   find   out   the   intention   of
the   lawmaker   and   the   object   sought   to   be
achieved.   Sub­section   (2)   of   Section   357
uses the word “fine”. It does not say that
what   would   be   stayed   i.e.   application   of
fine. Sub­section (2) of Section 357, in our
opinion,   does   not   contemplate   any   other
interpretation. Even assuming that Mr Lalit
was   correct   in   his   submission,   still   then
sub­section   (3)   would   be   squarely
attracted.”
20. Referring   to   Section   389   Cr.   P.C.,   this   Court   noticed
that suspension of a sentence and enlarging an appellant on
bail, who is convicted and realisation of fine has been dealt
with by Parliament under different provisions of the Code. In
paragraph 51 following has been laid down:
“51.  Section   389   does   not   deal   with
exactly   a   similar   situation.   Section   389   of
the   Code   is   to   be   read   with   Section   387
thereof.   Suspension   of   a   sentence   and
enlarging   an   appellant   on   bail,   who   is
convicted   and   realisation   of   fine   has   been
dealt   with   by   Parliament   under   different
provisions   of   the   Code.   The   power   of   the
court, thus, to suspend a sentence in regard
15
to   realisation   of   compensation   may   be
different   from   that   of   a   direction   in
realisation of fine.”
21. This   Court   in   the   aforesaid   case   has   noted   the
distinction between fine of Rs.25,000/­ which was imposed on
the Company and compensation of Rs.15 lakh which was directed
to be paid by the Chairman of the Company. In paragraph 71 the
aforesaid was mentioned to the following effect:
“71.  We   are   prima   facie   of   the   opinion
(without going into the merit of the appeal)
that the direction of the learned trial Judge
appears   to   be   somewhat   unreasonable.   The
appellant   herein   has   been   sentenced   to
imprisonment.   Only   fine   has   been   imposed   on
the   Company.   Thus,   for   all   intent   and
purpose, the learned trial Judge has invoked
both sub­sections (1) and (3) of Section 357
of  the  Code.  The  liability  of  the  appellant
herein   was   a   vicarious   one   in   terms   of
Section   141   of   the   Negotiable   Instruments
Act.   The   question   may   also   have   to   be
considered   from   the   angle   that   the   learned
trial Judge thought it fit to impose a fine
of Rs 25,000 only upon the Company. If that
be so, a question would arise as to whether
an amount of compensation for a sum of Rs 15
lakhs should have been directed to be paid by
the Chairman of the Company. We feel that it
is not.”
22. This Court ultimately directed the appellant to deposit
rupees   one   lakh   towards   the   compensation   and   recorded   its
conclusion in paragraph 72 which is to the following effect:
“72. We, therefore, are of the opinion:
16
(i) in a case of this nature, sub­section (2)
of   Section   357   of   the   Code   of   Criminal
Procedure   would   be   attracted   even   when   the
appellant was directed to pay compensation;
(ii)   the   appellate   court,   however,   while
suspending the sentence, was entitled to put
the appellant on terms. However, no such term
could   be   put   as   a   condition   precedent   for
entertaining   the   appeal   which   is   a
constitutional and statutory right;
(iii)   the   amount   of   compensation   must   be   a
reasonable sum;
(iv)   the   court,   while   fixing   such   amount,
must   have   regard   to   all   relevant   factors
including the one referred to in sub­section
(5)   of   Section   357   of   the   Code   of   Criminal
Procedure;
(v) no unreasonable amount of compensation can
be directed to be paid.”
23. This   Court,   in   the   above   case,   was   dealing   with   the
question of payment of compensation which was awarded by the
Court under sub­Section (3) of  Section 357 Cr.P.C. The Court
was not dealing with fine which was part of the sentence. The
Court, thus, had no occasion to consider the issue which has
arisen in the present case. We, in the present case, are not
concerned with payment of any compensation or applicability of
Section   357(2)   Cr.P.C.   with   regard   to   payment   of   any   such
compensation.
24. We   also   need   to   notice   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in
17
Stanny   Felix   Pinto   (supra).  In   the   above   case   along   with
sentence of imprisonment, fine was also imposed under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The High Court while
entertaining the revision granted suspension of the sentence
by   imposing   a   condition   that   part   of   the   fine   shall   be
remitted in court within a specified time which direction was
challenged   in   this   Court.   This   Court   upheld   the   said
direction. Following was held in paragraph 2:
“2.  When   a   person   was   convicted   under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
and   sentenced   to   imprisonment   and   fine   he
moved   the   superior   court   for   suspension   of
the   sentence.   The   High   Court   while
entertaining   his   revision   granted   suspension
of the sentence by imposing a condition that
part of the fine shall be remitted in court
within   a   specified   time.   It   is   against   the
said   direction   that   this   petition   has   been
filed. In our view the High Court has done it
correctly and in the interest of justice. We
feel   that   while   suspending   the   sentence   for
the   offence   under   Section   138   of   the
Negotiable   Instruments   Act   it   is   advisable
that  the  court  imposes  a  condition  that the
fine   part   is   remitted   within   a   certain
period.   If   the   fine   amount   is   heavy,   the
court  can  direct  at least  a portion thereof
to be remitted as the convicted person wants
the   sentence   to   be   suspended   during   the
pendency   of   the   appeal.   In   this   case   the
grievance   of   the   appellant   is   that   he   is
required   by   the   High   Court   to   remit   a   huge
amount of rupees four lakhs as a condition to
suspend   the   sentence.   When   considering   the
total   amount   of   fine   imposed   by   the   trial
court   (twenty   lakhs   of   rupees)   there   is
nothing unjust or unconscionable in imposing
such a condition. Hence, there is no need to
18
interfere with the impugned order. As such no
notice   need   be   issued   to   the   respondent.
Appeal is accordingly dismissed.”
25. It is true that this Court while deciding the said case
did not consider  Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. Learned counsel for
the   appellant   is   right   in   his   submission   that   the   above
judgment   cannot   be   held   to   be   laying   down   any   ratio   on
applicability of Section 357(2) Cr.P.C.
26. We may also refer to a judgment of Karnataka High Court
in Irrigation Engineering Company (India) Private Limited and
Anr. vs. The Small­Scale Industrial Development Bank of India
(SIDBI), 2003 (6) KarLJ 387, where while interpreting Section
357(2) Cr.P.C., Karnataka High Court had observed that word
“payment” found in Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. does not refer to
the 'deposit' of compensation or fine amount by the accused.
In the case before the High Court appellant was convicted with
sentence of fine. In appeal the High Court directed suspension
of sentence on the condition that the appellant shall deposit
20% of  the  total  fine  which was challenged  before  the  High
Court on the ground that in view of Section 357(2) Cr.P.C.,
Appellate Court was not right in asking them to deposit 20% of
the total fine. In paragraphs 8,9 and 10 following was stated:
“8.  What Section 357(2) of the Cr. P.C. says
is as under:
19
"If   the   fine   is   imposed   in   a   case
which   is   subject   to   appeal,   no   such
payment   shall   be   made   before   the
period   allowed   for   presenting   the
appeal has elapsed, or, if an appeal
be   presented,   before   the   decision   of
the appeal".
Nowhere   it   says   that   the   Court   of   Appeal,
while   suspending   sentence   imposed   on   an
accused,   cannot   impose   a   condition   of
depositing a part of fine amount. It is true
that  as per the decision  relied on  for  the
petitioners,   stay   engrafted   under   the   said
provision   of   law   equally   applies   to   the
compensation granted under Sub­section (3) of
Section   357   of   the   Code,   but   it   cannot   be
taken   to   hold   or   read   that   the   Appellate
Court   cannot   pass   a   conditional   order   for
suspending a sentence.
9.  According to me, the word "payment" found
in Section 357(2) of the Cr. P.C., does not
refer   to   the   'deposit'   of   compensation   or
fine amount by an accused in pursuance of an
order   passed   by   Appellate   Court   while
suspending   sentence   imposed   on   an   accused
since, to my mind, the word "payment" refers
to payment to be made to the person, who is
ordered to  be  paid  compensation and not the
fine amount, inclusive of compensation amount
to   be   'deposited'   by   accused.   The   stay
engrafted  into  the  said provision  of  law  is
with   reference   to   the   'payment'   of   such
amount   earlier   to   the   expiry   of   the   appeal
period   or,   where   appeal   has   been   preferred,
during   the   pendency   of   such   appeal.   So,
Section 357 need not and cannot be read with
Section 389 of the Cr. P.C. In fact, neither
the   petitioners/appellants   applied   for,   nor
the Appellate Court ordered suspension of the
sentence   relating   to   compensation   of   Rs.   16
lakhs   only.   On   the   other   hand,   when   the
suspension   of   impugned   sentence   passed
against them is seen with the power given to
the Appellate Court under Section 389 of the
20
Cr.   P.C.,   besides   the   ambit   or   scope   of
Section 357 of the Cr. P.C., there will not
be any difficulty in holding that there is no
error of record or infirmity or irregularity
or illegality in the impugned order passed by
the Court of Sessions suspending the sentence
on  condition  of depositing  20%  of  the  total
fine amount imposed on them (petitioners).
10.  In   this   view   of   the   matter,   neither
Section   357(2)   of   the   Cr.   P.C.   nor   the
decision relied on for the petitioners is of
any help to the petitioners.“
27. Learned   Counsel   for   the   appellant   has   relied   on   three
judgments of High Courts, one of Punjab and Haryana High Court
and   two   judgments   of   Patna   High   Court   in   support   of   his
submissions. We need to refer to above judgments relied by the
learned   counsel   for   the   appellant.   The   first   judgment   is
judgment   of   Punjab   and   Haryana   High   Court   reported   in  2006
(3) PLR 194, Kedar Nath versus State of Haryana. In the above
case, the petitioner was convicted for offence under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for dishonour of
several cheques amounting to Rs.1,50,000/­. The petitioner was
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for period of one
year and to pay a fine of Rs.3,00,000/­. It was also ordered
that out of fine of Rs.3,00,000/­, a sum of Rs.2,50,000/­be
given to the complainant as compensation. An appeal was filed
where Appellate Court suspended the sentence on the condition
21
that petitioner will deposit an amount of Rs.1,50,000/­ before
the trial court. The aforesaid condition was challenged by the
petitioner   in   the   High   Court.   It   was   submitted   that   in
accordance with Section 357 sub­section (2) Cr.P.C. petitioner
was   not   liable   to   pay   any   amount   of   fine.   The   High   Court
accepted the submission relying on Section 357 sub­section (2)
Cr.P.C.. In paragraph 8 of the judgment, following was held:
“8. Against the judgment of conviction and order to
sentence, an appeal was preferred by the petitioner,
which was admitted for hearing. While suspending the
sentence,   the   Appellate   Court   imposed   a   condition
for depositing an amount of Rs.1,50,000/­ out of the
amount   of   fine   of   Rs.3   lacs   imposed   by   the   trial
Court.   In   my   opinion,   by   imposing   the   said
condition, the petitioner was compelled to pay the
amount of fine, which according to sub­section (2)
of Section 357 Cr.P.C., the accused is not liable to
pay   till   the   final   adjudication   of   the   appeal.
Merely   because   out   of   the   amount   of   fine   of   Rs.3
lacs, Rs.2,50,000/­ was ordered to be paid to the
complainant as compensation, in my opinion, does not
change the nature of fine. The judgment of the trial
court  is   very  clear  that  a  fine  of  Rs.3  lacs   was
imposed   along   with   the   sentence   of   one   year.   The
facts   of   this   case   are   squarely   covered   by   the
decision   of   the   this   Court   in   Sabita   Behl’s
case(supra).   Thus,   in   my   opinion,   the   Appellate
Court was not justified while imposing the impugned
condition   directing   the   petitioner   to   deposit   an
amount   of   Rs.1,50,000/­   before   the   trial   Court   at
the time of furnishing the bail bonds in view of the
order   of   suspension   of   sentence   passed   by   the
Appellate Court.”
28. The   above   case   is   clearly   distinguishable   from   the
present case. In the above case, there was direction within
22
the meaning of Section 357 sub­section (1) (b) Cr.P.C. for
payment   of   compensation.   Hence   Section   357   sub­section   (2)
Cr.P.C. was relied  by  the  Court.  Present  is not a  case  of
payment of any compensation out of fine imposed on appellant.
Thus, the above case in no manner helps the appellant.
29. Now we come to the second case relied by the appellant
i.e. Division Bench Judgment of Patna High court in  Bharat
Mandal son of Sitaram Mandal & Ors. Vs. The State of Bihar,
2012 (2) PLJR 855.  In the above case accused were convicted
under   Section   307/149   IPC   and   Section   27   of   the   Arms   Act.
They   were   sentenced   for   life   imprisonment   and   further
directed to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/­ each. The appeal was
filed   in   which   the   Appellate   Court   declined   to   stay   the
payment of fine. The appellant pressed for stay of payment of
fine   which   was   considered   by   the   High   Court.   High   Court
relied   on   Section   357   sub­section   (2)   Cr.P.C.   and   accepted
the submission of the appellant that the fine was not to be
paid. Following was held in paragraph 7:
“7.   The   argument   of   Mr.   Yogesh   Chandra   Verma,
learned counsel for the appellant is based squarely
upon the literal interpretation from the Section.
In our view, the submission as made by Sri Verma
has   to   be   accepted.   On   the   plain   reading   of
sub­section   (2)   of   Section   357   of   the   Code   of
Criminal Procedure we find that there is absolutely
no ambiguity in the provision as engrafted by the
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legislature, it clearly stipulates firstly, that no
such   payment   shall   be   made   before   the   period
allowed   for   presenting   the   appeal   has   elapsed.
Thus, this stops any court from enforcing payment,
for the period in which appeal could be filed. It
then secondly provides that the stay of action of
realization or payment would continue if an appeal
is   presented   till   the   decision   of   the   appeal.
“Decision of the Appeal” would only mean the final
judgment   in   the   appeal   and   not   any   order   at   any
interlocutory stage because that would not be the
decision of the appeal. Thus, on the plain reading
of Section 357(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
a   fine   imposed,   would   automatically   get   stayed
firstly for the period which is available to file
appeal and once the appeal is filed then till the
decision of the appeal. That is the mandate of the
legislature   itself,   clear   and   unambiguous.   The
situation   would   be   different,   if   instead   of
awarding fine, in terms of Section 357(3) of the
Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   compensation   only   is
awarded. In such a case, the appellate court has
judicial   discretion   to   stay   or,   not   to   stay   the
compensation so awarded depending upon the facts of
the case under consideration.”
30. From the facts noticed by the High Court it is not clear
as to whether the amount of fine Rs.20,000/­ was directed to
be paid to the victim. No such facts have been noticed in the
judgment. If there was no direction to pay any compensation
out   of   the   fine   imposed   the   facts   of   the   said   case   are
similar to the case in hand. We have taken the view that if
there   is   no   direction   to   pay   any   compensation   out   of   fine
imposed, Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. is not attracted. We are of
the view that the High Court's observation that in view of
Section   357   sub­section   (2)   of   Cr.P.C.   the   realisation   of
24
fine   would   automatically   get   stayed   does   not   take   into
consideration the distinction in a case where fine is part of
sentence and there is direction to pay compensation and in a
case where there is no direction to pay any compensation.
31. The   third   case   relied   by   the   learned   Counsel   for   the
appellant is again a Division Bench Judgment of Patna High
Court in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.529 of 2012, Naresh Yadav@
Naresh   Mahto   &   Ors.   Vs.   The   State   of   Bihar,   decided   on
26.06.2012. The Judgment of Patna High Court has been placed
on record along with the short submissions of learned counsel
for the appellant. A perusal of the judgment   indicate that
Patna High Court has not noticed the facts of the case and
the   nature   of   Order   passed   by   the   trial   Court   regarding
imposition of fine. The applicant prayed for modification of
Order of the High Court by which the direction was issued for
depositing the fine. Section 357 sub­section (2) Cr.P.C. was
relied and the Division Bench relying on earlier judgment of
Patna High Court in Bharat Mandal & Ors. (Supra) modified the
last paragraph of the Order dated 04.06.2012 providing that
the fine imposed shall remain stayed till the decision of the
case. The above judgment relies only on Bharat Mandal & Ors.
which has already been noted above by us hence this judgment
also does not help the appellant.
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32. The   object   and   purpose   of   Section   357   Cr.P.C.   was
considered by this Court in Hari Singh vs. Sukhbir Singh and
others,   (1988)   4   SCC   551.  This   Court   held   that   the   power
given to the Court to direct for payment of compensation is
intended to do something for the victim. The provision was
held to be a step   forward in our criminal justice system.
Following were the observations made in paragraph 10:
"10...It   empowers   the   court   to   award
compensation   to   victims   while   passing
judgment   of   conviction.   In   addition   to
conviction,   the   court   may   order   the   accused
to pay some amount by way of compensation to
victim   who   has   suffered   by   the   action   of
accused. It may be noted that this power of
courts to award compensation is not ancillary
to   other   sentences   but   it   is   in   addition
thereto.   This   power   was   intended   to   do
something  to  reassure  the  victim  that  he  or
she is not forgotten in the criminal justice
system.   It   is   a   measure   of   responding
appropriately to crime as well of reconciling
the victim with the offender. It is, to some
extent, a constructive approach to crimes. It
is   indeed   a   step   forward   in   our   criminal
justice   system.   We,   therefore,   recommend   to
all   courts   to   exercise   this   power   liberally
so as to meet the ends of justice in a better
way.”
33. What   is   the   purpose   and   object   of   sub­Section   (2)   of
section   357   Cr.P.C.?   Section   357(1)   Cr.P.C.   contemplated
utilisation   of   fine   imposed   in   certain   circumstances   as
compensation to be paid to victim. Sub­section (2) engrafted
26
an embargo that such payment shall not be made till the period
allowed for appeal has elapsed or if the appeal is filed, till
the   same   is   decided.   Legislature   was   conscious   that
compensation paid if utilised, there may not be appropriate
measures to recover the said amount utilised from victim to
whom   the   compensation   is   paid   hence   embargo   in   payment   has
been engrafted in sub­section (2).   Thus at best sub­section
(2) of  Section  357  Cr.P.C.  is  a provision  which differs or
withholds   the   utilisation   of   the   amount   of   compensation
awarded till the limitation of appeal elapses or if filed till
it is decided.  The provision in no manner stays the sentence
of  fine during  the  pendency of  the  appeal.  The  purpose  for
which sub­section (2) of Section 357 Cr.P.C. has been enacted
is different as noted above and it never contemplates as stay
of sentence of fine imposed on accused.
34. We,   however,   make   it   clear   that   Appellate   Court   while
exercising   power   under   Section   389   Cr.P.C.   can   suspend   the
sentence   of   imprisonment   as   well   as   of   fine   without   any
condition   or   with   conditions.   There   are   no   fetters   on   the
power   of   the   Appellate   Court   while   exercising   jurisdiction
under   Section   389   Cr.P.C..   The   Appellate   Court   could   have
suspended the sentence and fine both or could have directed
for deposit of fine or part of fine.
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35. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on the
judgment of this Court in  K.C. Sareen vs. C.B.I. Chandigarh,
(2001)   6   SCC   584,  where   this   Court   has   made   the   following
observation:
"No doubt when the appellate court admits
the   appeal   filed   in   challenge   of   the
conviction and sentence for the offence under
the   PC   Act,   the   superior   court   should
normally suspend the sentence of imprisonment
until disposal of the appeal, because refusal
thereof   would   render   the   very   appeal   otiose
unless such appeal could be heard soon after
the filing of the appeal.”
36. The   above   observation   was   made   by   this   Court   in   the
context of suspension of sentence of imprisonment. The present
is   not   a   case   where   question   of   suspension   of   sentence   of
imprisonment   is   involved   rather   Appellate   Court   has   already
suspended the sentence of imprisonment. The above case also
thus does not help the appellant in the facts of the present
case.
37. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view
that Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. was not attracted in the present
case   since   there   was   no   direction   of   payment   of   any
compensation  out  of the fine  imposed  by the trial  court as
part of sentence. Section 357 Cr.P.C.(2) comes into play only
where any order of payment of compensation utilising the fine
imposed   as   sentence   under   Section   357(1)   Cr.P.C.   or
28
compensation as directed under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. is made.
Present   being   neither   a   case   of   Section   357(1)   Cr.P.C.   nor
Section   357(3),   sub­section(2)   of   Section   357   Cr.P.C.   is
clearly   not   applicable   and   the   submissions   raised   by   the
learned counsel for the appellant are without any substance.
We, thus, do not find any infirmity in the impugned order of
the High Court where the High Court has directed the appellant
to deposit the fine awarded by the trial court. In the result,
the appeal is dismissed.
...............................J.
( A.K. SIKRI )
...............................J.
( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
NEW DELHI,
MARCH 23, 2018.