A. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — S.2(2) — Scheduled Tribes — Applicability — Statutory exclusion — Act not applicable to members of Scheduled Tribes unless Central Govt. issues notification — Burden wrongly placed by Courts below on female successors to prove entitlement by custom — Held, patriarchal assumptions based on Hindu Law wholly misplaced — Reiterated, exclusion from provision does not imply exclusion from equality-based inheritance — Held, women cannot be denied inheritance only due to absence of explicit enabling custom.
B. Customary Law — Proof of custom — When not established by either party — Courts cannot presume exclusion of women — In absence of personal law/custom — inheritance to be adjudicated based on justice, equity and good conscience as statutorily recognised under Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875, S.6 — Repeal Act, 2018 — S.4 (Savings) — Right crystallised prior to repeal continues — High Court’s contrary view incorrect.
C. Constitution of India — Arts. 14, 15(1), 38, 46 — Gender equality — Tribal woman’s right to inherit ancestral property — Denial of succession on the sole basis of sex violates Art.14 — No rational basis to differentiate tribal daughters from sons where no custom bars inheritance — Progressive interpretation to remove “historical discrimination”.
D. Evidence Act, 1872 — Burden of proof — Mistake in approach — Lower courts assumed custom prohibiting female inheritance — Expected plaintiffs to prove contrary — Held, incorrect — Inclusion, not exclusion, must be presumed unless a prohibitory custom proven.
Result: Appeal allowed — Judgments of Courts below set aside — Legal heirs of tribal woman (daughter of propositus) entitled to equal share in ancestral property — No costs.
2025 INSC 865
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9537 OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(C)No.5559 of 2023)
RAM CHARAN & ORS. … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SUKHRAM & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KAROL, J.
Leave Granted
2. The instant appeal is preferred against the judgment dated
1
st July 2022 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh,
Bilaspur, in Second Appeal No.465 of 2009, whereby it
affirmed the judgment and decree dated 21st April 2009 passed
SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 1
by the Second Additional District Judge (FTC)1
, Surajpur,
District Sarguja (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No.1A/08 and the
judgment and decree dated 29th February 2008 passed by the
Second Civil Judge, Class-2, Surajpur, Sarguja (C.G.)2
in Civil
Suit No.21A/08, dismissing the suit of partition filed by the
appellant-plaintiffs.
3. The short question involved in this appeal is whether a
tribal woman (or her legal heirs) would be entitled to an equal
share in her ancestral property or not. One would think that in
this day and age, where great strides have been made in
realizing the constitutional goal of equality, this Court would
not need to intervene for equality between the successors of a
common ancestor and the same should be a given, irrespective
of their biological differences, but it is not so.
4. The facts lie in a narrow compass. The appellantsplaintiffs are the legal heirs of one Dhaiya, a woman belonging
to a Scheduled Tribe. They sought partition of a property
belonging to their maternal grandfather, Bhajju alias Bhanjan
Gond. Their mother was one of the six children - five sons and
one daughter, stating that their mother is entitled to an equal
share in the scheduled property. The cause of action arose in
October 1992 when defendant Nos.6 to 16 refused to make a
1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘First Appellate Court’
2 Hereinafter referred to as‘Trial Court’
SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 2
partition. The appellant-plaintiffs approached the Trial Court
seeking a declaration of title and partition of the suit property.
5. By judgment dated 29th February 2008, the suit was
dismissed holding as follows :
“11. From the contentions of the above three Plaintiff
Witness it is clear that they have stated the fact of the
right of the Bua and her sons i.e. the rights of the
daughters on the land of the father. The judicial review
Heera Lal Gond Vs Sukhbariya Bai M.P. V. No.1993
(Part-2) 143 has been presented on behalf of the
plaintiffs, wherein it has held that as per the custom of
parties of the Gond Caste that on proving the
succession of the widow and daughter they shall get the
succession. This Judicial Review is not applied in this
case, because the plaintiffs have not certified their caste
customs. They have only stated to be claimed the rights
of the daughters to get into the properties of their father,
but who can say that in their knowledge such right has
been given to any specific person. In this regard a
judicial review Bihari Vs. Yashwantin 1973 R.N.. 64
has been presented on behalf of the defendants, wherein
the Hon’ble High Court has opined that the peoples of
the Gond Caste are not governed by the Hindu custom,
but they shall be governed by their specific tradition in
their all cases including succession. In regard to the
certification of tradition, the opinion of the Hon’ble
Court is that the statement being tradition is not
sufficient, they should be presented the real events.
12. Thus, from the analysis of the above evidence it
is made clear that the plaintiff has not made the
statement of even any witness for providing their
custom. Apart from this, they have also not made the
claim of the fact of governing their custom from the
caste tradition in their contentions. They are telling
themselves Hindu and claiming that they are governed
under the Hindu Succession Act, which is a specific
provision in sub-section 2 of section 2 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 that the member of the Scheduled
Tribe shall not be governed by this Act. Accordingly,
the plaintiffs have failed to prove suit issues No.1 to 3
SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 3
in their favor. Resultantly, their conclusion is made in
the ‘not certified’.”
(Emphasis supplied)
6. The First Appellate Court, by its judgment dated 21st
April 2009 concurred with the findings of the Trial Court that
the mother of the appellant-plaintiffs had no right in the
property of her father. It is held so for the reason that no
evidence had been led to show that children of a female heir are
also entitled to property.
7. An appeal under Section 100 Code of Civil Procedure,
19083
has been admitted on the following substantial question
of law :
“(l) Whether both the Courts below were justified in
dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs by recording a
finding which is perverse and contrary to the record?”
8. The High Court, having considered the contentions of the
parties qua the first argument of custom, held that the finding of
the Trial Court is in consonance with the judgments of this
Court in Salekh Chand v. Satya Gupta and Ors.4
; Ratanlal v.
Sundarabai Govardhandas Samsuka5
; and Aliyathammuda
Beethathebiyyappura Pookoya v. Pattakal Cheriyakoya6
. It
was held that the appellant-plaintiffs seeking partition of
property had failed to establish their right over such property by
3 Hereinafter ‘CPC’
4 2008 13 SCC 119
5 2018 11 SCC 119
6 (2019) 16 SCC 1
SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 4
way of custom, showing that a female heir is also entitled
thereto.
9. The second argument of the counsel for the appellantplaintiffs is that in the absence of custom, justice, equity and
good conscience must prevail, in accordance with Daduram
and Others v. Bhuri Bai & Ors.7
, the judgment of a coordinate
Bench of the said Court. This argument was rejected on the
ground that the coordinate Bench of the High Court was not
informed that the 1875 Act stood repealed on 30th March 2018.
It is the latter order from which the judgment of this Court in
Tirith Kumar v. Daduram8
arose.
10. In so far as the argument of the appellant-plaintiffs that
they had adopted Hindu traditions, it was held that since there
was no evidence to that effect brought on record, the Trial Court
as well as the First Appellate Court had rightly rejected this
contention. In terms of the above, the substantial question of
law was answered in the negative.
11. In that view of the matter, the appellant-plaintiffs are
before us. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at
length and perused their written submissions.
12. At the outset of our consideration, it is clarified that the
question of the parties having adopted Hindu customs and way
of life is no longer in play. That apart, we may also notice
7 SA No.270 of 2023
8 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3810
SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 5
Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which
unequivocally excludes from its application, Scheduled Tribes.
It reads :
“Section 2(2): Notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-section (1), nothing contained in this Act shall
apply to the members of any Scheduled Tribe within the
meaning of clause (25) of article 366 of the
Constitution unless the Central Government, by
notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs.”
13. Since the Hindu Law has no application, the next
possibility to be considered is that of the application of the
custom. For the application of a custom to be shown, it has to
be proved, but it was not in the present case. In fact, the Courts
below proceeded, in our view, with an assumption in mind and
that assumption was misplaced. The point of inception
regarding the discussion of customs was at the exclusion stage,
meaning thereby that they assumed there to be an exclusionary
custom in a place where the daughters would not be entitled to
any inheritance and expected the appellant-plaintiffs to prove
otherwise. An alternate scenario was also possible where not
exclusion, but inclusion could have been presumed and the
defendants then could have been asked to show that women
were not entitled to inherit property. This patriarchal
predisposition appears to be an inference from Hindu law,
which has no place in the present case.
SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 6
14. The Chhattisgarh High Court in Mst. Sarwango and
others v. Mst. Urchamahin and others9
has observed :
“10. In the present case, both the parties have failed
to prove any law of inheritance or custom prevailing in
their Gond caste i.e. member of Scheduled Caste whom
Hindu law or other law governing inheritance is not
applicable. In absence of any law of inheritance or
custom prevailing in their caste governing the
inheritance the Courts are required to decide the rights
according to justice, equity and good conscience in
term of Section 6 of the Act. Plaintiffs Sawango and
Jaituniya are daughters of Jhangal, nearest relative
rather the respondents, who were daughter-in-law of
brother of Jhangal and legitimate or illegitimate son of
Balam Singh, son of Dakhal.
11. In these circumstances, plaintiffs Sawango and
Jaituniya would be the persons' best entitlement to
inherit the property left by their father. The Courts
below ought to have decreed the suit for partition to the
extent of share of Jhangal, but the Court below i.e. the
lower appellate Court has allowed the appeal and
dismissed the suit in absence of any law or custom for
inheritance for a member of Schedule Tribe. The Courts
below are required to decide their rights of inheritance
in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of the
Act applicable to the State of Chhattisgarh and
undivided State of Madhya Pradesh”
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Given the above situation that neither any particular law
of a community nor custom could be brought into application
by either side, we now proceed to examine the argument
advanced before the High Court that is the principle of justice,
equity, and good conscience. These principles find statutory
9 2013 SCC OnLine Chh 5
SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 7
recognition in the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875, Section 6
whereof is extracted herein below :
“6. In cases not provided for by section five, or by
Rule in cases any other law for the time being in force,
the Courts shall act according to justice, equity and
good conscience.”
16. At the outset, it is observed that regarding the 1875 law,
the impugned judgment notes that the same has been repealed
as of March 2018 and, therefore, cannot be applied. We find this
position to be mistaken. The Repeal Act No.4 of 2018 provides
for a saving clause, which reads as under :
“4. Savings.— The repeal by this Act of any
enactment shall not affect any other enactment in
which the repealed enactment has been applied,
incorporated or referred to;
and this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity,
effect or consequences of anything already done or
suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability
already acquired, accrued or incurred, or any remedy
or proceeding in respect thereof, or any release or
discharge of or from any debt, penalty, obligation,
liability, claim or demand, or any indemnity already
granted, or the proof of any past act or thing;
nor shall this Act affect any principle or rule of law, or
established jurisdiction, form or course of pleading,
practice or procedure, or existing usage, custom,
privilege, restriction, exemption, office or
appointment, notwithstanding that the same
respectively may have been in any manner affirmed or
recognised or derived by, in or from any enactment
hereby repealed;
nor shall the repeal by this Act of any enactment
revive or restore any jurisdiction, office, custom,
liability, right, title, privilege, restriction, exemption,
SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 8
usage, practice, procedure or other matter or thing not
now existing or in force.”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. The effect of Section 4 is clear that no right having been
accrued prior to the repeal of the Act shall be affected thereby.
As we have already observed, the parties to the instant lis are
neither governed by Hindu nor Muslim laws and, therefore,
would be covered by Section 6 of the 1875 Act. So, the right
having been accrued in favour of the appellant-plaintiffs’
mother upon the death of her father, which was approximately
30 years before the filing of the plaint became crystallized and
would not be affected by the fact that the Act was no longer in
the statute book. This Act, therefore, necessarily had to be
applied by the High Court. At this juncture, it is pertinent to
consider the meaning of ‘justice, equity and good conscience’.
18. It is trite in law that this principle can be applied only
when there is a void or, in other words, in the absence of any
law governing that aspect. Since no custom to the effect that
women were entitled to the property, the application thereof
would be consistent with this position. What exactly this phrase
‘justice, equity and good conscience’ entails has been
considered by this Court on a few occasions. We may refer to
certain instances :
(a) In Niemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v. 2nd
Punjab Tribunal10, it was held by a Constitution Bench of
10 1957 SCC OnLine SC 64
SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 9
this Court that this principle can be applied even in the
context of labour disputes, so long as the law on the
question in consideration is not codified for there are many
situations that arise in everyday function, which, it is not
possible for a legislature to foresee and account for in the
principal legislation.
(b) The principle of ‘justice, equity and good
conscience’ is not of recent application. As J.C. Shah, J.
demonstrated the Courts, which functioned in the former
British Indian territory, were also equipped to apply the
said principle. See Superintendent and Remembrancer of
Legal Affairs v. Corpn. of Calcutta11
.
(c) This principle found an extensive discussion in the
decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in M.
Siddiq v. Suresh Das12 (Ram Janmabhoomi Temple),
relevant extracts whereof are as follows :
“Justice, Equity and Good Conscience today
1019. With the development of statutory law and
judicial precedent, including the progressive
codification of customs in the Hindu Code and in the
Shariat Act, 1937, the need to place reliance on justice,
equity and good conscience gradually reduced. There is
(at least in theory) a reduced scope for the application
of justice, equity and good conscience when doctrinal
positions established under a statute cover factual
situations or where the principles underlying the system
of personal law in question can be definitively
11 1966 SCC OnLine SC 42
12 (2020) 1 SCC 1
SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 10
ascertained. But even then, it would do disservice to
judicial craft to adopt a theory which excludes the
application of justice, equity and good conscience to
areas of law governed by statute. For the law develops
interstitially, as Judges work themselves in tandem with
statute law to arrive at just outcomes. Where the rights
of the parties are not governed by a particular personal
law, or where the personal law is silent or incapable of
being ascertained by a court, where a code has a lacuna,
or where the source of law fails or requires to be
supplemented, justice, equity and good conscience may
properly be referred to.
…
1022. The common underlying thread is that justice,
good conscience and equity plays a supplementary role
in enabling courts to mould the relief to suit the
circumstances that present themselves before courts
with the principal purpose of ensuring a just outcome.
Where the existing statutory framework is inadequate
for courts to adjudicate upon the dispute before them,
or no settled judicial doctrine or custom can be availed
of, courts may legitimately take recourse to the
principles of justice, equity and good conscience to
effectively and fairly dispose of the case. A court
cannot abdicate its responsibility to decide a dispute
over legal rights merely because the facts of a case do
not readily submit themselves to the application of the
letter of the existing law. Courts in India have long
availed of the principles of justice, good conscience and
equity to supplement the incompleteness or
inapplicability of the letter of the law with the ground
realities of legal disputes to do justice between the
parties. Equity, as an essential component of justice,
formed the final step in the just adjudication of
disputes. After taking recourse to legal principles from
varied legal systems, scholarly written work on the
subject, and the experience of the Bar and Bench, if no
decisive or just outcome could be reached, a Judge may
apply the principles of equity between the parties to
ensure that justice is done. This has often found form in
the power of the court to craft reliefs that are both
legally sustainable and just.”
(Emphasis supplied)
SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 11
(d) In Tirith Kumar (supra), which was also an appeal
arising from a judgment of the High Court of Chhattisgarh,
this Court speaking through one of us (Sanjay Karol J.)
had the occasion to consider the application of this
principle and in accordance with it, the order of the High
Court granting right over the property to the female heirs
was confirmed.
19. When applying the principle of justice, equity and good
conscience, the Courts have to be mindful of the above and
apply this otherwise open-ended principle contextually. In the
present case, a woman or her successors, if the views of the
lower Court are upheld, would be denied a right to property on
the basis of the absence of a positive assertion to such
inheritance in custom. However, customs too, like the law,
cannot remain stuck in time and others cannot be allowed to
take refuge in customs or hide behind them to deprive others of
their right.
20. Apart from the application of this general principle, we
also find this to be a question of violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. There appears to be no rational nexus or
reasonable classification for only males to be granted
succession over the property of their forebears and not women,
more so in the case where no prohibition to such effect can be
shown to be prevalent as per law. Article 15(1) states that the
SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 12
State shall not discriminate against any person on grounds of
religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. This, along with
Articles 38 and 46, points to the collective ethos of the
Constitution in ensuring that there is no discrimination against
women.
21. In Western U.P. Electric Power and Supply Co. Ltd. v.
State of U.P.13, it was observed :
“7. Article 14 of the Constitution ensures equality
among equals; its aim is to protect persons similarly
placed against discriminatory treatment. It does not,
however, operate against rational classification. A
person setting up a grievance of denial of equal
treatment by law must establish that between persons
similarly circumstanced, some were treated to their
prejudice and the differential treatment had no
reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved
by the law...”
22. This Court in the seminal case of Air India v. Nergesh
Meerza14, laid down the following propositions, among others,
in regard to Article 14 :
“39. Thus, from a detailed analysis and close
examination of the cases of this Court starting from
1952 till today, the following propositions emerge:
…
(2) Article 14 forbids hostile discrimination but not
reasonable classification. Thus, where persons
belonging to a particular class in view of their special
attributes, qualities, mode of recruitment and the like,
are differently treated in public interest to advance and
boost members belonging to backward classes, such a
classification would not amount to discrimination
13 (1969) 1 SCC 817
14 (1981) 4 SCC 335
SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 13
having a close nexus with the objects sought to be
achieved so that in such cases Article 14 will be
completely out of the way.
(3) Article 14 certainly applies where equals are treated
differently without any reasonable basis.
(4) Where equals and unequals are treated differently,
Article 14 would have no application.…”
23. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India15
, it was observed :
“7. Now, the question immediately arises as to what is
the requirement of Article 14 : what is the content and
reach of the great equalising principle enunciated in this
article? There can be no doubt that it is a founding faith
of the Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests
securely the foundation of our democratic republic.
And, therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow,
pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should
be made to truncate its all-embracing scope and
meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist
magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many
aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned
within traditional and doctrinaire limits. We must
reiterate here what was pointed out by the majority
in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1974) 4 SCC 3
: 1974 SCC (L&S) 165 : (1974) 2 SCR 348] namely,
that “from a positivistic point of view, equality is
antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and
arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule
of law in a republic, while the other, to the whim and
caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is
arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both
according to political logic and constitutional law and is
therefore violative of Article 14”. Article 14 strikes at
arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and
equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness,
which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential
element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades
Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the
procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the
test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with
15 (1978) 1 SCC 248
SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 14
Article 14. It must be “right and just and fair” and not
arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it .would be
no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21
would not be satisfied…”
(Emphasis supplied)
24. While relying on State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa16
,
this Court in Vijay Lakshmi v. Punjab University17, observed as
follows :
“8. …
It was also observed that discrimination is the essence
of classification and does violence to the constitutional
guarantee of equality only if it rests on an unreasonable
basis and it was for the respondents to establish that
classification was unreasonable and bore no rational
nexus with its purported object. Further, dealing with
the right to equality, the Court (in paras 29 & 30) held
thus: (SCC p. 33)
“But the concept of equality has an inherent limitation
arising from the very nature of the constitutional
guarantee. Equality is for equals. That is to say that
those who are similarly circumstanced are entitled to an
equal treatment.
....”
25. A Constitution Bench in Shayara Bano v. Union of
India18
, while dealing with the issue of triple talaq, referred to
Article 14 in the following terms :
“62. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is a facet of
equality of status and opportunity spoken of in the
Preamble to the Constitution. The Article naturally
divides itself into two parts—(1) equality before the
law, and (2) the equal protection of the law. Judgments
of this Court have referred to the fact that the equality
16 (1974) 1 SCC 19
17 (2003) 8 SCC 440
18 (2017) 9 SCC 1
SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 15
before law concept has been derived from the law in the
UK, and the equal protection of the laws has been
borrowed from the 14th Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States of America. In a revealing
judgment, Subba Rao, J., dissenting, in State of
U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya [State of U.P. v. Deoman
Upadhyaya, (1961) 1 SCR 14 : AIR 1960 SC 1125 :
1960 Cri LJ 1504] , AIR p. 1134 para 26 : SCR at p. 34
further went on to state that whereas equality before
law is a negative concept, the equal protection of the
law has positive content. The early judgments of this
Court referred to the “discrimination” aspect of Article
14, and evolved a rule by which subjects could be
classified. If the classification was “intelligible” having
regard to the object sought to be achieved, it would pass
muster under Article 14's anti-discrimination aspect.
Again, Subba Rao, J., dissenting, in Lachhman
Dass v. State of Punjab [Lachhman Dass v. State of
Punjab, (1963) 2 SCR 353 : AIR 1963 SC 222] , SCR
at p. 395, warned that: (AIR p. 240, para 50)
“50. … Overemphasis on the doctrine of
classification or an anxious and sustained
attempt to discover some basis for
classification may gradually and
imperceptibly deprive the Article of its
glorious content…”
(Emphasis supplied)
26. This discussion on equality under Article 14, which,
needless to state, includes the aspect of gender equality within
its fold will be, in our view, incomplete without reference to the
first and most commendable step taken under the Hindu Law by
way of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 which
made daughters the coparceners in joint family property. The
object and reasons as stated in the Bill are instructive in the
general sense and we reproduce the same with profit :
SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 16
“…The law by excluding the daughter from
participating in the coparcenary ownership not only
contributes to her discrimination on the ground of
gender but also has led to oppression and negation of
her fundamental right of equality guaranteed by the
Constitution. having regard to the need to render social
justice to women, the States of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil
Nadu, Karnataka and Maharashtra have made necessary
changes in the law giving equal right to daughters in
Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary property. The Kerala
Legislature has enacted the Kerala Joint Hindu Family
System (Abolition) Act, 1975...”
(Emphasis supplied)
27. Similarly, we are of the view that, unless otherwise
prescribed in law, denying the female heir a right in the property
only exacerbates gender division and discrimination, which the
law should ensure to weed out.
28. Granted that no such custom of female succession could
be established by the appellant-plaintiffs, but nonetheless it is
also equally true that a custom to the contrary also could not be
shown in the slightest, much less proved. That being the case,
denying Dhaiya her share in her father’s property, when the
custom is silent, would violate her right to equality vis-à-vis her
brothers or those of her legal heirs vis-à-vis their cousin.
29. In view of the above discussion, we are of the firm view
that in keeping with the principles of justice, equity and good
conscience, read along with the overarching effect of Article 14
of the Constitution, the appellant-plaintiffs, being Dhaiya’s legal
heirs, are entitled to their equal share in the property. The
SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 17
judgments of the Courts below are accordingly set aside to that
extent. The civil appeal is allowed accordingly.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
30. No costs.
….….…………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
…………..…………….J.
(JOYMALYA BAGCHI)
New Delhi;
July 17, 2025.
SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 18