A. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — S.2(2) — Scheduled Tribes — Applicability — Statutory exclusion — Act not applicable to members of Scheduled Tribes unless Central Govt. issues notification — Burden wrongly placed by Courts below on female successors to prove entitlement by custom — Held, patriarchal assumptions based on Hindu Law wholly misplaced — Reiterated, exclusion from provision does not imply exclusion from equality-based inheritance — Held, women cannot be denied inheritance only due to absence of explicit enabling custom. B. Customary Law — Proof of custom — When not established by either party — Courts cannot presume exclusion of women — In absence of personal law/custom — inheritance to be adjudicated based on justice, equity and good conscience as statutorily recognised under Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875, S.6 — Repeal Act, 2018 — S.4 (Savings) — Right crystallised prior to repeal continues — High Court’s contrary view incorrect. C. Constitution of India — Arts. 14, 15(1), 38, 46 — Gender equality — Tribal woman’s right to inherit ancestral property — Denial of succession on the sole basis of sex violates Art.14 — No rational basis to differentiate tribal daughters from sons where no custom bars inheritance — Progressive interpretation to remove “historical discrimination”. D. Evidence Act, 1872 — Burden of proof — Mistake in approach — Lower courts assumed custom prohibiting female inheritance — Expected plaintiffs to prove contrary — Held, incorrect — Inclusion, not exclusion, must be presumed unless a prohibitory custom proven. Result: Appeal allowed — Judgments of Courts below set aside — Legal heirs of tribal woman (daughter of propositus) entitled to equal share in ancestral property — No costs.

A. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — S.2(2) — Scheduled Tribes — Applicability — Statutory exclusion — Act not applicable to members of Scheduled Tribes unless Central Govt. issues notification — Burden wrongly placed by Courts below on female successors to prove entitlement by custom — Held, patriarchal assumptions based on Hindu Law wholly misplaced — Reiterated, exclusion from provision does not imply exclusion from equality-based inheritance — Held, women cannot be denied inheritance only due to absence of explicit enabling custom.

B. Customary Law — Proof of custom — When not established by either party — Courts cannot presume exclusion of women — In absence of personal law/custom — inheritance to be adjudicated based on justice, equity and good conscience as statutorily recognised under Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875, S.6 — Repeal Act, 2018 — S.4 (Savings) — Right crystallised prior to repeal continues — High Court’s contrary view incorrect.

C. Constitution of India — Arts. 14, 15(1), 38, 46 — Gender equality — Tribal woman’s right to inherit ancestral property — Denial of succession on the sole basis of sex violates Art.14 — No rational basis to differentiate tribal daughters from sons where no custom bars inheritance — Progressive interpretation to remove “historical discrimination”.

D. Evidence Act, 1872 — Burden of proof — Mistake in approach — Lower courts assumed custom prohibiting female inheritance — Expected plaintiffs to prove contrary — Held, incorrect — Inclusion, not exclusion, must be presumed unless a prohibitory custom proven.

Result: Appeal allowed — Judgments of Courts below set aside — Legal heirs of tribal woman (daughter of propositus) entitled to equal share in ancestral property — No costs.

2025 INSC 865

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9537 OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP(C)No.5559 of 2023)

RAM CHARAN & ORS. … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SUKHRAM & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL, J.

 Leave Granted

2. The instant appeal is preferred against the judgment dated

1

st July 2022 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh,

Bilaspur, in Second Appeal No.465 of 2009, whereby it

affirmed the judgment and decree dated 21st April 2009 passed

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 1

by the Second Additional District Judge (FTC)1

, Surajpur,

District Sarguja (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No.1A/08 and the

judgment and decree dated 29th February 2008 passed by the

Second Civil Judge, Class-2, Surajpur, Sarguja (C.G.)2

 in Civil

Suit No.21A/08, dismissing the suit of partition filed by the

appellant-plaintiffs.

3. The short question involved in this appeal is whether a

tribal woman (or her legal heirs) would be entitled to an equal

share in her ancestral property or not. One would think that in

this day and age, where great strides have been made in

realizing the constitutional goal of equality, this Court would

not need to intervene for equality between the successors of a

common ancestor and the same should be a given, irrespective

of their biological differences, but it is not so.

4. The facts lie in a narrow compass. The appellantsplaintiffs are the legal heirs of one Dhaiya, a woman belonging

to a Scheduled Tribe. They sought partition of a property

belonging to their maternal grandfather, Bhajju alias Bhanjan

Gond. Their mother was one of the six children - five sons and

one daughter, stating that their mother is entitled to an equal

share in the scheduled property. The cause of action arose in

October 1992 when defendant Nos.6 to 16 refused to make a

1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘First Appellate Court’

2 Hereinafter referred to as‘Trial Court’

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 2

partition. The appellant-plaintiffs approached the Trial Court

seeking a declaration of title and partition of the suit property.

5. By judgment dated 29th February 2008, the suit was

dismissed holding as follows :

“11. From the contentions of the above three Plaintiff

Witness it is clear that they have stated the fact of the

right of the Bua and her sons i.e. the rights of the

daughters on the land of the father. The judicial review

Heera Lal Gond Vs Sukhbariya Bai M.P. V. No.1993

(Part-2) 143 has been presented on behalf of the

plaintiffs, wherein it has held that as per the custom of

parties of the Gond Caste that on proving the

succession of the widow and daughter they shall get the

succession. This Judicial Review is not applied in this

case, because the plaintiffs have not certified their caste

customs. They have only stated to be claimed the rights

of the daughters to get into the properties of their father,

but who can say that in their knowledge such right has

been given to any specific person. In this regard a

judicial review Bihari Vs. Yashwantin 1973 R.N.. 64

has been presented on behalf of the defendants, wherein

the Hon’ble High Court has opined that the peoples of

the Gond Caste are not governed by the Hindu custom,

but they shall be governed by their specific tradition in

their all cases including succession. In regard to the

certification of tradition, the opinion of the Hon’ble

Court is that the statement being tradition is not

sufficient, they should be presented the real events.

12. Thus, from the analysis of the above evidence it

is made clear that the plaintiff has not made the

statement of even any witness for providing their

custom. Apart from this, they have also not made the

claim of the fact of governing their custom from the

caste tradition in their contentions. They are telling

themselves Hindu and claiming that they are governed

under the Hindu Succession Act, which is a specific

provision in sub-section 2 of section 2 of the Hindu

Succession Act, 1956 that the member of the Scheduled

Tribe shall not be governed by this Act. Accordingly,

the plaintiffs have failed to prove suit issues No.1 to 3

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 3

in their favor. Resultantly, their conclusion is made in

the ‘not certified’.”

(Emphasis supplied)

6. The First Appellate Court, by its judgment dated 21st

April 2009 concurred with the findings of the Trial Court that

the mother of the appellant-plaintiffs had no right in the

property of her father. It is held so for the reason that no

evidence had been led to show that children of a female heir are

also entitled to property.

7. An appeal under Section 100 Code of Civil Procedure,

19083

 has been admitted on the following substantial question

of law :

“(l) Whether both the Courts below were justified in

dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs by recording a

finding which is perverse and contrary to the record?”

8. The High Court, having considered the contentions of the

parties qua the first argument of custom, held that the finding of

the Trial Court is in consonance with the judgments of this

Court in Salekh Chand v. Satya Gupta and Ors.4

; Ratanlal v.

Sundarabai Govardhandas Samsuka5

; and Aliyathammuda

Beethathebiyyappura Pookoya v. Pattakal Cheriyakoya6

. It

was held that the appellant-plaintiffs seeking partition of

property had failed to establish their right over such property by

3 Hereinafter ‘CPC’

4 2008 13 SCC 119

5 2018 11 SCC 119

6 (2019) 16 SCC 1

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 4

way of custom, showing that a female heir is also entitled

thereto.

9. The second argument of the counsel for the appellantplaintiffs is that in the absence of custom, justice, equity and

good conscience must prevail, in accordance with Daduram

and Others v. Bhuri Bai & Ors.7

, the judgment of a coordinate

Bench of the said Court. This argument was rejected on the

ground that the coordinate Bench of the High Court was not

informed that the 1875 Act stood repealed on 30th March 2018.

It is the latter order from which the judgment of this Court in

Tirith Kumar v. Daduram8

 arose.

10. In so far as the argument of the appellant-plaintiffs that

they had adopted Hindu traditions, it was held that since there

was no evidence to that effect brought on record, the Trial Court

as well as the First Appellate Court had rightly rejected this

contention. In terms of the above, the substantial question of

law was answered in the negative.

11. In that view of the matter, the appellant-plaintiffs are

before us. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at

length and perused their written submissions.

12. At the outset of our consideration, it is clarified that the

question of the parties having adopted Hindu customs and way

of life is no longer in play. That apart, we may also notice

7 SA No.270 of 2023

8 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3810

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 5

Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which

unequivocally excludes from its application, Scheduled Tribes.

It reads :

“Section 2(2): Notwithstanding anything contained in

sub-section (1), nothing contained in this Act shall

apply to the members of any Scheduled Tribe within the

meaning of clause (25) of article 366 of the

Constitution unless the Central Government, by

notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs.”

13. Since the Hindu Law has no application, the next

possibility to be considered is that of the application of the

custom. For the application of a custom to be shown, it has to

be proved, but it was not in the present case. In fact, the Courts

below proceeded, in our view, with an assumption in mind and

that assumption was misplaced. The point of inception

regarding the discussion of customs was at the exclusion stage,

meaning thereby that they assumed there to be an exclusionary

custom in a place where the daughters would not be entitled to

any inheritance and expected the appellant-plaintiffs to prove

otherwise. An alternate scenario was also possible where not

exclusion, but inclusion could have been presumed and the

defendants then could have been asked to show that women

were not entitled to inherit property. This patriarchal

predisposition appears to be an inference from Hindu law,

which has no place in the present case.

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 6

14. The Chhattisgarh High Court in Mst. Sarwango and

others v. Mst. Urchamahin and others9

 has observed :

“10. In the present case, both the parties have failed

to prove any law of inheritance or custom prevailing in

their Gond caste i.e. member of Scheduled Caste whom

Hindu law or other law governing inheritance is not

applicable. In absence of any law of inheritance or

custom prevailing in their caste governing the

inheritance the Courts are required to decide the rights

according to justice, equity and good conscience in

term of Section 6 of the Act. Plaintiffs Sawango and

Jaituniya are daughters of Jhangal, nearest relative

rather the respondents, who were daughter-in-law of

brother of Jhangal and legitimate or illegitimate son of

Balam Singh, son of Dakhal.

11. In these circumstances, plaintiffs Sawango and

Jaituniya would be the persons' best entitlement to

inherit the property left by their father. The Courts

below ought to have decreed the suit for partition to the

extent of share of Jhangal, but the Court below i.e. the

lower appellate Court has allowed the appeal and

dismissed the suit in absence of any law or custom for

inheritance for a member of Schedule Tribe. The Courts

below are required to decide their rights of inheritance

in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of the

Act applicable to the State of Chhattisgarh and

undivided State of Madhya Pradesh”

(Emphasis supplied)

15. Given the above situation that neither any particular law

of a community nor custom could be brought into application

by either side, we now proceed to examine the argument

advanced before the High Court that is the principle of justice,

equity, and good conscience. These principles find statutory

9 2013 SCC OnLine Chh 5

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 7

recognition in the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875, Section 6

whereof is extracted herein below :

“6. In cases not provided for by section five, or by

Rule in cases any other law for the time being in force,

the Courts shall act according to justice, equity and

good conscience.”

16. At the outset, it is observed that regarding the 1875 law,

the impugned judgment notes that the same has been repealed

as of March 2018 and, therefore, cannot be applied. We find this

position to be mistaken. The Repeal Act No.4 of 2018 provides

for a saving clause, which reads as under :

“4. Savings.— The repeal by this Act of any

enactment shall not affect any other enactment in

which the repealed enactment has been applied,

incorporated or referred to;

and this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity,

effect or consequences of anything already done or

suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability

already acquired, accrued or incurred, or any remedy

or proceeding in respect thereof, or any release or

discharge of or from any debt, penalty, obligation,

liability, claim or demand, or any indemnity already

granted, or the proof of any past act or thing;

nor shall this Act affect any principle or rule of law, or

established jurisdiction, form or course of pleading,

practice or procedure, or existing usage, custom,

privilege, restriction, exemption, office or

appointment, notwithstanding that the same

respectively may have been in any manner affirmed or

recognised or derived by, in or from any enactment

hereby repealed;

nor shall the repeal by this Act of any enactment

revive or restore any jurisdiction, office, custom,

liability, right, title, privilege, restriction, exemption,

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 8

usage, practice, procedure or other matter or thing not

now existing or in force.”

(Emphasis supplied)

17. The effect of Section 4 is clear that no right having been

accrued prior to the repeal of the Act shall be affected thereby.

As we have already observed, the parties to the instant lis are

neither governed by Hindu nor Muslim laws and, therefore,

would be covered by Section 6 of the 1875 Act. So, the right

having been accrued in favour of the appellant-plaintiffs’

mother upon the death of her father, which was approximately

30 years before the filing of the plaint became crystallized and

would not be affected by the fact that the Act was no longer in

the statute book. This Act, therefore, necessarily had to be

applied by the High Court. At this juncture, it is pertinent to

consider the meaning of ‘justice, equity and good conscience’.

18. It is trite in law that this principle can be applied only

when there is a void or, in other words, in the absence of any

law governing that aspect. Since no custom to the effect that

women were entitled to the property, the application thereof

would be consistent with this position. What exactly this phrase

‘justice, equity and good conscience’ entails has been

considered by this Court on a few occasions. We may refer to

certain instances :

(a) In Niemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v. 2nd

Punjab Tribunal10, it was held by a Constitution Bench of

10 1957 SCC OnLine SC 64

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 9

this Court that this principle can be applied even in the

context of labour disputes, so long as the law on the

question in consideration is not codified for there are many

situations that arise in everyday function, which, it is not

possible for a legislature to foresee and account for in the

principal legislation.

(b) The principle of ‘justice, equity and good

conscience’ is not of recent application. As J.C. Shah, J.

demonstrated the Courts, which functioned in the former

British Indian territory, were also equipped to apply the

said principle. See Superintendent and Remembrancer of

Legal Affairs v. Corpn. of Calcutta11

.

(c) This principle found an extensive discussion in the

decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in M.

Siddiq v. Suresh Das12 (Ram Janmabhoomi Temple),

relevant extracts whereof are as follows :

“Justice, Equity and Good Conscience today

1019. With the development of statutory law and

judicial precedent, including the progressive

codification of customs in the Hindu Code and in the

Shariat Act, 1937, the need to place reliance on justice,

equity and good conscience gradually reduced. There is

(at least in theory) a reduced scope for the application

of justice, equity and good conscience when doctrinal

positions established under a statute cover factual

situations or where the principles underlying the system

of personal law in question can be definitively

11 1966 SCC OnLine SC 42

12 (2020) 1 SCC 1

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 10

ascertained. But even then, it would do disservice to

judicial craft to adopt a theory which excludes the

application of justice, equity and good conscience to

areas of law governed by statute. For the law develops

interstitially, as Judges work themselves in tandem with

statute law to arrive at just outcomes. Where the rights

of the parties are not governed by a particular personal

law, or where the personal law is silent or incapable of

being ascertained by a court, where a code has a lacuna,

or where the source of law fails or requires to be

supplemented, justice, equity and good conscience may

properly be referred to.

…

1022. The common underlying thread is that justice,

good conscience and equity plays a supplementary role

in enabling courts to mould the relief to suit the

circumstances that present themselves before courts

with the principal purpose of ensuring a just outcome.

Where the existing statutory framework is inadequate

for courts to adjudicate upon the dispute before them,

or no settled judicial doctrine or custom can be availed

of, courts may legitimately take recourse to the

principles of justice, equity and good conscience to

effectively and fairly dispose of the case. A court

cannot abdicate its responsibility to decide a dispute

over legal rights merely because the facts of a case do

not readily submit themselves to the application of the

letter of the existing law. Courts in India have long

availed of the principles of justice, good conscience and

equity to supplement the incompleteness or

inapplicability of the letter of the law with the ground

realities of legal disputes to do justice between the

parties. Equity, as an essential component of justice,

formed the final step in the just adjudication of

disputes. After taking recourse to legal principles from

varied legal systems, scholarly written work on the

subject, and the experience of the Bar and Bench, if no

decisive or just outcome could be reached, a Judge may

apply the principles of equity between the parties to

ensure that justice is done. This has often found form in

the power of the court to craft reliefs that are both

legally sustainable and just.”

(Emphasis supplied)

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 11

(d) In Tirith Kumar (supra), which was also an appeal

arising from a judgment of the High Court of Chhattisgarh,

this Court speaking through one of us (Sanjay Karol J.)

had the occasion to consider the application of this

principle and in accordance with it, the order of the High

Court granting right over the property to the female heirs

was confirmed.

19. When applying the principle of justice, equity and good

conscience, the Courts have to be mindful of the above and

apply this otherwise open-ended principle contextually. In the

present case, a woman or her successors, if the views of the

lower Court are upheld, would be denied a right to property on

the basis of the absence of a positive assertion to such

inheritance in custom. However, customs too, like the law,

cannot remain stuck in time and others cannot be allowed to

take refuge in customs or hide behind them to deprive others of

their right.

20. Apart from the application of this general principle, we

also find this to be a question of violation of Article 14 of the

Constitution of India. There appears to be no rational nexus or

reasonable classification for only males to be granted

succession over the property of their forebears and not women,

more so in the case where no prohibition to such effect can be

shown to be prevalent as per law. Article 15(1) states that the

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 12

State shall not discriminate against any person on grounds of

religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. This, along with

Articles 38 and 46, points to the collective ethos of the

Constitution in ensuring that there is no discrimination against

women.

21. In Western U.P. Electric Power and Supply Co. Ltd. v.

State of U.P.13, it was observed :

“7. Article 14 of the Constitution ensures equality

among equals; its aim is to protect persons similarly

placed against discriminatory treatment. It does not,

however, operate against rational classification. A

person setting up a grievance of denial of equal

treatment by law must establish that between persons

similarly circumstanced, some were treated to their

prejudice and the differential treatment had no

reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved

by the law...”

22. This Court in the seminal case of Air India v. Nergesh

Meerza14, laid down the following propositions, among others,

in regard to Article 14 :

“39. Thus, from a detailed analysis and close

examination of the cases of this Court starting from

1952 till today, the following propositions emerge:

…

(2) Article 14 forbids hostile discrimination but not

reasonable classification. Thus, where persons

belonging to a particular class in view of their special

attributes, qualities, mode of recruitment and the like,

are differently treated in public interest to advance and

boost members belonging to backward classes, such a

classification would not amount to discrimination

13 (1969) 1 SCC 817

14 (1981) 4 SCC 335

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 13

having a close nexus with the objects sought to be

achieved so that in such cases Article 14 will be

completely out of the way.

(3) Article 14 certainly applies where equals are treated

differently without any reasonable basis.

(4) Where equals and unequals are treated differently,

Article 14 would have no application.…”

23. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India15

, it was observed :

“7. Now, the question immediately arises as to what is

the requirement of Article 14 : what is the content and

reach of the great equalising principle enunciated in this

article? There can be no doubt that it is a founding faith

of the Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests

securely the foundation of our democratic republic.

And, therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow,

pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should

be made to truncate its all-embracing scope and

meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist

magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many

aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned

within traditional and doctrinaire limits. We must

reiterate here what was pointed out by the majority

in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1974) 4 SCC 3

: 1974 SCC (L&S) 165 : (1974) 2 SCR 348] namely,

that “from a positivistic point of view, equality is

antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and

arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule

of law in a republic, while the other, to the whim and

caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is

arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both

according to political logic and constitutional law and is

therefore violative of Article 14”. Article 14 strikes at

arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and

equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness,

which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential

element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades

Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the

procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the

test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with

15 (1978) 1 SCC 248

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 14

Article 14. It must be “right and just and fair” and not

arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it .would be

no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21

would not be satisfied…”

(Emphasis supplied)

24. While relying on State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa16

,

this Court in Vijay Lakshmi v. Punjab University17, observed as

follows :

“8. …

It was also observed that discrimination is the essence

of classification and does violence to the constitutional

guarantee of equality only if it rests on an unreasonable

basis and it was for the respondents to establish that

classification was unreasonable and bore no rational

nexus with its purported object. Further, dealing with

the right to equality, the Court (in paras 29 & 30) held

thus: (SCC p. 33)

“But the concept of equality has an inherent limitation

arising from the very nature of the constitutional

guarantee. Equality is for equals. That is to say that

those who are similarly circumstanced are entitled to an

equal treatment.

....”

25. A Constitution Bench in Shayara Bano v. Union of

India18

, while dealing with the issue of triple talaq, referred to

Article 14 in the following terms :

“62. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is a facet of

equality of status and opportunity spoken of in the

Preamble to the Constitution. The Article naturally

divides itself into two parts—(1) equality before the

law, and (2) the equal protection of the law. Judgments

of this Court have referred to the fact that the equality

16 (1974) 1 SCC 19

17 (2003) 8 SCC 440

18 (2017) 9 SCC 1

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 15

before law concept has been derived from the law in the

UK, and the equal protection of the laws has been

borrowed from the 14th Amendment to the Constitution

of the United States of America. In a revealing

judgment, Subba Rao, J., dissenting, in State of

U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya [State of U.P. v. Deoman

Upadhyaya, (1961) 1 SCR 14 : AIR 1960 SC 1125 :

1960 Cri LJ 1504] , AIR p. 1134 para 26 : SCR at p. 34

further went on to state that whereas equality before

law is a negative concept, the equal protection of the

law has positive content. The early judgments of this

Court referred to the “discrimination” aspect of Article

14, and evolved a rule by which subjects could be

classified. If the classification was “intelligible” having

regard to the object sought to be achieved, it would pass

muster under Article 14's anti-discrimination aspect.

Again, Subba Rao, J., dissenting, in Lachhman

Dass v. State of Punjab [Lachhman Dass v. State of

Punjab, (1963) 2 SCR 353 : AIR 1963 SC 222] , SCR

at p. 395, warned that: (AIR p. 240, para 50)

“50. … Overemphasis on the doctrine of

classification or an anxious and sustained

attempt to discover some basis for

classification may gradually and

imperceptibly deprive the Article of its

glorious content…”

(Emphasis supplied)

26. This discussion on equality under Article 14, which,

needless to state, includes the aspect of gender equality within

its fold will be, in our view, incomplete without reference to the

first and most commendable step taken under the Hindu Law by

way of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 which

made daughters the coparceners in joint family property. The

object and reasons as stated in the Bill are instructive in the

general sense and we reproduce the same with profit :

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 16

“…The law by excluding the daughter from

participating in the coparcenary ownership not only

contributes to her discrimination on the ground of

gender but also has led to oppression and negation of

her fundamental right of equality guaranteed by the

Constitution. having regard to the need to render social

justice to women, the States of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil

Nadu, Karnataka and Maharashtra have made necessary

changes in the law giving equal right to daughters in

Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary property. The Kerala

Legislature has enacted the Kerala Joint Hindu Family

System (Abolition) Act, 1975...”

(Emphasis supplied)

27. Similarly, we are of the view that, unless otherwise

prescribed in law, denying the female heir a right in the property

only exacerbates gender division and discrimination, which the

law should ensure to weed out.

28. Granted that no such custom of female succession could

be established by the appellant-plaintiffs, but nonetheless it is

also equally true that a custom to the contrary also could not be

shown in the slightest, much less proved. That being the case,

denying Dhaiya her share in her father’s property, when the

custom is silent, would violate her right to equality vis-à-vis her

brothers or those of her legal heirs vis-à-vis their cousin.

29. In view of the above discussion, we are of the firm view

that in keeping with the principles of justice, equity and good

conscience, read along with the overarching effect of Article 14

of the Constitution, the appellant-plaintiffs, being Dhaiya’s legal

heirs, are entitled to their equal share in the property. The

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 17

judgments of the Courts below are accordingly set aside to that

extent. The civil appeal is allowed accordingly.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

30. No costs.

….….…………………J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

…………..…………….J.

(JOYMALYA BAGCHI)

New Delhi;

July 17, 2025.

 SLP (C) No. 5559/2023| 18