whether while releasing the appellant­accused on default bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C., any condition of deposit of amount as imposed by the High Court, could have been imposed?

 whether while releasing the appellant­accused on default   bail/statutory   bail   under   Section   167(2),   Cr.P.C.,   any condition of deposit of amount as imposed by the High Court, could have been imposed?

The   circumstances   while   considering   the   regular   bail application   under   Section   437   Cr.P.C.   are   different,   while considering the application for default bail/statutory bail.  Under the circumstances, the condition imposed by the High Court to deposit Rs.8,00,000/­, while releasing the appellant on default bail/ statutory bail is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 10. Now so far as condition no. (d) imposed by the High Court, namely, directing the appellant to report before the concerned police   station   daily   at   10:00   a.m.,   until   further   orders,   for interrogation is concerned, the same is also unsustainable, as it is   too   harsh.     Instead,   condition   which   can   be   imposed   is directing the appellant to cooperate with the investigating officer in completing the investigation and to remain present before the concerned police station for investigation/interrogation as and when   called   for,   and   on   breach   the   investigating   officer   can approach   the   concerned  court  for   cancellation   of   the   bail  on breach of such condition. 11 11. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present   appeals   succeed.     Condition   No.   (b)   of   order   dated 24.06.2020 passed by the High Court in Criminal OP(MD) No. 6214   of   2020,   i.e.,   directing   the   appellant   to   deposit Rs.8,00,000/­ to the credit of crime No. 31 of 2019 before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Nagercoil, Kanyakumari District, while releasing the appellant on default bail, is hereby quashed and set aside.  Condition no. (d), namely, directing the appellant to report before the concerned police station at 10:00 a.m.   daily,   until   further   orders   for   interrogation   is   hereby modified to the extent and it is directed that the appellant shall co­operate  with   the  investigating  agency  and  shall   report  the concerned   police   station   as   and   when   called   for investigation/interrogation   and   on   non­cooperation,   the consequences including cancellation of the bail shall follow.  Rest of   the   conditions   imposed   by   the   High   Court   in   order   dated 24.06.2020 are maintained.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.    681­682       OF 2020

(Arising from S.L.P. (Criminal) Nos.4386­4387/2020)

Saravanan …Appellant

Versus

State represented by the Inspector of Police …Respondent

J U D G M  E N T

M.R. SHAH, J.

Leave granted.

2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order

dated 24.06.2020 in Criminal O.P.(MD) No. 6214 of 2020 and

order dated 27.07.2020 in Criminal M.P.(MD) No. 3622 of 2020

passed by the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, by

which   the   High   Court   has   released   the   appellant   on   default

bail/statutory   bail,   on   condition   to   deposit   Rs.8,00,000/­

(Rupees Eight Lakhs only) to the credit of crime No. 31 of 2019

before the  learned  Judicial  Magistrate,  Court  No.1,  Nagercoil,

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Kanyakumari   District,   the   original   accused   has   preferred   the

present appeals.

3. That the appellant herein was arrested and remanded to the

judicial custody on 31.01.2020 for the offences punishable under

Section 420 of the IPC in Crime No.31 of 2019 on the file of the

D.C.B. Police Station, Kanyakumari District.  That the appellant

herein filed an application before the learned Judicial Magistrate

seeking bail under Section 437 Cr.P.C.   That the wife of the

appellant   filed   an   affidavit   before   the   learned   Magistrate   and

assured to pay Rs.7,00,000/­ (Rupees Seven Lakhs only) and the

balance amount to be paid on or before 06.04.2020, against the

alleged amount of Rs.15,67,338/­ (Rupees Fifteen lakhs Sixty

Seven thousand Three hundred thirty eight only).  Therefore, by

order   dated   3.2.2020,   the   learned   Magistrate   released   the

appellant on bail on the conditions stated in the said order.  One

of   the   conditions   was   directing   the   appellant   to   deposit

Rs.7,00,000/­   in   the   Court,   and   the   balance   amount   of   Rs.

8,67,338/­ was directed to be deposited on or before 06.04.2020.

4. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with condition nos. 2 and

3 of the order passed by the learned Magistrate releasing the

appellant   on   bail,   i.e,   directing   the   appellant   to   deposit

2

Rs.7,00,000/­, out of the total alleged amount of Rs.15,67,338/­

and   the   balance   to   be   deposited   on   or   before   6.4.2020,   the

appellant approached the High Court by way of Criminal OP(MD)

No. 6214 of 2020.  The High Court dismissed the said application

with liberty to the appellant to approach the Magistrate Court for

any   modification   and   observed   that   if   any   modification   is

required, the same may be considered by the Magistrate.  That

thereafter, the appellant filed an application before the learned

Sessions Court being Criminal M.P. No. 1695/2020 to release the

appellant  on  default  bail/statutory bail under  Section  167(2),

Cr.P.C.  It was the case on behalf of the appellant that he was

arrested and remanded on 31.01.2020 and he is inside the jail

for more than 101 days and the investigation is not completed

and the police has not filed the final report within the period

provided under Section 167 Cr.P.C.  The said application came to

be dismissed by the learned Sessions Court on the ground that

earlier when the appellant applied for regular bail and which was

allowed on condition to deposit Rs.7,00,000/­ in the Court and

the same has not been complied with, and despite the liberty

reserved by the High Court to approach the Magistrate Court for

modification of the conditions, instead of doing so, the appellant

3

has   filed   an   application   for   default   bail/statutory   bail   under

Section  167(2), Cr.P.C., therefore, the  learned  Sessions  Court

dismissed the said application.

5. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant approached the High Court

and prayed to release the appellant on default bail/statutory bail.

It was the case on behalf of the appellant that non­deposit of any

amount which  was required to be deposited pursuant to  the

order passed by the learned Magistrate, imposed while releasing

the appellant on regular bail under Section 437, Cr.P.C., shall

not come in the way of the appellant­accused in getting default

bail/statutory   bail   under   Section   167(2),   Cr.P.C.       It   was

submitted   that   the   default   bail/statutory   bail   under   Section

167(2),   Cr.P.C.   is   mandatory   bail,   provided   the   conditions   in

Section   167   Cr.P.C.   are   satisfied,   i.e.,   investigation   is   not

completed   and   the   chargesheet/report   is   not   filed   by   the

investigating agency within the time stipulated under Section 167

Cr.P.C.   The High Court, by the impugned judgment and order

dated 24.06.2020 accepted the same, however, considering the

earlier undertaking given by the wife of the appellant in the Court

of   the   learned   Magistrate   while   considering   the   regular   bail

application   under   Section   437,   Cr.P.C.,   i.e.,   to   deposit

4

Rs.7,00,000/­,   while   releasing   the   appellant   on   default

bail/statutory bail, the High Court has imposed the condition

that the appellant shall deposit a sum of Rs.8,00,000/­ before

the learned Magistrate.  That thereafter, the appellant preferred

application being Criminal MP(MD) No. 3622 of 2020 before the

High Court to   modify condition nos. (b) and (d) in Criminal

OP(MD) No. 6214/2020 by which the appellant was directed to

deposit Rs.8,00,000/­ before the learned Judicial Magistrate and

the appellant was directed to report before the concerned police

station daily at 10:00 a.m., until further orders, for interrogation.

By the impugned order dated 27.07.2020, the High Court has

dismissed the said application for modification observing that

earlier   wife   of   the   appellant   filed   affidavit   before   the   learned

Magistrate to deposit Rs.7,00,000/­ and the alleged amount is

Rs.32,23,073/­,   condition   nos.   (b)   and   (d)   in   order   dated

24.06.2020 in Criminal OP(MD) No. 6214/2020 are not required

to be modified.  Hence, the present appeals.

6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has

vehemently submitted that condition nos. (b) and (d) imposed by

the High Court imposed while releasing the appellant on default

bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C is contrary to the

5

scheme of Section 167 of the Cr.P.C.   It is submitted that as

observed by this Court in catena of decisions, the scheme of Code

of Criminal Procedure delineates that provisions of Section 167

Cr.P.C.   give   due   regard   to   the   personal   liberty   of   a   person.

Without submission of charge sheet within 60 days or 90 days,

as may be applicable, an accused cannot be detained by the

Police. The provision gives due recognition to the personal liberty.

It is submitted that as held by this Court in Rakesh Kumar Paul

v. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67, where investigation is not

completed within 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, no

chargesheet is filed on the 60th or 90th day, accused applies for

default bail and is prepared to furnish bail, accused becomes

entitled  to   default   bail,   it   cannot   be   frustrated   either   by   the

prosecution or the Court.  It is submitted that it is further held

that accused need not make out any grounds for grant of default

bail but only needs to state that 60/90 days, as the case may be,

have expired, chargesheet not filed, he is entitled to bail and

willing   to   furnish   the   same.     It   is   submitted   that   therefore

condition   nos.   (b)   and   (d)   imposed   by   the   High   Court   while

releasing the appellant on default bail/statutory bail are against

the scheme of Section 167, Cr. P.C.

6

6.1 It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf

of the appellant that affidavit filed by the wife of the appellant

before the learned Magistrate to deposit Rs.7,00,000/­ and the

earlier  order passed by  the learned Magistrate to  release the

appellant   on   deposit   of   Rs.15,   67,338/­   was   with   respect   to

regular bail under Section 437, Cr.P.C. and the same shall not

come   in   the   way   of   the   appellant   in   getting   the   default

bail/statutory bail, if a case is made out under Section 167(2),

Cr.P.C.  It is submitted that, as such, and in fact the High Court

has accepted the same and has released the appellant on default

bail/statutory   bail,   however,   with   condition   to   deposit

Rs.8,00,000/­ on the ground that while considering the regular

bail   application   under   Section   437,   Cr.P.C.,   the   wife   of   the

appellant agreed to and filed affidavit to deposit Rs.7,00,000/­.  It

is   submitted   that   condition   to   deposit   Rs.8,00,000/­   while

releasing   the   appellant   on   default   bail/statutory   bail   on   the

aforesaid   ground   would   defeat   the   very   purpose   of   grant   of

default bail/statutory bail.  It is submitted that while considering

the default bail/statutory bail, the only thing which is required to

be considered and the statutory requirement is that the statutory

7

period for filing the chargesheet or challan has expired and the

accused is prepared to furnish the bail.

6.2 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to allow the

present appeals and delete condition nos. (b) and (d) of order

dated 24.06.2020 passed by the High Court in Criminal OP(MD)

No. 6214 of 2020.  

7. Mr. Jayanth Muthuraj, learned Additional Advocate General

appearing   on   behalf   of   the   State   has   tried   to   support   the

impugned order(s) passed by the High Court by submitting that

as earlier the wife of the appellant filed an affidavit before the

learned   Magistrate   to   deposit   Rs.7,00,000/­   and   the   alleged

amount   was   Rs.15,67,338/­,   probably   the   High   Court   has

imposed   condition   no.   (b)   directing   the   appellant   to   deposit

Rs.8,00,000/­.

8. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties

at length.

The short question which is posed for the consideration of

this Court is, whether while releasing the appellant­accused on

default   bail/statutory   bail   under   Section   167(2),   Cr.P.C.,   any

condition of deposit of amount as imposed by the High Court,

could have been imposed?

8

9. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties

and   considering   the   scheme   and   the   object   and   purpose   of

default bail/statutory bail, we are of the opinion that the High

Court has committed a grave error in imposing condition that the

appellant shall deposit a sum of Rs.8,00,000/­ while releasing

the appellant on default bail/statutory bail.  It appears that the

High   Court   has   imposed   such   a   condition   taking   into

consideration the fact that earlier at the time of hearing of the

regular bail application, before the learned Magistrate, the wife of

the appellant filed an affidavit agreeing to deposit Rs.7,00,000/­.

However, as observed by this Court in catena of decisions and

more   particularly   in   the   case   of  Rakesh   Kumar   Paul   (supra),

where the investigation is not completed within 60 days or 90

days, as the case may be, and no chargesheet is filed by 60th or

90th day, accused gets an “indefeasible right” to default bail, and

the accused becomes entitled to default bail once the accused

applies   for default bail and furnish bail.   Therefore, the only

requirement   for   getting   the   default   bail/statutory   bail   under

Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. is that the accused is in jail for more than

60 or 90 days, as the case may be,  and within 60 or 90 days, as

the   case   may   be,   the   investigation   is   not   completed   and   no

9

chargesheet is filed by 60th or 90th day and the accused applies

for   default   bail   and   is   prepared   to   furnish   bail.     No   other

condition   of   deposit   of   the   alleged   amount   involved   can   be

imposed. Imposing such condition while releasing the accused on

default bail/statutory bail would frustrate the very object and

purpose of default bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C.  As observed

by this Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) and in

other decisions, the accused is entitled to default bail/statutory

bail, subject to the eventuality occurring in Section 167, Cr.P.C.,

namely, investigation is not completed within 60 days or 90 days,

as the case may be, and no chargesheet is filed by 60th or 90th day

and   the   accused   applies   for   default   bail   and   is   prepared   to

furnish bail.

9.1 As   observed   hereinabove   and   even   from   the   impugned

orders passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court

while releasing the appellant on default bail/statutory bail has

imposed   the   condition   to   deposit   Rs.8,00,000/­   taking   into

consideration that earlier before the learned Magistrate and while

considering   the   regular   bail   application   under   Section   437

Cr.P.C.,   the   wife   of   the   accused   filed   an   affidavit   to   deposit

Rs.7,00,000/­.  That cannot be a ground to impose the condition

10

to   deposit   the   amount   involved,   while   granting   default

bail/statutory bail.

9.2. The   circumstances   while   considering   the   regular   bail

application   under   Section   437   Cr.P.C.   are   different,   while

considering the application for default bail/statutory bail.  Under

the circumstances, the condition imposed by the High Court to

deposit Rs.8,00,000/­, while releasing the appellant on default

bail/ statutory bail is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed

and set aside.

10. Now so far as condition no. (d) imposed by the High Court,

namely, directing the appellant to report before the concerned

police   station   daily   at   10:00   a.m.,   until   further   orders,   for

interrogation is concerned, the same is also unsustainable, as it

is   too   harsh.     Instead,   condition   which   can   be   imposed   is

directing the appellant to cooperate with the investigating officer

in completing the investigation and to remain present before the

concerned police station for investigation/interrogation as and

when   called   for,   and   on   breach   the   investigating   officer   can

approach   the   concerned  court  for   cancellation   of   the   bail  on

breach of such condition.

11

11. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the

present   appeals   succeed.     Condition   No.   (b)   of   order   dated

24.06.2020 passed by the High Court in Criminal OP(MD) No.

6214   of   2020,   i.e.,   directing   the   appellant   to   deposit

Rs.8,00,000/­ to the credit of crime No. 31 of 2019 before the

learned Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Nagercoil, Kanyakumari

District, while releasing the appellant on default bail, is hereby

quashed and set aside.  Condition no. (d), namely, directing the

appellant to report before the concerned police station at 10:00

a.m.   daily,   until   further   orders   for   interrogation   is   hereby

modified to the extent and it is directed that the appellant shall

co­operate  with   the  investigating  agency  and  shall   report  the

concerned   police   station   as   and   when   called   for

investigation/interrogation   and   on   non­cooperation,   the

consequences including cancellation of the bail shall follow.  Rest

of   the   conditions   imposed   by   the   High   Court   in   order   dated

24.06.2020 are maintained.

12

13. The appeals are allowed accordingly in the aforesaid terms.

…………………………………..J.

[ASHOK BHUSHAN]

………………………………….J.

[R. SUBHASH REDDY]

NEW DELHI; ………………………………….J.

OCTOBER 15, 2020 [M.R. SHAH]   

13

ACQUITTAL IN MARTIMONIAL CRIMINAL CASES - NO STIGMA FOR APPOINTMENTS

ACQUITTAL IN MARTIMONIAL CRIMINAL CASES - NO STIGMA FOR APPOINTMENTS

quashing the orders dated 14.09.2018, 18.07.2018 and 21.09.2019 by which appellant has been 2 held not suitable for being appointed to the post of District Judge (Entry Level).

The High Court of Madhya Pradesh issued an advertisement dated 09.03.2017 inviting applications for recruitment in the post of District Judge(Entry Level) in the cadre of Higher Judicial Service by Direct Recruitment from amongst the eligible Advocates. In pursuance to the advertisement, the appellant submitted online application form. The appellant after being declared successful in the Main Examination was called for interview. The provisional select and waiting list was published in which the name of the appellant was included at Serial No.13 in the category of unreserved. The appellant received a communication on 06.04.2018 from the Law and Legislative Department informing that he has been selected for the post of District Judge (Entry Level). He was asked to appear before the Medical Board for the health tests. On 02.07.2018 the appellant was informed that in his 3 attestation form FIR No.852/2014 under Section 498/406/34 IPC is shown and the copy of the same was asked for. On 14.09.2018 order was issued by the Principal Secretary, Madhya Pradesh, Law and Legislative Department declaring the appellant ineligible and directing for deletion the name of the appellant from the select list. The Government also issued a Gazette notification deleting the name of the appellant from the Merit No.13 of the main select list.

We, thus, are of the view that the High Court did not commit any error in dismissing the writ petition. The appellant was not entitled for any relief in the writ petition. In the result, while dismissing this appeal we observe that stigma, if any, of the criminal case lodged against appellant under Section 498A/406/34 IPC is washed out due to the acquittal of the appellant vide judgment dated 18.09.2019. 

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).3419 of 2020

(Arising out of SLP(C)No.10255 of 2020)

ANIL BHARDWAJ APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF

MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal has been filed questioning the Division

Bench judgment dated 06.01.2020 of the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh dismissing the writ petition filed by

the appellant. The appellant in the writ petition has

prayed for quashing the orders dated 14.09.2018,

18.07.2018 and 21.09.2019 by which appellant has been

2

held not suitable for being appointed to the post of

District Judge (Entry Level).

3. The brief facts of the case are:

The High Court of Madhya Pradesh issued an

advertisement dated 09.03.2017 inviting applications

for recruitment in the post of District Judge(Entry

Level) in the cadre of Higher Judicial Service by

Direct Recruitment from amongst the eligible Advocates.

In pursuance to the advertisement, the appellant

submitted online application form. The appellant after

being declared successful in the Main Examination was

called for interview. The provisional select and

waiting list was published in which the name of the

appellant was included at Serial No.13 in the category

of unreserved. The appellant received a communication

on 06.04.2018 from the Law and Legislative Department

informing that he has been selected for the post of

District Judge (Entry Level). He was asked to appear

before the Medical Board for the health tests. On

02.07.2018 the appellant was informed that in his

3

attestation form FIR No.852/2014 under Section

498/406/34 IPC is shown and the copy of the same was

asked for. On 14.09.2018 order was issued by the

Principal Secretary, Madhya Pradesh, Law and

Legislative Department declaring the appellant

ineligible and directing for deletion the name of the

appellant from the select list. The Government also

issued a Gazette notification deleting the name of the

appellant from the Merit No.13 of the main select list.

4. The appellant filed a Writ Petition No.27434 of

2018 before the High Court challenging the order dated

14.09.2018 and the Gazette notification dated

21.09.2018. On application submitted under the Right to

Information Act, the appellant was provided extract of

the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of Administrative

Committee (Higher Judicial Service) and Examinationcum-Selection and Appointment Committee dated

18.07.2018 by which proceedings the appellant was not

considered suitable for being appointed to the post of

District Judge (Entry Level). On the basis of a

4

complaint by the wife of the appellant, a criminal case

was registered and vide judgment dated 18.09.2019 the

appellant was acquitted of the charge framed against

him.

5. The appellant filed an application for amendment of

the writ petition to bring on record the order of the

acquittal and other events occurred during the pendency

of the writ petition. The appellant was permitted to

withdraw his earlier writ petition with liberty to file

a fresh writ petition. Writ Petition No.27779 of 2019

was filed by the appellant incorporating subsequent

events, facts and acquittal order which writ petition

has been dismissed by the impugned judgment dated

06.01.2020 by the High Court. Aggrieved by the impugned

judgment, the appellant has come up in this appeal.

6. We have heard Shri R. Venkataramani, learned senior

counsel for the appellant.

7. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits

that the appellant in his online application form has

disclosed about the lodging of FIR No.852/2014 under

5

Section 498A/406/34 IPC. He submits that appellant

having disclosed the lodging of FIR against him has not

concealed any fact before the High Court and he having

been selected on merit was entitled to be appointed.

Shri Venkataramani submits that on the subsequent

acquittal of the appellant on 18.09.2019 his case for

appointment was to be reconsidered by the High Court

and the High Court committed an error in not

considering the appellant for appointment. The

candidature of the appellant could not have been

cancelled merely on the ground of pendency of criminal

case. The appellant could not have been deprived of the

employment after acquittal. There was no other material

on record to indicate that antecedent or conduct of the

appellant was not upto the mark. The High Court ought

to have sent the matter back before the Higher Judicial

Service and Examination-cum-Selection Committee for

reconsideration.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to

the judgments of this Court which have been relied by

6

the High Court in the impugned judgment. Learned

counsel for appellant has also placed reliance on the

judgment of this Court in Mohammed Imran vs. State of

Maharashtra and others (C.A.No.10571 of 2018) decided

on 12.10.2018. He submits that the judgment of Mohammed

Imran was also a case of a judicial officer who was

directed by this Court to be given appointment.

9. We have considered the submissions of the learned

counsel for the parties and perused the records.

10. The present is not a case where the name of the

appellant was deleted in the select list on the ground

of any concealment of criminal case against him. The

appellant has brought on the record the proceedings of

Examination-cum-Selection Committee dated 18.07.2018.

At Item No.2 of the Agenda the Committee recorded the

following decision:

“ITEM NO.02.Consideration on the matter relates

to Character Verification Reports of

selected 13 candidates of MPHJS

(District Judge-Entry Level) (Direct

from Bar) Exam-2016 & 2017, received

from Law Department, Bhopal for

7

determination of their eligibility

for the said post.

1.Shri Anil Bhardwaj:-

Attestation Form submitted Shri Anil

Bhardwaj and police verification report

submitted by Deputy Commissioner of Police,

Special Branch, New Delhi, goes to show that

FIR 852/2014 under Section 498A/406/34 of IPC

has been registered against Shri Anil

Bhardwaj on the basis of complaint filed by

Smt. Pooja wife of Shri Anil Bhardwaj.

After due consideration resolved that a

case against Shri Anil Bhardwaj under Section

498A, 406-34 IPC is still pending before

Rohini Court, New Delhi. Therefore, he is not

considered suitable for being appointed to

the post of District Judge (Entry Level).”

10. The FIR against the appellant was lodged by his

wife under Section 498A and 406 IPC in the year 2014 on

the basis of which a charge-sheet was submitted in the

Court on 15.07.2017 under Section 498A and 406 IPC. The

appellant has disclosed lodging of the FIR against him

in his online application form. The name of the

appellant was included in the select list which was

forwarded to the State. The State after character

verification submitted a report which report was

8

considered on 18.07.2018 by the Administrative

Committee (Higher Judicial Service) and Examinationcum-Selection and Appointment Committee and a

resolution was taken that due to pendency of the case

under Section 498A, 406-34 IPC on the basis of

complaint filed by the wife, Smt. Pooja, the appellant

is not considered suitable for being appointed to the

post of District Judge.

11. Before the High Court, the decision of the

Committee dated 18.07.2018 as well as the order of the

State dated 14.09.2018 for deleting the name of the

appellant was challenged in the writ petition. The main

issue to be considered was as to whether resolution

dated 18.07.2018 suffered from error which requires

judicial review by the High Court in exercise of

jurisdiction under Article 226. The submission which

has been pressed by the counsel for the appellant is

that appellant’s case was required to be reconsidered

in view of his subsequent acquittal on 18.09.2019.

9

12. The recruitment to the Judicial Service is governed

by the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Uchchatar Nyayik

Seva (Bharti Tatha Seva Sharten) Niyam, 1994. This

Court issued direction to all States to fill up the

vacancies in subordinate Courts in a time schedule. The

direction was issued by this Court in Malik Mazhar

Sultan (3) and another vs. Uttar Pradesh Public Service

Commission and others, 2008(17) SCC 703. The selection

process for filling up the post of District Judge has

to be completed by all the High Courts as per the time

schedule fixed by this Court. After declaration of the

merit list the candidates have to be given appointments

in time bound manner so that they may join the

respective posts. There is no dispute that on the date

when the Committee declared the appellant unsuitable,

criminal case against him under Section 498A and 406

IPC was pending which was registered on a complaint

filed by the appellant’s wife, Smt. Pooja. The mere

inclusion in the select list does not give an

indefeasible right to a candidate. The employer has

10

right to refuse appointment to the candidate included

in the select list on any valid ground. The persons who

occupy Judicial Service of the State are persons who

are expected to have impeccable character and conduct.

It is not disputed that the criminal case under Section

498A and 406 IPC was pending at the time when the

appellant applied for the recruitment, when he appeared

for the interview and when the result was declared. The

character verification report was received from the

State where pendency of the criminal case was mentioned

which was the reason for the Committee to declare the

appellant unsuitable. The submission which needs to be

considered is that whether in view of the subsequent

acquittal of the appellant, his case was required to be

reconsidered and he was entitled to be appointed.

13. This Court in Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and

another vs. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685, while

considering a case of antecedents verification for

11

appointment into Delhi Police Service made the

following observation in paragraph 35:

“35. The police force is a disciplined force.

It shoulders the great responsibility of

maintaining law and order and public order in

the society. People repose great faith and

confidence in it. It must be worthy of that

confidence. A candidate wishing to join the

police force must be a person of utmost

rectitude. He must have impeccable character

and integrity. A person having criminal

antecedents will not fit in this category. Even

if he is acquitted or discharged in the

criminal case, that acquittal or discharge

order will have to be examined to see whether

he has been completely exonerated in the case

because even a possibility of his taking to the

life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline

of the police force.…………”

14. The observation was made by this Court in the above

case that a candidate wishing to join the police force

must be a person having impeccable character and

integrity. The above observations apply with greater

force to the Judicial Service. This Court further

observed that even in the case of acquittal, it has to

be examined as to whether the person was completely

exonerated in the case or not. In the present case the

acquittal having taken place after the close of

12

recruitment process, there was no question of examining

the acquittal order by the High Court at the time of

finalizing the selection process.

15. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to

the judgment of this Court in Joginder Singh vs. Union

Territory of Chandigarh and others, (2015) 2 SCC 377,

which was a case whether the appellant was acquitted by

the trial court for a case under Section

148/149/323/325/307 IPC. In the above case acquittal

took place even before the appellant was called for the

interview/medical examination. This fact was recorded

in paragraph 24 of the judgment in the following words:

“24. However, in the present case, we have

observed that the appellant was involved in a

family feud and the FIR came to be lodged

against him on 14-4-1998, after he had applied

for the post of Constable. Further, he had been

acquitted on 4-10-1999 i.e. much before he was

called for the interview/medical

examination/written test………”

16. The above case is clearly distinguishable and does

not help the appellant. 

13

17. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Avtar Singh

vs. Union of India and others, (2016) 8 SCC 471, had

occasion to examine different aspects of verification

form after selection including the question of having

criminal antecedents and pending of criminal case. This

Court laid down that in the event criminal case is

pending and incumbent has not been acquitted employer

may well be justified in not appointing such an

incumbent. In paragraph 32 following has been laid

down:

“32. No doubt about it that once

verification form requires certain information

to be furnished, declarant is duty-bound to

furnish it correctly and any suppression of

material facts or submitting false information,

may by itself lead to termination of his

services or cancellation of candidature in an

appropriate case. However, in a criminal case

incumbent has not been acquitted and case is

pending trial, employer may well be justified

in not appointing such an incumbent or in

terminating the services as conviction

ultimately may render him unsuitable for job

and employer is not supposed to wait till

outcome of criminal case. In such a case nondisclosure or submitting false information

would assume significance and that by itself

14

may be ground for employer to cancel

candidature or to terminate services.”

18. Even in a case where candidates have been acquitted

in criminal case, it was held that the decision of the

Screening Committee being not actuated by mala fide

regarding suitability of the candidate is to be

respected. This Court in Union Territory, Chandigarh

Administration and others vs. Pradeep Kumar and

another, (2018) 1 SCC 797, laid down following in

paragraphs 13 and 17:

“13. It is thus well settled that acquittal

in a criminal case does not automatically

entitle him for appointment to the post. Still

it is open to the employer to consider the

antecedents and examine whether he is suitable

for appointment to the post. From the

observations of this Court in Mehar Singh, 2013

(7) SCC 685 and Parvez Khan, 2015 (2) SCC 591

cases, it is clear that a candidate to be

recruited to the police service must be of

impeccable character and integrity. A person

having criminal antecedents will not fit in

this category. Even if he is acquitted or

discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was

honourably acquitted/completely exonerated. The

decision of the Screening Committee must be

taken as final unless it is shown to be mala

fide. The Screening Committee also must be

alive to the importance of the trust reposed in

15

it and must examine the candidate with utmost

character.

17. In a catena of judgments, the importance

of integrity and high standard of conduct in

police force has been emphasised. As held in

Mehar Singh case5, the decision of the

Screening Committee must be taken as final

unless it is mala fide. In the case in hand,

there is nothing to suggest that the decision

of the Screening Committee is mala fide. The

decision of the Screening Committee that the

respondents are not suitable for being

appointed to the post of Constable does not

call for interference. The Tribunal and the

High Court, in our view, erred in setting aside

the decision of the Screening Committee and the

impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.”

19. Now, we may notice the judgment of Mohammed Imran

(supra) which has been heavily relied by the learned

counsel for the appellant. In the above case the

appellant was selected for Judicial Service whose

selection was cancelled on 04.06.2010 due to the

character verification report of the Police. Writ

petition was dismissed by the High Court. It was

contended before this court that the appellant was

acquitted of the charge under Sections 363, 366, 34 IPC

on 28.10.2004 that is much before he cleared the

16

examination for appointment in the year 2009. The

appellant disclosed his prosecution and acquittal by

the Sessions Court. This Court noticed the aforesaid

fact in paragraph 9 of the judgment in the following

words:

“9. It is an undisputed fact that one Shri

Sudhir Gulabrao Barde, who had been acquitted

on 24.11.2009 in Case No.3022 of 2007 under

Sections 294, 504, 34 IPC, has been

appointed……”

20. This Court held that report received reveals that

except for the criminal case, in which he had already

been acquitted, the appellant has a clean record and

there is no adverse material against him to deny him

the fruits of his academic labour. This Court found

decision rejecting the candidature of the appellant as

untenable by making following observation in paragraph

11:

“11. In the entirety of the facts and

circumstances of the case, we are of the

considered opinion that the consideration of

the candidature of the appellant and its

rejection are afflicted by a myopic vision,

blurred by the spectacle of what has been

described as moral turpitude, reflecting

17

inadequate appreciation and application of

facts also, as justice may demand.”

21. There can be no dispute that in event it is found

that decision by which the candidature of a candidate

is rejected is arbitrary or actuated by malafide such

decision can be interfered by the Constitutional

Courts. We have already noticed the judgment of this

Court in Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration and

others vs. Pradeep Kumar and another (supra) that the

decision of the Screening Committee must be final

unless it is mala fide.

22. There can be no dispute to the above preposition.

But there can be other valid reasons for not sustaining

the decision of Screening Committee/ Selection

Committee apart from the ground of mala fide. Any

arbitrary decision taken by the Selection Committee can

very well be interfered by the Constitutional Courts in

exercise of Judicial Review Jurisdiction. 

18

23. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the

decision of Examination-cum-Section and Appointment

Committee for holding the appellant unsuitable was

based on the relevant consideration, i.e., a criminal

case against the appellant under Section 498A/406/34

IPC was pending consideration which was registered on a

complaint filed by the wife of the appellant. Such

decision of the Committee was well within the

jurisdiction and power of the Committee and cannot be

said to be unsustainable. The mere fact that

subsequently after more than a year when the person

whose candidature has been cancelled has been acquitted

cannot be a ground to turn the clock backward.

24. There being no infirmity in the decision dated

18.07.2018 of the Committee declaring the appellant

unsuitable for the post and consequential decision

taken by the State to delete the name of the appellant,

the High Court did not commit any error in dismissing

the writ petition. The fact that subsequently the

appellant was acquitted in the criminal case did not

19

furnish sufficient ground for reconsidering the

appellant for appointment on the post.

25. One more submission advanced by learned counsel for

the petitioner needs also to be considered. The

petitioner’s contention is that the decision declaring

the petitioner unsuitable on the ground of pendency of

criminal case under Section 498A, 406 IPC was contrary

to the guidelines issued by the Government of Madhya

Pradesh for character verification dated 05.06.2003. He

submits that as per paragraph 6(viii) of the guidelines

on the acquittal on merit of the case by the Court, the

candidate will be eligible for Government service. He

submits that the above clause of the Government Order

has been breached in declaring the appellant

unsuitable.

26. The guidelines dated 05.06.2003 has been issued by

Government of Madhya Pradesh on the subject “regarding

issuing of new guidelines for character verification.”

Paragraph 6 which has been relied by the counsel for

20

the appellant is regarding column 12 of the Attestation

form. It is useful to extract paragraph 6 and clause

(viii) which are as follows: -

“6. The Column 12 of the attestation form

filled for character verification by selected

candidates for government service, criminal

background, judicial case and the information

about acquittal or conviction in it, willfully

or erroneously or ignorantly kept vacant

subject to qualification for appointment in

government service taking into consideration

the policy as per rules by the state government

with immediate effect decisions have been

taken.

(i)……… ………… ……………

 ………… ………… ……………

(viii) On the acquittal on merit of the

case by the Hon’ble Court, the candidate

will be eligible for government service.”

27. Clause (viii) on which the reliance is placed

contemplates that the candidate who has been acquitted

on merit by the Court will be eligible for the

Government service. The aforesaid contemplation relates

to at the time of character verification. Thus, at the

time of character verification, if a candidate is found

to be acquitted on merits by the Court, the candidate

shall be treated to be eligible for Government Service.

21

The above clause (viii) as quoted above cannot come to

the rescue of the appellant who at the time of

character verification or at the time of consideration

of the case of the appellant by the committee on

18.07.2018 had not been acquitted. Had the appellant in

column 12 had mentioned about the acquittal or at the

time of character verification it was found that the

candidate has been acquitted on merit by the Court,

Clause 6(viii) would have been attracted but in the

present case the said clause is not attracted since at

the time of character verification the appellant had

not been acquitted and he was acquitted after more than

a year from rejection of his candidature.

28. Learned counsel for the appellant lastly has

contended that due to deletion of the name of appellant

from select list a stigma is attached to him, for

removal of which this Court may issue notice in this

SLP. As noted above, the appellant having already been

acquitted by the judgment dated 18.09.2019 stigma of

criminal case has already washed out and the criminal

22

case having resulted in acquittal no stigma is attached

to the appellant’s name on the above ground. The

apprehension of the learned counsel for the appellant

that a stigma shall continue with the name of the

appellant is misconceived, stigma, if any, is already

over by acquittal.

29. We, thus, are of the view that the High Court did

not commit any error in dismissing the writ petition.

The appellant was not entitled for any relief in the

writ petition. In the result, while dismissing this

appeal we observe that stigma, if any, of the criminal

case lodged against appellant under Section 498A/406/34

IPC is washed out due to the acquittal of the appellant

vide judgment dated 18.09.2019.

......................J.

 [ASHOK BHUSHAN]

......................J.

 [M.R. SHAH]

NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 13, 2020.

an application for intervention so as to enable him to seek extension of time for transporting the mineral allegedly extracted on or before 15.03.2018.

 an application for intervention so as to enable him to seek extension of time for transporting the mineral allegedly extracted on or before 15.03.2018.

whether royalty had already been paid or not assumed significance in the second   round   of   litigation,   in   respect   of   the   minerals excavated/mined on or before 15.03.2018 and removed to jetties. The order dated 04.04.2018 in SLP(C)Nos.8483 & 8484 of 2018, and the order dated 11.05.2018 in SLP(C)No.12449 of 2018 used the expression “royalty paid ore”, in the context of the mineral removed from the mines and brought to the jetties on or before 15.03.2018.   Therefore, the first objection of  Goa  Foundation cannot be sustained.   In any case the acceptance of the said objection   would   tantamount   to   reviewing   the   judgment   dated 30.01.2020, without an application for review.    Coming to the second contention, the same revolves around Rule 12(1)(hh)  of   The   Minerals  (Other than Atomic  and Hydro 10 Carbon Energy Minerals) Concession Rules, 2016, which reads as follows:­ “… (hh)  if at the end of six calendar months after the expiry or sooner termination of the lease term there shall remain in or upon the leased land, any ore or mineral, engines, machinery, plant,   buildings   structures,   tramways,   railways   and   other work, erections and conveniences or other property which are not required by the lessee in connection with operations in any other lands held by it under prospecting licence or mining lease, the same shall, if not removed by the lessee within one calendar   month   of   being   notified   to   do   so   by   the   State Government, be deemed to become the property of the State Government and may be sold or disposed of in such manner as the State Government shall deem fit without liability to pay any   compensation   or   to   account   to   the   lessee   in   respect thereof. …” 

By virtue of the aforesaid Rule, any (i) ore or mineral; (ii) engines; (iii) plant and machinery; (iv) building structures; (v) tramways,   railways   and   other   work;   (vi)   erections   and conveniences; and (vii) other property which are not required by the lessee in connection with operations in any other land held by it under a mining lease, shall be deemed to become the property of the Government if two conditions are satisfied, namely:­ (i) that   such   property   remained   in   or   upon   the leased   land, at the end of six calendar months after the expiry or sooner termination of the lease term; and 11 (ii) that such property is not removed by the lessee within one calendar month of being notified to do so by the State Government.  

Therefore, Goa Foundation may be right in contending that the   State   Government   should   have   invoked   Rule   12(1)(hh)   to confiscate the mineral allegedly lying at site for the past more than 2½ years.  But the difficulty today is that Rule 12(1)(hh) was not   pressed   into   service   before   this   Court,   when   this   Court rendered   its   judgment   dated   30.01.2020.     As   a   result,   the judgment dated 30.01.2020 giving six months’ time to the lessees to remove the material, has attained finality.  If the lessees had removed the material within the six months’  period prescribed in the judgment 30.01.2020, Goa Foundation could not have come up with this contention.  In fact, the application for clarification/ direction in M.A.No.1625 of 2020 was filed only in September, 2020, after the expiry of six months’ period granted by this Court by the judgment dated 30.01.2020. 17. Having said that, we should also clarify that we should not be understood as saying as though the power under Rule 12(1) 12 (hh) is no more available to the State.   Even now there is no impediment for the State to invoke Rule 12(1)(hh).   

One   last   contention   was   with   regard   to   the   quantity   of mineral allegedly mined on or before 15.03.2018, but lying unremoved from lease­hold area.   The learned Advocate General stated   that   the   Government   has   complete   details   about   the mineral already excavated on or before 15.03.2018 and lying at site.  The lessees cannot remove more than what the records of the Government, already maintained in the course of discharge of official duties of the concerned officers, reflect.  In the judgment dated 30.01.2020, this Court has proceeded in good faith that all mining activities have been stopped on 15.03.2018 and that the mineral mined until then is what is sought to be removed now. Therefore, this should be made subject to the verification with reference to records.  In the light of the above, the applications for extension of time   filed   by   the   lessees   and   the   application   for clarification/direction filed by Goa Foundation are disposed of to the following effect:­ 13 (1) The   lessees   are   granted   time   up   to   end   of January,   2021   for   the   removal   of   the   minerals excavated/mined on or before 15.03.2018 subject to payment of royalties and other charges; 

(2) The quantity of mineral to be removed by each of the   lessees   shall   be   determined   by   the   concerned officials   with   reference   to   the   records   of   the Government maintained at the relevant point of time; 

(3) If within the time stipulated above, the lessees could not remove the mineral, the Government shall invoke the power under Rule 12(1)(hh).

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

M.A.NO.1260 OF 2020 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 839 OF 2020

CHOWGULE AND COMPANY                              …APPLICANT(S)/

PRIVATE  LIMITED                    ...APPELLANT(S) 

VERSUS

GOA FOUNDATION & ORS.                        ... RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

M.A.NOS.1385­1387/2020 IN CIVIL APPEAL NOS.840­842 OF 2020

M.A.NO.1384/2020 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 843 OF 2020 

M.A.NO.1345 /2020 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.848 OF 2020

M.A.NO.1344/2020 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 847 OF 2020

M.A.NO.1625/2020 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.839 OF 2020

O R D E R

1. While M.A.Nos.1260, 1344, 1345, 1384, 1385, 1386 and

1387   of   2020   are   applications   filed   by   the   lessees   of

manganese/iron  ore mines, seeking  extension  of  time  for the

transportation of the mineral alleged to have been mined before

15.03.2018, M.A.No.1625 of 2020 is filed by the Goa Foundation,

2

which was the writ petitioner before the High Court and the first

respondent in the Civil Appeals before this Court, praying for

certain directions and for a clarification of the judgment delivered

by this Court in Civil Appeal No.839 of 2020 dated 30.01.2020.

2. M.A.No.1653 of 2020 is by a person who claims to be one of

the lease holders but who was not a party to the Civil Appeals.

As the applicant was not a party to the Civil Appeals, he has

come up with an application for intervention so as to enable him

to seek extension of time for transporting the mineral allegedly

extracted on or before 15.03.2018.

3. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties.

4. Brief facts essential for the disposal of these applications

are as follows:­

(i) In Goa Foundation  vs.  Union of India­I1

, this Court

held   that   all   iron­ore   and   manganese­ore   leases   had

expired   on   22.11.2007   and   that   any   mining   operation

carried out beyond the said date was illegal.  While holding

so, this Court also pointed out that for a second renewal of

1 (2014) 6 SCC 590

3

the mining lease, an order is required to be passed by the

State;

(ii) The   observations   regarding   second   renewal   of   the

mining leases, gave rise to a fresh set of litigations, which

culminated in the decision in  Goa  Foundation  vs.  Sesa

Sterlite  Ltd.­II2

.   In paragraph 154 of the said decision,

this Court recorded 9 conclusions, one of which in para

154.6, reads as follows:­

“...                        

154.6. The mining leaseholders who have been granted

the   second   renewal   in   violation   of   the   decision   and

directions   of   this   Court   in Goa   Foundation [Goa

Foundation v. Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 590] are given

time   to   manage   their   affairs   and   may   continue   their

mining   operations   till 15­3­2018.   However,   they   are

directed to stop all mining operations with effect from

16­3­2018 until fresh mining leases (not fresh renewals

or other renewals) are granted and fresh environmental

clearances are granted.”

(iii) The aforesaid directions led to a fresh bout of litigation,

that culminated in the order by this Court on 30.01.2020

in Civil Appeal Nos.839­848 of 2020.  The controversy that

revolved around paragraph 154.6  Goa Foundation­II  was

as to whether the time given to the lease holders to manage

their affairs up to 15.03.2018 would include the time to

2 (2018) 4 SCC 218

4

remove the mined mineral.   This controversy was resolved

by this Court in the judgment dated 30.01.2020 which we

may call Goa Foundation­III.  This Court held therein:­

(1)           that   the   only   prohibition   imposed   by

paragraph   154.6   of   Goa   Foundation­II   was   for

carrying   out   mining   operations     and   not

transportation; and

(2)       that the  policy decision of the State of Goa

dated   21.03.2018,   to   permit   the   transportation   of

mineral mined prior to 15.03.2018 was valid.

(iv) After   so   interpreting   paragraph   154.6   of  Goa

Foundation­II, this Court also took note of Rule 12(1)(gg) of

The Minerals (Other than Atomic and Hydro Carbons Energy

Minerals)   Concession   Rules,   2016,   which   also   allows   a

period of six months for the lessees to remove the excavated

material, on the expiry or sooner termination of the term of

lease.   Accordingly,   this   Court,   by   its   order   dated

30.01.2020,   granted   a   period   of   6   months   to   all   lease

holders to transport the mineral already excavated on or

before 15.03.2018;

(v) The time granted by this Court to the lease holders, by

the order  dated 30.01.2020 expired on 30.07.2020.  A lock

down was clamped on 24.03.2020 due to the pandemic.

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Therefore, a few lessees have come up with the aforesaid

applications for extension of time by six months with effect

from   01.10.2020   for   the   transportation   of   the   mineral

allegedly extracted by them on or before 15.03.2018;

(vi) Contending that the benefit of extension of time should

be granted also to them, a lessee who did not challenge the

order of the High Court by way of a civil appeal, has come

up with an application for intervention, in the disposed of

Civil Appeals;

(vii) Goa Foundation which was the first respondent in the

Civil Appeals has come up with an independent application

seeking the following reliefs:­

(a) Clarify that the judgment/order, dated 30.1.2020,

passed in Civil Appeal No.839 of 2020 only applies to

or on which royalty has been paid prior to 15.03.2018;

(b) Direct the Directorate of Mines & Geology of the

Government of Goa (Respondent No.4) to recover the

amounts   involved   in   transportation   and   sale   of

mineral in violation of the order dated 30.01.2020;

(c) Direct the State of Goa (Respondent No.2) to take

possession   of   all   active   and   passive   mining   leases

forthwith in compliance of the aforesaid judgment;

(d) Pass such other or further order(s) as this Hon’ble

Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of

the case in favour of the Applicant.

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Intervention application  

5. Let us first take up the intervention application, as it is

capable of being disposed without much ado.  The applicants in

M.A. No.1653 of 2020 did not challenge the order of the High

Court   before   this   Court.     Even   if   he   had   benefited   by   the

judgment dated 30.01.2020, by virtue of the policy of the State

dated 21.03.2018, which we upheld, the applicant cannot now

seek   the   benefit   of   extension.   Therefore,   the   application   for

intervention is  dismissed.

Applications   for   extension   of   time   and   application   of   Goa

Foundation for directions

6. Applications for extension of time have been filed by the

lessees primarily on two grounds namely:­

(1) the delay on the part of the statutory authorities

in issuing transit permits for the transportation of the

royalty paid ore; and

(2) the imposition of lockdown within two months of

the judgment of this Court dated 30.01.2020.

7. But the applications for extension of time are opposed by

Goa Foundation on the grounds inter alia:­

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(1) that the ore on  which royalty had not  already

been paid, can never be removed;

(2) that   even   as   per   the   affidavit   of   the   Chief

Secretary of the State, the ore inside the lease­hold

area on which advance royalty had already been paid,

was only 73,850.26 tonnes;

(3) that in terms of Rule 12(1)(hh) of   The Minerals

(Other   than   Atomic   and   Hydro   Carbons   Energy

Minerals)   Concession   Rules,   2016,   the   mineral   not

removed   within   a   period   of   six   calendar   months   is

liable to be confiscated to the Government; and 

(4) any extension of time is bound to be misused by

the lessees.

8. On the same grounds as aforesaid, Goa Foundation has also

sought some directions in M.A.No.1625 of 2020, which we have

already extracted above.   

9. From the rival contentions raised in the applications for

extension of time and in the petition for directions, two issues

arise for consideration.  They are :­

(1) whether the right to remove the mined minerals is

only   in   respect   of   “the   royalty   paid   ore”   or   upon

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payment   of   royalty   at   the   time   of   movement   and

disposal; and

(2) whether   the   State   Government   ought   to   have

invoked Rule 12 (1)(hh) of the Rules or not?

10. For finding an answer to issue no.1, we have to take a look

at the statutory provisions.  Section 9 of the Mines and Minerals

(Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, deals with royalties in

respect of mining leases.  Sub­section (1) of Section 9 deals with

the liability to pay royalty by the holder of a mining lease granted

before the commencement of the Act.   Sub­section (2) of Section

9 deals with the liability of a holder of a mining lease granted on

after commencement of the Act.

11. Obviously, Section 9(2) is what may be applicable to the

lessees who are now before us.  It reads as follows:­

“9. Royalties in respect of mining leases.­

…                       …                         …                           …

(2)  The holder of a mining lease granted on or after the

commencement of this Act shall pay royalty in respect of

any   mineral   removed   or   consumed   by   him   or   by   his

agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub­lessee from

the leased area at the rate for the time being specified in

the Second Schedule in respect of that mineral.

…                       …                            …                        ...”

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12. Therefore,   the   contention   of   the   lessees   that   royalty   is

payable   at   the   time   of   removal   or   consumption,   cannot   be

rejected outright.  We must keep in mind the fact that we are now

dealing   with   the   miscellaneous   applications   in   a   disposed   of

matter.  Therefore, a substantial question as to when the royalty

is payable, cannot be decided at this stage.  

13. We may also point out one more fact.  The question whether

royalty had already been paid or not assumed significance in the

second   round   of   litigation,   in   respect   of   the   minerals

excavated/mined on or before 15.03.2018 and removed to jetties.

The order dated 04.04.2018 in SLP(C)Nos.8483 & 8484 of 2018,

and the order dated 11.05.2018 in SLP(C)No.12449 of 2018 used

the expression “royalty paid ore”, in the context of the mineral

removed from the mines and brought to the jetties on or before

15.03.2018.   Therefore, the first objection of  Goa  Foundation

cannot be sustained.   In any case the acceptance of the said

objection   would   tantamount   to   reviewing   the   judgment   dated

30.01.2020, without an application for review.  

14. Coming to the second contention, the same revolves around

Rule 12(1)(hh)  of   The   Minerals  (Other than Atomic  and Hydro

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Carbon Energy Minerals) Concession Rules, 2016, which reads as

follows:­

“…

(hh)  if at the end of six calendar months after the expiry or

sooner termination of the lease term there shall remain in or

upon the leased land, any ore or mineral, engines, machinery,

plant,   buildings   structures,   tramways,   railways   and   other

work, erections and conveniences or other property which are

not required by the lessee in connection with operations in any

other lands held by it under prospecting licence or mining

lease, the same shall, if not removed by the lessee within one

calendar   month   of   being   notified   to   do   so   by   the   State

Government, be deemed to become the property of the State

Government and may be sold or disposed of in such manner

as the State Government shall deem fit without liability to pay

any   compensation   or   to   account   to   the   lessee   in   respect

thereof.

…”

15. By virtue of the aforesaid Rule, any (i) ore or mineral; (ii)

engines; (iii) plant and machinery; (iv) building structures; (v)

tramways,   railways   and   other   work;   (vi)   erections   and

conveniences; and (vii) other property which are not required by

the lessee in connection with operations in any other land held by

it under a mining lease, shall be deemed to become the property

of the Government if two conditions are satisfied, namely:­

(i) that   such   property   remained   in   or   upon   the

leased   land, at the end of six calendar months after

the expiry or sooner termination of the lease term; and

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(ii) that such property is not removed by the lessee

within one calendar month of being notified to do so by

the State Government. 

16. Therefore, Goa Foundation may be right in contending that

the   State   Government   should   have   invoked   Rule   12(1)(hh)   to

confiscate the mineral allegedly lying at site for the past more

than 2½ years.  But the difficulty today is that Rule 12(1)(hh) was

not   pressed   into   service   before   this   Court,   when   this   Court

rendered   its   judgment   dated   30.01.2020.     As   a   result,   the

judgment dated 30.01.2020 giving six months’ time to the lessees

to remove the material, has attained finality.  If the lessees had

removed the material within the six months’  period prescribed in

the judgment 30.01.2020, Goa Foundation could not have come

up with this contention.  In fact, the application for clarification/

direction in M.A.No.1625 of 2020 was filed only in September,

2020, after the expiry of six months’ period granted by this Court

by the judgment dated 30.01.2020.

17. Having said that, we should also clarify that we should not

be understood as saying as though the power under Rule 12(1)

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(hh) is no more available to the State.   Even now there is no

impediment for the State to invoke Rule 12(1)(hh).  

18. One   last   contention   was   with   regard   to   the   quantity   of

mineral allegedly mined on or before 15.03.2018, but lying unremoved from lease­hold area.   The learned Advocate General

stated   that   the   Government   has   complete   details   about   the

mineral already excavated on or before 15.03.2018 and lying at

site.  The lessees cannot remove more than what the records of

the Government, already maintained in the course of discharge of

official duties of the concerned officers, reflect.  In the judgment

dated 30.01.2020, this Court has proceeded in good faith that all

mining activities have been stopped on 15.03.2018 and that the

mineral mined until then is what is sought to be removed now.

Therefore, this should be made subject to the verification with

reference to records.  

19. In the light of the above, the applications for extension of

time   filed   by   the   lessees   and   the   application   for

clarification/direction filed by Goa Foundation are disposed of to

the following effect:­

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(1) The   lessees   are   granted   time   up   to   end   of

January,   2021   for   the   removal   of   the   minerals

excavated/mined on or before 15.03.2018 subject to

payment of royalties and other charges;

(2) The quantity of mineral to be removed by each of

the   lessees   shall   be   determined   by   the   concerned

officials   with   reference   to   the   records   of   the

Government maintained at the relevant point of time;

(3) If within the time stipulated above, the lessees

could not remove the mineral, the Government shall

invoke the power under Rule 12(1)(hh).

....................................CJI

(S.A. Bobde)

.......................................J.

(A.S. Bopanna)

........................................J.

(V. Ramasubramanian)

New Delhi

October  13, 2020

Amendment of election petition in respect of material pleadings after other side took objections for lack of material pleadings - not maintainable. ; All contested candidates are necessary parties to the election petition =

Amendment of election petition in respect of material pleadings after other side took objections for lack of material pleadings - not maintainable. ; All contested candidates are necessary parties to the election petition =

Amendment of election petition in respect of material pleadings after other side took objections for lack of material pleadings - not maintainable.

It is only after two months of the first respondent filing I.A. No.4 of 2019 that the petitioner herein moved an application in I.A.No.1 of 2020 for amendment of the pleadings by incorporating one paragraph, after the existing para 30 of the election petition. To be precise I.A. No.1 of 2020 was filed on 11.02.2020 seeking to   incorporate   one   paragaraph   as   para   30(a)   in   the   original election petition. This proposed additional paragraph comprised of two parts, one relating the alleged corrupt practices and the other relating to the requirements of section 101 (b) of the Act. By the   order   impugned   herein,   the   High   Court   allowed   the amendment to the extent of first part of para 30(a), but rejected the amendment as regards the second part which relates to the ingredients of section 101 (b). As rightly pointed out by the High Court, the election petitioner cannot be allowed to suddenly wake up to the reality of lack of pleading of material facts, relating tohis rights in terms of section 101 after  more than 18 months of the filing of the election petition.   The same is also barred by limitation.     Therefore,   the   High   Court   did   the   right   thing   in disallowing the second part of the proposed para 30 (a) and in striking off prayer (c).

 All contested candidates are necessary parties to the election petition =

“in   the   present case, for one seat, there were five candidates and it would be impossible to predict or guess in whose favour the voters would   have   voted   if   they   were   aware   that   the   elected candidate was disqualified to contest election or if he was not   permitted   to   contest   the   election   by   rejecting   his nomination   paper   on   the   ground   of   disqualification   to contest  the  election  and  what  would  have  been  the  voting pattern.”

1

NON­REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPEME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS.6787­6788 OF 2020

SRI MUNIRAJU GOWDA P.M.                           … PETITIONER(S)

VERSUS

SRI MUNIRATHNA & ORS.                              …RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R

V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.

1. Challenging the interim orders passed in two interlocutory

applications, one seeking amendment of pleadings and the other

for   striking   out   prayer   (c)   in   the   main   election   petition,   the

election   petitioner   has   come   up   with   these   Special   Leave

Petitions.

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2. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties.

3. In   the   elections   held   to   the   Karnataka   State   Legislative

Assembly   on   28.05.2018,   the   first   respondent   was   declared

elected from Constituency No.154, namely Rajarajeshwari Nagar.

4. The  petitioner  herein  challenged  the  election   of  the  first

respondent by way of an election petition in E.P.No.11 of 2018

before the High Court of Karnataka. The election petition was

filed   on   13.07.2018.   After   service   of   notice,   the   returned

candidate   who   is   the   first   respondent   herein   filed   three

interlocutory applications in I.A. Nos. 2, 3 and 4 of 2019, praying

respectively for:­

(i) Striking out the pleadings in paragraphs 8­30;

(ii) Rejection of the election petition on the ground of lack

of substratum; and

(iii) Striking out prayer (c) in the election petition.

5. The petitioner herein (the election petitioner) also filed two

interlocutory applications in I.A. Nos. 1 & 4 of 2020, praying for:­

(i) Amendment of the election petition by incorporating

additional pleadings; and

(ii) Leave to produce copies of 8 documents.

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6. By a common order passed on 20.03.2020, the High Court

(i)     partly allowed I.A.No.1 of 2020 filed by the election 

                Petitioner;

(ii) fully allowed I.A. No.4 of 2020 filed by the election

petitioner ;

(iii)   rejected I.A. Nos. 2 and 3 of 2019 filed by the first

respondent;  and 

(iv)  allowed I.A. No.4 of 2019 filed by the first respondent

for striking out prayer (c) in the election petition.

7. Aggrieved by that portion of the order of the High Court:­

(i) Allowing     I.A.   No.4   of   2019   filed   by   the   returned

candidate namely the first respondent and striking out

prayer (c) in the election petition;  and

(ii) Partially disallowing I.A. No.1 of 2020 filed by himself

for introducing additional pleadings with reference to

the substratum contemplated in section 101(b) of the

Act, 

the election petitioner has come up with the above Special Leave

Petitions.

8. The order impugned in the Special Leave Petitions is dated

20.03.2020   but   certain   events   that   happened   during   the

pendency of  the  election  petition,  have  now changed the entire

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complexion of the game.  These events are as follows:­

(i) The first respondent herein along with 12 other elected

members   submitted   their   resignations   from   the

membership   of   the   house   during   the   period   from

01.07.2019 to 11.07.2019;

(ii) On the ground that the Speaker failed to take any

decision   on   the   resignation   of   those   legislators

including the first respondent herein, a few of them

filed a writ petition in W.P.(C) No.872 of 2019 in this

Court. This Court passed an order on 11.07.2019 in

the said writ petition directing the Speaker to take a

decision qua the resignations and to place the decision

before this Court;

(iii) In   the   meantime,   petitions   for   disqualification   were

moved   before   the   Speaker   of   the   Assembly   against

those   13   legislators   including   the   first   respondent

herein;

(iv) In view of the said development, this Court passed a

couple   of   interim   orders   on   12.07.2019   and

17.07.2019;

(v) On   23.07.2019   a   trust   vote   was   taken   up   for

consideration and the resigned members including the

first   respondent   did   not   attend.   Thereafter,   the

Speaker passed 5 independent orders on 25.07.2019

and   28.07.2019   on   the   various   petitions   for

disqualification. By these orders, the Speaker rejected

the resignation of the members and disqualified all of

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them till the end of the term of the 15th State legislative

Assembly;

(vi) Challenging   the   said   orders   of   the   Speaker,   9   writ

petitions came to be filed on the file of this Court, one

of them being W.P.(C) No.998 of 2019.  In the said writ

petition,   there   were   6   petitioners,   one   among   them

being   the   first   respondent   herein.   All   the   9   writ

petitions were disposed of by this Court by a judgment

dated 13.11.2019. By the said judgment, this Court

upheld the order of the Speaker on the disqualification

petitions   but   with   a   slight   modification.   The

modification   was   to   the   effect   that   a   member

disqualified under the 10th Schedule shall be subjected

to sanctions provided under Articles 75(1B), 164(1B)

and   361B   of   the   Constitution   which   bars   the

disqualified   member   from   being   appointed   as   a

Minister   or   from   holding   any   remunerative   political

post from the date of disqualification till the date on

which the term of his office would expire or if he is reelected, whichever is earlier.

9. As a result of the above judgment of this Court, the first

respondent ceased to be a member of the 15th  Karnataka State

Assembly. In the judgment dated 13.11.2019, this Court made it

clear that the disqualification would relate back to the date when

the   act   of   defection   took   place.   This   Court   also   held   that   a

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pending or impending disqualification action does not become

infructuous by the submission of a letter of resignation, if the act

of disqualification had arisen prior to the letter of resignation.

10. In the light of the events that happened as aforesaid, during

the pendency of the election petition, let us now see the reliefs

sought   by   the   election   petitioner   before   the   High   Court   of

Karnataka in E.P. No.11 of 2018. The reliefs sought were as

follows:­

“Wherefore,   the   petitioner   most   respectfully  pray  that

this Hon’ble Court be pleased to –

a) Set   aside  Election  of   Respondent   No.   1  to  the   15th

Karnataka  Legislative Assembly from Constituency No.

154, Rajarajeshwarinagar;

b) To declare the return candidate Respondent No. 1 as

void of corrupt electoral practice U/Sec. 123 of R.P Act

1950;

c) To declare the petitioner as duly elected to the seat of

Karnataka   Legislative   Assembly   Rajarajeshwarinagar

Constituency No. 154;

d) Pass such other order/s as this Hon’ble Court deems

fit to grant, in the interest of justice and equity;

e) Cost of the proceedings”

11. There can be no quarrel about the fact that as on date, the

grant of relief to the petitioner herein in terms of prayer (a) is only

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academic.  This is for the reason that instead of the High Court

setting aside the election of the first respondent, the Speaker

himself has disqualified the first respondent, albeit on a different

ground and the disqualification has been upheld by this Court

during the pendency of the election petition.  

12. However, the contention of Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned

senior counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner can still

pursue prayer (b) and in the event of his success, he may be

entitled to press for the grant of relief in terms of prayer (c).

Technically,   the   learned   Senior   Counsel   is   right,   since   the

involvement of a person in corrupt practices, in an election, does

not get washed away, by his subsequent resignation.

13. But there is something that stares at the face. It appears

that   when   the   results   were   announced,   the   petitioner   was

declared to have secured 82,572 votes, while the first respondent

was declared to have secured 1,08,064 votes. Therefore, in terms

of Section 101 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for

short the ‘Act’) the election petitioner should satisfy:­

(i) that he received a majority of the valid votes; or

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(ii) that but for the votes obtained by the returned

candidate  by corrupt practices, he would have

obtained a majority of the valid votes.

14. As observed by the High Court, pleadings necessary for the

High Court to form an opinion in terms of Clause (a) or Clause (b)

of Section 101 of the Act were not there in the election petition.

Under Section 83(1)(a) of the Act, an election petition should

contain a concise statement of material facts. What constitutes

“material facts” would depend upon the ground on which the

election of a returned candidate is challenged. Several grounds

are enumerated in Section 100(1) of the Act and pleading of

material   facts   co­relatable   to   the   grounds   set   out   in   Section

100(1), forms the bedrock of an election petition.

15. In the election petition, as it was originally filed, there was

no   averment   of   material   facts   traceable   to   the   ingredients

incorporated in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 101. This is why

the first respondent herein made the first strike by moving an

application   in   I.A.No.4   of   2019   for   striking   out   prayer   (c).

Actually, I.A.No.4 of 2019 was filed by the first respondent herein

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on   11.10.2019,   pointing   out   that   there   are   no   necessary

pleadings with reference to Section 101.

16. It is only after two months of the first respondent filing I.A.

No.4 of 2019 that the petitioner herein moved an application in

I.A.No.1 of 2020 for amendment of the pleadings by incorporating

one paragraph, after the existing para 30 of the election petition.

To be precise I.A. No.1 of 2020 was filed on 11.02.2020 seeking

to   incorporate   one   paragaraph   as   para   30(a)   in   the   original

election petition. This proposed additional paragraph comprised

of two parts, one relating the alleged corrupt practices and the

other relating to the requirements of section 101 (b) of the Act. By

the   order   impugned   herein,   the   High   Court   allowed   the

amendment to the extent of first part of para 30(a), but rejected

the amendment as regards the second part which relates to the

ingredients of section 101 (b). As rightly pointed out by the High

Court, the election petitioner cannot be allowed to suddenly wake

up to the reality of lack of pleading of material facts, relating to

his rights in terms of section 101 after more than 18 months of

the filing of the election petition.   The same is also barred by

limitation.     Therefore,   the   High   Court   did   the   right   thing   in

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disallowing the second part of the proposed para 30 (a) and in

striking off prayer (c).

17. In any case, the second part of paragraph 30 (a) sought to

be   incorporated   by   way   of   amendment,   does   not   satisfy   the

requirement of pleading of material facts, necessary for the High

Court to form an opinion in terms of Clause (a) or (b) of Section

101.

18. Once it is found that neither the original election petition

nor   the   amended   election   petition   contains   any   pleading   of

material facts which would enable the High Court to form an

opinion in terms of Section 101, there was no alternative for the

High Court but to strike off prayer (c).  

19. There   is   one   more   reason   why   the   petitioner   cannot

succeed. In the elections in question, there were 14 candidates in

the fray, including the petitioner herein and the first respondent.

In Viswanath Reddy   vs.  Konappa Rudrappa Nadgouda1

, the

Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   treated   the   votes   polled   in

favour of the returned candidate as thrown away votes, on the

1AIR 1969 SC 604

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ground that he was disqualified from contesting and that the

election petitioner was entitled to be declared elected, in view of

the fact that there was no other contesting candidate. But the

Constitution Bench cautioned that the rule for the exclusion of

the votes secured by corrupt practices by the returned candidate

in   the   computation   of   the   total   votes   and   the   consequential

declaration   of   the   candidate   who   secured   the   next   highest

number of votes as duly elected, can be applied only when there

are just two candidates at an election. 

20. The   ratio   in  Viswanath   Reddy (supra)   was   followed  in

Thiru   John    vs.   Returning  Officer  &   Others.2

. Though this

case   concerned   election   to   the   Rajya   Sabha   through   single

transferable votes, this Court observed in this case that it would

be extremely difficult if not impossible, to predicate what the

voting pattern would have been, if the electors knew at the time

of election that one was disqualified. The Court pointed out that

the question as to how many of the voters would have cast their

votes   in   favour   of   other   continuing   candidates   and   in   what

2(1977) 3 SCC 540

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preferential   order,   remained   a   question   in   the   realm   of

speculation and unpredictability.

21. In  D.K.   Sharma  vs.  Ram   Sharan   Yadav   and   Others3

,

this Court followed the dictum in Vishwanatha Reddy (supra) to

the effect that where there are more than two candidates in the

field, it is not possible to apply the same ratio as could be applied

when   there   are   only   two   candidates.   This   principle   was   also

reiterated in Prakash Khandre  vs. Dr. Vijay Kumar Khandre

and   Others4

, where this Court pointed out  “in   the   present

case, for one seat, there were five candidates and it would

be impossible to predict or guess in whose favour the voters

would   have   voted   if   they   were   aware   that   the   elected

candidate was disqualified to contest election or if he was

not   permitted   to   contest   the   election   by   rejecting   his

nomination   paper   on   the   ground   of   disqualification   to

contest  the  election  and  what  would  have  been  the  voting

pattern.”

3(1993) Supp. (2) SCC 117

4(2002) 5 SCC 568

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22. Therefore, apart from the fact that in the election petition,

there   were   no   pleadings   of   material   facts   co­relatable   to   the

ingredients   of   clause  (a)  or   (b)  of  Section   101   of  the   Act,  to

sustain prayer (c), even legally the High Court could not have

granted   prayer   (c)   in   view   of   the   fact   that   there   were   14

candidates in the fray.  

23. In view of the above, the Order of the High Court does not

call for any interference. Hence these Special Leave Petitions are

dismissed. No costs.

………………………………..CJI

(S.A. Bobde)

…………………………………J.

(A.S. Bopanna)

………………………………….J.

(V. Ramasubramanian)

New Delhi

October 13, 2020

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