No person can be deprived to his job for which he was selected on the groud that he was a Juvniel offender In the present case, the complaint/FIR lodged against the respondent was to the effect that when he was a minor, he had teased a girl a few times and went to the extent of catching hold of her hand. However, the girl and her parents finally decided to pardon the respondent by not giving any evidence against him, resulting in the acquittal of the respondent. In the aforesaid facts, even if the aforesaid is found to be true, it cannot be said that the respondent had committed such a crime, which would be covered under the definition of moral turpitude, specially when the respondent is said to have committed the alleged offence when he was a minor. 9. From the facts, it is clear that at the time when the charges were framed against the respondent, on 30.06.2009, the respondent was well under the age of 18 years as his date of birth is 05.09.1991. Firstly, it was not disputed that the charges were never proved against the respondent as the girl and her parents did not depose against the respondent, resulting in his acquittal on 24.11.2011. Even if the allegations were found to be true, then too the respondent could not have been deprived of getting a job on the basis of such charges as the same had been committed while the respondent was juvenile. The thrust of the legislation, i.e. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 as well as The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is that even if a juvenile is convicted, the same should be obliterated, so that there is no stigma with regard to any crime committed by such person as a juvenile. This is with the clear object to reintegrate such juvenile back in the society as a normal person, without any stigma. Further, the case against the respondent is not with regard to the suppression of any conviction or charges having been framed against him. The respondent had very fairly disclosed about the charges which had been framed and his acquittal on the basis of no evidence having been adduced by the complainant against the respondent. In our considered view, the same can also not be said to be a suppression by the respondent, on the basis of which he could be deprived of a job, for which he was duly selected after following the due process and appointment having been offered to him.

 No person can be deprived to his job for which he was selected on the groud that he was a Juvniel offender
In the present case, the complaint/FIR lodged against the respondent was to the effect that when he was a minor, he had teased a girl a few times and went to the extent of catching hold of
her hand.   However, the girl and her parents finally decided to pardon the respondent by not giving any evidence against him, resulting in the acquittal of the respondent.  In the aforesaid facts,
even if the aforesaid is found to be true, it cannot be said that the respondent had committed such a crime, which would be covered under   the   definition   of   moral   turpitude,   specially   when   the
respondent is said to have committed the alleged offence when he
was a minor.
9. From the facts, it is clear that at the time when the charges were framed against the respondent, on 30.06.2009, the respondent was well under the age of 18 years as his date of birth is 05.09.1991.  Firstly, it was not disputed that the charges were never proved against the respondent as the girl and her parents did not depose against the respondent, resulting in his acquittal
on 24.11.2011.  Even if the allegations were found to be true, then too the respondent could not have been deprived of getting a job on the basis of such charges as the same had been committed
while the respondent was juvenile. The thrust of the legislation, i.e.
The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 as well as The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is that even if a juvenile is convicted, the same should be
obliterated, so that there is no stigma with regard to any crime committed by such person as a juvenile.  
This is with the clear object to reintegrate such juvenile back in the society as a normal
person, without any stigma.    

Further, the case against the respondent is not with regard to the suppression of any conviction or charges having been framed against him.   The respondent had very fairly disclosed
about the charges which had been framed and his acquittal on the basis of no evidence having been adduced by the complainant against the respondent.  
In our considered view, the same can also not be said to be a suppression by the respondent, on the basis of which he could be deprived of a job, for which he was duly selected after   following   the   due   process   and   appointment   having   been offered to him. 
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.9109 OF 2019
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.26395 OF 2018]
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS             …..APPELLANTS
VERSUS
RAMESH BISHNOI        ……RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
Vineet Saran, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal pertains to the appellants (Union of India)
denying appointment to the respondent, (even though selected) on
the post of Sub­Inspector, on the ground of a criminal case having
been registered in the past against the respondent. 
3. Brief facts relevant for the purpose of this case are that
in response to an advertisement dated 28.03.2015, for recruitment
on the post of Sub­Inspector in the Central Industrial Security
2
Force (for short ‘CISF’) issued by the Staff Selection Commission
(SSC), the respondent had appeared in the written examination
and physical endurance test and was thus selected and offered
appointment on 15.09.2016.  The respondent was then required to
submit a form, wherein there was a column relating to whether
any   First   Information   Report   (for   short   ‘FIR’)   had   been   lodged
against the respondent in the past.  The respondent had given the
details of the FIR (No.70/2009) under Sections 354, 447 and 509
of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   (for   short   ‘IPC’)   having   been   lodged
against   the   respondent   and   in   the   further   column   of   the
questionnaire form, the respondent had clearly mentioned that on
the matter having been compromised, he was acquitted of the
aforesaid   offence   on   24.11.2011,   as   there   was   no   evidence
adduced   against   the   respondent.     The   respondent   had   thus
rendered all  necessary information regarding the  criminal  case
lodged against him and did not conceal any material fact.   The
case   was   then   referred   to   the   Standing   Screening   Committee,
which found the respondent unsuitable for appointment in CISF
on the aforesaid ground that a criminal case had been lodged
against   him   in   the   past.     Consequently,   on   03.06.2017   the
National Industrial Security Academy cancelled the appointment of
3
the respondent, on the ground of registration of a criminal case in
the past.
4. Challenging the said order, the respondent filed Writ
Petition No.7522 of 2017, which was allowed by a learned Single
Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur vide judgment
dated 06.12.2017, and the case of the respondent was directed to
be decided afresh within 15 days in the light of the guidelines
issued by this Court in the case of Avtar Singh vs. Union of India
(2016)   8   SCC   471.    The   case   of  the   respondent   was  then   reexamined by the Standing Screening Committee on 02.01.2018,
which by an order dated 16.01.2018, again rejected the claim of
the respondent, holding that the respondent was acquitted merely
for due to lack of adequate evidence and compromise, and that the
offence in the charge sheet falls in the category of serious offence,
and   thus   the   respondent   was   not   considered   suitable   for
appointment on the post of Sub­Inspector in CISF.
5. Challenging the said order, the respondent filed Writ
Petition No.1310 of 2018, which was allowed by an order dated
08.03.2018 with the following directions:
4
“………..   the   impugned   Order
dated 16.1.2018 (communicated
vide   letter   dated   17.01.2018)
(Annex.1)   is   recashed   and   set
aside;   the   respondents   are
directed   to   activate   offer   of
appointment   of   the   petitioner
earlier made to the Petitioner for
the   post   of   Sub­Inspector   in
Central Industrial Security Force.
The order may be operated upon
within   a   period   of   thirty   days
from   today   and   all   notional
benefits   shall   be   prospectively
given.”
6. The   appellants   herein,   challenged   the   order   of   the
learned Single Judge dated 08.03.2018 before the Division Bench
of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in Special Appeal Writ
No.702 of 2018, which was dismissed by the Division Bench by
judgment dated 08.05.2018.   Aggrieved by the said orders dated
08.03.2018 and 08.05.2018, passed by the learned Single Judge
and Division Bench respectively of the High Court of Rajasthan at
Jodhpur,   this   appeal   has   been   filed   by   way   of   Special   Leave
Petition.
7. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length
and have perused the material on record.
5
8. In the present case, the complaint/FIR lodged against
the respondent was to the effect that when he was a minor, he had
teased a girl a few times and went to the extent of catching hold of
her hand.   However, the girl and her parents finally decided to
pardon the respondent by not giving any evidence against him,
resulting in the acquittal of the respondent.  In the aforesaid facts,
even if the aforesaid is found to be true, it cannot be said that the
respondent had committed such a crime, which would be covered
under   the   definition   of   moral   turpitude,   specially   when   the
respondent is said to have committed the alleged offence when he
was a minor.
9. From the facts, it is clear that at the time when the
charges were framed against the respondent, on 30.06.2009, the
respondent was well under the age of 18 years as his date of birth
is 05.09.1991.  Firstly, it was not disputed that the charges were
never proved against the respondent as the girl and her parents
did not depose against the respondent, resulting in his acquittal
on 24.11.2011.  Even if the allegations were found to be true, then
too the respondent could not have been deprived of getting a job
on the basis of such charges as the same had been committed
while the respondent was juvenile. The thrust of the legislation, i.e.
6
The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 as
well as The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2015 is that even if a juvenile is convicted, the same should be
obliterated, so that there is no stigma with regard to any crime
committed by such person as a juvenile.   This is with the clear
object to reintegrate such juvenile back in the society as a normal
person, without any stigma.     Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 lays down guidelines
for the Central Government, State Governments, the Board and
other agencies while implementing the provisions of the said Act.
In clause (xiv) of Section 3, it is clearly provided as follows:
“……………..
(xiv) Principle  of fresh  start: All
past records of any child under
the   Juvenile   Justice   system
should   be   erased   except   in
special circumstances.
………………”
In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the respondent
was a minor when the charges had been framed against him of
offences under Sections 354, 447 and 509 of IPC. It is also not
disputed that he was acquitted of the charges. However, even if he
7
had been convicted, the same could not have been held against
him for getting a job, as admittedly he was a minor when the
alleged offences were committed and the charges had been framed
against him. Section 3(xiv) provides for the same and the exception
of special circumstances does not apply to the facts of the present
case.
10. Further, the case against the respondent is not with
regard to the suppression of any conviction or charges having been
framed against him.   The respondent had very fairly disclosed
about the charges which had been framed and his acquittal on the
basis of no evidence having been adduced by the complainant
against the respondent.  In our considered view, the same can also
not be said to be a suppression by the respondent, on the basis of
which he could be deprived of a job, for which he was duly selected
after   following   the   due   process   and   appointment   having   been
offered to him. 
11. For the reasons given hereinabove, we do not find any
ground  for  interference with the  orders  passed by the  learned
Single Judge as well as the Division bench of the High Court of
Rajasthan at Jodhpur.   Consequently, this appeal is dismissed.
8
The respondent shall be entitled to all the benefits of the judgment
of the writ Court within 30 days from today.
No orders as to cost.
………………………………..J
                                          (UDAY UMESH LALIT)
...…………………………….J
     (VINEET SARAN)
New Delhi
Dated: November 29, 2019

The casual labourers shall be entitled to the wages according to the rates specified in the order dated 14.01.2010 passed by this Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 9472­9473/2003 and the contractor shall not be entitled to 471% ASOR basis with respect to supply of casual labourers as claimed by him. Therefore, it is specifically observed and held that the FCI shall be liable to pay the wages payable to the casual labourers under the subject contract according to the rates specified in the judgment and order dated 14.01.2010 passed by this Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 9472­9473/2003 and not on 471% ASOR basis. It goes without saying that the contractor shall be entitled to reimburse the wages paid by him, i.e., Rs.106.38 per labourer, if the same is not reimbursed/paid to the contractor.

 The casual labourers shall be entitled to the wages according to the rates specified in the order dated 14.01.2010 passed by this   Court   in   Civil   Appeal   Nos.   9472­9473/2003   and   the
contractor shall not be entitled to 471% ASOR basis with respect to supply of casual labourers as claimed by him.  
Therefore, it is specifically observed and held that the FCI shall be liable to pay the   wages  payable  to   the  casual  labourers  under  the  subject contract according to the rates specified in the judgment and order dated 14.01.2010 passed by this Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 9472­9473/2003 and not on 471% ASOR basis.  It goes without saying   that   the   contractor   shall   be   entitled   to   reimburse   the wages paid by him, i.e., Rs.106.38 per labourer, if the same is not reimbursed/paid to the contractor.  

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.9127 OF 2019
(Arising from SLP(C) No.21970 of 2019)
Food Corporation of India …Appellant
Versus
Pratap Kundu …Respondent
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.9128 OF 2019
(Arising from SLP(C) No.28248 of 2019)
                        @ Diary No.35242/2019
Pratap Kundu …Appellant
Versus
Food Corporation of India …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
M.R. SHAH, J.
Delay condoned.  Leave granted.
1
2. Both these appeals which, as such, can be said to be cross
appeals arise out of the impugned judgment and order dated
12.04.2019 passed by the High Court of Calcutta in F.M.A. No.
1168 of 2017, filed by the original appellants – Food Corporation
of India and others.
3. The facts leading to the present appeals in nutshell are as
under:
By judgment and order dated 23.06.1998, the Calcutta High
Court in Writ Petition No. 1491 of 1997 filed by the contract
casual labourers supplied by an earlier contractor for the Bikna
Depot   directed   that   the   contract   casual   labourers   would   be
entitled to payment of wages equivalent to Class IV employees.
The appeal filed by the Food Corporation of India (for short ‘FCI’)
came to be dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court on
16.07.1998.   The judgment and order passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court dated 16.07.1998 was challenged by the
FCI before this Court by way of Civil Appeal Nos. 6064­6065 of
1998.  That on 16.12.1999 after the earlier contract period came
to an end, the appellant – FCI floated tender for appointment of
Handling and Transport Contractor for the Bikna Depot.   The
respondent – contractor submitted his tender in which he quoted
2
471% above the schedule of rates fixed in the tender.  Appendix
VIII of the tender provided the schedule of rates for the contract
and printed rates were provided on all items.  The tenderer was
required to quote rates above the schedule rates provided in the
contract.  Item No. 24 was for supply of casual labour.  That the
aforesaid Civil Appeals arising out of special leave petitions were
pending before this Court so far as Item No. 24 which was for
supply of casual labour and therefore it was stated in the tender
that “relevant rate of wages is to be paid and such rate shall
abide by the decision of  pending SLP as filed by FCI in  the
Hon’ble Supreme Court”.   That by judgment and order dated
28.09.2000, this Court dismissed the aforesaid Civil Appeal Nos.
6064­6065   of   1998   upholding   the   judgment   of   the   Division
Bench   of   the   High   Court   dated   16.07.1998.     That   vide
communication dated 17.01.2000, tender of the respondent was
accepted   and   he   was   appointed   as   Handling   and   Transport
Contractor for a period of two years at the negotiated rate of
471%   ASOR   (above   the   schedule   rates).     That   the   original
contract   was   meant   for   a   period   of   two   years,   i.e.,   up   to
16.01.2002.     That   after   the   original   contract   was   over,   the
respondent­contractor   submitted   a   bill   dated   19.07.2002
3
claiming ASOR of 471% on the amount paid to the  contract
casual labourers.   In the meantime, one contempt petition was
filed before the High Court alleging non­compliance of the earlier
judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   learned   Single   Judge,
confirmed up to this Court. The High Court vide judgment and
order   dated   04.04.2003   convicted   the   officers   of   the   FCI   for
contempt of court and sentenced them to undergo three months
imprisonment   and   fine   for   violation   of   the   orders   for   nonpayment to the contract casual labour.  The order passed by the
High   Court   in   the   contempt   petition   was   the   subject   matter
before this Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 9472­9473 of 2003.  This
Court stayed the further proceedings before the High Court.  That
the demand of the contractor claiming ASOR of 471% on the
amount paid to the contract casual labourers was rejected by the
FCI.  The contractor filed Writ Petition No. 7790 of 2004 seeking,
inter alia, additional amount for payment of the contract casual
labourers.  By judgment and order dated 14.01.2010, this Court
disposed of Civil Appeal Nos. 9472­9473 of 2003 and directed the
FCI to make payment of wages to the workmen in Scale­II, as
revised from time to time, and also directed that the arrears and
wages   should   be   directly   paid   to   the   workmen   and   legal
4
representatives of the workers without involving any contractor
or other agency.   It was also directed that once the payments
were made, the sentence awarded would stand set aside. That
thereafter contempt petition Nos. 56­57 of 2011 were filed by the
contract casual labourers alleging non­compliance of order dated
14.01.2010   passed   in   Civil   Appeal   Nos.   9472­9473   of   2003
passed by this Court.   The same came to be dismissed by this
Court by order dated 04.07.2011.  That in Writ Petition No. 7790
of 2004 filed by the contractor, the High Court vide order dated
08.12.2011 directed the CMD of FCI to pass a reasoned and
speaking order on the grievance raised by the contractor.   The
CMD of FCI passed a detailed speaking order dated 15.03.2012
holding, inter alia, that the contractor was not entitled to claim
raised by him regarding 471% of ASOR on the wages actually
paid to the casual labour because the claim was contrary to the
contract   between   the   parties.     The   contractor   amended   the
aforesaid petition.   In the aforesaid amended writ petition No.
7790 of 2004, the contractor prayed for the following reliefs:
“b) A writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the
respondents and their men and agents to make payment
A.S.O.R as per the bill submitted by the petitioner in
terms of Clause 24 of the tender at the rate of 471%
A.S.O.R.   above   the   Schedule   Rate   immediately   being
5
Annexure   “P­4”   and   “P­11”   to   this   writ   petition   and
further   commanding   the   respondents   to   delete   the
liability as fixed up upon the petitioner towards payment
of E.P.F., Administrative Charges and Income Tax liability
by   the   District   Manager,   Food   Corporation   of   India,
Bankura   vide   his   letter   dated   24.04.2004   and   the
statement annexed thereto being Annexure “P­10” to the
writ petition.”
3.1. That   the   learned   Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court,   by
judgment and order dated 12.04.2016, allowed the aforesaid Writ
Petition   No.   7790   of   2004   and   quashed   and   set   aside   the
speaking order dated 15.03.2012 passed by the CMD, FCI and
directed the CMD to verify the bill and make payment of the
unpaid dues with liberty to deduct the payment already made.
3.2 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, the FCI
preferred appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court
being MAT No. 1151 of 2016/F.M.A. 1168 of 2017.  That by the
impugned judgment and order, the High Court has disposed of
the appeal with the following directions:
“(a) the appellant will furnish details to the Chairman
of how the Supreme Court judgment and order dated 14th
January, 2010 was applied to fix the differential daily
rate of casual labourers between Rs.308.85/­ per day
and Rs.353.19/­ per day between January and March,
2000 and October to December, 2001 respectively and
6
the differential rate for the subsequent period up to July,
2004.
(b) the   Chairman   shall   also   determine   the   exact
amount of wages that was payable, applying the above
Supreme Court judgment the amount that was actually
paid by the appellant directly to the labourers and the
wages   outstanding,   if   any.     According   to   the   said
Supreme Court judgment, such outstanding wages is to
be paid directly to the workers/their heirs.
In fact, the said judgment of the Supreme Court dated
14th  January,   2010   has   left   open   other   issues   to   be
determined.
One such issue is the amount representing the profit
receivable by the respondent.
The Chairman will determine the profit to be earned by
the respondent out of this contract, in accordance with
law.
He shall make the determination with intelligible reasons
within four months of communication of this order, upon
hearing the parties.
If   any   amount   is   determined   by   the   Chairman   to   be
payable to the respondent the same shall be released by
the   appellant   to   him   within   8   weeks   of   making   the
determination.”
3.3 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court, both the FCI as
well as the contractor have preferred the present appeals.
4. Shri N.K. Kaul, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on
behalf   of   the   FCI   and   Mrs.   Meenakshi   Arora,   learned   Senior
7
Advocate has appeared on behalf of the Contractor in respective
appeals.
4.1 Shri N.K. Kaul, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
of the FCI has vehemently submitted that as such the High Court
in the impugned judgment and order has clearly given a finding
that after the judgment of this Court dated 14.01.2010, the rate
of wages payable to the labourers under the said contract would
be according to the rate specified in that judgment and not on
471% ASOR basis, still the High Court has dismissed the appeal
and has directed the CMD to calculate the amount of wages.
4.2 It is further submitted by Shri N.K. Kaul, learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the FCI that it is required to be
noted that the contract specifically provided that the rate quoted
by the contractor and agreed to between the parties of 471% was
above   the  schedule   of  rates  provided   in  Appendix   VIII  of   the
contract.   It is submitted that Appendix VIII clearly shows that
such a schedule of rate was only provided regarding Item Nos. 1
to 23 and 25 of the Appendix.  It is submitted against Item No.
24, which was with respect to supply of casual labourers, it was
specifically provided that “Relevant rate of wages is to be paid and
such rate shall abide by the decision of pending SLP as filed by
8
the FCI in the Hon’ble Supreme Court”.  It is submitted that there
was no schedule of rate for Item No. 24 which was for supply of
casual labour and therefore the claim of 471% above schedule of
rates (ASOR) has no application to the quotation pertaining to
supply of casual labour.
4.3 It is further submitted by Shri N.K. Kaul, learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the FCI that the High Court has
failed to consider the fact that after the order passed by the
Supreme Court dated 14.01.2010, a contempt petition was filed
which came to be dismissed by this Court on 4.7.2011 as the
order passed by this Court was complied with.   It is submitted
that therefore the High Court has materially erred in passing the
impugned judgment and order, more particularly directing the
CMD to re­calculate the wages.
4.4 It is further submitted by Shri N.K. Kaul, learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the FCI that the High Court has
materially erred in directing the Chairman to determine the profit
to be earned by the contractor out of his contract.  It is submitted
that   while   passing   such   a   direction,   the   High   Court  has   not
properly appreciated and considered the order passed by this
Court dated 14.01.2010.  It is submitted that in the order dated
9
14.01.2010 passed by this Court, this Court never kept an issue
left open, more particularly with respect to profit received by the
contractor.   It is submitted that therefore the High Court has
clearly erred in directing the CMD to determine the profit to be
earned by the contractor.
4.5 It is further submitted by Shri N.K. Kaul, learned Senior
Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   FCI   that,   in   fact,   the
contractor   paid   the   wages   @   Rs.106.38/­   per   day   and   if   his
enhanced claim of 471% ASOR on the wages paid to the casual
labour   is   accepted,   in   that   case,   there   would   be   unjust
enrichment to the contractor.  It is submitted that the additional
claim of the contractor for Item No. 24 is Rs. 5,34,41,520/­.  It is
almost three times the amount due to him under the contract.  It
is submitted that in any case this Court having decided the rate
of wages to be paid to the casual labour and in view of the
direction   to   pay   the  same  directly  to   the   labour  without   any
intermediary, there was no question of payment of any further
amount as per the additional claim made by the contractor of
471% ASOR on the wages paid to the casual labour.
5. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf of the contractor has vehemently submitted that as such
10
the Division Bench of the High Court has materially erred in
referring the matter back to the Chairman of the FCI to decide
certain   issues   and   even   consider   to   determine   the   profit
receivable by the contractor.   It is submitted that referring the
matter back to the Chairman of the FCI would be nothing but a
futile   exercise   of   power   by   the   Chairman,   who   has   already
rejected the claim of the contractor by its order dated 15.03.2012.
5.1 It is further submitted by Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the contractor that even
otherwise the Division Bench of the High Court has materially
erred in interfering with the decision of the learned Single Judge
in which the learned Single Judge rightly held that Clause 24 of
the agreement of wages of the casual labourers is covered by
471%   of   ASOR,   which   the   FCI   was   obliged   to   pay   to   the
contractor as per the terms of the agreement.
5.2 It is further submitted by Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the contractor that, as
such, both the parties were bound by the terms and conditions of
the agreement and therefore when the contractor submitted the
tender   with   471%   ASOR   and   the   same   was   accepted,   the
11
contractor   shall   be   entitled   to   471%   ASOR   on   every   item
including the supply of the casual labourers.
5.3 It is further submitted by Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the contractor that, as
such, the contractor had to pay provident fund etc. over and
above the wages to be paid and therefore the same was required
to be compensated by the FCI.  It is submitted therefore that the
FCI authorities are obliged to pay ASOR at the tune of 471% for
supply   of   casual   labourers,   as   categorically   laid   down   in   the
agreement.
5.4 It is further submitted by Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the contractor that even
according to FCI the contractor shall be entitled to 471% ASOR
with respect to Item Nos. 1 to 23 and 25.   It is submitted that
therefore there is no question of not paying 471% ASOR with
respect to supply of casual labourers.  It is submitted therefore
that the demand of the contractor making the claim of 471%
ASOR with respect of supply of casual labourers is absolutely just
and proper and as per the agreement between the parties, which
the learned Single Judge rightly appreciated.   It is submitted
therefore that the Division Bench of the High Court has materially
12
erred in interfering with the judgment and order passed by the
learned Single Judge which was absolutely in consonance with
the terms and conditions of the agreement.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties
at length.
At the outset, it is required to be noted that the controversy
centres around the interpretation of Clause 24 of the agreement
and the dispute is whether the contractor is entitled to 471%
ASOR in respect of all items including item No. 24 for supply of
casual labourers?   It is required to be noted that the original
contract period was from 18.01.2000 to 17.01.2002 and it was
extended till 13.07.2004.  It is also required to be noted that at
the time when the contract between the FCI and the contractor
was   entered   into,   there   was   already   a   dispute   pending   with
respect to the rate of wages to be paid to the casual labourers.
Therefore, so far as Item No.24 for supply of casual labourers is
concerned, it was provided that “relevant rate of wages is to be
paid and such rate shall abide by the decision of pending SLP as
filed by the FCI in the Hon’ble Supreme Court”.  It is also required
to be noted that in Appendix VIII with respect to other items,
namely item nos. 1 to 23 and 25, specific rates were mentioned,
13
however, with respect to Item No. 24 – supply of casual labourers,
it was blank and with respect to Item No. 24, it was specifically
provided that the  wages to be paid to the casual labourers shall
abide by the decision of the pending SLP.  The contractor paid the
wages to the casual labourers at the rate of Rs.106.38 per day.
The first SLP came to be dismissed by this Court on March 29,
2004.     However,   still   the   dispute   continued.     Contempt
proceedings were initiated which ultimately reached this Court by
way of Civil Appeal Nos. 9472­9473 of 2003.   Civil Appeal Nos.
9472­9473 of 2003 came to be finally disposed of by this Court
on 14.01.2010 and it was directed that the FCI shall fix the pay of
the casual labourers as also of the deceased workers, who were
petitioners in the first or second case filed in the High Court, in
Scale­II, as revised from time to time (as on 1.1.1997, the scale
was   Rs.4320­7330).     This   Court   also   directed   that   all   the
payments shall be made to the workers and legal representatives
of the deceased workers directly without involving any contractor
and other agency.  Therefore, the dispute with respect to wages
came to be finally settled/disposed of by this Court by its order
dated 14.01.2010 passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 9472­9473 of 2003.
Therefore, the casual labourers were entitled to the wages as per
14
the final order passed by this Court dated 14.01.2010 in Civil
Appeal   Nos.   9472­9473   of   2003,   and   as   per   the   terms   and
conditions of the contract, more particularly with respect to Item
No.   24   the   wages   were   required   to   be   paid   as   per   the
determination in the pending SLP, i.e., Civil Appeal Nos. 9472­
9473 of 2003.
6.1 At   this   stage,   it   is   also   required   to   be   noted   that   even
subsequently   the   workers   filed   contempt   petition   before   this
Court   which   came  to  be  dismissed  as   this  Court   was  of   the
opinion that order dated 14.01.2010 passed in Civil Appeal Nos.
9472­9473 of 2003 has been complied with. That thereafter the
contractor made the claim claiming 471% ASOR with respect to
supply of casual labourers at 471% ASOR as per the claim the
contractor claimed between Rs.607.43 to Rs.1225.19 per day.
The FCI determined and paid the wages as per the direction
issued   by   this   Court   in   the   order   dated   14.01.2010   ranging
between   Rs.   308.85   to   391.35   per   day.     The   statement   with
respect to claim made by the contractor and the amount paid to
the casual labourers as determined and paid by the FCI is as
under:
15
Period Bill   raised   by
Pratap Kundu,
HTC & paid by
FCI   (per
day/Casual
Labourer
Now   being
Claimed   by
Contractor
Pratap   Kundu
@   471%   on
wages raised
Amount   paid
to   Casual
Labourers   for
the   contract
period   of
Pratap   Kundu
(18.01.2000 to
13.07.2004)
after   order
dated
14.01.2010   of
Hon’ble
Supreme
Court   in   SLP
No. 9472­9473
of   2003   filed
by FCI v. Bijoy
Kumar   Singh
& Ors.
Jan­Mar, 00 Rs.106.38 Rs. 607.43 Rs.308.85
Apr­May,00 Rs.106.38 Rs. 607.43 Rs.306.31
June, 2000 Rs.106.38 Rs.607.43 Rs.317.42
July­Sept, 00 Rs.106.38 Rs.607.43 Rs.321.46
Oct­Dec.,00 Rs.106.38 Rs.607.43 Rs.325.31
Jan­Mar, 01 Rs.106.38 Rs.607.43 Rs.333.88
Apr­Jun, 01 Rs.106.38 Rs.607.43 Rs.331.92
Jun­Sept, 01 Rs.106.38 Rs.607.43 Rs.334.08
Oct­Dec, 01 Rs.106.38 Rs.607.43 Rs.343.00
Jan­Mar, 02 Rs.106.38 Rs.607.43 Rs.353.19
Apr­Jun, 02 Rs.106.38 Rs.607.43 Rs.352.54
July­Sept.,02 Rs.106.38 Rs. 607.43 Rs.353.85
Oct­Dec.,02 Rs.106.38 Rs.607.43 Rs.360.73
Jan­Mar, 03 Rs.106.38 Rs.607.43 Rs.372.23
Apr­Jun, 03 Rs.206.73 Rs.1180.42 Rs.369.96
Jul­Sept, 03 Rs.209.96 Rs.1198.87 Rs.374.96
Oct­Dec, 03 Rs.213.23 Rs.1217.54 Rs.379.96
Jan­Mar, 04 Rs.214.58 Rs.1225.25 Rs.389.23
Apr­Jun, 04 Rs.214.57 Rs.1225.19 Rs.390.19
July, 04 Rs.214.57 Rs.1225.19 Rs.391.35
16
The aforesaid claim has been rejected by the Chairman of the FCI
and   according   to   us   the   same   was   rightly   rejected   by   the
Chairman as the wages to the casual labourers were required to
be determined and paid as per the order passed by this Court
dated   14.01.2010   in   Civil   Appeal   Nos.   9472­9473/2003.
Therefore, as such, the Division Bench of the High Court has
rightly observed and held that after this Court’s judgment and
order   dated   14.01.2010,   the   rate   of   wages   payable   to   the
labourers under the subject contract would be according to the
rate specified in that judgment and not on 471% ASOR basis.  We
are in complete agreement with the said finding recorded by the
Division   Bench.     Therefore,   it   is   observed   and   held   that   the
contractor shall not be entitled to the wages to be paid to the
casual labourers on 471% ASOR basis and the wages to be paid
to the labourers would be at the rate specified in the order dated
14.01.2010 in Civil Appeal Nos. 9472­9473/2003.  However, the
Division Bench of the High Court was of the opinion that there is
no clarity how judgment and order dated 14.01.2010 has been
applied by the FCI to calculate the wages of the casual labourers,
therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court has referred the
matter back to the Chairman of the FCI to consider how the
17
differential rate of casual labourers between Rs. 308.85/­ per day
and Rs.353.19/­ per day between January and March, 2000 and
October to December, 2001 respectively and the differential rate
for the subsequent period up to July, 2004 has been determined
and the Chairman is directed to determine the exact amount of
wages that was payable, applying the judgment and order passed
by   this   Court   dated   14.01.2010   in   Civil   Appeal   Nos.   9472­
9473/2003.
6.2 So far as the direction issued by the Division Bench of the
High Court directing the Chairman to determine the profit earned
by the contractor out of his contract is concerned, the same is not
sustainable at all.   The Division Bench of the High Court has
observed   that   the   judgment   and   order   of   this   Court   dated
14.01.2010 has left open other issues to be determined.  We do
not find anything in the order dated 14.01.2010.  On bare reading
of the order dated 14.01.2010 there does not appear to be left
open other issues to be determined, as observed by the High
Court   in   the   impugned   judgment   and   order.     Under   the
circumstances, that part of the direction issued by the Division
Bench directing the Chairman to determine the profit earned by
the contractor deserves to be quashed and set aside.
18
7. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
appeal filed by the FCI being Civil Appeal arising from SLP (C) No.
21970 of 2019 is hereby partly allowed.  It is observed and held
that the casual labourers shall be entitled to the wages according
to the rates specified in the order dated 14.01.2010 passed by
this   Court   in   Civil   Appeal   Nos.   9472­9473/2003   and   the
contractor shall not be entitled to 471% ASOR basis with respect
to supply of casual labourers as claimed by him.  Therefore, it is
specifically observed and held that the FCI shall be liable to pay
the   wages  payable  to   the  casual  labourers  under  the  subject
contract according to the rates specified in the judgment and
order dated 14.01.2010 passed by this Court in Civil Appeal Nos.
9472­9473/2003 and not on 471% ASOR basis.  It goes without
saying   that   the   contractor   shall   be   entitled   to   reimburse   the
wages paid by him, i.e., Rs.106.38 per labourer, if the same is not
reimbursed/paid to the contractor.   Therefore, remand to the
Chairman of the FCI shall be restricted to the determination of
the wages as per the judgment and order dated 14.01.20120
passed by this Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 9472­9473/2003, more
particularly as contained in paragraph a & b of the operative
portion   of   the   impugned   order.     However,   that   part   of   the
19
direction issued by the Division Bench in the operative portion of
the order by which the Chairman is directed to determine the
profit earned by the contractor, the same is hereby quashed and
set aside.   The appeal preferred by the FCI is partly allowed in
terms of the above.   Consequently, the appeal preferred by the
contractor being Civil Appeal arising out of Diary No. 35242/2019
stands dismissed.  There shall be no order as to costs.
…………………………………J.
[ASHOK BHUSHAN]
NEW DELHI; …………………………………J.
NOVEMBER 29, 2019. [M.R. SHAH]
20

in the absence of any further evidence implicating the accused­ convicts, if one of the accused was acquitted, the same reasoning is apply to other accused also At the outset, it is required to be noted that the Learned Trial Court convicted five accused out of 14 accused who came to be tried for the offences under Sections 148, 302/149, 379 of the IPC. The prosecution heavily relied upon the deposition of PW2 and PW3 who claimed to be the eye­witnesses. The prosecution also relied upon the so­called dying declaration; however, the dying declaration has not been believed. In an appeal, the High Court has further acquitted another Accused Bhanwar Lal on the ground that the statement of PW2 Om Prakash and the statement of PW3 Ram Dayal under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. were recorded after a period of 18 days and that the statement of Ram Dayal was exaggerated and more and more persons of the family were tried to be implicated. Therefore, the High Court was of the opinion that recording the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of Om Prakash PW2 and Ram Dayal PW3, leaves no doubt that both the witnesses took benefit of delay and for the three injuries on the person of the deceased Hariram, out of which one was abrasion, the witnesses have resorted to implicate 14 accused.- except relying upon the deposition of PW2 and PW3, there is no other evidence implicating the appellantsAccused convicts. Under the circumstances, in the absence of any further evidence implicating the accused­ convicts, the High Court has materially erred in confirming the conviction of the appellant solely relying upon the deposition of PW2 and PW3 whose deposition has been doubted by the High Court and not relied upon by the High Court so far as one of the accused is concerned, the same reasoning should be applied in the appellants’ case also which weighed with the High Court while acquitting Bhanwar Lal.

in the absence of any further evidence implicating the accused­ convicts, if one of the accused was acquitted, the same reasoning is apply to other accused also 

At the outset, it is required to be noted that the Learned Trial Court convicted five accused out of 14 accused who came to be tried for the offences under Sections 148, 302/149, 379 of the IPC.
The prosecution heavily relied upon the deposition of PW2 and PW3 who claimed to be the eye­witnesses.  
The prosecution also relied upon the so­called dying declaration; however, the dying declaration
has not been believed.   
In an appeal, the High Court has further acquitted another Accused Bhanwar Lal on the ground that the statement of PW2 Om Prakash and the statement of PW3 Ram Dayal under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. were recorded after a period of 18 days and that the statement of Ram Dayal was exaggerated
and   more   and   more   persons   of   the   family   were   tried   to   be implicated.     
Therefore,  the   High  Court   was  of   the   opinion  that recording the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of Om Prakash PW2 and Ram Dayal PW3, leaves no doubt that both the witnesses
took benefit of delay and for the three injuries on the person of the deceased Hariram, out of which one was abrasion, the witnesses have resorted to implicate 14 accused.- except relying upon the deposition of PW2 and PW3, there is no other evidence implicating the appellantsAccused convicts. Under the circumstances, in the absence of any further evidence implicating the accused­ convicts, the High Court has materially erred in confirming the conviction of the appellant solely   relying   upon   the   deposition   of   PW2   and   PW3   whose deposition has been doubted by the High Court and not relied upon by the High Court so far as one of the accused is concerned, the same reasoning should be applied in the appellants’ case also which weighed with the High Court while acquitting Bhanwar Lal.
1
NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1779 OF 2019
[Arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 8410 of 2016]
Jodhraj  & Anr. .. Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Rajasthan .. Respondent(s)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1780 OF 2019
[Arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 5350 of 2017]
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment and order dated 19.01.2016 passed by the High Court of
Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench in DB Criminal Appeal No.
549 of 2012 by which the High Court has confirmed the conviction
of the appellants herein – original Accused Nos. 1 and 12 for the
offences punishable under Section 302 r/w Section 149 of the IPC,
the original Accused have preferred the present appeal.
2
2. By the impugned Judgment and Order, the High Court has
acquitted the respondent herein Bhanwar Lal ­ Original Accused
No. 3.   Therefore, the State has preferred an appeal against his
acquittal.
3. The case of the prosecution is that on 22.5.2005 in the night
at   9.30   P.M.,   in   the   revenue   estate   of   village   Kadiayavan,   14
persons namely Jodhraj s/o Mathura Lal, Hemraj s/o Birdhi Lal,
Bhanwar Lal s/o Mathura Lal, Mathura Lal s/o Baldev, Dwarka Lal
s/o Ram Narayan, Dev Kishan s/o Ram Narayan, Prakash @ Om
Prakash s/o Birdhi Lal, Naval @ Naval Kishore s/o Birdhi Lal, Badri
Lal s/o Kanwar Lal, Ram Prasad s/o Narayan @ Ram Narayan,
Prabhu Lal s/o Bridhi Lal, Jagdish Prasad s/o Mathura Lal, Ram
Dayal   s/o   Ram   Narayan   and   Pooran   Mal   s/o   Ram   Narayan,
constituted unlawful assembly and caused injuries to Hariram, as a
result of which, on the intervening night of 22nd May and 23rd May
of 2005, Hariram died. 
3
3.1 That all the accused came to be tried by the Learned Trial
Court   for   the   offences   punishable   under   Sections   147,   148,
323/149, 324/149, 326/149, 3/2 r/w 149 and 379 of the IPC. 
3.2 To   prove   the   case,   the   prosecution   examined   in   all   18
witnesses including PW2 Om Prakash and PW3 Ram Dayal – so
called eye­witnesses.  The prosecution also brought on record the
documentary evidence such as injury report relating to deceased
Hari Ram.  In the Injury Report, the following injuries were found
on the deceased Hari Ram:
“(i) abrasion 1 cm X 1 cm, right side of forehead,
simple, blunt.
(ii) Incised wound, 7 cm X 1cm, muscle deep,
right side of neck, obliquely, simple, sharp.
(iii) Incised   wound,   20cm   X   7   cm,   intestine
coming   out,   anterior   on   abdomen,   longitudinal,
grievous and dangerous to life, sharp.”
3.3 Upon   appreciation   of   evidence,   the   Learned   Trial   Court
convicted five accused – Jodhraj, Bhanwar Lal, Dwarka Lal, Jagdish
Prasad, Pooran Mal for the offences under Sections 148, 302/149
and 379 IPC and acquitted rest of the accused by giving them
benefit of doubt.   The Learned Trial Court imposed punishment for
life so far as the convicted accused are concerned.
4
3.4 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   Judgment   and
Order dated 11.05.2012 passed by the Learned Trial Court, the
convicted accused preferred appeal before the High Court.  Against
the   order   of   acquittal   of   some   of   the   accused,   the   State   also
preferred   an   appeal   before   the   High   Court.     By   the   impugned
Judgment   and   Order,   the   High   Court   has   acquitted   Original
Accused No. 3 – Bhanwar Lal by giving him benefit of doubt, not
believing the deposition of very PW2 and PW3.     However, at the
same time, relying upon the deposition of PW2 and PW3, the High
Court   has   confirmed   the   conviction   of   the   appellants   herein   –
Jodhraj and Jagdish Prasad – original Accused Nos. 1 and 12.
3.5 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned Judgment
and Order passed by the High Court confirming their conviction,
original Accused Nos. 1 and 12 – Jodhraj and Jagdish Prasad have
preferred the present Appeal.  Against the order of acquittal passed
by the High Court acquitting the accused Bhanwar Lal, the State
has also preferred the appeal.  Both the appeals are heard together.
5
4. Learned   Counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   –
convicts Jodhraj and Jagdish Prasad has vehemently submitted
that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has
materially erred in confirming the conviction of the appellants.
4.1 It is vehemently submitted by the Learned Counsel appearing
for the appellants­convicts that the High Court has confirmed the
conviction of the appellants solely relying upon the deposition of
PW2 and PW3.  It is submitted that the statements of PW2 and PW3
under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. were recorded after 18 days.  The
statements made by PW2 and PW3 were in exaggeration.     It is
submitted that the grounds on which Bhanwar Lal and others came
to be acquitted, namely, not believing the deposition of PW2 and
PW3, the same shall be applicable to the appellants also.   It is
submitted   that   therefore   no   reliance   can   be   placed   upon   the
deposition of PW2 and PW3 so far as the appellants/accused are
concerned.   It is submitted that except the deposition of PW2 and
PW3, the High Court has not relied upon and/or considered any
other evidence. 
6
5. Learned   Counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   State   has
vehemently submitted that even the High Court has committed a
grave error in acquitting Bhanwar Lal.
5.1 It is submitted by the Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of
the State that Injury No.3 was attributed to Accused – Jagdish
Prasad which proved to be fatal.  It is submitted that prior incident
has been proved from the deposition of PW2 – Om Prakash.  It is
further submitted that PW2 in his deposition viz. the eye­witness of
the occurrence has specifically attributed Injury No. 3 to Jagdish
Prasad.  It is submitted that to that extent the deposition of PW 2 is
reliable and believable and therefore the Trial Court as well as the
High Court have rightly convicted Jagdish Prasad.  It is submitted
that even another Accused – Jodhraj has also participated in the
incident and Injury No.2 was attributed to him and therefore he has
been rightly convicted by the Learned Trial Court and confirmed by
the High Court.
6. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the acquitted accused
– Bhanwar Lal has supported the impugned Judgment and Order
passed by the High Court acquitting Bhanwar Lal.  It is submitted
7
that   cogent   reasons   have   been   given   by   the   High   Court   while
acquitting Bhanwar Lal and, therefore, the acquittal of Bhanwar Lal
is not required to be interfered with.
7. Heard the Learned Counsel for the respective parties at length.
We   have   gone   through   the   entire   evidence   on   record   and   the
Judgment and Order passed by the Learned Trial Court as well as
the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court.
At the outset, it is required to be noted that the Learned Trial
Court convicted five accused out of 14 accused who came to be
tried for the offences under Sections 148, 302/149, 379 of the IPC.
The prosecution heavily relied upon the deposition of PW2 and PW3
who claimed to be the eye­witnesses.  The prosecution also relied
upon the so­called dying declaration; however, the dying declaration
has not been believed.   In an appeal, the High Court has further
acquitted another Accused Bhanwar Lal on the ground that the
statement of PW2 Om Prakash and the statement of PW3 Ram
Dayal under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. were recorded after a period
of 18 days and that the statement of Ram Dayal was exaggerated
8
and   more   and   more   persons   of   the   family   were   tried   to   be
implicated.     Therefore,  the   High  Court   was  of   the   opinion  that
recording the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of Om Prakash
PW2 and Ram Dayal PW3, leaves no doubt that both the witnesses
took benefit of delay and for the three injuries on the person of the
deceased Hariram, out of which one was abrasion, the witnesses
have resorted to implicate 14 accused. Thus, the blemish on the
part of the witnesses, calls upon us to sift grain from the chaff.
Thus, the High Court did not accept the deposition of PW2 and PW3
so far as the accused Bhanwar Lal is concerned.   However, at the
same time, relying upon the statement of very two witnesses PW2
and   PW3,   the   High   Court   has   confirmed   the   conviction   of   the
Appellants – Jodhraj and Jagdish Prasad.   Therefore, considering
the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that
if the deposition of PW2 and PW3 are not reliable qua one of the
accused on the grounds stated hereinabove and one of the accused
came to be acquitted by giving benefit of doubt, the same benefit
ought to have been given to the other accused also, unless there is
some   further   material/evidence   against   the   other   accused.     As
9
observed hereinabove, except relying upon the deposition of PW2
and PW3, there is no other evidence implicating the appellantsAccused convicts. Under the circumstances, in the absence of any
further evidence implicating the accused­convicts, the High Court
has materially erred in confirming the conviction of the appellant
solely   relying   upon   the   deposition   of   PW2   and   PW3   whose
deposition has been doubted by the High Court and not relied upon
by the High Court so far as one of the accused is concerned, the
same reasoning should be applied in the appellants’ case also which
weighed with the High Court while acquitting Bhanwar Lal.  So far
as the acquittal of Bhanwar Lal is concerned, we are in complete
agreement with the view taken by the High Court.  Cogent reasons
have been given by the High Court for not believing the deposition
of PW2 and PW3.
8. In view of the reasons stated hereinabove, the appeal preferred
by accused Jodhraj and Jagdish Prasad is hereby allowed.   The
impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court and the
Judgment and Order passed by the Trial Court convicting them for
the offences under Sections 302/149 IPC are hereby quashed and
10
set aside and both of them are acquitted for the offences for which
they were tried, by giving them benefit of doubt.   The accused be
set at free forthwith, if not required in any other case.  The appeal
preferred by the State challenging the impugned Judgment and
Order passed by the High Court acquitting the accused – Bhanwar
Lal is hereby dismissed.
…………………………..J.
(ASHOK BHUSHAN)
…………………………..J.
(M. R. SHAH)
New Delhi,
November 29, 2019.

Whether in mediations [ lokadalat etc., ] other than the subject matter of the suit can be added and the award/decree to that effect is valid and excutable ? yes Now so far as the submission on behalf of Ramu Ram that as the disputed properties in question were not the subject matter of original suit proceedings and therefore the same could not have been the subject matter of Settlement Agreement entered into between the Kaushaliya and Jodha Ram and/or the order passed by this Court dated 05.05.2017 is concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that being the dispute between father and daughter the matter was referred to the Supreme Court Mediation Centre to explore an amicable settlement between the parties. Both the parties agreed to settle all the disputes between the parties in the Mediation. In the Mediation it is always open for the parties to explore the possibility of an overall amicable settlement including the disputes which are not the subject matter of the proceedings before the Court. That is the benefit of the Mediation. In the Mediation parties may try for amicable settlement, which is reduced into writing and/or a Settlement Agreement and thereafter it becomes the part of the Court’s Order and the Court disposes of the matter in terms of the Settlement Agreement. Thereafter the order in terms of the Settlement Agreement is executable irrespective of the fact whether the Settlement Agreement is with respect to the properties which was/were not the subject matter of the proceedings before the Court. Thereafter the order passed by the Court in terms of the Settlement is binding to the parties and is required to be acted upon and/or complied with and as observed above the same is executable. Under the circumstances, the submission on behalf of Ramu Ram and Rampal that as the properties in question were not the subject matter of the suit before the Trial, the same could have been the subject matter of the Settlement Agreement and/or the order dated 05.05.2017 cannot be accepted. The order passed by this Court dated 16 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 is required to be complied with and the same is executable. Under the circumstances the Executing Court has to execute the order passed by this Court dated 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 in its true spirit. 13. In view of the reasons stated above, M.A. No.2485 of 2018 stands dismissed. I.A. No.30045 of 2019 is hereby allowed. In exercise of powers conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and to see that the order passed by this Court dated 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 is fully complied with, we direct all the concerned persons claiming to be in possession of the disputed properties in questions including Plot Nos. 29 and 29A of the Jodha House to handover the peaceful and vacant possession to Jodha Ram as per the order passed by this Court on 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016, within a period of four weeks from today. Executing Court is hereby directed to see that the present order passed by this Court and its earlier order dated 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 is fully complied with. Both the parties Kaushaliya and Jodha Ram ­ parties to the Settlement Agreement dated 10.02.2017 are hereby directed to comply with 17 the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement dated 10.02.2017 and the order passed by this Court on 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 fully and in its true spirit.

Whether in mediations [ lokadalat etc., ] other than the subject matter of the suit can be added and  the award/decree to that effect is valid and excutable ? yes

Now so far as the submission on behalf of Ramu Ram that as the disputed properties in question were not the subject matter of original suit proceedings and therefore the same could not have
been   the   subject   matter   of   Settlement   Agreement   entered   into between the Kaushaliya and Jodha Ram and/or the order passed by this Court dated 05.05.2017 is concerned, at the outset, it is
required to be noted that being the dispute between father and daughter the matter was referred to the Supreme Court Mediation Centre   to   explore   an   amicable   settlement   between   the   parties.
Both  the parties agreed to  settle all  the  disputes  between  the parties in the Mediation.  In the Mediation it is always open for the parties to explore the possibility of an overall amicable settlement
including the disputes which are not the subject matter of the proceedings before the Court.  That is the benefit of the Mediation.
In the Mediation parties may try for amicable settlement, which is reduced into writing and/or a Settlement Agreement and thereafter it becomes the part of the Court’s Order and the Court disposes of the matter in terms of the Settlement Agreement.  Thereafter the order   in   terms   of   the   Settlement   Agreement   is   executable irrespective of the fact whether the Settlement Agreement is with respect to the properties which was/were not the subject matter of the proceedings before the Court. 
Thereafter the order passed by the Court in terms of the Settlement is binding to the parties and
is required to be acted upon and/or complied with and as observed above   the   same   is   executable.     
Under   the   circumstances,   the submission   on   behalf   of   Ramu   Ram   and   Rampal   that   as   the properties in question were not the subject matter of the suit before the Trial, the same could have been the subject matter of the   Settlement   Agreement   and/or   the   order   dated   05.05.2017
cannot   be   accepted.     The   order   passed   by   this   Court   dated 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 is required to be complied
with and the same is executable.   Under the circumstances the Executing Court has to execute the order passed by this Court dated 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 in its true spirit.

In view of the reasons stated above, M.A. No.2485 of 2018 stands dismissed.   I.A. No.30045 of 2019 is hereby allowed.   In exercise of powers conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution
of India and to see that the order passed by this Court dated 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 is fully complied with, we direct all the concerned persons claiming to be in possession of the
disputed properties in questions including Plot Nos. 29 and 29A of the Jodha House to handover the peaceful and vacant possession to Jodha Ram as per the order passed by this Court on 05.05.2017
in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016, within a period of four weeks from today. Executing   Court   is   hereby   directed   to   see   that   the present order passed by this Court and its earlier order dated
05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 is fully complied with.  Both the parties Kaushaliya and Jodha Ram ­ parties to the Settlement Agreement dated 10.02.2017 are hereby directed to comply with the   terms   and   conditions   of   the   Settlement   Agreement   dated 10.02.2017 and the order passed by this Court on 05.05.2017 in SLP   (C)   No.10022   of   2016   fully   and   in   its   true   spirit.

1
NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ORIGINAL CONTEMPT JURISDICTION
CONTEMPT PETITION NO. 1868 OF 2018
WITH
I.A. NO.30045 OF 2019
WITH
M.A. NO.2485 OF 2018
IN
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.10022 OF 2016
KAUSHALIYA  …Petitioner (s)
Versus
JODHA RAM & ORS. … Respondent (s)
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
Present   petition   has   been   filed   for   non­compliance   of   the
order  dated   05.05.2017  passed  in   this  Court   in  Special   Leave
Petition (C) No.10022 of 2016.
2
2. Litigation started between the father and daughter namely
Jodha  Ram and  Kaushaliya.   Smt.  Kaushaliya filed a  suit for
injunction against her father Jodha Ram with respect to some of
the properties.   Jodha Ram – father filed a counter claim.   Smt.
Kaushaliya  lost   before  the   Learned   Trial   Court.     However,   the
counter claim came to be allowed.   The matter was ultimately
reached   to   this   Court   by   way   of   Special   Leave   Petition   (C)
No.10022 of 2016.   Pursuant to the order passed by this Court
dated   24.10.2016,   the   matter   was   referred   to   the   Mediation
Centre,   Supreme   Court   to   explore   the   possibility   of   amicable
settlement between the parties.   Both the parties entered into a
settlement agreement dated 10.02.2017.   As per the settlement
both the parties agreed as under:
“1.  It is agreed between the parties that Respondent
No.1 (Shri Jodha Ram) i.e. Father of the Petitioner
shall purchase another plot bearing No.55, Hudco
Scheme, D­Circle, Kirti Nagar, Jodhpur, Rajasthan,
admeasuring   (30   X   13)   390   Sq.Ft.,   and   get   it
registered   in   the   name   of   the   Petitioner   Ms.
Kaushaliya   within   four   weeks   from   the   final
settlement/consent order of this Hon’ble Court.
2.  It is also agreed the parties that the entire sum
for the registry, stamp duty, mutation etc. would be
borne by the Respondent No.1 Mr. Jodha Ram.
3
3.  It is agreed between the parties that in view of the
Respondent No.1 buying the property as mentioned
in clause – 1 and 2 of this settlement agreement, the
petitioner   shall   handover   complete,   vacant   and
peaceful possession of the disputed properties (as
shown in site map annexed by Petitioner in original
Civil Suit No.29 of 2010 filed before Additional Civil
Judge, Junior Division, Jodhpur, Rajasthan) bearing
Plot  No.29D, land adjoining 29D (four parts)  and
land adjoining 29D (two parts) forming part of Meera
Bhawan, Ship House, First Polo, Pawta, Jodhpur,
Rajasthan and undisputed properties bearing Plot
Nos. 29, 29A, forming part of Jodha Bhawan, Ship
House, First Polo, Pawta, Jodhpur, Rajasthan to the
Respondent No.1.
4. It is agreed between the parties that complete,
vacant   and   peaceful   possession   of   the   properties
mentioned   in   clause   no.2   of   this   settlement
agreement shall be handed over by the petitioner to
the respondent no.1 simultaneously on respondent
no.1 handling over registry and sale documents of
property mentioned in clause – 1 of this settlement
agreement in favour of the petitioner.  The petitioner
undertakes not to create any third party right in any
manner in respect of the said property till the final
settlement.
5. It   is   agreed   between   the   parties   that   all
necessary steps shall be taken by each party within
eight   weeks   to   withdraw   all   pending   litigations
between   the   parties   shall   be   withdrawn   by   each
within four weeks from the final settlement/consent
order of this Hon’ble Court.
6. It is agreed between the parties that the petition
pending   before   the   sessions   court   Jodhpur,
Rajasthan titled Kailash Vs. Jodha Ram, Kaushaliya
and   Ors.   bearing   case   no.9   of   2011   will   also   be
settled between the parties.    Aforesaid petition  is
4
with regard to ten LIC bonds of Rs.50,000/­ each
bearing   Nos.104200480,   104200481,   104200482,
104200483,   104200484,   104200485,   104200486,
104200487,   104200491   and   104200501,   date   of
proposal of all bonds being 19.03.2007 and date of
commencement of being 20.03.2007 for a term of ten
years,   totaling   Rs.5   Lakh,   the   proceeds   of   which
shall   be   shared   in   equal   proportion   between   the
petitioner and Respondent No.2 herein Shri Kailash
by way of two separate cheques of equal amounts to
be received by petitioner and Respondent No.2 from
LIC.
7.   By signing this agreement, the parties hereto
solemnly state and affirm that they have no further
claims or demands against each other in respect of
the   property   measuring   on   all   the   disputes   and
differences   between   the   parties   relating   to   the
subject matter of the suit have been amicably settled
by   the   parties   hereto   through   the   process   of
mediation.
8.  The parties undertake to abide by the terms and
condition set out in the above­mentioned Agreement,
which   have   been   arrived   without   any   coercion,
duress or collusion and undertake not to raise any
dispute whatsoever henceforth.
3. This   Court   vide   order   dated   05.05.2017   disposed   of   the
aforesaid   Special   Leave   Petition   in   terms   of   the   Settlement
Agreement dated 10.02.2017.   This Court directed that both the
parties shall abide by the settlement.   This Court also further
directed the petitioner – Kaushaliya to vacate the premises within
5
10   days   and   simultaneously   she   would   be   provided   further
accommodation which has been agreed to by the respondent.  The
petitioner ­ Kaushaliya handed over some portion of the premises.
However, did not hand over all the properties/entire properties
which   she   was   required   to   hand   over   as   per   the   Settlement
Agreement and the order passed by this Court.   Therefore, the
respondent   –   father   did   not   hand   over   the   possession   of   the
premises which he was required to hand over by the petitioner –
Kaushaliya.   Execution   proceedings   were   initiated   in   which
Kaushaliya   and   two   persons   namely   Ramu   Ram   Vishnoi   and
Rampal   Bishnoi   applicants   in   M.A.   No.2485   of   2018   also
submitted their objections claiming to be in possession of some of
the properties namely Plot Nos.29 and 29A forming part of Jodha
Bhawan,  Ship   House   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   disputed
premises).  As the respondent did not hand over the properties to
the petitioner – Kaushaliya, which she was required to hand over
as   per   the   order   passed   by   this   Court   she   has   preferred   the
present   Contempt   Petition   No.1868   of   2018   alleging   noncompliance of the order passed by this Court in SLP (C) No.10022
6
of 2016 by the respondent father – Jodha Ram.  In the Contempt
Petition, Jodha Ram and others have filed I.A. No.30045 of 2019
for an appropriate order directing the Executing Court to hand
over the vacant and peaceful possession of entire Meera Bhawan
and Jodha Bhawan in terms of the Settlement Agreement dated
10.02.2017   and   the   orders   dated   05.05.2017   and   11.12.2018
passed in present proceedings.  Order passed by this Court dated
11.12.2018 is as under:
“After   hearing   learned   counsel   for   the   parties   at
length   and,   particularly,   after   perusing   the   order
dated   13.09.2017   of   the   Executing   Court,   we
adjourn these matters by four months.
We   may   record   that   in   the   Settlement
Agreement,   which   was   arrived   at   between   the
petitioner   and   her   father,   it   was   agreed   by   the
petitioner   that   she   would   handover   vacant
possession of Jodha Bhawan and Meera Bhawan to
her father. Now she has come up with the plea that
only   a   portion   of   the   said   house   was   in   her
possession   which   she   has   vacated   and   other
portions are in possession of third parties.  It is in
respect   thereof   that   execution   proceedings   are
pending.
We also find from the records that insofar as
Respondent   No.1/father   of   the   petitioner   is
concerned, he has purchased one house which is to
the liking of the petitioner herself and to show his
bona fide, he has deposited the keys thereof as well
with the Executing Court.  His only plea is that the
7
possession   thereof   should   be   handed   over   to   the
petitioner after he gets possession of Jodha Bhawan
and Meera Bhawan.
In   the   circumstances,   we   impress   upon   the
Executing   Court   to   expedite   the   execution
proceedings.”
4. Thereafter   applicants   Ramu   Ram   Vishnoi   and   Rampal
Bishnoi have preferred M.A. No.2485 of 2018 alleging  inter alia
that they are in possession of the properties bearing No.29 and
29A forming part of the Jodha Bhawan and they have purchased
the said properties vide an Agreement to Sell dated 06.12.2016 for
a consideration of Rs.22 lakhs.  Therefore, it is the case on behalf
of two applicants that as they are the owners of the disputed
properties and they are in possession of the said properties,  the
settlement entered into between Kaushaliya and Jodha Ram and
his son are not binding to them as it affects their rights.
5. Ms. Bhati, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
daughter has vehemently submitted that she is required to be
handed over the possession of the properties mentioned in the
agreement which the respondent Jodha Ram is required to hand
over.  It is submitted that she has already vacated that part of the
8
premises which she was required to hand over to the extent she
was in possession.  It is submitted that therefore she has fulfilled
her part of commitment as per the settlement agreement.
6. Learned   Counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   Jodha   Ram   has
vehemently submitted that as such applicants of M.A. No.2485 of
2018 have no right title in the disputed properties in Jodha House.
It is submitted that they have no locus whatsoever in the present
proceedings as well as before the Executing Court.  It is submitted
that those applicants claim to be in possession and title on the
basis of the Agreement to Sell.  It is submitted that Agreement to
Sell does not confer any right title or interest.  It is submitted that
till date those two applicants have never filed any suit claiming
title/ownership.     It   is   submitted   that   the   suit   for   permanent
injunction was filed in which the learned Trial Court has refused
to grant any interim injunction in their favour.  It is submitted that
at the relevant time applicant No.1 Ramu Ram Vishnoi paid only
Rs.51,000/­  in  the   year  2006,  however,  he  did  not   make  any
further payment and therefore the Agreement to Sell was cancelled
by serving a legal notice in the year 2007 itself.   It is further
9
submitted that even the applicant Ramu Ram, though had no
title/ownership transferred the said property on the strength of the
Agreement to Sell to one Kishan Gopal Singh on 08.09.2013.  It is
submitted that Ramu Ram in the said agreement claimed that he
purchased the suit property from Jodha Ram and sale deed was
executed   between   them.     It   is   submitted   that   therefore   the
applicants Ramu Ram and Rampal are claiming to be the owners
and   in   possession   pursuant   to   Agreement   to   Sell   only.     It   is
submitted that even the applicants Ramu Ram filed the Objection
Petition/Objections Proceedings before the Executing Court along
with Kaushaliya which came to be dismissed.  It is submitted that
both Kaushaliya and Ramu Ram are acting in collusion.   It is
requested   to   dismiss   the   application   preferred   by   Ramu   Ram
Vishnoi and Rampal and also the contempt petition initiated by
Kaushaliya.  It is requested to direct the Executing Court to hand
over the possession of the entire properties, which Jodha Ram is
entitled pursuant to order passed by this Court and as per the
Settlement dated 10.02.2017. 
10
7. Learned   Counsel   appearing   for   Ramu   Ram   Vishnoi   and
Rampal Bishnoi has submitted that they are the owners of the
premise Nos. 29 and 29A forming part of Jodha Bhawan, Ship
House pursuant to the Agreement to Sell for a sale consideration of
Rs.22 lakhs.  It is submitted that as they are in possession of the
said premises/properties and neither Kaushaliya nor Jodha Ram
and his son have any right title.  It is submitted that in any case,
the   aforesaid   properties   cannot   be   said   to   be   undisputed
properties.  It is submitted that therefore in the Settlement dated
10.02.2017 it is stated that the properties in Jodha Bhawan is
undisputed property of Jodha Ram the same is not correct.  It is
submitted that in any case when they are in possession of the
disputed   properties   settlement   between   Kaushaliya   and   Jodha
Ram before this Court in Special Leave Petition (C) No.10022 of
2016 and the order passed by this Court dated 05.05.2017 is not
binding to them. 
7.1   It is further submitted by Learned Counsel appearing on
behalf of the aforesaid Ramu Ram Vishnoi and Rampal that even
otherwise the dispute between Kaushaliya and Jodha Ram which
11
went upto this Court by way of SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 was not
with respect to the disputed properties,  more particularly,  Plot
Nos.29 & 29A.   It is submitted that therefore as the disputed
properties in question were not the subject matter of the original
suit,   the   disputed   properties   could   not   have   been   the   subject
matter of the order dated 05.05.2017 and/or Settlement between
Kaushaliya and Jodha Ram.  For the above, Learned Counsel has
relied upon the map attached with the plaint.
7.2 Making   above   submissions,   it   is   requested   to   allow   M.A.
No.2485   of   2018   and   recall   the   final   order   dated   05.05.2017
passed in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 to the extend with respect to
Plot No.29 and 29A of the Jodha House.
8. Heard   the   learned   Counsel   appearing   for   the   parties
respectively at length.
9. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the dispute was
between Kaushaliya – daughter and Jodha Ram – father; That
matter   ultimately   reached   to   this   Court   by   way   of   SLP   (C)
No.10022 of 2016.  The matter was referred to the Supreme Court
12
Mediation Centre to explore the possibility of amicable settlement
between the parties.   In the Mediation,  the parties to the SLP
namely   Kaushaliya   and   Jodha   Ram   entered   into   a   Settlement
Agreement   dated   10.02.2017   and   resolved   the   entire   dispute
between the parties over and above the dispute before the Trial
Court.  This Court disposed of the SLP in terms of the Settlement
Agreement dated 10.02.2017 and directed both the parties to abide
by the terms of the Settlement produced above.
10. It is the case on behalf of Kaushaliya that she has been
ousted   from   the   premises   that   was   in   her   possession   on
30.03.2018,  however,  she   has   not   been   given   the   other
accommodation which was agreed to be given simultaneously by
Jodha Ram.  However, on the other hand, it is the case on behalf
of Jodha Ram that Kaushaliya has not vacated the entire premises
and he has not been handed over the possession or occupation of
entire Jodha House more particularly Plot No.29 and 29A of the
Jodha   House   which   he   is   entitled   to   under   the   Settlement
Agreement dated 10.02.2017.  Applicants of M.A. No.2485 of 2018
claimed to be in possession of the aforesaid Plots Nos.29 and 29A
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on the basis of the Agreement to Sell executed by Jodha Ram and
they claim to be the owners and they are objecting to the order
dated 05.05.2017 passed in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016.  However,
it is requested to be noted that Ramu Ram Vishnoi and Rampal
Bhisnoi claim to be the owners and in possession pursuant to
Agreement to Sell dated 10.02.2017.  As per the settled preposition
of law, Agreement to Sell does not confer any right, title or interest
in the property.  Therefore, as such on the basis of the Agreement
to Sell, only Ramu Ram and Rampal cannot claim any ownership
and/or right title or interest in the disputed properties.  Apart from
that even the Trial Court in the suit for permanent injunction filed
by them has refused to grant injunction in their favour. 
11. At this stage, it is required to be noted that except filing the
suit for permanent injunction, Ramu Ram and Rampal, who claim
to be the Agreement to Sell in their favour, has never filed any suit
for specific performance of the alleged Agreement to Sell.  It also
appears that even the objection raised by them and Kaushaliya
filed   before   the   Executing   Court   have   been   rejected   by   the
Executing Court.  Under the circumstances, the applicants of M.A.
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No.2485 of 2018 cannot claim any ownership and/or the right title
or interest in the disputed properties and therefore they have no
locus to object to the Settlement Agreement between Kaushaliya
and Jodha Ram and the order dated 05.05.2017 passed by this
Court in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016.  Under the circumstances, the
M.A. No.2485 of 2016 deserves to be dismissed, however, without
prejudice to their rights, if any, to be established in a Competent
Court of law.
12. Now so far as the submission on behalf of Ramu Ram that as
the disputed properties in question were not the subject matter of
original suit proceedings and therefore the same could not have
been   the   subject   matter   of   Settlement   Agreement   entered   into
between the Kaushaliya and Jodha Ram and/or the order passed
by this Court dated 05.05.2017 is concerned, at the outset, it is
required to be noted that being the dispute between father and
daughter the matter was referred to the Supreme Court Mediation
Centre   to   explore   an   amicable   settlement   between   the   parties.
Both  the parties agreed to  settle all  the  disputes  between  the
parties in the Mediation.  In the Mediation it is always open for the
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parties to explore the possibility of an overall amicable settlement
including the disputes which are not the subject matter of the
proceedings before the Court.  That is the benefit of the Mediation.
In the Mediation parties may try for amicable settlement, which is
reduced into writing and/or a Settlement Agreement and thereafter
it becomes the part of the Court’s Order and the Court disposes of
the matter in terms of the Settlement Agreement.  Thereafter the
order   in   terms   of   the   Settlement   Agreement   is   executable
irrespective of the fact whether the Settlement Agreement is with
respect to the properties which was/were not the subject matter of
the proceedings before the Court. Thereafter the order passed by
the Court in terms of the Settlement is binding to the parties and
is required to be acted upon and/or complied with and as observed
above   the   same   is   executable.     Under   the   circumstances,   the
submission   on   behalf   of   Ramu   Ram   and   Rampal   that   as   the
properties in question were not the subject matter of the suit
before the Trial, the same could have been the subject matter of
the   Settlement   Agreement   and/or   the   order   dated   05.05.2017
cannot   be   accepted.     The   order   passed   by   this   Court   dated
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05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 is required to be complied
with and the same is executable.   Under the circumstances the
Executing Court has to execute the order passed by this Court
dated 05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 in its true spirit.
13. In view of the reasons stated above, M.A. No.2485 of 2018
stands dismissed.   I.A. No.30045 of 2019 is hereby allowed.   In
exercise of powers conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution
of India and to see that the order passed by this Court dated
05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016 is fully complied with, we
direct all the concerned persons claiming to be in possession of the
disputed properties in questions including Plot Nos. 29 and 29A of
the Jodha House to handover the peaceful and vacant possession
to Jodha Ram as per the order passed by this Court on 05.05.2017
in SLP (C) No.10022 of 2016, within a period of four weeks from
today. Executing   Court   is   hereby   directed   to   see   that   the
present order passed by this Court and its earlier order dated
05.05.2017 in SLP (C) No.10022 is fully complied with.  Both the
parties Kaushaliya and Jodha Ram ­ parties to the Settlement
Agreement dated 10.02.2017 are hereby directed to comply with
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the   terms   and   conditions   of   the   Settlement   Agreement   dated
10.02.2017 and the order passed by this Court on 05.05.2017 in
SLP   (C)   No.10022   of   2016   fully   and   in   its   true   spirit.
Consequently,  the Contempt Petition stands disposed of at this
stage.
……………………………………J.
(ASHOK BHUSHAN)
……………………………………J.
(M. R. SHAH)
New Delhi;
November 25, 2019