Sections 498A and 306 of the IPC = entitled for acquital = While the handwriting expert testified that the writing in the letter is the same as that of certain notebooks, no independent proof has been led regarding who owned or wrote in the aforesaid notebook. In fact, the only persons who were examined for the purposes of identifying the handwriting of the deceased were her father and cousin. However, how either of them could be said to be acquainted with her writing is unclear. The father of the deceased was her teacher nearly 15 years prior to the incident, and the deceased had admittedly not written any other letter to her father after her marriage. Similarly, the cousin of the deceased also did not have any other letter from the deceased in his possession.

   
Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.V. Ramana
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 539­540 OF 2008
JAGDISHRAJ KHATTA               … APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                  … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
    N.V. RAMANA, J.
1. These appeals are directed against judgment and order dated
09.01.2008 and 27.02.2008, passed by the Division Bench of the
High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in Criminal Appeal No.
356 of 1993, whereby the appeal preferred by the State of Himachal
Pradesh was allowed, and the judgment and order dated 03.04.1993
passed   by   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Kangra,   Dharamshala,
Himachal   Pradesh,   acquitting   the   appellant­accused   for   offences
under Sections 498A and 306 of the IPC, and Section 30 of the
Indian Arms Act, was set aside.
2. The case of the prosecution in brief is that the appellant, who
NON­REPORTABLE
1
was   posted   as   the   Forest   Range   Officer   at   Jawalamukhi,   at   the
relevant time, was residing with the deceased (his wife) and two
minor children. On 07.01.1990, at about 10 a.m., within seven years
of the deceased’s marriage with the appellant, the deceased used the
appellant’s gun to kill herself. On receiving information about her
death, the deceased’s mother, cousin, brother in law and father’s
neighbor went to Jawalamukhi, and the inquest report was prepared
in their presence. After the funeral ceremonies were completed, on
08.01.1990 at around 11 p.m., the deceased’s cousin lodged a report
against the appellant herein, alleging that the appellant drove the
deceased   to   commit   suicide   as   he   continuously   subjected   the
deceased   to   cruelty,   harassment,   physical   violence   and   even
mistreated her and insulted her in the presence of her parents and
relatives. Subsequently, on 13.01.1990, the father of the deceased
produced a letter allegedly written to him by the deceased, which he
received on 10.01.1990. The contents of the letter supported the
allegations made against the appellant in the FIR, regarding cruelty
and harassment towards the deceased.
3. The appellant was charged under Sections 498A and 306 of the
IPC and Section 30 of the Indian Arms Act. The Trial Court, after
2
considering the material against the appellant, acquitted him of all
the charges. On appeal by the State, the High Court reversed the
findings   of   the   Trial   Court   and   convicted   the   appellant   for   the
offences under Sections 498A and 306 of the IPC and sentenced him
to three years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 10,000, in
default of payment of which he is to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for a further period of six months, for the offence under Section 306,
IPC, and one­year rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5,000, in
default of payment of which he is to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for a further period of three months, for the offence under Section
498A, IPC, with both sentences to run concurrently. Aggrieved by the
judgment and order of the High Court, the appellant has preferred
the present appeals before us.
4. The   counsel   for   the   appellant   strongly   urged   that   the   High
Court erred in relying on a letter which was allegedly sent by the
deceased to her relatives in overturning the well­reasoned judgment
of the Trial Court. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the letter
was   surrounded   by   suspicious   circumstances   which   were   not
considered by the High Court, such as the fact that there was a delay
in   handing   over   the   letter   to   the   police,   which   delay   was   not
3
explained, and that the family of the deceased had never received
any other letter from the deceased, who had a phone connection and
often   used  to   be  visited  by  her family.  Additionally,  the  counsel
submitted that the High Court did not consider that the notebook,
which   was   used   as   a   handwriting   sample   of   the   deceased   for
comparison purposes, was not proved to belong to the deceased. As
such, the learned counsel for the appellant supported the findings of
the Trial Court and prayed that the High Court’s findings be set
aside, and the appellant be acquitted.
5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondentState supported the findings of the High Court and submitted that
the same do not merit any interference by this Court.
6. Heard the submissions of the learned counsels of both parties.
7. On perusing the judgment of the High Court, we find that it
has reversed the findings of the Trial Court by mainly relying on the
following   evidences:   (1)   the   testimonies   of   the   relatives   of   the
deceased that the appellant acted in a cruel manner against the
deceased in front of her relatives, and  (2) the letter allegedly written
by the deceased around the time of her death to her parents.
8. With respect to the former, we are unable to agree with the
reasoning of the High Court in relying on the testimonies of the
4
relatives of the deceased. As highlighted by the Trial Court, not only
were the allegations in the FIR extremely general in nature, but also
the same were never raised by the family of the deceased when they
were present at the time of preparation of the inquest report or to the
investigating officer. In fact, the allegation of cruelty meted out by the
appellant against the deceased appears for the first time at the time
of filing the FIR, after a delay of nearly one and a half days. Further,
the prosecution did not even examine any neighbor of the appellant
and the deceased to substantiate the allegation that the appellant illtreated the deceased. In fact, and as the High Court also recorded, it
appears from the evidence on record that the appellant treated the
deceased with love and affection and provided for all her needs. In
these circumstances, a reliance on the general oral testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, without any supporting evidence, would be
misplaced.  Further,  as  the   High  Court   itself   indicated  somewhat
contradictorily, reliance on the instances testified to by the witnesses
would not be appropriate as the said incidents had taken place much
before the deceased’s death and could not be treated as conduct
which drove the deceased to commit suicide.
5
9. This brings us to the second part of the High Court’s reasoning
in convicting the appellant, relating to the letter allegedly sent by the
deceased to her parents one day before her death. We are again
unable to accept the findings of the High Court on this point. We
agree with the submission of the counsel for the appellant that the
letter has not been proved to have been written by the deceased and
is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. While the handwriting
expert testified that the writing in the letter is the same as that of
certain notebooks, no independent proof has been led regarding who
owned or wrote in the aforesaid notebook. In fact, the only persons
who were examined for the purposes of identifying the handwriting of
the deceased were her father and cousin. However, how either of
them could be said to be acquainted with her writing is unclear. The
father of the deceased was her teacher nearly 15 years prior to the
incident, and the deceased had admittedly not written any other
letter to her father after her marriage. Similarly, the cousin of the
deceased also did not have any other letter from the deceased in his
possession. 
10. Most   importantly,   the   letter   was   received   by   the   deceased’s
father on 10.01.1990 but was handed over to the police only on
6
13.01.1990, casting serious doubt on the authenticity of the letter.
The fact that the deceased had never written any other letter to her
family after her marriage but had rather been in touch with her
relatives through the telephone, further strengthens the case of the
appellant.
11. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, as
well as the material placed before us, we hold that the prosecution
was not able to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable
doubt. Additionally, we are of the opinion that this was not a fit case
for the High Court to interfere with the well­reasoned judgment and
order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court, particularly when there
existed no grave infirmity in the findings of the Trial Court. [See
Bannareddy and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., (2018) 5
SCC 790]. In the aforesaid circumstances, the appeals are allowed,
and the impugned judgment and order of the High Court are set
aside. The judgment and order of the Trial Court, acquitting the
appellant herein, is therefore affirmed.
7
12. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.   
..............................................J.
                                                                      (N.V. RAMANA)
 ..............................................J.
 (S. ABDUL NAZEER)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 26, 2019.
8

Circumstantial evidence was proved = Though the prosecution case is premised on circumstantial evidence in the absence of any eyewitness, the depositions of prosecution witnesses which have stood the rigour of cross­examination clearly support the prosecution version and establishes enmity between the accused and the deceased. This fact supported by PW1’s last seen evidence, her prompt 10 complaint to the police and the forensic evidence which correlates the recovered weapon to the physical injuries on the body of the deceased proves the prosecution case beyond any reasonable doubt independent of the extrajudicial confession.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.V. Ramana
NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1990 OF 2012
SADAYAPPAN @ GANESAN             …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE, REPRESENTED BY         …RESPONDENT
INSPECTOR OF POLICE
J U D G M E N T
N.V. RAMANA, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the Judgment dated
13th  December,   2011   passed   by   the   High   Court   of
Judicature at Madras in Criminal Appeal No. 346 of 2011
whereby the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed
the appeal preferred by the appellant herein and upheld
his conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court for
the   offence   punishable   under   Section   302   read   with
Section 34, IPC.
2. Prosecution case in brief is that Selvam @ Thangaraj
(deceased),   Karuppusamy   (A1)   and   Sadayappan   @
Ganesan   (A2/appellant   herein)   were   neighbouring
1
agricultural land owners in the village of Kandavayal who
used to go together for hunting of rabbits in the nearby
forest area. Around 15 years prior to the incident, the
deceased   Thangaraj   had   negotiated   to   buy   some
agricultural   land   from   A1   and   paid   him   Rs.   30,000/­
towards the sale value and took possession of the said
land. However, despite repeated requests, A1 had never
come forward for registering the sale deed in favour of the
deceased. Owing to this, A1 and the deceased developed
animosity towards each other. A2—appellant herein is the
adjacent landowner who always supported A1 in avoiding
registration of the sale deed. Despite animosity against
the deceased, A1 and A2 kept on going to the forest for
hunting along with him. On May 27, 2008 at about 11
p.m., both A1 and A2 went to the house of deceased and
insisted   that   he   accompany   them   to   the   fields/forest.
Eventually,   the   deceased   went   with   them   hesitatingly.
When the deceased did not return home till 4 am in the
morning, his wife—Rajammal (PW1) sent one Palanisamy
(PW2—brother of the deceased) and Govindarajan (PW3—
nephew of the deceased) to search for her husband. PWs
2
2 and 3, while searching for the deceased, found his dead
body   near   the   fields   with   bleeding   injuries.   They
immediately   rushed   to   PW1   and   informed   her   of   the
same.
3. On a complaint given by PW1, the Sub­Inspector of
Police (PW14) at Sirumugai Police Station registered the
crime under Section 302, IPC and Section 25 (1B)(a) of
the Indian Arms Act against the accused. The Assistant
Commissioner   of   Police   (PW15—Pandian)   took   up   the
investigation   and   after   completing   the   formalities   of
holding inquest and preparing inquest report (Ext. P21),
sent   the   body   of   the   deceased   for   post­mortem.   On
August 29, 2008 the accused appeared before the Village
Administrative Officer (VAO) and confessed to committing
the   crime.  When  the  VAO  produced the   accused  with
their confessional statements, the I.O. arrested them and
at   their   instance   recovered   material   objects   including
Single Barrel Muzzle Loading Gun (MO1), torch light with
battery,   blood   stained   and   normal   soil,   torn   clothes,
lungi, towel etc. and sent them for chemical analysis.
Subsequently, the learned Judicial Magistrate committed
3
the case to the Principal District and Sessions Judge,
Coimbatore   who   framed   charges   against   the   accusedappellant under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC.
The appellant denied the charges and claimed to be tried.
4. After an elaborate trial, the Trial Judge opined that
the circumstantial evidence correlates with the accused
and clearly proves that owing to prior enmity, A1 and A2,
in furtherance of their common intention, committed the
murder   of   the   deceased   with   a   gun   shot   from   the
unauthorized gun owned by accused­appellant.  The Trial
Court   thereby   found   both   the   accused   guilty   and
accordingly convicted the appellant herein under Section
302 read with Section 34, IPC and sentenced him to life
imprisonment and also to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000  vide
order dated 18.05.2011. Both the accused preferred an
appeal before the High Court which was dismissed  vide
order dated December 13, 2011. Aggrieved thereby, both
the accused preferred separate appeals before this Court.
It is pertinent to state that the appeal of the A1 stood
abated owing to his death during its pendency. Thus, we
are now concerned only with the appeal preferred by A2.
4
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
contended that the courts below have incorrectly relied on
the testimonies of interested witnesses who are relatives
of   the   deceased.   He   submitted   that   the   chain   of
circumstances connecting the appellant to the crime is
incomplete. He further submitted that the courts below
erred in holding that the appellant had motive to commit
the alleged crime and shared a common intention with
A1, inasmuch as the land dispute between A1 and the
victim   had   already   been   settled   amicably   in   the
panchayat. He argued that A1, A2 and the victim were on
friendly terms thereafter which is reinforced from the fact
that they used to go to the forest for hunting together.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the State, however,
supported the judgment of the High Court and submitted
that there was no occasion for this Court to interfere with
it.
7. We have  heard the learned counsels for the parties
and meticulously perused the material on record.
8. Admittedly,   the   deceased,   A1   and   A2   (appellant
herein) were neighbouring agricultural landowners and
5
used   to   go   for   hunting   together.   Further,   there   is   no
denial of the fact that around 15 years prior to the date of
incident, the deceased and A1 had entered into a deal
through which land was sold to the deceased, but the
same   was   never   registered.   Additionally,   record   shows
that A2—the appellant herein, whose land was adjacent
to   that   of   A1,   always   supported   A1   in   the   matter   of
delaying the registration of land in favour of the deceased.
This is the factual matrix of enmity between the accused
and the deceased which serves as motive for the offence.
Despite this, the deceased kept on going to the forest for
hunting   with   the   accused   persons.   These   facts   are
abundantly clear from the testimonies of PWs 1, 2, 3, 4
and 6.
9. Further, PW1 – wife of the deceased (complainant),
who   is   the   witness   to   the   last   seen,   supported   the
prosecution version and deposed that two days prior to
the incident she had pressed A1 to register the land, but
he kept quiet and went away. She further stated that
owing to this pre­existing enmity, the accused persons
were motivated to eliminate her husband. Thus, on the
6
fateful night, the accused had come, armed, to take the
deceased along with them to the forest, a request which
was acceded to by the deceased hesitatingly.
10. With respect to the deposition of PWs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6
which   firmly   establish   the   prosecution   version,   the
learned counsel for the appellant contended that they are
inter­related and interested witnesses, thus, making their
evidence unreliable.
11. Criminal law jurisprudence makes a clear distinction
between   a  related  and  interested  witness.   A   witness
cannot be said to be an “interested” witness merely by
virtue of being a relative of the victim.   The witness may
be called “interested” only when he or she derives some
benefit from the result of a litigation in the decree in a
civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. [See:
Sudhakar v. State, (2018) 5 SCC 435].
12. In the case at hand, witnesses maybe related but
they   cannot   be   labelled   as   interested   witnesses.   A
scrutiny of their testimonies which has stood the rigour of
cross­examination corroborates the prosecution story.
13. PW2—brother of the deceased and PW3—nephew of
7
the deceased, clearly deposed that when they came to
know from PW1 that the deceased did not turn up after
leaving home at 11 pm on the previous night, they went
in search of him and found his dead body in ‘Vaalaithope’.
Similarly, PW4 – another nephew of the deceased has also
deposed that upon coming to know from his brother—
PW3  about  the  death  of  his uncle, he along with his
mother went to ‘Vaalaithope’ where they found the dead
body   of   the   deceased.   PW6—another   nephew   of   the
deceased also deposed in his statement that when he
went   to   Sirumugai   Police  Station   he   saw   the   accused
persons   there   and   witnessed   their   confessional
statements recorded by the police. He also stated that he
accompanied the police with the accused to the place of
occurrence  where  normal   and  blood  stained   mud   was
collected, and that he signed the observation Mahazar
(Ex.P7). 
14. Going   by   the   corroborative   statements   of   these
witnesses, it is discernible that though they are related to
each other and to the deceased as well, their evidence
cannot   be   discarded   by   simply   labelling   them   as
8
“interested” witnesses. After thoroughly scrutinizing their
evidence, we do not find any direct or indirect interest of
these witnesses to get the accused punished by falsely
implicating him so as to meet out any vested interest. We
are, therefore, of the considered view that the evidences of
PWs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 are quite reliable and we see no
reason to disbelieve them.
15. With respect to forensic evidence, Dr. T. Jeya Singh
(PW12), who conducted post mortem on the body of the
deceased, found prominent injures on the body of the
deceased and opined that the deceased died due to shock
and haemorrhage from multiple injuries (perforating and
penetrating)   which   were   possible   due   to   piercing   of
pellets. The post mortem report and chemical analysis
report confirms the gun shot and proves that the gun
powder   discovered   on   the   body   and   clothes   of   the
deceased   was   the   residue   of   the   gun   (MO1).   The
ownership of this gun (MO1), which was discovered on
the basis of his extra­judicial confession, has not been
disputed   by   the   appellant   in   his   Section   313   Cr.P.C.
statement.
9
16. The   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellant
agitated the genuineness and admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of the accused on the basis of which
recovery of gun (MO1) was made. He questioned the same
on the basis of absence of the examination of the VAO
who allegedly recorded the same. It is to be noted that the
record indicates that the VAO could not be examined due
to   his   death   before   the   commencement   of   the   trial.
However, it is clear that the said confessional statement,
was sent by the VAO to the Inspector of Police along with
a   covering   letter   (Ext.   P14).   Moreover,   the   Village
Assistant—PW11,   even   though   turned   hostile,   had
specifically deposed that the said extra judicial confession
was recorded by the VAO.
17. Though   the   prosecution   case   is   premised   on
circumstantial   evidence   in   the   absence   of   any   eyewitness, the depositions of prosecution witnesses which
have   stood   the   rigour   of   cross­examination   clearly
support the prosecution version and establishes enmity
between   the   accused   and   the   deceased.   This   fact
supported   by   PW1’s   last   seen   evidence,   her   prompt
10
complaint to the police and the forensic evidence which
correlates the recovered weapon to the physical injuries
on the body of the deceased proves the prosecution case
beyond any reasonable doubt independent of the extrajudicial confession.
18. Thus, the High Court was justified in upholding the
conviction   of   the   appellant   and   did   not   commit   any
illegality in passing the impugned judgment which merits
interference. Therefore, the appeal being devoid of merit
stands dismissed.
……………………………….……..J.
                        (N. V. RAMANA)
……………………………………...J.
 (MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 26, 2019.
11

discharge application under Section 239 read with Section 245 Cr.P.C for alleged offences under sec.Section 504 and 506 of I.P.C. The allegation is that appellant with two or three other unknown persons, one of whom was holding a revolver, came to the complainant’s house and abused him in filthy language and attempted to assault him and when some neighbours arrived there the appellant and the other persons accompanying him fled the spot. The above allegation taking on its face value does not satisfy the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 as has been enumerated by this Court in the above two judgments. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The mere allegation that appellant came and abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients - entitled for discharge

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 759 of 2019
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.4820/2017)
VIKRAM JOHAR ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
 ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal has been filed challenging the
judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated 06.02.2017
by which judgment, the criminal revision filed by the
appellant was dismissed. The criminal revision was
filed by the appellant challenging the order dated
29.11.2016 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate rejecting his discharge application moved
under Section 239 read with Section 245 Cr.P.C. in a
complaint case No.483 of 2013 under Section 504 and
506 of I.P.C.
1
3. The brief facts of the case, which need to be
noted for deciding this appeal are:-
3.1 The respondent No.2 (hereinafter referred
to as “complainant”), was a partner of M/s.
Ram Company engaged in business of wood
processing and sale. The company had its
premises at Kosikala, District Mathura,
Uttar Pradesh.
3.2 On 18.12.2010 at 3.00 AM fire broke into
the premises of M/s. Ram Company. Fire
brigade and police were informed, which
reached on the spot and fire could be
controlled after several hours. The cause
of fire was shown as electric short circuit
in electric cable. Fire caused damages of
stocks, plant and machinery and building.
M/s. Ram Company had taken a Standard Fire
& Special Perils Policy from M/s. United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. M/s. Ram Company
had submitted insurance claim on
20.12.2010. Total claim raised by the
2
company was Rs.3,62,45,114/-. The United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. (hereinafter
referred to as “insurance company”)
appointed the appellant M/s. Protocol
Surveyor and Engineers Private Limited, who
is a certified surveyor by Insurance
Regulatory and Development Authority. The
appellant being Director of M/s. Protocol
Surveyor and Engineers Private Limited
undertook survey of insurance claim of the
company.
3.3 On 04.04.2011, the appellant visited the
premises at Kosikala, District Mathura for
the purposes of preparing a survey report.
Joint Inspection note was prepared on
04.04.2011, for which various documents
were asked from the company. After various
correspondences, the appellant submitted a
final survey report dated 23.09.2011.
M/s. Ram Company wrote letter dated
15.07.2011 and 22.07.2011 to the surveyor,
3
which was duly replied on 23.07.2011 by the
surveyor. M/S. Ram Company has also
written to insurance company, which was
replied by insurance company on 08.08.2011
informing M/s. Ram Company that surveyors
have been asked to submit their final
report at the earliest.
3.4 On 11.09.2011, the M/s Ram company
submitted a letter to insurance company
requesting to make payment of policy amount
of Rs. 285.60 Lacs. In the said letter,
some complaints were also made against the
surveyor. Again on 19.09.2011, a letter was
sent by M/s. Ram Company to the insurance
company, where allegations were made
against the surveyor. The surveyor, i.e.,
the appellant submitted final report on
23.09.2011 with regard to claim of M/s. Ram
Company, in detail noticing all aspects of
the matter. In the Survey Report in the
last paragraph, following was stated:-
4
“15) Underwriters Liability
In view of the above, it stands
established that
(a) The insured has mis represented
their claim of building.
(b) The insured has mis represented
their claim of Plant & Machinery.
(c) The insured had made false
declaration to inflate the stock
quantity.
(d) The insured had made false
declaration on the stock value
declaration.
This policy shall be voidable in the
event of mis representation, mis
description or non disclosure of any
material particular.
If the claim be in any respect
fraudulent, or if any false
declaration be made or used in
support thereof if any fraudulent
means or devices are used by the
insured or any one acting on his
behalf to obtain any benefit under
the policy or if the loss or damage
be occasioned by the wilful act, or
with the connivance of the insured,
all benefits under this policy shall
be forfeited.
It is clear that the insured’s Mis
representation & False declaration
5
have breached both the above stated
policy conditions.
In view of above, that the subject
claim is not admissible under the
captioned policy of insurance.
This report is being submitted
without prejudice and is subject to
the terms and conditions of the
policy of insurance.
Signed
Protocol Surveyors & Engineers Pvt.
Ltd.”
3.5 On 14.11.2011, respondent No.2, i.e.,
complainant filed an application under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. alleging offences
under Sections 383, 384, 471, 504 and 506
I.P.C. In the complaint, allegation was
made against the appellant that he
alongwith two or three other unknown
persons, one of whom was holding a
revolver, came to the complainant’s house
on 02.10.2011 at 7.00 PM and abused him in
filthy language and was about to assault
him, When some neighbours arrived there,
the appellant and two or three other
unknown persons fled the spot on their
6
vehicle. On the above application dated
14.11.2011, on the order of the Magistrate,
first information report was lodged being
F.I.R. No.367 of 2011 under Sections 383,
384, 471, 504 and 506 I.P.C. registered on
24.11.2011. Insurance company by letter
dated 12.12.2011 repudiated the claim of
M/s. Ram Company. Paragraph Nos. 3, 4 and
5 of the said letter are to the following
effect:-
“3. That during the course of
carrying out survey & assessment of
this claim, the overall approach &
conduct of the surveyor was found to
be satisfactory.
4. That the said surveyors
submitted a copy of their Final
Survey report No.2010-DEC-131 dated
23 September, 2011 to this office on
27 September, 2011.
5. That after scrutiny of the
submitted survey report and in
consultation with the technical team
of our Head Office, we have
repudiated the said claim vide our
letter ref.no. VKJ:RK:FC:2011: 235:11
dated 06.12.2011.”
3.6 I.O. conducted the investigation calling
the appellant also and submitted a closure
7
report. In the closure report, I.O. also
had stated that as per the call details and
location of Vikram Singh’s mobile
(appellant), there was no roaming of his
mobile from 1st October to 4th October and
his location was within the NCR area.
After recording the statements of several
persons, the I.O. submitted final form,
closure report. Against the report, a
protest petition was filed by the
complainant before the Judicial Magistrate,
who by order dated 18.05.2012 allowed the
protest petition and directed for further
investigation in the Crime No. 448 of 2011.
Further investigation was also conducted by
another I.O., who again submitted a final
report opining that no offence has been
committed. Again, a protest petition was
filed. The Judicial Magistrate by Order
dated 21.12.2012 held that no further
investigation is required and it shall be
justified to try and dispose of the case as
8
a complaint case. Complainant’s statement
under Section 200 Cr.P.C was recorded.
Complainant also got recorded statement of
PW1- Ganesh Sharma and PW2 – Roop Singh @
Munna.
3.7 The Magistrate by Order dated 07.02.2014
summoned the appellant under Sections 504
and 506 I.P.C. Against the order dated
07.02.2014 an application under Section 482
Cr.P.C. was filed by the appellant in the
Allahabad High Court, which application was
disposed of by the High Court by order
dated 30.07.2014. High Court while
disposing of the application under Section
482 Cr.P.C. observed that in case, if
discharge application is moved by the
applicant within 30 days, it is expected
that the same shall be considered and
decided by a reasoned and speaking order,
and till disposal of the application on
merit, no coercive action shall be taken
against the appellant.
9
3.8 An application was filed by the applicant
under Section 239 read with Section 245
Cr.P.C. before the Court of Judicial
Magistrate praying that appellant be
discharged. In the application under
Sections 239 and 245, details of claim,
various reports and consideration by
insurance company was mentioned.
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate vide
its order dated 29.11.2016 rejected the
application for discharge against which
Criminal Revision was filed in the High
Court, which has been dismissed on
06.02.2017. Aggrieved, by above order,
this appeal has been filed.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of
this appeal contends that complaint filed by the
complainant was nothing but proceeding for harassment
of the appellant. The appellant, who was surveyor
having given adverse reports regarding the fire claim
of the company, the complainant due to annoyance and
10
to teach a lesson to the appellant has filed the
complaint. It is submitted that incident is alleged
of 02.10.2011 when appellant is claimed to be visited
his house and threatened him whereas the complaint in
the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate was filed on
14.11.2011, i.e., about more than one month and 12
days, which itself indicate that whole story was
concocted to harass the appellant. It is submitted
that police after making thorough investigation twice
have found no offence committed and has submitted the
closure report. It is submitted that ingredients of
offence under Sections 504 and 506 are not made out
on the reading of the complaints and Chief Judicial
Magistrate committed error in rejecting the discharge
application. High Court also did not advert to the
allegations of the complaint and failed to notice
that ingredients of offence under Sections 504 and
506 are not made out.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents
have refuted the submissions of the appellant and
submits that there was sufficient material before the
Judicial Magistrate to issue process to summon the
11
appellant and there was no ground for discharging the
appellant from the offence. The allegations in the
complaint makes out a case under Sections 504 and 506
and no error has been committed by learned Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate in rejecting the discharge
application and the High Court in dismissing the
criminal revision.
6. Learned counsel for the parties have also placed
reliance on various judgments of this Court, which
shall be referred to while considering the
submissions in detail.
7. We have considered the submissions of the learned
counsel for the parties and have perused the records.
8. The question to be considered and answered in
this appeal is as to whether in the present case,
appellant was entitled to be discharged from the
offence under Sections 504 and 506 and whether Courts
below committed error in rejecting the discharge
application.
12
9. We have noticed the facts and sequence of events,
which led to filing of the application under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. by the complainant against the
appellant. We, in the present case, are not
concerned on the merits of the claim of the
complainant regarding insurance claim of the
complainant pertaining to fire incident dated
18.12.2010. Our consideration has to confine only to
the question as to whether the appellant has made out
a case for discharge under Sections 504 and 506
I.P.C.
10. From the facts noticed above, it is clear that
appellant’s role was only of a surveyor appointed by
insurance company to survey and submit report on the
fire insurance claim alleged by the complainant with
regard to incident dated 18.12.2010, which took place
in his factory premises at Kosikala, District
Mathura.
11. The appellant is Director of M/s. Protocol
Surveyor & Engineers Pvt. Ltd. at Sector-7, Noida,
Uttar Pradesh. Appellant visited the premises at
13
Kosikala and held joint inspection on 04.04.2011.
Various correspondences were made by the complainant
with the appellant as well as insurance company. In
the letter dated 11.09.2011, which was addressed to
insurance company, there was no allegation made
against the appellant and for the first time in
letter dated 19.09.2011 sent by M/s. Ram Company,
allegation was made against the appellant that
appellant has asked for money for the final survey
report, which was submitted by the appellant on
23.09.2011, which was received by insurance company
on 27.09.2011.
12. We have noticed above that in the final survey
report recommendation has been made to repudiate the
claim due to misrepresentation and false declaration
made by the appellant, which is breach of policy
condition. The incident alleged against the
appellant is dated 02.10.2011, i.e., immediately
after submission of final survey report. It was only
after final survey report submitted by the appellant
on 23.09.2011, which was received on 27.09.2011 that
14
the appellant alleged the incident dated 02.10.2011,
in which appellant has alleged to have threatened the
complainant. It is to be noted that application
under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. was filed for the
first time on 14.11.2011, copies of which is brought
as Annexure P-9. The allegation in the complaint
against the appellant with regard to incident dated
02.10.2011 are as follows:-
“…………..When the complainant did not
entertain the accused Surveyor Vikaram
Johar, he and 2-3 other unknown persons,
one of whom was holding a revolver, whom
the complainant can identify, came to the
complainant’s house on 2.10.2011 at 7.00 Pm
and abused him in filthy language and about
to assault him. When some neighbour
arrived there, the Surveyor Vikaram Johar,
he and 2-3 other unknown persons fled the
spot on their vehicle. The people who had
saved the complainant has seen the
occurrence.”
13. Twice the I.O. have conducted the investigation
and submitted a closure report, on which protest
petition was filed. On the protest petition,
ultimately, the Judicial Magistrate by Order dated
21.12.2012 decided to treat the case as a complaint
case. The complainant as well as its witnesses
15
appeared in the witness box and supported the
incident dated 02.10.2011.
14. Before we proceed to further examine the facts of
the present case, we may notice the ambit and scope
of power of the Court at the time of considering the
discharge application.
15. This Court in Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar
Samal & Another, (1979) 3 SCC 4 had occasion to
consider Section 227 Cr.P.C., which is Special
Judge’s power to pass order of discharge. After
noticing Section 227 in paragraph No.7, this Court
held following:-
“7. XXXXXXXXXX
The words “not sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused” clearly
show that the Judge is not a mere post
office to frame the charge at the behest of
the prosecution, but has to exercise his
judicial mind to the facts of the case in
order to determine whether a case for trial
has been made out by the prosecution. In
assessing this fact, it is not necessary
for the court to enter into the pros and
cons of the matter or into a weighing and
balancing of evidence and probabilities
which is really his function after the
trial starts. At the stage of Section 227,
the Judge has merely to sift the evidence
16
in order to find out whether or not there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused. The sufficiency of ground
would take within its fold the nature of
the evidence recorded by the police or the
documents produced before the court which
ex facie disclose that there are suspicious
circumstances against the accused so as to
frame a charge against him.”
16. After considering the earlier cases of this
Court, in paragraph No.10, following principles were
noticed:-
“10. Thus, on a consideration of the
authorities mentioned above, the following
principles emerge:
(1) That the Judge while considering the
question of framing the charges under
Section 227 of the Code has the
undoubted power to sift and weigh the
evidence for the limited purpose of
finding out whether or not a prima
facie case against the accused has
been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the
Court disclose grave suspicion against
the accused which has not been
properly explained the Court will be
fully justified in framing a charge
and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie
case would naturally depend upon the
facts of each case and it is difficult
to lay down a rule of universal
17
application. By and large however if
two views are equally possible and the
Judge is satisfied that the evidence
produced before him while giving rise
to some suspicion but not grave
suspicion against the accused, he will
be fully within his right to discharge
the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction
under Section 227 of the Code the
Judge which under the present Code is
a senior and experienced court cannot
act merely as a Post Office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has
to consider the broad probabilities of
the case, the total effect of the
evidence and the documents produced
before the Court, any basic
infirmities appearing in the case and
so on. This however does not mean that
the Judge should make a roving enquiry
into the pros and cons of the matter
and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial.”
17. A Three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of
Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568, had
occasion to consider discharge under Section 227, it
was held by the court that Section 227 was
incorporated in the Code with a view to save the
accused from prolonged harassment which is a
necessary concomitant of a protracted criminal trial.
It is calculated to eliminate harassment to accused
18
persons when the evidential materials gathered after
investigation fall short of minimum legal
requirements.
18. Another judgment of this Court, which is to be
referred is Priyanka Srivastava and Another Vs. State
of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2015) 6 SCC 287. This
Court in the above case has noticed the potentiality
of misuse of Section 156(3) to harass those, who are
entrusted with various statutory functions. This
Court, in fact, has made observations that
application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has to be
supported by an affidavit so that person making
allegation should take responsibility of what they
have said in the complaint. In paragraph No.30,
following has been held:-
“30. In our considered opinion, a stage has
come in this country where Section 156(3)
CrPC applications are to be supported by an
affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who
seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of
the Magistrate. That apart, in an
appropriate case, the learned Magistrate
would be well advised to verify the truth
and also can verify the veracity of the
allegations. This affidavit can make the
applicant more responsible. We are
compelled to say so as such kind of
applications are being filed in a routine
manner without taking any responsibility
19
whatsoever only to harass certain persons.
That apart, it becomes more disturbing and
alarming when one tries to pick up people
who are passing orders under a statutory
provision which can be challenged under the
framework of the said Act or under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. But it
cannot be done to take undue advantage in a
criminal court as if somebody is determined
to settle the scores.”
19. It is, thus, clear that while considering the
discharge application, the Court is to exercise its
judicial mind to determine whether a case for trial
has been made out or not. It is true that in such
proceedings, the Court is not to hold the mini trial
by marshalling the evidence.
20. After noticing the nature of jurisdiction to be
exercised by the Court at the time of discharge, we
now revert back to the facts of the present case,
where taking an allegation of complaint as correct on
the face of it, whether offences under Sections 504
and 506 is made out, is a question to be answered.
21. We need to notice Sections 503, 504 and 506 for
appreciating the issues, which has come up for
consideration, which are to the following effect:-
20
“503. Criminal intimidation.—Whoever
threatens another with any injury to his
person, reputation or property, or to the
person or reputation of any one in whom
that person is interested, with intent to
cause alarm to that person, or to cause
that person to do any act which he is not
legally bound to do, or to omit to do any
act which that person is legally entitled
to do, as the means of avoiding the
execution of such threat, commits criminal
intimidation.
Explanation.— A threat to injure the
reputation of any deceased person in whom
the person threatened is interested, is
within this section.
504. Intentional insult with intent to
provoke breach of the peace.—Whoever
intentionally insults, and thereby gives
provocation to any person, intending or
knowing it to be likely that such
provocation will cause him to break the
public peace, or to commit any other
offence, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to two years, or with
fine, or with both.
506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.—
Whoever commits, the offence of criminal
intimidation shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to two years, or with
fine, or with both;
If threat be to cause death or grievous
hurt, etc.—And if the threat be to cause
death or grievous hurt, or to cause the
destruction of any property by fire, or to
21
cause an offence punishable with death or
imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to seven years,
or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to
seven years, or with fine, or with both.”
22. Section 504 of I.P.C. came up for consideration
before this Court in Fiona Shrikhande Vs. State of
Maharashtra & Another, (2013) 14 SCC 44. In the said
case, this Court had occasion to examine ingredients
of Section 504, which need to be present before
proceeding to try a case. The Court held that in the
said case, the order issuing process was challenged
by filing a criminal revision. This Court held that
at the complaint stage, the Magistrate is merely
concerned with the allegations made out in the
complaint and has only to prima facie satisfy whether
there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the
accused. In paragraph No.11, following principles
have been laid down:-
“11. We are, in this case, concerned only
with the question as to whether, on a
reading of the complaint, a prima facie
case has been made out or not to issue
process by the Magistrate. The law as
regards issuance of process in criminal
22
cases is well settled. At the complaint
stage, the Magistrate is merely concerned
with the allegations made out in the
complaint and has only to prima facie
satisfy whether there are sufficient
grounds to proceed against the accused and
it is not the province of the Magistrate to
enquire into a detailed discussion on the
merits or demerits of the case. The scope
of enquiry under Section 202 is extremely
limited in the sense that the Magistrate,
at this stage, is expected to examine prima
facie the truth or falsehood of the
allegations made in the complaint. The
Magistrate is not expected to embark upon a
detailed discussion of the merits or
demerits of the case, but only consider the
inherent probabilities apparent on the
statement made in the complaint. In Nagawwa
v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, (1976)
3 SCC 736, this Court held that once the
Magistrate has exercised his discretion in
forming an opinion that there is ground for
proceeding, it is not for the Higher Courts
to substitute its own discretion for that
of the Magistrate. The Magistrate has to
decide the question purely from the point
of view of the complaint, without at all
adverting to any defence that the accused
may have.”
23. In paragraph No.13 of the judgment, this Court
has noticed the ingredients of Section 504, which are
to the following effect:-
“13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the
following ingredients viz. (a) intentional
insult, (b) the insult must be such as to
give provocation to the person insulted,
and (c) the accused must intend or know
that such provocation would cause another
23
to break the public peace or to commit any
other offence. The intentional insult must
be of such a degree that should provoke a
person to break the public peace or to
commit any other offence. The person who
intentionally insults intending or knowing
it to be likely that it will give
provocation to any other person and such
provocation will cause to break the public
peace or to commit any other offence, in
such a situation, the ingredients of
Section 504 are satisfied. One of the
essential elements constituting the offence
is that there should have been an act or
conduct amounting to intentional insult and
the mere fact that the accused abused the
complainant, as such, is not sufficient by
itself to warrant a conviction under
Section 504 IPC.”
24. In another judgment, i.e., Manik Taneja and
Another Vs. State of Karnataka and Another, (2015) 7
SCC 423, this Court has again occasion to examine the
ingredients of Sections 503 and 506. In the above
case also, case was registered for the offence under
Sections 353 and 506 I.P.C. After noticing Section
503, which defines criminal intimidation, this Court
laid down following in paragraph Nos. 11 and 12:-
“11. Xxxxxxxxxxxxx
A reading of the definition of “criminal
intimidation” would indicate that there
must be an act of threatening to another
person, of causing an injury to the person,
24
reputation, or property of the person
threatened, or to the person in whom the
threatened person is interested and the
threat must be with the intent to cause
alarm to the person threatened or it must
be to do any act which he is not legally
bound to do or omit to do an act which he
is legally entitled to do.
12. In the instant case, the allegation is
that the appellants have abused the
complainant and obstructed the second
respondent from discharging his public
duties and spoiled the integrity of the
second respondent. It is the intention of
the accused that has to be considered in
deciding as to whether what he has stated
comes within the meaning of “criminal
intimidation”. The threat must be with
intention to cause alarm to the complainant
to cause that person to do or omit to do
any work. Mere expression of any words
without any intention to cause alarm would
not be sufficient to bring in the
application of this section. But material
has to be placed on record to show that the
intention is to cause alarm to the
complainant. From the facts and
circumstances of the case, it appears that
there was no intention on the part of the
appellants to cause alarm in the mind of
the second respondent causing obstruction
in discharge of his duty. As far as the
comments posted on Facebook are concerned,
it appears that it is a public forum meant
for helping the public and the act of the
appellants posting a comment on Facebook
may not attract ingredients of criminal
intimidation in Section 503 IPC.”
25
25. In the above case, allegation was that appellant
had abused the complainant. The Court held that the
mere fact that the allegation that accused had abused
the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients of
Section 506.
26. Now, we revert back to the allegations in the
complaint against the appellant. The allegation is
that appellant with two or three other unknown
persons, one of whom was holding a revolver, came to
the complainant’s house and abused him in filthy
language and attempted to assault him and when some
neighbours arrived there the appellant and the other
persons accompanying him fled the spot. The above
allegation taking on its face value does not satisfy
the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 as has been
enumerated by this Court in the above two judgments.
The intentional insult must be of such a degree that
should provoke a person to break the public peace or
to commit any other offence. The mere allegation
that appellant came and abused the complainant does
not satisfy the ingredients as laid down in paragraph
26
No.13 of the judgment of this Court in Fiona
Shrikhande (supra).
27. Now, reverting back to Section 506, which is
offence of criminal intimidation, the principles laid
down by Fiona Shrikhande (supra) has also to be
applied when question of finding out as to whether
the ingredients of offence are made or not. Here,
the only allegation is that the appellant abused the
complainant. For proving an offence under Section 506
IPC, what are ingredients which have to be proved by
the prosecution? Ratanlal & Dhirajlal on Law of
Crimes, 27th Edition with regard to proof of offence
states following: -
“…The prosecution must prove:
(i) That the accused threatened some
person.
(ii) That such threat consisted of
some injury to his person,
reputation or property; or to the
person, reputation or property of
some one in whom he was
interested;
(iii) That he did so with intent to
cause alarm to that person; or to
cause that person to do any act
which he was not legally bound to
do, or omit to do any act which
he was legally entitled to do as
27
a means of avoiding the execution
of such threat.”
A plain reading of the allegations in the complaint
does not satisfy all the ingredients as noticed
above.
28. On the principles as enumerated by this Court in
Fiona Shrikhande (supra) and Manik Taneja (supra), we
are satisfied that ingredients of Sections 504 and
506 are not made out from the complaint filed by the
complainant. When the complaint filed under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C., which has been treated as a complaint
case, does not contain ingredients of Sections 504
and 506, we are of the view that Courts below
committed error in rejecting the application of
discharge filed by the appellant. In the facts of
the present case, we are of the view that appellant
was entitled to be discharged for the offence under
Sections 504 and 506.
29. Thus, in result, the appeal is allowed. The
judgment of the High Court dated 06.02.2017 as well
as the order of Chief Judicial Magistrate dated
28
29.11.2016 are set aside and the appellant stands
discharged from the offence under Sections 504 and
506.

......................J.
 ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
......................J.
 ( K.M. JOSEPH )
New Delhi,
April 26, 2019.
29

Service matter = whether an offence involving bodily injury can be categorized as a crime involving moral turpitude. In this case, we are concerned with an assault. It is very difficult to state that every assault is not an offence involving moral turpitude. A simple assault is different from an aggravated assault. All cases of assault or simple hurt cannot be categorized as crimes involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the use of a dangerous weapon which can cause the death of the victim may may result in an offence involving moral turpitude. In the instant case, there was no motive for the Respondent to cause the death of the victims. The criminal courts below found that the injuries caused to the victims were simple in nature. On an overall consideration of the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that the crime committed by the Respondent does not involve moral turpitude. As the Respondent is not guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude, he is not liable to be discharged from service. we affirm the judgment of the High Court.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice L. Nageswara Rao
 Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL No . 7011 of2009
The State Bank of India & Others. .... Appellants

Versus
P. Soupramaniane …. Respondent
J U D G M E N T
L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.
1. The Respondent who was working as a Messenger in
the State Bank of India at Puducherry was discharged from
service by an order dated 15.05.1986. The appeal filed by
the Respondent against the order of discharge was
dismissed on 03.07.1986. Later, the Staff Union took up
the cause of the Respondent and made a representation
on his behalf which was also rejected on 04.05.1992.
Challenging the aforementioned orders, the Respondent
filed a Writ Petition in the High Court of Judicature at
Madras which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge on
07.06.2000. Aggrieved thereby, the Respondent filed
a Writ Appeal which was allowed by the Division Bench of
the Madras High Court. The order of discharge of the
Respondent from service was set aside and the Appellants
were directed to reinstate the Respondent. The Appellants
were directed to pay 1/4th of the salary from the date of
discharge till the date of reinstatement as back wages.
Notice was issued by this Court in Special Leave Petition
filed by the Appellants on 01.09.2009 and the judgment of
the High Court was stayed. Thereafter, leave was granted
on 19.10.2009 and the interim order was made absolute.
We are informed that the Respondent has attained the age
of superannuation on 31.12.2012.
2. Since the discharge of the Respondent from service is
on the basis of conviction for an offence involving moral
turpitude, it is necessary to refer to the facts of the
criminal case. A report was submitted by the Station
House Officer (SHO), Grand Bazaar Police Station,
Puducherry that on 17.06.1983 at 9.00 hours the
Respondent voluntarily stabbed Karthiban s/o
Dharamssivam and Sivagurunathan s/o Brame Dhanabal
with a broken soda bottle. On completion of investigation,
charge sheet was filed against the Respondent.
Thereafter, charge was framed under Section 307 IPC.
After appreciation of the evidence on-record, the trial
court found that the Respondent had no intention to cause
murder of the victims who were examined as PWs-1 and 2.
The injuries were certified as simple by PW-5. The trial
court was of the opinion that there was no material to
convict the Respondent under Section 307 IPC. However,
the trial court convicted the Respondent under Section 324
IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for three
months. The motive for the crime was an earlier dispute
between two groups belonging to different political parties.
The conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Court. The
Appellate Court released the Respondent on probation as it
was of the opinion that the Respondent was a fit person to
be dealt with under Section 360 CrPC. One of the reasons
given by the Appellate Court to release the Respondent on
probation was that the Respondent was employed as a
Messenger in a Bank and any sentence of imprisonment
would affect his career.
3. As stated earlier, discharge of the Respondent from
service was on the ground of his conviction by a criminal
court for an offence involving moral turpitude.
4. Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act,
1949 provides that conviction by a criminal court of an
offence involving moral turpitude shall disentitle a person
from continuing in employment of a banking company.
The Writ Appeal filed by the Respondent was allowed by a
Division Bench of the High Court on the ground that the
criminal court released the Respondent under probation in
exercise of its power under Section 360 CrPC to enable the
Respondent to continue in service. The High Court was of
the opinion that the purpose of the order of the criminal
court would be defeated if the Respondent is discharged
from service. Another reason given by the High Court is
that the provision of law under which the bank discharged
the Respondent from service was not mentioned and no
reasons were assigned by the bank in the order of
discharge.
5. We do not agree with the reasons given by the High
Court for setting aside the order of discharge and directing
the reinstatement of the Respondent in service. A showcause notice was issued to the Respondent in which it was
categorically mentioned that the Respondent cannot
continue in service after his conviction in a criminal case
involving moral turpitude in view of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of
the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. After considering the
explanation of the Respondent, an order of discharge was
passed. The High Court is not right in holding that no
reasons had been given by the bank for discontinuing the
Respondent from service. The High Court committed an
error in holding that the order of discharge should be set
aside on the ground that the provision of law under which
the Respondent was discharged was not mentioned in the
order. Yet another reason given by the High Court for
interference with the order of discharge is that the criminal
court released the Respondent on probation only to permit
him to continue in service. The release under probation
does not entitle an employee to claim a right to continue in
service. In fact the employer is under an obligation to
discontinue the services of an employee convicted of an
offence involving moral turpitude.1
 The observations made
by a criminal court are not binding2
 on the employer who
has the liberty of dealing with his employees suitably.
6. Though we do not agree with the reasons given by
the High Court for setting aside the order of discharge of
the Respondent from service, it is necessary to examine
whether Section 10 (1)(b)(i) of Banking Regulation Act is
applicable to the facts of the case. Conviction for an
offence involving moral turpitude disqualifies a person
from continuing in service in a bank. The conundrum that
arises in this case is whether the conviction of the
Respondent under Section 324 IPC can be said to be for an
offence involving moral turpitude.
7. Moral Turpitude’ as defined in the Black’s Law
Dictionary (6
th
 ed.) is as follows:
“The Act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in
the private and social duties which man owes to
1 Sushil Kumar Singhal v. Punjab National Bank, (2010) 8 SCC 573
2 This Court has observed on multiple occasions that in criminal jurisdiction,
Courts do not have the power to pass a direction that the said conviction will not
have any impact on the convict’s services. See: Girraj Prasad Meena v. State of
Rajasthan (2014) 13 SCC 674
his follow man, or to society in general, contrary
to accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and man.”
3
“implies something immoral in itself regardless of
it being punishable by law”; “restricted to the
gravest offences, consisting of felonies, infamous
crimes, and those that are malum in se and
disclose a depraved mind.”
4
According to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, ‘Moral
Turpitude’ is :
“An act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes to his
fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and man.”
Burton Legal Thesaurus defines ‘Moral Turpitude’
as :
“Bad faith, bad repute, corruption, defilement,
delinquency, discredit, dishonor, shame, guilt,
knavery, misdoing, perversion, shame, ice,
wrong.”
3 p. 1008
4 p. 1517
8. There is no doubt that there is an obligation on the
Management of the Bank to discontinue the services of an
employee who has been convicted by a criminal court for
an offence involving moral turpitude.5
 Though every
offence is a crime against the society, discontinuance from
service according to the Banking Regulation Act can be
only for committing an offence involving moral turpitude.
Acts which disclose depravity and wickedness of character
can be categorized as offences involving moral turpitude.
Whether an offence involves moral turpitude or not
depends upon the facts6
 and the circumstances7
 of the
case. Ordinarily, the tests that can be applied for judging
an offence involving moral turpitude are:
a) Whether the act leading to a conviction was
such as could shock the moral conscience or
society in general;
b) Whether the motive which led to the act was a
base one, and
c) Whether on account of the act having been
committed the perpetrators could be considered
5 Sushil Kumar Singhal (supra)
6 Allahabad Bank v. Deepak Kumar Bhola
7 Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1996) 4 SCC 17 ¶12
to be of a depraved character or a person who
was to be looked down upon by the society.
8

The other important factors that are to be kept in
mind to conclude that an offence involves moral turpitude
are :– the person who commits the offence; the person
against whom it is committed; the manner and
circumstances in which it is alleged to have been
committed; and the values of the society.9
 According to
the National Incident – Based Reporting System (NIBRS), a
crime data collection system used in the United States of
America, each offence belongs to one of the three
categories which are: crimes against persons, crimes
against property, and crimes against society. Crimes
against persons include murder, rape, and assault where
the victims are always individuals. The object of
crimes against property, for example, robbery and burglary
is to obtain money, property, or some other benefits.
Crimes against society for example gambling, prostitution,
and drug violations, represent society’s prohibition against
engaging in certain types of activities. Conviction of any
8 Mangali v. Chakki Lal, AIR 1963 ALL 527
9 Jorabhai Hirabhai Rabari v. District Development Officer, Mehsana, AIR 1996 Guj
3.
alien of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
deportation under the Immigration Law in the United
States of America. To qualify as a crime involving moral
turpitude for such purpose, it requires both reprehensible
conduct and scienter, whether with specific intent,
deliberateness, willfulness or recklessness.10


9. There can be no manner of doubt about certain
offences which can straightaway be termed as involving
moral turpitude e.g. offences under the Prevention of
Corruption of Act, NDPS Act, etc. The question that arises
for our consideration in this case is whether an offence
involving bodily injury can be categorized as a crime
involving moral turpitude. In this case, we are concerned
with an assault. It is very difficult to state that every
assault is not an offence involving moral turpitude.
A simple assault is different from an aggravated assault. All
cases of assault or simple hurt cannot be categorized as crimes
involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the use of a
dangerous weapon which can cause the death of the victim
may may result in an offence involving moral turpitude. In the
instant case, there was no motive for the Respondent to cause
10 Cristoval Silva – Trevina 241 & N Dec 687 (AG 2008)
the death of the victims. The criminal courts below found that
the injuries caused to the victims were simple in nature. On an
overall consideration of the facts of this case, we are of the
opinion that the crime committed by the Respondent does not
involve moral turpitude. As the Respondent is not guilty of an
offence involving moral turpitude, he is not liable to be
discharged from service.
10. For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment
of the High Court. The Appeal is dismissed accordingly.

 .................................J.
 [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
 ..................................J.
 [M.R.SHAH]
New Delhi,
April 26, 2019. 

whether the information sought under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘RTI Act’) can be denied by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the other banks on the ground of economic interest, commercial confidence, fiduciary relationship or public interest.

1
Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Contempt Petition (C) No.928 of 2016
In
(Transfer Case (C) No.95 of 2015)
GIRISH MITTAL
.... Petitioner
Versus
PARVATI V. SUNDARAM & ANR.
…. Respondent (s)
With
Contempt Petition (C) No.412 of 2016
In
(Transfer Case (C) No.96 of 2015)
And
Contempt Petition (C) No.59 of 2017
In
(Transfer Case (C) No.95 of 2015)
J U D G M E N T
L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.
1. The three Contempt Petitions are filed complaining of
wilful and deliberate disobedience of the directions issued by
this Court in the judgment dated 16.12.2015 in Transfer Case
(Civil) No.96 of 2015.
2
2. The subject matter of the judgment in Reserve Bank of
India v. Jayantilal N. Mistry1 is whether the information sought
under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘RTI Act’) can be denied by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
and the other banks on the ground of economic interest,
commercial confidence, fiduciary relationship or public interest.
The facts of all the 11 Writ Petitions which were transferred to
this Court are similar. The information that was sought by the
Respondents in the transfer cases was refused on the ground that
there was a fiduciary relationship between the RBI and the other
banks, and hence, the information cannot be disclosed in view of
the exemption under Section 8(1)(d) and (e) of the RTI Act. In
all the cases that were transferred to this Court, the Central
Information Commissioner directed the RBI to disclose the
information sought for by the Respondents in the transfer cases.
The RBI assailed the orders passed by the Central Information
Commission by filing Writ Petitions in the High Courts which
were transferred to this Court and decided by the judgment
dated 16.12.2015. In the said judgment dated 16.12.2015, this
Court held that the Right to Information Act, 2005 overrides all
earlier laws in order to achieve its objective and the only

1 2016 (3) SCC 525
3
exceptions to access to information were those which were
contained in Section 8 of the RTI Act. The argument of the RBI
that the information sought for by the Respondents therein was
rightly refused on the ground of fiduciary relationship, was
rejected by this Court. It was observed by this Court that there
is no fiduciary relationship between the RBI and the financial
institutions and by attaching an additional ‘fiduciary’ label to the
statutory duty, regulatory authorities have intentionally or
unintentionally created an in terrorem effect. This Court further
emphasized that RBI has a statutory duty to uphold the interests
of the public-at-large, the depositors and the country’s economy
and the banking sector. This Court was also of the opinion that
the RBI should act with transparency and not hide information
that might embarrass the individual banks and that the RBI is
dutybound to comply with the provisions of the RTI Act and
disclose the information sought by the Respondents therein. The
submission made on behalf of the RBI that the disclosure would
hurt the economic interests of the country was found to be totally
misconceived. While referring to Section 2(f) of the RTI Act, this
Court was of the opinion that the intent of the Legislature was to
make available to the general public such information which had
4
been obtained by the public authorities from private bodies. On
the basis of the above observations, it was held that the RBI is
liable to provide information regarding inspection reports and
other documents to the general public.
3. Being alive to Section 8(1) of the RTI Act, under which
information can be denied to the public to guard national
security, sovereignty, national economic interest and relations
with foreign states etc. this Court observed that not all the
information that the Government generates shall be given to the
public. Matters of national economic interest, disclosure of
information about currency or exchange rates, interest rates,
taxes, the regulation or supervision of banking, insurance and
other financial institutions, proposals for expenditure or
borrowing and foreign investments could in some cases harm
the national economy, particularly, if released prematurely.
However, lower-level economic and financial information like
contracts and departmental budgets should not be withheld
under this exemption, according to this Court in the judgment
dated 16.12.2015. On the basis of the above findings, the
transfer cases filed by the RBI were dismissed and the orders
passed by the Central Information Commission were upheld.
5
Contempt Petition (C) No.412 of 2016
4. The Petitioner filed an application dated 12.10.2010
seeking information from the RBI regarding the loss to the nation
in the foreign derivative contract cases. According to him, there
was a loss of Rs 32,000/- crores. The Petitioner also sought for a
bank-wise breakup of the mark-to-market (MTM) losses. In all,
the Petitioner sought information for 10 queries in his
application. No reply was given to query numbers 1, 2, 9 and 10.
The Appellate Authority under the RTI Act directed the RBI to
provide information for queries 2, 9 and 10. Incomplete
information was given for queries 2, 9 and 10 according to the
Petitioner. The Central Information Commission directed the RBI
to furnish information in respect of queries 1, 2, 9 and 10. In
obedience to the direction issued by the Central Information
Commission, RBI furnished information for queries 2, 9, 10.
However, the RBI filed a Writ Petition in the High Court
aggrieved by the directions issued by the Central Information
Commission qua query No.1. After the judgment of this Court
on 16.12.2015, RBI provided the information for query No.1.
Query No. 1 pertained to information regarding the market
6
losses on account of currency derivatives to the tune of 32,000/-
crores as stated by the RBI in an affidavit filed before the Orissa
High Court. The Petitioner sought a bank-wise breakup of the
MTM losses. The reply given by the RBI was that there was no
reference to losses of more than 32,000/- crores on account of
currency derivatives in the affidavit filed by RBI in Writ Petition
(Criminal) No. 344 of 2009 in the High Court of Orissa. The
relevant paragraph of the affidavit filed in High Court of Orissa
was also furnished to the Respondent. Not satisfied with the said
information and being convinced that the RBI was intentionally
withholding information in spite of the directions issued by this
Court, this Contempt Petition is filed.
Contempt Petition (C) No.59 of 2017
5. The Petitioner filed an application under the RTI Act
seeking details of the Show Cause Notices and fines imposed by
the RBI on various banks. The information was not disclosed by
the RBI by claiming exemption under Section 8(1)(a), (d) and (e)
of the RTI Act on the ground that the disclosure would affect the
economic interest of the country, the competitive position of the
banks, and that the information cannot be disclosed by the RBI as
7
it received the same in a fiduciary capacity. The RBI uploaded a
Disclosure Policy on 30.11.2016 on its website by which the
Public Information Officers were directed not to disclose
virtually all kinds of information. The Petitioner has filed the
above contempt case aggrieved by the disclosure policy dated
30.11.2016, which according to him, is in direct contravention of
the directions issued by this Court by its judgment dated
16.12.2015. One of the exemptions in the disclosure policy
relating to the department of banking regulation was that
information relating to specific supervisory issues emanating
from inspection or scrutiny reports received from other
supervisory departments are exempted from disclosure. Similar
exemption was given to the inspection reports falling within the
purview of the ‘department of banking supervision’. Any
information obtained from/submitted by banks/Financial
Institutions and held by the RBI in a fiduciary capacity was also
exempted from disclosure. The learned counsel for the
Petitioner submitted that the exemptions from disclosure
mentioned in the disclosure policy are contrary to the directions
issued by this Court in its judgment dated 16.12.2015.
8
Contempt Petition (C) No.928 of 2016
6. The Petitioner filed an application under the RTI Act on
18.12.2015 seeking information relating to the inspection reports
of ICICI bank, AXIS bank, HDFC bank and State Bank of India
from 01.04.2011 to the date of filing of the application. The
Petitioner sought further information relating to the Sahara
Group of Companies and Bank of Rajasthan. The information
sought by the Petitioner was not given by the Central Public
Information Officer of the RBI in view of the exemption from
disclosure under Section 8(1)(a) and (b) as the disclosure was
not in economic interest of the State, and would adversely affect
the competitive position of the third party. Though the Petitioner
was not a party to the judgment of this Court dated 16.12.2015,
he filed the contempt petition as non-furnishing the information
that he sought for was in contravention of the directions issued
by this court by its judgment dated 16.12.2015.
7. Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the contemnors made a valiant effort to impress upon us that the
judgment of this court dated 16.12.2015 needs reconsideration.
He submitted that there is no intention on the part of the
Respondents to disobey the directions given by this Court in the
9
judgment dated 16.12.2015. In respect of Contempt Petition (C)
No. 412 of 2016, he referred to the relevant material to submit
that the only query which remained to be answered by the RBI
was query No.1. After the judgment of this Court, the
information sought for was given to the Petitioner on 18.02.2016.
A contempt petition is not maintainable merely because the
Petitioner is not satisfied with the information given to him.
According to Mr. Gupta it is open to the Petitioner to file another
application for further information if he is of the opinion that the
entire information sought by him was not furnished. In any
event, according to Mr. Gupta, the Contempt Petition is notmaintainable. In so far as the disclosure policy dated 30.11.2016
is concerned, he argued that the said policy is superseded and
no complaint can be filed against the implementation of the
disclosure policy as the said policy does not exist. Moreover,
Mr. Gupta submitted that issuance of the said policy cannot be
held to be a violation of the directions given in the judgment
dated 16.12.2015 inviting a contempt petition. If the Petitioner is
aggrieved by the policy, he has to challenge the policy by
resorting to the remedies available to him in law. He informed
us that the policy dated 30.11.2016 is replaced by another policy
10
which would be put on the website of the RBI. Mr. Gupta
strenuously submitted that a leeway was given to the RBI in the
matter of providing information on certain issues that were
mentioned in paragraph 77 of the judgment. He referred to the
said paragraph to support the disclosure policy. He finally
submitted that if this Court feels that the policy is in violation of
the directions issued by this Court, it would be taken off the
website. The main submission made by Mr. Gupta is that any
application filed under the RTI Act shall have to be dealt with
separately on its own merits.
8. There is an element of public policy in punishing civil
contempt, since administration of justice would be undermined if
the order of any Court of law could be disregarded with
impunity.
2 There is no ambiguity in the judgment of this Court
dated 16.12.2015. After holding that there is no fiduciary
relationship between the RBI and the other banks, this Court
stressed the importance of the RTI Act, and held that it is in the
interest of the general public that the information sought for by
the Respondents therein has to be furnished. There is a specific
reference to the inspection reports and the other materials,
which were directed to be given to the Respondents therein.

2 Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (1973) 3 All ER 54 (HL)
11
The only exception that was carved out by this Court is in
paragraph 77 of the judgment, particularly, information which
has a bearing on the security of the State etc. We are not
persuaded to accept the submission of Mr. Gupta that the
judgment dated 16.12.2015 requires reconsideration as we
cannot consider the said submission while deciding the
contempt petitions. After hearing the learned counsel for the
parties, judgment was reserved in this case on 02.04.2019. The
new disclosure policy was uploaded on the RBI website on
12.04.2019. Mr. Pranav Sachdeva, learned counsel for the
petitioner is right in submitting that the new policy which
replaces the disclosure policy dated 30.11.2016 directs various
departments not to disclose information that was directed to be
given by the judgment of this Court on 16.12.2015. The
Respondents, in our opinion, have committed contempt of this
Court by exempting disclosure of material that was directed to
be given by this Court. In all fairness, Mr. Gupta has submitted
that the disclosure policy shall be deleted from the website.
9. We do not agree with Mr. Gupta that a contempt petition is
maintainable only at the behest of a party to the judgment. The
directions issued by this Court are general in nature and any
12
violation of such directions would enable an aggrieved party to
file a contempt petition.
3
10. Though we could have taken a serious view of the
Respondents continuing to violate the directions issued by this
Court, we give them a last opportunity to withdraw the
disclosure policy insofar as it contains exemptions which are
contrary to the directions issued by this Court. The Respondents
are dutybound to furnish all information relating to inspection
reports and other material apart from the material that was
exempted in para 77 of the judgment. Any further violation shall
be viewed seriously by this Court.
11. The contempt petitions are disposed of with the above
directions.
 ..…................................J.
 [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
 ..…................................J.
 [M.R. SHAH]
New Delhi,
April 26th 2019

3 Priya Gupta v. Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, (2013) 11 SCC 404