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Sunday, March 31, 2019

failed to prove the case of rape = First, the complainant was not examined by the Doctor after the alleged incident. Second, in absence of any medical examination done, the prosecution did not examine any doctor in the trial in support of their case; Third, it was not disputed that similar type of complaints were being made in past by the complainant against other persons also 4 and such complaints were later found false; Fourth, it was also not disputed that there was enmity between the appellant and the husband of the prosecutrix, due to which their relations were not cordial; Fifth, it had also come in evidence that the prosecutrix was in habit of implicating all the persons by making wild allegations of such nature against those with whom she or/and her husband were having any kind of disputes; Sixth, there was no eye witness to the alleged incident and the one, who was cited as witness, i.e., PW­2 was a chance witness on whose testimony, a charge of rape could not be established; and lastly, so far as PW­1, husband of the complainant, is concerned, he admitted that he was away and returned to village the next day morning of the incident. In the light of the aforementioned seven reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the case of rape alleged by the Complainant(PW­3) against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, there is no evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the commission of the offence of rape by the appellant on PW­3 and the evidence adduced is not sufficient to prove the case of rape against the appellant. Both the Courts below were, therefore, not justified in convicting the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 376 IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years. He was entitled for acquittal.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL  APPEAL No.526 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No.8664 of 2014)
Ganga Prasad Mahto  ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
State of Bihar & Anr.       ….Respondent(s)
               
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This   appeal   is   directed   against   the   final
judgment and order dated 30.01.2014 passed by
the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Patna   in   Crl.A.
No.251 of 2002 whereby the High Court dismissed
the appeal filed by the appellant herein and upheld
1
the   order   dated   24.04.2002   of   the   4th  Additional
District & Sessions Judge, Samastipur in Sessions
Trial No.233 of 1999.
3. The appeal involves a short point as would be
clear from the facts stated infra.
4. The appellant was prosecuted and eventually
convicted for an offence punishable under Section
376   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code,   1860   (hereinafter
referred   to   as   “IPC”)     and   sentenced   to   undergo
rigorous imprisonment for 7 years by the Sessions
Judge. The conviction and sentence was upheld by
the High Court. The appellant (accused) is now in
appeal   in   this   Court   against   his   concurrent
conviction/sentence.
5. So,   the   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration   in   this   appeal,   is   whether   the   two
Courts   below   were   justified   in   convicting   the
2
appellant for an offence punishable under Section
376 IPC.
6. PW­   3     lodged   a   complaint   on   15.12.1997
complaining   therein   that   the   appellant   in   the
previous night at around 8.00 PM entered into her
house when she was alone and threatened her by
showing pistol and committed rape on her. This,  in
substance,  was the allegation in the FIR, which was
lodged by PW­3 on the next day of the incident.
7. The   prosecution   examined   three   witnesses.
Hari Narain  Singh  (PW­1) is the  husband  of  the
complainant.  Ram Udgar Singh(PW­2) claims to be
the person living near the complainant’s house and
PW­3 is the complainant(prosecutrix).
8. As mentioned above, the Sessions Judge and
the   High   Court   convicted   the   appellant   placing
3
reliance   on   the   evidence   of   three   prosecution
witnesses.
9. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
are constrained to allow the appeal and set aside
the impugned order.
10. In our considered opinion, the prosecution has
failed to prove the case of rape alleged against the
appellant at the instance of the complainant(PW­3).
This we say for the following reasons:
11. First, the complainant was not examined by
the   Doctor   after   the   alleged   incident.   Second,   in
absence   of   any   medical   examination   done,   the
prosecution did not examine any doctor in the trial
in support of their case; Third, it was not disputed
that similar type of complaints were being made in
past by the complainant against other persons also
4
and such complaints were later found false; Fourth,
it   was   also   not   disputed   that   there   was   enmity
between   the   appellant   and   the   husband   of   the
prosecutrix, due to which their relations were not
cordial; Fifth, it had also come in evidence that the
prosecutrix   was   in   habit   of   implicating   all   the
persons by making wild allegations of such nature
against those with whom she or/and her husband
were having any kind of disputes; Sixth, there was
no eye witness to the alleged incident and the one,
who was cited as witness, i.e., PW­2 was a chance
witness on whose testimony, a charge of rape could
not be established; and lastly, so far as     PW­1,
husband   of   the   complainant,   is   concerned,   he
admitted that he was away and returned to village
the next day morning of the incident.
5
12. In   the   light   of   the   aforementioned   seven
reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the
prosecution   has   failed  to   prove   the  case   of   rape
alleged   by     the   Complainant(PW­3)   against   the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt. In other words,
there is no evidence adduced by the prosecution to
prove the commission of the offence of rape by the
appellant on PW­3 and the evidence adduced is not
sufficient   to   prove   the   case   of   rape   against   the
appellant. 
13. Both   the   Courts   below   were,   therefore,   not
justified in convicting the appellant for an offence
punishable under Section 376 IPC and sentenced
him   to   undergo   rigorous   imprisonment   for   seven
years. He was entitled for acquittal. 
14. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal
succeeds and is accordingly allowed.  The impugned
6
order is set aside. The appellant is acquitted from
the charges leveled against him. He is accordingly
set free. His bail bonds are accordingly discharged.

………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                       
                                               
....……..................................J.
        [DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
March 26, 2019.
7

wire ropes used in the Mobile Cranes are a part of the Mobile Cranes and thus fall in Entry 155 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act. = It is for this reason, we are of the considered opinion that the Mobile Crane Wire Rope is an essential part of the Mobile Crane and, therefore, falls in Entry 155 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act. It is, therefore, taxable at the rates prescribed for the goods specified in Entry 155.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL  APPEAL No.3198 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.11937 of 2017)
CTO, Anti Evasion, Circle III,
Rajasthan, Jaipur ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
M/s Prasoon Enterprises, Jaipur            ….Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL  APPEAL Nos.3199­3200 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.4837­4838 of 2017)
CIVIL  APPEAL Nos.3201­3202 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.4839­4840 of 2017)
AND
CIVIL  APPEAL No.3203 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.5981 of 2017)
               
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
In C.A. @ S.L.P.(c) No.11937/2017
1. Leave granted.
1 1
2. This appeal is filed against the final judgment
and   order   dated   05.01.2017  passed   by   the   High
Court of judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench,
Jaipur in S.B. Sales Tax Revision Petition No.114 of
2016 whereby the High Court dismissed the revision
petition filed by the appellant herein.
3. The appeal involves a short point as would be
clear from the undisputed facts stated infra.
4. The   appellant   herein­State   of   Rajasthan
(Commercial   Tax   Department)   is   the   revision
petitioner   whereas   the   respondent   herein   is   the
respondent of the revision petition before the High
Court out of which this appeal arises.
5. The respondent is engaged in the business of
trading of spare parts of mining machinery, steel
wire ropes, standard wires, wire rods etc.   These
goods are subjected to payment of Value Added Tax
(VAT) under the Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act,
2 2
2003   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “VAT   Act”).   The
respondent is a registered dealer under the VAT Act.
6. The Commercial Tax Officer (AE) [hereinafter
referred   to  as   “CTO”]   conducted   a   survey  in   the
respondent’s business premises on 16.03.2009 and
it   was   noticed   therein   that   the   respondent   was
charging VAT at the rate of 4% on "Mobile Crane
Wire Ropes”.
7. It is with this background fact, the question
arose before the taxing authorities under the VAT
Act as to which is the proper Entry under the VAT
Act for charging tax on "Mobile Crane Wire Ropes".
8. The aforementioned question arose before the
CTO   in   the   assessment   proceedings,   which   were
initiated against the respondent in their business
premises as a result of the survey conducted by the
CTO   and   also   arose   before   the   Deputy
3 3
Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department to seek
his advance ruling on the aforementioned question.
9. The CTO and the Deputy Commissioner were
of the view that the rate of tax chargeable to the
goods  in question  is 12.5%  as prescribed in  the
Residuary Entry in Schedule V under the Act and
not 4% as prescribed in Entry 155 of Schedule IV of
the VAT Act.
10. In   other   words,   both   the   taxing   authorities
were of the view that the proper Entry for payment
of  tax  on   these  goods is  the  Residuary  Entry of
Schedule   V,   which   prescribes   the   rate   of   tax   as
12.5%.
11. The CTO accordingly initiated the assessment
proceedings   against   the   respondent   for   the
Assessment Year 2007­2008.  By assessment order
dated 16.03.2009, it was held that the respondent
was liable to pay VAT at the rate of 12.5% under the
4 4
Residuary   Entry   of   Schedule   V   of   the   VAT   Act.
Since the respondent had deposited the tax at the
rate of 4% treating the goods in question as falling
in Entry 155 of Schedule IV, the notice was issued
to the respondent to pay the difference amount of
VAT along with penalty and the  interest payable
under the VAT Act.
12. The respondent felt aggrieved and filed appeal
before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals). By order
dated 02.12.2010, the Appellate Authority allowed
the appeal and set aside the order of the CTO (AE).
The   Appellate   Authority   held   that   the   ropes   in
question were essentially used in Mobile Cranes as
part of the Mobile Cranes. It was held that a Mobile
Crane   is   not   complete   and   nor   it   can   effectively
function   without   the   use   of   the   rope.     It   was,
therefore, held that the rope is a part of a Mobile
Crane and chargeable to VAT in accordance with
5 5
rates prescribed in the Entry 155 of Schedule IV of
the Act.
13. The State (CTO) felt aggrieved and filed appeal
before the Rajasthan Tax Board under Section 83 of
the VAT Act.  By order dated 06.01.2016, the Board
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the
Deputy   Commissioner.     The   State   (CTO)   felt
aggrieved   and   filed   revision   petition   in   the   High
Court of Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur.
14. By impugned order, the High Court dismissed
the   revision   and   upheld   the   order   of   the   Board,
which has given rise to filing of this appeal by way
of special leave by the State (CTO) in this Court.
15. So,   the   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the High
Court   was   justified   in   dismissing   the   appellant's
(State/CTO)   revision   and   thereby   justified   in
upholding the  view taken  by  the Board that  the
6 6
"Mobile Crane Wire Ropes" are chargeable to tax @
4% under Entry 155 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act.
16. Heard Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned AAG for the
appellant and Ms. Jyoti Mendiratta, learned counsel
for the respondent.
17. Learned counsel for the appellant (CTO) while
assailing   the   legality   and   correctness   of   the
impugned order reiterated the same submissions,
which were urged before the High Court.
18. In   substance,   his   submission   was   that   the
goods in question are chargeable to tax at the rate
of   12.5%,   which   is   the   rate   prescribed   in   the
Residuary Entry of Schedule V of VAT Act because,
according to the learned counsel, there is no specific
Entry under which the goods in question fall for
being taxed at a specified rate. 
19. In other words, the submission was that since
the goods in question are not specified in any of the
7 7
Entries in Schedule IV and Schedule V of the VAT
Act and nor they are the parts of the Mobile Cranes,
the only Entry under which they can be taxed is the
Residuary Entry of Schedule V of the VAT Act.
20. In   reply,   the   learned   counsel   for   the
respondent (dealer) supported the impugned order
and   contended   that   it   does   not   call   for   any
interference.
21. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case
including the written submissions, we find no merit
in this appeal.
22. As taken note of  supra, the question, which
arises for consideration in this case, is whether the
"Mobile Cranes Wire Ropes" are chargeable to tax at
the rate of 4% or 12.5% under the VAT Act.
23. In other words, the question arises is whether
the goods "Mobile Cranes Wire Ropes" fall under
8 8
Entry 155 of Schedule IV or under the Residuary
Entry of Schedule V of the  VAT Act.
24. At the relevant time, there were two relevant
Entries which read as under:
SCHEDULE IV
[See section 4]
Goods Taxable at 4%
S.No. Description of Goods Rate of
Tax %
Conditions, if any
1. 2. 3. 4.
155. Hydraulic excavators
(earth moving and mining
machinery), mobile
cranes and hydraulic
dumpers (including parts
thereof).
Bracketed portion was inserted by
Notification
No.F.12(63)FD/Tax/2005­51 dated
08.05.2006 vide S.O. No.99 dated
09.05.2006
4
SCHEDULE V
[See section 4]
Goods Taxable at 12.5%
S.No Description of Goods Rate of Tax %Conditions, if any
1 2 3 4
1. Goods not covered in any other
Schedule under the Act or under
any notification issued under
section 4 of the Act.
12.5
25. Mere reading of Entry 155 quoted above would
go   to   show   that   the   goods   called   Hydraulic
9 9
excavators (earth moving and mining machinery),
Mobile Cranes and Hydraulic Dumpers (including
parts thereof) are chargeable to tax at the rate of
4%.
26. It may be mentioned here that the expression
“including parts thereof” was inserted in the Entry
155   by   an   amendment   w.e.f.   09.05.2006.   It,
therefore,   indicates   that   the   parts   of   the   goods
specified in the Entry were not chargeable to tax at
the   rate   of   4%   prior   to   09.05.2006   but   became
chargeable   at   the   rate   of   4%   only   on   and   after
09.05.2006.
27. This Court has laid down the test as to how
the Court should decide the question as to whether
a particular item is a part of other.  The test is “a
thing   is   a   part   of   the   other   if   the   other   is
incomplete without it”.   In other words, “a thing
is   a   part   of   the   other,   if   the   other   cannot
10 10
function   without   it”.   [See   M/s   Annapurna
Carbon   Industries  vs.  State   of   Andhra   Pradesh
[(1976) 2 SCC 273 and  Commissioner  of  Central
Excise,   Delhi  vs.  Insulation   Electrical   Private
Limited (2008) 12 SCC 45)]
28. When we apply this principle to the facts of the
case at hand then we find no difficulty in holding
that the wire ropes used in the Mobile Cranes are a
part of the Mobile Cranes and thus fall in Entry 155
of  Schedule IV of the VAT Act. 
29. A fortiori, it is taxable at the rate of 4%. The
reasons are not far to seek.
30. The respondent has filed (Annexure R­1), the
complete literature with a view to show as to how
the Mobile cranes are designed, structured, built
and operated in the field when it put to its ultimate
use   by   the   consumer.   They   have   also   filed   the
11 11
details of the specification issued by the Bureau of
Indian Standards specifying therein the strength of
each   wire   rod/rope,   which   is   used   in   the
manufacture of different kind of Cranes.   
31. Mere perusal of the literature would go to show
that the Mobile Cranes are not complete without the
wire   ropes.   In   other   words,   in   order   to   use   the
Mobile Cranes and make them operational, the use
of wire ropes is essential.  If wire ropes are not fitted
in the Mobile Cranes, they will not function much
less effectively.
32. It is for this reason, we are of the considered
opinion   that   the   Mobile   Crane   Wire   Rope   is   an
essential part of the Mobile Crane and, therefore,
falls in Entry 155 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act.  It
is, therefore, taxable at the rates prescribed for the
goods specified in Entry 155.
12 12
33. We,   however,   make   it   clear   that   we   have
examined only the question of taxability of the “wire
ropes” in the context of its use in Mobile Cranes as
would be clear from the question posed by the High
Court in Para one of the impugned order.
34. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal
is found to be devoid of any merit and it thus fails
and is accordingly dismissed.
In C.A.Nos. @ S.L.P.(c) Nos.4837­4838/2017,
4839­4840/2017 and 5981/2017
1. Leave granted.
2. These   appeals   are   directed   against   the
common final judgment and order dated 07.10.2016
passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   for
Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench at Jaipur in S.B. Sales Tax
Revision Petition Nos.106, 101, 99, 100/2013 and
449/2011 whereby the High Court dismissed the
revision petitions filed by the appellant herein.
13 13
3. In view of the order passed above in C.A. @
S.L.P.(C)   No.11937/2017,   these   appeals   are
dismissed.     
                                     .………...................................J.
                                   [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]   
                               
     …...……..................................J.
             [DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
March 26, 2019
14 14

Terimination of employement = In our opinion, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case coupled with the fact that there were several complaints, which were being regularly received by the appellant against the respondent during his tenure, and further the appellant having lost their confidence on the respondent and also the fact that the respondent was appointed temporarily under Rule 8 of the Regulations to take care of the appellant’s guest house and lastly, it is now almost 19 years that the respondent has been out of appellant’s services, we are of the view that the interest of justice would be met if a compensation of Rs.One Lakh (Rs.1,00,000/­) is awarded to the respondent in full and final satisfaction in lieu of his right to claim reinstatement in the appellant's services and also in lieu of all his service claims against the appellant. It will also balance the equities between the parties and will put to an end to this litigation

NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.3197 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 22909 of 2017)
The Regional Manager,
Life Insurance Corporation of India ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Dinesh Singh       ….Respondent(s)
             
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment
and   order   dated   10.03.2017   of   the   High   Court   of
Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Petition No. 3067
1
of 2015 whereby the High Court dismissed the petition
filed by the appellant herein.
3. The appeal involves a short point as is clear from
the facts stated hereinbelow.
4. The respondent was appointed as a Caretaker on
temporary   basis   by   the   appellant   (LIC)   on   a   fixed
salary   of   Rs.   1000/­   p.m.   in   the   year   1994.   The
respondent's job was to act as a Caretaker of one VIP
Guesthouse of the appellant at Bhopal.
5. The appointment of respondent was made under
Regulation No. 8 of the Regulations framed under the
Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, which empowers
the officers specified therein to appoint any person of
Class III and IV category on temporary basis from time
to time.
6.  The services of the respondent were brought to
an end in the year 2001 by the appellant (LIC) which
gave   rise   to   making   a   reference   to   the   Industrial
2
Tribunal   (CGIT),   Jabalpur   being
No.CGIT/LC/101/2005 by the Central Government for
deciding the legality of the termination order of the
respondent.
7. By   award   dated   11.02.2014,   the   Tribunal
answered   the   reference   partly   in   favour   of   the
respondent.   The   Tribunal   set   aside   the   termination
order of the respondent and directed the appellant to
reinstate him in their services but without payment of
any back wages to him.
8. The appellant (LIC) felt aggrieved by the order of
the Tribunal and filed a writ petition in the High Court
of MP at Jabalpur. By impugned order, the High Court
(Single Judge) dismissed the appellant's writ petition
and   affirmed   the   award   of   the   Industrial   Tribunal
which gives rise to filing of the present appeal by way
of special leave in this Court by the appellant(LIC).
3
9. Heard Mr. Gurukrishan Kumar, learned senior
counsel for the appellant and Ms. Anuradha Mutatkar,
learned counsel for the respondent.
10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and   on   perusal   of   the   record   of   the   case,   we   are
inclined to allow the appeal and modify the impugned
order to the extent indicated below.
11. In our opinion, having regard to the peculiar facts
and circumstances of this case coupled with the fact
that there were several complaints, which were being
regularly   received   by   the   appellant   against   the
respondent   during   his   tenure,   and   further   the
appellant   having   lost   their   confidence   on   the
respondent and also the fact that the respondent was
appointed temporarily under Rule 8 of the Regulations
to take care of the appellant’s guest house and lastly,
it is now almost 19 years that the respondent has been
out of appellant’s services, we are of the view that the
4
interest of justice would be met if a compensation of
Rs.One   Lakh   (Rs.1,00,000/­)   is   awarded   to   the
respondent in full and final satisfaction in lieu of his
right to claim reinstatement in the appellant's services
and also in lieu of all his service claims against the
appellant. It will also balance the equities between the
parties and will put to an end to this litigation.
12. Since we have formed an opinion to dispose of
this appeal by awarding to the respondent a lump sum
compensation of Rs. one Lakh in lieu of his all claims
arising   out   of   this   case,   we   do   not   consider   it
necessary to examine any legal issue arising in the
case though argued by the learned counsel for the
parties in support of their respective contentions.
13.    We, however, make it clear that, as mentioned
above,   this   order   is   passed   keeping   in   view   the
peculiar facts of this case, which we have taken note of
5
on perusal of the record of this case and hearing the
submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.
14. The  appellant  is  accordingly  directed  to  pay  a
sum of Rs. one Lac (Rs.1,00,000/­) to the respondent
within a period of 3 months from today.
15. The   appeal   is   accordingly   disposed   of.   The
impugned   order   is   thus   modified   to   the   extent
indicated above.
………...................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]   
               
                                               
....……..................................J.
        [DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
March 26, 2019.
6

whether the definition of “excluded employees” in Paragraph 2(f) as also the stipulation in Paragraphs 26 and 69 of the Scheme of 1952 refer to any provident fund or only to the Fund under the Scheme of 1952? = if a person is member of the Fund created thereunder i.e., under the Scheme of 1952 and withdraws all his accumulations therein, he may not be obliged to be a member of the same Fund under the Scheme of 1952 over again and could be treated as an “excluded employees”. However, such is not the relaxation granted in relation to an employee who was earlier a member of any other Fund but later on joins such an establishment where he would be entitled to membership of the Fund created under the Scheme of 1952. This framework of the provisions and stipulations appears to be best serving the interest of employees, while providing them with continued financial security.

REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7698 OF 2009
MODERN TRANSPORTATION CONSULTATION
SERVICES PVT. LTD. & ANR. ..... APPELLANT(S)
VS.
CENTRAL PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER
EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND
ORGANISATION & ORS. ..... RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
Dinesh Maheshwari, J.
1. In this appeal by special leave, the appellants (writ petitioners) have called
in question the judgment and order dated 07.05.2008 in FMA No. 537 of 2007
whereby, the Division Bench of High Court at Calcutta has reversed the order
dated 07.04.2006, as passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 2982(W) of
2005.
1.1. By the aforesaid order dated 07.04.2006, the learned Single Judge of High
Court allowed the writ petition filed by the appellants while upholding their
contentions that the employees of Railways, who had withdrawn full amount of
1
provident fund while retiring and who were engaged by them on lump sum
honorarium basis, should be treated as “excluded employees" for the purpose of
the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'/'the Act of 1952') and the Employees'
Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Scheme of 1952').
However, in the Letters Patent appeal preferred by the Central Provident Fund
Commissioner and the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, the Division
Bench of High Court totally disagreed with the learned Single Judge; and
dismissed the writ petition while holding that the said employees, who retired
after serving an exempted employer, would not fall within the category of
excluded employees on re-employment and would be covered by the Act and the
Scheme of 1952.
2. The basic question arising for determination in this appeal is as to whether
the retired employees of Railways, who had withdrawn all the superannuation
benefits, including full amount of accumulations in their provident fund accounts,
are to be treated as "excluded employees" in terms of Paragraph 2(f) of the
Scheme of 1952? If to be treated as "excluded employees", the said retired
employees of Railways, on being re-employed by the appellants, may not be
required to join the Fund created under the said Scheme of 1952 and
consequently, the appellants may not be obliged to make any contribution in that
regard.
2
3. The relevant factual aspects leading to the question aforesaid are not of
much controversy and could be briefly summarised as follows:
3.1. The appellant No. 1, a Private Limited Company, had been engaged in
manning the Captive Railway System of the respondent No. 4-Damodar Valley
Corporation ('DVC'). The appellant No. 2 is said to be a Director of the appellant
No. 1-company. The appellants would submit that their only connection with DVC
had been a contract to supply the personnel for manning the cabins and gates on
the railway-road; and they were receiving the remuneration for supplying the
aforesaid personnel, who were retired employees of the Indian Railways and
were engaged on a lump sum honorarium basis.
3.2. By his letter dated 18.02.2002, the Assistant Provident Fund
Commissioner Circle-IV, Calcutta informed the appellant-company that the
number of employees of its establishment being twenty-eight in the month of
May, 1999, the establishment came within the purview of the Act of 1952 with
effect from 01.05.1999. In reply, the Director of the appellant-company stated in
his letter dated 05.03.2002 that all the persons engaged by the company, except
two of them, were the retired Railway employees above 58 years of age; that all
of them were working only on retainer basis; and that they were not covered
under the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme. The said Assistant Provident
Fund Commissioner, in his letter dated 03.05.2002, refuted the contentions of the
appellants while referring to Paragraph 26 of the Scheme of 1952 and while
3
asserting, inter alia, that on and from 01.11.1990, an employee is eligible for
enrolment as a member of the Scheme of 1952 from the date of joining an
establishment covered under the Act of 1952; that there was no age bar for an
employee to become a member of the Scheme of 1952; and that the employees
in question were not excluded employees in terms of the Scheme of 1952.
3.3. It appears that the appellant-company applied for exemption under Section
17 of the Act and Paragraph 27 of the Scheme of 1952 on the ground that the
persons concerned were retired Railway employees but then, no decision was
taken on such representations. On the other hand, by yet another letter dated
22.05.2002, the appellant-company elaborated on its contentions that the
employees in question, being retired employees of Railways, did not come within
the purview of the Act of 1952 and were to be treated as "excluded employees"
under Paragraph 26 of the Scheme of 1952. It was stated that these employees,
whilst in the service of Railways, were not covered under the Scheme of 1952
but were covered under the General Provident Fund (‘GPF’) Scheme and had
withdrawn all the superannuation benefits including Provident Fund (‘PF’) and
pension and hence, they were not covered under the Act of 1952. It was also
claimed that these employees were in receipt of more favourable benefits than
those available under the Scheme of 1952 and had expressed their unwillingness
to become the members of the Scheme of 1952. However, the authorities related
with the Employees' Provident Fund Organisation (the contesting respondents
4
herein) maintained that the employees of an establishment were eligible for
enrolment as members of the Scheme of 1952 irrespective of age; and the
employees of the appellant company were not "excluded employees", as defined
in the Scheme of 1952.
3.4. The appellant-company having failed to remit the requisite contribution in
relation to the employees concerned, the competent authority under the Act of
1952 commenced proceedings under Section 7A thereof, for determination of the
money due from the appellants. By its order dated 31.12.2004, the competent
authority, after having heard the appellants, determined the amount payable by
the appellant-company under various heads while holding, inter alia, that the
provisions of the Act of 1952 were not repugnant to the GPF Scheme; that a
person was entitled to draw double or multiple pension/s; and that the retirement
of the employees from Railways would not take them within the definition of
"excluded employees". Aggrieved, the appellants preferred the writ petition
before the High Court at Calcutta [W.P. No. 2982(W) of 2005].
4. In the impugned order dated 07.04.2006, the learned Single Judge of High
Court, though held that the Act was applicable to the establishment of appellants
but, thereafter, concluded that on superannuation, the retired employees of the
Railways would fall within the definition of “excluded employees”. The learned
Single Judge observed that an employee, who had withdrawn full amount of his
accumulation in the fund, on re-employment with any establishment not
5
exempted under Section 17 of the Act, would not be again treated as an
employee to be covered under the Act. The learned Single Judge further
observed that accepting the submissions of the authorities would create a
situation where an employee, after being employed in any establishment and
working for some time, may voluntarily retire from service and join another
establishment and keep on doing so successively and get the benefit of various
provisions of the Act of 1952. According to the learned Single Judge, even
though the Act of 1952 is a piece of social benefit legislation, and its provisions
are intended to protect the employees, who are considered to be the weaker
section of society, yet, the enactment is not intended to create a largesse in
favour of the employees at the cost of the employer. In the opinion of learned
Single Judge, the retired employees of Railways cannot be compelled to become
members of the Fund and else, the object and purpose of the expression
“excluded employees” in the Scheme of 1952 would be rendered nugatory. The
learned Single Judge also observed that when an employee earning more than
Rs. 6,500/- was treated as an “excluded employee” because of the scale of pay
as per Paragraph 2(f)(ii) of the Scheme of 1952, there was no reason as to why
Paragraph 2(f)(i) would not apply in case of an employee who had withdrawn the
full amount of his accumulations. The learned Single Judge further observed that
in order to decide as to whether the provisions of the Act do not apply in respect
of some of the employees, the provisions contained in Paragraph 2(f) of the
Scheme of 1952 must be strictly construed; and having taken the benefit of one
6
Scheme, the employees cannot compel the employer to comply with the
provisions of the Act. With these observations, the learned Single Judge allowed
the writ petition and remanded the matter to the authorities for re-determination
of the amount of provident fund payable by the appellants, after treating the
retired employees as “excluded employees”, but after taking into account those
employees who were seeking to be included under the Act voluntarily.
5. Aggrieved by the order so passed by the learned Single Judge, the Central
Provident Fund Commissioner and the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner
preferred the Letters Patent appeal that has been considered and allowed by the
Division Bench of High Court at Calcutta by way of the impugned judgment and
order dated 07.05.2008.
5.1. The Division Bench took note of the meaning assigned to the expressions
“Fund” and “Scheme” in the Act of 1952 as also the definition of “excluded
employee” in Paragraph 2(f) of the Scheme of 1952 and rejected the contentions
of the writ petitioners that the employees in question were to be treated as
excluded employees while observing as under:
“We are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Sengupta that the
receipt of GPF and the Pension by the retired railway employees would
be as if full payment has been received under paragraph 69(1). There
can be no addition to the term “Fund” as defined under Section 2(h). It is
also not possible to accept that since the Railway Employees have
retired on superannuation and are beyond the age of 55 years, they
would be on par with the “excluded employees”. There is no maximum
age limit prescribed in any of the provisions of the Act or the 1952
Scheme for an employee to become a member of the Fund or the
Scheme. It is claimed that the term “Scheme” refers only to the
7
Employees Provident Fund Scheme framed under Section 5. The term
“excluded employee” therefore has to be co-related to the employee who
was a member of the “fund” as defined under Section 2(h) of the Act.
Such an employee would be an “excluded employee” when the full
amount has been withdrawn by him on retirement from service after
attaining the age of 55 years i.e., in terms of Paragraph 69(1)(a). The
provision being crystal clear does not admit of any other interpretation.
Paragraph 69(1)(c) deals with an employee who withdraws the full
amount standing to his credit immediately after migration from India for
permanent settlement abroad and for taking employment abroad.
In our opinion, there can be no dissections of these provisions as
proposed by Mr. Sengupta. Under paragraph 2(f)(i) a retired employee
would be an excluded employee. Under Paragraph 2(f)(ii) an employee
who is otherwise entitled to become a Member of the fund becomes an
excluded employee as he is earning beyond the stipulated minimum that
is required for an employee to become a Member of the Scheme. This
provision clearly demonstrates the underlying principle of the Provident
Fund Act is to provide social security for those employees who otherwise
would not be in a position to save any money from their wages.
Paragraph 2(f)(iv) again provides that an apprentice shall be an excluded
employee till he becomes a fullfledged employee. There is a qualitative
difference between Paragraph 2(f)(i) on the one hand and Paragraph 2(f)
(ii) & (iv) on the other. Paragraph 2(f) 1(i) provides exclusion only to the
employees who have already received retirement benefits. On the other
hand, under Clause 2(f)(ii) and 2(f)(iv) an employee may be an excluded
employee at one point and may not be at a subsequent point. But benefit
of these provisions cannot be extended to any employees who are not
erstwhile members of a fund administered by the Central Board, under
Section 5A of the Act
The ‘Fund’ created by the exempted establishment under Section
17(1)(a) cannot be equated with the Fund which is established by the
Central Board under Section 5(1). Nor can it be added to the definition of
Fund under Section 2(h) of the Act. It is for this reason that the
appropriate Government can only exempt an establishment from the
operation of the scheme under Section 17(1) upon forming an opinion
that the employees of such an establishment enjoyed benefits which are
not less favourable to the employee than the benefits available under the
Act or any Scheme made under the Act. In fact, the exemption can only
be granted on consultation with the Central Board. This provision is
made only to give supervisory control to the Appropriate Government
over individual employers seeking exemption. But this provision cannot
be put on the same pedestal as Section 5(1) of the Act. It is admitted
position that employees of the Railways are not members of the 1952
Scheme. Therefore, these retired employees cannot be treated as
excluded employees covered under Paragraphs 69(1)(a) and 26 of the
8
1952 Scheme. There is a clear distinction between a fund which is
created by the Central Government and is administered by the Central
Board under Section 5(1)(a) and a fund created by a private employer,
exempted under Section 17(1) and administered by Board of Trustees
under Section 17(1A) and (b). There can be no intermingling of the two
provisions. ”
5.2. In view of the above, the Division Bench concluded on the matter in the
following:
“In view of the above, we find that the judgment of the learned
Single Judge is not sustainable in law. We are unable to hold that retired
employees of the Railways can be treated as excluded employees. We
are also unable to hold that, not including the retired employees in the
category of excluded employees would in any manner contravene the
provisions of the Act or the Scheme. We are unable to accept that
bringing the Railway employees within the purview of the Act and the
Scheme would result in unjust enrichment of the retired employees. We
are of the opinion that an employee who retires after serving an
exempted employer would not fall within the category of excluded
employees on re-employment and would be covered by the Act and the
1952 Scheme. We are also unable to accept that since the employees
covered under Paragraph 2(f)(i) and (ii) are excluded employees, all
employees who had drawn the full amount from any other Provident
Fund should also be treated as excluded employees.
In view of the above, we allow this appeal and set aside the order
passed by the learned Single Judge.
Consequently, the writ petition being W.P. No. 2982(W) of 2005
shall be dismissed.”
6. Assailing the judgment aforesaid, learned counsel for the appellant has
strenuously argued that the Division Bench of High Court has erred in
interpreting the term “excluded employee” and in holding that the retired
employees of the Railways, even when they had withdrawn the full amount from
their provident fund, cannot be treated as excluded employees. The learned
counsel emphasised on the submissions that the retired Railway employees, who
9
were covered under GPF Scheme while in service, who had drawn all the
superannuation benefits including the PF, and who were also receiving pension
under the CPG rules, would fall within the definition of "excluded employees" as
contained in clause (i) of Paragraph 2(f) of the Scheme of 1952. Learned counsel
submitted that as per Paragraph 26 thereof, the Scheme of 1952 shall apply to all
the employees other than excluded employees; and, as per Paragraph 2(f)(i), an
excluded employee is the one who, having been a member of a provident fund,
had withdrawn the full amount of his accumulations in the fund under clause (a)
or (c) of sub-paragraph (1) of Paragraph 69. Therefore, according to the learned
counsel, the employees concerned in the present case ought to be treated as
“excluded employees”, for having withdrawn their PF accumulated with the Indian
Railways after having reached the age of superannuation. Further, according to
the learned counsel, if these employees are not treated as “excluded
employees”, it would amount to their unjust enrichment, which has never been
the intention of the Act of 1952 or the Scheme thereunder. The learned counsel
contended that the Division Bench of High Court has erred in holding that
Paragraph 69 of the said Scheme does not apply to the case of retired Railway
employees and such retired employees, though not covered under the Act, came
to be so covered on their re-employment in an establishment covered under the
said Act. According to the learned counsel, the Division Bench has erred in
interpreting the definitions of ‘Fund’ and ‘Scheme’ and in restricting the definition
of ‘Fund’ under Section 2(h) of the Act by holding that even after retiring from the
10
Railways and receiving the benefits under GPF Scheme, the said employees are
not "excluded employees" as the said employer is not covered under the Scheme
of 1952.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the contesting respondents has referred to
the object as also the arrangement of the Act of 1952 and has particularly
submitted that two different sets of provident fund Schemes are envisioned: on
one hand is the Scheme contemplated by Section 5 of the Act, the Scheme of
1952 being that Scheme; and on the other hand, there could be other Scheme/s,
as permissible under Section 17 of the Act of 1952. According to the learned
counsel, coverage of the employees referable to the Act of 1952 by one of the
Schemes of provident fund is the rule and generally, such employees would be
covered by the Scheme of 1952 with the exception that such coverage may not
be necessary when the employees receive the benefits under some other
Scheme, which are not less than those available under the Scheme of 1952.
Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in the framework of the
Scheme of 1952, only some specific classes of employees are treated as
“excluded employees”, as defined in Paragraph 2(f) thereof; and, as per clause
(i) of Paragraph 2(f), only such an employee would be excluded who was earlier
the member of the Fund under the Scheme of 1952 and had withdrawn all the
benefits thereunder. According to the learned counsel, the present appeal is
devoid of merits for the reason that the Railway employees, who were not
11
covered under the Scheme of 1952, do not fall within the definition of “excluded
employees” as per Paragraph 2(f) of the Scheme of 1952, even if they had
withdrawn the amount standing to their credit in any provident fund created under
any other Scheme.
8. We have bestowed thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and
have examined the record of the case with reference to the law applicable.
9. For determination of the question involved in this matter, appropriate it
would be to briefly take note of the objects and reasons behind the Act of 1952
as also the relevant provisions thereof and the relevant stipulations in the
Scheme framed thereunder i.e., the Scheme of 1952.
9.1. The background aspects had been that, taking note of the need to provide
for the institution of contributory provident funds for the purpose of financial
security of industrial workers, the Government of India promulgated the
Employees' Provident Fund Ordinance with effect from 15.11.1951, which was
later on replaced by the Act of 19521
. Thus, the concept underlying the
enactment had been of providing for compulsory contributory provident funds for
safeguarding the future of industrial workers. Elaborate provisions have been
made in the Act for creation of a Fund, to be settled in accordance with a
Scheme to be framed by the Central Government. However, the Act also
1 The Act was originally enacted on 04.03.1952 as "The Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952" (No. 19
of 1952); its nomenclature was changed to "The Employees' Provident Funds and Family Pension Fund
Act, 1952" w.e.f. 23.04.1971; and its nomenclature was again changed to the present one i.e., "The
Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952" w.e.f. 01.08.1976.
12
provides for continuation of such of the other provident funds, which are offering
equal or more advantageous terms to the employees concerned and are
operating efficiently.
9.1.1. In the Act of 1952, the expression “employee” is defined in clause (f) of
Section 2 as under:
“(f) “employee” means any person who is employed for wages in any
kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an
establishment, and who gets, his wages directly or indirectly from the
employer, and includes any person,-
(i) employed by or through a contractor in or in connection with the work
of the establishment;
(ii) engaged as an apprentice, not being an apprentice engaged under
the Apprentices Act, 1961 (52 of 1961), or under the standing orders of
the establishment;”
9.1.2. The concepts of “exempted employee” and “exempted establishment” are
defined in clauses (ff) and (fff) of Section 2 of the Act of 1952 as under:
“(ff) “exempted employee” means an employee to whom a Scheme or
the Insurance Scheme, as the case may be, would, but for the exemption
granted under section 17, have applied;
(fff) “exempted establishment” means an establishment in respect of
which an exemption has been granted under section 17 from the
operation of all or any of the provisions of any Scheme or the Insurance
Scheme, as the case may be, whether such exemption has been granted
to the establishment as such or to any person or class of persons
employed therein;”
9.1.3. The expression “Fund” is defined in clause (h) of Section 2 of the Act of
1952 as under:
“(h) “Fund” means the provident fund established under a Scheme;”
13
9.1.4. The expression “Scheme” means the one framed under Section 5 of the
Act of 1952 and is defined in clause (l) of Section 2 as under:
“(l) “Scheme” means the Employees Provident Fund Scheme framed
under section 5;”
9.1.5. Section 5 of the Act of 1952, providing for the Employees’ Provident Fund
Scheme, reads as under2
:
"5. Employees’ Provident Funds Scheme. – (1) The Central
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, frame a scheme
to be called the Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme for the
establishment of provident funds under this Act for employees or for any
class of employees and specify the establishments or class of
establishments to which the said Scheme shall apply and there shall be
established, as soon as may be after the framing of the Scheme, a Fund
in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Scheme.
(1A) The Fund shall vest in, and be administered by, the Central
Board constituted under section 5A.
(1B) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a Scheme framed under
sub-section 1 may provide for all or any of the matters specified in
Schedule II.
(2) A Scheme framed under sub-section 1 may provide that any of
its provisions shall take effect either prospectively or retrospectively on
such date as may be specified in this behalf in the Scheme."
9.1.6. For the purpose of the question at hand, sub-section (1) and sub-section
(1-A) of Section 17 of the Act of 1952, relating to the powers of the appropriate
2 The original Section 5 has undergone several changes by way of amendments. The
relevant amendments to be noticed for the present purpose are that by Act No. 37 of 1953,
original Section 5 was re-numbered as sub-section (1), the expressions for establishment of
Fund soon after framing of Scheme were added, and sub-section (2) was also inserted.
Moreover, by Act No. 28 of 1963, Sub-section (1A) to Section 5 (providing for vesting and
administration of Fund in and by the Central Board) was inserted. The provisions relating to
Central and State Boards and co-related aspects were also inserted as Sections 5A to 5E by
the said Act No. 28 of 1963, which need not be dilated upon, for being not relevant for
present purpose.
14
Government to grant exemption and the consequence thereof, could also be
taken note of as under:
"17. Power to exempt - (1) The appropriate Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, and subject to such conditions as may
be specified in the notification, exempt, whether prospectively or
retrospectively, from the operation of all or any of the provisions of any
Scheme –
(a) any establishment to which this Act applies if, in the opinion of
the appropriate Government, the rules of its provident fund with respect
to the rates of contribution are not less favourable than those specified in
section 6 and the employees are also in enjoyment of other provident
fund benefits which on the whole are not less favourable to the
employees than the benefits provided under this Act or any Scheme in
relation to the employees in any other establishment of a similar
character; or
(b) any establishment if the employees of such establishment are
in enjoyment of benefits in the nature of provident fund, pension or
gratuity and the appropriate Government is of opinion that such benefits,
separately or jointly, are on the whole not less favourable to such
employees than the benefits provided under this Act or any Scheme in
relation to employees in any other establishment of a similar character:
Provided that no such exemption shall be made except after
consultation with the Central Board which on such consultation shall
forward its views on exemption to the appropriate Government within
such time limit as may be specified in the Scheme.
(1A) Where an exemption has been granted to an establishment
under clause (a) of sub-section (1),-
(a) the provisions of sections 6, 7A, 8 and 14B shall, so far as may
be, apply to the employer of the exempted establishment in addition to
such other conditions as may be specified in the notification granting
such exemption, and where such employer contravenes, or makes
default in complying with any of the said provisions or conditions or any
other provision of this Act, he shall be punishable under section 14 as if
the said establishment had not been exempted under the said clause (a);
(b) the employer shall establish a Board of Trustees for the
administration of the provident fund consisting of such number of
members as may be specified in the Scheme;
(c) the terms and conditions of service of members of the Board of
Trustees shall be such as may be specified in the Scheme;
15
(d) the Board of Trustees constituted under clause (b) shall–
(i) maintain detailed accounts to show the contributions credited,
withdrawals made and interest accrued in respect of each employee;
(ii) submit such returns to the Regional Provident Fund
Commissioner or any other officer as the Central Government may direct
from time to time;
(iii) invest the provident fund monies in accordance with the
directions issued by the Central Government from time to time;
(iv) transfer, where necessary, the provident fund account of any
employee; and
 (v) perform such other duties as may be specified in the Scheme.
*** *** *** "
9.2. After having taken note of the relevant provisions of the Act of 1952,
essential it is to take into comprehension the relevant provisions and stipulations
of the Scheme of 1952 that has been, as noticed, framed by the Central
Government under Section 5 of the Act of 1952.
9.2.1. Noteworthy it is that there is no definition of an "excluded employee" in the
Act of 1952. In fact, this expression comes in operation for the purpose of
exclusion of certain employees from compulsion to join the Fund created under
the Scheme of 1952. Therefore, this expression is defined only in the Scheme of
1952, in clause (f) of paragraph 2 thereof, as under:
"(f) "excluded employee" means—
(i) an employee who, having been a member of the Fund, withdrew the
full amount of his accumulations in the Fund under clause (a) or (c) of
sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 69;
16
(ii) an employee whose pay at the time he is otherwise entitled to
become a member of the Fund, exceeds fifteen thousand rupees per
month;3
Explanation. --'Pay' includes basic wages with dearness allowance,
retaining allowance (if any) and cash value of food concessions
admissible thereon;
(iii) [omitted]4
;
(iv) an apprentice.
Explanation.-- An apprentice means a person who, according to the
certified standing orders applicable to the factory or establishment, is an
apprentice, or who is declared to be an apprentice by the authority
specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government;"
9.2.2. Paragraph 26 of the Scheme of 1952 specifies the classes of employees
entitled to, and required to, join the Fund as also the co-related aspects. Useful it
shall be to keep in view the fact that the expression "Fund", as occurring in
Paragraph 26 refers to the Fund created under the Scheme of 19525
. This
Paragraph 26 reads as under:
"26. Classes of employees entitled and required to join the fund.-
(1) (a) Every employee employed in or in connection with the work of a
factory or other establishment to which this Scheme applies, other than
an excluded employee, shall be entitled and required to become a
member of the Fund from the day this paragraph comes into force in
such factory or other establishment.
(b) Every employee employed in or in connection with the work of a
factory or other establishment to which this Scheme applies, other than
an excluded employee, shall also be entitled and required to become a
member of the fund from the day this paragraph comes into force in such
factory or other establishment if on the date of such coming into force,
such employee is a subscriber to a provident fund maintained in respect
3 At the relevant point of time, in sub-clause (ii) the figures had been 'six thousand and five hundred
rupees' in place of the present figures of ‘fifteen thousand rupees’
4 Sub-clause (iii) and explanation thereto were omitted by GSR 1467 dated 02.12.1960
5 The contra-distinction of this "Fund" with a "private provident fund" is noticeable in sub-paragraph (5),
where reference is made to an exempted establishment.
17
of the factory or other establishment, or in respect of any other factory or
establishment (to which the Act applies) under the same employer:
Provided that where the Scheme applies to a factory or other
establishment on the expiry or cancellation of an order of exemption
under section 17 of the Act, every employee who but for the exemption
would have become and continued as a member of the Fund, shall
become a member of the fund forthwith.
(2) After this paragraph comes into force in a factory or other
establishment, every employee employed in or in connection with the
work or that factory or establishment, other than an excluded employee,
who has not become a member already shall also be entitled and
required to become a member of the fund from the date of joining the
factory or establishment.
(3) An excluded employee employed in or in connection with the work of
a factory or other establishment to which this Scheme applies shall, on
ceasing to be such an employee, be entitled and required to become a
member of the fund from the date he ceased to be such employee.
(4) On re-election of an employee or a class of employees exempted
under paragraph 27 or paragraph 27 A to join the fund or on the expiry or
cancellation of an order under that paragraph, every employee shall
forthwith become a member thereof.
(5) Every employee who is a member of a private provident fund
maintained in respect of an exempted factory or other establishment and
who but for exemption would have become and continued as a member
of the fund shall, on joining a factory or other establishment to which this
Scheme applies, become a member of the fund forthwith.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this paragraph an officer not
below the rank of an Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner may, on
the joint request in writing of any employee of a factory or other
establishment to which this Scheme applies and his employer, enroll
such employee as a member or allow him to contribute more than fifteen
thousand rupees of his pay per month if he is already a member of the
fund and thereupon such employee shall be entitled to the benefits and
shall be subject to the conditions of the fund, provided that the employer
gives an undertaking in writing that he shall pay the administrative
charges payable and shall comply with all statutory provisions in respect
of such employee."
9.2.3. For comprehension of all the relevant provisions and stipulations, a
reference to sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 69 of the Scheme of 1952 is also
18
pertinent and the same, as applicable at the relevant point of time, may be
noticed as under6
:
"69. Circumstances in which accumulations in the Fund are payable
to a member.- (1) A member may withdraw the full amount standing to
his credit in the Fund—
(a) on retirement from service after attaining of the age of 55 years:
Provided that a member, who has not attained the age of 55 years at the
time of termination of his service, shall also be entitled to withdraw the
full amount standing to his credit in the Fund if he attains the age of 55
years before the payment is authorized;
(b) on retirement on account of permanent and total incapacity for
work due to bodily or mental infirmity duly certified by the medical officer
of the establishment or where an establishment has no regular medical
officer, by a registered medical practitioner designated by the
establishment;
(c) immediately before migration from India for permanent settlement
abroad or for taking employment abroad;
(d) on termination of service in the case of mass or individual
retrenchment;
(dd) on termination of service under a voluntary scheme of retirement
framed by the employer and the employees under a mutual agreement
specifying, inter alia, that notwithstanding the provisions contained in
sub-clause (a) of clause (oo) of section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, excluding voluntary retirements from the scope of definition of
"retrenchment" such voluntary retirements shall for the purpose be
treated as retrenchments by mutual consent of the parties;
(e) in any of the following contingencies, provided the actual payment
shall be made only after completing a continuous period of not less than
two months immediately preceding the date on which a member makes
the application for withdrawal:—
(i) where a factory or other establishment is closed but certain
employees who are not retrenched, are transferred by the employer to
other factory or establishment, not covered under the Act;
6 This paragraph 69 and its sub-paragraphs and clauses have also undergone several amendments from
time to time; however, the contents as reproduced herein are more or less in the same form, as are
applicable to the present case.
19
(ii) where a member is transferred from a covered factory or other
establishment to another factory or other establishment not covered
under the Act, but is under the same employer; and
(iii) where a member is discharged and is given retrenchment
compensation under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947);"
10. Before proceeding further, we may take note of a decision of this Court
referred to by the learned counsel for the parties, being that in the case of N.K.
Jain and Ors. v. C.K. Shah and Ors.: (1991) 2 SCC 495. The relevant
background aspect of the said case had been that the establishment in question
was governed by the provisions of the Act of 1952 but was exempted under
Section 17; and had its own trust in respect of the provident fund contributions.
However, the establishment failed to pay such contributions for some period
during the year 1974 and there was a default. The question was as to whether
such default would entail prosecution also, or only the exemption was to be
cancelled ? The said case, being related to a different fact situation and different
controversy may not have a direct bearing on the present matter but, the
observations of this Court, illuminative on the setup and framework of the Act
and the Scheme of 1952, could be usefully reproduced as under:
“7. On a perusal of the above extracted provisions of the Act the
following aspects to the extent relevant to the present case can be spelt
out. The management of an establishment has to contribute to the
provident fund and the government under Section 5 can frame a
Scheme called Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme and such a Scheme
was framed in the year 1952. The Scheme provides for the
establishment of provident fund under the Act for employees of the
establishments specified therein. Section 6 is the material provision and
deals with contributions which may be provided under the Scheme and
also prescribes the rate of contribution to the fund and that the
employees’ contribution should be equal to the contribution payable by
20
the employer. Section 14 deals with the penalties and Section 14(1-A)
lays down that an employer who contravenes, or makes default in
complying with the provisions of Section 6 shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months but shall not be
less than three months in case of default in payment of the employees’
contribution which has been deducted by the employer from the
employees’ wages. But for adequate reasons it can be less. Paragraph
76 of the Scheme also provides for punishment for failure to pay such
contributions to the fund. Then we have Section 17 which provides for
the exemption. As per the said section the appropriate government may
by notification and subject to such conditions, as may be specified in the
notification, exempt from the operation of all or any of the provisions of
any Scheme (in the present case 1952 Scheme) if the appropriate
government is satisfied that the rules of the provident fund which a
particular establishment is following in the matter of contribution to the
provident fund are not less favourable than those specified in Section 6
and that the employees are also in enjoyment of other provident fund
benefits. In other words the exemption from the operation of the Scheme
is granted provided the particular establishment makes contribution as
per its own rules governing the contribution to the fund, which in other
words, can be called a provident fund scheme of its own are not less
favourable than those specified in Section 6. Accordingly the exempted
establishment has to provide for its employees the benefits which are in
no way less favourable than the ones provided under the Act and the
Scheme.”
10.1. In the said case, this Court finally held that the failure to make the
contributions by an exempted establishment to the provident fund as per its own
rules may also attract the penalties under sub-sections (1-A) and (2-A) of Section
14 of the Act of 1952.
11. In the scheme and structure of the Act of 1952, it is but clear that for the
specified establishments or class of establishments, the Central Government was
to frame a Scheme, to be called “the Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme”; and
soon after framing of such Scheme, a Fund was to be established, which was to
vest in, and administered by, the Board constituted under Section 5A. As noticed,
21
the expression “Fund” is defined in the Act of 1952 to mean the provident fund
established under a Scheme; and the expression “Scheme” is defined to mean
the Employees Provident Fund Scheme framed under Section 5. Indisputably,
the Scheme of 1952 is the one framed by the Central Government in exercise of
the powers conferred by Section 5 ibid. We shall examine the provisions of the
Scheme of 1952 a little later. At this juncture, apposite it would be to take note of
another feature of the Act of 1952 emanating from the provisions relating to
exemption, as contained in Section 17 thereof.
12. By virtue of sub-section (1) of Section 17, an establishment could be
exempted from the operation of all or any of the provisions of any Scheme if: (a)
in regard to the establishment to which the Act applies, the appropriate
Government is of opinion that the rules of its provident fund, with respect to the
rates of contributions, are not less favourable for the employees than those
specified in Section 6 and the employees are in enjoyment of other provident
fund benefits which, on the whole, are not less favourable than the benefits
available under the Act or under the Scheme in relation to any other
establishment of similar character; and (b) in regard to any other establishment,
the appropriate Government is of opinion that benefits in the nature of provident
fund, pension or gratuity, as available to the employees of such establishment
are, on the whole, not less favourable than the benefits provided under the Act or
any Scheme in any other establishment of similar character.
22
12.1. When an exemption is granted to an establishment under clause (a) of
sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act of 1952, several duties are cast upon the
employer as specified in sub-section (1-A) thereof, with penal provisions in the
event of default. We need not elaborate on various other provisions contained in
Section 17. Suffice would be to notice for the present purpose that coverage of
the employees like the one engaged in the establishment of appellants is the
rule; and ordinarily, the employees are expected to be covered by the Scheme
framed under Section 5 of the Act of 1952 with the exception being that in case of
availability of equivalent or more favourable benefits in an establishment, the
appropriate Government could grant exemption. As per sub-section (2) of Section
17, even the Scheme may make a provision for exemption but the basic
requirement being again that the persons or the class of persons to be exempted
are entitled to such benefits which are, on the whole, not less favourable than the
benefits provided under the Act and the Scheme thereunder i.e., the Scheme of
19527
. All the requirements of Section 17 make the position undoubtedly clear
that the provisions are intended to ensure optimum benefits for the employees
and even the exemption is granted only on the satisfaction of appropriate
7 Sub-section (2) of Section 17 reads as under:
 (2) Any Scheme may make provision for exemption of any person or class of persons employed
in any establishment to which the Scheme applies from the operation of all or any of the provisions of the
Scheme, if such person or class of persons is entitled to benefits in the nature of provident fund, gratuity
or old age pension and such benefits, separately or jointly, are on the whole not less favourable than the
benefits provided under this Act or the Scheme:
Provided that no such exemption shall be granted in respect of a class of persons unless the
appropriate Government is of opinion that the majority of persons constituting such class desire to
continue to be entitled to such benefits.
23
Government about existence of equivalent or more favourable provident fund
Scheme for the employees concerned.
13. The Scheme of 1952 was framed by the Central Government on
02.09.1952 i.e., within 6 months of the enactment of the Act of 1952. The
provisions of the Scheme are generally made applicable, subject to the
provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of the Act, to all the factories and other
establishments to which the Act applies or is applied under sub-sections (3) and
(4) of Section 1 or under Section 3 of the Act. The provisions of the Scheme of
1952 have been extended to various establishments from time to time under
clause (b) of sub-paragraph (3) of Paragraph 1 thereof. As per Paragraph 26 of
the Scheme of 1952, every employee employed in or in connection with the work
of the factory or other establishment to which this Scheme applies, is entitled to,
and is obliged to, become a member of the Fund from the date the Scheme
would come into force for such factory or establishment, except the “excluded
employees”. Significantly, even an "excluded employee", on ceasing to be so i.e.,
on ceasing to be an “excluded employee”, is entitled to, and is required to,
become a member of the Fund from the date of such cessation.
13.1. In the framework of the Scheme of 1952, exclusion is provided under
clause (i) of Paragraph 2(f) thereof to an employee who had been a member of
the Fund and had withdrawn full amount of his accumulations in the Fund under
clause (a) or (c) of Paragraph 69(1). Now, clause (a) of the said Paragraph 69(1)
24
of the Scheme of 1952 refers to a member who would withdraw the full amount
standing to his credit in the Fund on retirement from service after attaining the
age of 55 years. Clause (c) is not relevant for the present purpose as the same
relates to a member who withdraws the amount before migration from India for
permanent settlement or taking employment abroad but then, a comprehensive
look at various clauses of paragraph 69(1) makes it clear that reference therein is
to a member of the Fund who withdraws full amount standing to his credit for
different eventualities like regular retirement; retirement for disablement or
incapacity; migration from the country; termination of service; accepting a
voluntary retirement scheme; closure of the factory; transfer from a covered
factory or establishment to another factory or establishment not covered under
the Act etc.
14. It is not a matter of much debate in this case that the appellants otherwise
answer to the description of "employer" under the Act of 1952 and their
establishment is covered thereunder. The basic contention urged in this matter
on behalf of the appellants is that the persons engaged by them had been the
members of General Provident Fund while working as the employees of Railways
and had withdrawn the full amount of accumulations in GPF and are, therefore,
to be treated as “excluded employees”. This contention has fundamental
shortcomings as pointed out infra.
25
14.1. The crucial aspect to be considered in this matter is as to whether the
definition of “excluded employees” in Paragraph 2(f) as also the stipulation in
Paragraphs 26 and 69 of the Scheme of 1952 refer to any provident fund or only
to the Fund under the Scheme of 1952? As noticed above, in the setup and
structure of the Act of 1952, specific distinction is maintained between the Fund,
which is created by the Central Government under Section 5(1) of the Act and
any other provident fund, which is created by an employer. Significantly, clause
(f) of Paragraph 2 of the Scheme of 1952 refers to “the Fund" and not to "any
Fund”; and Paragraphs 26 and 69 also refer to “the Fund" and not to "any Fund”.
The determiner “the”, as occurring in Paragraph 2(f) as also Paragraph 69 before
the expression "Fund" makes it clear that the reference therein is only to the
Fund which is created under the Scheme of 1952 and it is not a general
reference to any Fund. The requirement of joining the Fund under Paragraph 26
ibid. is also of joining that Fund which is created under the Scheme of 1952. In
other words, obviously and undoubtedly, the Fund referred to in Paragraphs 2(f),
26 and 69 of the Scheme of 1952 is that Fund, which is created under the
Scheme of 1952 and the reference is not to any other Fund. Thus, to be covered
under the expression “excluded employee” by virtue of clause (i) of paragraph
2(f) read with clause (a) of paragraph 69(1) ibid., the employee must be such
who was a member of the Fund established under the Scheme of 1952 and who
had withdrawn full amount of his accumulations in the said Fund on retirement
from service after attaining the age of 55 years.
26
14.2. On the plain interpretation aforesaid, we have not an iota of doubt that the
retired Railway employees, who had withdrawn their accumulations in General
Provident Fund or any other Fund of which they were members, could not have
been treated as “excluded employees” for the purpose of the Scheme of 1952 for
the reason that such a withdrawal had not been from the Fund established under
the Scheme of 1952. In fact, there was no occasion for them to make any
withdrawal from the Fund established under the Scheme of 1952 because they
were never the members of the said Fund. In other words, the employees in
question were not answering to the requirements of clause (i) of paragraph 2(f)
read with clause (a) of paragraph 69(1) of the Scheme of 1952 and hence, were
not the “excluded employees”. The Division Bench of the High Court has rightly
rejected the contention of appellants that every employee, who had withdrawn
full amount from any provident fund, should be treated as an “excluded
employee”. In our view, the answer by the Division Bench of the High Court is in
accord with law and deserves to be approved.
15. We may also take note of and deal with a few ancillary aspects. The
appellants, in their initial response to the proposition for coverage of the
employees in question under the Scheme of 1952, attempted to state that most
of the said employees were above 58 years of age and that they had expressed
unwillingness to join the Fund under the said Scheme. It does not appear from
the record if the concerned employees categorically made any such expression
27
of unwillingness. Even otherwise, as noticed, the provisions of the Act and the
stipulations of the Scheme of 1952 are mandatory in character and the
application thereof could not have been averted by the appellants or the said
employees except on certain eventualities as mentioned in Section 17 of the Act
as also Paragraph 26 of the Scheme of 1952. Such eventualities are indeed nonexistent in the present matter. So far the aspect relating to age is concerned, the
operation and effect of the Act and the Scheme of 1952 are not restricted with
reference to any age limit of the employee. Such a suggestion relating to the age
of the employees had been entirely baseless and has rightly been disapproved.
15.1. Apart from the above, the appellants also alleged that they had applied for
exemption and no decision was taken on their representation. In this regard, it is
noticed that the appellant had not made any such submission that they had any
better and beneficial scheme for their employees. In any case, there is no
concept of any holidaying in payment of contribution by the employer by merely
moving an application for exemption; and when there was no order of exemption
under Section 17 by the competent authority, the appellant-company was under
the liability to make payment of its contribution.
16. Before concluding, we may also point out that the observations by the
learned Single Judge of High Court in this matter, that clause (i) of Paragraph 2(f)
of the Scheme of 1952 has to be applied in relation to the withdrawal from any
provident fund and else, an employee may keep on successively deriving
28
benefits, remain rather unwarranted because the principle underlying the
enactment and the Scheme of 1952 is to provide financial security to the
employees. The concept of exclusion from the Scheme of 1952 is limited to the
class/es of employees mentioned in Paragraph 2(f) only; and the area of
operation of this exclusion clause cannot be expanded by way of an assumption
about the alleged extra advantage likely to be driven home by an employee. In
fact, even the assumption of the learned Single Judge does not appear apt in the
framework of the Act and the Scheme of 1952. Whatever an employee gets by
virtue of the Act of 1952 is basically the accumulation in his provident fund
account, where he and his employer do contribute. The learned Single Judge
had gone to the extent of observing that when the employees earning more than
the particular amount (Rs. 6,500/- per month at the relevant time) were excluded
under clause (ii) of Paragraph 2(f) of the Scheme of 1952, the retired employees
who had received their accumulations could also be excluded under clause (i) of
Paragraph 2(f). With respect, we are unable to find any logic in these
observations because the stipulation in clause (ii) of Paragraph 2(f) relates to an
entirely different class of employees with reference to the quantum of their pay;
and exclusion of such class of employees as per clause (ii) cannot lead to any
corollary that clause (i) be also expanded beyond its plain language. The order
passed by the learned Single Judge, being based on entirely irrelevant
considerations, has rightly been disapproved by the Division Bench of High
Court.
29
17. To summarise, in the framework and setup of the Scheme of 1952, the
concept remains plain and clear that if a person is member of the Fund created
thereunder i.e., under the Scheme of 1952 and withdraws all his accumulations
therein, he may not be obliged to be a member of the same Fund under the
Scheme of 1952 over again and could be treated as an “excluded employees”.
However, such is not the relaxation granted in relation to an employee who was
earlier a member of any other Fund but later on joins such an establishment
where he would be entitled to membership of the Fund created under the
Scheme of 1952. This framework of the provisions and stipulations appears to be
best serving the interest of employees, while providing them with continued
financial security. Therefore, we find no reason to take any view different than the
one taken by the Division Bench of the High Court in this case.
18. For what has been discussed hereinabove, this appeal fails and is,
therefore, dismissed.
 ...............................................J.
 (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
 ..............................................J.
(DINESH MAHESHWARI) 1
New Delhi
Dated: 26th March, 2019.
30

whether the amendment which has been brought about by the legislature is intended to be clarificatory or to remove an ambiguity in the law must depend upon the context. = The provisions of Section 142(2C) of the Income Tax Act 1961, as they stood prior to the amendment which was enacted with effect from 1 April 2008 by the Finance Act, 2008 did not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction and authority by the assessing officer to extend time for the submission of the audit report directed under subsection (2A), without an application by the assessee. We hold and declare that the amendment was intended to remove an ambiguity and is clarificatory in nature. As a consequence of our decision, we specifically overrule the judgment of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v Bishan Swaroop Ram Kishan Agro Pvt. Ltd.15 dated 27 May 2011.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No 3211 of 2019
(Arising out of SLP (C) No 2810 of 2012)
The Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi …Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Ram Kishan Dass …Respondent(s)
WITH
Civil Appeal No(s). 3214, 3212, 3213, 3228, 3230, 3215, 3229, 3216, 3219, 3220,
3217, 3221, 3218, 3222, 3223, 3225, 3226, 3224, 3227
of 2019 @SLP (C) No. 6082, 2808, 2811, 27681, 36495, 6680, 36496, 7573, 8761,
9463, 7660, 9720, 8512, 10191, 10190, 12026, 12027, 11869, 16130 of 2012, Civil
Appeal No 2951 of 2012, Civil Appeal Nos.4334, 4599, 5305 of 2017, Civil
Appeal Nos.3231, 3232, 3233 of 2019 @ SLP (C) Nos 10248, 10247, 17500 of 2017
and Civil Appeal No 7076 of 2017
J U D G M E N T
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J.
1 Leave granted in the Special Leave Petitions.
2 This batch of appeals involves the interpretation of a cluster of provisions of
1
the Income Tax Act 19611
, particularly Section 142(2C). A Division Bench of the
Delhi High Court by its judgment dated 27 May 2011 dismissed a batch of appeals
filed by the Revenue against an order dated 18 September 2009 of the Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal2
. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that prior to the insertion of
the expression “suo motu” with effect from 1 April 2008 in Section 142(2C), the
assessing officer had no jurisdiction to extend time for the submission of the report
of an auditor appointed under sub section (2A), of his own accord. As a
consequence, it was held that the assessment which was made under Section
153A, in respect of the assessment years in question, was barred by limitation.
3 In the present batch of cases, the submission of the assessees is that the
assessing officer had no jurisdiction or authority under Section 142 (2C), as it stood
prior to 1 April 2008, to extend time for the submission of the audit report of the
auditor appointed under the provisions of sub section (2A). In essence, the
submission is that the assessing officer was authorized to extend time (not
exceeding 180 days) from the date on which a direction under sub section (2A) was
received by the assessee, only on an application made by the assessee and for any
good and sufficient reason. If the assessee made no application, the assessing
officer would have no jurisdiction – according to the assessees – to extend time.
1 “IT Act 1961”
2 “Tribunal”
2
4 The Revenue adopted a contrary position, submitting that even before 1 April
2008, the jurisdiction of the assessing officer to extend time for the submission of the
audit report was not confined to a situation in which the assessee had made an
application for extension. Consequently, the incorporation of a provision for a suo
motu exercise of power by the assessing officer, with effect from 1 April 2008 by the
Finance Act, 20083
, was only intended to remove an ambiguity and was clarificatory
in nature.
5 Section 142(2A) as it stood at the material time, provided as follows:
“(2A) – If, at any stage of the proceedings before him, the
Assessing Officer, having regard to the nature and complexity of
the accounts of the assessee and the interests of the revenue, is
of the opinion that it is necessary so to do, he may, with the
previous approval of the Chief Commissioner of Commissioner,
direct the assessee to get the accounts audited by an accountant,
as defined in the Explanation below sub-section (2) of section
288, nominated by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner in
this behalf and to furnish a report of such audit in the prescribed
form - duly signed and verified by such accountant and setting
forth such particulars as may prescribed and such other
particulars as the Assessing Officer may require:
Provided that the Assessing Officer shall not direct the assessee
to get the accounts so audited unless the assessee has been
given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.”
Sub section (2C) of Section 142 was in the following terms:
“(2C) Every report under sub-section (2A) shall be furnished by
the assessee to the Assessing Officer within such period as may
be specified by the Assessing Officer:
Provided that the Assessing Officer may, on an application made
in this behalf by the assessee and for any good and sufficient
reason, extend the said period by such further period or periods
as he thinks fit; so, however, that the aggregate of the period
originally fixed and the period or periods so extended shall not, in
any case, exceed one hundred and eighty days from the date on
which the direction under sub-section (2A) is received by the
assessee.”
6 Consequent to the Finance Act, sub section (2C) was amended to read as
3 “Finance Act”
3
follows:
“(2C) Every report under sub-section (2A) shall be furnished by
the assessee to the Assessing Officer within such period as may
be specified by the Assessing Officer:
Provided that the – Assessing Officer may, suo motu, or on an
application made in this behalf by the assessee and for any good
and sufficient reason, extend the said period by such further
period or periods as he thinks fit; so, however, that the aggregate
of the period originally fixed and the period or periods so
extended shall not, in any case, exceed one hundred and eighty
days from the date on which the direction under sub-section (2A)
is received by the assessee.”
7 Section 153B prescribes time limits for the completion of assessments under
Section 153A. Explanation (ii), as it stood at the material time, provided that in
computing the period of limitation for the purposes of the Section, “the period
commencing from the day on which the Assessing Officer directs the assessee to
get his accounts audited under sub-section (2A) of Section 142 and ending on the
day on which the assesse is required to furnish a report of such audit under that
sub-section” shall be excluded. While issuing a direction under sub section (2A) of
Section 142, the assessing officer was vested with the authority to require the
assessee to furnish a report of the audit in the prescribed form, signed and verified
by the accountant, and setting forth such particulars as may be prescribed and as
may be required by him. The substantive part of sub section (2C) mandates that the
report under sub section (2A) shall be furnished by the assessee to the assessing
officer within the period that is specified by the assessing officer under the proviso,
as it stood prior to its amendment by the Finance Act. The assessing officer was
further empowered, on an application made by the assessee and for any good and
sufficient reason, to extend the period further, subject to the stipulation that it shall
4
not exceed an aggregate of 180 days from the date on which the direction under sub
section (2A) has been received by the assessee.
8 The crucial words which fall for interpretation are “On an application made in
this behalf by the assessee and for any good and sufficient reason…”
9 Simply stated, the contention of the assessees is that the above words
indicate that the assessing officer may extend the period, which has been specified
under the substantive part of sub section (2C), only on an application made by the
assessee and for good and sufficient reason. Contrariwise, according to the
Revenue, the assessing officer, who issues a direction to the assessee under sub
section (2A) to get his accounts audited, is vested with the authority to specify the
period for the submission of the report, and within the overall limit of 180 days it is
open to the assessing officer to extend the time which has been fixed in the first
instance. The Revenue posits that the authority conferred upon the assessing officer
to extend time, on an application made by the assessee, does not take away the
authority of the assessing officer, who has prescribed the time for the submission of
the report in the first instance, to extend time without an application for extension
being made by the assessee, subject to the overall ceiling of 180 days. In the
submission of the Revenue, the expression “and for any good and sufficient reason”
must be construed logically to mean “or for any good and sufficient reason”.
10 The submission which has been urged on behalf of the assessees is sought
to be buttressed by adverting to the legislative intent behind the insertion of the term
“suo motu” in the provisions of Section 142(2C) by the Finance Act. Circular No
5
1/2009 dated 27 March 2009 contains the following explanation for the amendments
made to Section 142(2C):
“27. Granting of power to the Assessing Officer to extend the
time for completion of special audit under sub-section (2A)
of section 142
27.1 Sub-sections (2A) to (2D) of section 142 deal with
power of Assessing Officer to order a special audit. Such power is
required to be exercised by the Assessing Officer having regard
to the nature and complexity of the accounts of the assessee and
the interest of the revenue.
27.2 Sub-section (2C) of the said section specifies the
period within which the audit reports is to be furnished. The
proviso to said sub-section empowers the Assessing Officer to
extend this period of furnishing of audit report. Further, it is also
provided that the aggregate of the originally fixed period and the
period(s) so extended shall not exceed 180 days from the date of
issuance of direction of special audit. Further, such extension can
be made only when an application is made in this behalf by the
assessee and there are good and sufficient reasons for such
extension.
27.3 With a view to rationalise the said proviso so as to
also allow the Assessing Officer to extend this period of furnishing
of audit report suo motu, the said proviso has been amended.
Hence, while the Assessing Officer shall continue to have power
to grant extension on an application made in this behalf by the
assessee and when there are good and sufficient reasons for
such extension, he can also grant such extension on his own.
27.4 Applicability – This amendment has been made
applicable with effect from 1-4-2008. Hence, from this date and
onwards, the Assessing Officer shall also have power to extend
the period of furnishing of audit report suo motu.”
11 The Notes on clauses to the Finance Bill, 2008 contain the following
explanation:
“Clause 28 seeks to amend section 142 of the Income-tax Act,
which relates to enquiry before assessment.
Sub-sections (2A) to (2D) of the said section deal with power of
Assessing Officer to order special audit, where the nature and
complexity of the accounts requires such audit, to seek the
assistance of a chartered accountant.
Sub-section (2C) of the said section specifies the period within
which the audit report is to be furnished. The Proviso to the said
sub-section provides that the Assessing Officer may extend the
6
said period of furnishing of audit report, on an application made in
this behalf, by the assessee and for any good and sufficient
reason.
It is proposed to amend the said proviso so as to provide that the
Assessing Officer may, suo motu, or on an application made in
this behalf by the assessee, and for any good and sufficient
reason, extend the said period by such further period or periods
as he thinks fit.
This amendment will take effect from 1st April, 2008.”
The Memorandum accompanying the Finance Act similarly provides:
“Granting of power to the Assessing Officer to extend the
time for completion of special audit under sub-section (2A)
of section 142
Sub-sections (2A) to (2D) of section 142 deal with power of
Assessing Officer to order a special audit. Such power is required
to be exercised by the Assessing Officer having regard to the
nature and complexity of the accounts of the assessee and the
interest of the revenue.
Sub-section (2C) of the said section specifies the period within
which the audit report is to be furnished. The proviso to said subsection empowers the Assessing Officer to extend this period of
furnishing of audit report. Further, it is also provided that the
aggregate of the originally fixed period and the period(s) so
extended shall not exceed 180 days from the date of issuance of
direction of special audit. Further, such extension can be made
only when an application is made in this behalf by the assessee
and there are good and sufficient reasons for such extension.
It is proposed to amend the said proviso so as to also allow the
Assessing Officer to extend this period of furnishing of audit
report suo motu. Hence, while the Assessing Officer shall
continue to have power to grant extension on an application
made in this behalf by the assessee and when there are good
and sufficient reasons for such extension, he can also grant such
extension on his own.
The amendment will take effect from 1st April, 2008.”
12 In the context of the above background, it has been submitted that the
purpose of the amendment was to “also allow the assessing officer to extend the
7
period for furnishing of an audit report, suo motu”. The amendment to Section
142(2C) preserves the jurisdiction of the assessing officer to grant an extension on
an application made by the assessee and for any good and sufficient reasons. In
addition, the amendment allows the assessing officer to extend the period suo motu.
The amendment having taken effect from 1 April 2008, it has been urged on behalf
of the assessees that this power was not vested in the assessing officer prior to that
date. Moreover, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the assessee urged that:
(i) The consequence of the exercise of the jurisdiction to extend time for
submission of the audit report under the proviso to sub section (2C) is the
extension of the period of limitation for the completion of an assessment
under Explanation (ii) to Section 153B. This is indicative of the fact that the
provision for extension is not procedural in nature;
(ii) The consequence of the failure of the assessee to comply with the direction of
submitting the audit report by the date prescribed by the assessing officer is
that under Section 144(1)(b), the assessing officer is empowered to frame
a best judgment assessment;
(iii) The expression in Explanation (ii) to Section 153B “ending on the date on
which the assesse is required to furnish a report of such audit” signifies the
end of the period of exclusion of time for the framing of an assessment under
Section 153B;
(iv) Section 142(2C) must consequently be interpreted in the context of the
provisions of Sections 153B and 144; and
(v) The expression ‘and’ in the substantive part of Section 142(2A) has been
held to be conjunctive by the decision of this Court in Sahara India (Firm),
8
Lucknow v Commissioner of Income Tax, Central-I4
. The expression ‘and’
in the proviso to sub-section 2C must be given the same meaning.
13 On the other hand, it has been submitted on behalf of the Revenue that:
(i) In construing the proviso to Section 142(2C), it is primarily the language of the
statutory provision which must be construed;
(ii) The amendment to sub section (2C) was necessitated by reason of the
ambiguity in the provision as it stood prior to 1 April 2008;
(iii) The legislature having stepped in to remove an ambiguity, the amendment
brought about by the Finance Act must necessarily be regarded as
clarificatory in nature; and
(iv) The amendment is purely procedural and must be retrospective in character.
14 The rival submissions now fall for consideration.

15 Sub-section (2A) of Section 142 empowers the assessing officer to direct the
assessee to get the accounts audited by an accountant, on the formation of an
opinion that the conditions specified in the provision for recourse to the power are
fulfilled. The power to order an audit is vested with the assessing officer. As a
necessary incident of this power, sub-section (2C) imposes an obligation on the
assessee to furnish the report to the assessing officer within the period which is
specified by the assessing officer. The substantive part of sub-section (2C) places
an obligation on the assessee to comply with the time schedule which is prescribed
by the assessing officer. The overall ceiling of time appears in the proviso to subsection (2C), which mandates that the aggregate of the time fixed and the extended
period cannot exceed 180 days, after which there can be no further extension of
4 (2008) 14 SCC 151
9
time.
16 The submission of the assessee would have this Court interpret the proviso to
mean that the assessing officer can extend the period which was originally fixed only
on the request of the assessee. Besides leading to absurd consequences, such a
construction of the proviso is patently contrary to its language, purpose and
intendment.
17 The proviso was intended to deal with a situation where an assessee, for valid
reasons, may not be able to furnish the audit report within the period that was fixed
by the assessing officer. The enactment of the proviso was necessary to give a
remedy to an assessee who, for genuine reasons, is unable to comply with the
direction issued in the first instance by the assessing officer. Hence, the proviso
stipulates that for good and sufficient reason, the assessing officer may extend time
on an application submitted by the assessee. The “good and sufficient reason”
requirement is intended to ensure that an extension of time cannot be demanded by
the assessee as a matter of right. Indeed, the use of the expression ‘may’ indicates
that whether or not time should be extended is discretionary. The discretion is
intimated to the Assessing officer.
18 In determining whether the power to extend time vests in the assessing officer
in a situation where the assessee has not made an application for extension, it is
well to remember that under the substantive part of sub-section (2C), the assessing
officer can fix time for the submission of the audit report. Subject to an overall limit of
180 days, the assessing officer is fully clothed with the authority to determine the
10
time within which the audit report should be submitted. For instance, the assessing
officer may in a given case consider the grant of 90 days as adequate for the
completion of the exercise. Though the assessing officer has the power, in the first
instance, to fix an even longer period subject to the overall ceiling of time, she may
fix a particular period within the limit. To then postulate that while the assessing
officer could in the first instance have fixed a longer time limit but, having fixed a limit
of time, is precluded from extending time thereafter would be an absurd course of
interpretation. The assessing officer while fixing time in the first instance will do so
on an estimate of the reasonable time which is likely to be taken in completing the
exercise and submitting an audit report. The exigencies of the situation may
however require an extension of time for genuine reasons or, as the statute calls it,
“for any good and sufficient reason”.
19 There are two ways of looking at the situation. Firstly, the proviso to subsection (2C) creates a remedy for an assessee to apply for extension where, for a
good and sufficient reason, the audit report could not be submitted. Otherwise, the
assessee may face a penalty under Section 271 apart from being subjected to a
best judgment assessment under Section 144. By extending time at the behest of
the assessee, the assessing officer allows the original order calling for an audit
report to be duly implemented. The creation of a remedy under the proviso in favour
of the assessee cannot be construed to detract from the authority which vests in the
assessing officer, who has specified the time limit for the submission of an audit
report in the first instance, to extend time without an application by the assessee. To
hold otherwise, and to construe the proviso to sub-section (2C) as foreclosing the
11
authority of the assessing officer to extend time without a request by the assessee,
would lead to an absurd consequence. The assessee would then be in control of
whether or not to seek an extension of time, where the audit report has not been
finalized. Even if the auditor, for genuine reasons (not bearing on the default of the
assessee), was unable to comply with the time schedule, having regard to the
nature or complexity of the accounts, the assessee would then have a sole and
unrestricted power to determine whether an extension should be sought. Not
seeking an extension would in effect defeat the underlying purpose and object of
directing the assessee to obtain a report of an auditor under sub-section (2A). The
legislature could not have intended this consequence. An interpretation which would
defeat the purpose underlying sub-section (2A) must be avoided. The assessing
officer who has fixed the time in the first instance must necessarily, as an incident of
the authority to fix time, be entitled to extend time without an application by the
assessee. While extending time, the assessing officer will be subject to the overall
ceiling of time fixed under the proviso to sub section 2C.
20 Secondly, the alternate construction of the proviso is that the expression “and
for any good and sufficient reason” should be read to mean “or for any good and
sufficient reason”. As a matter of statutory interpretation, it is well settled that the
expression “and” can in a given context be read as “or” (see in this context Ishwar
Singh Bindra v State of UP5
). This submission was opposed on behalf of the
assessees by urging that in the context of sub-section (2A), it has been held by this
Court in Sahara India (Firm), Lucknow v CIT (supra) that the word “and” is used in
5 (1969) 1 SCR 219 = AIR 1968 SC 1450
12
the conjunctive sense. Undoubtedly the expression “and” in sub-section (2A) has
been held to the conjunctive, while delineating the circumstances on the basis of
which an opinion can be arrived at by the assessing officer. This would not
necessarily furnish an index to how the expression “and” in the proviso to subsection (2C) should be construed. The interpretation of the expression must be
based on the context in which it is used. In the proviso to sub-section (2C), the
expression “and” is used in connection with the grant of an extension of time and not
in the context of the formation of an opinion for ordering a special audit. The power
is of a procedural nature.
21 The learned counsel for the assessees sought to urge that the legislative
history surrounding the amendment to the proviso to sub-section (2C) by the
Finance Act would indicate that the amendment was intended to be prospective with
effect from 1 April 2008 and, that prior to this date, the assessing officer had no
jurisdiction to grant an extension of time, save on the application by the assessee.
Circular 1/2009 dated 27 March 2009 indicates that the amendment was brought
about “with a view to rationalize the said proviso”. Learned counsel argued that the
expression in Circular 1/2009 that the amendment was to also allow the assessing
officer to extend the period for furnishing of the audit report suo motu, indicates that
such a power did not exist prior to the amendment. The submission cannot be
accepted. The mere fact that the amendment has been made with effect from 1 April
2008 does not detract from it being clarificatory in nature or that it was designed to
obviate an ambiguity. In Justice GP Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation6
6 11th Edition (2008)
13
the issue of whether a statutory provision is retrospective has been analysed thus:
““The presumption against retrospective operation is not
applicable to declaratory statutes. As stated in Craies and
approved by the Supreme Court: ‘For modern purposes a
declaratory Act may be defined as an Act to remove doubts
existing as to the common law, or the meaning or effect of any
statute. Such Acts are usually held to be retrospective. The usual
reason for passing a declaratory Act is to set aside what
Parliament deems to have been a judicial error, whether in the
statement of the common law or in the interpretation of statutes.
Usually, if not invariably, such an Act contains a preamble, and
also the word “declared” as well as the word “enacted”.’ But the
use of the words ‘it is declared’ is not conclusive that the Act is
declaratory for these words may, at times, be used to introduce
new rules of law and the Act in the latter case will only be
amending the law and will not necessarily be retrospective. In
determining, therefore, the nature of the Act, regard must be had
to the substance rather than to the form. If a new Act is ‘to
explain’ an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed
retrospective. An explanatory Act is generally passed to
supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the
meaning of the previous Act. It is well settled that if a statute is
curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective
operation is generally intended. The language ‘shall be deemed
always to have meant’ or ‘shall be deemed never to have
included’ is declaratory, and is in plain terms retrospective. In the
absence of clear words indicating that the amending Act is
declaratory, it would not be so construed when the amended
provision was clear and unambiguous. An amending Act may be
purely clarificatory to clear a meaning of a provision of the
principal Act which was already implicit. A clarificatory
amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect ….”
 (emphasis supplied)
The above extract was cited by this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax-1,
Ahmedabad v Gold Coin Health Food Pvt Ltd7
. A Constitution Bench of this Court
also cited the above extract with approval in Commissioner of Income Tax
(Central – I) v Vatika Township (P) Ltd.8
.
22 The Notes on Clauses as well as the Memorandum to the Finance Act do not
7 2008 (9) SCC 622
8 [2014] 31 ITR 466 (SC); 2015 1 SCC 1
14
indicate a contrary hypothesis. The reason for the introduction of the amendment
arose because of the element of ambiguity inherent in the erstwhile position as it
stood before 1 April 2008. The ambiguity was precisely on the question as to
whether the assessing officer was precluded from granting an extension of time of
his own accord merely because the assessee was permitted to apply for an
extension. Since the purpose of the amendment was to remove this ambiguity, we
are clearly of the view that by the Finance Act, Parliament essentially clarified the
position as it existed prior to the amendment.
23 Moreover, there exists a presumption of retrospective application in regard to
amendments which are of a procedural nature. This position was stated in Maxwell
on The Interpretation of Statutes9
:
“The general principle, however, seems to be that alterations in
procedure are retrospective, unless there be some good reason
against it.”
In Commissioner of Income Tax (Central – I) v Vatika Township (P) Ltd. (supra),
this Court held thus:
“30. We would also like to point out, for the sake of completeness,
that where a benefit is conferred by a legislation, the rule against
a retrospective construction is different. If a legislation confers a
benefit on some persons but without inflicting a
corresponding detriment on some other person or on the
public generally, and where to confer such benefit appears to
have been the legislators' object, then the presumption
would be that such a legislation, giving it a purposive
construction, would warrant it to be given a retrospective
effect. This exactly is the justification to treat procedural
provisions as retrospective…
9 11th Edition, Sweet and Maxwell (1962) at pg 217
15
31… Thus, the rule against retrospective operation is a
fundamental rule of law that no statute shall be construed to have
a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very
clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct
implication. Dogmatically framed, the rule is no more than a
presumption, and thus could be displaced by outweighing
factors.”
(emphasis supplied)
24 We find no substance in the submission urged on behalf of the assessees that
to adopt an interpretation which we have placed on the provisions of Section
142(2C) would enable the assessing officer to extend the period of limitation for
making an assessment under Section 153B. Explanation (iii) to Section 153B(1), as
it stood at the material time, provided for the exclusion of the period commencing
from the date on which the assessing officer had directed the assessee to get his
accounts audited under sub-section (2A) of Section 142 and ending on the day on
which the assesee is required to furnish a report under that sub-section. The day on
which the assessee is required to furnish a report of the audit under sub-section (2A)
marks the culmination of the period of exclusion for the purpose of limitation. Where
the assessing officer had extended the time, the period, commencing from the date
on which the audit was ordered and ending with the date on which the assessee is
required to furnish a report, would be excluded in computing the period of limitation
for framing the assessment under Section 153B. The principle governing the
exclusion of time remains the same. The act on which the exclusion culminates is
the date which the assessing officer fixes originally, or on extension for submission
of the report.
16
25 The issue as to whether the amendment which has been brought about by the
legislature is intended to be clarificatory or to remove an ambiguity in the law must
depend upon the context. The Court would have due regard to (i) the general scope
and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former state
of the law; and (iv) what power that the legislature contemplated (See Zile Singh v
State of Haryana10). The decision in Sedco Forex International Drill Inc. v
Commissioner of Income Tax11 on which learned counsel for the assesses relied
involved a substitution of the Explanation to Section 9(1)(ii) of the IT Act, 1961 with
effect from 1 April 2000. A two Judge Bench of this Court held that given the
legislative history of Section 9(1)(ii), it can only be assumed that it was deliberately
introduced with effect from 1 April 2000 and was therefore intended to be
prospective. This was also so construed by the CBDT, and in the explanatory notes
to the provisions of the Finance Act, 1999. As we have indicated, interpretation is a
matter of determining the path on the basis of statutory context and legislative
history. In taking the view that we have, we have also taken note of the fact that the
same view was adopted by several High Courts. Among them are (i) the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Jagatjit Sugar Mills Co Ltd v Commissioner of Income
Tax12; (ii) the Kerala High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Cochin v
Popular Automobiles13; and (iii) the Allahabad High Court in Ghaziabad
10 (2004) 8 SCC 1
11 [2005] 279 ITR 310 (SC); (2005) 12 SCC 717
12 (1994) 74 Taxman 8 (Pun.&Har.); [1994] 210 ITR 468
13 (2011) 333 ITR 308
17
Development Authority v Commissioner of Income Tax, Ghaziabad (UP)14
. The
decision of the Kerala High Court in Popular Automobiles (supra) is the subject
matter of Civil Appeal No 2951 of 2012 in these proceedings.
26 For the reasons we have adduced, we have come to the conclusion that the
provisions of Section 142(2C) of the Income Tax Act 1961, as they stood prior to the
amendment which was enacted with effect from 1 April 2008 by the Finance Act,
2008 did not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction and authority by the assessing
officer to extend time for the submission of the audit report directed under subsection (2A), without an application by the assessee. We hold and declare that the
amendment was intended to remove an ambiguity and is clarificatory in nature. As a
consequence of our decision, we specifically overrule the judgment of a Division
Bench of the Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v Bishan Swaroop
Ram Kishan Agro Pvt. Ltd.15 dated 27 May 2011.
27 Accordingly, Civil Appeals @ SLP (C) Nos 6082, 7573, 8761 and C.A. No.
2951 of 2012 are restored to the file of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)
for decision on merits. Civil Appeals @ SLP(C) Nos 2808, 2811, 36496, 6680,
36495, 11869, 12026, 12027, 10191, 10190, 9720, 8512, 2810, 7660, 9463, 16130,
27681 of 2012; Civil Appeal Nos 4599, 4334, 7076 of 2017; Civil Appeals @ SLP(C)
Nos 17500, 10248, 10247 of 2017 and C.A. No. 5305 of 2017 are restored to the file
of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal for decision on merits.
14 (2011) 12 Taxman.com 334 (Allahabad); 2011 SCC On Line All 1151
15 [2011] 203 TAXMAN 326 (Delhi) – ITA No. 1775/2010 - 2011 SCC Online Del 2463
18

28 There shall be no order as to costs.
 ............................................................J
 [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]
...........................................................J
 [Hemant Gupta]
New Delhi;
March 26, 2019
19