applications were required to be disposed of on the basis of the Rules in force at the time of the disposal of the applications. = the claim of plaintiff for allotment of additional land of 20.61 acres which can be at best said to be pending on the date of enforcement of Rules, 1983 would have been only dealt with in accordance with Rule 5 of Rules, 1983 and disregard of said Rules the trial court would not have decreed the suit directing the Trust to execute lease in favour of the plaintiff of 20.61 acres of land. The decree of the trial court was clearly in the teeth of the statutory Rules and the High Court committed error in taking the view that Rules, 1983 were not applicable in the present case.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
    CIVIL APPEAL NO.     10853     of 2018
(arising out of SLP (C) No.18959 /2017)
NAGPUR IMPROVEMENT TRUST                ...APPELLANT(S)
   VERSUS
SHEELA RAMCHANDRA TIKHE              ..RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.
Leave granted.
2.   This appeal  has been filed by Nagpur Improvement
Trust, challenging the judgment dated 14.03.2017 of High
Court   of   Judicature   Bombay   at   Nagpur   in   Second   Appeal
No.   122   of   2015,   by   which   judgment   the   Second   Appeal
filed   by   the   respondent   has   been   allowed   by   setting
aside   the   judgment   of   lower   appellate   court   and
restoring   the   judgment   of   trial   court   decreeing   the
suit.
3.   Brief facts of the case necessary to be noted for
deciding this appeal are:­
2
The Nagpur Improvement Trust, the appellant has
been constituted under the Nagpur Improvement Trust
Act,   1936.     For   the   purposes   of   Drainage   and
Sewerage Scheme Part­II, notification under Section
39   of   the   Nagpur   Improvement   Trust   Act,   1936   was
issued   on   27.11.1953   for   acquiring   44.61   acres   of
land   of   the   respondent.     An   award   was   passed   on
31.12.1962   determining   the   compensation   of
Rs.23,500/­   on   the   basis   of   compromise,   which
compensation amount was paid to the respondent and
possession was taken over by the appellant of the
land.  On taking up the possession, the land vested
in the appellant, which became the absolute owner.
A   statutory   rule   namely,   Nagpur   Improvement   Trust
Land Disposal Rules, 1955 was framed in exercise of
power under Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 for
disposal   of   land   by   the   Nagpur   Improvement   Trust.
As per Rule 3 of the Statutory Rules, 1955, one of
the   mode   of   transfer   of   trust   land   was   by   direct
negotiation   with   the   party.     With   regard   to   land
admeasuring   44.61   acres   as   noted   above,   a   policy
3
decision was taken by the Board of the Trust dated
03.05.1968   for   disposal   of   land   to   the   owners   on
lease   by   charging   the   determined   premium   and   the
ground   rent.     The   appellant   accordingly   invited
application for re­allotment of the land on lease.
The respondent filed an application dated 03.09.1975
for re­allotment of entire 44.61 acres of land. A
decision dated 06.10.1975 was taken to re­allot the
44.61   acres   to   the   respondent   on   the   terms   and
conditions stipulated in the Board Resolution dated
03.05.1968.     By   letter   dated   16.10.1975,   the
appellant   informed   the   respondent   in   reference   to
her application dated 03.09.1975 that land acquired
by the Trust may be allotted to her on the terms and
conditions as mentioned in the letter.   The letter
dated   16.10.1975   communicated   that   amount   of
consideration   for   allotment   would   be   1.5   times   of
the   amount   received   by   them   from   the   Land
Acquisition Officer.   The lessee can use the land
only   for   Agriculture   purposes   and   the   amount   of
consideration   will   have   to   be   made   in   maximum   10
4
installments.     The   respondent   was   required   to
deposit   amount   of   Rs.3,525/­   towards   first
installment   and   sign   the   form   of   terms   and
conditions   of   the   allotment,   only   after   that   the
Trust would be able to take further action in the
matter.
The respondent in reply to the aforesaid letter
wrote back to the appellant on 01.11.1975 requesting
to revise the amount of premium payable by her.  The
respondent   wrote   further   letters,   lastly   on
02.03.1982, again reiterating her request to reduce
the   amount.     It   was   further   requested   that   she
should be given the land measuring 44.61 acres  at
the   cost   of   acquisition   only.     The   letter   dated
02.03.1982 was replied by the appellant vide letter
dated 09.06.1982 allocating land measuring 24 acres
out   of   44.61   acres.     The   revised   premium   for
allotment of 24 acres was fixed as Rs.19,230/­ and
first installment of 10% was requested to be paid
immediately   and   to   further   accept   terms   and
conditions of allotment. The respondent acknowledged
5
the   allotment   letter   dated   09.06.1982   and
communicated   her   acceptance   on   15.06.1982.   The
respondent   accepted   the   allotment   on   revised
premium.     In   pursuance   of   the   acceptance   of
allotment letter dated 09.06.1982 allotting 24 acres
of land on terms and conditions mentioned therein,
the possession of 24 acres of land was also handed
over to the respondent on 11.11.1982. The respondent
after taking possession of 24 acres of land again
wrote   a   letter   dated   17.06.1983   thanking   the
appellant   for   allotment   of   24   acres   of   land   and
further requesting to release remaining 20.61 acres
of land.   The appellant wrote on 31.12.1986 to the
respondent   to   pay   Rs.4514.95   due   from   her.   The
respondent   thereafter   sent   various   representations
for allotment of remaining 20.61 acres of land.  On
09.02.1989, a lease was executed by the appellant in
favour   of   respondent   for   24   acres   of   land   as   was
allotted by allotment letter dated 09.06.1982.  The
respondent   filed   a   suit   –   Regular   Civil   Suit   No.
2515 of 1989 against the Nagpur Improvement Trust,
6
praying for following reliefs:­
(a) Declare that the plaintiff is entitled to
re­allotment of 20.61 acres of her land to
her   to   the   exclusion   of   anybody   else   as
the   acquisition   of   the   plaintiff’s   land
for   the   purpose   of   defendant’s   scheme   is
not   required   by   the   defendant   for   its
scheme.
(b) Issue a mandatory injunction directing the
defendant to re­allot 20.61 acres of land
out of survey no.9/1, 11 and 9/2 of Mouza
Godani,   Umrer   Road,   Nagpur,   to   the
plaintiff   and   execute   a   lease   indenture
accordingly in favour of the plaintiff.
(c) Issue   mandatory   injunction   directing   the
defendant   to   make   the   offer   of   her   land
admeasuring   20.61   acres   of   suit   land
S/Nos.9/1,   11,   9/2   of   Mouza   Gondhani,
Umrer Road, Nagpur to the plaintiffs land
is   not   required  by   the   defendant   for   its
scheme   and   the   defendant   a   permanently
7
restrained from making offer of plaintiffs
remaining suit land to anybody else in any
manner and under any pretext.
(d) Declare that the plaintiffs suit land i.e.
20.6 acres of land in Survey Nos. 9/1, 11,
9/2 of Mouza Godhani, Umrer Road, Nagpur,
has   been   unnecessarily   acquired   with
malafide   intention   and   that   it   was   never
required   and   needed   by   the   defendant   for
its drainage and Sewerage Disposal Scheme
Part­II as firstly notified on 27.11.1983,
as per award dated 31.12.1962.
(e) Saddle   the   costs   of   the   suit   on   the
defendant and
(f) Grant any other relief which this Hon’ble
Court   deems   fit   in   the   facts   and
circumstances of the case.
The trial court framed following issues:­
1) Does   the   plaintiff   prove   by   abuse   of
process   of   law,   malafidely   and   under
colorabale   exercise   of   power   that
defendant   has   unnecessarily   acquired   her
8
land?
2) Does   she   further   prove   that   she   has   the
preferential   right   to   get   reallotment   of
remaining 20.61 acres of land?
3) Does   she   further   prove   that   she   had
deposited   Rs.4515.95   for   allotment   of
remaining 20.61 acres of land?
4) Does   she   further   prove   that   defendant   is
avoiding   to   re­allot   her   remaining   20.61
acres of land?
5) Whether   plaintiff   is   entitled   to   get
relief as prayed?
6) What order and decree?
The trial court held that Issue No. 1 does not
survive.     Issue   No.3   was   decided   against   the
plaintiff, however, trial court answered the Issue
Nos.   2,   4   and   5   in   favour   of   the   plaintiff   and
decreed the suit holding that plaintiff is entitled
for   allotment   of   remaining   20.61   acres   of   land.
Plaintiff was directed to deposit remaining premium
amount of Rs.16,295/­ along with 10% p.a. interest
and the appellant was directed to execute the leasedeed
of land admeasuring 20.61 acres in favour of
9
the respondent. 
The   appellant   aggrieved   by   the   judgment   and
decree   of   the   trial   court   filed   a   Regular   Civil
Appeal No. 632 of 2007.  The District Judge, Nagpur
formulated following points for consideration:­
1) Whether   respondent­plaintiff   is   entitled   to
allotment of the suit land?
2) Is the suit barred by time?
3) Is   the   judgment   and   decree   impugned   herein
call for interference?
4) What order?
The learned District Judge held that plaintiff
was not entitled for allotment.  The District Judge
further held that suit filed by the plaintiff was
virtually   a   suit   for   specific   performance   of   the
letter of allotment dated 16.10.1975 and suit having
been filed beyond a period of 3 years is barred by
time.     The   District   Judge   vide   judgment   dated
26.08.2014 allowed the appeal, set aside the decree
of the trial court and dismissed the suit.  Against
the judgment of the Appellate Court, second appeal
10
was filed by the respondent before the High Court.
The   High   Court   framed   following   two   substantial
questions of law in the appeal:­
(1) Whether the lower appellate Court erred in
applying   and   relying   on   the   Nagpur
Improvement   Trust   Land   Disposal   Rules,
1983, when in fact what was sought to be
enforced   by   the   appellant   was   the   order
dated   16.10.1975   in   consonance   with
letter/order   dated   06.10.1975   passed   in
terms   of   Board   Resolution   dated
03.05.1968,   i.e.   decision   taken   by   the
respondent   much   prior   to   the   framing   of
Rules of 1983?
(2) Once   the   Nagpur   Improvement   Trust,   the
acquiring   body   chooses   to   re­allot   the
land acquired, whether such action of reallotment
can be enforced in the Court of
Law?
The High Court held that plaintiff was entitled
for   allotment   of   20.61   acres   of   land   in   view   of
11
resolution of the Board dated 03.05.1968.  The High
Court   also   held   that   the   Rules   namely   Nagpur
Improvement Trust Land Disposal Rules, 1983 having
came into force on 18.05.1983 was not applicable to
the   Board   Resolution   dated   03.05.1968   and   the
decision   taken   on   06.10.1975   and   16.10.1975.     The
High Court further held that trial court having not
framed   any   issues   regarding   limitation,   the   first
appellate Court committed error in holding that the
suit   was   barred   by   limitation,   consequently,   the
second appeal has been allowed by the High Court,
restoring   the   judgment   and   decree   of   the   trial
court. The Nagpur Improvement Trust being aggrieved
by   the  judgment  of  the   High  Court  has  come   up  in
this appeal.         
4. We   have   heard   Shri   Shyam   Divan,   learned   senior
counsel and Shri Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel
for   the   appellant.     We   have   also   heard   Shri   Mukul
Rohtagi, learned senior counsel, who   has appeared for
the respondent.
5. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   submitted   that
12
suit   filed   by   the   plaintiff   was   barred   by   limitation.
The appellant had claimed re­allotment of 44.61 acres of
land   as   per   Resolution   of   the   Board   dated   03.05.1968.
The Board having taken a decision to allot only 24 acres
of   land,   which   was   communicated   by   letter   dated
09.06.1982,   the   cause   of   action   with   regard   to   20.61
acres   of   land   arose   on   the   said   very   date   and   suit
having been filed in the year 1989 is barred by time.
It is further submitted that after enforcement of Rules,
1983, Rule 5 provided for manner of disposal of land and
there being no statutory provision for re­allotment of
land to the land owner from whom land was acquired, the
suit   filed   by   the   plaintiff   for   claiming   re­allotment
could not have been decreed.  Earlier Rules, 1955, which
permitted   allotment   by   direct   negotiations   having   been
rescinded   and   statutory   Rules,   1983   created   a
prohibition   for   allotment   of   any   land   of   the   Trust
except   as   Rule   5(2),   the   claim   of   the   plaintiff   was
liable   to   be   dismissed   and   the   trial   court   committed
error  in   decreeing   the  suit.    It  is  further  submitted
that even the Rules 1955, Rule 3(a), which provided for
13
allotment of land by direct negotiations was struck down
by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court vide its
judgment   dated   7/20.09.2004  Transport   Nagar   Free   Zone
Co­operative   Society   Limited   Vs.   Nagpur   Improvement
Trust, 2005(3) Bom.C.R.485. The plaintiff could not have
relied on Rules, 1955 claiming allotment. The High Court
committed error in observing that First Appellate Court
erred in considering the question of limitation when no
issue was framed by the trial court.   It is submitted
that   suit   having   been   barred   by   limitation,   the
Appellate   Court   was   well   within   its   jurisdiction   to
enter   into   the   issue   of   limitation   and   hold   that   the
suit   was   barred   by   time.     The   suit   filed   in   the   year
1989   was   clearly   barred   by   time   and   was   rightly
dismissed by the First Appellate Court.  The High Court
committed   error   in   holding   that   Statutory   Rules,   1983
were not applicable. 
6.  Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel refuting
the   submission   of   counsel   for   the   appellant   contends
that   plaintiff   was   clearly   entitled   for   allotment   of
20.61   acres   of   balance   area   of   land   as   was   already
14
allotted   by   letter   dated   16.10.1975.   The   allotment   of
land to the plaintiff was under Rule 5 of Rules, 1955.
Hence, Division Bench judgment relied by the appellant
in  Transport   Nagar   Free   Zone   Co­operative   Society
Limited (supra) is not applicable. The resolution having
been passed by the Board to re­allot area acquired from
plaintiff,   it  was  no   longer  a  matter  of  contract.  The
letter   dated   09.06.1982   allotting   24   acres   of   land
cannot be said to be letter denying allotment of 44.61
acres, hence no cause of action arose to the plaintiff
in the year 1982 and first time cause of action arose in
the year 1989 when lease­deed was executed. Hence, the
suit of the plaintiff was not barred by limitation. The
suit of the plaintiff was filed under Section 39 of the
Specific   Relief   Act,   1963   by   which   plaintiff   was
enforcing her entitlement.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent further contends
that present is not a case where this Court may exercise
its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution
of   India   by   interfering   in   the   judgment   of   the   High
Court. The total area of land was 44.61 acres which was
15
owned by the plaintiff and was acquired and Trust having
taken a decision to return the land to land owner since
it was no longer required for the scheme, the plaintiff
has every right to receive acquired area of 44.61 acres
and no error has been committed by the trial court in
decreeing the suit.
8. We   have   considered   the   submissions   of   the   learned
counsel for the parties and perused the records.
9. The principal issue which needs to be decided is as
to   whether   trial   court   was   right   in   holding   that
plaintiff was entitled for allotment of 20.61 acres of
land   for   which   decree   was   granted.   From   the   facts
noticed above, there is no dispute between the parties
that in pursuance of resolution dated 03.05.1968 of the
Board, plaintiff had made an application on 03.09.1975
for allotment of entire 44.61 acres of land and a letter
of   allotment   dated   16.10.1975   for   44.61   acres   of   land
was   issued.   The   allotment   letter   dated   16.10.1975
contains certain conditions. It is useful to extract the
communication dated 16.10.1975 which is to the following
effect:
16
“With   reference   to   the   above   application
letter this is to inform you that under the
drainage and sewage disposal scheme allotment
of 44.61 acres land in Khasra NO.9­1,9­2 and
11 out of excess land acquired by the Trust
may   be   allotted   to   you   on   the   terms   and
conditions   as   mentioned   in   lease   deed
subjected   to   using   it   only   for   agricultural
purpose.
1. The amount of consideration for the above
land would be 1.50 times of the amount 
received from Land Acquisition Officer.
2. The allotment from the Trust Layout would
be done on  the  basis of lease for which
Land   Rent   of   2%   of   the   value   of 
consideration will have to be paid.
3. The lessee can use the said land only for
agricultural purpose. For irrigating the
land the water of sewage flow would be 
provided   by   Nagpur   Improvement   Trust 
and/or   Nagpur   Municipal   Corporation   as 
per the rate fixed up by Nagpur Municipal
Corporation whenever possible.
4. The amount of consideration will have to
be made in maximum 10 instalments and on
the   remaining   unpaid   amount   of   the 
consideration interest would be charged 
at the  rate of 10% p.a.
Hence you are required to deposit amount of
Rs.3,525/­   towards   first   instalment   of   the
consideration in this office at the earliest
and sign the form of terms and conditions of
the   allotment.   Only   after   that   the   Trust
would be able to take further action in the
matter which please note.”
17
10. On   receipt   of   letter   dated   16.10.1975   appellant
requested   for   reduction   of   proportionate   value   of   the
premium   from   the   total   amount   and   further   wrote   on
02.03.1982 to the Trust wherein rate of 1.5 times of the
amount of compensation was asked to be reduced. In the
letter   dated   02.03.1982   following   request   was   made   by
the plaintiff:
"Considering   all   the   situation   stated
above, how can I give you more amount as cost
of field which you acquired I would like to
request you to give the same at the cost of
acquisition   only.   Further   terms   are
acceptable to me, at any time.
If you do not consider my above request,
I will have to move the Govt. for shelter.”
11. After   receipt   of   the   letter   dated   02.03.1982   the
Trust   by   letter   dated   09.06.1982   made   allotment   of   24
acres   out   of   44.61   acres   of   land   to   the   following
effect:
"With reference to your application mentioned
above this is to inform that the Chairman is
pleased   to   consider   your   request   for
allotment   of   land   measuring   about   24   acres
out   of   44.61   acres   of   land     acquired   under
drainage and sewerage disposal scheme on the
same   terms   and   conditions   informed   to   you
vide No.ES/7821 dated 16.10.1975. The revised
premium   for   allotment   of   24   acres   would   be
18
about Rs.19.230/­ and you will have to pay 1st
installment   10%   of   the   premium   immediately
and   accept   the   terms   and   conditions   for
allotment and sign necessary lease indenture
etc.”
12. The possession of 24 acres of land was also handed
over to the respondent on 11.11.1982. The plaintiff thus
was well aware that her request for allotment of entire
44.61 acres was not acceded to and only 24 acres have
been allotted. Subsequent execution of the lease dated
09.02.1989   was   in   continuation   of   the   allotment   dated
09.06.1982. 
13. As noted above the allotment of land of the Trust
was   subject   to   statutory   Rules,   namely,   Nagpur
Improvement Trust Land Disposal Rules, 1955. Rule 3 of
the Rules provides as follows:
"Rule 3. The transfer of Trust land shall be­
(a) by direct negotiation with the party; or
(b) by public auction;  or
(c) by inviting tenders; pr
(d) by concessional rated.”
14. Rule   5   of   the   1955   Rules   which   has   also   been
referred is as follows:
19
"Rule 5. The   Trust   may   lease   out   on
concessional rates any Trust land to any (i)
Public   institution   or   body   registered   under
any   law   for   the   time   being   in   force   or   to
(ii) the evictees (which means persons whose
lands in some locality have been compulsorily
acquired by the Trust and includes tenants in
occupation  of such  lands) which vests or is
to   vest  in   the   Trust,   or   to  (iii)   the   poor
persons   residing   within   the   limits   of   the
Nagpur Corporation who have no house of their
own within the limits either individually or
as   a   member   of   a   joint   family   and   whose
annual   income   from   all   sources   either
individually or of  the joint family,  as the
case   may   be   does   not   exceed   Rs.1,800/­   per
annum.”
15. The   Resolution   dated   03.05.1968   was   passed   by   the
Board   for   disposal   of   surplus   land   acquired   for   the
drainage and sewage disposal scheme, during the period
of enforcement of 1955 Rules. The allotment letter dated
16.10.1975 to the plaintiff of 44.61 acres of land was
in   furtherance   of   Resolution   dated   03.05.1968.   The
plaintiff after receipt of the letter dated 16.10.1975
prayed   for   reduction   of   amount   of   premium   demanded,
several letters were written by the plaintiff regarding
premium   and   allotment,   last   being   letter   dated
02.03.1982   as   extracted   above,   in   which   the   plaintiff
herself   was   not   ready   to   accept   the   terms   as
20
communicated   by   letter   dated   16.10.1975.   The   Trust   on
09.06.1982, thus, has alloted only 24 acres out of 44.61
acres of land. The facts of the case and correspondence
as   noticed  above  clearly   indicate  that  at  no   point   of
time allotment of 44.61 acres was made in favour of the
plaintiff.   The   decision   to   allot   44.61   acres   was
communicated   on   16.10.1975   on   terms   and   conditions
mentioned   therein.   The   plaintiff   having   expressed
certain reservation with the conditions   and asked for
relaxation of conditions and the Trust after taking into
consideration the entire facts and circumstances took a
decision   to   allot   only   24   acres   of   land   out   of   44.61
acres on 09.06.1982, there was never any firm allotment
of   44.61   acres   of   land   to   the   plaintiff   giving   any
indefeasible right of allotment of 44.61 acres of land
and   the   plaintiff   herself   has   to   be   blamed   for   not
getting   allotment   of   entire   44.61   acres   of   land   on
account of she having raised request for the reduction
of   the   premium   and   she   having   not   communicated   her
consent   to   accede   to   the   terms   and   conditions   of
allotment as proposed by the Trust.
21
16. After   the   allotment   of   24   acres   of   land   on
09.06.1982, a new set of Rules for disposal of land of
Nagpur   Improvement   Trust   was   framed,   namely,   Nagpur
Improvement Trust Land Disposal Rules, 1983 which came
into   force   w.e.f.   18.05.1983.   Part   III   of   the   Rules
dealt with manner of disposal of land. Rule 5(1) & (2)
which are relevant for the present case are as follows:
“Rule 5. General.­ (1) No piece of Government
land vested in or managed by the Trust shall
be   transferred   except   with   the   general   or
special   sanction   of   the   Government   given   in
that behalf.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in sub­rule
(1) and in Part VI of these rules, all other
lands   vested   in   and   acquired   by   the   Trust
shall be disposed of by the Trust by ­
(i) holding public auction; or
(ii) inviting tenders by public
advertisement; or
(iii)   making   offers   to   or   accepting
offers   from   any   Government,   Local
Authority, Public Sector Undertaking or a
body   corporate   which   is   owned   or
controlled by Government;
(iv)   inviting   applications   from   persons
or bodies of persons who are eligible for
allotment   of   plots   under   rule   4,   by
public   advertisement   to   be   published   at
22
least   in   one   leading   local   news   paper
each in Marathi, Hindi and English on the
basis   of   predetermined   premium   or   other
considerations or both and deciding these
applications   by   drawing   lots,   if
necessary, as it may determine, from time
to   time   in   accordance   with   the   rules
hereinafter appearing.
(v) Land for public amenities such as for
primary   school,   vehicle   stand,   public
latrine   or   urinal,   public   library,
reading   room,   hospital,   dispensary   or
such other purpose may be transferred to
the   Corporation   of   the   City   of   Nagpur,
either free of premium and ground rent or
at nominal premium and ground rent as the
Trust may determine in each case.”
17. The present is a case where for the disposal of the
land   in   question   Rule   5(2)   became   applicable     from
18.05.1983.   The   earlier   Resolution   of   the   Board   dated
03.05.1968 would no longer have been availed after the
enforcement   of   1983   Rules   for   allotment   of   land.   Sub
­rule   (2)   of   Rule   5   which   provides   for   no   exception
except as otherwise provided in sub­rule (1) and Part VI
of   these   Rules.   Sub­rule   (1)   of   Rule   5   referred   to
general or special sanction of the Government which is
not applicable in the present case. Part VI dealt with
grant of land for religious, educational, charitable and
23
public   purposes   which   also   is   not   applicable   in   the
facts of the present case. Hence, after the enforcement
of the Rules of land vested and acquired by the Trust
was to be disposed of only in the manner as indicated in
sub­rule (2) of Rule 5. Admittedly 24 acres out of 44.61
acres of land was already allotted to the plaintiff on
09.06.1982 and Trust has taken a decision not to allot
any   further   land   in   view   of   its   subsequent   decision
dated   24.04.1983   to   keep   the   remaining   20.61   acres   of
land for Department of Social Forest Trees for Central
Nursery and for Nursery of the Nagpur Improvement Trust
was   taken   by   the   Board.   Thus,   there   was   decision   of
Trust to set apart land of 20.61 acres for Department of
Social Forest Trees for Central Nursery and for Nursery
of   the   Trust.   After   enforcement   of   Rules,   1983   which
were   brought   into   force   on   18.05.1983,   20.61   acres   of
land  could  not   be  allotted   to  the  plaintiff  except   by
following Rule 5 of the Rules, 1983. The First Appellate
Court has categorically made note of the Rules, 1983 and
held that the plaintiff was not entitled for any further
allotment.   After   referring   to   Rules,   1983   specifically
24
Rules   5,   4   and   23,   the   First   Appellate   Court   in
paragraph 22 laid down following:
"22) In the present case, admittedly land
adm.24   acres   was   already   allotted   to   the
respondent   by   the   appellant   before   coming
into   force   of   the   Rules   of   1983   and
therefore, the appellant is not even entitled
to   claim   500   sq.   meter   of   land.   Except   the
aforesaid   provision   there   is   no   other
provision in these Rules empowering the Trust
to  allot  land to  the respondent without the
sanction of State Government.”
18. Rules, 1983 were also relied by the appellant before
the   High   Court   in   the   Second   Appeal   filed   by   the
plaintiff. The High Court held that Rules, 1983 had no
retrospective effect so as to nullify the actions taken
in accordance with the earlier Rules, hence, Rules,1983
were   not   relied.   The   High   Court   held   that   lower
Appellate Court committed error in relying on Rule 5 of
Rules,   1983.   The   High   Court   in   paragraph   18   of   the
judgment has held following:
"18.   The lower Appellate Court has committed
an   error   in   holding   that   the   defendant­NIT
could not have disposed of the land in favour
of   the   appellant­plaintiff   without   there
being any authority of law. The reliance was
placed   by   the   lower   Appellate   Court   on   the
provision of Rule 5 of the Nagpur Improvement
25
Trust Land Disposal Rules, 1982 to hold that
there was no compliance and the allotment was
not in conformity with it. In my view, such
reliance was misplaced. The reason being that
the   said   Rules   wee   brought   in   force   on
18.05.1983 and the decision to re­allot 44.61
acres of land to the appellant­plaintiff was
taken on 6.10.1975 and 16.10.1975, i.e. prior
to   coming   into   force   of   these   Rules.   The
Rules   had   no   retrospective   effect   so   as   to
nullify the actions taken in accordance with
the earlier Rules prevailing. The substantial
question   of   law   at   serial   No.(I)   is,
therefore, answered accordingly.”
19. The High Court took the view that since the decision
to allot 44.61 acres of land was taken on 06.10.1975 and
16.10.1975 i.e. prior to Rules, 1983, the Rules had no
retrospective effect which shall not nullify the actions
taken   in   accordance   with   the   earlier   Rules   then
prevailing.   There   is   no   question   of   nullifying   the
decision   taken   on   06.10.1975   and   16.10.1975   which   was
taken   earlier   to   the   subsequent   Rules,   1983.   In
pursuance of earlier decision i.e. taken on 06.10.1975
and   16.10.1975   the   entire   allotment   which   took   place
prior to Rules, 1983 were completely saved but allotment
which could not culminate before enforcement of Rules,
1983, would not have been made after the enforcement of
26
Rules,   1983   except   in   accordance   with   Rules,   1983.   We
have   already   noticed   that   the   plaintiff   was   allotted
only   24   acres   of   land   in   pursuance   of   decision   dated
06.10.1975 and 16.10.1975 and request of the plaintiff
to allot entire 44.61 acres of land was not acceded to
and   only   24   acres   of   land   was   allotted   possession   of
which   was   handed   over   to   the   plaintiff   on   11.11.1982.
There   being   no   allotment   of   rest   20.61   acres   of   land
prior to 18.05.1983 on the basis of earlier decision no
allotment would have been made after the enforcement of
the   Rules     in   disregard   to   the   statutory   Rules.   The
statutory Rules enforced w.e.f 18.05.1983 substantially
changed   the   manner   of   allotment   and   more   rigorous
conditions   were   put   on   the   land   of   the   Trust.   There
cannot   be   any   dispute   with   the   proposition   that   after
the land is acquired for public purpose it vests in the
acquiring body and the land holder has no right to claim
the   land   acquired.   In   this   context   reference   has   been
made to State of Kerala and others vs. M. Bhaskar Pillai
and another, (1997) 5 SCC 432. In paragraph 4 following
has been laid down:
27
“4. In view of the admitted position that the
land in question was acquired under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 by operation of Section
16   of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act,   it   stood
vested   in   the   State   free   from   all
encumbrances.   The   question   emerges:   whether
the   Government   can   assign   the   land   to   the
erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if
the   land   is   acquired   for   a   public   purpose,
after   the   public   purpose   was   achieved,   the
rest of the land could be used for any other
public   purpose.   In   case   there   is   no   other
public purpose for which the land is needed,
then   instead   of   disposal   by   way   of   sale   to
the erstwhile owner, the  land should  be put
to  public auction and the amount  fetched in
the public auction can be better utilised for
the public purpose envisaged in the Directive
Principles   of   the   Constitution.   In   the
present   case,   what   we   find   is   that   the
executive order is not in consonance with the
provision   of   the   Act   and   is,   therefore,
invalid.   Under   these   circumstances,   the
Division Bench is well justified in declaring
the   executive   order   as   invalid.   Whatever
assignment   is   made,   should   be   for   a   public
purpose.   Otherwise,   the   land   of   the
Government   should   be   sold   only   through   the
public auctions so that the public also gets
benefited by getting higher value. ”
20. This   Court   again   in  Sulochana   Chandrakant   Galande
vs.   Pune   Municipal   Transport   and   others,   (2010)   8   SCC
467, held that after vesting of land in State free from
all   encumbrances   after   acquisition,   landowner   becomes
persona   non   grata   after   vesting   and   has   right   to
28
compensation only and cannot claim right of restoration
of   land   on   any   ground,   whatsoever.   In   paragraph   22
following has been laid down:
“22.   In   view   of   the   above,   the   law   can   be
summarised that once the land is acquired, it
vests   in   the   State   free   from   all
encumbrances.   It   is   not   the   concern   of   the
land owner how his land is used and whether
the   land   is   being   used   for   the   purpose   for
which   it   was   acquired   or   for   any   other
purpose.   He   becomes   persona   non   grata   once
the land vests in the State. He has a right
to   get   compensation   only   for   the   same.   The
person   interested   cannot   claim   the   right   of
restoration   of   land   on   any   ground,
whatsoever. ”
21. The   plaintiff's   case   at   the   highest   is   that   her
application   for   allotment   of   20.61   acres   of   land   was
pending   consideration   when   Rules,   1983   were   enforced.
The plaintiff's own case is that refusal to allot 20.61
acres   of   land   took   place   only   on   09.02.1989   when   the
Trust executed lease of 24 acres of land only. Thus, at
best the application for re­allotment of 20.61 acres of
land   was   pending   at   the   time   when   new   Rules   came   in
force.   New   Rules,   thus,   were   fully   attracted   for   any
further disposal of land by the Trust as per Rule 5 and
29
as per sub­Rule (2) of Rule 5 the land would have been
disposed of except as otherwise provided in sub­Rule (1)
only   by   holding   public   auction;   inviting   tenders   by
public   advertisement;   making   offers   to   or   accepting
offers   from   any   Government,   Local   Authority,   Public
Sector Undertaking or a body corporate which is owned or
controlled   by   Government;   inviting   applications   from
persons   or   bodies   of   persons   who   are   eligible   for
allotment of plots under Rule 4, by public advertisement
and   land   for  public   amenities   such   as   for   primary
school, vehicle stand, public latrine or urinal, public
library,   reading   room,   hospital,   dispensary   or   such
other purpose, etc. Plaintiff's claim is not covered  in
any manner of disposal under Rule 5(2), hence no decree
would  have  been  passed  by  the  trial  court  contrary   to
the statutory Rules as envisaged by Rule 5(2). The view
of the High Court that Rules, 1983 are prospective and
shall   not   effect   the   allotment   made   in   favour   of   the
plaintiff on 06.10.1975 and 16.10.1975 was erroneous. As
observed   above   the   allotments   which   were   finalised   in
pursuance of Resolution dated 06.10.1975 and 16.10.1975
30
were  saved,  but  allotment  of  any   land  which  could  not
take place finally before enforcement of Rules, 1983 has
to   be   in   accordance   with   the   Rules,   1983.   In   this
context, reference is made to the judgment of this Court
in  State of Tamil Nadu vs. M/s. Hind Stone and others,
(1981)   2   SCC   205.  In   that   case,   the   applications   by
various   persons   desirous   of   taking   mining   lease   were
pending when the Rules for grant of lease were amended.
The Rules were amended on 02.12.1977 by introducing Rule
8­C,   it   was   contended   by   several   applicants   that   Rule
8­C   was   not   applicable   to   the   applicants   whose
applications   were   pending.   The   relevant   facts   were
mentioned   in   paragraph   4   which   are   to   the   following
effect:
“4.   Several   persons   who   held   leases   for
quarrying   black   granite   belonging   to   the
State Government and whose leases were about
to expire, applied to the Government of Tamil
Nadu for renewal of their leases. In some of
the   cases   applications   were   made   long   prior
to   the   date   of   G.O.   Ms.   No.   1312   by   which
Rule   8C   was   introduced.   Some   applications
were   made   after   Rule   8C   came   into   force.
There   were   also   some   applications   for   the
grant   of   fresh   leases   for   quarrying   black
granite. All the applications were dealt with
after Rule 8C came into force and all of them
31
were rejected in view of Rule 8C Several Writ
Petitions   were   filed   in   the   High   Court
questioning the vires of  Rule 8C  on various
grounds.   Apart   from   canvassing   the   vires   of
Rule   8C,   it   was   contended   that   Rule   8C   did
not   apply   to   grant   of   renewals   of   lease   at
all. It was also argued that in any event, in
those   cases   in   which   the   applications   for
renewal   had   been   made   prior'   to   the   coming
into   force   of   Rule   8C,   their   applications
should have been dealt with without reference
to Rule 8C. The Madras High Court while not
accepting   some   of   the   contentions   raised   on
behalf of the applicants, struck down Rule 8C
on   the   ground   that   it   exceeded   the   rule
making   power   given   to   the   State   Government
under Section 15 which, it was said, was only
to regulate and not to prohibit the grant of
mining   leases.   As   a   consequence   all   the
applications were directed to be disposed of
without   reference   to   Rule   8C.   It   was   also
observed   that   even   if   Rule   8C   was   valid   it
applied only to the grant of fresh leases and
not to renewals. It was also held that it was
not   open   to   the   Government   to   keep   the
applications pending for a long time and then
to   dispose   them   of   on   the   basis   of   a   rule
which   had   come   into   force   later.   The   State
Government   has   come   in   appeal   against   the
judgment of the Madras High Court while the
respondent­applicants   have   tried   to   sustain
the   judgment   of   the   Madras   High   Court   on
grounds   which   were   decided   against   them   by
the Madras High Court. ”
22. Rejecting   the   argument   that   Rule   8­C   is   not
attracted on the applications which were pending on date
of   amendment,   it   was   held   that   applications   were
32
required to be disposed of on the basis of the Rules in
force at the time of the disposal of the applications.
Following was laid down in paragraph 13:
"13.   Another   submission   of   the   learned
Counsel in connection with the consideration
of   applications   for   renewal   was   that
applications   made   sixty   days   or   more   before
the   date   of   G.O.   Ms.   No.   1312   (December   2,
1977) should be dealt with as if Rule 8C had
not   come   into   force.   It   was   also   contended
that   even   applications   for   grant   of   leases
made   long   before   the   date   of   G.O.   Ms.   No.
1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8C had
not come into force. The submission was that
it   was   not   open   to   the   Government   to   keep
applications   for   the   grant   of   leases   and
applications   for   renewal   pending   for   a   long
time and then to reject them on the basis of
Rule   8C   notwithstanding   the   fact   that   the
applications had been made long prior to the
date on which Rule 8C came into force. While
it  is true  that such applications should be
dealt   with   within   a   reasonable   time,   it
cannot on that account be said that the right
to   have   an   application   disposed   of   in   a
reasonable   time   clothes   an   applicant   for   a
lease   with   a   right   to   have   the   application
disposed   of   on   the   basis   of   the   rules   in
force   at   the   time   of   the   making   of   the
application. No one has a vested right to the
grant   or   renewal   of   a   lease   and   none   can
claim a vested  right  to have  an application
for   the   grant   or   renewal   of   a   lease   dealt
with   in   a   particular   way,   by   applying
particular provisions. In the absence of any
vested rights in anyone, an application for a
lease   has   necessarily   to   be   dealt   with
according to the rules in force on the date
33
of   the   disposal   of   the   application   despite
the fact that there is a long delay since the
making of the application. We are, therefore,
unable   to   accept   the   submission   of   the
learned   Counsel   that   applications   for   the
grant or renewal of leases made long prior to
the date of G.O. Ms. No. 1312 should be dealt
with as if Rule 8­C did not exist. ”
23. We,   thus,   are   of   the   considered   opinion   that   the
claim of plaintiff for allotment of additional land of
20.61 acres which can be at best said to be pending  on
the date of enforcement of Rules, 1983 would have been
only dealt with in accordance with Rule 5 of Rules, 1983
and  disregard  of  said  Rules  the  trial  court  would  not
have   decreed   the   suit   directing   the   Trust   to   execute
lease   in     favour   of   the   plaintiff   of   20.61   acres   of
land. The decree of the trial court was clearly in the
teeth   of   the   statutory   Rules   and   the   High   Court
committed error in taking the view that Rules, 1983 were
not applicable in the present case.
24. It is also relevant to notice that lower Appellate
Court has held that suit of the plaintiff was barred by
time  it  having   been  filed  more  than  three  years  after
the refusal to allot the land. The High Court has held
34
that the Appellate Court has committed error of law in
considering   the   issue   of   limitation   which   was   not   the
question raised before the trial court. In paragraph 17
of the judgment following has been held:
"17. Though   the   allotment   of   44.61   acres   of
land   was   on   16.10.1975,   the   lease­deed   in
respect of 24 acres of land was executed on
09.02.1989.   Thus,   there   was   refusal   on
09.02.1989   to   execute   the   lease­deed   in
respect   of   20.61   acres   of   land.   Hence,   the
cause of action in terms of Article 54 of the
Limitation   Act   would   start   running   from
09.02.1989 when the defendant­NIT refused to
execute the lease­deed. The suit in question
having   filed   on   15.12.1989   was   not,
therefore,   barred   by   the   law   of   limitation.
In   fact,   this   was   not   the   question   raised
before   the   trial   court   and   no   issue   was
framed in respect of it. The lower Appellate
Court   has   committed   an   error   of   law   in
considering   such   issue   and   holding   that   the
suit   in   question   was   barred   by   the   law   of
limitation.   The   finding   of   the   lower
Appellant   Court,   therefore,   needs   to   be   set
aside.”
25. In so far as view of the High Court that Appellate
Court   committed   error   in   entertaining   the   question   of
limitation which was not the issue framed by the trial
court, suffice is to refer the   provision of Section 3
of   the   Limitation   Act,   1963.   Section   3(1)   of   the
35
Limitation Act provides as follows:
“Section 3. Bar of limitation.­(1) Subject to
the   provisions   contained   in   sections   4   to
24(inclusive),   every   suit   instituted,   appeal
preferred,   and   application   made   after   the
prescribed   period   shall   be   dismissed,
although limitation has not been set up as a
defence.”
26. This Court in Foreshore Cooperative Housing Society
Limited   vs.   Praveen   D.   Desai(dead)   through   Legal
Representatives   and   others,   (2015)   6   SCC   412,  had
considered   the   question   of   jurisdiction   of   Court   in
reference   to   provisions   of   Limitation   Act.   Noticing
Section 3 of the Act following was observed:
“48.   Section   3   of   the   Limitation   Act,   1963
clearly provides that every suit instituted,
appeal   preferred   and   application   made   after
the prescribed period of limitation, subject
to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to
24,   shall   be   dismissed   although   the
limitation has not been set up as a defence.
49.   A   Constitution   Bench   of   five   Judges   of
this   Court   in   the   case   of   Pandurang   Dhondi
Chougule v. Maruti  Hari Jadhav, AIR 1966 SC
153,   while   dealing   with   the   question   of
jurisdiction,   observed   that   a   plea   of
limitation or plea of res judicata is a plea
of law which concerns the jurisdiction of the
court   which   tries   the   proceeding.   The   Bench
held(AIR p.155, para 10):
36
10. The provisions of Section 115 of the
Code   have   been   examined   by   judicial
decisions   on   several   occasions.   While
exercising its jurisdiction Under Section
115,   it   is   not   competent   to   the   High
Court to correct errors of fact however
gross   they   may,   or   even   errors   of   law,
unless the said errors have relation to
the jurisdiction of the court to try the
dispute itself. As Clauses (a), (b) and
(e) of Section 115 indicate, it is only
in cases where the subordinate court has
exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it
by   law,   or   has   failed   to   exercise   a
jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in
the   exercise   of   its   jurisdiction
illegally   or   with   material   irregularity
that   the   revisional   jurisdiction   of   the
High Court can be properly invoked. It is
conceivable that points of law may arise
in   proceedings   instituted   before
subordinate   courts   which   are   related   to
questions   of   jurisdiction.   It   is   well
settled   that   a   plea   of   limitation   or   a
plea   of   res   judicata   is   a   plea   of   law
which   concerns   the   jurisdiction   of   the
court   which   tries   the   proceedings.   A
finding on these pleas in favour of the
party   raising   them   would   oust   the
jurisdiction   of   the   court,   and   so,   an
erroneous decision on these pleas can be
said   to   be   concerned   with   questions   of
jurisdiction   which   fall   within   the
purview of Section 115 of the Code. But
an   erroneous   decision   on   a   question   of
law   reached   by   the   subordinate   court
which   has   no   relation   to   questions   of
jurisdiction   of   that   court,   cannot   be
corrected by the High Court Under Section
115. ”
37
27. No   error   was   committed   by   the   Appellate   Court   in
entering   into   the   issue   as   to   whether   application   was
barred by time. The Appellate Court was well within its
jurisdiction in considering the question of limitation.
We, however, for the present case need not express any
opinion   with   regard   to   the   question   of   limitation   in
view of we having held that plaintiff was not entitled
for   the   decree.   Thus,   even   without   entering   into   the
question of limitation we are of the clear opinion that
plaintiff  was  not  entitled  for   the  decree  as   has  been
granted   by   the   trial   court   and   affirmed   by   the   High
Court.
28. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment
of   the   High   Court   is   set   aside   and   the   suit   of   the
plaintiff stands dismissed.
..........................J.
( A.K. SIKRI )
..........................J.
    ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
NEW DELHI,
OCTOBER 31, 2018.

whether respondent is having personal bonafide necessity or not. Accordingly, impugned order passed by the Rent Appellate Tribunal is set aside.” (emphasis supplied) 15. Having held that, the High Court had two options: first either to remand the case to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for deciding the appeal afresh on 6 merits in accordance with law and second, to decide the matter itself on merits in accordance with law. 16. Since the High Court heard the matter in its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, it was not possible to examine the issue on facts in detail like an Appellate Court. It is for this reason, in our view, the High Court ought to have resorted to first option and remanded the case back to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for deciding the appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law. 17. The High Court, therefore, committed an error in not taking recourse to any option and without deciding the issue arising in the case on its merit, simply restored the order of the Rent Tribunal. 18. This approach of the High Court caused prejudice to the appellant (landlady) because there was no factual finding recorded either by the first 7 appellate Court or the High Court on the question of bona fide need.

      REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 10811 OF 2018
[Arising out of SLP (C) No. 9716 of 2018]
KALPANA VYAS ... Appellant
Versus
RAJ KUMAR RANGWANI … Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This   appeal   is   directed   against   the   final
judgment and order dated 02.01.2018 passed by the
High Court of Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur in S.B. Civil
Writ Petition No. 5403/2015 whereby the High Court
1
has allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent
herein.
3. The issue involved in the appeal is short, as
also the facts of the case lie in a narrow compass,
which would be clear from the narration infra.
4. The   appellant   is   the   applicant,   whereas   the
respondent   is   the   non­applicant   in   the   eviction
petition   filed   by   the   appellant   against   the
respondent   before   the   Rent   Control   Tribunal,
Rajasthan out of which this appeal arises.
5. The appellant ­ a landlady of the suit premises
filed the eviction petition against the respondenttenant
of the suit premises under Section 9 of the
Rajasthan Rent Control Act (for short called “The
Act”)   before   the   Rent   Tribunal   Kota   (R­84/2005)
praying therein for respondent's eviction from the
tenanted suit premises.
2
6. The   appellant   claimed   respondent's   eviction
from   the   suit   premises   on   the   ground   of   her
personal bona fide need for raising construction in
the   existing   suit   premises   to   be   used   for   her
children and for stay of appellant's guest in the suit
premises.
7. The   respondent   denied   the   appellant's   need
and,  inter alia,  contended that the appellant is in
possession of an alternative accommodation in the
city   and   hence   her   alleged   need   set   up   in   the
eviction petition can be accomplished by using the
alternative accommodation available in the city.
8. By  order dated  8.2.2011, the  Rent  Tribunal
dismissed the appellant's eviction petition holding
that appellant's need can be accomplished with an
alternative space available with her in the city.
3
9. The appellant (landlady) felt aggrieved and filed
an appeal (144/2014) before the Appellate Tribunal.
The Appellate Tribunal by order dated 12.2.2015
allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Rent
Tribunal, decreed the appellant's eviction petition
and   passed   the   eviction   decree   against   the
respondent, in relation to the suit premises.
10. The respondent (tenant) felt aggrieved and filed
writ   petition   before   the   High   Court   of   Rajasthan
(Jaipur).   By   impugned   order,   the   learned   Single
Judge allowed the respondent's writ petition and set
aside   the   order   of   the   Appellate   Tribunal   and
restored the order of the Rent Tribunal which gives
rise to filing of the special leave to appeal in this
Court by the landlady.
11. So   the   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the High
4
Court   was   justified   in   allowing   the   respondent's
(tenant’s) writ petition thereby justified in setting
aside   the   appellate   order   of   the   Rent   Appellate
Tribunal and restoring that of the Rent Tribunal.
12. Heard Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned counsel for
the   appellant   and   Mr.   Purvish   Jitendra   Malkan,
learned counsel for the respondent.
13. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
are   inclined   to   allow   the   appeal,   modify   the
impugned order and remand the case to the Rent
Appellate   Tribunal   for   deciding   the   appeal
(144/2014) afresh on merits.
14. In our opinion, the need to remand the case to
the Rent Appellant Tribunal has occasioned because
the High Court, while allowing the respondent's writ
petition, came to a conclusion and accordingly held
5
that   the   Rent   Appellate   Tribunal   allowed   the
appellant's   (landlady's)   appeal   with   a   casual
approach   and   failed   to   record   any   categorical
finding on the plea of bona fide need.  The operative
part of the High Court order reads as under:­
“Taking   into   consideration   the   fact
aforesaid,  I do  not find  any  reason  for Rent
Appellate Tribunal for setting aside the order
of   the   Rent   Tribunal.    The   perusal   of   the
impugned  order   shows  a  casual  approach  of
the Rent Appellate Tribunal in reversing the
finding   of   the   Rent   Tribunal,   that   too,
without   going   into   the   issue   of   personal
bonafide   necessity.     The   Rent   Appellate
Tribunal   was   expected   to   first   decide   the
issue   as   to   whether   respondent   is   having
personal   bonafide   necessity   or   not.
Accordingly,   impugned   order   passed   by   the
Rent Appellate Tribunal is set aside.”
          (emphasis supplied)
15. Having   held   that,   the   High   Court   had   two
options: first either to remand the case to the Rent
Appellate Tribunal for deciding the appeal afresh on
6
merits in accordance with law and second, to decide
the matter itself on merits in accordance with law.
16.  Since the High Court heard the matter in its
writ   jurisdiction   under   Article   227   of   the
Constitution,   it   was   not   possible   to   examine   the
issue on facts in detail like an Appellate Court.  It is
for this reason, in our view, the High Court ought to
have resorted to first option and remanded the case
back to the Rent Appellate Tribunal for deciding the
appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law. 
17.  The High Court, therefore, committed an error
in not taking recourse to any option and without
deciding the issue arising in the case on its merit,
simply restored the order of the Rent Tribunal. 
18. This   approach   of   the   High   Court   caused
prejudice to the appellant (landlady) because there
was no factual finding recorded either by the first
7
appellate Court or the High Court on the question of
bona fide need. 
19. It is for this reason that we uphold the finding
of the High Court in relation to the approach and
the manner in which the Rent Appellate Tribunal
decided the appellant's appeal but consider it just
and proper to remand the case to the Rent Appellate
Tribunal   for   its   decision   on   merits   afresh   in
accordance with law.
20. In   view   of   foregoing   discussion,   the   appeal
succeeds   and   is   allowed.   Impugned   order   is
modified to the extent that the case is remanded to
the Rent Appellate Tribunal for deciding the appeal
(No. 144/2014)(Old No. 41/11) afresh on merits in
accordance with law.
8
21. Since the matter pertains to  bona fide  need
and eviction, the Rent Appellate Tribunal will decide
the   appeal   within   six   months   as   an   outer   limit
strictly   in   accordance   with   law   without   being
influenced by any observations made by this Court
and the High Court.
22. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed
of.
     ………………………………..J.
     (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
           ..………………………………J.
    (INDU MALHOTRA)
New Delhi,
October 29, 2018
9

Service matter -whether the reliefs as prayed for can be granted to the respondents, who not only failed to challenge the termination w.e.f. 1st April, 2001 pursuant to the policy decision of the State Government at the relevant time but also failed to challenge the latest policy decision of the State Government noted in communication dated 20th May, 2005, regarding adjustment of the terminated employees on terms and conditions stipulated thereunder and including the terms and conditions specified in the appointment letter dated 16th 25 March, 2007. Neither the single Judge nor the Division Bench of the High Court has dilated on this aspect at all. = order of termination was the subject matter of the challenge and, having set aside the impugned termination, the court granted consequential relief of reinstatement with back­wages to the concerned petitioner(s). The respondents herein, however, for reasons best known to them, did not challenge the order of termination which event had occurred w.e.f. 1st April, 2001 consequent to abolition of the scheme in which they were employed. Taking an overall view of the matter, therefore, the respondents are not entitled to the reliefs as claimed, having acted upon the terms and conditions upon which they came to be engaged vide appointment letter dated 16th March, 2007.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.10806 OF  2018
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 7358 of 2018)
THE STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. ….          APPELLANTS
:Versus:
BALIRAM SINGH & ORS. ….      RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the final judgment and order
dated 15th January, 2018 in L.P.A. No.2307 of 2016 passed by
the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna
whereby the judgment and order passed by the Single Judge
in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.22208 of 2013 dated 22nd
August,   2016   allowing   the   writ   petition   preferred   by   the
2
respondents  inter alia  for relief of payment of salary for the
period   from   1st  October,   2001   till   3rd  July,   2007   and
consequently   directing   the   appellants   to   pay   the   amount
towards salary for the said period had been upheld.
3. The respondents filed a writ petition initially praying for a
direction against the appellants to make payment of salary to
them for the period from 1st October, 2001 till 3rd July, 2007,
along with statutory interest. By way of an amendment, a
further relief was claimed to issue a writ of mandamus to the
appellants   to   give   continuity   of   past   services   to   the
respondents taking into account the period from 1st October,
2001 till 3rd July, 2007 for the purpose of making payment of
salary to the respondents for the said period. The respondents
asserted   that   they   were   appointed   as   Adult   Education
Supervisors   between   1981   and   1987   pursuant   to
advertisements published between 1979 and 1983. It is stated
that 771 posts of Adult Education Supervisor were abolished
in   terms   of   the   decision   of   the   State   Government   after
3
adjusting the remaining 367 supervisors who continued to
work until the abolition of the posts in the year 1991.
4. These   termination   orders   were   challenged   by   the
association of the respondents, namely, the Bihar State Adult
and Non­Formal Education Employees Association, by way of
CWJC No.5036 of 1992. That writ petition was disposed of
along with connected cases vide judgment dated 24th  May,
19961
. Paragraph Nos.36 and 37 of the judgment read thus:
“36. There is no doubt that petitioners’ initial appointments
were   made   to   a   scheme   which   was   purely   temporary,
therefore,   it   may   not   be   possible   for   me   to   ask   the
respondent   authorities   to   regularize   their   services.   But   I
have already noticed that their appointments were made as
per the prescribed norms of the Government after proper
advertisement etc. I have also noticed that having regard to
their past services rendered continuously for ten to fourteen
years, the State authorities had themselves absorbed at least
771   of   such   Supervisors   and   for   rest   steps   were   under
contemplation. Petitioners have also been able to establish
successfully that the decision of the authorities to cancel
such adjustment was not only malafide rather shameful. But
now a stand is being taken by the respondents that those
771 posts were also temporary hence a decision was taken to
terminate the petitioners. Therefore, in these backgrounds, it
would   not   be   proper   to   quash   the   order   of   petitioners’
termination.
37. But it cannot be ignored that having regard to the long
services   rendered   by   the   petitioners,   administrative
1 The Bihar State Adult and Non­Formal Education Employees Association and Ors. Vs.
The State of Bihar and Ors. 1996 SCC Online Pat 235;(1996) 2 PLJR 394
4
authorities had suggested steps for their absorption even in
other   departments.   Therefore,   having   taken   into
consideration entire facts and circumstances of the case, I
dispose of the writ petitions with the following direction to
the respondent­authorities: (a) to allow the petitioners and
interveners   to   continue   against   these   771   posts,   against
which   they   were   adjusted   in   terms   of   the   letter   of   the
concerned department, dated 19th December, 1990. But such
adjustment is to be made as per their seniority or (b) in case
those   posts   have   also   been   abolished,   take   steps   to
absorb/adjust the petitioners along with the interveners in a
similar manner, the employees of Consolidation Department
were adjusted or (c) if for any justified reason condition nos.
(a) or (b) are not possible, take a decision similar to the State
of   Uttar   Pradesh,   which   I   have   already   indicated   in
paragraph   no.18   of   this   order   and   adjust/absorb   them
accordingly. But in the facts and circumstances of the case, I
could not persuade myself to quash the impugned order.
With   the   aforesaid   directions/observations,   these   writ
applications are, thus, disposed of. But the parties are left to
bear their own costs.”
5. Consequent   to   the   said   decision,   the   appellants
appointed   the   respondents   in   the   Non­Formal   Education
Scheme/Adult Education Scheme vide order dated 15th March,
1998. The said order reads thus:
“The Government of Bihar
Secondary, Primary and Adult Education Department
Office Order
Patna, date: 15th March, 98
No.24/Mu. 5­042/92 P.E. 112/C.W.J.C.­5036/92
1. In the light of order passed on the date of 24.5.96 by
the Hon’ble Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No.­5036/92 and
other annexed petitions and in the light of order passed on
the date of 26.11.97 in M.J.C. No.­2884/96 and 3172/96,
against   the   sanctioned   and   vacant   posts   of   the   Project
5
Officers,   under   Informal   Dist.   Public   Education   Program
under Public Education Directorate, to the following service
relieved Adult Education Supervisors along with the other
allowances payable from time to time by the Government, in
pay­scale­1600­50­2300­60­2700,   making   appointment   in
temporary way on the post of Project Officer under Informal
Education,   order   is   passed   to   make   joining   in   Public
Education Directorate, Bihar Patna.
S.N. Name Amended/
Provisional
Home District Dist.   From
where
retrenchment
was made
1. Mrs.   Kalyani
Devi
1 Bhagalpur Pakud
2. 2
3. 3
4.
5.
453 Mr.   Panna   Lal
Yadav
500 W. Singhbhum W. Singhbhum
2. Aforesaid   all   appointed   employees   at   the   time   of
joining, shall submit necessarily Medical Certificate issued
by Civil Surgeon.
3. This   appointment   shall   be   deemed   fresh
appointment, resultantly their earlier services shall not
be calculated for their pension,/ promotion/ time bound
promotion etc.
4. If by the aforesaid employees, their earlier charges are
not handed over, then only after handing over earlier charge,
joining shall be made at new posted place.
5. To  all  aforesaid  employees  only  starting  salary  of
pay­scale   mentioned   in   this   letter   shall   be   payable
immediately.
6. The service of all aforesaid employees shall be under
policy and principle of Informal Education Program/Adult
Education Program.
6
7. The   service   conditions   of   aforesaid   all   appointed
employees shall be deemed under circulars issued earlier
in  the  context  of  retrenchment  and  adjustment  by  the
Personnel Department and Finance Department.
8. On being any kind of alteration in Sl. No. in amended
Provisional   Seniority   List   prepared   by   Public   Education
Directorate, Bihar, Patna, alteration may be made in the post
of employees mentioned in this letter also.
9. If during review by Public Education Directorate, proof
is   found   of   arrear   or   defalcation   against   any   aforesaid
employee,   then   action   shall   be   taken   for   its   recovery.   If
against   any  employee  serious  charges   are  found  or  their
service is found unsatisfactory, then their service may be
terminated.
10. The   aforesaid   appointed   employees   shall   submit
affidavit in the context of their appointment at the time of
joining stating therein that, their appointment is made in
formal   way   and   as   per   rule   and   if   in   future   their
appointment   is   found   illegal/irregular,   then   their   service
shall be terminated and they shall be liable to punishment.
11. The   employee  who  was   appointed  on   the  post   of
Project Officer, under informal education for the period
of three years on the basis of contract earlier in category
of   Adult   Education   Supervisor   and   whose   service   was
extended up to December, 97, his appointment also shall
be deemed fresh appointment.
12. Aforesaid   all   appointed   employees   shall   make
joining   in   Public   Education   Directorate,   Bihar,   Patna
within  one  month   from  date  of   issuance  of  this   letter,
otherwise their appointment shall be terminated.
Sd./­dated 15­3­98
[Vishnu Kumar]
Director, Public Education, Bihar, Patna
Memo no.­412/Patna, Date: 15 March 1998
Copy sent to;­Accountant General, Bihar, Patna/Ranchi for
information and necessary action.
Sd./­dated 15­3­98
7
[Vishnu Kumar]
Director, Public Education, Bihar, Patna
Memo no.­412/Patna, Date: 15 March 1998
Copy sent to:­ The Treasury Officer, Vikas Bhawan, Patna
Secretariat for information and necessary action.
Sd./­dated 15­3­98
[Vishnu Kumar]
Director, Public Education, Bihar, Patna
Memo no.­412/Patna, Date: 15 March 1998
Copy   sent   to:­   All   Dist.   Magistrates/all   Dy.   Development
Commissioner/all   Dist.   Public   Education   Officer/all
Assistant Driector, Informal Education for information and
necessary action.
Sd./­dated 15­3­98
[Vishnu Kumar]
Director, Public Education, Bihar, Patna
Memo no.­412/Patna, Date: 15 March 1998
Copy   sent   to:­   All   concerned
employees……………………………………..for   information   and
necessary action.
Sd./­dated 15­3­98
[Vishnu Kumar]
Director, Public Education, Bihar, Patna
Memo no.­412/Patna, Date: 15 March 1998
Copy sent to:­ The Secretary, Secondary, Primary and Adult
Education   Department,   Bihar,   Patna   for   information   and
necessary action.
Sd./­dated 15­3­98
[Vishnu Kumar]
Director, Public Education, Bihar, Patna
Memo no.­412/Patna, Date: 15 March 1998
[True Translated Copy]”
(emphasis supplied)
8
6. Be it noted that the appointment of the respondents to
the   post   of   Project   Officer   was   a   fresh   appointment.   The
respondents   accepted   the   said   terms   and   conditions   of
appointment   and   none   of   the   respondents   challenged   the
same. The scheme, in respect of which the respondents were
appointed, was abolished w.e.f. 1st April, 2001, as a result of
which all of them came to be terminated. The respondents,
however, neither challenged the policy decision to abolish the
scheme   under   which   the   Informal   Education   Programme
Scheme was implemented by the State Government nor their
termination   order.   Indeed,   some   of   the   affected   persons
challenged their order of termination by way of writ petitions.
We shall advert to this aspect a little latter.
7. It is indisputable that the State Government took a policy
decision on 20th May, 2005 to adjust all the 1427 retrenched
employees.   The   policy   is   reflected  in   the   resolution,  which
reads thus:
“State of Bihar
Department of Human Resources Development
(Primary and Adult Education)
9
Resolution
       Patna Dated:­ May, 2005.
Like   other   states   in   State   of   Bihar,   Informal   Education
Program  in  the  form of  Central  sponsored programe was
managed   in   order   to   arrange   primary   education   to   such
children who are aged about 6­14 years and not going to
government school for study. Central Government and State
Government   were   bearing   the   expenses   incurred   in   this
programe in specified ratio. The Central Government has
taken decision to stop Informal Education Programe and to
regulate   the   Education  Guarantee   Program/Objective  and
Navachari Education Programe with effect from 01.04.2001
for the purpose of this object. Subsequently the following
employees for informal Education Program were retrenched
with effect from 01.04.2001.
S.
No
.
Post Name Req.
qualification
Salary No.
Reentrant
Emp.
1. Project Officer Graduation 5,000­
8,000
316
2. Clerk Cum Accnt. Matric 4,000­
6,000
346
3. Clerk Cum Typist Matric 4,000­
6,000
346
4. Stenographer  Matric 4,000­
6,000
1
5. Driver Literate 3,050­
4,590
30
6. Peon Literate 2,550­
3,200
370
Total 1,427
2. The   matter   of   a   adjustment   of   1427   retrenched
employees under the aforesaid explained in formal education
programe   was   pending   before   the   government.   State
government   has   taken   decision   for   adjustment   of   the
retrenched   employees   against   the   available   vacancies   in
different departments in the following manners:­
J. The   concerned   retrenched   employee   shall   be
adjusted   on   such   post   for   which   he   possesses   the
10
required prescribed educational qualification and no
new post shall be created for him.
B. They shall be adjusted for the same salary at which
they   were   retrenched.   In   case   of   unavailability   of
post/vacancy   and   upon   furnishing   their   written
consent, retrenched employees shall also be adjusted
at minimum salary.
C. The   reservation   roster   shall,   necessarily   be
complied   with.   The   retrenched   employees   shall   be
adjusted against the roster point of the same class,
they belong to.
D. The maximum limit of age shall be exhausted for
adjustment.
E. In   the   light   recommendation   of   personnel   and
administrative   reforms   department,   as   per   the
definition of retrenched employees mentioned in their
resolution no.­209 dated 06.07.92, Public Education
Director shall prepare, self sufficient panel, in the light
of advice of learned counsel, all 1,427 employees have
been deemed to be retrenched.
F. The   direct   recruitment   shall   not   be­stopped   in
series   of   adjustment   in   different   departments.   The
Public Education Director shall initiate proceedings to
mark   the   post   for   the   purpose   of   adjustment   in
different departments.
G. Consent of Bihar Employees Selection Commission
is  not  necessary in  filing  the marked  post  through
adjustment.
H. According   to   availability   of   vacancies,   the
appointments shall be made from such panel time to
time through adjustment after obtaining the approval
of chief secretary. Chief Secretary must be empowered
by the governor or Council of Ministers of State for
giving such approval.
I. The   adjustment   of   retrenched   employees   shall
be   deemed   to   be   a  new   appointment.   They   shall
11
not get the benefit of seniority on the basis of their
service before being retrenched. But the period of
service   prior   to   retrenchment   shall   be   used   for
pension purpose.
J. The   retrenched   employees   whose   immediate
adjustment   is   not   done   due   to   unavailability   of
vacancy,   after   preparing   their   list   they   shall   be
adjusted against vacancy post available in next five
years.
        By the order of Governor of Bihar.
 SD/illegible­Vijay Prakash
         Secretary
      Primary and Adult Education
    20/5/2005”
(emphasis supplied)
8. Even   this   policy   makes   it   amply   clear   that   the
adjustment   of   retrenched   employees   was   to   be   a   new
appointment and the employees would not get the benefit of
seniority on the basis of their services before being retrenched.
However, the period of service prior to retrenchment would be
reckoned for pension purposes only. Even this policy has not
been challenged by the respondents.
9. The   respondents   eventually   came   to   be   appointed
pursuant to the letter dated 16th March, 2007. The said letter
reads thus:
12
“Letter no.­13/Est. 15­05/06 270/
The Government of Bihar
Human Resource Development Department
From,
Dr. Madan Mohan Jha
Commissioner­cum­Secretary.
To,
Commissioner­cum­Secretary,
Food and Supply Department,
Bihar, Patna.
 Patna, Date: 16 March, 2007
Subject:­About the adjustment on the posts equivalent of
Supervisors   of   Adult   Public   Education,   in   the
compliance of order passed by the Hon’ble Patna
High Court in C.W.J.C. No.­5036/92 and M.J.C.
No.­2884/96, in course of Resolution No.­582 dated
20.05.05 and 1638 dated 11.10.06 passed by the
State Government.
Sir,
1. In the context of aforesaid subjects, as per instruction,
it is to say that, a decision is taken by the State Government
of   re­adjustment   against   the   vacant   posts   equivalent   to
supervisory   category   under   different   departments,   of   the
employees   of   concerned   Adult   Education   Supervisor
Category,   in   context   of   which   decision   was   taken   of
adjustment   in   other   departments   as   consequence   of
conclusion of Informal Education Program with effect from
date 01.04.01 and whose adjustment was made in year 1998
under Informal Education Program on account of wants of
posts, for some time against the post of clerk, the employees
of   Adult   Education   Supervisor   Category,   concerned   with
Resolution   No.­582   dated   20.05.05   for   the   adjustment
against   the   vacancies   available   in   different
Departments/Offices, of retrenched  employees  of  Informal
Education Program. In this context, the copy of Resolution
No.­582   dated   20.05.05   and   Resolution   No.­1638   dated
11.10.06 are annexed.
Vide Letter No.­646 dated 25.03.05 of the Food and
Supply  Department,  on  the  basis  of  said  decision  of  the
Government   and   option   received   for   adjustment   from
13
employees   against   the   communicated   rest   vacancies   of
Supply Inspector, for the appointment/adjustment in payscale
[5000­8000] against vacant posts of Supply Inspector,
under   Food   and   Supply   Department,   of   the   following
retrenched   employees   of   Adult   Education   Supervisory
Category:­
S.
No.
Name Reservatio
n Category
D.O.B. Home
Dist.
Date   of
First
joining   on
the post of
Adult
Education
Supervisor
Presently   in   which
office   department
adjusted   or   to   be
adjusted
1. Swarn Lata
Fransis
S.T. 25.06.58 Kodrama 01.03.82 Clerk in the Office of
D.S.I. Samastipur
2. Dinesh
Chandra
Manjhi
S.T. 02.04.56 Giridih 05.03.82 R.D.E.D. Darbhanga
3. Rasique
Murm
S.T. 03.01.57 Dumka 13.04.82 R.D.E.D. Darbhanga
4. Munshi
Murmu
S.T. 03.01.57 Dumka 14.04.82 R.D.E.D. Darbhanga
5. Thiyophil
Tuddu
S.T. 12.08.49 Dumka 15.04.82 Clerk in the Office of
S. Madhubani
6. Timothy
Marandi
S.T. 19.04.55 Dumka 27.01.83 Clerk in the P.T.E.C.
Ghoghradih
Madhubani
7. Jagnath
Singh
S.T. 16.01.58 Ranchi 01.09.84 R.D.E.D. Darbhanga
8. Kumari
Usha Kiran
W.B.C.­1 05.06.56 Patna 21.05.80 W. Supervisor C.D.P.
Badhara Bhjojpur
9. Bhagwan
Osta
B.C.­1 16.07.49 Dumka 15.06.81 Office   of   Dist.
Magistrate, Katihar
10. Radha
Prasad
Verma
B.C.­1 30.07.51 Palamu 15.01.82 Dis.   Magistrate
Purnia
11. Devendra
Thakur
B.C.­1 09.03.54 Bhojpur 06.08.82 Recommended   in
Welfare Department
12. Muneshwa
r Prasad
B.C.­1 25.09.52 Gaya 06.08.82 Clerk   in   Sub
Divisional   Office
Masaodi
13. Moise
Ansari
B.C.­1 05.02.57 E.
Champaran
06.08.82 Dist.   Magistrate
Gopalganj
14. Ramayan
Choudhary
B.C.­1 03.12.55 W.
Champaran
07.08.82 Dist.   Magistrate   W.
Champaran
14
15. Arjun
Mahto
B.C.­2 24.01.58 Palamu 15.01.82 Welfare Department
16. Arvind
Kumar
B.C.­2 02.01.59 Ranchi 15.01.82 Recommended   on
the   post   of
accountant   welfare
department
17. Krishna
Kumari
B.C.­2 30.08.56 Vaishali 27.02.82 Welfare Department
18. Raj
Kishore
B.C.­2 09.08.59 Hazaribagh 01.03.82 Recommended   on
the   post   of   clerk   in
Youth   sports   art   &
cultural depart.
19. Manohar
Ram
Madani
B.C.­2 18.07.55 Giridih 03.03.82 Clerk   in   04   Bihar
Batalian   N.C.C.
Bhagalpur
20. Gangadhar
Mandal
B.C.­2 10.09.58 Dhanbad 05.03.82 Clerk in Office of 23
Bihar   Batalian
N.C.C. Bhagalpur
21. Abdula
Kasmi
B.C.­2 11.04.55 Ranchi 22.03.82 Recommended   on
the   post   of
accountant   in
welfare department
22. Sudhir
Kumar
Gupta
B.C.­2 31.12.48 Bhagalpur 13.04.82 Recommended   on
the   post   of   clerk   in
Youth   Sports   Art   &
Culture Depart.
23. Om
Prakash
Mandal
B.C.­2 24.05.54 Deoghar 14.04.82 Recommended   on
the   post   of   clerk   in
Youth   Sports   Art   &
Culture Depart.
24. Ganesh
Prasad
Umar
B.C.­2 02.01.52 Deoghar 20.04.82 Recommended   on
the   post   of   clerk   in
Youth   Sports   Art   &
Culture Depart.
25. Suraj
Prasad
B.C.­2 22.06.48 E.
Champaran
06.08.82 D.M. W. Champaran
26. Sudha
Rani
Jaiswal
B.C.­2 01.08.52 E.
Champaran
06.08.82 Recommended   on
the   post   of   clerk   in
Youth   Sports   Art   &
Culture Depart.
27. Krishna
Kumar
Prasad
B.C.­2 08.06.53 Gopalganj 06.08.82 Recommended   in
Welfare Department
28. Narendra B.C.­2 28.01.56 Nalanda 06.08.82 Recommended   in
15
Dev Welfare Department
29. Dasrath
Singh
Yadav
B.C.­2 15.10.57 Palamu 26.12.82 Recommended   on
the   post   of   clerk   in
welfare department
30. Kamal
Kumar
Jaisawal
B.C.­2 02.03.61 Godda 27.01.83 Welfare department
31. Rama
Mahto
B.C.­2 07.07.50 Palamu 01.05.83 Welfare department
32. Dilip
Kumar
Maiti
B.C.­2 11.04.58 E.
Singhbhum
24.08.84 Recommended   in
Welfare Department
33. Shoukat
Ara
B.C.­2 16.03.48 Purnia 02.02.85 Recommended   in
Welfare Department
34. Naresh Kr.
Jaiswal
B.C.­2 05.01.58 Saharsa 18.04.85 Recommended   in
Welfare Department
35. Mira
Kumara
General  19.07.50 Purnia 05.02.80 Child   Development
Office, Purnia
36. Dineshwar
Pathak
General  17.08.54 E.
Champaran
11.06.81 D.M. Office Purnia
37. Krishna
Kumar
General 01.08.55 Palamu 15.01.82 Youth   sports,   art   &
culture depart.
38. Sharmasip
tansu
Konar
General 01.01.54 Dhanbad 27.02.82 I.C.D.S.   Social
Welfare   Department,
Bihar
39. Vinod
Kumar
General 28.06.53 Dhanbad 01.03.82 I.C.D.S.   Social
Welfare   Department,
Bihar
40. Anand
Singh
Choudhary
General 05.02.58 Dhanbad 08.03.82 I.C.D.S.   Social
Welfare   Department,
Bihar
41. Satish
Kumar
Sinha
General 15.11.55 Dhanbad 13.04.82 I.C.D.S.   Social
Welfare   Department,
Bihar
42. Ajijur
Rahman
General 02.06.50 Dumka 19.04.82 D.E.O. Office Munger
43. Nand
Kishore
Mishra
General  01.06.50 Dumka 20.04.82 Welfare Department
44. Vimla Devi General 05.06.55 Gaya 06.08.82 Collectariate Patna
45. Baliram
Singh
General  13.10.55 Gopalganj 06.08.82 Recommended   in
Gopalganj
Collectariate
46. Radha
Krisna
Mishra
General 01.05.57 Gopalganj 06.08.82 Gopalganj
Collectariate
16
2. In the adjustment, compliance of Reservation roster
shall   be   mandatory.   Retrenched   employee   shall   be
adjusted/appointed against roster point of same category of
reservation to which they belong.
3. Their   adjustment   shall   be   deemed   new
appointment  and  on  the  basis  of  their   service  prior  to
retrenchment   benefit   of   seniority   shall   not   be
permissible   to   them   but   their   service   prior   to
retrenchment   shall   be   calculated   for   the   purpose   of
pension.
4. All employees were under the control of Dist. Public
Education Officer/Public Education directorate. So Joining
of all employees should be accepted at their new place only
after receiving No Objection Certificate issued by Dist. Public
Education   Officer/Public   Education   Directorate.   The
employees who have made joining in any other department
earlier   as   result   of   adjustment,   such   employees   shall
produce   No   Objection   Certificate   issued   from   concerned
Office.
5. After the appointment of aforesaid employees, copy of
appointment letter send immediately to the under signatory,
so   that,   information  should   be   sent   to  the   Hon’ble   High
Court.
6. On   finding   any   kind   of   discrepancy,   inform
immediately, so that, it may be resolved immediately.
Sincerely
Sd./­dated 16/03/07
[Dr. Madan Mohan Jha]
    Commissioner & Secretary
Memo No.270, Patna Date: 16 March, 2007”
(emphasis supplied)
17
10. This appointment letter reiterated the position that the
appointment/adjustment of the respondents was to be a new
appointment   and,   on   the   basis   of   their   service   prior   to
retrenchment, benefit of seniority would not be permissible to
them   but   it   would   be   reckoned   only   for   the   purpose   of
pension. The respondents acted upon the said conditions and
did not challenge the same. The writ petition, however, came
to be filed only in 2013, being CWJC No.22208 of 2013, for the
following reliefs:
“i) To   issue   an   appropriate  writ/order/direction  in   the
nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to make
payment of salary to the petitioners of the period 1.10.2001
to 3.7.2007 with statutory interest.
ii) To any other relief or reliefs for which the petitioner is
found to be entitled in the facts and circumstances of the
case.”
The   respondents   sought   further   relief   by   way   of   an
amendment, which reads thus:
“1.(iii). To issue an appropriate writ/order/direction in the
nature of mandamus commanding the Respondents to give
continuity   of   past   services   of   the   Petitioners   taking   into
account the period 2001­2007, for the purpose of making
payment of salary to the Petitioners of the said period.”
18
11. The sole basis to buttress the relief as claimed was that
in the case of Smt. Ram Laxmi Mishra Vs. State of Bihar
and   Ors.2
similar   reliefs   had   been   granted   and   the
respondents were similarly placed. The writ petition filed by
the respondents was resisted by the appellants by  inter alia
placing reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of
State of Bihar and Ors. Vs. Arun Kumar3
. According to the
appellants, no relief could be granted to the respondents as
they   were   appointed   as   per   the   policy   articulated   in
communication dated 20th May, 2005 and including the terms
and conditions of appointment noted in the communication
dated 16th March, 2007. Inasmuch as, the respondents acted
upon the terms and conditions of fresh appointment without
any demurrer. Further, the case of the respondents was not
similar to the factual matrix involved in the case of Smt. Ram
Laxmi Mishra (supra). In any case, no relief can be granted in
2 Decided on 29th August, 2005 in CWJC No.1712/2002 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Patna.
3 Decided on March 2, 2016 in Civil Appeal No.2433 of 2016 and connected appeals.
19
the fact situation of the present case by invoking Article 14 or
16 of the Constitution of India.
12. Even though the learned Single Judge of the High Court
noted the argument of the appellants that, in a similar case of
Arun Kumar (supra), this Court had refused to grant relief of
back­wages, but nevertheless proceeded to answer the matters
in issue by holding that the appellants could not point out the
factual   difference   between   the   case   of  Smt.   Ram   Laxmi
Mishra  (supra)   and   that   of   the   respondents.   Further,   the
decision   in  Smt.   Ram   Laxmi   Mishra  (supra)   had   been
affirmed right up to this Court by dismissal of the Special
Leave Petition being SLP (Civil) No.18429 of 2009 on 24th July,
2009.   On   that   basis   alone,   the   writ   petition   came   to   be
allowed. Thus, the reliefs claimed in the writ petition were
granted to the respondents by directing the appellants to pay
salary for the period from 1st October, 2001 till 3rd July, 2007.
20
13. The appellants, therefore, carried the matter in appeal by
way   of   Letters   Patent   Appeal   No.2307   of   2016   before   the
Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench also
disposed of the appeal vide impugned judgment and order
dated 15th January, 2018, which reads thus:
“Heard counsel for the State, the appellants, as well as
the private respondents.
Since   the   learned   single   Judge   allowed   the   writ
application, gave a direction for payment of salary for the
period   01.10.2001   to   03.07.2007   in   conformity   with   a
similar   decision   passed   in   the   case   of   Smt.   Ram   Laxmi
Mishra, which order in turn even upheld by the Division
Bench as well as by the Hon’ble Apex Court. In the interest
of maintaining consistency in identical situation, the learned
single Judge has committed no error in allowing the writ
application and granted direction for payment for the period
indicated above.
We do not find any infirmity in the order. The appeal is
dismissed.”
14. The   appellants   would   contend   that   the   sole   basis   on
which the High Court granted reliefs to the respondents is
tenuous. For, the factual matrix involved in the case of Smt.
Ram Laxmi Mishra (supra), is inapplicable to the case of the
respondents and moreso, unlike in the case of  Smt.   Ram
Laxmi   Mishra  (supra),   the   respondents   not   only   failed   to
21
challenge   the   termination   order   passed   against   them
consequent to abolition of the scheme w.e.f. 1st April, 2001 but
also failed to challenge both, the policy of the State articulated
in communication dated 20th  May, 2005 and the terms and
conditions of the letter of appointment dated 16th March, 2007.
Having failed to do so, the respondents were not entitled to
any relief whatsoever. Besides, the cause of action first arose
in 2001, then in May 2005 and again, in March 2007, but the
writ petition seeking relief of back­wages for the stated period
came to be filed by the respondents, without challenging the
termination order or the policy, for the first time in the year
2013. In other words, the writ petition filed by the respondents
also suffered from laches. It is then contended that in the case
of Smt. Ram Laxmi Mishra  (supra), the High Court directed
reinstatement and, as a consequential relief, ordered payment
of back­wages, after setting aside the termination order. In the
present case, there is no challenge against the termination
order or the terms and conditions specified in the appointment
letter dated 16th March, 2007, being fresh appointment of the
22
respondents. If it is not a case of reinstatement, the question
of granting back­wages for the stated period would not arise.
Moreover, since the respondents had not worked during the
relevant period at all, the principle of ‘no work, no pay’ would
inevitably come into play.
15. The respondents, on the other hand, would contend that
the High Court, while granting relief to the respondents, has
placed reliance on the dictum in the judgment rendered in
Smt.  Ram  Laxmi  Mishra  (supra). That judgment has been
upheld by this Court by dismissal of Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No.18429 of 2009 on 24th July, 2009. Further, the High
Court while deciding the case of  Smt.  Ram  Laxmi  Mishra
(supra) had adverted to the decision of the same High Court in
the case of  Binod  Kumar  Verma4
, which decision has also
been  affirmed  by  this  Court  by  dismissal  of  Special  Leave
Petition   (Civil)   No.11560   of   2005   on   16th  December,   2005.
Reliance has also been placed on the decision of the same
4 Decided on 14th February, 2005 in CWJC No.15365 of 2001 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Patna.
23
High Court in Krishnandan Singh5 and also on the decisions
rendered in Amar Nath Prasad Karn6
, Yogi Kamti & Sunil
Kumar7 and Asgar Ali8
. The decision in Asgar Ali has been
affirmed by this Court by dismissal of Special Leave Petition
(C) CC Nos.10361­10364 of 2014 on 18th July, 2014.  Further,
the decision of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in LPA
No.359/2009 dated 10th October, 2009 came to be affirmed by
dismissal of SLP (C) No.1377 of 2011 on 2nd August, 2013. As
regards the decision of this Court in State of Bihar & Ors.
Vs. Arun Kumar (supra), and connected cases, it is submitted
that   the   same   is   distinguishable.   According   to   the
respondents, the appointment of Smt. Ram Laxmi Mishra  and
other petitioners who succeeded before the High Court was on
the same terms and conditions consequent to the policy dated
20th May, 2005. The respondents submitted that no fault could
5 Decided on 23rd May, 2003 in CWJC No.12469 of 2002 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Patna.
6 Decided on 10th July, 2017 in CWJC No.18490 of 2008 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Patna.
7 Decided on 11th July, 2017 in CWJC No.18960 of 2008 and 18993 of 2008 passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Patna.
8 Decided on 4th January, 2010 in WPS No.729 of 2004 by the High Court of
Jharkhand.
24
be found with the impugned decision of the High Court for
having   followed   the   decision   in  Smt.   Ram   Laxmi   Mishra
(supra), which has been upheld by this Court by dismissal of
the concerned Special Leave Petition. It is, therefore, prayed
that the appeal be dismissed, being devoid of merits.
16. We have heard Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellants and Mr. Navaniti Prasad Singh,
learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents.
17. The   principal   issue   that   arises   for   consideration   is
whether   the   reliefs   as   prayed   for   can   be   granted   to   the
respondents, who not only failed to challenge the termination
w.e.f. 1st  April, 2001 pursuant to the policy decision of the
State   Government   at   the   relevant   time   but   also   failed   to
challenge the latest policy decision of the State Government
noted   in   communication   dated   20th  May,   2005,   regarding
adjustment   of   the   terminated   employees   on   terms   and
conditions stipulated thereunder and including the terms and
conditions   specified   in   the   appointment   letter   dated   16th
25
March, 2007. Neither the single Judge nor the Division Bench
of the High Court has dilated on this aspect at all. The learned
Single Judge mechanically followed the decision in Smt. Ram
Laxmi Mishra (supra). What has been completely glossed over
by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench in
the present case is that the writ petition filed in  Smt.  Ram
Laxmi   Mishra  (supra),  was   to   challenge   the   order   of
termination dated 1st April, 2001, in which the said petitioner
succeeded in establishing that her initial appointment was in
the   Adult   Education   Scheme   and   not   in   the   Non­Formal
Education Scheme. What weighed with the High Court in that
case   was   that   the   closure   of   the   Non­Formal   Education
Scheme in which the concerned petitioner was working at the
relevant time, would not affect her service condition in the
cadre   of   Adult   Education   Scheme.   Notably,   in  Smt.   Ram
Laxmi   Mishra  (supra),   the   petitioner   succeeded   in   the
challenge to her termination order and it came to be set aside
with   consequential   reliefs   of   reinstatement   and   monetary
benefits, which included back­wages for the relevant period.
26
18. In   the   present   case,   however,   the   respondents   have
neither challenged the termination order after closure of the
Non­Formal Education Scheme w.e.f. 1st  April, 2001 nor the
policy   dated   20th  May,   2005   under   which   they   have   been
appointed or the appointment letter dated 16th  March, 2007.
Even   the   appointment   letter   dated   16th  March,   2007
unambiguously predicates that the appointment was a fresh
appointment and the past services would be reckoned only for
the   purpose   of   grant   of   pension   and   nothing   more.
Indisputably,   the   respondents   acted   upon   such   terms   and
conditions of appointment without any demurrer. They chose
to file the subject writ petition only in the year 2013, when the
cause of action first arose on 1st April, 2001, then on 20th May,
2005   and   once   again,   on   16th  March,   2007.   Unless   the
respondents are to be reinstated in their previous post (held
prior to 1st April, 2001), the question of awarding back­wages
would not arise at all. The relief of back­wages is and can be
linked only to the order of reinstatement. It cannot be awarded
27
in isolation or, for that matter, during the period when the
respondents were not in employment at all.
19. A fortiori, we have no hesitation in taking the view that
the writ petition filed by the respondents for the stated reliefs
is devoid of merits for more than one reason. First, it suffers
from laches since it came to be filed only in the year 2013.
Second, there is no challenge to the termination w.e.f. 1st April,
2001 and including the policy dated 20th May, 2005, or to the
terms and conditions of appointment letter dated 16th March,
2007. No order of reinstatement could be passed in favour of
the respondents and  sans such an order, the respondents
cannot be bestowed with back­wages for the period during
which they were not in the employment of the appellants and
also because they did not work during that period. Third, the
scheme in respect of which the respondents were employed on
temporary basis was closed w.e.f. 1st April, 2001. No order of
reinstatement could be made much less of back­wages for the
period subsequent thereto and until the engagement of the
respondents on 16th March, 2007 in a new post. If the scheme
28
in   which   they   were   employed   has   been   abolished,   by   no
stretch of imagination can the court direct payment of backwages
for the period after abolition of the scheme w.e.f. 1st
April, 2001. Fourth, the principle of ‘no work, no pay’ would
disentitle the respondents from the relief of back­wages. Fifth,
the   decision   in  Smt.   Ram   Laxmi   Mishra  (supra),   is
distinguishable on facts and, in any case, a relief wrongly
granted to the petitioner therein cannot be the basis to grant
similar   relief   to   the   respondents   herein,   which   is   not   in
conformity with the extant regulations or policy, the dismissal
of Special Leave Petition of the State by this Court in that case
notwithstanding. Lastly, the principle underlying the decision
of this Court in  State  of  Bihar  and  Ors.  Vs.  Arun  Kumar
(supra),   would   apply  proprio   vigore  to   the   case   of   the
respondents.
20. Counsel for the respondents was at pains to point out
that in all other cases of similarly placed persons, relief of
back­wages for the relevant period has been granted by the
29
High Court, which has been upheld right up to this Court by
dismissal   of   Special   Leave   Petition(s)   filed   by   the   State
Government and for that reason, unequal treatment ought not
to be meted out to similarly placed persons. To buttress this
submission, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court
in  Ashwani   Kumar   and   Ors.   Vs.   State   of   Bihar   and
Others,
9
  in particular, the dictum in paragraph 18 thereof.
The said paragraph reads thus:
“18. Now is the time for us to take stock of the situation in
the light of our answers to the aforesaid three points. As a
logical corollary to these answers the appeals are liable to be
dismissed as the decision of the High Court is found to be
well sustained. The submission made by the learned counsel
for the appellants to sustain services of these appellants on
humanitarian grounds cannot be countenanced. When 6000
appointees are found to have been illegally loaded on the
State Exchequer by Dr Mallick and when there were only
2250 sanctioned posts, in the absence of clear data as to
who were the senior most and which were the sanctioned
posts available at the relevant time against which they could
be   fitted,   it   would   be   impossible   to   undertake   even   a
jettisoning operation to offload the removable load of excess
employees amounting to 3750 by resorting to any judicial
surgery. Once the source of their recruitment is found to be
tainted all of them have to go by the board. Nor can we say
that   benefit   can   be   made   available   only   to   1363
appellants   before   us   as   the   other   employees   similarly
circumscribed and who  might not have  approached  the
High Court or this Court earlier and who may be waiting
in the wings would also be entitled to claim similar relief
9 1997 (2) SCC 1
30
against the  State  which  has to  give  equal treatment to
all   of   them   otherwise   it   would   be   held   guilty   of
discriminatory   treatment   which   could   not   be
countenanced   under   Articles   14   and   16(1)   of   the
Constitution of India. Everything, therefore, must start on
a clean slate. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the
appellants on the doctrine of tempering justice with mercy
also cannot be pressed in service on the peculiar facts of
these cases as mercy also has to be based on justice. The
decision of this Court in the case of H.C. Puttaswamy10 also
can be of no assistance to the appellants on the facts of the
present cases as in that case the Chief Justice of the High
Court  had full financial powers to create any number of
vacancies   on   the   establishment   of   the   High   Court   as
required and to fill them up. There was no ceiling on his
such powers. Therefore, the initial entry of the appointees
could not be said to be unauthorised or vitiated or tainted.
The fault that was found was the manner in which after
recruitment they were passed on to the establishments of
subordinate courts. That exercise remained vitiated. But as
the   original   entries   in   High   Court   service   were   not
unauthorised these candidates/employees were permitted to
be regularised. Such is not the present case. The initial entry
of the employees is itself unauthorised being not against
sanctioned vacancies nor was Dr Mallick entrusted with the
power of creating vacancies or posts for the schemes under
the Tuberculosis Eradication Programme. Consequently the
termination of the services of all these appellants cannot be
found   fault   with.   Nor   any   relief   as   claimed   by   them   of
reinstatement with continued service can be made available
to them.”
(emphasis supplied)
21. For the reasons already recorded, the argument under
consideration does not commend to us. As mentioned earlier,
the factual position stated in the decisions in which relief has
10  1991 Supp. (2) SCC 421
31
been given to the petitioners in the concerned petitions is
distinguishable. More importantly, in those petitions, order of
termination   was   the   subject   matter   of   the   challenge   and,
having set aside the impugned termination, the court granted
consequential relief of reinstatement with back­wages to the
concerned petitioner(s). The respondents herein, however, for
reasons best known to them, did not challenge the order of
termination which event had occurred w.e.f. 1st  April, 2001
consequent to abolition of the scheme in which they were
employed. Taking an overall view of the matter, therefore, the
respondents are not entitled to the reliefs as claimed, having
acted upon the terms and conditions upon which they came to
be engaged vide appointment letter dated 16th March, 2007.
22. Accordingly, this appeal must succeed. The impugned
judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   on   15th
January, 2018 in LPA No.2307 of 2016 is quashed and set
aside. The writ petition filed by the respondents, being Civil
32
Writ Jurisdiction Case No.22208 of 2013, stands dismissed.
The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
   
  .....……………………………...J.
          (A.M. Khanwilkar)
…..…………………………..….J.
     (L. Nageswara Rao)
New Delhi;
October 29, 2018.