we hold that the rights under the amendment are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September, 2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born……” (emphasis supplied by us) It is pertinent to note here that recently, this Court in Danamma @ Suman Surpur & Anr. Vs. Amar & Ors, 2018 (1) Scale 657 dealt, inter-alia, with the dispute of daughter’s right in the ancestral property. In the above case, father of the daughter died in 2001, yet court permitted the daughter to claim the right in ancestral property in view of the amendment in 2005. On a perusal of the judgment and after having regard to the peculiar facts of the Danamma (supra), it is evident that the Division Bench of this Court primarily did not deal with the issue of death of the father rather it was mainly related to the question of law whether daughter who born prior to 2005 amendment would be entitled to claim a share in ancestral property or not? In such circumstances, in our view, Prakash & Ors. (supra), would still hold precedent on the issue of death of coparcener for the purpose of right of daughter in ancestral property. Shortly put, only living daughters of living 9 coparceners would be entitled to claim a share in the ancestral property. 11) Hence, without touching any other aspect in the present case, we are of the view that the appellants were not the coparceners in the Hindu Joint Family Property in view of the 1989 amendment, hence, they had not been entitled to claim partition and separate possession at the very first instance. At the most, they could claim maintenance and marriage expenses if situation warranted.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1933 OF 2009
 Mangammal @ Thulasi and Anr. ….Appellant(s)
 Versus
T.B. Raju and Ors. …. Respondent(s)
 J U D G M E N T
R.K.Agrawal, J.
1) This appeal is preferred against the impugned judgment and
order dated 18.09.2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Madras in S.A. No. 780 of 2006 whereby learned single Judge of the
High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants herein at
the admission stage.
2) Brief facts:-
(a) The case of the appellants, in a nutshell, is that the appellants
herein are the daughters of Late Shri T.G. Basuvan (died on
29.12.1979) and Late Smt. Sundari (died on 22.07.1989) whereas
Respondent No. 1 is the brother of the appellants herein. Late T.G.
1
Basuvan left three properties consisting of agriculture land (Item
Nos. 1 & 2) and dwelling house (Item No. 3)
(b) Later on, due to the irresponsible behaviour of Respondent No.
1, suit properties at Item Nos. 1 and 2 were leased out to
Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 herein during the lifetime of the mother of
the appellants herein.
(c) During the lease period, the mother of the appellants died. On
the expiry of said lease deed, the appellants herein through legal
notice approached the Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 to deliver the vacant
possession of Item Nos.1 and 2. In reply, it has been stated that the
lands were sold to them by Defendant No. 1.
(d) Being aggrieved, the appellants instituted a suit being O.S. No.
202 of 2003 praying, inter-alia, for the partition and separate
possession of the suit properties which consisted of three items,
namely, agriculture land (Item Nos. 1 and 2) and building site with
constructed building (Item No. 3) and arrayed the brother as
Defendant No. 1 and lessees/subsequent buyers as Defendant Nos.
2 to 4. The appellants herein were the plaintiffs in the original suit
2
(e) The trial Court, after hearing the suit at length, dismissed the
same, vide judgment dated 28.09.2004 while holding, inter alia,
that the plaint is the creature of the Defendant No. 1 and the
plaintiffs, who being the puppets in the hands of Defendant No. 1,
are not entitled to any partition.
(f) Being dissatisfied, the appellants took the matter before the
District Judge, Udhagamandalam. Learned District Judge, vide
judgment dated 14.12.2005, dismissed the appeal while upholding
the decision of the trial court.
(g) Feeling aggrieved with the decision, the appellants herein
preferred a Second Appeal being No. 780 of 2006 before the High
Court of Judicature at Madras. Learned single Judge of the High
Court, vide order dated 18.09.2006, dismissed the appeal at the
admission stage itself.
(h) Consequently, this appeal has been filed before this Court by
way of special leave.
3) We have given our solicitous consideration to the submissions
of learned counsel appearing for both the parties and perused the
relevant material on record.
3
Point(s) for consideration:-
4) The short question that arises before this Court is whether in
the light of present peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,
any intervention of this Court is required with the impugned
decision of the High Court?
Rival contentions:-
5) At the outset, learned counsel for the appellants submitted
that the High Court failed to appreciate that no limitation has been
prescribed for filing a suit for partition by one or more co-sharers,
hence, a suit for partition cannot be dismissed as being barred by
time. Further, it was submitted that dismissal of a suit for partition
by holding that the appellants herein have not filed the suit within
12 years from the date of dispossession cannot be sustained in the
eyes of law specially when there is no proof to prove dispossession
and the respondents have failed to plead and prove ouster. Hence,
the impugned judgment of the High Court is liable to be set aside at
the threshold.
6) Per contra, learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 herein
submitted that Respondent No. 1 had never been a drunkard and
4
the appellants made such allegations in order to defeat the sale
made in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and that during the
lifetime of their mother, the suit properties remained un-partitioned
and that the properties at Item Nos. 1 and 2 having been legally
sold to Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, hence, the question of seeking
partition and separate possession does not arise in any
circumstance. Further, it was also pointed out that the High Court
rightly dismissed the case at admission case. Hence, this appeal
also deserves to be dismissed. Learned counsel appearing for other
respondents also submitted that they are the bona fide purchasers
of the suit property, hence, this appeal deserves to be dismissed
being devoid of merits.
Discussion:-
7) Before proceeding further, it is apt to have an understanding
of the concept of ancestral property in a nutshell. Any property
inherited upto four generations of male lineage from the father,
father’s father or father’s father’s father i.e. father, grand father etc.,
is termed as ancestral property. In other words, property inherited
from mother, grandmother, uncle and even brother is not ancestral
property. In ancestral property, the right of property accrues to the
5
coparcener on birth. The concept of ancestral property is in
existence since time immemorial. In the State of Tamil Nadu, in
order to give equal position to the females in ancestral property, in
the year 1989, the State Government enacted the Hindu Succession
(Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989 effective from March 25, 1989
which brought an amendment in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956
(for brevity “the Act”) by adding Section 29-A vide Chapter II-A
under the heading of Succession by Survivorship. It is apt to
reproduce the said provision herein below.
29-A. Equal rights to daughter in coparcenary propertyNotwithstanding
anything contained in Section 6 of this Act,-
 (i) in a Joint Hindu Family governed by Mitakshara Law,
the daughter of a coparcener shall be birth become a
coparcener in her own right in the same manner as a son
and have the same rights in the coparcener property as she
would have had if she had been a son, inclusive of the right
to claim by survivorship: and shall be subject to the same
liabilities and disabilities in respect thereto as the son:
 (ii) at a partition in such a Joint Family the coparcener
property shall so divided as to allot to a daughter the same
share as is allotable to a son:
 Provided that the share which a pre-deceased son or a
pre-deceased daughter would have got at the partition if he
or she had been alive at the time of the partition shall be
allotted to the surviving child of such pre-deceased son or of
such pre-deceased daughter:
 Provided further that the share allotable to the
pre-deceased child of pre-deceased son or pre-deceased
daughter, if such child had been alive at the time of the
partition, shall be allotted to the child of such pre-deceased
6
child of the pre-deceased son or of the pre-deceased
daughter, as the case may be:
 (iii) any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled
by virtue of the provisions of clause (i) shall be held by her
with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be
regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or
any other law for the time being in force, as property capable
of being disposed of by her by will or other testamentary
disposition:
 (iv) nothing in this Chapter shall apply to a daughter
married before the date of the commencement of the Hindu
Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment ) Act , 1989:
 (v) nothing in clause (ii) shall apply to a partition which
had been effected before the date of commencement of the
Hindu Succession ( Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989.
8) At this juncture, it is to be examined as to whether the
appellants were entitled to claim partition in ancestral property in
view of the amendment? If the answer to this question is affirmative
then only further determination of dispute would arise. Prior to the
amendment, it was only the male who would have been coparcener
and entitled to claim the partition and share from the joint family
property. On the other hand, daughter did not have any right to
partition and to claim share in the ancestral property since she was
not a coparcener. At the most, at the time of partition, she could
only ask for reasonable maintenance and marriage expenses.
9) To cut a long story short, it is undisputed fact that Late T.G.
Basuvan, father of the appellants, had only ancestral properties and
7
he did not left behind any self acquired properties. On a plain
reading of the newly added provision i.e., Section 29-A of the Act, it
is evident that, inter-alia, daughter of a coparcener ought not to
have been married at the time of commencement of the amendment
of 1989. In other words, only un-married daughter of a coparcener
is entitled to claim partition in the Hindu Joint Family Property. In
the instant case, it is admitted position that both the appellants,
namely, Mangammal, got married in the year 1981 and Indira, got
married in or about 1984 i.e., prior to the commencement of the
1989 amendment. Therefore, in view of clause (iv) of the Section
29-A of the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989,
appellants could not institute the suit for partition and separate
possession at first instance as they were not the coparceners.
10) Moreover, under Section 29-A of the Act, legislature has used
the word “the daughter of a coparcener”. Here, the implication of
such wordings mean both the coparcener as well as daughter
should be alive to reap the benefits of this provision at the time of
commencement of the Amendment of 1989. The similar issue came
up for the consideration before this Court in Prakash & Ors. vs.
8
Phulavati & Ors., (2016) 2 SCC 36, this Court while dealing with
the identical matter held at Para 23 as under:-
23. Accordingly, we hold that the rights under the amendment are
applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th
September, 2005 irrespective of when such daughters are
born……”
(emphasis supplied by us)
It is pertinent to note here that recently, this Court in Danamma @
Suman Surpur & Anr. Vs. Amar & Ors, 2018 (1) Scale 657 dealt,
inter-alia, with the dispute of daughter’s right in the ancestral
property. In the above case, father of the daughter died in 2001, yet
court permitted the daughter to claim the right in ancestral
property in view of the amendment in 2005. On a perusal of the
judgment and after having regard to the peculiar facts of the
Danamma (supra), it is evident that the Division Bench of this
Court primarily did not deal with the issue of death of the father
rather it was mainly related to the question of law whether daughter
who born prior to 2005 amendment would be entitled to claim a
share in ancestral property or not? In such circumstances, in our
view, Prakash & Ors. (supra), would still hold precedent on the
issue of death of coparcener for the purpose of right of daughter in
ancestral property. Shortly put, only living daughters of living
9
coparceners would be entitled to claim a share in the ancestral
property.
 11) Hence, without touching any other aspect in the present case,
we are of the view that the appellants were not the coparceners in
the Hindu Joint Family Property in view of the 1989 amendment,
hence, they had not been entitled to claim partition and separate
possession at the very first instance. At the most, they could claim
maintenance and marriage expenses if situation warranted.
Division of the Property:-
12) However, as appears from the record of the case and also in
view of the contention of the parties, the coparcener property in the
hand of Late T.G. Basuvan got divided between him and his son
T.B.Raju-Respondent No. 1. In such partition, Late T.G. Basuvan
got ½ share and T.B.Raju also got ½ share. Now the property left in
the hand of Late T.G.Basuvan would be his separate property. On
his death, such separate property would devolve through
succession by applying the rules of Sections 8, 9 & 10 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 in the following manner:
10
 Widow i.e. mother of the appellants would get ¼ of the half
share which stands at 1/8.
 Daughter Mangammal-Appellant No. 1 would get ¼ of the half
share which stands at 1/8.
 Daughter Indira-Appellant No. 2 would get the ¼ of the half
share which stands at 1/8.
 Son T.B.Raju-Respondent No. 1 would get the ¼ of the half
share which stands at 1/8. This 1/8 share would be in
addition of ½ share which he got in partition.
13) On the death of the widow i.e., mother of the appellants, her
1/8 share which she got in succession, would devolve through
succession by applying the rules of Sections 15 & 16 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 in the following manner:
 Daughter Mangammal-Appellant No. 1 would get the 1/3 of
the 1/8 which stands at 1/24.
 Daughter Indira-Appellant No. 2 would get the 1/3 of the 1/8
which stands at 1/24.
11
 Son T.B.Raju-Respondent No. 1 would get the 1/3 of the 1/8
which stands at 1/24.
Final Share of Each Person:-
1. Daughter Mangammal-Appellant No .1, total share would
be 1/8 + 1/24 = 4/24 or 1/6.
2. Daughter Indira-Appellant No. 2, total share would be
1/8 + 1/24 = 4/24 or 1/6.
3. Son T.B.-Respondent No. 1, total share would be ½ + 1/8
+ 1/24 = 16/24 or 2/3.
14) At this juncture, we would like to make it clear that any sale
which made to Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 in pursuance of two sale
deeds dated 03.04.1996 and 24.08.1998 respectively shall not be
disturbed anymore. In lieu of the same, the appellants shall be
entitled to their legitimate share, if any, which belonged to them in
such properties and which had been sold through sale deeds from
Respondent No. 1 by way of money or some other property of the
same amount. The price of the properties shall be calculated
according to the rate prevailing at the date of sale deeds respectively
12
along with interest @ 9 per cent per annum from the date of sale
deeds till the payment of money or transfer of property. Here,
legitimate share means share which appellants have got through
the division of property as mentioned above in paragraph Nos. 12
and 13.
15) To sum up the case, the appellants are not entitled to any
share in coparcenary property since they were not the coparceners
in view of 1989 amendment. However, on the death of their father
and mother, appellants would get their property through succession
in the above manner.
16) In view of above discussion, we, hereby, partially allow the
appeal in the above terms leaving the parties to bear their own cost.
 ...…………………………………J.
 (R.K. AGRAWAL)

 …………….………………………J.
 (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)

NEW DELHI;
APRIL 19, 2018.
13

“The prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by courts only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. =The mere fact that a person has made a contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution under Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”); but it must be shown that the defendant has intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings. Even after the above position has emerged also, still the court has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate an inquiry into the offences of false evidence and offences against public justice and more specifically referred to in Section 340(1) CrPC, having regard to the overall factual matrix as well as the probable consequences of such a prosecution. (See K.T.M.S. Mohd. v. Union of India). The 4 (2017) 1 SCC 113 8 court must be satisfied that such an inquiry is required in the interests of justice and appropriate in the facts of the case.” 14. We are of the considered view that initiation of proceedings in the present case was not consistent with the parameters laid down by this Court. The election petition itself has been dismissed and considering the entirety of the matter, it would not be expedient to initiate proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C. read with Section 195(1)(b)(i) of Cr.P.C. We, therefore, accept the appeal and close the proceedings. The appeal stands allowed and the judgment and order under appeal is set aside.

1
Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 649 OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.545 of 2016)
Prof. Chintamani Malviya ……Appellant
Versus
High Court of Madhya Pradesh ..…. Respondent
JUDGMENT
Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal challenges the Judgment and Order dated 07.10.2015
passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in M.CR.C No.2526
of 2015 whereby the High Court authorized the Principal Registrar of the
High Court under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of Criminal Procedure Code
(“Cr.P.C”, for short) to file complaint in the concerned court of Magistrate
against the appellant herein.
3. The appellant was elected to Lok Sabha in the elections held in the
year 2014 from Ujjain Lok Sabha Constituency. His election was
challenged vide Election Petition No.33 of 2014 by one Premchand Guddu.
2
On 31.07.2014 notice was issued by the High Court in said election petition
and the same was to be served upon the appellant through the District Judge,
Ujjain. The next date in the petition being 01.09.2014, the notice was said to
have been served upon the appellant on 16.08.2014 by one Mr. Arun
Bhalerao, Process Server.
4. According to the appellant, the aforesaid notice was served on one of
his employees while the appellant was in Delhi and that the appellant came
to know about the pendency of the election petition only on 25.01.2015. On
the other hand according to the election petitioner, the process server had
served the notice on the appellant himself.
5. On the returnable date of hearing, namely, on 01.09.2014, neither the
appellant was present before the High Court nor was he represented by any
counsel. Since the service report presented before the Court showed that the
appellant was duly served on 16.08.2014, the case proceeded ex parte.
6. On 29.01.2015 the appellant moved an application under Order 9 Rule
7 Civil Procedure Code (“CPC”, for short) being I.A. No.927 of 2015 and
submitted inter alia that the process server had served notice and documents
on one of the employees while the appellant was in Delhi and that the
appellant came to know about the election petition only on 25.01.2015.
3
Soon thereafter the original election petitioner filed an application under
Section 340 Cr.P.C. being I.A. No.1303 of 2015 in pending election petition
alleging that the appellant had committed perjury by stating falsely that the
notice in the election petition was given to his employee whereas said notice
was actually served upon the appellant by the process server.
7. By its order dated 24.03.2015, the High Court allowed I.A. No.927 of
2015 preferred by the appellant for setting aside the order for proceedings
ex-parte against the appellant and it allowed the appellant to participate in
the proceedings. Further, by another order of the same date, the High Court
allowed I.A. No.1303 of 2015 preferred by the original election petitioner
and directed the Registry to register a criminal case. The Registrar was also
given directions to conduct appropriate inquiry under Section 340 Cr.P.C. In
compliance of said order, M.Cr.C. No.2526 of 2015 was registered on
27.03.2015 and appropriate show cause notice was issued to the appellant.
In the subsequent proceedings, statement of Mr. Arun Bhalerao, Process
Server was recorded who stated that the requisite notice was served on the
appellant by him.
8. By its order dated 24.09.2015, the High Court accepted the plea taken
by the appellant in his application preferred under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. in
pending election petition and the election petition was dismissed.
4
9. By subsequent order dated 07.10.2015 which is presently under
appeal, the High Court authorized the Principal Registrar of the High Court
under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of Cr.P.C. to file appropriate complaint in the
concerned Court of Magistrate. It was observed:-
“(6) After recording the statements and taking into
consideration the served notice bearing No.1762 dated
12.08.2014 and enclosed hukmnama, it is apparent that notice
was served personally on the respondent while in the affidavit,
he mentioned that notice was served on his staff.
…
(8) It is to be seen whether, it is in the interest of justice to
punish the respondent whether, such lapses on his part are
immaterial and innocent.
(9) Counsel for the respondent argues that it was
unintentional mistake on the part of the respondent and,
therefore, no action should be taken against him.
(10) In my considered opinion, however, more cautious and
responsible approach was expected from the respondent being
representative of people and professor himself. He is expected
to understand the consequences of not appearing before the
Court of law and specially before the High Court. Therefore, in
this case, lenient and sympathetic view is not called for. In this
view of the matter, I find that prosecution for perjury should be
initiated against the respondent.”
10. Appearing for the appellant, Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, learned Senior
Advocate submitted inter alia ;
(a) It has consistently been laid down by this Court that
prosecution for perjury be sanctioned by Courts only in those cases where
5
perjury appears to be deliberate and on a matter of substance and the
conviction would reasonably be probable. Further, prosecution ought to be
ordered when it would expedient in the interest of justice to punish the
delinquent and not merely because there is some inaccuracy in the statement.
He placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Chajoo Ram v. Radhey
Shyam and Another1 where this Court observed:-
“The prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by courts
only in those cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate
and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or
likely. No doubt giving of false evidence and filing false
affidavits is an evil which must be effectively curbed with a
strong hand but to start prosecution for perjury too readily and
too frequently without due care and caution and on inconclusive
and doubtful material defeats its very purpose. Prosecution
should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the
interests of justice to punish the delinquent and not merely
because there is some inaccuracy in the statement which may
be innocent or immaterial. There must be prima facie case of
deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and the court
should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the
charge. In the present case we do not think the material brought
to our notice was sufficiently adequate to justify the conclusion
that it is expedient in the interests of justice to file a complaint.
The approach of the High Court seems somewhat mechanical
and superficial: it does not reflect the requisite judicial
deliberation….”
Reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court in K.T.M.S.
Mohd. and Another v. Union of India2
.
1
 (1971) 1 SCC 774
2
 (1992) 3 SCC 178
6
(b) The fact that there was delay of five months in filing the
application under Order 9 Rule 7 from the date of alleged service of notice
on 16.08.2014 indicated that the appellant was not aware of the pendency of
the election petition.
11. Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, learned Advocate appearing for the
respondent submitted that for a person to be made liable under Section 191
and 193 of IPC following ingredients would be required :-
(i) Person must be legally bound by an oath or any express
provision of law to state the truth or to make a declaration on any subject.
(ii) He must make the false statement.
(iii) He must know or believe to be false or must not be believed to
be true.
Relying on Baban Singh and Anr v. Jagdish Singh & Ors3
, it was
submitted that the appellant was obliged to state facts correctly. According
to Ms. Chaturvedi the statement of Arun Bhalerao, Process Server clearly
showed that the appellant himself had signed the receipt of notice and yet a
false statement was made.
3
 AIR 1967 SC 68
7
12. Having given our anxious consideration to the entirety of the matter,
in our view, the guiding principle is the one as laid down in Chajoo Ram
(supra). The law is clear, “prosecution should be ordered when it is
considered expedient in the interest of justice to punish the delinquent….
and there must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on the matter of
substance and the Court should be satisfied that there is reasonable
foundation for the charge”. The assessment made by the High Court, as
extracted in the paragraph hereinabove, in our considered view, does not
satisfy the parameters and requirements as laid down by this Court.
13. Recently, this Court in Amarsang Nathaji v. Hardik Harshadbhai
Patel and Others4
summed up the legal position as under:
“6. The mere fact that a person has made a contradictory
statement in a judicial proceeding is not by itself always
sufficient to justify a prosecution under Sections 199 and 200 of
the Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to as
“IPC”); but it must be shown that the defendant has
intentionally given a false statement at any stage of the judicial
proceedings or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of
using the same at any stage of the judicial proceedings. Even
after the above position has emerged also, still the court has to
form an opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to
initiate an inquiry into the offences of false evidence and
offences against public justice and more specifically referred to
in Section 340(1) CrPC, having regard to the overall factual
matrix as well as the probable consequences of such a
prosecution. (See K.T.M.S. Mohd. v. Union of India). The
4
 (2017) 1 SCC 113
8
court must be satisfied that such an inquiry is required in the
interests of justice and appropriate in the facts of the case.”
14. We are of the considered view that initiation of proceedings in the
present case was not consistent with the parameters laid down by this Court.
The election petition itself has been dismissed and considering the entirety
of the matter, it would not be expedient to initiate proceedings under Section
340 Cr.P.C. read with Section 195(1)(b)(i) of Cr.P.C. We, therefore, accept
the appeal and close the proceedings. The appeal stands allowed and the
judgment and order under appeal is set aside.
…………………..……J.
(Arun Mishra)
…………………..……J.
(Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi,
April 27, 2018

truck was running ahead of the maruti car and at the time of accident, the distance between the truck and maruti car was only 10 ­15 feet. = Regulation 23 of the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989 - “23. Distance from vehicles in front.­ The driver of a motor vehicle moving behind another vehicle shall keep at a sufficient distance from that other vehicle to avoid collision if the vehicle in front should suddenly slow down or stop.” The expression ‘sufficient distance’ has not been defined in the Regulations or elsewhere. The thumb rule of sufficient distance is at least a safe distance of two to three seconds gap in ideal conditions to avert collision and to allow the following driver time to respond. The distance of 10–15 feet between the truck and maruti car was certainly not a safe distance for which the driver of the maruti car must take the blame=whether the Tribunal should have at least answered the issue of contributory negligence of the truck driver in favour of the appellants (claimants). The question of contributory negligence would arise when both parties are involved in the accident due to rash and negligent driving. In a case such as the present one, when the maruti car was following the truck and no fault can be attributed to 13 the truck driver, the blame must rest on the driver of the maruti car for having driven his vehicle rashly and negligently= It is a well settled position that fastening liability under Section 140 of the Act on the owner of the vehicle is regardless of the fact that the subject vehicle was not driven rashly and negligently. We may usefully refer to the decisions in Indra Devi and others Vs. Bagada Ram and another1 and 1 (2010) 13 SCC 249 14 Eshwarappa alias Maheshwarappa and Another Vs. C.S. Gurushanthappa and Another2 , which are directly on the point. Accordingly, even though the appeal fails insofar as claim petition under Section 166 of the Act, for the appellants having failed to substantiate the factum of rash and negligent driving by the driver of the subject truck, the appellants must succeed in this appeal to the limited extent of relief under Section 140 of the Act. We have no hesitation in moulding the relief on that basis. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal is partly allowed. The appellants are granted limited relief under Section 140 of the Act. The respondent Nos.2 and 3 are made jointly and severally liable to pay a sum of Rs.50,000/­ (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only) to the appellants towards compensation under Section 140 of the Act, on account of the death of Balvinder Kaur in the accident

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10145 OF  2016
NISHAN SINGH & ORS.      …..Appellant(s)
:Versus:
ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.
THROUGH REGIONAL MANAGER & ORS.    ....Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. This   appeal,   by   special   leave,   filed   by   the   claimants
assails   the   judgment   and   order   of   the   High   Court   of
Uttarakhand at Nainital in Appeal From Order No.125 of 2015
dated 5th March, 2015, whereby the appeal was dismissed and
the order passed by the MACT/Additional District Judge­III,
Rudrapur, Udham Singh Nagar, dated 10th December, 2014 in
Motor Accident Claim Petition No.147 of 2012 dismissing the
2
claim petition on the finding that the accident in question was
not on account of rash and negligent driving of Truck bearing
No.   U.P.­32   Z­2397   but   on   account   of   rash   and   negligent
driving of Maruti Car bearing No. U.P.­02 D­5292 resulting in
death of Balvinder Kaur who was sitting in the car driven by
Manjeet Singh, came to be upheld.
2. Briefly stated, appellant No.1 asserted that when he was
returning home to village Bindukhera with his wife Balvinder
Kaur, the mother of appellant Nos.2 to 4, from his matrimonial
home at village Kuankhera, District Bijnaur along with his
cousin   brothers   Manjeet   Singh   and   Bittu   and   his   son
Karanjeet   Singh   on   28th  November,   2010   in   a   Maruti   Car
bearing   No.   U.P.­02   D­5292   which   was   being   driven   by
Manjeet Singh, son of Kashmir Singh, the said car met with an
accident   causing   serious   injuries   to   the   persons   travelling
therein, including the death of Balvinder Kaur. The maruti car
had dashed against Truck bearing No. U.P.­32 Z­2397 which
was running ahead of it. According to the appellants, the truck
driver   suddenly   applied   brake   while   the   truck   was   in   the
3
centre of the road, bringing it to the right side, as a result of
which, the maruti car collided with the truck from the back.
Balvinder Kaur eventually succumbed to her injuries on the
same   day   i.e.   28th  November,   2010,   while   she   was   being
treated at Govt. Hospital, Kashipur. After that, an F.I.R. was
registered   on  4th  December,   2010   at   police   station   Kunda,
District Udham Singh Nagar, bearing No.93/10 u/s 279 for
offences punishable under Sections 304A, 337, 338 and 427 of
IPC. The appellants asserted that Balvinder Kaur was gainfully
employed   and   earned   around   Rs.10,000/­   (Rupees   Ten
Thousand Only) per month from the dairy business.
3. On these assertions, a claim petition was filed before the
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge­III
Rudrapur,   Udham   Singh   Nagar   being   M.A.C.   Case
No.147/2012. Appellant No.1 who was travelling in the car
along with his wife deposed before the Tribunal. Appellants
also examined Manjeet Singh who was driving the Maruti Car
bearing   No.   U.P.­02   D­5292   at   the   relevant   time.   The
appellants also relied on the charge­sheet filed by the police
4
against respondent No.3 (Parasnath) driver of the offending
truck.
4. The respondents contested the claim petition. According
to   the   respondents,   the   accident   occurred   due   to   the
negligence of the driver of the maruti car and there was no
negligence on the part of the truck driver. It was asserted by
the   respondents   that   the   truck   driver   had   a   valid   driving
licence.   Further,   the   appellants   had   failed   to   implead   the
owner and driver of the maruti car who was responsible for the
accident   and   as   such,   no   relief   could   be   granted   to   the
appellants.
5. The Tribunal analysed the entire evidence on record and
answered the issue as to whether the truck was being driven
in   rash   and   negligent   manner   against   the   appellants.   The
Tribunal instead held that the accident occurred due to rash
and negligent driving by the driver of the maruti car. The
Tribunal, therefore, concluded that the truck driver and the
insurer of the truck were not liable to pay compensation as
claimed.   The   Tribunal   noted   the   issue   of   contributory
5
negligence but, having regard to the facts of the present case
and   particularly   because   the   owner   and   the   driver   of   the
maruti car were not made parties, it held that the appellants
were not entitled to any relief. The Tribunal also noted that the
maruti car was purchased by Manjeet Singh about 1­1½ years
before the accident but the same was not transferred in his
name nor was it insured. Taking an overall view of the matter,
the Tribunal dismissed the claim petition vide judgment dated
10th December, 2014.
6. The appellants carried the matter in appeal before the
High   Court   of   Uttarakhand   at   Nainital.   The   High   Court
summarily   dismissed   the   appeal   by   reiterating   the   finding
recorded by the Tribunal that the evidence clearly indicated
that the driver of the maruti car himself was negligent in
driving his vehicle and had failed to keep sufficient distance
between   the   two   vehicles   running   in   the   same   direction.
Furthermore,   the   maruti   car   driver,   owner   and   concerned
insurance   company   were   not   made   parties   to   the   claim
6
petition. The High Court, thus, declined to interfere in the first
appeal.
7. The   appellants   have   assailed   the   aforementioned
decisions   in   this   appeal.   According   to   the   appellants,   the
finding recorded by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High
Court, that the driver of the maruti car had not maintained
safe distance from the truck running ahead of the maruti car
in the same direction, is untenable. The appellants have also
assailed   the   finding   of   fact   recorded   by   the   Tribunal   and
affirmed by the High Court that the maruti car was driven in a
rash and negligent manner. It is urged that the fact that the
maruti car was not registered in the name of Manjeet Singh or
that the documents pertaining to the maruti car and even the
valid   driving   licence   of   the   driver   of   maruti   car   was   not
brought on record, cannot denude the appellants to receive
compensation   due   to   contributory   negligence   of   the   truck
driver.   Further,   the   Tribunal   committed   manifest   error   in
recording the finding on the issue of contributory negligence
against   the   appellants   without   framing   any   issue   in   that
7
behalf. It is urged that the findings recorded by the Tribunal to
absolve the truck driver, on the ground that the truck was not
driven rashly and negligently, is perverse and untenable in
law. Moreover, the Tribunal has completely glossed over the
efficacy   of   the   charge­sheet   filed   by   the   police   against
respondent   No.3   truck   driver   after   due   investigation.   The
appellants   have   also   reiterated   their   claim   regarding
compensation, on the assertion that deceased Balvinder Kaur
was earning around Rs.10,000/­ (Rupees Ten Thousand Only)
per month and after her death, her family was facing grave
hardship. According to the appellants, the Tribunal as well as
the High Court had dealt with the matter in a hyper­technical
manner and did not appreciate the evidence on the basis of
preponderance of probabilities.
8. The respondents, on the other hand, have supported the
finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, that the accident
occurred  not   because  of   rash  and   negligent   driving   of  the
truck but was on account of rash and negligent driving by the
driver of the maruti car. On that finding, contends learned
8
counsel for the respondents, no liability can be fastened on the
respondents. He submitted that the analysis of the evidence
on record by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court does
not warrant any interference. The respondents have supported
the conclusions recorded by the Tribunal and affirmed by the
High Court for dismissing the claim petition.
9. We   have   heard   Mr.   Vijay   Prakash,   learned   counsel
appearing   for   the   appellants   and   Mr.   K.K.   Bhat,   learned
counsel for the respondents.
10. The moot question is whether the Tribunal committed
any error in answering issue No.1 against the appellants and
in favour of the respondents. The Tribunal, while answering
the   said   issue   No.1,   analysed   the  evidence,  both   oral   and
documentary,   including   the   charge­sheet   filed   by   the
appellants and observed thus:
“20. In site plan paper No.6C/6 which is filed on record,
the breadth of the road in question appears to be 14 feet and
about 7 steps Kachcha Lekh appears at the both sides of the
road. This fact is remarkable that the said accident is not of
front   accident   but   the   accident   occurred   as   a   result   of
collision of the Maruti Car on the rear part of the truck in
question by the driver of the car in question and the same
fact is also mentioned in the evidence of the petitioners. PW2
Manjeet Singh driver of the car in question as stated in his
9
cross examination that he was driving the car behind the
truck at the distance of about 10­15 feet. Despite there being
the breadth of the road 14 feet Pucca, the driver of the car in
question kept the vehicle only at the distance of 10­15 feet
from  the   truck   which   doesn’t   appear   in  accordance   with
traffic rules. He should have driven the vehicle maintaining
the   proper   distance   in   order   to   escape   from   each
circumstance but he has admitted in his cross examination
as PW­2 that, “he knows that he should maintain proper
distance from the heavy vehicle”. Under such circumstance if
the vehicle which is running behind the heavy vehicle, must
maintain the proper distance if the proper distance is not
maintain then the whole negligence shall be determined on
the   part   of   rear   vehicle   in   regard   to   the   occurrence   of
accident in question. In addition no evidence in regard to the
seizing of truck in question on the place of occurrence and
taking into police custody  the  vehicles from the place of
occurrence and getting done their technical survey is not
available on place of occurrence.
21. By   the   facts   mentioned   in   the   petition   and   by   the
evidence of PW­1 and PW­2 it doesn’t appear reliable that
rash and negligent driving in the accident in question was on
the part of the driver of the truck in question and for this
purpose only by registering of F.I.R. of said accident and
submitting of charge­sheet against the driver of the truck in
question, the driver of the truck in question cannot be held
guilty for the said accident, whereas by the evidence of the
petitioner   on   record   this   fact   comes   forward   that   the
accident occurred as the driver of the car in question was
not driving the car in question in accordance with traffic
rules i.e. the accident occurred as the vehicle was not being
driven maintaining proper distance from the truck and it
appears clearly that the speed of the car would have been
fast whereby the car in question collided with the rear part of
the truck in question being uncontrolled and said accident
took place. Under such circumstance there was no rash and
negligence on the part of the driver of truck bearing No.U.P.­
32 Z­2397 regarding the accident in question but the same
is determined on the part of Manjeet Singh driver of Maruti
Car bearing No.U.P.­02 D­5292.
22. On the basis of the aforesaid interpretation it appears
that the said accident didn’t occur on 28.11.2010 at about
10
6:45 p.m. at village Kunda Kashipur­Jashpur Road under
area of P.S. Kunda district Udham Singh Nagar by the driver
of the truck bearing No. U.P.­32 Z­2397 due to rash and
negligent driving of the truck and by applying sudden break
but it occurred as a result of rash and negligent driving of
Maruti   Car   bearing   No.   U.P.­02   D­5292   in   question   by
Manjeet   Singh   driver,   wherein   Balvinder   Kaur   who   was
sitting   in   the   car   sustained   serious   injuries   and   expired
during her treatment on account of serious injuries.”
The finding so recorded by the Tribunal has been affirmed by
the High Court, by observing that the evidence was clearly
indicative of the fact that the maruti car was being driven in a
rash and negligent manner, which was the cause for accident
of this nature and resulting in death of one of the passengers
in the maruti car. The maruti car was driven by none other
than PW­2 Manjeet Singh. In his evidence, he has admitted
that the subject truck was running ahead of the maruti car for
quite   some   time   about   one   kilometre   and   at   the   time   of
accident, the distance between the truck and maruti car was
only 10 ­15 feet. He has also admitted that the law mandates
maintaining sufficient distance between two vehicles running
in the same direction. It is also not in dispute that the road on
which the two vehicles were moving was only about 14 feet
11
wide. It is unfathomable that on such a narrow road, the
subject truck would move at a high speed as alleged. In any
case,   the   maruti   car   which   was   following   the   truck   was
expected   to   maintain   a   safe   distance,   as   envisaged   in
Regulation 23 of the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989,
which reads thus:
“23. Distance from vehicles in front.­ The driver of a motor
vehicle   moving   behind   another   vehicle   shall   keep   at   a
sufficient distance from that other vehicle to avoid collision if
the vehicle in front should suddenly slow down or stop.”  
                  
The expression ‘sufficient distance’ has not been defined in the
Regulations   or   elsewhere.   The   thumb   rule   of   sufficient
distance is at least a safe distance of two to three seconds gap
in ideal conditions to avert collision and to allow the following
driver time to respond. The distance of 10–15 feet between the
truck and maruti car was certainly not a safe distance for
which the driver of the maruti car must take the blame. It
must necessarily follow that the finding on the issue under
consideration ought to be against the claimants.
12
11. The Tribunal also noted that there was no evidence on
record to indicate that the driver of the truck suddenly applied
his brake in the middle of the road. Further, the finding on
issue   No.1   recorded  by   the  Tribunal   is  that   there  was   no
evidence regarding exact place of occurrence of accident and
having taken survey. Therefore, the issue under consideration
was answered against the appellants (claimants), namely, that
the subject truck was not driven rashly and negligently by the
truck driver nor had he brought the truck in the centre of the
road at right side or applied sudden brake as being the cause
of   the   accident.   Being   a   concurrent   finding   of   fact   and   a
possible view, needs no interference.
12. The next question is whether the Tribunal should have at
least   answered   the   issue   of   contributory   negligence   of   the
truck   driver   in   favour   of   the   appellants   (claimants).   The
question  of  contributory negligence  would  arise  when  both
parties are involved in the accident due to rash and negligent
driving. In a case such as the present one, when the maruti
car was following the truck and no fault can be attributed to
13
the truck driver, the blame must rest on the driver of the
maruti car for having driven his vehicle rashly and negligently.
The High Court has justly taken note of the fact that the driver
and owner of the maruti car, as well as insurer of that vehicle,
had not been impleaded as parties to the claim petition. The
Tribunal has also taken note of the fact that in all probability,
the driver and owner of the maruti car were not made party
being close relatives of the appellants. In such a situation, the
issue of contributory negligence cannot be taken forward.
13. However, even in such a case, the Tribunal could have
been well advised to invoke Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988, (for short “the Act”) providing for liability of the
owner of the vehicle (subject truck) involved in the accident. It
is a well settled position that fastening liability under Section
140 of the Act on the owner of the vehicle is regardless of the
fact   that   the   subject   vehicle   was   not   driven   rashly   and
negligently. We may usefully refer to the decisions in  Indra
Devi   and   others   Vs.   Bagada   Ram   and   another1 and
1
(2010) 13 SCC 249
14
Eshwarappa alias Maheshwarappa and Another Vs. C.S.
Gurushanthappa  and   Another2
,  which are directly on the
point. 
 
14. Accordingly, even though the appeal fails insofar as claim
petition   under   Section   166   of   the   Act,   for   the   appellants
having failed to substantiate the factum of rash and negligent
driving by the driver of the subject truck, the appellants must
succeed in this appeal to the limited extent of relief under
Section 140 of the Act. We have no hesitation in moulding the
relief on that basis.
15. For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal is partly
allowed.   The   appellants   are   granted   limited   relief   under
Section 140 of the Act. The respondent Nos.2 and 3 are made
jointly   and   severally   liable   to   pay   a   sum   of   Rs.50,000/­
(Rupees   Fifty   Thousand   Only)   to   the   appellants   towards
compensation under Section 140 of the Act, on account of the
death of Balvinder Kaur in the accident which occurred on 28th
2
(2010) 8 SCC 620
15
November, 2010, along with interest at the rate of 9% from the
date of filing of the claim petition till realization.
16. The appeal is partly allowed in the above terms with no
order as to costs.   
.………………………….CJI.
(Dipak Misra)
…………………………..….J.
        (A.M. Khanwilkar)
…………………………..….J.
       (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud)
New Delhi;
April  27, 2018.

where the accident occurs without any fault of the owner of the vehicle or the fault of the other vehicle, the liability to pay compensation, at best, must be determined in terms of Section 140 of the Act as has been held in A. Sridhar (supra). It is true that the High Court in the present case has overturned the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the motorcycle was driven by appellant No.2 at the relevant time when the accident occurred and, instead, concluded that the motorcycle was, in fact, driven by deceased Krishna Kumar. In that sense, the accident occurred neither due to the fault of the owner of the vehicle (appellant No.1) who, admittedly, was not present 9 or travelling on the motorcycle at the relevant time nor due to the fault of any other vehicle. However, on a deeper scrutiny of the materials on record, we are of the opinion that the High Court committed manifest error, an error apparent on the face of the record, in reversing the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the motorcycle was being driven by appellant No.2 (son of appellant No.1 – owner of the motorcycle) and had caused accident due to rash and negligent driving

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8411 OF  2015
MOHAR SAI AND ANR.      …..Appellant(s)
:Versus:
GAYATRI DEVI AND ORS.     ....Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. This   appeal,   by   special   leave,   emanates   from   the
judgment and order dated 1st April, 2015 passed by the High
Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Misc. Appeal (C) No.1100
of 2011, partly allowing the appeal filed by the appellants
herein (owner and driver of the offending vehicle) against the
award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Koriya,
Baikunthpur,   Chhatisgarh   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the
2
Tribunal”), in Claim Case No.22/2008 dated 21st September,
2011,   on   the   finding   that   the   deceased   was   liable   for
contributory negligence to the extent of 50% and as such, after
deducting   50%   of   the   compensation   amount,   the
respondents/claimants   would   be   entitled   to   a   sum   of
Rs.3,86,500/­   along   with   interest   at   the   rate   of   7.5%   per
annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till the date
of realization.
2.   Briefly stated, the respondents claiming to be the heirs
and legal representatives of the deceased Krishna Kumar Sahu
alias Tipu Sahu, son of Dashrath Sahu, filed a claim petition
before the Tribunal under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988 (for short “the Act”) for compensation, amounting to
Rs.20,21,000/­ on account of the death of Krishna Kumar
Sahu in a motor accident which occurred on 14th November,
2006.   Respondent No.1 is the widow of deceased Krishna
Kumar Sahu.  Respondent Nos.2 to 4 are the minor children of
the deceased and respondent Nos. 5 & 6 are the parents of the
deceased. They asserted that when Krishna Kumar was in his
3
Pan Shop near the bus stand of Village Kathghor, appellant
No.2 Prem Lal Rajawade came to his shop  on his motorcycle
bearing registration No. CG 16C/5171 with a friend, Narendra
Panika, at around 1.00 P.M. and cajoled Krishna Kumar to
accompany him to Village Belia. All the three left for Village
Belia   on   the   motorcycle.   While   returning   back   from   Belia,
when they reached Khaad Naala, the motorcycle skidded due
to high speed as the driver lost control over it.  Consequently,
all the three persons travelling on the motorcycle were injured.
The motorcycle was driven by Prem Lal all along. They were
given   first   aid   at   Government   Hospital,   Sonhat   and   then
referred to Charcha Regional Hospital for further treatment.
Krishna Kumar died en­route to Charcha Hospital. In this
background, the claim petition was filed, which was resisted
by the appellants.
3. Admittedly, appellant No.1 is the owner of the offending
vehicle and appellant No.2 is the son of appellant No.1 who
went along with the deceased on the offending motorcycle on
the date of accident. According to the appellants, however, the
4
motorcycle   was   being   driven   by   Krishna   Kumar   and   not
appellant   No.2,   as   alleged,   when   the   accident   took   place.
Appellant No.2 was sitting in the middle and Narendra Panika
was sitting at the back, as pillion riders.  Krishna Kumar was
driving the motorcycle rashly and at a high speed. He was told
to slow down but he did not pay any heed to it and eventually
the accident was caused. In other words, the deceased Krishna
Kumar was himself responsible for the accident. 
4. In   light   of   the   competing   claims   of   the   parties,   the
Tribunal framed four issues and finally answered the claim
petition in favour of the claimants. The Tribunal accepted the
plea of the claimants that the offending vehicle (motorcycle)
was driven by Prem Lal (appellant No.2) at the relevant time
and   had   caused   the   accident   due   to   rash   and   negligent
driving.     The   Tribunal   then   determined   the   quantum   of
compensation amount on the basis of monthly income of the
deceased estimated at Rs.3,000/­ and applied multiplier of 15.
Besides,   the   Tribunal   awarded   lump   sum   amount   of
Rs.25,000/­   towards   funeral   expenses,   loss   of   love   and
5
affection   due   to   the   death   of   the   deceased.   The   Tribunal
determined the compensation amount at Rs.3,85,000/­ to be
paid with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date
of   filing   of   the   claim   petition   until   its   realization.   The
appellants assailed the said decision of the Tribunal by way of
First   Appeal   before   the   High   Court   of   Chhattisgarh   at
Bilaspur.
5. The High Court reversed the finding of fact recorded by
the Tribunal that the offending vehicle (motorcycle) was driven
by Prem Lal (appellant No.2) at the relevant time and instead
found that the deceased himself was driving the motorcycle
and had caused the accident.  On that finding, the High Court
proceeded to hold that being a case of contributory negligence,
the   claimants   would   be   entitled   to   only   50%   of   the
compensation amount to be determined by it.  With regard to
the quantum of compensation amount, the High Court opined
that the Tribunal failed to provide for addition of 50% to the
actual income of the deceased towards future prospects and
also   deduction   of   1/4th  of   the   income,   instead   of   1/3rd
.
6
Further, the amount awarded towards funeral expenses and
loss of consortium for the wife and loss of love and affection
towards   the   children   and   parents,   was   enhanced   to
Rs.50,000/­.  On that basis, the High Court opined that the
total   compensation   amount   payable   would   have   been
Rs.7,73,000/­,  but  after  deduction  of  50%  of  that   amount
towards contributory negligence, the amount actually payable
to   the   respondents   –   claimants   would   work   out   to
Rs.3,86,500/­ with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum
from the date of filing of the claim petition till the date of
realization. This decision is the subject matter of the present
appeal at the instance of the appellants (owner/driver of the
motorcycle).
6. The foremost contention in this appeal is that the High
Court having concluded that appellant No.2 was not driving
the   motorcycle   at   the   relevant   time   and   applying   the
exposition   in   the   case   of  A.   Sridhar   Vs.   United   India
Insurance   Company   Limited   and   Anr.,
1
  the claimants at
1
 (2011) 14 SCC 719
7
best would be entitled to compensation on ‘no fault liability
principle’ under Section 140 of the Act, for it was a case of
accident   not   because     of   fault   of   owner   of   the   vehicle   or
because of the fault of any other vehicle. It is urged that no
liability can be fastened on the appellants for the negligence of
the deceased, much less on the pillion riders. It is also urged
that the appellants come from a very humble background and
are engaged in ordinary agricultural labour work. They will not
be in a position to pay any compensation amount, if awarded.
It is also contended that there was no relationship of master
and servant, principal/employer and employee between the
deceased and the appellants which alone could have been the
basis for awarding compensation, much less fasten liability on
the   appellants   to   pay   such   amount   on   the   principle   of
vicarious liability. It is submitted by the appellants that the
High   Court’s   decision   of   fastening   the   liability   on   the
appellants of Rs.3,86,500/­, with interest at the rate of 7.5%
per annum, deserves to be set aside and the appellants ought
to be absolved from any liability. Alternatively, it is submitted
8
that the compensation amount be determined under Section
140 of the Act and not under Section 166 of the Act.
7. Although notice has been served on the respondents, no
appearance has been entered on their behalf.  As a result, the
hearing of this appeal had to proceed ex­parte against them.
We have heard Ms. Sumita Hazarika, learned counsel for the
appellants, at length.
8. The appellants may be right in contending that in cases
where the accident occurs without any fault of the owner of
the vehicle or the fault of the other vehicle, the liability to pay
compensation, at best, must be determined in terms of Section
140 of the Act as has been held in  A. Sridhar (supra). It is
true that the High Court in the present case has overturned
the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the motorcycle was
driven   by   appellant   No.2   at   the   relevant   time   when   the
accident occurred and, instead, concluded that the motorcycle
was, in fact, driven by deceased Krishna Kumar. In that sense,
the accident occurred neither due to the fault of the owner of
the vehicle (appellant No.1) who, admittedly, was not present
9
or travelling on the motorcycle at the relevant time nor due to
the fault of any other vehicle. However, on a deeper scrutiny of
the materials on record, we are of the opinion that the High
Court committed manifest error, an error apparent on the face
of the record, in reversing the finding recorded by the Tribunal
that the motorcycle was being driven by appellant No.2 (son of
appellant No.1 – owner of the motorcycle) and had caused
accident due to rash and negligent driving.  We are conscious
of the fact that the respondents – claimants have neither come
up in cross appeal against the reduction of the compensation
amount on the finding of contributory negligence nor have
they filed any cross objection regarding reversing of the crucial
finding of fact by the High Court. However, it is well settled
that  in motor accident claim cases, the Court cannot adopt a
hyper­technical   approach   but   has   to   discharge   the   role   of
parens patriae. This appeal being continuation of the claim
petition  albeit  at   the   instance   of   the   owner   (appellant
No.1)/alleged   driver   of   the   vehicle   (appellant   No.2),   we
consider it appropriate to examine the approach of the High
10
Court in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal
on   the   factum   of   motorcycle   being   driven   by   Prem   Lal
(appellant No.2, son of appellant No.1 owner of the motorcycle)
at the relevant time and also that he had caused the accident
due to rash and negligent driving. We are inclined to do so as
it is open to the respondents to support the decree whilst
urging that the finding against them recorded by the High
Court on the matter in issue ought to have been in their
favour as has been held by the Tribunal. 
9. The   respondents,   in   support   of   their   claim   that   the
deceased Krishna Kumar travelled as pillion rider and was
sitting in the middle, between the two other persons who were
travelling together on the motorcycle, had examined witnesses
who spoke about the fact that Prem Lal along with Narendra
Panika came to the Pan Shop of deceased Krishna Kumar and
cajoled   him   to   accompany   them   to   Village   Belia.   Krishna
Kumar agreed to go with Prem Lal and when he left his Pan
shop, the vehicle was being driven by Prem Lal (appellant
No.2). The witnesses have also unambiguously mentioned that
11
when they reached Village Belia and left from that Village,
Prem Lal was driving the motorcycle and Krishna Kumar was
sitting in the middle and Narendra Panika behind him. The
witness Jawahar Lal (AW­5),  has also stated that while he was
going to Sonhat from Baikunthpur in a jeep, he saw Krishna
Kumar going with his friends on a motorcycle and sitting in
the middle.   Few minutes thereafter, the accident occurred.
The   respondents,   through   their   witnesses,   have   also
established that the motorcycle was owned by appellant No.1
and appellant No.2 used to drive that motorcycle himself. The
appellants did not even produce any tittle of evidence, except
the bare words of the appellants and their witnesses Narendra
Panika   (DW­2)   and   Jai   Prakash   (DW­3)   who   are   obviously
interested witnesses. Taking the entirety of the evidence on
record, the Tribunal in paragraphs 17 and 18 of its judgment
observed thus: 
“17.   Examining   the   witnesses   Gayagtri  (AW­1),   Rajkumar
(AW­2), Sanjay Pratap Singh (AW­3), Bhagwat Prasad (AW­4),
Jawahar   Lal   (AW­5),   Sandeep   Kuma   (AW­6)   and   the
documents exhibited it was found that on 14.11.2006 near
the Khad Naala near village Kailashpur motorcycle no.CG
16C/5171   met   with   an   accident,   and   the   riders   of   the
motorcycle Premlal, Narendra Panika, and Krishna Kumar
12
were   injured.   Krishna   Kumar   was   seriously   injured   and
therefore, he died while being taken to Charcha hospital.
18. From  the statement  of applicant  no.1  Smt.  Gayatri
Devi and the Criminal Complaint no.39/08 before the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Baikunthpur, prima facie case against
Premlal Rajwade under section 279, 304A of IPC has been
registered on the basis of the witnesses and documents and
the matter is pending before the court. These facts have
stood the test of cross­examination.”
10. Again, in paragraphs 22­24, the Tribunal negatived the
plea   of   the   appellants   being   far­fetched   and   accepted   the
version of the respondents – claimants that the motorcycle at
the relevant time was being driven by Prem Lal (appellant
No.2)   and   he   had   caused   the   accident   due   to   rash   and
negligent driving.  Paragraphs 22­24 read thus:
“22. On the basis of the above mentioned statements of the
Defendant Premlal (DW­1), Witness Narendra Panika (DW­2),
and Jayprakash (DW­3) the claim of applicants that Krishna
Kumar died in a motorcycle accident is proved.
23. The defence of the defendants is that on the said date
the   motorcycle   was   being   driven   by   deceased   Krishna
Kumar. Defendant witness Premlal (DW­1), Narendra Kumar
(DW­2), and Jayprakash (DW­3) in their chief examination
have stated that while going back from Kailashpur the said
vehicle was being driven by Krishna Kumar. Krishna Kumar
was   driving   the   motorcycle   in   high   speed   and   negligent
manner, due to which he was not able to control the vehicle
and   accident   was   caused.   Witness   Premlal   (DW­1)   has
refuted the claim of the applicants in his cross examination
and has stated that deceased Krishna Kumar knew how to
drive all kinds of vehicles. But he has conceded of not having
any   knowledge   whether   Krishna   Kumar   had   any   driving
licence or not. This witness has stated that the deceased had
13
scooter for himself. However, the defendants have not been
able to produce any reliable evidence as to the ownership of
the said scooter and neither any valid licence to prove that
Krishna Kumar had a license to drive to vehicles. Narendra
Panika (SW­2) has also not produced any documents relating
to the vehicle of the deceased neither relating to the driving
license   of   the   deceased.   Witness   Jayprakash   (DW­3)   has
admitted that he did not see the accident happening. In this
situation, the burden of proof is on the defendants to prove
that deceased had a valid driving licence and that he was the
one who was driving the motorcycle. The defendants have
failed to produce any reliable evidence in this regard. The
vehicle   involved   in   accident   CG­16/C5171   is   owned   by
Mohar Sai and it was regularly driven by Premlal (Defendant
no.2), if he or his father (defendant no.2 and 1) had allowed
deceased   Krishna   Kumar,   so   both   of   them   are   definitely
liable for the accident, because without finding out whether
the   deceased   had   a   valid   driving   license,   the   defendants
allowed him to drive the motorcycle.
24. Therefore,   on   the   basis   of   the  above   evidence   it   is
decided that on question no.1 and 2 the applicants have
been able to successfully prove against the defendants. On
the other had the defendants have not been able to prove
their case on question no.2. Therefore, the question no.1 is
adjudicated as Yes and question no.2 is adjudicated as No.”
11. The view so taken by the Tribunal, it appears to us, was
not only a possible view but also in conformity with the scale
to be applied for appreciation of evidence in motor accident
cases namely preponderance of probabilities. Nevertheless, the
High   Court   reversed   this   well   considered   finding   of   fact
recorded by the Tribunal by merely observing thus:
14
“11. After evaluating the evidence of witnesses, it would
reveal   that   the   Applicant   had   examined   the   eye   witness
Sanjay Pratap Singh as A.W.3, but he has stated in cross
examination that he has not seen the incident and reached
the spot after the accident had happened. Similarly, witness
Bhagwat Prasad only says about the fact that before the
occurrence of accident, the vehicle was driven by Premlal.
Another   witness   Jawharlal   Sahu   has   stated   in   his   cross
examination that he has not seen the incident. Therefore,
taking into statements of witnesses  alongwith  FIR wherein
it is stated that at the relevant time, the vehicle was being
driven by the deceased himself appears to be more plausible.
Ex.D­4 is a document of MLC of two persons, which is an
intimation sent by Doctor Ex.D­4 purports that the doctor
intimated   the   police   about   the   injured   persons   and   it
contains the statement that 3 persons were travelling in the
motorcycle and the driver of the motorcycle had died.  This
was sent on 14.11.2006 at about 11.45 p.m., that is the date
of accident and immediately after the incident happened.
Reading it alongwith the statements of pillion riders who
were also travelling on the motorcycle would clearly go to
show that that at the relevant time, the vehicle was being
driven by the deceased Krishna Kumar Rajwade itself.
12. So taking into account the facts which have emerged
from evidence and documents on record, I am of the opinion
that the finding of the learned Claims Tribunal that at the
relevant   time   the   vehicle   was   being   driven   by   Premlal
Rajwade  appears to be  not  sustainable  and  is set  aside.
Accordingly,   it   is   held   that   deceased   was   also   liable   for
contributory negligence for the accident.”
12. The entirety of evidence has not been analysed by the
High Court, including the material evidence of witnesses who
had seen Prem Lal (appellant No.2) driving the motorcycle and
deceased Krishna Kumar sitting behind him as pillion rider,
whilst leaving his Pan shop and when they reached Village
Belia and again, when they left that village, including having
15
been seen by Jawahar Lal (AW­5) on the way just before the
occurrence of the accident.  The High Court has not discarded
the version of the claimants’ witnesses as untruthful. Besides
the oral evidence adduced by the claimants, the Tribunal also
took   note   of   the   police   papers   in   respect   of   the   Criminal
Complaint No.39/08 filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Baikunthpur, for offence punishable under Sections 279 and
304A   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   and   the   statement   of   the
witnesses   referred   to   therein.   The   High   Court,   however,
selectively   relied   on   the   statements   of   interested   witnesses
examined on behalf of the appellants and Exh. D­4 and Exh.
D­5.   Exh. D­4 is a document of MLC of Narendra Panika who
presumably gave intimation that Krishna Kumar was seriously
injured and that he succumbed to injuries before he could be
shifted to the hospital. The version given to the doctor by
appellant no.2 and Narendra Panika was unilateral and not
verified from independent eye witnesses before recording the
same. Exh.D­5 was similarly founded on the intimation given
by the two injured persons who obviously did not reveal the
16
correct position for reasons best known to them. Notably, the
eye witnesses examined by the claimants have neither been
discarded as untruthful nor has the High Court found any
contradiction   in   the   version   given   by   them.   Their   version
remained unshaken during the cross­examination. As such,
the   High   Court   committed   manifest   error   in   reversing   the
finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal by solely relying on the
version of interested witnesses examined by the appellants in
defence. On the other hand, the analysis of the totality of
evidence by the Tribunal is consistent with the principle of
preponderance of probabilities.
13.    Once this finding of the High Court becomes doubtful,
the principal argument of the appellants must fail, in which
case the question of applying Section 140 of the Act does not
arise. For the same reason, the exposition in the case of  A.
Sridhar (supra), will be of no avail to the appellants. In other
words, we find no infirmity in the finding recorded by the
Tribunal   that   the   motorcycle   was   driven   by   Prem   Lal
(appellant   No.2)   at   the   relevant   time   and   had   caused   the
17
accident due to rash and negligent driving resulting in injuries
to all the three persons travelling on the motorcycle, including
the deceased Krishna Kumar who succumbed to the injuries
before   being   admitted   in   Charcha   Hospital.   No   serious
argument has been made about the quantum of compensation
determined by the High Court providing for future prospects
and   deducting   1/4th  towards   personal   expenses,   including
applying the multiplier of 16.   Even if any argument in that
behalf is available to the appellants, as the amount involved is
insignificant   and   the   difference   between   the   quantum
determined by the Tribunal and the quantum determined by
the   High   Court   is   only   marginal   (the   Tribunal   determined
Rs.3,85,000/­ and the High Court determined Rs.3,86,500/­),
we decline to interfere in exercise of our jurisdiction under
Article 136 of the Constitution. At the same time, we must
clarify that we have not examined the justness of the finding of
the High Court regarding contributory negligence against the
deceased and providing for deduction of 50% compensation
18
amount therefor. For, the respondents have not assailed that
part of the finding of the High Court.
14.   Taking overall view of the matter, we have no hesitation
in   concluding   that   in   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the
present   case,   no   interference   under   Article   136   of   the
Constitution  is  warranted.  Hence,  this  appeal  is  dismissed
with no order as to costs. 
.………………………….CJI.
(Dipak Misra)
…………………………..….J.
        (A.M. Khanwilkar)
New Delhi;
April  27, 2018.

the offence has committed by the Advocates, this Court considers it necessary to issue certain directions because the offence in this case was committed in a court room while Presiding Officer was sitting and that too by Advocates, who are also the part of the system. No one can be permitted to pollute the pious stream of justice delivery system. = “(i) It is prayed to include section 307 of IPC on the charge sheet submitted in Crime No. 419 of 2010, police station Wazirganj, Lucknow. (ii) It is prayed to impose other relevant sections of IPC or other Acts against accuseds in crime no. 419/2010, police station Wazirganj, LKO that Lordship deems fit, just and proper for assaulting in Judicial Custody even after Hon'ble High Court Security Instructions. (iii) It is prayed to frame proper charges against Jameeruddin Siddiqui (exADJ). (iv) It is prayed to take cognizance against the concerned Emergency Medical Officer of Adarsh Karavas on 24/06/2010. (v) It is prayed to regard para 8 of Counter Affidavit as a key to discover all the accused. (vi) It is prayed to grant reasonable time for the completion of Investigation as Lordship deems, just, fit and proper. (vii) It is prayed to pass any other order in favour of the petitioners.”

1
NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL  APPEAL NO.  648  OF  2018
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.2082 of 2016)
OSAMA AZIZ AND ANR.      …..Appellant(s)
:Versus:
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS.     ....Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. This appeal, by special leave, filed by the appellants inperson,
  is   against   the   judgment   and   orders   dated   10th
January,   2013   and   19th  March,   2013   passed   by   the   High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, in Case
U/S 482/378/407 No.60 of 2013.  The first order dated 10th
January, 2013 is obviously an interlocutory order but also
2
rejecting reliefs (i) to (iv) claimed in the petition filed by the
appellants. The petition came to be finally disposed of by the
High Court vide judgment and order dated 19th March, 2013.
Accordingly,   both   these   orders   have   been   assailed   in   the
present appeal.  The copy of the petition filed before the High
Court   has   not   been   included   in   the   appeal   paper   book.
However, from the impugned order dated 10th January, 2013,
it is noticed that the first prayer in the petition filed before the
High Court was to direct the investigating agency to include
Section   307  of  Indian  Penal  Code  (“IPC”,  for  short)   in  the
charge­sheet filed against three persons before the Trial Court
in   Crime   No.419   of   2010,   P.S.   Wazirganj,   Lucknow.   The
second prayer is to include other relevant sections of IPC or
other Acts against the accused in the aforementioned crime.
The   third   prayer   is   to   frame   proper   charges   against
Jameeruddin   Siddiqui   (ex­ADJ).   Fourth   prayer   is   to   take
cognizance against the Emergency Medical Officer of Adarsh
Karavas on 24th June, 2010. The fifth prayer is to discover all
the accused on the basis of the clue given in paragraph 8 of
3
the Counter Affidavit. The sixth prayer is to grant reasonable
time for completion of investigation and seventh prayer is to
pass any other or further orders in favour of the appellants. In
the   impugned   order   dated   19th  March,   2013,   the   prayers
mentioned in the subject petition filed by the appellants before
the High Court have been reproduced as under:
“2. By means of the instant petition, the petitioners have
challenged the investigation pending in Case No. CB 447 of
2010, arising out of case crime no. 419 of 2010 (State Vs.
Airaz Siddiqui & Others), police station Wazirganj, Lucknow
investigated   by   the   C.B.   CID,   Luckonw   and   has   made
following prayer­ 
“(i) It is prayed to include section 307 of IPC on the charge
sheet submitted in Crime No. 419 of 2010, police station
Wazirganj, Lucknow. 
(ii) It is prayed to impose other relevant sections of IPC or
other Acts against accuseds in crime no. 419/2010, police
station Wazirganj, LKO that Lordship deems fit, just and
proper for assaulting in Judicial Custody even after Hon'ble
High Court Security Instructions. 
(iii)   It   is   prayed   to   frame   proper   charges   against
Jameeruddin Siddiqui (exADJ). 
(iv) It is prayed to take cognizance against the concerned
Emergency   Medical   Officer   of   Adarsh   Karavas   on
24/06/2010. 
(v) It is prayed to regard para 8 of Counter Affidavit as a key
to discover all the accused. 
(vi) It is prayed to grant reasonable time for the completion of
Investigation as Lordship deems, just, fit and proper. 
(vii) It is prayed to pass any other order in favour of the
petitioners.”
2. As regards reliefs (i), (ii) and (iii), the same stood disposed
of in terms of the impugned order dated 10th January, 2013,
4
and rest of the reliefs were considered and answered by the
High Court vide impugned order dated 19th March, 2013.
3. In   substance,   the reliefs claimed in the   petition filed
before the High Court were in reference to the criminal case
registered   against   private   respondents   and   other   accused,
being Crime No.419 of 2010.  In the order dated 10th January,
2013, the High Court noted that the charge­sheet was already
filed in respect of the said crime before the competent Court
against three accused for offences punishable under Sections
147, 323, 504 and 353 of IPC and the Court was informed by
the   AGA  that  investigation   against   other  accused  was  still
going on. It is in that context the High Court observed at the
end of the impugned order dated 10th January, 2013 that so
far as reliefs (i), (ii) and (iii) are concerned, the appellants may
approach the Trial Court. This is one aspect to which our
attention   has   been   drawn   by   appellant   No.1,   who   has
appeared   in­person.     As   regards   this   grievance   of   the
appellants, we are in agreement with the High Court that the
appellants are free to pursue their legal remedies before the
5
Trial Court for inclusion of Section 307 of IPC in Crime No.419
of   2010.   Needless   to   observe   that   even   if   charge­sheet   in
respect of the said offence has been filed, it is open to the Trial
Court at the appropriate stage to frame the charge for offence
under Section 307 of IPC if the material on record justifies
framing of such a charge, including to amend the charges and
also to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of
offence. None of the observations made by the High Court in
the  impugned  orders  will  be  any  impediment  for  the  Trial
Court to do so. This must assuage the apprehension of the
appellants   that   even   if   there   is   evidence   to   indicate
commission of offence under Section 307, such a charge has
not been framed against the concerned accused. We leave that
question open to be considered by the Trial Court on its own
merits and in accordance with law. 
4. As regards relief (iv), the High Court, in its impugned
order   dated  10th  January,   2013,   has   noted   that   the   same
pertained to some other case unconnected with Crime No.419 of
2010,  arising   from   an   independent   act   of   commission  and
6
omission   in  the   discharge   of   duty   for   which   no   criminal
proceeding is pending in the Court. As a result, the High Court
declined to issue any direction in respect of prayer clause (iv).
As regards prayer clause (v), the High Court observed that the
same   will   be   considered   after   submission   of   the   progress
report   by   the   concerned   Investigating   Officer   in   respect   of
Crime No.419 of 2010.   Thus, the Court finally disposed of
reliefs (i) to (iv) with the observation that no further action is
needed in respect of the said reliefs.
5. The matter was then taken up by the High Court on 19th
March, 2013, for considering the remaining reliefs (v) to (vii).
The grievance made by the appellants before the High Court
has been considered in the following words:
“The petitioner has made only seven reliefs in his petition.
Since final order has already been passed with regard to the
abovementioned four reliefs, only relief no. 5 to 7 needs to be
considered. Admittedly police has filed charge sheet in this
case. So far as relief No. 5 is concerned, it relates to discover
the accused persons during investigation and if the police
has not submitted charge sheet against them, the petitioner
himself   can   adduce   evidence   before   the   trial   court.
Thereafter   the   accused   persons   may   be   summoned   in
exercise of the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. Relief no. 6
has also become infructuous as by means of this prayer, the
petitioner   prayed   for   relief   to   complete   the   investigation
7
within   a   stipulated   period,   therefore,   it   has   rendered
infructuous by submission of the charge sheet.
4. It is submitted by the petitioner that the investigation is
per   se   incorrect   because   as   per   the   conclusions   of   the
investigation, there were so many persons, who committed
the  offence but  charge  sheet  has  been filed only against
three  accused  persons  under  Section  147  IPC  also.   It   is
further submitted that to constitute an offence under Section
147   IPC   at   least   five   persons   should   have   been   chargesheeted.
No other ground was pressed into service by the
petitioner in his argument.
5. Learned A.G.A. has submitted that in this case prayer has
been   made   to   interfere   in   the   investigation   and   to   issue
certain   directions   to   the   Investigating   Officer   and   these
prayers   have   rendered   infructuous   as   police   has   already
submitted charge sheet.
6. It transpires from the perusal of the record that in this
case F.I.R. was lodged at case crime no. 419 of 2010 at
police station Wazirganj, district Lucknow with the allegation
that   accused   Airaz   Ahmad   Siddiqui,   Advocate   with   the
intention to create his influence in the area had lodged a
false report under Section 147, 323, 336, 504 & 506 IPC,
police station Chowk, district Lucknow at case crime no. 24
of 2009 after taking the police under his pressure and in
collusion with police got a false charge sheet submitted in
court.   Feeling   aggrieved   by   the   said   charge   sheet,   the
petitioner moved a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before
this Court, which was dismissed with the direction to the
court  concerned  to dispose of the bail application of  the
petitioner in the light of Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs.
State of U.P. reported in [2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC)]. When the
petitioner   was   present   for   his   bail   before   the   court
concerned, then the accused persons, namely, Airaz Ahmad
Siddiqui, Iraj Ahamad Siddiqui, his father Jamaruddin (Ex.
ADJ),   Aamir   Nakvi,   Advocate,   Pradeep,   Advocate   Saraan
Kahn, Advocate, Sahil, Advocate and a friend of Iraj Ahmad
Zuber and Tarik along with other persons entered into the
court room and started beating him with kick and fists and
Danda while the petitioner was in judicial custody. At that
time, Presiding Officer was present in Court. He made an
effort   for   his   rescue.   His   mother   made   an   effort   for   the
rescue of the petitioner then Iraz Ahmad also caused her
injuries.   Thereafter   the   police   force   was   called   and   the
8
accused persons ran away from there and the petitioner was
sent for medical examination to District Jail, Lucknow. After
investigation,   police   submitted   charge   sheet   only   against
three accused persons and the petitioner was not satisfied
with the investigation. Result of the investigation was to the
effect that several persons took part in the incident but their
identity could not be ascertained, hence charge sheet was
filed against three accused persons.
Since   the   investigation   has   already   been   completed
and charge sheet has been filed, therefore, the submission of
the petitioner that the investigation is per se illegal because
charge sheet has been filed only against three persons under
Section 147 IPC, which could not have been filed against less
than five persons. But this Court is not satisfied with this
argument as the investigation has revealed that offence was
committed by several persons but the identity of other coaccused
persons could not be ascertained, therefore, there
was no illegality in submission of charge sheet under Section
147   IPC.   The   offence   was   committed   by   an   unlawful
assembly and identity of only three accused persons could
be ascertained, who were members of unlawful assembly,
therefore, submission of charge sheet including Section 147
IPC only against three accused persons cannot be said to be
illegal in any manner. But keeping in view the facts of the
case, the petitioner may raise his grievance before the court
concerned.
But keeping in view the manner in which, the offence
has  committed  by  the  Advocates,   this   Court   considers   it
necessary to issue certain directions because the offence in
this case was committed in a court room while Presiding
Officer was sitting and that too by Advocates, who are also
the part of the system. No one can be permitted to pollute
the pious stream of justice delivery system.
7.   Hence,   it   is   provided   that   if   the   petitioner   raise   his
grievance before the learned Magistrate concerned, the same
shall   be   considered   and   decided   by   the   court   below   in
accordance with law as expeditiously as possible. This Court
is also conscious about the security of the petitioner, hence,
this Court considers it necessary to issue certain direction to
ensure the safety of the petitioner. Therefore, it is hereby
directed that the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lucknow
shall   provide   sufficient   security   to   the   petitioner   for   his
appearance before the court below on each date fixed from
9
his residence to the court and thereafter from the court to
his residence so long as danger to his security persists. The
District   Judge   shall   also   supervise   that   the   petitioner   is
provided sufficient security to pursue the matter before the
court   and   shall   also   ensure   that   no   hindrance,   by   any
person, is created in his right to move the court for getting
justice.
8.   In   view   of   the   above,   though   the   petition   is   hereby
dismissed but direction as indicated above are issued in the
interest of justice.
9. Ordered accordingly.”
We   must   clarify   that   we   have   reproduced   the   aforequoted
portion from the impugned order dated 19th March, 2013 only
to highlight the relevant portion. We may not be understood to
have affirmed any observation therein or on the merits of the
controversy.
6. According to the appellants, the observation so made by
the High Court will come in their way in pursuing the criminal
case. We are not impressed by the said grievance inasmuch as
the High Court had itself made it clear that all aspects will
have to be considered by the Trial Court at the appropriate
stage.   The   High   Court   was   cognizant   of   the   fact   that   the
allegations against the persons involved in the commission of
crime were very serious. The High Court has then observed
that as charge­sheet has been filed only against three persons,
10
all   contentions   available   to   the   appellants   could   be   raised
before the Trial Court for being decided in accordance with
law.
7. We reiterate that the none of the observation made by the
High Court will come in the way of the appellants in pursuing
the criminal cases and for taking the same to its logical end, in
accordance with law.   The Trial Court shall consider every
aspect of the matter that will be brought to its notice by the
appellants, on its own merits, objectively.
8. Besides this, no other aspect is required to be considered
by this Court even though in the prayer clause of the special
leave   petition,   the   appellants   have   asked   for   reliefs   much
beyond the lis that was before the High Court in Petition No.60
of 2013.  Notably, in the prayer clause of the memo of special
leave   petition,   no   relief   has   been   claimed   to   assail   the
impugned judgment and orders of the High Court as such.
What has been prayed is as follows: 
“It is therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble
Court may graciously be pleased to:
11
A. Direct an Agency other than the State to discover the extent
of   assault   of   petitioners   in   Court   room   in   Case   Crime
No.419/2010 of P.S. Wazirganj, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh.
B. Punish and penalize Respondent Nos.4 and 5 for polluting
the   judiciary   as   Additional   Government   Advocate   and
Central   Government   counsel   after   becoming   accused   of
unlawful assembly.
C. Judge the bails of Respondent Nos.5 and 6 in view of MB
6794 of 2011 and MB 5461 of 2011 as compared to the Bail
No.4320 of 2011 of Respondent No.4 from the High Court, in
Case Crime No.419/2010 of P.S. Wazirganj, Lucknow.
D. And pass such further order(s), as this Hon’ble Court may
deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the
case.”
We may overlook this aspect as the appellants are pursuing
this appeal in­person. 
9. Accordingly,   we   dispose   of   this   appeal   with   the
observations made hitherto. While parting with the case, we
may observe that if the trial of subject Crime No.419 of 2010
has still not commenced, all concerned must take necessary
steps in that behalf and ensure that the trial is concluded
expeditiously.
10. A copy of this order be brought to the notice of the Trial
Court   by   the   Public   Prosecutor   appearing   before   the   Trial
12
Court, within two weeks from the date of its receipt. It will also
be open to the appellants to produce a copy of this order
before the Trial Court, if so advised.
11. Ordered accordingly.
.………………………….CJI.
(Dipak Misra)
…………………………..….J.
        (A.M. Khanwilkar)
…………………………..….J.
        (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud)
New Delhi;
April  27, 2018.