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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

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Tuesday, October 31, 2017

CORPORATE LAWS - BANKING LAWS - APEX COURT - DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEED REGISTRATION COMPULSORY - in Veeramachineni Gangadhara Rao v. The Andhra Bank Ltd. And Ors.1 the High Court took the view that the waiver of the rights made by the mortgagor amounts to a contract and unless the said document is registered the mortgage will not take effect. Accordingly, the mortgage 1 (1971) 1 SCC 874 3 was held to be invalid and consequently the sale proceedings including the sale certificate were set aside. = validity of the mortgage on the strength of which the loan was sanctioned and obtained was not raised at any point of time in any of the earlier proceedings. It was so raised for the first time before the High Court. The High Court, in our considered view, therefore, ought not to have gone into the said question at such a belated stage. - The auction purchaser is an innocent third party who, it is stated, has obtained a loan to pay the sale price and is presently servicing the said loan. It is also stated that the auction purchaser is in possession of the property since March 2016 and has spent considerable amount of money in renovating/repairing the premises in question. 7. For all the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the conclusion of the High Court is not tenable in law. We accordingly allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court.


1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 17372 of 2017
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No.32885 of 2016]
STATE BANK OF INDIA & ANR. ...APPELLANTS
VERSUS
METTA CHANDRA SEKHAR RAO
& ORS. ...RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 17374 of 2017
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No.13173 of 2017]
JUDGMENT
RANJAN GOGOI, J.
CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C) NO.32885/2016
1. Leave granted.
2. We have heard the learned counsels for
the parties. We have perused the impugned
order of the High Court and have also
considered the facts of the case.
3. The challenge in this appeal is to an
order dated 24th August, 2016 passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for
the State of Telangana and the State of
2
Andhra Pradesh in Writ Petition (Civil)
No.12879 of 2016 by which the High Court
has set aside the sale proceedings held in
respect of the house property of the
respondent No.1 and the sale certificate
dated 15th March, 2016 issued in favour of
the auction purchaser.

4. The High Court took the view that
though the mortgage was created by deposit
of title deeds there was a letter of the
mortgagor to the appellant-State Bank of
India on 28th May, 2011 whereby the
mortgagor had waived his rights under
Section 61, 65A and 67A of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882.
Relying on a decision
of this Court in Veeramachineni Gangadhara
Rao v. The Andhra Bank Ltd. And Ors.1 the
High Court took the view that the waiver
of the rights made by the mortgagor
amounts to a contract and unless the said
document is registered the mortgage will
not take effect. Accordingly, the mortgage
1
(1971) 1 SCC 874
3
was held to be invalid and consequently
the sale proceedings including the sale
certificate were set aside.

5. Upon due consideration of the matter,
we arrive at the conclusion that the High
Court was not justified in passing the
impugned order and setting aside the sale
certificate.
6. The issue with regard to validity of
the mortgage on the strength of which the
loan was sanctioned and obtained was not
raised at any point of time in any of the
earlier proceedings. It was so raised for
the first time before the High Court. The
High Court, in our considered view,
therefore, ought not to have gone into the
said question at such a belated stage.

The fact that the mortgage was acted upon
by the parties to sanction and obtain the
loan is another fact that the High Court
had overlooked. The mortgage was also in
respect of certain other properties, the
sale of which has attained finality. This
4
is a vital aspect of the case that the
High Court ought to have taken into
account while passing the impugned order.
Above all, an independent Special Leave
Petition (Special Leave Petition (Civil)
No.13173 of 2017) has also been filed by
the auction purchaser who is also
aggrieved by the order of the High Court.
The auction purchaser is an innocent third
party who, it is stated, has obtained a
loan to pay the sale price and is
presently servicing the said loan. It is
also stated that the auction purchaser is
in possession of the property since March
2016 and has spent considerable amount of
money in renovating/repairing the premises
in question.
7. For all the aforesaid reasons, we are
of the view that the conclusion of the
High Court is not tenable in law. We
accordingly allow this appeal and set
aside the order of the High Court.

5
CIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(C) NO.13173 OF 2017
8. Leave granted.
9. This appeal is disposed of in terms of
the order of this Court passed today in
Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No.32885 of 2016.
....................,J.
(RANJAN GOGOI)
....................,J.
(NAVIN SINIHA)
NEW DELHI
OCTOBER 30, 2017

INCOME TAX LAWS - CORPORATE LAWS - APEX COURT - when income is computed under the head ‘profits and gains of business or profession’, rate of tax payable on the said income is much higher. However, the Legislature provided a simple formula, namely, treating the amounts paid or payable (whether in or out of India) and amount received or deemed to be received in India as mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 44BB as the deemed profits and gains. Thereafter, on such deemed profits and gains 45 (treating the same as income), a concessional flat rate of 10% is charged to tax. The computation of income of the assessee was done under Section 44BB of the Act. However, the amount which was sought to be taxed was reimbursement of cost of tools lost in hole by ONGC. It is, thus, clear that this was not the amount which was covered by sub-section (2) of Section 44BB of the Act as ONGC had lost certain tools belonging to the assessee, and had compensated for the said loss by paying the amount in question. On these facts, conclusion of the High Court is correct. Even otherwise, the tax effect is Rs.15,12,344/-.


1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4906 OF 2010
SEDCO FOREX INTERNATIONAL INC.
THROUGH IT’S CONSTITUTED
ATTORNEY MR. NAVIN SARDA .....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,
MEERUT & ANR. .....RESPONDENT(S)
W I T H
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2166 OF 2012
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 17388 OF 2017
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 2955 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4908 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2631 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4910 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4911 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4907 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4913 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4543 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5005 OF 2014
2
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 17389 OF 2017
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 11560 OF 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4920 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4919 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4921 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4916 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4918 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4917 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5015 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4925 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4924 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4922 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5437 OF 2016
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5154 OF 2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5152 OF 2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5153 OF 2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5089 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5090 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4923 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8627 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5155 OF 2011
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6573 OF 2014
3
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4909 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5935 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5934 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6651 OF 2014
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 17390 OF 2017
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 20000 OF 2015)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 17391 OF 2017
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 22343 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 17392 OF 2017
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 22833 OF 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4914 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4915 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8595 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9188 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8665 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10294 OF 2016
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10295 OF 2016
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10296 OF 2016
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4926 OF 2010
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 267 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 268 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 17393 OF 2017
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 39683 OF 2013)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3695 OF 2012
4
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 435 OF 2017
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10382 OF 2017
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10385 OF 2017
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10383 OF 2017
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10384 OF 2017
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10386 OF 2017
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 17394 OF 2017
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 21939 OF 2017)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12365 OF 2017
A N D
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12366 OF 2017
J U D G M E N T
A.K. SIKRI, J.
Leave granted in SLP(C) No. 2955 of 2012, SLP(C) No. 11560 of
2014, SLP(C) No. 20000 of 2015, SLP(C) No. 22343 of 2012, SLP(C)
No. 22833 of 2012, SLP(C) No. 39683 of 2013 and SLP(C) No. 21939 of
2017.
2) In all these appeals filed by different appellants (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘assessees’) except Civil Appeal No. 3695 of 2012 which is filed
5
by Director of Income Tax (Revenue), the question of law which arises
for consideration is identical and pertains to the scope and interpretation
of Section 44BB of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘Act’).
3) For computation of profits and gains of a business, to make it exigible to
tax under the Act, provisions contained in Chapter IV, from Sections 28
to 41, 43 and 43A of the Act apply. However, in those cases where the
assessee is a non-resident and specifically engaged in the business of
exploration etc. of mineral oil, special mechanism is provided in Section
44BB of the Act for computation of profits and gains, on which the tax is
charged. It, however, gives choice to such non-resident assessees to
opt for computation formula provided under Section 44BB or to be
covered by normal computation mechanism contained in Sections 28 to
41, 43 and 43A of the Act. Section 44BB of the Act stipulates that a sum
equal to 10% of the ‘aggregate of the amounts specified in sub-section
(2)’ shall be deemed to be the profits and gains of such business
chargeable to tax under the head ‘profits and gains of business or
profession’. Thus, concessional rate of 10% is charged as tax, which is
admittedly much less than the normal tax rate payable on profits and
gains of business or profession. However, this tax @10% is on the
aggregate of the amounts specified in sub-section (2) which are
“deemed” profits and gains of such business. Thus, insofar as
6
calculation of profits and gains of the business under Section 44BB of
the Act is concerned, on which 10% tax is payable, it is worked out on
fictional basis by adopting the formula laid down in sub-section (2).
Sub-section (2) mentions those amounts aggregate whereof is to be
treated as deemed profits and gains of such a business.
4) At this juncture, we reproduce the provisions of Section 44BB of the Act,
as reading of this provision is necessary before spelling out the nature of
dispute which had arisen in these appeals. This section reads as under:
“44BB. Special provision for computing profits and gains
in connection with the business of exploration, etc., of
mineral oils.
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
sections 28 to 41 and sections 43 and 43A, in the case of an
assessee, being a non-resident, engaged in the business of
providing services or facilities in connection with, or supplying
plant and machinery on hire used, or to be used, in the
prospecting for, or extraction or production of, mineral oils, a
sum equal to ten per cent of the aggregate of the amounts
specified in sub-section (2) shall be deemed to be the profits
and gains of such business chargeable to tax under the head
"Profits and gains of business or profession" :
Provided that this sub-section shall not apply in a case
where the provisions of section 42 or section 44D or section
44DA or section 115A or section 293A apply for the purposes
of computing profits or gains or any other income referred to in
those sections.
(2) The amounts referred to in sub-section (1) shall be the
following, namely :—
(a) the amount paid or payable (whether in or out of India) to
the assessee or to any person on his behalf on account of
the provision of services and facilities in connection with, or
supply of plant and machinery on hire used, or to be used, in
the prospecting for, or extraction or production of, mineral
7
oils in India; and
(b) the amount received or deemed to be received in India by or
on behalf of the assessee on account of the provision of
services and facilities in connection with, or supply of plant
and machinery on hire used, or to be used, in the
prospecting for, or extraction or production of, mineral oils
outside India.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), an
assessee may claim lower profits and gains than the profits
and gains specified in that sub-section, if he keeps and
maintains such books of account and other documents as
required under sub-section (2) of section 44AA and gets his
accounts audited and furnishes a report of such audit as
required under section 44AB, and thereupon the Assessing
Officer shall proceed to make an assessment of the total
income or loss of the assessee under sub-section (3) of
section 143 and determine the sum payable by, or refundable
to, the assessee.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
(i) "plant" includes ships, aircraft, vehicles, drilling units,
scientific apparatus and equipment, used for the
purposes of the said business;
(ii) "mineral oil" includes petroleum and natural gas.”
5) A bare reading of the aforesaid provision brings out the following salient
features thereof:
(a) Sub-section (1) is a non-obstante clause, starting with the
expression ‘notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
Sections 28 to 41 and Sections 43 and 43A’. Thus, once we apply
this special provision for computation of profits and gains,
provisions for computation of such profits as contained in Sections
28 to 41 and Sections 43 and 43A of the Act stand excluded.
8
(b) In order to attract the provisions of Section 44BB of the Act, two
conditions are to be specified, namely, (i) assessee has to be a
non-resident; and (ii) assessee should be engaged in the business
of exploration etc. in mineral oils of the nature specifically spelled
out in the provision.
(c) Choice is given to such an assessee under sub-section (3) of the
Act to either claim lower profits and gains than the profits and gains
specified in sub-section (2) and covered by normal provisions of
computing profits and gains of business or profession, subject to
fulfilling the conditions of audit etc. as mentioned therein or to be
governed by Section 44BB of the Act.
(d) In case the twin conditions mentioned above are satisfied, the
assessee can take the benefit of paying the tax as per the
provisions of Section 44BB on “deemed profits and gains” of its
business and such profits and gains are to be calculated as per the
formula provided in sub-section (2) thereof. Pertinently, it is a
‘deemed’ provision for calculating profits and gains of business or
profession, which means that such profits and gains are to be
arrived at fictionally, as per provisions contained in sub-section (2).
(e) Sub-section (2) mentions the amounts which are to be added up,
9
and the aggregate of those amounts is deemed to be profits and
gains on which 10% tax is charged as component of income tax.
6) Coming to the lis that is involved in these appeals, it may be seen that
sub-section (2) mentions two kinds of amounts which are to be treated
as profits and gains of the business. In clause (a) of sub-section (2), the
amount referred to are those which are paid or payable to the assessee
on account of the provision of services and facilities in connection with,
or supply of plant and machinery on hire used or to be used in the
prospecting for, or extraction or production of, mineral oils in India. It is
immaterial whether the said amount is paid or payable in India or out of
India. Second kind of amounts mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section
(2) are those sums which are received or deemed to be received by or
on behalf of the assessee on account of provision of services and
facilities in connection with, or supply of plant and machinery on hire
used or to be used in the prospecting for, extraction or production of
mineral oils outside India. Here, however, only those sums which are
paid or payable in India are to be included.
7) The assessees herein had entered into contracts primarily with Oil and
Natural Gas Commission (ONGC), a public sector company, for hire of
their rig for carrying out oil exploration activities in India. For this
purpose, they were paid mobilisation fee as well, for and on account of
10
mobilisation/movement of rig from foreign soil/country to the off-shore
side at Mumbai (India). The issue that has fallen for consideration is as
to whether aforesaid amount received is to be included for computation
of deemed profits and gains of the business, chargeable to tax under
Section 44BB of the Act. Right from the Assessing Officer (AO) till the
High Court, all the fora have answered this question in affirmative
holding that this amount is to be included for computing profits and gains
of the businesses of the assessees.
8) Civil Appeal Nos. 4906 of 2010, 4907 of 2010, 4915 of 2010 filed by
Sedco Forex International Inc., M/s Transocean Offshore Inc., M/s
Sedco Forex International Drilling Inc. respectively were taken up as
lead matters and, therefore, for the sake of brevity, we recapitulate the
factual matrix from the said appeals, as it would suffice for answering
the question involved.
9) During the years under consideration, the assessees are engaged in
executing the contracts all over the world including India in connection
with exploration and production of mineral oil. The assessees are
companies incorporated outside India and, therefore, non-resident within
the meaning of Section 6 of the Act. The assessees entered into
agreements with ONGC, Enron Oil and Gas India Ltd. The aforesaid
agreements provided for the scope of work along with separate
11
consideration for the work undertaken. Since the dispute is about
mobilisation charges, clauses in respect thereof are as under:
“Operating Rate – Receipts for undertaking drilling operations
computed by per day rates provided in the contract. The
operating rates shall be payable from the time the drilling unit
is jacked-up and ready at the location to spud the first well.
Mobilisation – charges for the transport of the drilling unit from
a location outside India to a location in India as may be
designated by ONGC.”
In addition to the above, assessees also received amounts from
the operator towards reimbursement of expenses like catering,
boarding/lodging, fuel, customs duty, the supply of material etc., with
which we are not concerned.
10) The assessees filed their return of income declaring income from
charter higher of the rig. The same was offered to tax under Section
44BB of the Act. In the case of Sedco Forex International Inc., the
assessee did not include the amount received as mobilisation charges to
the gross revenue for the purpose of computation under Section 44BB of
the Act. In the case of Transocean Offshore Inc., the assessee included
1% of the mobilisation fees. The mobilisation fees were offered to tax on
a 1% deemed profit basis on the ratio of the CBDT Instruction No. 1767
dated July 1, 1987.
11) The AO included the amounts received for
12
mobilisation/demobilisation to the gross revenue to arrive at the “profits
and gains” for the purpose of computing TAX under Section 44BB of the
Act. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) {hereinafter referred to
as the ‘CIT(A)’} confirmed the action of the AO. The Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ITAT’) in the case of
Sedco Forex International Inc. dismissed the appeal of the assessee
and the action of the AO was upheld insofar as the mobilisation charges
were concerned. In the case of Transocean Offshore Inc., the ITAT
upheld the view taken by the assessee and directed the AO to assess
the profits on mobilisation charges at 1% of the amount received. This
was done following the Circular of CBDT Instruction No. 1767 dated July
1, 1987 and decision of the third Member in the case of Saipem S.P.A.
v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax1
. The High Court has held
that the mobilisation charges reimbursed inter alia even for the services
rendered outside India were taxable under Section 44BB of the Act as
the same is not governed by the charging provisions of Sections 5 and 9
of the Act. Even on the issue of reimbursement in M/s. Sedco Forex
International Drilling Inc. (Civil Appeal No. 4915 of 2010), the High Court
followed its earlier judgments dated September 20, 2007 and May 22,
2009 to hold that reimbursement of expenses incurred by the assessee
was to be included in the gross receipts, and taxable under Section
44BB of the Act.
1 88 ITD 213 (Del)
13
12) From the aforesaid brief narration of facts, it may be discerned that
following three types of payments were given by the ONGC to the
assessees:
(i) Mobilisation/demobilisation advance.
(ii) Custom duty reimbursement.
(iii) Operational charges reimbursement.
13) The High Court has held that these payments be also included as
amounts received for computation of aggregate of amounts specified in
sub-section (2) as deemed to be the profits and gains of the businesses
of the assessees, chargeable to tax under the said provision.
14) Mr. Porus F. Kaka, learned senior advocate appearing in some of
these appeals submitted that the aforesaid amounts were, in fact,
towards reimbursement of expenses actually incurred by the assessees.
According to him, the work undertaken was, in fact, the obligation of the
ONGC and it was for ONGC to provide such facilities/material under the
contract. Still the assessees performed the said task at the request of
the ONGC and ONGC simply reimbursed these expenses which did not
have any profit element. It was emphasised by Mr. Kaka that insofar as
the assessee—Sedco Forex International Inc. is concerned, the
expenditure incurred on mobilisation was much higher than the actual
payment received. Thus, this assessee had, in fact, suffered loss on this
14
transaction. He also pointed out that the agreement separately provided
for consideration/remuneration for mobilisation and demobilisation of
drilling unit and reimbursement of cost incurred on behalf of the operator
of ONGC. It was submitted that as this was the nature of the amount
received, namely, reimbursement of expenses without there being any
profit element, it could not be treated as ‘amount’ within the meaning of
sub-section (2) of Section 44BB of the Act.
15) Explaining the taxation of income scheme enumerated under
Sections 4, 5 and 9 of the Act, Mr. Kaka submitted that globally the tax
systems can be classified broadly into two models; Worldwide and
Territorial system. India follows a territorial system of taxation specially
qua business income of non-residents, which is taxed only as it is
attributable to operations within the Indian territory. This, according to
him, was clear from the conjoint reading of Sections 4, 5 and 9 of the
Act. Section 4 is the charging section for levying a tax on income of any
person under the Act which provides that income tax shall be levied at
the rates provided by the Finance Act on the ‘total income’ of the
previous year. Scope of total income is provided under Section 5 of the
Act which deals with total income of residents as well as non-residents.
The learned senior counsel pointed out that insofar as non-residents are
concerned, total income as per Section 5(2) of the Act is the income
which is received or deemed to be received in India in such year or on
15
behalf of such person; or income which accrues or arises or is deemed
to accrue or arise in India during such year. He, thus, argued that in
respect of non-residents only that income which is received or deemed
to be received in India or which accrues or arises or deemed to accrue
or arise in India is taxable. In order to locate the income which is
deemed to accrue or arise in India, Section 9 is the concerned provision.
Section 9 acknowledges principle of attribution of income under the Act.
Section 9 lays down two broad categories of taxable of income i.e. (a)
business income; and (b) income from interest or royalty or fees for
technical services. Insofar as business income is concerned, it
becomes taxable and only that income becomes chargeable to tax in
India which is attributable to operations carried out in India. Insofar as
second category, namely, income in the nature of interest, royalty or fees
for technical services is concerned, such income would be deemed to
accrue or arise in India, irrespective of situs of the services. The learned
senior counsel argued that insofar as payment for mobilisation which
was received by the assessee is concerned, it is neither income receipt
nor deemed to be received in India. It is in respect of services outside
India and, therefore, does not accrue or arise or deemed to accrue or
arise under Section 5 read with Section 9 of the Act.
16) Proceeding further on the aforesaid line of argument, he submitted
that, in the first instance, it has to be determined that income accrues or
16
arises or is deemed to accrue or arise in India. Only when that is
established, the next step is to compute the total income based on other
provisions of the Act and here Chapter IV of the Act which deals with
computation of income from ‘Profits and Gains of Business or
Profession’ gets triggered. It was submitted that, no doubt, Sections
44B, 44BB, 44BBB etc. provide for special mechanism for computing the
income in the case of non-residents on presumptive basis. However,
even when the income is to be computed under any of these provisions,
first pre-requisite is to find out as to whether a particular income has
accrued or arisen or deemed to accrue or arise in India. If that threshold
is not met, the question of treating such payments as ‘income’, merely
because the income is to be computed under special provision, is of no
consequence. Mr. Kaka also referred to Circular No. 495 dated
September 22, 1987 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes
(CBDT) which, according to him, explains the Legislature intent behind
inserting Section 44BB in the Act. According to the circular, the
computation of taxable income of a non-resident assessee engaged in
the business of exploration etc. of mineral oils in accordance with the
general mode of computation under Sections 28 to 43A involved a
number of complications. As a measure of simplification, Section 44BB
was inserted by the Finance Act, 1987 with retrospective effect from
April 1, 1983 for determination of income of such tax payers on a
17
presumptive basis, at 10% of the amounts mentioned in sub-section (2)
thereof. Relevant portion of that circular is as under:
“21.1 A number of complications are involved in the
computation of taxable income of a taxpayer engaged in the
business of providing services and facilities in connection with
or supply of plant and machinery on hire, used or to be used in
the exploration for and exploitation of mineral oils. With a view
to simplifying the provisions, the Amending Act has inserted a
new Section 44BB which provides for determining of the
income of such taxpayers at 10 percent of the aggregate of
certain amounts which have been specified. This amount will
include the amounts received or due to be received in India on
account of such services or facilities or supply of plant and
machinery.”
17) After arguing that the provisions have to be read in the aforesaid
manner, proposition advanced by the learned senior counsel is that
Section 44BB of the Act is only a computation provision and does not
override Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. For this purpose, he referred to the
judgment of this Court in Union of India & Anr. v. A. Sanyasi Rao &
Ors.2
wherein Section 44AC of the Act has been interpreted in a similar
manner holding that Section 44AC read with Section 206C is the only
machinery provision and not charging Section.
18) Towing the aforesaid line of argument, another submission of
Mr. Kaka was that since Section 44BB is a computation provision under
the head ‘income’, it cannot override the charging section. For this
purpose, he relied upon the judgment of Bombay High Court in
2 (1996) 3 SCC 465
18
Commissioner of Income Tax v. F.Y. Khambaty3
. Mr. Kaka also relief
upon the following judgments:
(a) Anglo-French Textile Company, Ltd., by Agents M/s Best &
Company, Ltd., Madras v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras4
(b) Ishikawajma-Harima Heavy Industries Ltd. v. Director of
Income Tax, Mumbai5
(c) Carborandum & Co. v. CIT, Madras6
(d) Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Best and
Company (Private) Ltd., Madras7
19) He also cited judgments on the proposition that CBDT Circulars
are binding on tax authorities; reimbursement of actual expenses does
not represent income and, therefore, cannot be taxed; and normal
concept of income cannot be taken away by presumption provisions.
20) In nutshell, as can be seen from the aforesaid arguments, the
proposition advanced by learned senior counsel are as follows:
(a) Principle of apportionment between India and outside India is a
basic principle of income tax law. Where payments are made to a
non-resident outside India, for services rendered outside India,
3 (1986) 159 ITR 203
4 (1954) 25 ITR 27 (SC)
5 (2007) 288 ITR 408 (SC) = (2007) 3 SCC 481)
6 (1977) 108 ITR 335 (SC)
7 (1966) 60 ITR 11 (SC)
19
namely mobilization charges for drilling rigs from a foreign location to
a location in India, the same is not chargeable to tax in India under
Sections 5 and 9 of the Act and the same cannot be made
chargeable to tax under Section 44BB of the Act.
(b) A computation provision like Section 44BB cannot override the
charging provisions of Sections 4 and 5. It is so stated in the
instruction No. 1767 dated July 1, 1987 issued by the CBDT. The
understanding of the CBDT is binding on the Revenue.
(c) The charges were reimbursed for services rendered outside India.
Services rendered outside India cannot be chargeable to tax under
the Act. There should be sufficient territorial nexus between the
rendering of services and the territorial limits of the Act to make the
income taxable.
(d) Where the actual expenditure incurred by the assessee for the
mobilization of the rigs was higher than the amount reimbursed, there
cannot be any income chargeable to tax under the Act.
(e) Reimbursement of actual expenditure, which was the obligation of
the operator/company cannot be included in receipts under Section
44BB of the Act as the income tax is levied on income. Further, the
fact of such reimbursements being devoid of any profit element has
not been disputed by the Revenue.
21) Mr. Vohra, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant
20
Pride Foramer S.A. (Civil Appeal No. 4543 of 2013) stated that the
appellant in the said case is a non-resident company incorporated in the
Republic of France. It also entered into contract with ONGC for hire of
its rig for carrying out oil exploration activities by ONGC in India. The rig
was located in Singapore and accordingly, under the contract,
mobilization fees of US$1 million (equivalent to Rs.4,31,10,000/-) was
payable by ONGC to the appellant for and on account of mobilization/
movement of rig from Singapore to the offshore site at Mumbai. In case
of delay, liquidated damages @0.5% of operating day rate subject to a
maximum of 5% of the annual operating charges was payable by the
appellant to ONGC. In Assessment Year 2000-01, during the year under
consideration, the appellant received outside India, net mobilization
charges of US$ 6,42,300 (equivalent to Rs.2,76,89,533/-) after
deduction of liquidated damages for delay, for mobilization from
Singapore to the offshore site (in India).
22) On the aforesaid facts, he submitted that net mobilization charges
received outside India could not be taxed in India, more so, when these
were in the nature of reimbursement of expenses on account of
mobilization/movement of rig from Singapore to the offshore site at
Mumbai. His primary contention was that before this payment could be
included while making computation under Section 44BB of the Act, it had
to be ‘income’ which is taxable in India in the first instance. His
21
submissions on the scheme of Sections 4, 5 and 9 of the Act were the
same as that of Mr. Kaka, already noted above. Additionally, he
submitted that insofar as Section 44BB of the Act is concerned, it only
provides a simplified computation mechanism for computing profits and
gains in case of non-resident assessee engaged in activities relating to
business of exploration of mineral oil etc. Thereby, overriding the normal
computation mechanism contained in Sections 28 to 41, 43 and 43A of
the Act. His emphasis was that this provision does not override charging
provisions as contained in Section 4 read with Sections 5 and 9 of the
Act, thereby bringing to tax an amount which is not at all taxable under
the provisions of the Act. In addition to Circular No. 495 dated
September 22, 1987 (already noted above), he also relied upon
Instruction No. 1767 dated July 1, 1987 issued by CBDT explaining the
computation of business income in case of a contractor engaged in
business of exploration of oil where part of the activities are carried out
in India and part of the activities are carried on outside India. It has
been stated as under:
“3. On these facts, it is clear that income accruing or arising to
the non-resident contractor should be apportioned between the
various activities carried on by it, some of which would be
within India and some outside. Where the ownership in the
platform, terminal, treatment plant or other facilities passed
outside India, the non-resident will be taxable only in respect of
the activities performed in India by way of installation, hook-up
and commissioning etc., of the facilities acquired by the Indian
enterprises engaged in oil exploration or production…”
22
23) In support of the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Vohra relied upon the
following judgments:
(i) Commissioner of Income Tax and Anr. v. Hyundai Heavy
Industries Co. Ltd.8
(ii) State Bank of Travancore v. Commissioner of Income Tax,
Kerala9
24) To summarise, proposition advanced by Mr. Vohra are as under:
(i) Mobilization fee was in respect of activities carried outside India
prior to coming into existence of the PE in India and, therefore, this
mobilization fee was not taxable at all, in view of Article 7 of
Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) between India and
France, the relevant portion whereof is as under:
“1. The profits of an enterprise of one of the Contracting
States shall be taxable only in that Contracting State unless
the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting
State through a permanent establishment situated therein. If
the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the profits of
the enterprise may be taxed in the other Contracting State
but only so much of them as is attributable to that permanent
establishment….”
(ii) In case the payment is held liable to tax in India, then the same
has to be computed in terms of Sections 4, 5 and 9 read with
Section 44BB of the Act. In that situation, only the mobilization fee
pertaining to voyage within the territorial waters of India can be
subjected to tax.
8 (2007) 7 SCC 422
9 (1986) 158 ITR 102 (SC)
23
(iii) Without prejudice to the aforesaid, it is alternatively submitted that
since the appellant only received mobilization fee amounting to
Rs.2,76,89,533/- (equivalent to US$ 6,42,300), after deduction of
liquidated damages, the AO erred in bringing to tax the gross
amount of US$1 million under Section 44BB of the Act.
25) Mr. Lakshmikumaran and Mr. Jay Savla, learned advocates
appearing for some other assessees treaded the same path by adopting
same line of arguments.
26) M/s. Chidananda and Arijit Prasad, learned advocates appearing
for the Revenue put up an emphatic defence to the judgment of the High
Court which has accepted the position taken by the Revenue. It was
argued that assessee Sedco, which is a non-resident company, had
entered into a composite/indivisible contract with ONGC to provide a
drilling unit to carry out drilling operations. A finding of fact to this effect
i.e. a composite/indivisible contract was entered into, was arrived at by
the ITAT and, therefore, matter had to be proceeded on that basis.
Submission was that, as per this contract, it was the obligation of the
assessee to mobilise its resources for the purpose of drilling operations.
According to them, since the payments were made by ONGC to the
assessee in terms of indivisible contract for the purposes of drilling
operations, it was not open to the assessee to claim that mobilisation
24
fee/charges and it should not be included in the aggregate receipts for
the purposes of Section 44BB of the Act and their plea that they are not
actual charges but expenses in the nature of reimbursement by ONGC
was not permissible. It was submitted that though, mobilisation
fee/charges have been separately indicated in the said contract, the
payments have been made by ONGC for supply of drilling unit including
the rigs, for operating these rigs and for providing experts and other
personnel for operating the rigs etc. Therefore, it is a misnomer to term
payment of mobilisation fee/charge as ‘reimbursement’. They are
payments made pursuant to an indivisible contract. Assuming, for the
purposes of argument that it amounts to reimbursement, the same will
not make any difference for the reason that parties may agree to divide
the total amount as a direct payment by way of fees and some part of
the consideration by way of expenses, but this arrangement between the
parties would not alter the character of receipts. A receipt will remain as
such and will not partake the character of an expenditure. According to
the learned counsel, the mobilisation fee/charges paid by ONGC to
assessee amounts to income chargeable to tax.
27) For this purpose, reliance was placed on the definition of “income”
as contained in Section 2(24) of the Act which defines the said
expression in an inclusive manner. Attention was also drawn to Section
2(45) of the Act which defines “total income” to mean total income
25
referred to in Section 5, computed in the manner laid down in the Act. It
was, thus, argued that income had to be computed as per the provisions
of the Act. Even Section 4 of the Act, which is a charging section, clearly
points out that income tax is to be paid ‘in respect of the total income of
the previous year’. Likewise, Section 5 of the Act which deals with
‘scope of total income’ includes all income from whatever the source
derived. It was submitted that, in this hue, Section 9 which deals with
income deemed to accrue or arise in India, had to be looked into.
According to the learned counsel, the assessee had business
connection in India through the equipment owned by it, operating in
India and its employees, experts etc. working in India. Its assets are
employed/used in India and the source of income is in India. Therefore,
the ingredients of Section 9(1)(i) are fulfilled. Thus, assessee has
territorial nexus in India. Further, in a given case, if the assessee fulfils
these requirements and a DTAA applies, this will also constitute a
Permanent Establishment (PE) through which an assessee operates its
business in India. Further, the rigs/equipment are mobilised for its
business operations in India and that source of income is in India,
therefore, the question of apportionment. Thus, the mobilisation
fee/charges paid by ONGC to assessee is an income chargeable to tax
from a conjoint reading of Sections 4, 5 and 9. Therefore, the
submission of the assessee that Section 44BB seeks to tax an event
26
which the charging sections does not seek to tax is incorrect.
28) Adverting to the provisions of Section 44BB of the Act which finds
place in Chapter IV dealing with ‘computation of income’ in respect of
business or profession, it was submitted that the scope and effect of
Section 44BB has been explained in Departmental Circular No. 495
dated September 22, 1987. It has been mentioned in the said circular
that a number of complications were involved in the computation of
taxable income of a taxpayer engaged in the business of providing
services and facilities in connection with or supply of plant and
machinery on hire, used or to be used in the exploration for and
exploitation of mineral oils. Section 44BB was introduced with a view to
simplifying the relevant provisions which provide for determining the
income of such taxpayers at 10 per cent of the aggregate of certain
amounts, which have been specified in the said section. It was
submitted that Section 44BB provides for “presumptive income
determination”. It is a complete code in itself for determining the taxable
income in the case of an assessee, being a non-resident, engaged in
the business of providing services or facilities in connection with, or
supplying plant and machinery on hire used, or to be used, in the
prospecting for, or extraction or production of, mineral oils. It replaces
Sections 28 to 41 and Sections 43 and 43A (which otherwise mandates
assessee to maintain accounts, claim and prove expenses). Only the
27
receipts are taken into account. Even if the actual profits and gains of
the assessee are more than 10%, only 10% is presumed to be its
income. Thus, 10% is the income and the rest 90% is allowed as
expenditure/allowable claims of the assessee. Assuming that Section
44BB was not on the statute book, assessee would have shown
mobilisation fee as receipt and claimed the actual expenditure and
arrived at the net taxable income. Now, Section 44BB presumes that
only 10% of the aggregate receipts is income and the remaining 90% is
expenditure. It was also argued that in the case of presumptive income
determination like Section 44BB, items of expenditure cannot be claimed
separately, otherwise it would lead to double deduction as Section 44BB
presumes that only 10% of the aggregate receipts is income and the
remaining 90% is expenditure. It was pleaded that when all the
authorities including the final fact finding authority as well as the High
Court have recorded their concurrent findings on consideration of
relevant material, this Court may not disturb those findings. Reliance
was placed on Avasarala Technologies Limited v. Joint
Commissioner of Income Tax, Special Range 1, Bangalore10 and
Commissioner of Income Tax Bihar and Orissa, Patna v. Ashoka
Marketing Co.11
29) Before we appreciate the rival submissions made by counsel for
10 (2015) 14 SCC 732
11 (1972) 4 SCC 426
28
the parties on both sides, it would be apposite to go into the raison
d’etre behind the orders of the ITAT as well as the High Court.
30) The ITAT in its order has taken note of the relevant clauses of the
agreements entered into between ONGC and assessee (Sedco)
pertaining to mobilisation and mobilisation fee. Clause 3.2 of the
Agreement dated September 3, 1985 relating to providing the Shallow
Dash Water Jack Up Rig covering this aspect reads as under:
“Mobilisation
Operator shall pay to Contractor a mobilisation fee of eight
hundred thousand United States Dollars (US $ 800,000)
(“Mobilisation Fee”) for the mobilisation of the Drilling Unit from
its present location in Setubal, Portugal to the first well location
designated by Operator, Offshore Bombay, India. Operator will
notify Contractor no later than fifteen (15) days from the
execution of this Agreement if it desires to mobilize the Drilling
Unit to another location offshore India and no additional costs
shall be charged to Operator for mobilisation to such other
location. In the event that Operator desires to mobilize the
Drilling Unit to another location offshore India and it fails to
notify Contractor by such date, any additional costs incurred by
Contractor for such mobilisation in excess of the Mobilisation
Fee shall be borne by the Operator. Contractor shall invoice
Operator for payment of the Mobilization Fee after the Drilling
Unit is jacked-up on the first well location and ready to spud
the well. Operator shall make payment to Contractor no later
than thirty (30) days after receipt of the invoice.”
31) Clause 4.2 of the Agreement dated July 12, 1986 relating to
Mobilisation of the Drilling Unit (including Rig 21) is also reproduced
hereunder:
“Mobilisation and Mobilisation Fee
29
Contractor shall notify Operator when it is prepared to
commence mobilisation of the Drilling Unit from Muscat, Oman.
Within thirty days of receipt of Contractor’s notice of readiness,
Operator shall instruct Contractor to commence mobilisation,
and Contractor shall forthwith ship the Drilling Unit to the port
of entry (Kandla or Bombay).
Contractor shall be compensated for the mobilisation of the
Drilling Unit from its place of origin by a mobilisation fee
payable within thirty days following the commencement date.”
32) It also noted that apart from the aforesaid mobilisation fee
stipulated in the aforesaid two contracts, the ONGC had undertaken to
pay compensation based on operating rate of US $ 24,550 per 24 hours
a day for all operating time and US $ 24,060 as non operating rate per
day relating to Sedco 252 Rig. Similarly operating rate – R1 and stand
by rate – R2 was also separately stipulated in the other contract dated
July 12, 1986 relating to Rig-21 etc.
33) Thereafter, the ITAT pointed out that even as per the assessee,
there was no dispute about the applicability of Section 44BB of the Act in
relation to payments made by the ONGC under the aforesaid
agreements by way of operating charges and other payments made by
ONGC to the assessee except in relation to mobilisation fee and
reimbursement of certain other expenses as according to the assessee,
these payments were not in the nature of fee (income) but
reimbursement of expenses only. This argument is dealt with by the
ITAT, taking note of the provisions of Section 44BB of the Act. The ITAT
30
concluded that it was a special provision for computing profits and gains
in connection with the business of exploration of mineral oils, effect
whereof was explained in Departmental Circular No. 495 dated
September 22, 1987. It further noted that agreements between ONGC
and the assessee were indivisible in nature as per which entire
payments had been agreed to be made by ONGC for supply of drilling
unit including the rigs, for operating those rigs, and for providing experts
and other personnel for operating those rigs. Therefore, all these
payments were deemed to be the profits and gains of business for the
purposes of Section 44BB of the Act and 10% thereof was to be treated
as income chargeable to tax. Section 44BB of the Act does not provide
that separate consideration mentioned in the Agreement for
transportation of the drilling units/rigs from their present location to the
designated location in India would be excluded from the correct amount
of gross receipts on which 10% profit rate is required to be applied. The
ITAT held that the mobilisation fee paid by ONGC to the assessee had
no nexus with the actual amount incurred by the assessee for
transportation of drilling units/rigs and, therefore, it could not be said that
this payment was made for reimbursement of actual expenditure.
34) This is the summary of the rationale given by the ITAT in support of
its conclusion, as can be seen from the following detailed discussion:
“2.14 The aforesaid Sec. 44BB making a special provision for
31
computing profits and gains in connection with the business of
exploration of mineral oils has been inserted by the Finance
Act, 1987 with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1983. The
scope and effect of new Sec. 44BB was explained in
Departmental Circular No. 495 dated 22nd September, 1987. It
has been mentioned in the said Circular that a number of
complications were involved in the computation of taxable
income of a taxpayer engaged in the business of providing
services and facilities in connection with or supply of Plant &
Machinery on hire, used or to be used in the exploration for
and exploitation of mineral oils. Section 44BB was introduced
with a view to simplifying the relevant provisions which provide
for determining the income of such tax-payers at 10% of the
aggregate of certain amounts, which have been specified in
the said Section. The provisions of Section 44BB were
amended by the Finance Act, 1988 with retrospective effect
w.e.f. 1st April, 1983 which clarifies that applicability of Section
44BB will be restricted to the cases of only non-resident
tax-payers. It is clear from the language used in Section
44BB(2)(a) that the amount referred to in Section 44BB(1) on
which profits have to be calculated @10% will be the
aggregate of amounts paid or payable to the taxpayer or to any
person on his behalf whether in or out of India on account of
the provisions of such services or facilities.
2.15 A perusal of the relevant Agreements executed between
the appellant company and ONGC clearly reveals that both the
Agreements are indivisible contracts. It is true that mobilisation
fee and operating charges have been separately indicated in
the said Agreements but the entire payments have been
agreed to be made by ONGC for supply of the Drilling Unit
including the Rigs, for operating these Rigs, and for providing
experts and other personnel for operating those rigs etc.
Section 44BB specifically provides that the aggregate of the
amounts referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 44BB will be
adopted as the basis for calculating profits @10%, which shall
be deemed to be the profits and gains of such business
chargeable to tax under the head “Profits & Gains of Business
or Profession”. It does not provide that separate consideration
mentioned in the Agreement for transportation of the Drilling
Unit/Rig from their present location to the designated location
in India will be excluded from the aggregate amount of gross
receipts on which 10% profit rate is required to be applied.
ONGC has made the entire payment including the mobilisation
fee, operating charges, daily hire on non operating days etc.
for availing the services and facilities and the supply of Plant &
Machinery on hire agreed to be provided by the appellant
company to ONGC. The mobilisation fee paid by ONGC to the
32
appellant company has no nexus with the actual amount
incurred by the appellant company for transportation of the
Drilling Unit/Rigs to the specified drilling location in India. Even
if the actual expenditure incurred by the appellant company
would have been substantially less, ONGC was liable to pay
the fixed amount of mobilisation fee stipulated in the respective
Agreements.”
35) Before the High Court, argument of the assessee was that amount
of mobilisation charges cannot be included in the amount referred to
under sub-section (2) of Section 44BB of the Act as the mobilisation
charges represent reimbursement of expenses incurred for
transportation of drilling units of rigs from outside India to designated
drilling places in India and the payment has also not been made in India.
In support of his submission, apart from other judgments, heavy reliance
was placed on the decision of this Court in Ishikawajima-Harima
Heavy Industries Ltd. case. The High Court noted that in the said
case, the assessee was a Japanese company, inter alia, engaged in the
business of construction of storage tanks as also engineering etc. It
formed consortium along with few other Japanese companies and one
subsidiary company of the Japanese company. This consortium had
entered into an agreement with an Indian company on January 19, 2001
for setting up a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) receiving, storage and
degasification facility at Dahej in the State of Gujarat. A supplementary
agreement was also entered by the parties on March 19, 2001. It was a
turnkey project. At the same time, role and responsibility of each
33
member of the consortium was separately specified and each of the
members of the consortium was to receive separate payments. Insofar
as appellant-assessee is concerned, it was to develop, design, engineer
and procure equipment, materials and supplies to reject and construct
storage tanks of 5 MMTPA capacity, with potential expansion of
10MMTPA capacity at the specified temperature, i.e., 200 degree
celsius. The arrangement also included marine facilities (jetty and island
breakwater) for transmission and supply of LNG to purchaser; to test
and commission facilities relating to receipt and unloading, storage and
regasification of LNG and to send out regasified LNG by means of a
turnkey fixed lump sum price time certain engineering procurement,
construction and commission contract. The contract indisputably
involved: (i) offshore supply, (ii) offshore services, (iii) onshore supply,
(iv) onshore services and (v) construction and erection. The price was
payable for offshore supply and offshore services in US dollars, whereas
that of onshore supply as also onshore services and construction and
erection partly in US dollars and partly in Indian rupees.
36) The High Court noted that while determining the tax liability of the
said foreign company, this Court had taken into consideration Section
5(2), Section 9(1)(i) and Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act and considered the
question of imposition of tax on income arising from a business
connection of the assessee. Holding that income is not taxable in India,
34
the Court premised the conclusion, inter alia, on the ground that as per
clause (a) of Explanation 1 to Section 9(1)(i) of the Act, only such part of
income as is attributable to the operations carried out in India, is taxable
in India and further that sufficient territorial nexus between the rendition
of services and territorial limits of India is necessary to make the income
taxable. As far as offshore supply and offshore services in US$ are
concerned, it was done outside the territory of India and the payment
was also made to the assessee (a foreign company) in US$ outside
India, said payment was not taxable as it was not “income” arising from
a business connection of the said assessee.
37) The High Court, after taking note of the aforesaid judgment, has
held that it is not applicable in the instant case. Reason given is that in
Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Ltd., the Court had dealt with
the assessment of a non-resident company on its income as per the
provisions of Sections 5 and 9 of the Act and these sections are not
attracted in the instant case, as the same is governed by Section 44BB
of the Act. This is the material distinction, in the opinion of the High
Court, the manner in which the same is discussed needs to be
reproduced. Thus, we hereby quote the relevant portion of the said
discussion:
“…..Therefore, section 5 and section 9 both are aimed a the
income for the taxability under section 4 of the Act, while
section 44BB does not take into Account the income for
calculating the aggregate amount t calculate 10 percent profit
35
and gains. Profit and gains is a type of income to be taxed
under a legal fiction, i.e., @10 percent of the amount specified
in sub-section (2) of section 44BB. Section 44BB is a special
provision relating to non-resident assessee who is providing
services and facilities in connection with, or supply of plant and
machinery on hire used, or to be used, in the prospecting for,
or extraction or production of, mineral oils in or outside India.
The section is a complete code in itself. Thus, the reliance
placed by Sri Porus Kaka, learned Counsel for the assessee, is
misplaced as we have observed that the amount referred in
sub-section (2) of Section 44BB are four types of amounts and
all the four types of amounts are mutually inclusive and has to
be taken into account either all of them or any of them and its
clauses themselves provide that whether the payment is made
inside India or outside India.
17.In the present case, a finding has been recorded by the ITAT
that it was not in dispute before the Tribunal that the payment
was made to the appellant company outside India and the
mobilization fee as claimed by the assessee was paid to the
appellant by ONGC has no nexus with the actual amount
incurred by the appellant company for transportation of drilling
units of rigs to the specified drilling locations in India. Hence,
the mobilization fee is not the reimbursement of expenditure.
ONGC was liable to pay a fixed sum as stipulated in the
contract regardless of actual expenditure which may be
incurred by the assessee company for the purpose. In view of
the fictional taxing provision contained under Section 44BB,
the Assessing Officer was right in adding the amount of Rs.
99,04,000/- for the Assessment Year 1986-87 and amount
worth Rs. 64,64,530/- for the Assessment Year 1987-88
received by the assessee towards mobilization charges for the
purpose of imposing income tax and CIT (Appeals) and ITAT
were also right in upholding the order of the Assessing Officer.”
38) We feel that High Court may not be entirely correct in law in
excluding the provisions of Sections 5 and 9 in those cases where the
assessment is opted by the assessee under Section 44BB of the Act.
Submissions of learned counsel for the assessees are justified to the
extent that Section 44BB of the Act is a special provision providing
computation mechanism for computing profits and gains in case of
36
non-resident assessee engaged in activities relating to business of
exploration of mineral oil etc. At the same time Sections 4,5 and 9 of the
Act which deal with charging section, total income and income of
non-resident which arises or deem to arise in India cannot be
sidetracked. These are the provisions which bring a particular income
within the net of income tax. Therefore, it is imperative that a particular
income is covered by the charging provisions contained in Section 5 of
the Act. Indian Income Tax Act, admittedly, follows a territorial system of
taxation. As per this system only that income of a non-resident is
taxable in India which is attributable to operations within the Indian
Territory. Therefore, in the first instance it is to be seen whether a
particular income arises or accrues or deem to arise or accrue within
India. In order to seek this answer, the principles contained in Section 9
have to be applied only when it becomes an income taxable in India as
per Section 9, in case of non-resident, the question of computation of
the said income would arise. To recapitulate the scheme of the Act in
this behalf, it may be stated that Section 4 is the charging section for
levying a tax on the income of any person under the Act and provides
that income-tax shall be levied at the rates provided by the Finance Act
on the ‘total income’ of the previous year of every person. The
expression ‘total income’ has been defined in Section 2(45) of the Act to
mean the total amount of income referred to in Section 5 computed in
37
the manner laid down under the Act.
39) The scope of the total income of any person, which could be
subjected to tax under the provisions of the Act, is defined under Section
5 of the Act and dependent upon the residential status of the persons.
Section 5(1) provides the scope of ‘total income’ in the case of residents,
whereas Section 5(2) provides the scope of ‘total income’ in the case of
non-residents. As per Section 5(2) of the Act, subject to the provisions
of this Act, the ‘total income’ of any previous year of non-resident
includes:
• Income which is received or deemed to be received in India in such
year or on behalf of such person; or
• Income which ‘accrues or arises’ or is deemed to accrue or arise to
him in India during such year.
40) Section 9 enumerates the income which is deemed to accrue or
arise in India. There are two broad categories of taxability of income
provided under this Section, i.e., Business Income and income from
interest or royalty or fees for technical services (FTS).
41) Section 9(1)(i) provides that income is to be deemed to have
accrued or arising in India if the income is accruing directly or indirectly
through any business connection in India or from any property in India or
from any asset or source of income in India or any capital asset situated
38
in India (referred as business income).
Explanation 1(a) to Section 9(1)(i) of the Act provides an exclusion
in the case of operations which are not carried out in India. The
explanation provides that the income of the business deemed under this
clause to accrue or arise in India shall be only that part of the income as
is reasonably attributable to the operations carried out in India. Thus,
business income earned by non-resident is chargeable to tax in India
only to the extent reasonably attributable to the operations carried out in
India.
42) It is, however, pertinent to point out that Section 44BB(2) makes
certain receipts as “deemed income” for the purposes of taxation in the
said provision. Therefore, aid of this provision is to be necessarily taken
to determine whether a particular amount will be “income” within the
meaning of Section 5 of the Act. Likewise, Section 44BB(2) also acts as
guide to determine whether a particular income is attributed as income
occurred in India. Section 44BB of the Act provides for special provision
for computing profits and gains. However, that would not mean that if
the income is to be computed under this provision, we have to give a
go-by to Sections 5 and 9 of the Act. To this extent, remarks of the High
Court may not be correct. Law in this behalf is settled by the judgment
of this Court in A. Sanyasi Rao case as can be discerned from the
following discussion in the said judgment.
39
“We are further of the view that the basis of a charge relating to
income tax is laid down in Sections 4 to 9 of the Act. Section 4
is the charging section. Income-tax is levied in respect of the
total income of the previous year of every person. Section 5
deals with the scope of total income. Section 6 deals with the
residence in India. Section 7 deals with the income deemed to
be received. Section 8 deals with dividend income. Section 9
deals with the income deemed to accrue or arise in India.
xxx xxx xxx
The crucial words in Section 9(1) to the effect that “all income
accruing or arising, whether directly or indirectly, through or
from any business connection” occurred in Section 42 of the
Income Tax Act, 1922 as well. The said section came up for
consideration before this Court in Anglo-French Textile Co.
Ltd. v. CIT [(1953) 23 ITR 101…
xxx xxx xxx
The counsel for the revenue Dr. Gaurishankar vehemently
contended before us that Section 44AC read with Section
206C are only machinery provisions and not charging sections.
We see force in this plea. The charge for the levy of the
income that accrued or arose is laid by the charging sections,
viz., Sections 5 to 9 and not by virtue of Section 44AC or
section 206C…
xxx xxx xxx
However, the denial of relief provided by sections 28 to 43C to
the particular businesses or trades dealt with in Section 44AC
calls for a different consideration. Even, according to the
revenue, the provisions (sections 44AC and 206C) are only
‘machinery provisions’. If so, why should the normal reliefs
afforded to all assessees be denied to such traders? Prima
facie, all assessees similarly placed under the Income Tax Act
are entitled to equal treatment. In the matter of granting
various reliefs provided under sections 28 to 43C, the
assessees carrying on business are similarly placed and
should there be a law, negativing such valuable reliefs to a
particular trade or business, it should be shown to have some
basis and fair and rational. It has not been shown as to why
the persons carrying on business in the particular goods
specified in section 44AC are denied the reliefs available to
others. No plea is put forward by the revenue that these trades
are distinct and different even for the grant of reliefs under
40
Sections 28 to 43C. The denial of such reliefs to trades
specified in section 44AC, available to other assessees, has no
nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the Legislature.
(emphasis supplied)”
43) Having corrected the position in law, by emphasising that Sections
4, 5 and 9 of the Act are to be kept in mind even in those cases where
assessment is done under Section 44BB of the Act, we are of the
opinion that the argument of the assessees that Section 44BB is only a
computation provision, is also not entirely justified.
44) In the first blush, assessees may appear to be correct in their
contentions that Section 44BB falls in Chapter IV of the Act. Insofar as
computation of income from ‘Profits or Gains of Business or Profession’
is concerned, it has to be computed as per the provisions of Sections 28
to 43D(2). However, certain provisions are made for providing special
mechanism for computing the income on presumptive basis in case of
non-resident and it includes Section 44BB as well.
45) Having put the law in prospective, we need to examine as to
whether mobilisation charges received by the assessees can be treated
as ‘income’ under Section 5 of the Act and would fall within the four
corners of Section 9, namely, whether it can be attributed as having
arisen or deemed to arise in India. Argument of the learned counsel
appearing for the assessees is that the amount was received by way of
reimbursement of expenses for the operation carried outside India and
41
the payment was also received outside India. It is on this premise,
entire edifice is built to argue that it is not an “income” and, in any case,
not taxable in India at the hands of the assessees which are foreign
entities.
46) We have already reproduced above Clause 3.2 of the Agreement
dated September 3, 1985 and Clause 4.2 of the Agreement dated July
12, 1986. Clause 3.2 of the Agreement dated September 3, 1985
pertains to providing the Shallow Dash Water Jack Up Rig against which
payment was made to the assessees. This Clause says that the
assessees shall be paid ‘mobilisation fee’ for the mobilisation of drilling
unit from its present location in Portugal to the well location designated
by ONGC, offshore Mumbai, India. Fixed amount is agreed to be paid
which is mentioned in the said Clause. The aforesaid mobilisation fee
was payable to the assessees after the jacking up of the drilling at the
designated location and ready to spud the well. After the aforesaid
operation, assessees were required to raise invoice and ONGC was
supposed to make the payment within 30 days of the receipt of this
invoice. Insofar as Clause 4.2 of Agreement dated July 12, 1986 is
concerned, it related to mobilisation of drilling unit. Here again,
‘mobilisation fee’ was payable for the mobilisation of the drilling unit from
the place of its origin to the port of entry (Kandla Port, Mumbai). What
follows from the above is that a fixed amount of mobilisation fee was
42
payable under the aforesaid contracts as “compensation”. Contracts
specifically describe the aforesaid amounts as ‘fee’. In this hue, we
have to consider as to whether it would be treated as “income” under
Section 5 of the Act and can be attributed as income earned in India as
per Section 9 of the Act. For this purpose, Section 44BB(2) has to be
invoked.
47) Section 44BB starts with non-obstante clause, and the formula
contained therein for computation of income is to be applied irrespective
of the provisions of Sections 28 to 41 and Sections 43 and 43A of the
Act. It is not in dispute that assessees were assessed under the said
provision which is applicable in the instant case. For assessment under
this provision, a sum equal to 10% of the aggregate of the amounts
specified in sub-section (2) shall be deemed to be the profits and gains
of such business chargeable to tax under the head ‘profits and gains of
the business or profession’. Sub-section (2) mentions two kinds of
amounts which shall be deemed as profits and gains of the business
chargeable to tax in India. Sub-clause (a) thereof relates to amount paid
or payable to the assessee or any person on his behalf on account of
provision of services and facilities in connection with, or supply of plant
and machinery on hire used, or to be used in the prospecting for, or
extraction or production of, mineral oils in India. Thus, all amounts
pertaining to the aforesaid activity which are received on account of
43
provisions of services and facilities in connection with the said facility are
treated as profits and gains of the business. This clause clarifies that
the amount so paid shall be taxable whether these are received in India
or outside India. Clause (b) deals with amount received or deemed to
be received in India in connection with such services and facilities as
stipulated therein. Thus, whereas clause (a) mentions the amount which
is paid or payable, clause (b) deals with the amounts which are received
or deemed to be received in India. In respect of amount paid or payable
under clause (a) of sub-section (2), it is immaterial whether these are
paid in India or outside India. On the other hand, amount received or
deemed to be received have to be in India.
48) From the bare reading of the clauses, amount paid under the
aforesaid contracts as mobilisation fee on account of provision of
services and facilities in connection with the extraction etc. of mineral oil
in India and against the supply of plant and machinery on hire used for
such extraction, clause (a) stands attracted. Thus, this provision
contained in Section 44BB has to be read in conjunction with Sections 5
and 9 of the Act and Sections 5 and 9 of the Act cannot be read in
isolation. The aforesaid amount paid to the assessees as mobilisation
fee is treated as profits and gains of business and, therefore, it would be
“income” as per Section 5. This provision also treats this income as
earned in India, fictionally, thereby satisfying the test of Section 9 of the
44
Act as well.
49) The Tribunal has rightly commented that Section 44BB of the Act is
a special provision for computing profits and gains in connection with the
business of exploration of mineral oils. Its purpose was explained by the
Department vide its Circular No. 495 dated September 22, 1987,
namely, to simplify the computation of taxable income as number of
complications were involved for those engaged in the business of
providing services and facilities in connection with, or supply of plant and
machinery on hire used or to be used in the prospecting for, or extraction
or production of, mineral etc. Instead of going into the nitigrities of such
computation as per the normal provisions contained in Sections 28 to 41
and Sections 43 and 43A of the Act, the Legislature has simplified the
procedure by providing that tax shall be paid @10% of the ‘aggregate of
the amounts specified in sub-section (2)’ and those amounts are
‘deemed to be the profits and gains of such business chargeable to
tax...’. It is a matter of record that when income is computed under the
head ‘profits and gains of business or profession’, rate of tax payable on
the said income is much higher. However, the Legislature provided a
simple formula, namely, treating the amounts paid or payable (whether
in or out of India) and amount received or deemed to be received in
India as mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 44BB as the deemed
profits and gains. Thereafter, on such deemed profits and gains
45
(treating the same as income), a concessional flat rate of 10% is
charged to tax.
In these circumstances, the AO is supposed to apply the
provisions of Section 44BB of the Act, in order to find out as to whether a
particular amount is deemed income or not. When it is found that the
amount paid or payable (whether in or out of India), or amount received
or deemed to be received in India is covered by sub-section (2) of
Section 44BB of the Act, by fiction created under Section 44BB of the
Act, it becomes ‘income’ under Sections 5 and 9 of the Act as well.
50) It is stated at the cost of repetition that, in the instant case, the
amount which is paid to the assessees is towards mobilisation fee. It
does not mention that the same is for reimbursement of expenses. In
fact, it is a fixed amount paid which may be less or more than the
expenses incurred. Incurring of expenses, therefore, would be
immaterial. It is also to be borne in mind that the contract in question
was indivisible. Having regard to these facts in the present case as per
which the case of the assessees get covered under the aforesaid
provisions, we do not find any merit in any of the contentions raised by
the assessees. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion drawn by the AO,
which is upheld by all other Authorities is correct, though some of the
observations of the High Court may not be entirely correct which have
been straightened by us in the above discussion. For our aforesaid
reasons, we uphold the conclusion.
Resultantly, all the appeals of the
46
assessees are dismissed.
51) In this batch of appeals, Civil Appeal No. 3695 of 2012 is the
solitary appeal which is preferred by the Director of Income Tax, New
Delhi (Revenue) against the judgment of the High Court of Uttarakhand.
The computation of income of the assessee was done under Section
44BB of the Act. However, the amount which was sought to be taxed
was reimbursement of cost of tools lost in hole by ONGC. It is, thus,
clear that this was not the amount which was covered by sub-section (2)
of Section 44BB of the Act as ONGC had lost certain tools belonging to
the assessee, and had compensated for the said loss by paying the
amount in question. On these facts, conclusion of the High Court is
correct. Even otherwise, the tax effect is Rs.15,12,344/-.
Therefore,
Civil Appeal No. 3695 of 2012 filed by the Revenue is dismissed.
.............................................J.
(A.K. SIKRI)
.............................................J.
(ASHOK BHUSHAN)
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 30, 2017.

APEX COURT - MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS CLAIMS = The two-Judge Bench in Santosh Devi should have been well advised to refer the matter to a larger Bench as it was taking a different view than what has been stated in Sarla Verma, a judgment by a coordinate Bench.= (i) The two-Judge Bench in Santosh Devi should have been well advised to refer the matter to a larger Bench as it was taking a different view than what has been stated in Sarla Verma, a judgment by a coordinate Bench. It is because a coordinate Bench of the same strength cannot take a contrary view than what has been held by another coordinate Bench. (ii) As Rajesh has not taken note of the decision in Reshma Kumari, which was delivered at earlier point of time, the decision in Rajesh is not a binding precedent. (iii) While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was 48 between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax. (iv) In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component. (v) For determination of the multiplicand, the deduction for personal and living expenses, the tribunals and the courts shall be guided by paragraphs 30 to 32 of Sarla Verma which we have reproduced hereinbefore. (vi) The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the Table in Sarla Verma read with paragraph 42 of that judgment. (vii) The age of the deceased should be the basis for applying the multiplier. 49 (viii) Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs. 15,000/-, Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years. 62. The reference is answered accordingly. Matters be placed before the appropriate Bench.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELALTE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 25590 OF 2014
National Insurance Company Limited …Petitioner(s)
Versus
Pranay Sethi and Ors. …Respondent(s)
WITH
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 16735 of 2014
Civil Appeal No. 6961 of 2015
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 163 of 2016
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 3387of 2016
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 7076 of 2016
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 32844 of 2016
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 16056 of 2016
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 22134 of 2016
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 24163 of 2016
Civil Appeal No. 8770 of 2016
Civil Appeal Nos. 8045-8046 of 2016
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 26263 of 2016
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 25818 of 2016
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 26227 of 2016
2
Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 29520-29521 of 2016
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 35679 of 2016
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 34237 of 2016
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 36072 of 2016
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 35371 of 2016
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 34395 of 2016
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 36027 of 2016
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 8306 of 2017
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 37617 of 2016
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 7241 of 2017
Civil Appeal No.12046 of 2017
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 17436 of 2017
Civil Appeal No. 8611 of 2017
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, CJI.
Perceiving cleavage of opinion between Reshma Kumari
and others v. Madan Mohan and another1 and Rajesh and
others v. Rajbir Singh and others2, both three-Judge Bench
decisions, a two-Judge Bench of this Court in National
Insurance Company Limited v. Pushpa and others3 thought it
appropriate to refer the matter to a larger Bench for an
1
(2013 ) 9 SCC 65
2
(2013) 9 SCC 54
3
(2015) 9 SCC 166
3
authoritative pronouncement, and that is how the matters have
been placed before us.
2. In the course of deliberation we will be required to travel
backwards covering a span of two decades and three years and
may be slightly more and thereafter focus on the axis of the
controversy, that is, the decision in Sarla Verma and others v.
Delhi Transport Corporation and another4 wherein the twoJudge
Bench made a sanguine endeavour to simplify the
determination of claims by specifying certain parameters.
3. Before we penetrate into the past, it is necessary to note
what has been stated in Reshma Kumari (supra) and Rajesh’s
case. In Reshma Kumari the three-Judge Bench was answering
the reference made in Reshma Kumari and others v. Madan
Mohan and another5. The reference judgment noted divergence
of opinion with regard to the computation under Sections 163-A
and 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity, “the Act”)
and the methodology for computation of future prospects.
Dealing with determination of future prospects, the Court
referred to the decisions in Sarla Dixit v. Balwant Yadav6,
4
(2009) 6 SCC 121
5
(2009) 13 SCC 422
6
(1996) 3 SCC 179
4
Abati Bezbaruah v. Dy. Director General, Geological Survey
of India7 and the principle stated by Lord Diplock in Mallett v.
McMonagle8 and further referring to the statement of law in
Wells v. Wells9 observed:-
“46. In the Indian context several other factors
should be taken into consideration including
education of the dependants and the nature of job.
In the wake of changed societal conditions and
global scenario, future prospects may have to be
taken into consideration not only having regard to
the status of the employee, his educational
qualification; his past performance but also other
relevant factors, namely, the higher salaries and
perks which are being offered by the private
companies these days. In fact while determining the
multiplicand this Court in Oriental Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Jashuben 10 held that even dearness
allowance and perks with regard thereto from which
the family would have derived monthly benefit,
must be taken into consideration.
47. One of the incidental issues which has also to
be taken into consideration is inflation. Is the
practice of taking inflation into consideration wholly
incorrect? Unfortunately, unlike other developed
countries in India there has been no scientific
study. It is expected that with the rising inflation
the rate of interest would go up. In India it does not
happen. It, therefore, may be a relevant factor which
may be taken into consideration for determining the
actual ground reality. No hard-and-fast rule,
however, can be laid down therefor.
7
(2003) 3 SCC 148
8
1970 AC 166: (1969) 2 WLR 767
9
(1999) 1 AC 345
10 (2008) 4 SCC 162
5
48. A large number of English decisions have been
placed before us by Mr Nanda to contend that
inflation may not be taken into consideration at all.
While the reasonings adopted by the English courts
and its decisions may not be of much dispute, we
cannot blindly follow the same ignoring ground
realities.
49. We have noticed the precedents operating in the
field as also the rival contentions raised before us
by the learned counsel for the parties with a view to
show that law is required to be laid down in clearer
terms.”
4. In the said case, the Court considered the common
questions that arose for consideration. They are:-
“(1) Whether the multiplier specified in the Second
Schedule appended to the Act should be
scrupulously applied in all the cases?
(2) Whether for determination of the multiplicand,
the Act provides for any criterion, particularly as
regards determination of future prospects?”
5. Analyzing further the rationale in determining the laws
under Sections 163-A and 166, the Court had stated thus:-
“58. We are not unmindful of the Statement of
Objects and Reasons to Act 54 of 1994 for
introducing Section 163-A so as to provide for a new
predetermined formula for payment of
compensation to road accident victims on the basis
of age/income, which is more liberal and rational.
That may be so, but it defies logic as to why in a
similar situation, the injured claimant or his
heirs/legal representatives, in the case of death, on
proof of negligence on the part of the driver of a
motor vehicle would get a lesser amount than the
6
one specified in the Second Schedule. The courts, in
our opinion, should also bear that factor in mind.”
6. Noticing the divergence of opinion and absence of any
clarification from Parliament despite the recommendations by
this Court, it was thought appropriate that the controversy
should be decided by the larger Bench and accordingly it directed
to place the matter before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for
appropriate orders for constituting a larger Bench.
7. The three-Judge Bench answering the reference referred to
the Scheme under Sections 163-A and 166 of the Act and took
note of the view expressed by this Court in U.P. State Road
Transport Corporation and others v. Trilok Chandra and
others11, wherein the Court had stated:-
“17. The situation has now undergone a change
with the enactment of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,
as amended by Amendment Act 54 of 1994. The
most important change introduced by the
amendment insofar as it relates to determination of
compensation is the insertion of Sections 163-A and
163-B in Chapter XI entitled ‘Insurance of motor
vehicles against third-party risks’. Section 163-A
begins with a non obstante clause and provides for
payment of compensation, as indicated in the
Second Schedule, to the legal representatives of the
deceased or injured, as the case may be. Now if we
turn to the Second Schedule, we find a Table fixing
the mode of calculation of compensation for thirdparty
accident injury claims arising out of fatal
11 (1996) 4 SCC 362
7
accidents. The first column gives the age group of
the victims of accident, the second column indicates
the multiplier and the subsequent horizontal figures
indicate the quantum of compensation in thousand
payable to the heirs of the deceased victim.
According to this Table the multiplier varies from 5
to 18 depending on the age group to which the
victim belonged. Thus, under this Schedule the
maximum multiplier can be up to 18 and not 16 as
was held in Susamma Thomas12 case.
18. We must at once point out that the calculation
of compensation and the amount worked out in the
Schedule suffer from several defects. For example,
in Item 1 for a victim aged 15 years, the multiplier
is shown to be 15 years and the multiplicand is
shown to be Rs 3000. The total should be 3000 × 15
= 45,000 but the same is worked out at Rs 60,000.
Similarly, in the second item the multiplier is 16
and the annual income is Rs 9000; the total should
have been Rs 1,44,000 but is shown to be Rs
1,71,000. To put it briefly, the Table abounds in
such mistakes. Neither the tribunals nor the courts
can go by the ready reckoner. It can only be used as
a guide. Besides, the selection of multiplier cannot
in all cases be solely dependent on the age of the
deceased. For example, if the deceased, a bachelor,
dies at the age of 45 and his dependants are his
parents, age of the parents would also be relevant in
the choice of the multiplier. But these mistakes are
limited to actual calculations only and not in
respect of other items. What we propose to
emphasise is that the multiplier cannot exceed 18
years’ purchase factor. This is the improvement over
the earlier position that ordinarily it should not
exceed 16. We thought it necessary to state the
correct legal position as courts and tribunals are
using higher multiplier as in the present case where
the Tribunal used the multiplier of 24 which the
High Court raised to 34, thereby showing lack of
12 (1994) 2 SCC 176
8
awareness of the background of the multiplier
system in Davies case.”
[Underlining is ours]
8. The Court also referred to Supe Dei v. National Insurance
Company Limited13 wherein it has been opined that the position
is well settled that the Second Schedule under Section 163-A to
the Act which gives the amount of compensation to be
determined for the purpose of claim under the section can be
taken as a guideline while determining the compensation under
Section 166 of the Act.
9. After so observing, the Court also noted the authorities in
United India Insurance Co. Ltd v. Patricia Jean Mahajan14,
Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
15,
and Jashuben (supra). It is perceivable from the pronouncement
by the three-Judge Bench that it has referred to Sarla Verma and
observed that the said decision reiterated what had been stated
in earlier decisions that the principles relating to determination of
liability and quantum of compensation were different for claims
made under Section 163-A and claims made under Section 166.
It was further observed that Section 163-A and the Second
Schedule in terms did not apply to determination of
13 (2009) 4 SCC 513
14 (2002) 6 SCC 281
15 (2004) 5 SCC 385
9
compensation in applications under Section 166. In Sarla
Verma (supra), as has been noticed further in Reshma Kumari
(supra), the Court found discrepancies/errors in the multiplier
scale given in the Second Schedule Table and also observed that
application of Table may result in incongruities.
10. The three-Judge Bench further apprised itself that in Sarla
Verma (supra) the Court had undertaken the exercise of
comparing the multiplier indicated in Susamma Thomas
(supra), Trilok Chandra (supra), and New India Assurance Co.
Ltd v. Charlie and another16 for claims under Section 166 of
the Act with the multiplier mentioned in the Second Schedule for
claims under Section 163-A and compared the formula and held
that the multiplier shall be used in a given case in the following
manner:-
“42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used
should be as mentioned in Column (4) of the Table
above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas,
Trilok Chandra and Charlie), which starts with an
operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15
to 20 and 21 to 25 years); reduced by one unit for
every five years, that is, M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-
16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14
for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years,
then reduced by two units for every five years, that
is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years,
M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.”
16 (2005) 10 SCC 720
10
11. After elaborately analyzing what has been stated in Sarla
Verma (supra), the three-Judge Bench referred to the language
employed in Section 168 of the Act which uses the expression
“just”. Elucidating the said term, the Court held that it conveys
that the amount so determined is fair, reasonable and equitable
by accepted legal standard and not on forensic lottery. The Court
observed “just compensation” does not mean “perfect” or
“absolute compensation” and the concept of just compensation
principle requires examination of the particular situation
obtaining uniquely in an individual case. In that context, it
referred to Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Jenkins17 and held:-
“36. In Sarla Verma, this Court has endeavoured to
simplify the otherwise complex exercise of
assessment of loss of dependency and
determination of compensation in a claim made
under Section 166. It has been rightly stated in
Sarla Verma that the claimants in case of death
claim for the purposes of compensation must
establish (a) age of the deceased; (b) income of the
deceased; and (c) the number of dependants. To
arrive at the loss of dependency, the Tribunal must
consider (i) additions/deductions to be made for
arriving at the income; (ii) the deductions to be
made towards the personal living expenses of the
deceased; and (iii) the multiplier to be applied with
reference to the age of the deceased. We do not
think it is necessary for us to revisit the law on the
point as we are in full agreement with the view in
Sarla Verma.”
[Emphasis is added]
17 1913 AC 1 : (1911-13) All ER Rep 160 (HL)
11
12. And further:-
“It is high time that we move to a standard method
of selection of multiplier, income for future
prospects and deduction for personal and living
expenses. The courts in some of the overseas
jurisdictions have made this advance. It is for these
reasons, we think we must approve the Table in
Sarla Verma for the selection of multiplier in claim
applications made under Section 166 in the cases of
death. We do accordingly. If for the selection of
multiplier, Column (4) of the Table in Sarla Verma is
followed, there is no likelihood of the claimants who
have chosen to apply under Section 166 being
awarded lesser amount on proof of negligence on
the part of the driver of the motor vehicle than those
who prefer to apply under Section 163-A. As regards
the cases where the age of the victim happens to be
up to 15 years, we are of the considered opinion
that in such cases irrespective of Section 163-A or
Section 166 under which the claim for
compensation has been made, multiplier of 15 and
the assessment as indicated in the Second Schedule
subject to correction as pointed out in Column (6) of
the Table in Sarla Verma should be followed. This is
to ensure that the claimants in such cases are not
awarded lesser amount when the application is
made under Section 166 of the 1988 Act. In all
other cases of death where the application has been
made under Section 166, the multiplier as indicated
in Column (4) of the Table in Sarla Verma should be
followed.”
This is how the first question the Court had posed stood
answered.
12
13. With regard to the addition of income for future prospects,
this Court in Reshma Kumari (supra) adverted to Para 24 of the
Sarla Verma’s case and held:-
“39. The standardisation of addition to income for
future prospects shall help in achieving certainty in
arriving at appropriate compensation. We approve
the method that an addition of 50% of actual salary
be made to the actual salary income of the deceased
towards future prospects where the deceased had a
permanent job and was below 40 years and the
addition should be only 30% if the age of the
deceased was 40 to 50 years and no addition should
be made where the age of the deceased is more than
50 years. Where the annual income is in the taxable
range, the actual salary shall mean actual salary
less tax. In the cases where the deceased was selfemployed
or was on a fixed salary without provision
for annual increments, the actual income at the
time of death without any addition to income for
future prospects will be appropriate. A departure
from the above principle can only be justified in
extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional
cases.”
The aforesaid analysis vividly exposits that standardization
of addition to income for future prospects is helpful in achieving
certainty in arriving at appropriate compensation. Thus, the
larger Bench has concurred with the view expressed by Sarla
Verma (supra) as per the determination of future income.
14. It is interesting to note here that while the reference was
pending, the judgment in Santosh Devi v. National Insurance
13
Company Limited and others18 was delivered by a two-Judge
Bench which commented on the principle stated in Sarla Verma.
It said:-
“14. We find it extremely difficult to fathom any
rationale for the observation made in para 24 of the
judgment in Sarla Verma case that where the
deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary
without provision for annual increment, etc. the
courts will usually take only the actual income at
the time of death and a departure from this rule
should be made only in rare and exceptional cases
involving special circumstances. In our view, it will
be naïve to say that the wages or total
emoluments/income of a person who is selfemployed
or who is employed on a fixed salary
without provision for annual increment, etc. would
remain the same throughout his life.
15. The rise in the cost of living affects everyone
across the board. It does not make any distinction
between rich and poor. As a matter of fact, the effect
of rise in prices which directly impacts the cost of
living is minimal on the rich and maximum on those
who are self-employed or who get fixed
income/emoluments. They are the worst affected
people. Therefore, they put in extra efforts to
generate additional income necessary for sustaining
their families.
16. The salaries of those employed under the
Central and State Governments and their
agencies/instrumentalities have been revised from
time to time to provide a cushion against the rising
prices and provisions have been made for providing
security to the families of the deceased employees.
The salaries of those employed in private sectors
have also increased manifold. Till about two
decades ago, nobody could have imagined that
18 (2012) 6 SCC 421
14
salary of Class IV employee of the Government
would be in five figures and total emoluments of
those in higher echelons of service will cross the
figure of rupees one lakh.
17. Although the wages/income of those employed
in unorganised sectors has not registered a
corresponding increase and has not kept pace with
the increase in the salaries of the government
employees and those employed in private sectors,
but it cannot be denied that there has been
incremental enhancement in the income of those
who are self-employed and even those engaged on
daily basis, monthly basis or even seasonal basis.
We can take judicial notice of the fact that with a
view to meet the challenges posed by high cost of
living, the persons falling in the latter category
periodically increase the cost of their labour. In this
context, it may be useful to give an example of a
tailor who earns his livelihood by stitching clothes.
If the cost of living increases and the prices of
essentials go up, it is but natural for him to
increase the cost of his labour. So will be the cases
of ordinary skilled and unskilled labour like barber,
blacksmith, cobbler, mason, etc.
18. Therefore, we do not think that while making
the observations in the last three lines of para 24 of
Sarla Verma judgment, the Court had intended to
lay down an absolute rule that there will be no
addition in the income of a person who is selfemployed
or who is paid fixed wages. Rather, it
would be reasonable to say that a person who is
self-employed or is engaged on fixed wages will also
get 30% increase in his total income over a period of
time and if he/she becomes victim of an accident
then the same formula deserves to be applied for
calculating the amount of compensation.”
15. The aforesaid analysis in Santosh Devi (supra) may prima
facie show that the two-Judge Bench has distinguished the
15
observation made in Sarla Verma’s case but on a studied
scrutiny, it becomes clear that it has really expressed a different
view than what has been laid down in Sarla Verma (supra). If
we permit ourselves to say so, the different view has been
expressed in a distinctive tone, for the two-Judge Bench had
stated that it was extremely difficult to fathom any rationale for
the observations made in para 24 of the judgment in Sarla
Verma’s case in respect of self-employed or a person on fixed
salary without provision for annual increment, etc. This is a
clear disagreement with the earlier view, and we have no
hesitation in saying that it is absolutely impermissible keeping in
view the concept of binding precedents.
16. Presently, we may refer to certain decisions which deal with
the concept of binding precedent.
17. In State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer alias Kalika Singh and
others19, it has been held:-
“10. … an earlier decision may seem to be incorrect
to a Bench of a coordinate jurisdiction considering
the question later, on the ground that a possible
aspect of the matter was not considered or not
raised before the court or more aspects should have
been gone into by the court deciding the matter
earlier but it would not be a reason to say that the
19 (2003) 5 SCC 448
16
decision was rendered per incuriam and liable to be
ignored. The earlier judgment may seem to be not
correct yet it will have the binding effect on the later
Bench of coordinate jurisdiction. …”
The Court has further ruled:-
“10. … Easy course of saying that earlier decision
was rendered per incuriam is not permissible and
the matter will have to be resolved only in two ways
— either to follow the earlier decision or refer the
matter to a larger Bench to examine the issue, in
case it is felt that earlier decision is not correct on
merits.”
18. In G.L. Batra v. State of Haryana and others20, the Court
has accepted the said principle on the basis of judgments of this
Court rendered in Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India
Ltd. 21 , Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija v. Collector, Thane,
Maharashtra22 and Tribhovandas Purshottamdas Thakkar v.
Ratilal Motilal Patel 23 . It may be noted here that the
Constitution Bench in Madras Bar Association v. Union of
India and another 24 has clearly stated that the prior
Constitution Bench judgment in Union of India v. Madras Bar
Association25 is a binding precedent. Be it clarified, the issues
20 (2014) 13 SCC 759
21 (1985) 4 SCC 369
22 (1989) 3 SCC 396
23 AIR 1968 SC 372
24 (2015) 8 SCC 583
25 (2010) 11 SCC 1
17
that were put to rest in the earlier Constitution Bench judgment
were treated as precedents by latter Constitution Bench.
19. In this regard, we may refer to a passage from Jaisri Sahu
v. Rajdewan Dubey26:-
“11. Law will be bereft of all its utility if it should be
thrown into a state of uncertainty by reason of
conflicting decisions, and it is therefore desirable
that in case of difference of opinion, the question
should be authoritatively settled. It sometimes
happens that an earlier decision given by a Bench is
not brought to the notice of a Bench hearing the
same question, and a contrary decision is given
without reference to the earlier decision. The
question has also been discussed as to the correct
procedure to be followed when two such conflicting
decisions are placed before a later Bench. The
practice in the Patna High Court appears to be that
in those cases, the earlier decision is followed and
not the later. In England the practice is, as noticed
in the judgment in Seshamma v. Venkata
Narasimharao that the decision of a court of appeal
is considered as a general rule to be binding on it.
There are exceptions to it, and one of them is thus
stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol.
22, para 1687, pp. 799-800:
“The court is not bound to follow a decision of
its own if given per incuriam. A decision is given
per incuriam when the court has acted in
ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of
a Court of a co-ordinate jurisdiction which
covered the case before it, or when it has acted
in ignorance of a decision of the House of Lords.
In the former case it must decide which decision
to follow, and in the latter it is bound by the
decision of the House of Lords.”
26 AIR 1962 SC 83
18
In Virayya v. Venkata Subbayya it has been held by
the Andhra High Court that under the
circumstances aforesaid the Bench is free to adopt
that view which is in accordance with justice and
legal principles after taking into consideration the
views expressed in the two conflicting Benches, vide
also the decision of the Nagpur High Court in
Bilimoria v. Central Bank of India. The better course
would be for the Bench hearing the case to refer the
matter to a Full Bench in view of the conflicting
authorities without taking upon itself to decide
whether it should follow the one Bench decision or
the other. We have no doubt that when such
situations arise, the Bench hearing cases would
refer the matter for the decision of a Full Court.”
20. Though the aforesaid was articulated in the context of the
High Court, yet this Court has been following the same as is
revealed from the aforestated pronouncements including that of
the Constitution Bench and, therefore, we entirely agree with the
said view because it is the precise warrant of respecting a
precedent which is the fundamental norm of judicial discipline.
21. In the context, we may fruitfully note what has been stated
in Pradip Chandra Parija and others v. Pramod Chandra
Patnaik and others27. In the said case, the Constitution Bench
was dealing with a situation where the two-Judge Bench
disagreeing with the three-Judge Bench decision directed the
27 (2002) 1 SCC 1
19
matter to be placed before a larger Bench of five Judges of this
Court. In that scenario, the Constitution Bench stated:-
“6. … In our view, judicial discipline and propriety
demands that a Bench of two learned Judges should
follow a decision of a Bench of three learned Judges.
But if a Bench of two learned Judges concludes that
an earlier judgment of three learned Judges is so very
incorrect that in no circumstances can it be followed,
the proper course for it to adopt is to refer the matter
before it to a Bench of three learned Judges setting
out, as has been done here, the reasons why it could
not agree with the earlier judgment. …”
22. In Chandra Prakash and others v. State of U.P. and
another28, another Constitution Bench dealing with the concept
of precedents stated thus:-
“22. … The doctrine of binding precedent is of utmost
importance in the administration of our judicial
system. It promotes certainty and consistency in
judicial decisions. Judicial consistency promotes
confidence in the system, therefore, there is this need
for consistency in the enunciation of legal principles in
the decisions of this Court. It is in the above context,
this Court in the case of Raghubir Singh29 held that a
pronouncement of law by a Division Bench of this
Court is binding on a Division Bench of the same or
smaller number of Judges. …”
23. Be it noted, Chandra Prakash concurred with the view
expressed in Raghubir Singh and Pradip Chandra Parija.
28 (2002) 4 SCC 234
29 (1989) 2 SCC 754
20
24. In Sandhya Educational Society and another v. Union
of India and others 30 , it has been observed that judicial
decorum and discipline is paramount and, therefore, a coordinate
Bench has to respect the judgments and orders passed by
another coordinate Bench. In Rattiram and others v. State of
Madhya Pradesh31, the Court dwelt upon the issue what would
be the consequent effect of the latter decision which had been
rendered without noticing the earlier decisions. The Court noted
the observations in Raghubir Singh (supra) and reproduced a
passage from Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Municipal
Corporation32 which is to the following effect:-
“8. … The Division Bench of the High Court in
Municipal Corpn., Indore v. Ratnaprabha Dhanda
was clearly in error in taking the view that the
decision of this Court in Ratnaprabha was not
binding on it. In doing so, the Division Bench of the
High Court did something which even a later coequal
Bench of this Court did not and could not
do. …”
25. It also stated what has been expressed in Raghubir Singh
(supra) by R.S. Pathak, C.J. It is as follows:-
“28. We are of opinion that a pronouncement of law
by a Division Bench of this Court is binding on a
Division Bench of the same or a smaller number of
Judges, and in order that such decision be binding,
30 (2014) 7 SCC 701
31 (2012) 4 SCC 516
32 (1995) 4 SCC 96
21
it is not necessary that it should be a decision
rendered by the Full Court or a Constitution Bench
of the Court. …”
26. In Rajesh (supra) the three-Judge Bench had delivered the
judgment on 12.04.2013. The purpose of stating the date is that
it has been delivered after the pronouncement made in Reshma
Kumari’s case. On a perusal of the decision in Rajesh (supra),
we find that an attempt has been made to explain what the twoJudge
Bench had stated in Santosh Devi (supra). The relevant
passages read as follows:-
“8. Since, the Court in Santosh Devi case actually
intended to follow the principle in the case of
salaried persons as laid down in Sarla Verma case
and to make it applicable also to the self-employed
and persons on fixed wages, it is clarified that the
increase in the case of those groups is not 30%
always; it will also have a reference to the age. In
other words, in the case of self-employed or persons
with fixed wages, in case, the deceased victim was
below 40 years, there must be an addition of 50% to
the actual income of the deceased while computing
future prospects. Needless to say that the actual
income should be income after paying the tax, if
any. Addition should be 30% in case the deceased
was in the age group of 40 to 50 years.
9. In Sarla Verma case, it has been stated that in
the case of those above 50 years, there shall be no
addition. Having regard to the fact that in the case
of those self-employed or on fixed wages, where
there is normally no age of superannuation, we are
of the view that it will only be just and equitable to
provide an addition of 15% in the case where the
victim is between the age group of 50 to 60 years so
22
as to make the compensation just, equitable, fair
and reasonable. There shall normally be no addition
thereafter.”
27. At this juncture, it is necessitous to advert to another threeJudge
Bench decision in Munna Lal Jain and another v. Vipin
Kumar Sharma and others33 . In the said case, the three-Judge
Bench commenting on the judgments stated thus:-
“2. In the absence of any statutory and a
straitjacket formula, there are bound to be grey
areas despite several attempts made by this Court
to lay down the guidelines. Compensation would
basically depend on the evidence available in a case
and the formulas shown by the courts are only
guidelines for the computation of the compensation.
That precisely is the reason the courts lodge a
caveat stating “ordinarily”, “normally”, “exceptional
circumstances”, etc., while suggesting the formula.”
28. After so stating, the Court followed the principle stated in
Rajesh. We think it appropriate to reproduce what has been
stated by the three-Judge Bench:-
“10. As far as future prospects are concerned, in
Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, a three-Judge Bench of this
Court held that in case of self-employed persons
also, if the deceased victim is below 40 years, there
must be addition of 50% to the actual income of the
deceased while computing future prospects.”
29. We are compelled to state here that in Munna Lal Jain
(supra), the three-Judge Bench should have been guided by the
33 (2015) 6 SCC 347
23
principle stated in Reshma Kumari which has concurred with the
view expressed in Sarla Devi or in case of disagreement, it should
have been well advised to refer the case to a larger Bench. We
say so, as we have already expressed the opinion that the dicta
laid down in Reshma Kumari being earlier in point of time would
be a binding precedent and not the decision in Rajesh.
30. In this context, we may also refer to Sundeep Kumar
Bafna v. State of Maharashtra and another34 which correctly
lays down the principle that discipline demanded by a precedent
or the disqualification or diminution of a decision on the
application of the per incuriam rule is of great importance, since
without it, certainty of law, consistency of rulings and comity of
courts would become a costly casualty. A decision or judgment
can be per incuriam any provision in a statute, rule or regulation,
which was not brought to the notice of the court. A decision or
judgment can also be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile
its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a coequal
or larger Bench. There can be no scintilla of doubt that an
earlier decision of co-equal Bench binds the Bench of same
strength. Though the judgment in Rajesh’s case was delivered on
a later date, it had not apprised itself of the law stated in
34 (2014) 16 SCC 623
24
Reshma Kumari (supra) but had been guided by Santosh Devi
(supra). We have no hesitation that it is not a binding precedent
on the co-equal Bench.
31. At this stage, a detailed analysis of Sarla Verma (supra) is
necessary. In the said case, the Court recapitulated the relevant
principles relating to assessment of compensation in case of
death and also took note of the fact that there had been
considerable variation and inconsistency in the decision for
Courts and Tribunals on account of adopting the method stated
in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Co. Ltd.
35 and
the method in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries
Ltd.
36. It also analysed the difference between the considerations
of the two different methods by this Court in Susamma Thomas
(supra) wherein preference was given to Davies method to the
Nance method. Various paragraphs from Susamma Thomas
(supra) and Trilok Chandra (supra) have been reproduced and
thereafter it has been observed that lack of uniformity and
consistency in awarding the compensation has been a matter of
grave concern. It has stated that when different tribunals
35 1951 SC 601 : (1951) 2 All ER 448 (PC)
36 1942 AC 601 : (1942) 1 All ER 657 (HL)
25
calculate compensation differently on the same facts, the
claimant, the litigant and the common man are bound to be
confused, perplexed and bewildered. It adverted to the
observations made in Trilok Chandra (supra) which are to the
following effect:-
“15. We thought it necessary to reiterate the method
of working out ‘just’ compensation because, of late,
we have noticed from the awards made by tribunals
and courts that the principle on which the
multiplier method was developed has been lost sight
of and once again a hybrid method based on the
subjectivity of the Tribunal/court has surfaced,
introducing uncertainty and lack of reasonable
uniformity in the matter of determination of
compensation. It must be realised that the
Tribunal/court has to determine a fair amount of
compensation awardable to the victim of an
accident which must be proportionate to the injury
caused. …”
32. While adverting to the addition of income for future
prospects, it stated thus:-
“24. In Susamma Thomas this Court increased the
income by nearly 100%, in Sarla Dixit the income
was increased only by 50% and in Abati Bezbaruah
the income was increased by a mere 7%. In view of
the imponderables and uncertainties, we are in
favour of adopting as a rule of thumb, an addition of
50% of actual salary to the actual salary income of
the deceased towards future prospects, where the
deceased had a permanent job and was below 40
years. (Where the annual income is in the taxable
range, the words “actual salary” should be read as
“actual salary less tax”). The addition should be
26
only 30% if the age of the deceased was 40 to 50
years. There should be no addition, where the age of
the deceased is more than 50 years. Though the
evidence may indicate a different percentage of
increase, it is necessary to standardise the addition
to avoid different yardsticks being applied or
different methods of calculation being adopted.
Where the deceased was self-employed or was on a
fixed salary (without provision for annual
increments, etc.), the courts will usually take only
the actual income at the time of death. A departure
therefrom should be made only in rare and
exceptional cases involving special circumstances.”
33. Though we have devoted some space in analyzing the
precedential value of the judgments, that is not the thrust of the
controversy. We are required to keenly dwell upon the heart of
the issue that emerges for consideration. The seminal
controversy before us relates to the issue where the deceased was
self-employed or was a person on fixed salary without provision
for annual increment, etc., what should be the addition as
regards the future prospects. In Sarla Verma, the Court has
made it as a rule that 50% of actual salary could be added if the
deceased had a permanent job and if the age of the deceased is
between 40 – 50 years and no addition to be made if the deceased
was more than 50 years. It is further ruled that where deceased
was self-employed or had a fixed salary (without provision for
annual increment, etc.) the Courts will usually take only the
actual income at the time of death and the departure is
27
permissible only in rare and exceptional cases involving special
circumstances.
34. First, we shall deal with the reasoning of straitjacket
demarcation between the permanent employed persons within
the taxable range and the other category where deceased was
self-employed or employed on fixed salary sans annual
increments, etc.
35. The submission, as has been advanced on behalf of the
insurers, is that the distinction between the stable jobs at one
end of the spectrum and self-employed at the other end of the
spectrum with the benefit of future prospects being extended to
the legal representatives of the deceased having a permanent job
is not difficult to visualize, for a comparison between the two
categories is a necessary ground reality. It is contended that
guaranteed/definite income every month has to be treated with a
different parameter than the person who is self-employed
inasmuch as the income does not remain constant and is likely
to oscillate from time to time. Emphasis has been laid on the date
of expected superannuation and certainty in permanent job in
contradistinction to the uncertainty on the part of a selfemployed
person. Additionally, it is contended that the
28
permanent jobs are generally stable and for an assessment the
entity or the establishment where the deceased worked is
identifiable since they do not suffer from the inconsistencies and
vagaries of self-employed persons. It is canvassed that it may not
be possible to introduce an element of standardization as
submitted by the claimants because there are many a category in
which a person can be self-employed and it is extremely difficult
to assimilate entire range of self-employed categories or
professionals in one compartment. It is also asserted that in
certain professions addition of future prospects to the income as
a part of multiplicand would be totally an unacceptable concept.
Examples are cited in respect of categories of professionals who
are surgeons, sports persons, masons and carpenters, etc. It is
also highlighted that the range of self-employed persons can
include unskilled labourer to a skilled person and hence, they
cannot be put in a holistic whole. That apart, it is propounded
that experience of certain professionals brings in disparity in
income and, therefore, the view expressed in Sarla Verma
(supra) that has been concurred with Reshma Kumari (supra)
should not be disturbed.
29
36. Quite apart from the above, it is contended that the
principle of standardization that has been evolved in Sarla
Verma (supra) has been criticized on the ground that it grants
compensation without any nexus to the actual loss. It is also
urged that even if it is conceded that the said view is correct,
extension of the said principle to some of the self-employed
persons will be absolutely unjustified and untenable. Learned
counsel for the insurers further contended that the view
expressed in Rajesh (supra) being not a precedent has to be
overruled and the methodology stood in Sarla Verma (supra)
should be accepted.
37. On behalf of the claimants, emphasis is laid on the concept
of “just compensation” and what should be included within the
ambit of “just compensation”. Learned counsel have emphasized
on Davies method and urged that the grant of pecuniary
advantage is bound to be included in the future pecuniary
benefit. It has also been put forth that in right to receive just
compensation under the statute, when the method of
standardization has been conceived and applied, there cannot be
any discrimination between the person salaried or self-employed.
It is highlighted that if evidence is not required to be adduced in
30
one category of cases, there is no necessity to compel the other
category to adduce evidence to establish the foundation for
addition of future prospects.
38. Stress is laid on reasonable expectation of pecuniary
benefits relying on the decisions in Tafe Vale Railway Co.
(supra) and the judgment of Singapore High Court in Nirumalan
V Kanapathi Pillay v. Teo Eng Chuan37. Lastly, it is urged that
the standardization formula for awarding future income should
be applied to self-employed persons and that would be a
justifiable measure for computation of loss of dependency.
39. Before we proceed to analyse the principle for addition of
future prospects, we think it seemly to clear the maze which is
vividly reflectible from Sarla Verma, Reshma Kumari, Rajesh
and Munna Lal Jain. Three aspects need to be clarified. The
first one pertains to deduction towards personal and living
expenses. In paragraphs 30, 31 and 32, Sarla Verma lays
down:-
“30. Though in some cases the deduction to be made
towards personal and living expenses is calculated on
the basis of units indicated in Trilok Chandra4, the
general practice is to apply standardised deductions.
Having considered several subsequent decisions of this
37 (2003) 3 SLR (R) 601
31
Court, we are of the view that where the deceased was
married, the deduction towards personal and living
expenses of the deceased, should be one-third (1/3rd)
where the number of dependent family members is 2
to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the number of
dependent family members is 4 to 6, and one-fifth
(1/5th) where the number of dependent family
members exceeds six.
31. Where the deceased was a bachelor and the
claimants are the parents, the deduction follows a
different principle. In regard to bachelors, normally,
50% is deducted as personal and living expenses,
because it is assumed that a bachelor would tend to
spend more on himself. Even otherwise, there is also
the possibility of his getting married in a short time, in
which event the contribution to the parent(s) and
siblings is likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject
to evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have
his own income and will not be considered as a
dependant and the mother alone will be considered as
a dependant. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as
dependants, because they will either be independent
and earning, or married, or be dependent on the
father.
32. Thus even if the deceased is survived by parents
and siblings, only the mother would be considered to
be a dependant, and 50% would be treated as the
personal and living expenses of the bachelor and 50%
as the contribution to the family. However, where the
family of the bachelor is large and dependent on the
income of the deceased, as in a case where he has a
widowed mother and large number of younger nonearning
sisters or brothers, his personal and living
expenses may be restricted to one-third and
contribution to the family will be taken as two-third.”
40. In Reshma Kumari, the three-Judge Bench agreed with the
multiplier determined in Sarla Verma and eventually held that
32
the advantage of the Table prepared in Sarla Verma is that
uniformity and consistency in selection of multiplier can be
achieved. It has observed:-
“35. … The assessment of extent of dependency
depends on examination of the unique situation of the
individual case. Valuing the dependency or the
multiplicand is to some extent an arithmetical
exercise. The multiplicand is normally based on the
net annual value of the dependency on the date of the
deceased’s death. Once the net annual loss
(multiplicand) is assessed, taking into account the age
of the deceased, such amount is to be multiplied by a
“multiplier” to arrive at the loss of dependency.”
41. In Reshma Kumari, the three-Judge Bench, reproduced
paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of Sarla Verma and approved the
same by stating thus:-
“41. The above does provide guidance for the
appropriate deduction for personal and living
expenses. One must bear in mind that the proportion
of a man’s net earnings that he saves or spends
exclusively for the maintenance of others does not
form part of his living expenses but what he spends
exclusively on himself does. The percentage of
deduction on account of personal and living expenses
may vary with reference to the number of dependent
members in the family and the personal living
expenses of the deceased need not exactly correspond
to the number of dependants.
42. In our view, the standards fixed by this Court in
Sarla Verma on the aspect of deduction for personal
living expenses in paras 30, 31 and 32 must ordinarily
be followed unless a case for departure in the
33
circumstances noted in the preceding paragraph is
made out.”
42. The conclusions that have been summed up in Reshma
Kumari are as follows:-
“43.1. In the applications for compensation made
under Section 166 of the 1988 Act in death cases
where the age of the deceased is 15 years and above,
the Claims Tribunals shall select the multiplier as
indicated in Column (4) of the Table prepared in Sarla
Verma read with para 42 of that judgment.
43.2. In cases where the age of the deceased is up to
15 years, irrespective of Section 166 or Section 163-A
under which the claim for compensation has been
made, multiplier of 15 and the assessment as
indicated in the Second Schedule subject to correction
as pointed out in Column (6) of the Table in Sarla
Verma should be followed.
43.3. As a result of the above, while considering the
claim applications made under Section 166 in death
cases where the age of the deceased is above 15 years,
there is no necessity for the Claims Tribunals to seek
guidance or for placing reliance on the Second
Schedule in the 1988 Act.
43.4. The Claims Tribunals shall follow the steps and
guidelines stated in para 19 of Sarla Verma for
determination of compensation in cases of death.
43.5. While making addition to income for future
prospects, the Tribunals shall follow para 24 of the
judgment in Sarla Verma.
43.6. Insofar as deduction for personal and living
expenses is concerned, it is directed that the Tribunals
shall ordinarily follow the standards prescribed in
paras 30, 31 and 32 of the judgment in Sarla Verma
34
subject to the observations made by us in para 41
above.”
43. On a perusal of the analysis made in Sarla Verma which has
been reconsidered in Reshma Kumari, we think it appropriate to
state that as far as the guidance provided for appropriate
deduction for personal and living expenses is concerned, the
tribunals and courts should be guided by conclusion 43.6 of
Reshma Kumari. We concur with the same as we have no
hesitation in approving the method provided therein.
44. As far as the multiplier is concerned, the claims tribunal
and the Courts shall be guided by Step 2 that finds place in
paragraph 19 of Sarla Verma read with paragraph 42 of the said
judgment. For the sake of completeness, paragraph 42 is
extracted below :-
“42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used
should be as mentioned in Column (4) of the table
above (prepared by applying Susamma Thomas,
Trilok Chandra and Charlie), which starts with an
operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15
to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for
every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-
16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14
for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years,
then reduced by two units for every five years, that
is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years,
M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.”
35
45. In Reshma Kumari, the aforesaid has been approved by
stating, thus:-
“It is high time that we move to a standard method
of selection of multiplier, income for future
prospects and deduction for personal and living
expenses. The courts in some of the overseas
jurisdictions have made this advance. It is for these
reasons, we think we must approve the Table in
Sarla Verma for the selection of multiplier in claim
applications made under Section 166 in the cases of
death. We do accordingly. If for the selection of
multiplier, Column (4) of the Table in Sarla Verma is
followed, there is no likelihood of the claimants who
have chosen to apply under Section 166 being
awarded lesser amount on proof of negligence on
the part of the driver of the motor vehicle than those
who prefer to apply under Section 163-A. As regards
the cases where the age of the victim happens to be
up to 15 years, we are of the considered opinion
that in such cases irrespective of Section 163-A or
Section 166 under which the claim for
compensation has been made, multiplier of 15 and
the assessment as indicated in the Second Schedule
subject to correction as pointed out in Column (6) of
the Table in Sarla Verma should be followed. This is
to ensure that the claimants in such cases are not
awarded lesser amount when the application is
made under Section 166 of the 1988 Act. In all
other cases of death where the application has been
made under Section 166, the multiplier as indicated
in Column (4) of the Table in Sarla Verma should be
followed.”
46. At this stage, we must immediately say that insofar as the
aforesaid multiplicand/multiplier is concerned, it has to be
accepted on the basis of income established by the legal
representatives of the deceased. Future prospects are to be
36
added to the sum on the percentage basis and “income” means
actual income less than the tax paid. The multiplier has already
been fixed in Sarla Verma which has been approved in Reshma
Kumari with which we concur.
47. In our considered opinion, if the same is followed, it shall
subserve the cause of justice and the unnecessary contest before
the tribunals and the courts would be avoided.
48. Another aspect which has created confusion pertains to
grant of loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses.
In Santosh Devi (supra), the two-Judge Bench followed the
traditional method and granted Rs. 5,000/- for transportation of
the body, Rs. 10,000/- as funeral expenses and Rs. 10,000/- as
regards the loss of consortium. In Sarla Verma, the Court granted
Rs. 5,000/- under the head of loss of estate, Rs. 5,000/- towards
funeral expenses and Rs. 10,000/- towards loss of Consortium.
In Rajesh, the Court granted Rs. 1,00,000/- towards loss of
consortium and Rs. 25,000/- towards funeral expenses. It also
granted Rs. 1,00,000/- towards loss of care and guidance for
minor children. The Court enhanced the same on the principle
that a formula framed to achieve uniformity and consistency on a
socio-economic issue has to be contrasted from a legal principle
37
and ought to be periodically revisited as has been held in Santosh
Devi (supra). On the principle of revisit, it fixed different amount
on conventional heads. What weighed with the Court is factum
of inflation and the price index. It has also been moved by the
concept of loss of consortium. We are inclined to think so, for
what it states in that regard. We quote:-
“17. … In legal parlance, “consortium” is the right of
the spouse to the company, care, help, comfort,
guidance, society, solace, affection and sexual
relations with his or her mate. That non-pecuniary
head of damages has not been properly understood by
our courts. The loss of companionship, love, care and
protection, etc., the spouse is entitled to get, has to be
compensated appropriately. The concept of nonpecuniary
damage for loss of consortium is one of the
major heads of award of compensation in other parts
of the world more particularly in the United States of
America, Australia, etc. English courts have also
recognised the right of a spouse to get compensation
even during the period of temporary disablement. By
loss of consortium, the courts have made an attempt
to compensate the loss of spouse’s affection, comfort,
solace, companionship, society, assistance, protection,
care and sexual relations during the future years.
Unlike the compensation awarded in other countries
and other jurisdictions, since the legal heirs are
otherwise adequately compensated for the pecuniary
loss, it would not be proper to award a major amount
under this head. Hence, we are of the view that it
would only be just and reasonable that the courts
award at least rupees one lakh for loss of consortium.”
38
49. Be it noted, Munna Lal Jain (supra) did not deal with the
same as the notice was confined to the issue of application of
correct multiplier and deduction of the amount.
50. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. The
conventional sum has been provided in the Second Schedule of
the Act. The said Schedule has been found to be defective as
stated by the Court in Trilok Chandra (supra). Recently in
Puttamma and others v. K.L. Narayana Reddy and another38
it has been reiterated by stating:-
“… we hold that the Second Schedule as was
enacted in 1994 has now become redundant,
irrational and unworkable due to changed scenario
including the present cost of living and current rate
of inflation and increased life expectancy.”
51. As far as multiplier or multiplicand is concerned, the same
has been put to rest by the judgments of this Court. Para 3 of
the Second Schedule also provides for General Damages in case
of death. It is as follows:-
“3. General Damages (in case of death):
The following General Damages shall be payable in
addition to compensation outlined above:-
(i) Funeral expenses - Rs. 2,000/-
(ii) Loss of Consortium, if beneficiary is the
spouse – Rs. 5,000/-
38 (2013) 15 SCC 45
39
(iii) Loss of Estate - Rs. 2,500/-
(iv) Medical Expenses – actual expenses incurred
before death supported by bills/vouchers but not
exceeding – Rs. 15,000/-”
52. On a perusal of various decisions of this Court, it is
manifest that the Second Schedule has not been followed starting
from the decision in Trilok Chandra (supra) and there has been
no amendment to the same. The conventional damage amount
needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different
cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs.
1,00,000/- was granted towards consortium in Rajesh. The
justification for grant of consortium, as we find from Rajesh, is
founded on the observation as we have reproduced hereinbefore.
53. On the aforesaid basis, the Court has revisited the practice
of awarding compensation under conventional heads.
54. As far as the conventional heads are concerned, we find it
difficult to agree with the view expressed in Rajesh. It has granted
Rs. 25,000/- towards funeral expenses, Rs. 1,00,000/- loss of
consortium and Rs. 1,00,000/- towards loss of care and guidance
for minor children. The head relating to loss of care and minor
children does not exist. Though Rajesh refers to Santosh Devi,
it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and
40
traditional heads, needless to say, cannot be determined on
percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable
criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to
be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable
foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price
index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field
have to be noticed. The court cannot remain oblivious to the
same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise,
there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and
unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation
lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the
orders passed by the tribunals and courts are likely to be
unguided. Therefore, we think it seemly to fix reasonable sums.
It seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads,
namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses
should be Rs. 15,000/-, Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/-
respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an
acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact-centric or
quantum-centric. We think that it would be condign that the
amount that we have quantified should be enhanced on
percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement
should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years. We are
41
disposed to hold so because that will bring in consistency in
respect of those heads.
55. Presently, we come to the issue of addition of future
prospects to determine the multiplicand.
56. In Santosh Devi the Court has not accepted as a principle
that a self-employed person remains on a fixed salary throughout
his life. It has taken note of the rise in the cost of living which
affects everyone without making any distinction between the rich
and the poor. Emphasis has been laid on the extra efforts made
by this category of persons to generate additional income. That
apart, judicial notice has been taken of the fact that the salaries
of those who are employed in private sectors also with the
passage of time increase manifold. In Rajesh’s case, the Court
had added 15% in the case where the victim is between the age
group of 15 to 60 years so as to make the compensation just,
equitable, fair and reasonable. This addition has been made in
respect of self-employed or engaged on fixed wages.
57. Section 168 of the Act deals with the concept of “just
compensation” and the same has to be determined on the
foundation of fairness, reasonableness and equitability on
acceptable legal standard because such determination can never
42
be in arithmetical exactitude. It can never be perfect. The aim is
to achieve an acceptable degree of proximity to arithmetical
precision on the basis of materials brought on record in an
individual case. The conception of “just compensation” has to be
viewed through the prism of fairness, reasonableness and nonviolation
of the principle of equitability. In a case of death, the
legal heirs of the claimants cannot expect a windfall.
Simultaneously, the compensation granted cannot be an apology
for compensation. It cannot be a pittance. Though the discretion
vested in the tribunal is quite wide, yet it is obligatory on the part
of the tribunal to be guided by the expression, that is, “just
compensation”. The determination has to be on the foundation of
evidence brought on record as regards the age and income of the
deceased and thereafter the apposite multiplier to be applied. The
formula relating to multiplier has been clearly stated in Sarla
Verma (supra) and it has been approved in Reshma Kumari
(supra). The age and income, as stated earlier, have to be
established by adducing evidence. The tribunal and the Courts
have to bear in mind that the basic principle lies in pragmatic
computation which is in proximity to reality. It is a well accepted
norm that money cannot substitute a life lost but an effort has to
be made for grant of just compensation having uniformity of
43
approach. There has to be a balance between the two extremes,
that is, a windfall and the pittance, a bonanza and the modicum.
In such an adjudication, the duty of the tribunal and the Courts
is difficult and hence, an endeavour has been made by this Court
for standardization which in its ambit includes addition of future
prospects on the proven income at present. As far as future
prospects are concerned, there has been standardization keeping
in view the principle of certainty, stability and consistency. We
approve the principle of “standardization” so that a specific and
certain multiplicand is determined for applying the multiplier on
the basis of age.
58. The seminal issue is the fixation of future prospects
in cases of deceased who is self-employed or on a fixed salary.
Sarla Verma (supra) has carved out an exception permitting the
claimants to bring materials on record to get the benefit of
addition of future prospects. It has not, per se, allowed any future
prospects in respect of the said category.
59. Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are
disposed to think when we accept the principle of
standardization, there is really no rationale not to apply the said
principle to the self-employed or a person who is on a fixed
44
salary. To follow the doctrine of actual income at the time of
death and not to add any amount with regard to future prospects
to the income for the purpose of determination of multiplicand
would be unjust. The determination of income while computing
compensation has to include future prospects so that the method
will come within the ambit and sweep of just compensation as
postulated under Section 168 of the Act. In case of a deceased
who had held a permanent job with inbuilt grant of annual
increment, there is an acceptable certainty. But to state that the
legal representatives of a deceased who was on a fixed salary
would not be entitled to the benefit of future prospects for the
purpose of computation of compensation would be inapposite. It
is because the criterion of distinction between the two in that
event would be certainty on the one hand and staticness on the
other. One may perceive that the comparative measure is
certainty on the one hand and uncertainty on the other but such
a perception is fallacious. It is because the price rise does affect
a self-employed person; and that apart there is always an
incessant effort to enhance one’s income for sustenance. The
purchasing capacity of a salaried person on permanent job when
increases because of grant of increments and pay revision or for
some other change in service conditions, there is always a
45
competing attitude in the private sector to enhance the salary to
get better efficiency from the employees. Similarly, a person who
is self-employed is bound to garner his resources and raise his
charges/fees so that he can live with same facilities. To have the
perception that he is likely to remain static and his income to
remain stagnant is contrary to the fundamental concept of
human attitude which always intends to live with dynamism and
move and change with the time. Though it may seem appropriate
that there cannot be certainty in addition of future prospects to
the existing income unlike in the case of a person having a
permanent job, yet the said perception does not really deserve
acceptance. We are inclined to think that there can be some
degree of difference as regards the percentage that is meant for or
applied to in respect of the legal representatives who claim on
behalf of the deceased who had a permanent job than a person
who is self-employed or on a fixed salary. But not to apply the
principle of standardization on the foundation of perceived lack of
certainty would tantamount to remaining oblivious to the
marrows of ground reality. And, therefore, degree-test is
imperative. Unless the degree-test is applied and left to the
parties to adduce evidence to establish, it would be unfair and
inequitable. The degree-test has to have the inbuilt concept of
46
percentage. Taking into consideration the cumulative factors,
namely, passage of time, the changing society, escalation of price,
the change in price index, the human attitude to follow a
particular pattern of life, etc., an addition of 40% of the
established income of the deceased towards future prospects and
where the deceased was below 40 years an addition of 25% where
the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years would be
reasonable.
60. The controversy does not end here. The question still
remains whether there should be no addition where the age of the
deceased is more than 50 years. Sarla Verma thinks it
appropriate not to add any amount and the same has been
approved in Reshma Kumari. Judicial notice can be taken of the
fact that salary does not remain the same. When a person is in a
permanent job, there is always an enhancement due to one
reason or the other. To lay down as a thumb rule that there will
be no addition after 50 years will be an unacceptable concept.
We are disposed to think, there should be an addition of 15% if
the deceased is between the age of 50 to 60 years and there
should be no addition thereafter. Similarly, in case of selfemployed
or person on fixed salary, the addition should be 10%
47
between the age of 50 to 60 years. The aforesaid yardstick has
been fixed so that there can be consistency in the approach by
the tribunals and the courts.
61. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we proceed to record our
conclusions:-
(i) The two-Judge Bench in Santosh Devi should have been well
advised to refer the matter to a larger Bench as it was
taking a different view than what has been stated in Sarla
Verma, a judgment by a coordinate Bench. It is because a
coordinate Bench of the same strength cannot take a
contrary view than what has been held by another
coordinate Bench.
(ii) As Rajesh has not taken note of the decision in Reshma
Kumari, which was delivered at earlier point of time, the
decision in
Rajesh is not a binding precedent.
(iii) While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual
salary to the income of the deceased towards future
prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and
was below the age of 40 years, should be made. The
addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was
48
between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between
the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%.
Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax.
(iv) In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary,
an addition of 40% of the established income should be the
warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years.
An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age
of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between
the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the
necessary method of computation. The established income
means the income minus the tax component.
(v) For determination of the multiplicand, the deduction for
personal and living expenses, the tribunals and the courts
shall be guided by paragraphs 30 to 32 of Sarla Verma
which we have reproduced hereinbefore.

(vi) The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the Table
in Sarla Verma read with paragraph 42 of that judgment.

(vii) The age of the deceased should be the basis for applying the
multiplier.
49
(viii) Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of
estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be
Rs. 15,000/-, Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- respectively.
The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of
10% in every three years.
62. The reference is answered accordingly. Matters be placed
before the appropriate Bench.
…………………………….CJI.
(Dipak Misra )
…………………………………J.
(A.K. Sikri )
…………………………………J.
(A.M. Khanwilkar )
…………………………………J.
(Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud )
…………………………………J.
(Ashok Bhushan )
New Delhi;
October 31, 2017