Whether the subsequent purchasers/assignees/power of attorney holders, etc., have locus standi to file a petition for a declaration of lapse of acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2013 Act”), is the only issue arising for consideration in these cases.=Thus, the subsequent purchaser, the assignee, the successor in interest, the power of attorney, etc., are all persons who are interested in compensation/land owners/affected persons in terms of the 2013 Act and such persons are entitled to file a case for a declaration that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue of operation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. It is a declaration qua the land wherein indisputably they have an interest and they are affected by such acquisition. For such a declaration, it cannot be said that the respondents/writ petitioners do not have any locus standi.- In the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases, the appellants are given a period of six months to exercise its liberty granted under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act for initiation of the acquisition proceedings afresh.

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION



                   CIVIL APPEAL NO.    6112        OF 2017
                (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 13551 of 2015)


GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI                        ...  APPELLANT (S)


                                   VERSUS



MANAV DHARAM TRUST AND ANOTHER         ... RESPONDENT (S)

                                    WITH

      CIVIL APPEAL NO.    6113    OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.14802 of 2015),

                     CIVIL APPEAL NO.    6115    OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.15451 of 2015),

                     CIVIL APPEAL NO.    6118    OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.15454 of 2015),

                     CIVIL APPEAL NO.    6120   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.16995 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6123   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.17006 of 2015),

                    CIVIL APPEAL NO.     6128    OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.17248 of 2015),

                     CIVIL APPEAL NO.    6131   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.17740 of 2015),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6134  OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.18480 of 2015),

                     CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6136     OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.18485 of 2015),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6138  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.19204 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6140    OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.19452 of 2015),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6142  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.19555 of 2015),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6146  OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.22067 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6149   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.22069 of 2015),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6152  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.22994 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6156   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.22995 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6160    OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.23742 of 2015),

             CIVIL APPEAL NO.     6163                   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.24957 of 2015),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6164   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.24963 of 2015),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6166   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.25524 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6170  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.26493 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6173   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.26606 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6186    OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.26724 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6190   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.27318 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6194   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.27485 of 2015),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6197 OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.27729 of 2015),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6203  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.28002 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6206   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.28579 of 2015),

                     CIVIL APPEAL NO.    6209    OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.28745 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6213    OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.28768 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6216   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.28922 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.    6219  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 28927 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6224  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 28929 of 2015),

                     CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6228    OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.29537 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6233  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 30148 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6237  OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 30211 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6240   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 30224 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6242   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.30228 of 2015),

                     CIVIL APPEAL NO.    6246   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.30234 of 2015),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6249  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.30238 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6260   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.30243 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6264   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.30244 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6267   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.30275 of 2015),

                     CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6270    OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.30733 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6272  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.30734 of 2015),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6274  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.30735 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6276   OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.31250 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6279   OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.31366/2015),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6281  OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.31673 of 2015),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6283  OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.32614 of 2015),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6285  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.32617 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6287  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.32640 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6289  OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 32642 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6291  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.32643 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6292  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.32645 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6294  OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.32647 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6296   OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.33344 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6298   OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.34619 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6300  OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.35231 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6302  OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.35243 of 2015),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6125   OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.545 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6127  OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.848 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6129    OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.1686 of 2016),

                     CIVIL APPEAL NO.    6130   OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.1698 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6132  OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.1700 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6133   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.2070 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6135  OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.2839 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6137  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.4221 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6141  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.7016 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6143    OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 7564 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6145  OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.7568 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6147   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.7609 of  2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6150  OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.7735 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6153   OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.7761 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6155   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8770 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6157    OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8793 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6159  OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8798 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6161  OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8808 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6167 OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8811 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6169  OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8812 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6172  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8813 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6175   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8817 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6176    OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 8818 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6178   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8819 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6180   OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8820 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6181  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8829 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6182   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8836 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6184   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.9061 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6185    OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.9184 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6187   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.10009 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6189  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.10495 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6191  OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.11339 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6193  OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.11349 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6195   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.11356 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6198   OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.11372 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6200   OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.11380/2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6202  OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.11383 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6205  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.11448 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6207   OF 2017
                    (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.11458/2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6210  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.17354 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6212   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.19966 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6214   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.19972 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6217  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.19976 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6218  OF 2017
                    (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.23083/2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6221   OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.23085/2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6222   OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.23095/2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6225  OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.23642/2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6227   OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.23646/2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6230   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.23659 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6231   OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.24307 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6234   OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.24313 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6236   OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.24321 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6239    OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.25136 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6241 OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.28183 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6243   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.28270 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6245   OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.28272 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6248   OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 28274/2016),

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6250 OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.28279 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6252  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.28281 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6253   OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.28661 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6255  OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.28668 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6256   OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.30426 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6259   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.31440 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6262  OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.31442/2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6263  OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.31444 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6265  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.31480/2016),

                     CIVIL APPEAL NO.    6266    OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.32231 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6269  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.32996 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6119    OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.35159 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6121  OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.35160 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6122  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.35163 of 2016),

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6139 OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.36421 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6144   OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.36792 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6148   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.37159 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6151    OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.37657 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6154  OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38279 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6158    OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38283 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6162  OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38284 of 2016),

                     CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6168    OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38286 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6171  OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38292 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6174   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38295 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6177  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38300 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6179   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38303 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6183   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38354 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6188   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38358 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6192  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38364 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6196   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38367 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6199    OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38370 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6201   OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38373 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6204  OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.1498 of 2017),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6208  OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.1499 of 2017),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6211  OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.1639 of 2017),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6215  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.1724 of 2017),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6220  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.1726 of 2017),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6223   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.1728 of 2017),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6226  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.1729 of 2017),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6229   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.1730 of 2017),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6232    OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.1731 of 2017),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6235  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.3826 of 2017),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6238  OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.6911 of 2017),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6244  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8928 of 2017),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6247  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8929 of 2017),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6251  OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.9586 of 2017),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6254   OF 2017
                  (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.9734 of 2017),

                    CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  6257-6258  OF 2017
              (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.10556-10557 of 2017)

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6261  OF 2017
                 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.11873 of 2017),

                     CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6268    OF 2017
                   (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.25536 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6271     OF 2017
        (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38374 of 2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6273   OF 2017
        (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.28305 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6275    OF 2017
       (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.30167 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6278   OF 2017
       (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.30170 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.   6280   OF 2017
        (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.13381 of 2015),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6282   OF 2017
         (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.7731 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6284   OF 2017
         (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.7754 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6286   OF 2017
         (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8762 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6288   OF 2017
       (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.11404 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6290  OF 2017
          (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.11479/2016),

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6293   OF 2017
        (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38296 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6295   OF 2017
        (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38299 of 2016),

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  6297  OF 2017
        (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38355 of 2016),

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6299 OF 2017
        (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38360 of 2016)

                                AND

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6301   OF 2017
                (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.38366  of 2016)



                               J U D G M E N T



KURIAN, J.:



Leave granted.


Whether  the  subsequent  purchasers/assignees/power  of  attorney  holders,
etc., have locus standi to file a petition for a  declaration  of  lapse  of
acquisition  proceedings  under  Section  24(2)  of  The   Right   to   Fair
Compensation  and  Transparency  in  Land  Acquisition,  Rehabilitation  and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2013 Act”),  is  the
only issue arising for consideration in these cases.

The High Court has taken the view in favour of such people. Thus,  aggrieved
the NCT of Delhi and Delhi Development Authority are in appeals before  this
Court.

At the outset, we may  note  that  in  these  cases,  the  land  acquisition
proceedings have otherwise lapsed by the operation of Section 24(2)  of  the
2013 Act since either compensation was not paid or possession was not  taken
within five years prior to 01.01.2014, the date of coming into force of  the
2013 Act. Thus, the dispute is only on the locus standi.


Shri Amarendra Saran,  learned  Senior  Counsel  leading  the  arguments  on
behalf of the appellants submits that in all these cases,  the  transfer  is
in violation of  The  Delhi  Lands  (Restrictions  on  Transfer)  Act,  1972
(hereinafter referred to as “the Delhi Act, 1972”). The transfers in  favour
of the writ petitioners are hence void, and accordingly, the beneficiary  of
an illegal/void transaction is not entitled to file a case for any relief.


Reliance is placed on Sections 3,4,8, and 9 of the 1972 Act, which  read  as
follows:

1 “3. Prohibition on transfer of lands acquired by Central Government –


No person shall purport to  transfer  by  sale,  mortgage,  gift,  lease  or
otherwise any land or part thereof situated in the Union territory of  Delhi
which  has  been  acquired  by  the  Central  Government  under   the   Land
Acquisition Act, 1984 or under any other law providing  for  acquisition  of
land for a public purpose.


2 4. Regulation on transfer  of  lands  in  relation  to  which  acquisition
proceedings have been initiated.


No person shall, except with the  previous  permission  in  writing  of  the
competent authority, transfer or purport  to  transfer  by  sale,  mortgage,
gift, lease or otherwise any land or part  thereof  situated  in  the  Union
territory of Delhi, which is proposed to be acquired in connection with  the
Scheme and in relation to which a declaration to the effect that  such  land
or part thereof is needed for a public  purpose  having  been  made  by  the
Central Government under section 6 of the Land Acquisition  Act,  1894,  the
Central Government has not withdrawn from the acquisition under  section  48
of that Act.


                xxx                         xxx                   xxx


3 8. Restrictions on registration of transfers of land –


Notwithstanding any thing contained in any other law for the time  being  in
force, where any document required to be registered under the provisions  of
clause  (a)  to  clause  (e)  of  sub-section  (1)  of  section  17  of  the
Registration Act, 1908, purports to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift,  lease
or otherwise any  land  or  part  thereof  referred  to  in  section  4,  no
registering officer  appointed  under  that  Act  shall  register  any  such
document unless the transferor produces before such  registering  officer  a
permission in writing of the competent authority for such transfer.


4 9. Penalty –

If any person contravenes the provisions of  section  3  or  section  4,  he
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend  to  three
years or with fine or with both.”


Learned Senior Counsel and other learned Counsel further submitted that  the
issue is no more res integra in view of  the  following  decisions  of  this
Court:
(i)   U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow Through Its  Chairman  and  another  v.  Kalra
Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow and others[1],

(ii)  Sneh Prabha (Smt.) and others v. State of U.P. and another[2],

(iii) Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and others[3],

(iv)   V.  Chandrasekaran  and  another  v.   Administrative   Officer   and
others[4],

(v)    Rajasthan    State    Industrial    Development    and     Investment
Corporation v.  Subhash  Sindhi  Cooperative  Housing  Society,  Jaipur  and
others[5] and


U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow (supra), is a case where this Court  considered  the
consequences of a transfer of the land after issuance of notification  under
Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred  to  as
“the 1894 Act”) in the  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh.  It  was  held  that  any
encumbrances created  by  the  owner  after  Section  4(1)  Notification  is
published, does not bind the  Government  and  such  a  purchaser  does  not
acquire any title to  the  property.  Therefore,  such  a  purchaser  cannot
challenge the validity of the notification or the regularity of the  process
of taking possession of the land. To quote paragraph-3:

“3. …  It is settled law that after the notification under Section  4(1)  is
published in the Gazette any encumbrance created by the owner does not  bind
the Government  and  the  purchaser  does  not  acquire  any  title  to  the
property. In this case, notification under Section 4(1) was published on 24-
3-1973, possession of the land admittedly was taken on 5-7-1973 and  pumping
station house was constructed. No doubt, declaration  under  Section  6  was
published later on  8-7-1973.  Admittedly  power  under  Section  17(4)  was
exercised dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A and  on  service  of
the notice under Section 9 possession was taken, since  urgency  was  acute,
viz., pumping station house was to be constructed to drain out flood  water.
Consequently, the land stood vested in the State under  Section  17(2)  free
from all encumbrances. It is further settled law  that  once  possession  is
taken, by operation of Section 17(2), the land vests in the State free  from
all encumbrances unless a notification under Section 48(1) is  published  in
the Gazette withdrawing from the acquisition. Section 11-A,  as  amended  by
Act 68 of 1984, therefore, does not  apply  and  the  acquisition  does  not
lapse. The  notification  under  Section  4(1)  and  the  declaration  under
Section 6, therefore, remain valid. There is no other  provision  under  the
Act  to  have  the  acquired  land  divested,  unless,  as  stated  earlier,
notification under  Section  48(1)  was  published  and  the  possession  is
surrendered pursuant  thereto.  That  apart,  since  M/s  Kalra  Properties,
respondent had purchased the land after the notification under Section  4(1)
was published, its sale is void against the State and it acquired no  right,
title or interest in the land. Consequently,  it  is  settled  law  that  it
cannot challenge the validity of  the  notification  or  the  regularity  in
taking possession of the land before publication of  the  declaration  under
Section 6 was published.”

In Sneh  Prabha  (supra),  this  Court  reiterated  the  position  that  any
alienation of land after the publication of the notification  under  Section
4(1) of the 1894 Act does not bind the Government or the  beneficiary  under
the acquisition. It has also been held that once the possession of the  land
is taken under Section 16 of the Act, the land  vests  with  the  Government
free from  all  encumbrances  and  the  absolute  title  is  vested  in  the
Government. To quote from                 paragraph-5:

“5.  …  It  is  settled  law  that  any  person  who  purchases  land  after
publication of the notification under Section 4(1), does so at  his/her  own
peril. The object of publication of the notification under Section  4(1)  is
notice to everyone that the land is needed or is likely  to  be  needed  for
public purpose and the acquisition proceedings point out  an  impediment  to
anyone  to  encumber  the  land  acquired  thereunder.  It  authorises   the
designated  officer  to  enter  upon  the  land  to  do  preliminaries  etc.
Therefore, any alienation of land after the publication of the  notification
under Section 4(1) does not bind the Government  or  the  beneficiary  under
the acquisition. On taking possession of the land, all  rights,  titles  and
interests in land stand vested in the State, under Section 16  of  the  Act,
free from all encumbrances  and  thereby  absolute  title  in  the  land  is
acquired thereunder. If any  subsequent  purchaser  acquires  land,  his/her
only right would be subject to the provisions of the Act and/or  to  receive
compensation for the land. In a recent judgment,  this  Court  in  Union  of
India v. Shivkumar Bhargava considered  the  controversy  and  held  that  a
person who purchases land subsequent to the notification is not entitled  to
alternative site. It is seen that the Land Policy expressly  conferred  that
right only on that person whose land  was  acquired.  In  other  words,  the
person must be the owner of the land  on  the  date  on  which  notification
under Section 4(1) was published. By necessary implication,  the  subsequent
purchaser was elbowed out from the policy  and  became  disentitled  to  the
benefit of the Land Policy.”


In Meera Sahni (supra), this Court  dealt  with  the  provisions  under  the
Delhi Act, 1972. After referring to U.P. Jal Nigam  and  Sneh  Prabha  cases
(supra), in paragraph-21 of the judgment, it was held that  ...  “it  is  by
now well settled law that under the Land  Acquisition  Act,  the  subsequent
purchaser cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings and that he would  be
only entitled to get the compensation”.

In V. Chandrasekaran (supra), this Court again addressed  the  issue  as  to
whether the subsequent purchaser can challenge the acquisition  proceedings.
After referring to some of the earlier judgments, at paragraph-18,  the  law
has been laid down as follows:

“18. In view of the above, the law on the issue can  be  summarised  to  the
effect that a person who purchases land subsequent  to  the  issuance  of  a
Section 4 notification with respect to it, is  not  competent  to  challenge
the validity of the acquisition proceedings on any  ground  whatsoever,  for
the reason that the sale deed executed in his favour does  not  confer  upon
him, any title and at the most he can claim compensation  on  the  basis  of
his vendor’s title.”

In  Rajasthan  State  Industrial  Development  and  Investment   Corporation
(supra),  this  Court  held  that  such  transactions  after  initiation  of
acquisition proceedings would be void  and  would  not  be  binding  on  the
Government. To quote paragraph-13:

“13. There can be no quarrel with respect to the settled  legal  proposition
that a purchaser, subsequent to the issuance of a Section 4 notification  in
respect of the land, cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings,  and  can
only claim compensation as the sale transaction in such a situation is  void
qua the Government. Any such  encumbrance  created  by  the  owner,  or  any
transfer of the land in question, that is made after the issuance of such  a
notification, would be deemed to be void and would not  be  binding  on  the
Government. ...”

On behalf of  the  respondents,  it  has  been  mainly  contended  that  the
subsequent purchasers are persons interested and they have  every  right  to
file a case to protect their interests. It was also pointed out  that  under
the Delhi Act, 1972, there is  no  absolute  bar  on  transfer  since  under
Section 5, the transfer was possible with the permission  of  the  Competent
Authority and that under Section 5, the Competent  Authority  cannot  refuse
to grant the permission except on any of the grounds under  sub-Section  (3)
of Section 5. To quote Section 5:

5 “5. Application for grant of permission for transfer under section 4 –


           6 xxxx                 xxxx       xxxx             xxxx


(3) The competent  authority  shall  not  refuse  to  grant  the  permission
applied for under this section except  on  one  or  more  of  the  following
grounds, namely:-


(i) That the land is needed or is likely to  be  needed  for  the  effective
implementation of the Scheme;


(ii) That the land is needed or is likely to  be  needed  for  securing  the
objects of the Delhi Development Authority referred to in section 6  of  the
Development Act;


(iii) That the land is needed or is likely to be needed for any  development
within the meaning of clause (d) of section 2 of the Development Act or  for
such things as public building and other public works and utilities,  roads,
housing,  recreation,  industry,  business,  markets,  schools   and   other
educational  institutions,  hospitals  and  public  open  spaces  and  other
categories of public uses.”




It was also contended that the 2013 Act has not  exempted  the  acquisitions
under The Delhi Development Act, 1957, and for that matter  the  Delhi  Act,
1972 under the Fourth Schedule to Section 105.

Yet another contention was that in all these cases, the  challenge  was  not
to the acquisition proceedings but for a declaration under Section 24(2)  of
the 2013 Act to  the  effect  that  by  virtue  of  operation  of  the  said
provision, the acquisition proceedings have lapsed.

“Person interested”, under the 1894 Act, is defined under  Section  3(b)  of
the Act, which reads as follows:

“3(b) the expression “person interested” includes all  persons  claiming  an
interest in compensation to be made on account of the  acquisition  of  land
under this Act; and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if  he
is interested in an easement affecting the land;”


Under the 2013 Act, “person interested” has been given a much wider  meaning
under Section 3(x). To quote:
“3(x).     “person interested” means—

all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made  on  account  of
the acquisition of land under this Act;

 the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers, who  have  lost
any  forest  rights  recognised  under  the  Scheduled  Tribes   and   Other
Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006;

a person interested in an easement affecting the land;

persons having tenancy rights under the relevant State laws including share-
croppers by whatever name they may be called; and

any person whose primary source of livelihood  is  likely  to  be  adversely
affected;”



Thus, under the 2013 Act, all persons claiming interest in  compensation  to
be paid on account of the acquisition  of  land  under  the  2013  Act,  are
persons interested.  Among  others,  any  person  whose  primary  source  of
livelihood is likely to be adversely affected is also a person interested.


“Land owner” under the 2013 Act is defined under Section 3(r),  which  reads
as follows:


“3(r)      “land owner” includes any person,—

whose name is recorded as  the  owner  of  the  land  or  building  or  part
thereof, in the records of the authority concerned; or

any person who is granted forest  rights  under  the  Scheduled  Tribes  and
Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights)  Act,  2006
or under any other law for the time being in force; or

who is entitled to be granted Patta rights on the land under any law of  the
State including assigned lands; or

any person who has been declared as  such  by  an  order  of  the  court  or
Authority;


Thus, among others, a person whose name is recorded as owner of the land  or
building or part thereof in the records of the  Authority  concerned,  is  a
land owner.

“Affected family” has been defined in the  2013  Act   under  Section   3(c)
which reads as follows :-

“3(c) ?affected family? includes—
  a family whose land or other immovable property has been acquired;
   a family which does not own any land but a  member  or  members  of  such
family may be agricultural labourers, tenants including any form of  tenancy
or holding of usufruct right, share-croppers  or  artisans  or  who  may  be
working in the affected area for three years prior  to  the  acquisition  of
the  land,  whose  primary  source  of  livelihood  stand  affected  by  the
acquisition of land;
   the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers who have  lost
any of their forest rights recognised under the Scheduled Tribes  and  Other
Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006  (2  of
2007) due to acquisition of land;
   family whose primary source of livelihood for three years  prior  to  the
acquisition of the  land  is  dependent  on  forests  or  water  bodies  and
includes gatherers of forest produce, hunters, fisher folk and  boatmen  and
such livelihood is affected due to acquisition of land;
   a member  of  the  family  who  has  been  assigned  land  by  the  State
Government or the Central Government under any of its schemes and such  land
is under acquisition;
  a family residing on any land in  the  urban  areas  for  preceding  three
years or more prior to the acquisition of the land or whose  primary  source
of livelihood for three years prior  to  the  acquisition  of  the  land  is
affected by the acquisition of such land;”

This definition of  affected  family  also  indicates  that  even  a  family
residing in the lands sought to be acquired, be it an owner or  not,  is  an
affected family, and if a family or a person is  affected,  necessarily,  he
has a right to approach the Court to protect his interests.

It is also to be specifically noted that the  challenge  made  by  the  writ
petitioners in the Miscellaneous Application filed by them  is  not  to  the
acquisition or to the regularity of the  process  of  acquisition  including
the taking of possession. Their only prayer is for a  declaration  that  the
proceedings qua the land referred to  in  the  Application  have  lapsed  by
virtue of the operation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

All the decisions cited by the learned  Senior  Counsel  appearing  for  the
appellants,  no  doubt,  have  categorically  held   that   the   subsequent
purchasers  do  not  have  locus  standi  to   challenge   the   acquisition
proceedings.  But  in  the  present  case,  the  challenge  is  not  to  the
acquisition proceeding; it is only for a declaration  that  the  acquisition
proceedings have lapsed in view of the operation of  Section  24(2)  of  the
2013 Act, and therefore, the ratio in those  cases  has  no  application  to
these cases.

It is one thing to say  that  there  is  a  challenge  to  the  legality  or
propriety or validity of the acquisition proceedings and yet  another  thing
to say that  by  virtue  of  operation  of  a  subsequent  legislation,  the
acquisition proceedings have lapsed.

In  all  the  decisions  cited  by  the  learned  Senior  Counsel  for   the
appellants, which we have referred to above, this Court  has  protected  the
rights of the subsequent purchaser to claim  compensation,  being  a  person
interested in the compensation, despite holding  that  they  have  no  locus
standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings.

The 2013 Act has made a sea change in the approach  on  the  acquisition  of
land and compensation thereof. The only lapse under the 1894 Act  was  under
Section 11A where what would lapse is the ... “entire  proceedings  for  the
acquisition of land” whereas under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, what  gets
lapsed is the land acquisition proceedings  initiated  under  the  1894  Act
which has culminated in passing of an  award  under  Section  11  but  where
either possession was not taken or compensation was  not  paid  within  five
years prior to 01.01.2014. In other words, the land acquisition  proceedings
contemplated under Section 24(2)  of  the  2013  Act  would  take  in  both,
payment of compensation and  taking  of  possession  within  the  five  year
period prior to 01.01.2014. If either of them is not satisfied,  the  entire
land acquisition proceedings would lapse under the  deeming  provision.  The
impact of deemed lapse under Section 24(2) is that pervasive. To quote  R.F.
Nariman, J. in Delhi Development Authority v. Sukbhir Singh  and  others[6].
To quote:

“... As is well settled, a deeming fiction is enacted  so  that  a  putative
state of affairs must be imagined, the mind not being allowed to  boggle  at
the logical consequence of such putative  state  of  affairs  ...  In  fact,
Section 24(2) uses the  expression  “deemed  to  have  lapsed”  because  the
Legislature was cognisant of the fact that, in cases where compensation  has
not been paid, and physical possession handed over to the State/vesting  has
taken place, after which land acquisition proceedings could be said to  have
been ended. ...” (Paragraph-27).


      Thus, on account of the lapse, the encumbrance created  in  favour  of
the State comes to an end, and resultantly, the impediment to  encumber  the
land also comes to an end. Even, according to the appellants, the  transfers
were illegal and void for the reason that there was an  impediment  for  the
transfer. Once the acquisition proceedings lapse, all impediments  cease  to
exist.

As we have already noted above, the  whole  face  of  land  acquisition  has
changed by the 2013 Act.  Section 105 of the 2013 Act has provided that  the
provisions of the Act shall not apply to the  enactments  specified  in  the
Fourth Schedule. So far, only 13 Acts have been notified  under  the  Fourth
Schedule. Neither The Delhi  Development  Act,  1957  nor  The  Delhi  Lands
(Restrictions on Transfers) Act, 1972 is included in the Fourth Schedule.

The main purpose of the 2013 Act is clearly stated  in  the  preamble  which
reads as follows :-

“An Act  to  ensure,  in  consultation  with  institutions  of  local  self-
government and Gram Sabhas established under  the  Constitution,  a  humane,
participative, informed and transparent process  for  land  acquisition  for
industrialisation, development of essential infrastructural  facilities  and
urbanisation with the least disturbance to the owners of the land and  other
affected families and provide just and fair  compensation  to  the  affected
families whose land has been acquired or proposed  to  be  acquired  or  are
affected by such acquisition and make adequate provisions for such  affected
persons for their rehabilitation and resettlement and for ensuring that  the
cumulative  outcome  of  compulsory  acquisition  should  be  that  affected
persons become partners in development leading to an  improvement  in  their
post acquisition social  and  economic  status  and  for  matters  connected
therewith or incidental thereto.”


There is a clear indication that the Act proposes to  protect  the  interest
of those persons, among others who are  affected  by  the  acquisition.  The
subsequent purchasers/successors, etc., in the  cases  before  us,  are  all
people affected by the acquisition, and therefore, also  they  are  entitled
to seek a declaration on lapse under the 2013 Act.


The High Court of Karnataka at  Bengaluru  in  Suryaprakash  and  others  v.
State of Karnataka and others[7] has considered a  situation  of  lapse  and
locus standi of the subsequent purchaser to  file  a  writ  petition  for  a
declaration on lapse, though not under Section 24(2) of  the  2013  Act.  At
paragraph-16, it has been held:


“16. … the principle that  transferee  of  land  after  the  publication  of
preliminary notification cannot maintain a  writ  petition  challenging  the
acquisition, cannot be made applicable  to  a  case  where  the  acquisition
itself has been abandoned and has stood lapsed due  to  efflux  of  time  on
account  of  the  omission  and  inaction  on  the  part  of  the  acquiring
authority, particularly because, it is because of the lapse of time and  the
abandonment of the acquisition, right accrues to the original owner to  deal
with his property including by way  of  the  sale  and  the  purchaser  will
acquire right to protect his interest. Hence, the judgment in  the  case  of
Rajasthan  State  Industrial  Development  and  Investment  Corporation   v.
Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society, Jaipur and others (2013)  5  SCC
427, will have no application to the facts of the present case.”


      We are of the view that this decision, in principle, applies to the
facts of these appeals as well.


Thus, the subsequent purchaser, the assignee,  the  successor  in  interest,
the power  of  attorney,  etc.,  are  all  persons  who  are  interested  in
compensation/land owners/affected persons in terms of the 2013 Act and  such
persons are entitled to  file  a  case  for  a  declaration  that  the  land
acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue of operation of Section  24(2)
of the 2013 Act. It is a declaration qua the land wherein indisputably  they
have an interest and they are affected  by  such  acquisition.  For  such  a
declaration, it cannot be said that the respondents/writ petitioners do  not
have any locus standi.

Thus, we do not find any merit in these appeals  and  they  are  accordingly
dismissed. All Interlocutory Applications for Impleadment and  Intervention,
other than those by Legal Representatives, are also  rejected.  Applications
for Impleadment of Legal Representatives are  allowed.  There  shall  be  no
order as to costs.

In the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases, the  appellants  are
given a period of six months to exercise its liberty granted  under  Section
24(2) of the 2013 Act for initiation of the acquisition proceedings afresh.

We make it clear that we have not gone into the inter  se  disputes  between
the parties in some cases or other claims regarding the ownership.
                                                   .......................J.
                                                             (KURIAN JOSEPH)



                                                                 .……………………J.
                 (R. BANUMATHI)

New Delhi;
May 4, 2017.


-----------------------
[1]















       (1996) 3 SCC 124
[2]    (1996) 7 SCC 426
[3]    (2008) 9 SCC 177
[4]    (2012) 12 SCC 133
[5]    (2013) 5 SCC 427
[6]    (2016) 8 SCALE 655
[7]    MANU/KA/3319/2016 (Writ Petition No. 10286-291 of  2014,  decided  on
05.12.2016).


-----------------------
                                                                  REPORTABLE





-----------------------
33

failed to appreciate = but not discussed as to why their testimony as to the fact that married sister-in-law (of the deceased) and her husband used to live in village Sabutar, is not believed. - we find that both the courts below have erred in law in holding that the charge under Section 304B read with Section 34 IPC stood proved as against the present appellants. In our opinion, in view of the evidence discussed above, it cannot be said that it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the present appellants, who are sister-in-law and brother-in-law of the deceased, tortured the victim for any demand of dowry. In our opinion, in the present case which is based on circumstantial evidence it cannot be said that appellants had any common intention with the husband of the deceased in commission of the crime. It is sufficiently shown on the record that they used to live in a different village. Therefore, we are inclined to allow the present appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed, and conviction and sentence recorded as against the present appellants Bibi Parwana Khatoon @ Parwana Khatoon and Md. Hasan @ Hasan Raja is set aside.

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURSIDICTION

                    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.    888   OF 2017
               (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 6630 of 2016)


Bibi Parwana Khatoon @
Parwana Khatoon and another                  … Appellants

                                   Versus

State of Bihar                                     …Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T


Prafulla C. Pant, J.


Leave granted.

2.    The appellants,  who  are  sister-in-law  and  brother-in-law  of  the
deceased, have challenged the judgment and order dated 09.12.2016 passed  by
the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal  Appeal  (SJ)  No.  48  of
2014 whereby said Court has dismissed the criminal  appeal  affirming  their
conviction and sentence under Section 304B read with Section  34  of  Indian
Penal Code (IPC) recorded by the Ad hoc Additional  District  Judge,  Purnea
in Sessions Trial No. 1219 of 2010 (with Sessions Trial No. 617 of 2011).

3.    Prosecution story, in  brief,  is  that  Tamkinat  Ara  @  Bulbul  got
married to Md. Parwez Alam on 30.09.2009 and she used to  live  in  her  in-
laws’ house.  The prosecution case is that after her marriage deceased  used
to live with  Md.  Parwez  Alam  (husband),  Abdul  Gaffar  (father-in-law),
Baitun Nisha (mother-in-law), Bibi Parwana Khatoon (sister of  husband)  and
her husband Md. Hasan (both appellants).  It is  alleged  by  the  informant
Md. Faisal PW-5 (brother of the deceased) that the deceased  was  killed  by
setting her on fire by all  the  above  accused.   On  receiving  telephonic
information on 30.05.2010 from  father-in-law  of  the  deceased,  PW-5  Md.
Faisal went to see his sister and found that she had died of burn  injuries.
 On the basis of First Information Report given by  Md.  Faisal  Crime  Case
No. 184 of 2010 was registered relating to offence punishable under  Section
304B read with Section 34  IPC  against  all  the  five  accused  at  Police
Station Khajanchi Hat, Madhubani.  PW-7 Arti Kumari Jaiswal,  Station  House
Officer, started investigation.  Dead body of the deceased  was  sealed  and
sent for post mortem examination.  PW-6 Dr. Umesh Kumar of  Sadar  Hospital,
Purnea, conducted post mortem examination on the dead body of  Tamkinat  Ara
and found following ante mortem injuries: -
“(i)  Rigor mortis present in all four limbs and trunk

(ii)  Tongue was protruded between teeth

(iii) Burned (burnt) blood clot from/in ear opening

(iv)  100% burn of five degree with smell.  Key oil and roasted smell,  line
of redness along burn area absent, vesication and sign of  inflammation  was
absent, formation of  granulation  tissue  absent,  indicating  post  mortem
burnt.”

      The Medical Officer opined that the deceased died of asphyxia  due  to
strangulation.

4.    Later, investigation was taken  over  by  PW-8  Lal  Babu  Prasad  who
submitted charge sheet against all the five accused.  Accused  Baitun  Nisha
(mother-in-law of the deceased) died during the course of  trial,  as  such,
case as against her stood abated  and  the  trial  court  proceeded  against
remaining four accused.

5.    After framing charge against the accused,  the  trial  court  recorded
the evidence of PW-1 Syed  Masuf  Ahmad,  PW-2  Md.  Azam  Rad,  PW-3  Samim
Akhtar, PW-4 Taleba Kauser  (brother  of  the  deceased),  PW-5  Md.  Faisal
(brother  of  the  deceased  and  informant),  PW-6  Dr.  Umesh  Kumar  (who
conducted post mortem examination), PW-7 Arti Kumari  Jaiswal  (who  started
investigation) and PW-8 Lal Babu Prasad (who concluded the investigation).

6.    The prosecution evidence appears to  have  been  put  to  the  accused
under Section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code whereafter, on  behalf  of  the
accused, defence evidence was adduced, and DW-1 Md. Mozammil  Hussain,  DW-2
Md. Shamim, DW-3 Manish  Kumar  Srivastava,  DW-4  Raghunandan  Yadav,  DW-5
Rahul Kumar, DW-6 Mukesh Kumar, DW-7 Nakir Yadav,  DW-8  Dhani  Yadav,  DW-9
Md. Jasir and DW-10 Sanni Yadav, were got examined.

7.    The trial court,  after  hearing  the  parties,  found  all  the  four
accused guilty of offence punishable under Section 304B  read  with  Section
34 IPC, and convicted them accordingly.  Md. Parwez  Alam  (husband  of  the
deceased) was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for  ten  years,  and  each
one of the remaining three convicts was sentenced to  seven  years  rigorous
imprisonment.

8.    Aggrieved by the judgment  and  order  dated  19.11.2013/  26.11.2013,
passed by the trial court in Sessions Trial No. 1219 of 2010 (with  Sessions
Trial No. 617 of 2011), whereby the accused were  convicted  and  sentenced,
as above, three appeals were filed before the High Court.   Criminal  Appeal
(SJ) No. 59 of 2014 was filed by Md. Parwez Alam (husband of the  deceased),
Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 20 of 2014 was filed by  Abdul  Gaffar  (father-in-
law of the deceased) and Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 48 of 2014  was  filed  by
present appellants Bibi Parwana Khatoon and  Md.  Hasan.   The  High  Court,
after hearing the parties,  allowed  the  appeal  of  father-in-law  of  the
deceased but maintained the conviction and sentence recorded  against  other
three.  Hence, this appeal through special leave  by  sister-in-law  Parwana
Khatoon and brother-in-law Md. Hasan.

9.    Our attention is drawn on behalf of the appellants  to  the  testimony
of the defence witnesses relating to the fact that they  were  not  residing
in Kali Prasad Tola, and it is argued that the courts below have  failed  to
appreciate the same.  It is also pointed out that there is no  special  role
assigned to the appellants in the First Information Report.

10.   DW-1 Md. Mozammil Hussain, cousin of  husband  of  the  deceased,  has
stated that Parwana Khatoon and Md. Hasan used to live in  village  Sabutar,
and on the day of the incident they were not in village  Kali  Prasad  Tola,
Madhubani, i.e. the place where the deceased and her husband used  to  live.
DW-4 Raghunandan Yadav, who is  resident  of  Kali  Prasad  Tola,  has  also
stated  that  the  present  appellants  used  to  live  in  village  Sabutar
(Purnea).  This witness belongs to village Sabutar.  DW-7 Nakir  Yadav  also
corroborated the fact that Parwana and her husband Hasan  used  to  live  in
Sabutar.  This fact is further corroborated by DW-8 Dhani  Yadav,  DW-9  Md.
Jasir and DW-10  Sanni  Yadav,  all  neighbours  of  the  deceased  and  her
husband.

11.   We have gone through the judgment and order passed by the trial  court
(copy Annexure P-9) in which the trial  court  has  mentioned  the  name  of
defence witnesses but not discussed as to why  their  testimony  as  to  the
fact that married sister-in-law (of the deceased) and her  husband  used  to
live in  village  Sabutar,  is  not  believed.   The  High  Court  has  also
committed the same error.

12.   Apart from the above, in  support  of  their  plea,  there  are  three
documents filed on behalf of the appellants,  which  are  copies  of  public
documents, to show that they are residents of village  Sabutar  in  District
Purnea.  Copy of the Residence Certificate  is  Annexure  A-1,  which  shows
that Sub Divisional Officer, Sadar,  Purnea,  has  certified  on  31.10.2008
that Hasan Raja (appellant No. 2) used to live in village Sabutar,  P.S.  K.
Nagar, District Purnea.  Another document (Annexure  A-2)  is  copy  of  PAN
issued by Income-tax Department of Government of  India,  which  appears  to
have been sent  on  the  address  of  the  account  holder  Parwana  Khatoon
(appellant No. 1) on her address of Sabutar, Purnea, Pin Code  854205.   Not
only this, copy of service book (Annexure A-3) of appellant  No.  1  Parwana
Khatoon shows that she was Panchayat teacher in  primary  school,  K.  Nagar
(Purnea).  This document also shows that  address  of  appellant  No.  1  is
village Sabutar, P.O. Kajha, Police Station K. Nagar, District Purnea.   All
these public documents read with  the  oral  testimony  adduced  before  the
trial court, create serious doubt  in  the  prosecution  story,  so  far  it
relates as against the present appellants.  (We are not  commenting  on  the
evidence as against the husband of the deceased.)

13.   In view of the above discussion of oral and documentary  evidence,  we
find that both the courts below have  erred  in  law  in  holding  that  the
charge under Section 304B read with Section 34 IPC stood proved  as  against
the present appellants.  In our opinion, in view of the  evidence  discussed
above, it cannot be said that it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that  the
present  appellants,  who  are  sister-in-law  and  brother-in-law  of   the
deceased, tortured the victim for any demand of dowry.  In our  opinion,  in
the present case which is based on  circumstantial  evidence  it  cannot  be
said that appellants had any  common  intention  with  the  husband  of  the
deceased in commission of the crime. It is sufficiently shown on the  record
that they used to live in a different village.  Therefore, we  are  inclined
to allow the present appeal.

14.   Accordingly, this appeal  is  allowed,  and  conviction  and  sentence
recorded as against the present appellants Bibi Parwana  Khatoon  @  Parwana
Khatoon and Md. Hasan @ Hasan Raja is set  aside.   They  are  acquitted  of
charge of offence punishable under Section 304B read with  Section  34  IPC.
They are in jail.  They shall be  released  forthwith  if  not  required  in
connection with any other crime.


                                                            ………………………..…….J.
                                                               [N.V. Ramana]



                                                            ………………………..…….J.
                                                          [Prafulla C. Pant]
New Delhi;
May 04, 2017.

Section 85 of the Act which deals with the Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court provides that no suit or other legal proceedings shall lie in any civil court in respect of any dispute, question or other matter relating to any Wakf, Wakf property or other matter which is required by or under this Act to be determined by the Tribunal.= whether the suit land is a Wakf property or not. Plaintiff says that it is a Wakf property whereas the defendants say that it is not the Wakf property but it is their self property. This question, in our opinion, can be decided only by the Tribunal and not by the Civil Court Second, once the property is declared to be a Wakf property, a fortiori, whether the sale of such property is made by a person not connected with the affairs of the Wakf or by a person dealing with the affairs of the Wakf, the same becomes void by virtue of Section 51 of the Act unless it is proved that it was made after obtaining prior permission of the Board as provided under the Act. One cannot dispute that the matters falling under Sections 51 and 52 of the Act are also required to be decided by the Tribunal and hence jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide such matters is also barred by virtue of provisions contained in Section 85 of the Act.

           REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL No.  6310 OF 2017
                   (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.13251/2014)

Rajasthan Wakf Board                ….Appellant(s)

                             VERSUS

Devki Nandan Pathak & Ors.        …Respondent(s)


                               J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1)    Leave granted.
2)    This appeal is filed by defendant No.6 against the final judgment  and
order  dated  30.01.2014  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature   for
Rajasthan,  Bench at Jaipur in CRP No.400 of 2001  whereby  the  High  Court
allowed the revision petition filed by the respondent Nos.1 to 5 herein  and
set aside the order  dated  22.02.2001  passed  by  the  Presiding  Officer,
Rajasthan Wakf Tribunal, Jaipur,  wherein  the  Tribunal  decreed  the  suit
filed by the plaintiff-respondent No.6 herein against defendant Nos. 1 to  5
in respect of the suit land.
3)    In order to appreciate the issue involved in the  appeal,  which  lies
in a narrow compass, it is necessary to state the relevant facts infra.
4)    The appellant herein is defendant No. 6 whereas respondent Nos.  1  to
5 are defendant Nos. 1 to 5 and respondent No. 6 is the plaintiff in a  suit
out of which this appeal arises.
5)    The appellant is a Wakf Board registered  under  the  Waqf  Act,  1995
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).  It has an office at Jaipur  in  the
State of Rajasthan.
6)    There is a property called  "Kauria  Wali  Masjid"  situated  in  Town
Hindaun, Tehsil Hindaun Barpara District Karauli,  Rajasthan.  The  property
is registered as "Wakf" at Serial No. 23, Page No.116 in the  list  of  Wakf
published under Section 5 of the Act. Respondent No. 6 is  the  Mutawali  of
the Masjid.
7)    On 05.06.1998, respondent No.5 claiming to be the owner  of  the  land
situated adjacent to “Kauria Wali Masjid” property measuring 37  feet  x  34
feet (hereinafter called the “suit land”) sold to respondent Nos.1 to  4  by
deed of  sale.  This  sale  gave  rise  to  the  dispute  between  the  Wakf
represented by respondent No. 6 on the one hand and Respondent  Nos.1  to  5
on the other.
8)    Respondent No.6 filed a suit against respondent Nos.1  to  5  and  the
appellant before the Rajasthan Wakf Tribunal at Jaipur.  The  foundation  on
which respondent No. 6  (plaintiff)  filed  the  suit  for  claiming  relief
therein, inter alia, was that the “suit land” is the Wakf  property  or,  in
other words, a part of the Wakf property and hence respondent No.5,  who  is
an individual and unconnected with the affairs of the Wakf,  had  no  right,
title and interest to sell the suit land to anyone much less  to  respondent
Nos.1 to 4.  It was alleged that the sale of the suit land  was  equally  in
contravention of Section 51 of the Act and  hence  the  same  was  void  and
illegal (para  7  of  the  plaint).  It  was  also  alleged  that  even  the
plaintiff, who is a Mutawali of the Masjid (wakf), had no right to sell  the
Wakf property or/and any of its part without  following  the  due  procedure
prescribed under the Act.  Respondent  No.6,  therefore,  claimed  a  relief
that firstly, respondent Nos.1 to  4  (defendant  Nos.1  to  4)  should  not
forcibly take possession of the suit land and in the alternate the  sale  in
question be declared void.
9)    Respondent Nos.1 to 5 filed  the  written  statement  and  denied  the
claim set up by respondent No.6 in the plaint. According to them,  the  suit
land was neither the Wakf property and nor a part of any Wakf property.   It
was alleged that respondent No.5 being the owner of the suit land had  every
right to sell the suit land to respondent Nos.1 to 4 and  which  he  did  by
executing the sale deed.  It was also  alleged  that  the  Tribunal  has  no
jurisdiction to try the suit and the remedy of  the  plaintiff  is  to  file
civil suit before the Civil Court for  claiming  appropriate  reliefs.   The
Tribunal, on the basis of the pleadings, framed  the  following  issues  for
adjudication:
“1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to file   the case?

 2. Whether the property in suit is the part of Masjid Kauria Wali?

3.  Whether this Board has no jurisdiction to entertain this case?

4. Whether the case is time barred?

5. To what relief the plaintiff is entitled?”

10)   The parties adduced evidence. By order dated 22.02.2001, the  Tribunal
decreed the suit and accordingly passed an order  against  respondent  Nos.1
to 5.  It was held that firstly, the Tribunal has the  jurisdiction  to  try
the suit; secondly, the plaintiff (respondent No.6) is the Mutawali  of  the
Wakf property and, therefore, competent to file the suit in relation to  the
suit land; and thirdly, the suit land is the  Wakf  property  or,  in  other
words, a part of the Wakf property and, therefore, it is  subjected  to  the
Wakf Act.
11)   Felt aggrieved,  respondent  Nos.1  to  5  filed  the  revision  under
Section 83(9) of the Act in the High Court. By impugned  order,  the  Single
Judge of the High Court allowed the revision and set aside the order of  the
Tribunal on the ground that the Tribunal had  no  jurisdiction  to  try  the
suit and the remedy of respondent No.6 (plaintiff) was to  file  civil  suit
before the Civil Court. The High  Court,  therefore,  did  not  examine  the
merits of the issues arising in the case.
12)   Felt aggrieved, defendant No.6-Wakf Board filed this appeal by way  of
special leave petition questioning  the  legality  and  correctness  of  the
order of the High Court.
13)   Heard Mr. Salman Khurshid, learned senior counsel  for  the  appellant
and Mr. Nitin Bhardwaj and Mr. Praveen Chaturvedi, learned counsel  for  the
respondents.
14)    Mr.  Salman  Khurshid,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
appellant-Wakf Board while assailing the legality  and  correctness  of  the
impugned order contended that the High  Court  erred  in  holding  that  the
Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to try the suit out of which this  appeal
arises.
15)    According to him, reading the averments  made  in  the  plaint  as  a
whole would clearly go to show that the suit filed before the  Tribunal  was
maintainable and, therefore,  it  was  rightly  tried  and  decreed  by  the
Tribunal on merits holding the suit land to be the Wakf property.
16)   Learned counsel urged that the basic question, which was  required  to
be decided in the suit as would be clear from issue No. 2, was  whether  the
suit land is a Wakf property or, in other words, whether it  is  a  part  of
Wakf property or not.  Learned counsel pointed out from the  pleadings  that
it has been the case of the plaintiff  (respondent  No.6  herein)  that  the
suit land has all along been  the  part  of  the  Wakf  property  and  hence
neither respondent No.5 nor anyone had any right to sell the  said  land  so
long as the procedure prescribed under the Act for sale of such property  is
followed.
17)   Learned counsel pointed out that under the  Scheme  of  the  Act,  the
question as to whether a particular property is a Wakf property or  not  has
to be tried and decided by the Tribunal under Section 83 of the Act and  the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide such question is expressly  barred
by Section 85 of the Act.
18)   Learned counsel, therefore, urged that the impugned  order  should  be
set aside by holding that the Tribunal  has  the  jurisdiction  to  try  and
decide the suit and the matter be accordingly remitted  to  the  High  Court
for deciding the revision on merits with a view to decide as to whether  the
Tribunal was justified in holding the suit land to be part of Wakf  property
or not.
19)   In reply, learned counsel for the respondents (defendant Nos. 1 to  5)
supported the impugned order  and  contended  that  it  does  not  need  any
interference and the same be upheld by dismissing the appeal.
20)   Having heard learned counsel for the parties and  on  perusal  of  the
record of the case, we find force in the submission of the  learned  counsel
for the appellant.
21)   The main question that arises for  consideration  in  this  appeal  is
whether the High Court was justified  in  holding  that  the  suit  was  not
capable of being tried by the Tribunal under Section 83 of the Act  and  the
remedy of the plaintiff was to file a civil suit before the Civil Court.
22)   The Waqf Act, 1995 was amended by The Wakf (Amendment) Act, 2013  (Act
No. 27/2013). Since the case at hand is governed by the  unamended  Act,  we
take  note  of  some  of  the  relevant  unamended  provisions  of  the  Act
hereinbelow.
23)     Section  51  of  the  Act  provides  that  notwithstanding  anything
contained in the Wakf Deed, any gift, sale,  exchange  or  mortgage  of  any
immovable property, which is a Wakf property, shall be  void  unless  it  is
effected with the prior sanction  of  the  Board.  Section  52  of  the  Act
empowers the Board to approach the  Collector  of  the  District  to  obtain
possession of such Wakf property, which is  alienated  in  contravention  of
Section 51 or Section 56 of the Act. It also provides a right of  appeal  to
the Tribunal against the order of the Collector passed under  Section  52(2)
of the Act. Section 54 of the Act provides that the Chief Executive  Officer
to  approach  the  Tribunal  to  seek  an  order  of  eviction  against  any
encroacher of the Wakf property.
24)   Section 83 of the Act empowers the Tribunal to determine any  dispute,
question or other matter relating to a Waqf  or  Wakf  property  under  this
Act. Section 85 of the Act which deals  with  the  Bar  of  jurisdiction  of
Civil Court provides that no suit or other legal proceedings  shall  lie  in
any civil court  in  respect  of  any  dispute,  question  or  other  matter
relating to any Wakf, Wakf property or other matter which is required by  or
under this Act to be determined by the Tribunal.
25)      Reading  the  averments  made  in  the  plaint  in  the  light   of
aforementioned sections, we are of the considered opinion that the  Tribunal
was right in its view in holding that it had the  jurisdiction  to  try  the
suit on merits whereas the High Court was not so in holding the otherwise.
26)   In other words, we are  of  the  view  that  the  Tribunal  does  have
jurisdiction to decide the question arising in the suit filed by  respondent
No.6 and, therefore, the Tribunal rightly tried  the  suit  on  merits.  The
reasons are not far to seek.
27)    In the first place, the  main  question  involved  in  the  suit  was
whether the suit land is a Wakf property or not. Plaintiff says that  it  is
a Wakf property whereas the defendants say that it is not the Wakf  property
but it is their self  property.  This  question,  in  our  opinion,  can  be
decided only by the Tribunal and not by the Civil Court as has been  decided
by this Court consistently in  Ramesh  Gobindram  vs.  Sugra  Hamayun  Mirza
Waqf, (2010) 8 SCC 726 and Bhanwar Lal & Anr. Vs. Rajasthan Board of  Muslim
Wakf & Ors., (2014) 16 SCC 51).  Second, once the property  is  declared  to
be a Wakf property, a fortiori, whether the sale of such  property  is  made
by a person not connected with the affairs  of  the  Wakf  or  by  a  person
dealing with the affairs of the Wakf, the same becomes  void  by  virtue  of
Section 51 of the Act unless it is proved that it was made  after  obtaining
prior permission of the Board as provided under the Act. One cannot  dispute
that   the matters falling under Sections 51 and 52  of  the  Act  are  also
required to be decided by the Tribunal and hence jurisdiction of  the  Civil
Court to decide  such  matters  is  also  barred  by  virtue  of  provisions
contained in Section 85 of the Act.
28)   In the light of foregoing discussion, we are  unable  to  concur  with
the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High  Court  as  we  find
that the High  Court  while  deciding  the  question  did  not  examine  the
question in its  proper  perspective  keeping  in  view  the  aforementioned
provisions, their scope and the law laid down in the cases  referred  supra.

29)   As a result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.  The  impugned  order
is set aside.
30)   As a consequence thereof, the matter is remanded  to  the  High  Court
for deciding the revision afresh on merits with  a  view  to  decide  as  to
whether the findings of the  Tribunal  on  merits  by  which  the  suit  was
decreed are correct or not?
31)   We, however, make it clear that we have not expressed any  opinion  on
the merits of the case and  hence  the  High  Court  would  now  decide  the
revision  expeditiously  on  merits  strictly   in   accordance   with   law
uninfluenced by any of our observations.

                                    ………...................................J.
                       [R.K. AGRAWAL]


…...……..................................J.
                               [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]     New Delhi;
May 04, 2017
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