LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Wednesday, June 17, 2015

When the property in the hands of a sole coparcener allotted to him in partition revives as coparcenary Property ?


When the property in the hands of a sole coparcener allotted to him in partition revives as coparcenary Property ?
Whether  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to   a   decree   for
               declaration  to  the  effect  that  impugned  release   deed
               dt.28.5.2004 and mutation no.3365 entered  and  attested  in
               lieu of impugned release deed and  further  two  sale  deeds
               dt.19.5.2000 bearing no.272/1 and 273/1 and mutation no.3110
               and 3106 entered and attested on the basis of  impugned  two
               sale deeds and further revenue entries  are  wrong,  illegal
               and  not  binding  on  the  rights  of  the  plaintiff   and
               defendants no. 6     & 7?”
  

  “ It is now well settled in view of several decisions of this
           Court that the property  in  the  hands  of  a  sole  coparcener
           allotted to him in partition shall be his separate property  for
           the same shall revive only when a son is born to him. It is  one
           thing to say that the property remains  a  coparcenary  property
           but it is another thing to say that it revives. The  distinction
           between the two is absolutely clear and unambiguous. In the case
           of former any sale or alienation which has been done by the sole
           survivor coparcener shall be valid whereas  in  the  case  of  a
           coparcener any alienation made by the karta would be valid.”


so long, on partition an ancestral property remains in the hands of a single person, it has to be treated as separate property and such person shall be entitled to dispose of the co-parcenery property treating it to be his separate property, but if a son is subsequently born, the property becomes co-parcenery property and the son would acquire interest in that and become co-parcener.
The son would now include daughter also . 
The Central Act was amended only in the year 2005 and came in to force on 09.09.2005. 
There was a State amendment in the year 1989, thereby section 6 was amended by Tamil Nadu State Amendment Act. 
The daughter was recognised as a coparcenar. However the Central Act supersede the State amendment and from 9.9.2005 the daughter is a coparcenar along with the son.
The dates are crucial to decide whether the petitioners/appellants are entitled a share in the property of their grandfather along with their father. Another aspect is the right of disposal after partition by the coparcenar to whom it was allotted. 

  A person, who for the time being is the sole surviving  coparcener  as
in the present case Gulab Singh was, before the birth of the plaintiff,  was
entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property as if it were  his  separate
property.  Gulab Singh, till the  birth  of  plaintiff  Rohit  Chauhan,  was
competent to sell, mortgage and deal with the property as  his  property  in
the manner he liked.  Had he done so before the birth  of  plaintiff,  Rohit
Chauhan, he was not competent to  object  to  the  alienation  made  by  his
father before he was born or begotten.  But, in the present case, it  is  an
admitted position that the property which defendant no. 2 got  on  partition
was an ancestral property and till the birth of the plaintiff  he  was  sole
surviving coparcener but the moment plaintiff was born, he got  a  share  in
the father’s property and became a coparcener. As observed earlier, in  view
of the settled legal position, the property in the hands of defendant no.  2
allotted to him in partition was a separate property till the birth  of  the
plaintiff and, therefore,  after  his  birth  defendant  no.  2  could  have
alienated the property only as Karta for legal necessity.   It  is  nobody’s
case that defendant no. 2 executed the sale deeds and release deed as  Karta
for any legal necessity.   Hence,  the  sale  deeds  and  the  release  deed
executed by Gulab Singh to the extent of  entire  coparcenary  property  are
illegal, null and void.  However, in respect of  the  property  which  would
have fallen in the share of Gulab Singh at the time of  execution  of  sale-
deeds and  release  deed,  the  parties  can  work  out  their  remedies  in
appropriate proceeding.


- 2015 S.C.(2013)msklawreports

Monday, June 15, 2015

ONCE ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE - CAN NOT BE REVOKED
"Where a question as to the admissibility of a document is raised on the ground that it has not been stamped or has not been properly stamped, the party challenging the admissibility of the document has to be alert to see that the document is not admitted in evidence by the Court. The Court has to judicially determine the matter as soon as the document is tendered in evidence and before it is marked as an exhibit in the case. Once a document has been marked as an exhibit in the case and has been used by the parties in examination and cross-examination of their witnesses, S.36 comes into operation. Once a document has been admitted in evidence, as aforesaid, it is not open either to the Trial Court itself or to a Court of Appeal or Revision to go behind that order. Such an order is not one of those judicial orders which are liable to be reviewed or revised by the same court or a court of superior jurisdiction. AIR 1957 Raj 47, Reversed."2015 S.C.(1961) msklawreports

Wednesday, June 10, 2015

no offence can be made out against accused inasmuch as the petitioner/A.1 has already pronounced Talaq against complainant on 19.05.2009 and deposited Rs.79,800/- towards Mehar and Iddat for the period of three months and published the factum of divorce in Daily Urdu Newspaper Siasat on 14.06.2009 and said amount was received by the defacto complainant through her Advocate by addressing a letter dated 09.11.2013 and therefore, the complainant can no longer claim as the wife of A.1 and hence the criminal proceedings are not maintainable.= If a former/divorcee husband had subjected a divorced wife to cruelty in his status as her husband during subsistence of their marriage, he will be liable for offence under section 498A of IPC. But, if the alleged act of cruelty is committed by a former husband on the divorced wife after divorce, no offence under section 498A IPC will lie against him. He can however be proceeded against for such act, if it constitutes any other offence. Therefore, the argument of accused in this regard cannot be countenanced.

no offence can be made out against accused inasmuch as the petitioner/A.1 has already pronounced Talaq against complainant on 19.05.2009 and deposited Rs.79,800/- towards Mehar and Iddat for the period of three months and published the factum of divorce in Daily Urdu Newspaper Siasat on 14.06.2009 and said amount was received by the defacto complainant through her Advocate by addressing a letter dated 09.11.2013 and therefore, the complainant can no longer claim as the wife of A.1 and hence the criminal proceedings are not maintainable.= If a former/divorcee husband had subjected a divorced wife to cruelty in his status as her husband during subsistence of their marriage, he will be liable for offence under section 498A of IPC. But, if the alleged act of cruelty is committed by a former husband on the divorced wife after divorce, no offence under section 498A IPC will lie against him. He can however be proceeded against for such act, if it constitutes any other offence. Therefore, the argument of accused in this regard cannot be countenanced.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO        

Criminal Petition No.1036 of 2015

02-06-2015

Mohd. Rafiuddin Ahmed Rep. by its GPA Holder Syed Ismail and others.....
Petitioners

The State of Telangana  Through Public Prosecutor,High Court, Hyderabad and
another.. Respondents

Counsel for Petitioners   : Sri Sadu Rajeshwar Reddy

Counsel for Respondent No.1 : Asst. Public Prosecutor
Counsel for Respondent No.2 : Mirza Nisar Ahmed Baig Nizami

< Gist:
> Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1)  MANU/KE/0221/205 = 2005(1) KLJ 907


THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE U.DURGA PRASAD RAO        
Criminal Petition No.1036 of 2015
ORDER:
     In this petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., petitioners/A.1 to A.3
seek to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.342 of 2010 on the file of XV
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally, Hyderabad.
2)      A1 is the husband of de facto complainant. A2 and A3 are parents of
A.1.
3)      The private complaint filed by de facto complainant on 13.07.2009
was forwarded by learned XIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Hyderabad to the Women P.S Charminar South Zone, Hyderabad, which was  
registered as Crime No.172/2009 for the offences under Sec.498-A r/w 34
IPC and after investigation charge sheet was laid against A1 to A3 and the
learned XV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally, Hyderabad
took cognizance of the case and registered as C.C.No.342 of 2010.
4)      The prosecution case is that the marriage between A.1 and the defacto
complainant took place on 10.12.2004.  A.1 was doing Air Ticketing Job in
K.S.A (Kingdom Saudi Arabia).  The parents of complainant presented
Rs.1,00,000/- cash as dowry, 8 Tolas of Gold ornaments and huge Jahez
Articles including Electronic Gadgets at the time of marriage and the
Accused gave 15 Tolas of Gold ornaments to the complainant towards
Chadawa articles. The defacto complainant joined the society of her husband
and all the accused were residing jointly at Hyderabad. Within short time
after the marriage, all the accused started ill-treating her as they were not
satisfied with the dowry given by the parents of complainant.  On
20.02.2005, A.1 left to K.S.A in order to join his duty by leaving the
complainant at his residence with A.2 and A.3.  On 01.10.2005, the
complainant was blessed with a female child and the accused started abusing
and ill-treating her for giving birth to female child and demanded to deposit
Rs.1,00,000/- in the name of newly born baby. Accused demanded
Rs.1,00,000/- as additional dowry for arrangement of Visa to complainant
and accordingly, the parents of complainant paid Rs.1,00,000/- to A.2 and
A.3, upon which A.1 accommodated visa to complainant and her daughter
and both went to K.S.A on 11.08.2006 but the A.1 did not look after them
properly and did not provide minimum necessities and due to his negligence,
she became sick.  A.1 was having illegal contacts with other ladies at abroad
and when she objected the same, A.1 to A.3 abused her and threatened her
with dire consequences. In those circumstances, A.1 sent her to India on
16.03.2007 to live in her in-laws house.  Thereafter the complainant again
went to KSA in the month of May, 2007 and conceived pregnancy and came
to India on 18.12.2007 and was again blessed with a female child on
17.01.2008 and on knowing it, A.1 to A.3 made her life miserable and
tortured her and instigated A.1 to give Divorce to her. At the intervention of
elders and expenses of her parents, the complainant again went to KSA with
her two daughters in May, 2008 but the accused did not change their attitude.
a)      Whileso, In November, 2008, Complainant, her children and A.1
returned to India and started living in her in-laws house and the accused
demanded additional dowry of Rs.1,00,000/- and forcibly snatched all her
gold ornaments and Chadawa Articles. Accused accommodated a separate  
house for complainant nearby their house and the complainant was blessed
with a male child in the month of March, 2009.  Accused used to visit her
house and they tried to kill her by opening the gas pipe in the kitchen but she
rescued herself by sensing foul smell of gas leakage. The parents of
complainant paid Rs.25,000/- to A.1 but he was not satisfied and demanded
remaining amount of Rs.75,000/- and harassed her physically and mentally
for additional dowry.  On 24.03.2009, A.2 and A.3 visited the house of
complainant and demanded additional dowry of Rs.75,000/- and drove her
out of the house with minor children and threatened her not to comeback
until their demand was fulfilled otherwise they would see the end of
complainant.  Hence the charge sheet.
5)      Heard both sides.
6 a)    Denying the material averments, learned counsel for petitioners/ A.1 to
A.3 firstly argued that A.1 was in abroad as on 13.12.2008 as can be seen
from the stamping on his passport and he has not come back to India as on
today but inspite of it, the defacto complainant filed a private complaint on
13.07.2009 with all false and frivolous allegations as if A.1 along with A.2
and A.3 subjected her to cruelty both in India and KSA and therefore, all the
allegations of harassment are baseless beside being false.
b)      Secondly, he argued that the prosecution case even if uncontroverted,
no offence can be made out against accused inasmuch as the petitioner/A.1
has already pronounced Talaq against complainant on 19.05.2009 and
deposited Rs.79,800/- towards Mehar and Iddat for the period of three
months and published the factum of divorce in Daily Urdu Newspaper Siasat
on 14.06.2009 and said amount was received by the defacto complainant
through her Advocate by addressing a letter dated 09.11.2013 and therefore,
the complainant can no longer claim as the wife of A.1 and hence the
criminal proceedings are not maintainable.
c)      Thirdly, with regard to the petitioners/A.2 and A.3, learned counsel
submitted that the allegations of harassment and cruelty levelled against them
are false to the core as they have nothing to do with the affairs of
complainant and A.1 because the defacto complainant lived in a rented
portion and the petitioners/A.2 and A.3 used to never interfere with her
affairs and hence the proceedings against all the accused will amount to
abuse of process of law and liable to be quashed.
7)      Per contra, learned counsel for R.2/complainant firstly argued that the
complainant suffered ill-treatment and harassment in the hands of all the
accused in such a way that A.1 ill-treated her both at Saudi Arabia and also in
India whenever he used to visit India and whereas A.2 and A.3 used to harass
her in India and all the accused subjected her to cruelty continuously for
different reasons such as she gave birth to two female children and thereby
demanding her parents to deposit amounts in the name of those children and
also by seeking additional dowry from time to time. A.1 is concerned, when
the complainant visited him at Saudi Arabia after successive deliveries, he
did not provide Visa to her with his money but insisted that her parents
should bear the expenditure and not only that he did not look after the needs
of his wife and newly born female child in a foreign country and further, he
developed illegal contacts with women at Saudi Arabia. Learned counsel
vehemently argued that the height of atrocious acts of accused was that
somewhere after the complainant gave birth to a male child in March, 2009,
all the accused tried to kill her by opening the gas pipe in kitchen but she
providentially escaped by sensing the smell of the gas.
a)      Opposing the argument of the 1st petitioner that after 13.12.2008, A.1
was in Saudi Arabia and did not return India till today and false allegations
are made against him, learned counsel argued that the A1 did not file full
book of the passport but conveniently filed copies of only some pages to suit
his case and therefore, his version cannot be believed.  He submitted that as
per the contention of A.1, he gave Talaq and obtained divorce against
complainant on 19.05.2009 at Hyderabad and if it is true, he must be in India
since sometime prior to that date and hence A.1 was very much in India and
harassed her along with his parents. He submitted that the divorce intimation
was made to the complainant through lawyer notice dated 06.11.2009 and by
that time the complainant already filed the complaint under Sec.498A IPC on
13.07.2009.  He thus argued that whether the accused have harassed the
complainant in India as well as in Saudi Arabia or whether the complainant
gave false complaint can be determined only after a full-fledged trial as the
charges were already framed and the matter is coming up for trial, this Court
at this stage, may not quash the proceedings.
b)      Nextly, he argued that even assuming that the complainant knew that
Talaq was pronounced by A.1 on 19.05.2009 and filed complaint on
13.07.2009, still her complaint will not become invalid under law because for
the acts of cruelty of the husband and his relations during the subsistence of
marriage, a wife is entitled to launch criminal prosecution even after her
divorce.
c)      Finally regarding A.2 and A.3, learned counsel argued that in the
charge sheet, the complainant has vividly explained the harassment meted out
by her in-laws and therefore, they too do not deserve quashment of
proceedings.  He thus prayed to dismiss the petition.
8)      Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor (A.P.P) adopted the above
arguments and prayed to dismiss the petition.
9)      In the light of above rival arguments, the point for determination is:
     Whether there are merits in this petition to allow?
10)     POINT: Admittedly, the marriage between A.1 and complainant took
place on 10.12.2004 at Hyderabad and she lodged the complaint under
Sec.498A IPC on 13.07.2009.  A close scrutiny of the allegations in the
complaint and charge-sheet would reveal that she gave a vivid narration of
the harassment and cruelty meted out by A.1 to A.3 from 2005 to 2009 till
filing of complaint.  The alleged atrocious acts spread-over a period of more
than four years and occurred both in Hyderabad as well as in Saudi Arabia.
A.1 was doing Air Ticketing job at Saudi Arabia by the time of marriage.
The main allegations are that A.1 to A.3 did not like complainant delivering
two female children and so they insisted her and her parents to deposit
Rs.1,00,000/- in the name of those children and their further acts of cruelty
were that they demanded additional dowry of Rs.1,00,000/-. Besides, after
delivering first female child on 01.10.2005 when complainant went to join
her husband at Saudi Arabia, he did not even obtain Visa for her and the
expenditure was to be met by her parents and finally when she joined A.1
with her baby on 11.08.2006, he did not care for them and looked after their
necessities. Further, the scathing allegation is that A.1 was having illicit
contacts in Saudi Arabia. When she revealed these facts to A.2 and A.3, they
supported their son and threatened her and so the complainant returned India
in May, 2007 and on 18.12.2007 she gave birth to a second daughter and her
woes further intensified. A.2 and A.3 started instigating A.1 to give divorce
to complainant and with great persuasion and advice of elders, the
complainant and her two children were taken to Saudi Arabia in May, 2008.
The further allegations were that in or around November, 2008 A.1 along
with his wife and children came back to India and they were living in a
separate rented house. At that time also A.1 to A.3 demanded additional
dowry of Rs.1,00,000/- and A.1 bet her mercilessly and all the accused
snatched away her gold articles and Chadwa articles.  Subsequently she gave
birth to a male child in March, 2009 but there was no change in the attitude
of accused.  Another scaring allegation against accused is that they tried to
kill her by leaking the gas but she could providentially escape. This is the
gist
of the allegations and if uncontroverted, they provide a prima-facie material
to proceed against accused in trial.
a)      Be that it may, besides denying all the charge sheet allegations, the
accused claimed quashment firstly on the ground that since 30.12.2008 till
date, A.1 was at Saudi Arabia and did not return India and hence the question
of his harassing complainant during that relevant period and his parents
abetting him are all trash, which would show that complaint was lodged with
false averments.  In this regard, he relied upon the entry dated 13.12.2008 on
the copy of passport filed by him.  The said entry dated 13.12.2008 was
purported to be made on his passport at the R.G.I Airport, Hyderabad.  Per
contra, the contention of complainant is that copy of the full passport is not
filed by A.1 to show his subsequent visit to India and further, his claim that
he obtained divorce on 19.05.2009 at Hyderabad by pronouncing Talaq is
true, he must be in India during the relevant period also.  In my considered
view, whether A.1 has visited India subsequent to 13.12.2008 or not is not a
big issue, having regard to the nature of the allegations made in the charge
sheet against A.1 to A.3. As already stated supra, the allegations against all
the accused were spread over a period of four years from 2005 to 2009. The
allegations of atrocities were made against A.1 when he ill-treated his wife
when she visited twice to Saudi Arabia.  Whereas the allegations against A.2
and A.3 were made in respect of their atrocities at Hyderabad.  Ofcourse, few
allegations are made against A.1 to A.3 about their driving the complainant
away from their house after March, 2009.  A.1 claims that during that
relevant period he was not present in India.  However, divorce certificate
issued by Andhra Pradesh State Wakf Board and the legal notice dated
06.11.2009 issued by the Counsel of A.1 would show as if the accused
pronounced Talaq and obtained divorce on 19.05.2009.  If this is true, as
rightly argued by counsel for complainant, the A.1 must have been present in
India atleast sometime prior to 19.05.2009.  Therefore, his claim that after
13.12.2008 he was not in India to harass the complainant cannot be accepted.
Ofcourse, these aspects have to be vividly discussed after taking evidence
during trial.  For the present, the argument of accused cannot be accepted to
quash the proceedings.
11)     The second and most important ground propounded by the A.1 is that
he pronounced Talaq on 19.05.2009 and deposited Rs.79,800/- towards
Mehar and Iddat and published the factum of divorce in Daily Urdu
newspaper Siasat on 14.06.2009 and therefore, since after 19.05.2009 there
was no husband and wife relationship between the parties and suppressing all
these facts, the complainant filed the private complaint on 13.07.2009 which
is legally not maintainable. In a way, A.1 claims that in view of divorce dated
19.05.2009 the complainant cannot launch criminal prosecution against him
and other accused for their past alleged harassment even if it is true.
a)      I am afraid, this argument is quite preposterous.  It is not the trite law
that the divorced wife cannot launch prosecution against her husband and his
relations for the acts of harassment and legal cruelty meted out to her by them
the marriage was subsisting. It is profitable to extract Sec.498A IPC here:
Section 498A - Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a
woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall
also be liable to fine.
Explanation.--For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means--
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive
the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to
life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to
coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any properly or valuable security or is on account of
failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.
12)     From the expression whoever being the husband or the relatives of the
husband of a woman, what we can infer is that the status of husband as on
the date of offence is relevant but not as on the date of filing complaint.
Precisely, as on the date of offence under Sec.498-A IPC, if the husband and
wife relationship existed between the parties, that would be suffice to attract
the offence.  Subsequent divorce between parties will not have any impact on
launching prosecution under this section.  Therefore, the expression being
the husband should be understood only with reference to the date of offence
as otherwise, the very object with which Section 498A was inducted into the
Code will be defeated. That a divorced wife cannot launch prosecution for the
atrocities committed by her husband during the subsistence of the marriage is
the interpretation, it will lead to anomalous and disastrous results to the
effect
that a husband can cause all sorts of harassment to her within the purview of
Sec.498A IPC and pronounce Talaq against her and still get over from the
prosecution. That is not the intendment of the framers of the law. Similar
view was expressed by a learned Judge of Kerala High Court in the case of
M. Abdul Sathar vs. Aneesa and others , wherein the Learned Judge while
answering the questionCan a former/divorced husband be held liable for
offence under Sec.498A IPC, has made the following observations:
Para 6: From the above discussion it is clear that what is relevant
to establish offence under section 498A IPC is the marital status of
the accused at the time of commission of offence. The expression,
'being the husband' used in the section relates to the marital status of
the accused at the time of commission of the offence and not such
status at the time of filing of complaint. Emphasis is seen given in
section 498A IPC to the marital status of the accused at the time of
commission of offence and not to what it was at the time of filing the
complaint. In such circumstances, offence under section 498A IPC
will lie against a person irrespective of whether he was the husband
or former husband of a woman at the time of filing of complaint. If a
former husband had committed the offence in his capacity as the
husband during subsistence of his marriage with the victim, he can be
proceeded against for offence under section 498A IPC.
Para 7: A reading of section 498A IPC further reveals that the
expression used in section 498A IPC to denote 'the person aggrieved
by the offence' is significantly, 'woman' and not 'wife'. This in a way,
gives an indication that there is no bar for a 'woman'- whether she be
the wife or the divorced wife- to proceed against the accused/husband
for offence under section 498A IPC if she is aggrieved by commission
of such offence. But in such case, it has to be established that the
offence was committed by the accused while marriage between the
accused and victim was in existence. It is not necessary that the
victim should continue to be 'the wife' of the accused at the time of
filing of complaint also.
Para 13: I shall now sum up: If a former/divorcee husband had
subjected a divorced wife to cruelty in his status as her husband
during subsistence of their marriage, he will be liable for offence
under section 498A of IPC. But, if the alleged act of cruelty is
committed by a former husband on the divorced wife after divorce, no
offence under section 498A IPC will lie against him. He can however
be proceeded against for such act, if it constitutes any other offence.
        Therefore, the argument of accused in this regard cannot be
countenanced.
13)     So at the outset, none of the points raised by the petitioners/ accused
carry conviction to quash the proceedings. Hence, the Criminal Petition is
liable to be dismissed.
14)     In the result, this Criminal Petition is dismissed.  However, considering
that the petitioners/A.2 and A.3 are aged persons, their attendance before the
trial Court is dispensed with except on the occasions when the trial Court
specifically requires their presence.
        As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand
closed.
__________________________  
U. DURGA PRASAD RAO, J    
Date: 02.06.2015

Sunday, May 17, 2015

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is right in holding that the unabsorbed depreciation should be allowed before the allowance of the unabsorbed investment allowance in computing income of the appellant/assessee for the Assessment Year 1991-1992, when the assessee had not claimed the unabsorbed depreciation in its income-tax return though it had claimed depreciation for the current year? Once the unabsorbed carried forward depreciation has become a part of the depreciation of the current year, it is not open to the assessee to bifurcate the two again and exercising its choice to claim the depreciation of the current year under Section 32(1) of the Act and take a position that since unabsorbed depreciation of the previous years is not claimed, it cannot be thrusted upon the assessee. The position would have been different if the assessee had not claimed any depreciation at all. However, once the depreciation is claimed and while giving deductions the depreciation is to be set off against the profits of the current year prior to the unabsorbed carried forward investment allowance, it is the entire depreciation, namely, the depreciation of the current year as well as the unabsorbed carried forward depreciation, which is to be taken into account as by virtue of the fiction created under Section 32(2) of the Act, carried forward depreciation also partakes the character of depreciation of the current year. This scrambled egg cannot be unscrambled now. Otherwise, it would amount to negating the legal fiction that is created by the said provision, even to the limited extent. In fact, the case falls within the ambit of the said limited extent of legal fiction and gets covered by it.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1812-1813 OF 2005


|SESHASAYEE PAPER & BOARDS LIMITED             |.....APPELLANT(S)          |
|VERSUS                                        |                           |
|DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX             |.....RESPONDENT(S)         |

                                   W I T H
                    CIVIL APPEAL NO.       4498  OF 2015
                 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 15251 OF 2008)

                               J U D G M E N T


A.K. SIKRI, J.
                 Leave granted in Special Leave Petition (Civil)  No.  15251
of 2008.

Facts, as they appear in Civil Appeal Nos.  1812-1813  of  2005,  are  taken
note of as the following substantial  question  of  law,  which  arises  for
consideration, is common in these appeals:
“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the  Income  Tax
Appellate Tribunal is right in  holding  that  the  unabsorbed  depreciation
should  be  allowed  before  the  allowance  of  the  unabsorbed  investment
allowance in computing income of the appellant/assessee for  the  Assessment
Year  1991-1992,  when  the  assessee  had  not   claimed   the   unabsorbed
depreciation in its income-tax return though  it  had  claimed  depreciation
for the current year?

The aforesaid question has arisen for consideration in the following set  of
facts:

The appellant/assessee is a public limited company engaged in  the  business
of manufacturing paper.  It had filed its return under Section  139  of  the
Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short, the 'Act') for the Assessment Year  1991-92
declaring its income as 'Nil'.  In fact, the  income  for  that  year  after
showing exemptions, deductions and additions, which are to be made in  terms
of Sections 28 onward relating to computation of the  business  income,  was
arrived at ?2,87,15,912.  The assessee had unabsorbed  investment  allowance
of previous years.  It also  had  unabsorbed  depreciation  of  the  earlier
years.  In its  income-tax  return,  however,  it  chose  to  carry  forward
investment allowance and claimed set off of the said  unabsorbed  investment
allowance to the  extent  of  ?2,87,15,912,  thereby  showing  the  returned
income as 'Nil'.  According  to  the  Assessing  Officer,  it  was  not  the
investment allowance, but  unabsorbed  depreciation  of  the  earlier  years
which had to  be  set  off  first  by  giving  priority  to  the  unabsorbed
depreciation.  Therefore, instead of allowing the assessee to carry  forward
investment  allowance,  the  Assessing  Officer  adjusted   the   unabsorbed
depreciation of the earlier years,  namely  1983-84,  1985-86,  1986-87  and
1987-88 (part), and accepted 'Nil' income return as filed by  the  assessee,
but on the aforesaid basis.

The assessee, however, was not satisfied with  the  aforesaid  treatment  of
setting off of the unabsorbed depreciation instead of investment  allowance.
 It filed appeal  before  the  Commissioner  (Appeals).   This  appeal  was,
however, dismissed following the  judgment  of  the  Madras  High  Court  in
Commissioner  of  Income  Tax  v.  Coromandel   Steels[1].    The   assessee
approached the Tribunal.  The Tribunal  also  confirmed  the  order  of  the
Commissioner (Appeals).  The assessee, still not satisfied,  approached  the
Madras High Court.  Even  the  High  Court,  vide  impugned  judgment  dated
September 15, 2004, has affirmed the view taken  by  the  authorities  below
and dismissed the appeal of the assessee.  As the grievance still  persists,
the present appeal questions the treatment given to  the  income-tax  return
in the manner mentioned above, which has come  up  for  consideration  after
special leave to appeal was granted.

It is in this backdrop the question of law, which  is  to  be  answered  and
formulated above, relates to the  issue  as  to  whether  it  is  unabsorbed
investment allowance which is to be allowed as  set  off  in  computing  the
income of the assessee for the assessment year  in  question  or  unabsorbed
depreciation.

As pointed out above, in the income-tax return the assessee had claimed  set
off of unabsorbed investment allowance.  However, this request  is  declined
as according to the High Court, provisions of Section 32 of the Act  mandate
that precedence has to be given to unabsorbed depreciation  before  allowing
unabsorbed investment allowance.

The plea of the assessee before the High Court was that in  the  absence  of
any claim by the assessee  towards  depreciation  allowance,  the  assessing
authority could not erroneously assume that such a claim would be  untenable
under the provisions of the Act  and  could  not  thrust  the  deduction  of
carrying forward depreciation allowance, when the  assessee  had  chosen  to
have set off of unabsorbed investment  allowance  and  it  is  the  assessee
whose option should prevail.  It was also argued that even if the  provision
of law was not very clear and was susceptible to  two  interpretations,  one
which was more beneficial to the assessee had to be given effect to.

The High Court took note of these contentions of the assessee predicated  on
the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Nath Jindal &  Anr.
v. Commissioner of Income Tax[2], in which the said  High  Court  held  that
the Assessing Officer could not grant the  depreciation  allowance  when  it
was not  claimed  by  the  assessee  as  there  is  no  provision  by  which
depreciation could be fictionally deemed to have been claimed  and  granted.
It would be pertinent to point out that this judgment of the High Court  was
in the light of Section 32 of the Act which stood at the material  time  and
this very provision existed even in respect of Assessment Years 1991-92  and
1992-93 with which  we  are  concerned.   Therefore,  the  High  Court  took
cognizance of  the  said  judgment.   The  High  Court  also  noted  another
judgment of its own Court in Guindy Machine Tools P.  Ltd.  v.  Commissioner
of Income Tax[3], which had followed judgment of this Court in  Commissioner
of Income-Tax v. Mahendra Mills[4] wherein it was held  that  the  provision
in respect of depreciation was for the benefit of the assessee  and  if  the
assessee does not wish to avail the said benefit for some reason,  it  could
not be forced upon him.  Notwithstanding the aforesaid judgments,  the  High
Court observed that the real issue was not whether  the  assessee  could  be
compelled to claim depreciation, but, if he fails to claim,  what  would  be
the  order  of  priority  between  unabsorbed  depreciation  allowance   and
unabsorbed investment allowance.  On this purported 'real' issue,  the  High
Court  mentioned  that  since   unabsorbed   depreciation   allowance   gets
precedence over the unabsorbed investment allowance under the provisions  of
the Act, which has been held by various High Courts (and those judgments  of
the High Courts are taken  note  of),  it  is  the  unabsorbed  depreciation
allowance which would be set off first.

Arguments before us remain the same which were advanced by the  assessee  as
well as the Revenue in  the  High  Court.   In  order  to  appreciate  these
arguments and to answer the controversy which has arisen, it is apposite  to
take note of provisions of  Section  32  of  the  Act,  as  existed  at  the
relevant time.  The portion with which we are concerned reads as under:
“32. (1)  In respect of  depreciation  of  buildings,  machinery,  plant  or
furniture owned by the assessee and used for the purposes  of  the  business
or profession, the following deductions shall, subject to the provisions  of
section 34, be allowed-
                          xx          xx         xx
(2)  Where, in the assessment of the assessee [(or, if  the  assessee  is  a
registered firm or an unregistered firm assessed as a  registered  firm,  in
the assessment of  its  partners)]  full  effect  cannot  be  given  to  any
allowance [under clause (ii) of  sub-section  (1)]  in  any  previous  year,
owing to there being no profits or gains chargeable for that previous  year,
or owing to the profits or gains chargeable being less than  the  allowance,
then, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of section  72  and  sub-
section (3) of section 73, the allowance or part of the allowance  to  which
effect has not been given, as the case may be, shall be added to the  amount
of the allowance for  depreciation  for  the  following  previous  year  and
deemed to be part of that allowance, or if there is no  such  allowance  for
that previous year, be deemed to be the allowance for  that  previous  year,
and so on for the succeeding previous years.”


This Section deals with depreciation in respect of certain assets which  are
mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 32 and owned  wholly  or  partly  by
the assessee and used for  the  purpose  of  business  or  profession.   The
nature of deductions that is to be allowed is also mentioned in  sub-section
(1).  We are not directly concerned with this provision inasmuch  as  it  is
not in dispute that the assessee herein was entitled to depreciation on  its
assets and the amount of depreciation is also not in dispute.  As  mentioned
above, in fact, the depreciation of earlier orders could not be utilized  by
the assessee in those years.  Since the provisions of  the  Act  permit  the
assessee to accumulate the unabsorbed depreciation  of  the  previous  years
with right to the assessee to choose  the  same  in  subsequent  years,  the
assessee herein had unabsorbed depreciation of the previous years.  This  is
so stipulated in sub-section (2) of Section  32.,  which  has  already  been
noted earlier.

As per the aforesaid provision, the depreciation allowance or  part  thereof
to which effect has not been given in a particular assessment year owing  to
there being no profits or gains chargeable for that previous years or  owing
to profits  and  gains  chargeable  being  less  than  the  allowance,  such
unabsorbed depreciation allowance is to  be  added  to  the  amount  of  the
allowance for depreciation  for  the  following  previous  year  and  it  is
'deemed to be  part  of  that  allowance  for  that  previous  year  or  the
succeeding previous years, as the case may be'.  This is,  however,  subject
to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 72 and  sub-section  (3)  of
Section 73 of the Act.

What follows from the above is that in case of loss in the  business  income
or insufficient profits to absorb the depreciation  allowance  permitted  by
this Section, because of which reason depreciation allowance  or  some  part
thereof remains unabsorbed, it  may  be  carried  forward  under  this  sub-
section to the following year and set off against that  year's  profit,  and
so on for  succeeding  years.   There  is  an  amendment  in  the  aforesaid
provision with effect from April 01, 1996, which  shall  be  taken  note  of
subsequently at an appropriate stage.  However, as per the  provision  which
existed during the relevant period and extracted above, the carried  forward
depreciation allowance is deemed to be a part of, and stands on exactly  the
same footing as the current  depreciation  for  the  assessment  year.   The
unabsorbed depreciation of the past years, thus, by legal  fiction,  becomes
the depreciation of the year in question and can be set off  against  income
chargeable under any head.  There is, thus, actual depreciation which is  to
be calculated in that  particular  assessment  year.   To  this,  unabsorbed
depreciation is  to  be  added  by  the  application  of  aforesaid  deeming
provision and this entire depreciation, namely, that of the current year  as
well as unabsorbed depreciation of the previous years,  can  be  allowed  as
depreciation in that particular assessment  year  or  succeeding  assessment
years.  This is subject to the provisions of Sections  72(2)  and  73(3)  of
the Act.  Section 72 deals with carried forward  and  set  off  of  business
loss under the head 'business or profession'.   This  carried  forward  loss
can be set off only against the profits of any business  or  profession  and
is carried forward only for a period of eight years.   On  the  other  hand,
insofar as carry forward of depreciation allowance to  any  subsequent  year
is concerned, the same is  without  any  time  limit.   Sub-section  (2)  of
Section 72 stipulates that where any allowance or part thereof is under sub-
section (2) of Section 32 or sub-section (4) of Section  35  and  is  to  be
carried forward, effect shall first be  given  to  the  provisions  of  this
section.  Section 73, on the other hand,  deals  with  loss  in  speculation
business and subsequently mentions that such loss of a speculation  business
shall not be set off except against profits and gains, if  any,  of  another
speculation business.  Thus, losses of speculation business can be  set  off
only against profits and gains  of  another  speculation  business  and  not
against profits earned from other kinds  of  businesses.   Here  sub-section
(3) of Section 73,  which  finds  mention  in  Section  32(2),  states  that
provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 72 shall also apply in relation  to
speculation business.  We are not concerned  with  the  aforesaid  situation
arising out of sub-section (2) of Section 72 or sub-section (3)  of  Section
73.  However, the same are mentioned for the purpose of clarity as there  is
a reference to these provisions in Section 32(2).  Insofar  as  the  instant
case is concerned, it depends upon the meaning that is to be  given  to  the
deeming provision, as explained above.

Before we discuss this effect, let us take  note  of  some  of  the  nuances
regarding claim of depreciation allowance, which  have  been  laid  down  by
judicial pronouncements on interpretation of this provision.

It has been the consistent view of the Courts that  unabsorbed  depreciation
allowance should be allowed before the unabsorbed investment  allowance.  To
put it differently, unabsorbed depreciation is to be  given  precedence  and
is allowed to be set off first.  Some of the High Courts had  earlier  taken
the view that this would be so even if the  assessee  had  not  claimed  the
unabsorbed depreciation.  It is the necessary consequence of the  scheme  of
various provisions of the Act.  Section 32A of the  Act,  which  deals  with
investment allowance, was inserted by the  Finance  Act,  1976  with  effect
from 01.04.1976.  According to Circular No. 202 dated 05.07.1976  issued  by
CBDT [(1976) 105 ITR St 17],  the  combined  effect  of  the  provisions  of
Sections 32, 32A, 33, 33A  and  72  is  that  in  a  case  where  there  are
allowances in the nature of depreciation  allowance,  investment  allowance,
development rebate, development allowance and losses,  such  allowances  and
losses would be deductible in the order given  below,  in  cases  where  the
profits are insufficient to absorb all of them:
(i)   Current depreciation (Section 32(1))
      (ii)  Carried forward losses of earlier years (Section 72(1))
      (iii) Unabsorbed depreciation of earlier years (Section 32(2))
(iv)  Unabsorbed development rebate of earlier years (Section
            33(2)(ii)
(v)   Current development rebate (Section 33(2)(i))
(vi)  Unabsorbed development allowance of earlier years
            (Section 3A(2)(ii))
(vii) Current development allowance (Section 33A(2)(ii))
(viii)       Unabsorbed  investment  allowance  of  earlier  years  (Section
32A(3)(ii))

(ix)  Current investment allowance (Section 33A(3)(i))


            It emerges from sub-section (3) of Section 32A  that  unabsorbed
investment allowance takes precedence  over  current  investment  allowance.
However, this Court in Mahendra Mills (supra) took the view that  since  the
provision for depreciation is a benefit which enures  to  the  assessee,  if
the assessee does not wish to avail of that benefit for some reason, such  a
benefit cannot be forced upon him.  In that case, the Court  held  that  the
language of the provisions of Sections 32 and 34 of the Act is specific  and
admits of no  ambiguity.   Section  32  allows  depreciation  as  deduction,
subject  to  the  provisions  of  Section  34.   Section  34  provides  that
deduction  under  Section  32  shall  be  allowed  only  if  the  prescribed
particulars have been furnished.  It was specifically held that there is  no
mandatory duty on the officer to allow depreciation  if  the  assessee  does
not want to  claim  that.   The  provision  for  claim  of  depreciation  is
certainly for the benefit of the assessee.  If he does not wish to avail  of
that benefit for some reason, the benefit cannot be forced upon him.  It  is
for the assessee to see if the claim of depreciation is  to  his  advantage.
Income under the head “Profits and  gains  of  business  or  Profession”  is
chargeable to income-tax under Section 28 and income under Section 29 is  to
be computed in accordance with the provisions contained in  Sections  30  to
43A.  The argument that since Section 32 provides for  depreciation  it  has
to be allowed in computing  the  income  of  the  assessee  cannot,  in  all
circumstances, be accepted in view of the bar contained in Section  34.   If
Section 34 is not satisfied and the particulars are  not  furnished  by  the
assessee, his claim for depreciation under Section  32  cannot  be  allowed.
Section 29 is, thus, to be read with reference to other  provisions  of  the
Act.  It is not in itself a complete code.

This principle, thus,  is  grounded  in  the  reasoning  that  there  is  no
provision by which depreciation could be fictionally  deemed  to  have  been
claimed and granted and it is to be specifically claimed  by  the  assessee.
Further,  when  claiming  of  depreciation  is  a  privilege  given  to  the
assessee, it cannot be turned into a disadvantage  even  when  the  assessee
does not claim the depreciation.  Therefore, option  in  this  behalf  rests
with the assessee.

In the impugned judgment as well,  the  High  Court  accepts  the  aforesaid
legal position as this is so decided by this Court in Mahendra Mills's  case
(supra) and is a binding precedent. However, the aforesaid judgment  is  not
followed on the ground that real issue is something else.   Such  an  issue,
though already  noted  above,  is  stated  in  para  10.1  of  the  impugned
judgment, which reads as under:
“10.1  But, in the case on hand, it is not the issue  whether  the  assessee
could be compelled to claim depreciation allowance,  but,  if  he  fails  to
claim, what would be the order of priority between  unabsorbed  depreciation
allowance and unabsorbed investment allowance.”

Strangely, the issue is somewhat different, namely,  when  the  depreciation
allowance is not claimed, can it be said that the  assessee  has  failed  to
claim and in that case what would be the position?  According to  us,  there
is no question of failing to claim. Situation in  such  an  event  would  be
that depreciation is  not  claimed  at  all  and,  therefore,  the  position
mentioned in Mahendra Mills's case (supra) would follow.  To this extent  we
find that it was a wrong question posed by the High Court, which  led  to  a
wrong answer.

However, the matter does not rest there.  In the present case, the  assessee
in fact claimed the depreciation allowance insofar as it  pertained  to  the
current year.  At the same time, it did not want to claim  the  set  off  of
the unabsorbed depreciation  allowance  of  the  previous  years.   In  such
situation, the question is as to whether it  is  open  to  the  assessee  to
invoke the provisions of Section 32 of the Act by claiming  depreciation  of
the current year, but at the same time choose not to make  a  claim  of  set
off of unabsorbed depreciation allowance of the previous  years.   As  noted
above, by legal fiction unabsorbed depreciation becomes depreciation of  the
year in question and gets added to the depreciation  of  the  current  year.
If that be so, is it  the  right  of  the  assessee  to  partly  invoke  the
provisions of Section 32 when it comes to depreciation of the  current  year
and still claim that it has  right  not  to  claim  unabsorbed  depreciation
allowance?  On a plain reading of Section 32, it does not appear to  be  the
position.  Once the entire  depreciation,  namely,  unabsorbed  depreciation
allowance of the previous year gets merged  into  the  depreciation  of  the
current year, it would become  an  integral  part  thereof.   Legal  fiction
makes it one whole thereby making it possible to the assessee to  claim  set
off of unabsorbed carried  forward  depreciation  as  well.   A  fortiorari,
bifurcation thereof with option to claim depreciation of current  year  only
and contending at the same time that portion of unabsorbed  carried  forward
depreciation is not to be thrusted upon him as it is not claimed, would  not
be permissible.

Notwithstanding the above, the endeavour of  the  learned  counsel  for  the
assessee is to show that the assessee has such a right.  In  this  direction
it is argued that though by legal fiction unabsorbed depreciation  allowance
is carried forward to the assessment year in question and becomes a part  of
depreciation allowance of that year, it retains its identity inasmuch as  it
is brought forward only because of deeming provision which is to be  applied
to  that  limited  extent  and  no  further.   In  order  to  support   this
hypothesis, learned counsel referred to  the  judgment  in  Commissioner  of
Income-Tax, Kanpur v.  Mother  India  Refrigeration  Industries  P.  Ltd.[5]
where nature of carried forward depreciation  allowance  on  application  of
deeming provision is explained by the Court.  She specifically  referred  to
the following discussion in this behalf:
“Having regard to the aforesaid rival contentions, it  will  be  clear  that
the real issue that arises for our consideration in this  case  is  whether,
on a proper  construction  of  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  concerned
enactment, unabsorbed carried forward losses  should  have  preference  over
current depreciation in the matter of set off or is the position vice  versa
while computing the total income of an assessee in the concerned  assessment
year?  And the answer to this question depends on what  is  the  true  scope
and purpose of the legal fiction created under proviso (b) to  s.  10(2)(vi)
of the 1922 Act or under s. 32(2) of the 1961 Act.

            At the outset, it may be stated that a  close  scrutiny  of  the
relevant provisions of the 1922 Act as also the 1961 Act clearly shows  that
the computation of income under the head “Profits and gains of business”  of
any particular assessment year is required to be done after  making  certain
allowances specified in sub-s.(2) of  s.  10  of  the  1922  Act  and  after
allowing certain deductions in accordance with the provisions  contained  in
ss. 30 to 43A of the 1961 Act; in other words, it is  the  net  profits  and
gains after the specified deductions are made that  are  subjected  to  tax;
one of such deductions pertains to depreciation allowance at the  prescribed
rate of percentage of the written down value  of  the  business  asset;  and
this is provided in s. 10(2)(vi) of the 1922 Act and  in  s.  32(1)  of  the
1961 Act.  Up to this stage of computation,  no  question  of  either  carry
forward of unabsorbed depreciation of the earlier years or carry forward  of
unabsorbed business losses of earlier years arises.   In  other  words,  the
normal accountancy principle has to  be  applied  in  arriving  at  the  net
income  from  business  for  that  year  by  debiting  the  current   year's
depreciation.  The question is whether any deviation from this  normal  rule
of accountancy is contemplated by proviso (b)  to  s.  10(2)(vi)  read  with
proviso (b) to s. 24(2) of the 1922 Act or by s. 32(2) read  with  s.  72(2)
of the 1961 Act, and it is here that the aspect of  proper  construction  of
these provisions arises.  Dealing  with  the  provisions  of  the  1922  Act
first, it will be clear that proviso (b) to s. 10(2)(vi)  is  in  two  parts
and provides for two things; its first part provides for a carry forward  of
unabsorbed depreciation and its second part provides for clubbing  the  said
carried forward  depreciation  with  the  current  year's  depreciation  and
deeming the aggregate to  be  the  current  year's  depreciation.   However,
carrying forward of the unabsorbed depreciation and  the  deeming  provision
in proviso (b) are not absolute but are subject to the  proviso  (b)  to  s.
24(2).  Had proviso (b) to s. 24(2) not been  enacted  by  the  Legislature,
the result would have been that the aggregate depreciation would  have  been
deducted first out of the profits and  gains  in  preference  to  unabsorbed
business losses which might have been carried forward under s. 24(2) but  as
such losses can be carried forward only for limited  number  of  years,  the
assessee would in certain circumstances have in his books  losses  which  he
might not be able to set off even within the  time-limit  during  which  the
set  off  is  permitted.   In  order  to  prevent  such  a  situation,   the
Legislature enacted the proviso (b) to s. 24(2).   And  proviso  (b)  to  s.
24(2) expressly stated “where depreciation allowance is, under  cl.  (b)  of
the proviso to cl. (vi) of sub-s. (2) of s. 10, also to be carried  forward,
effect shall first be given to the  provisions  of  this  sub-section”.   In
other words, it clearly  provides  that  in  the  matter  of  set  off,  the
unabsorbed depreciation  that  is  required  to  be  carried  forward  under
proviso (b) to s. 10(2)(vi) and no preference over the current  depreciation
is intended.

            It is true that proviso (b) to  s.  10(2)(vi)  creates  a  legal
fiction and under that  fiction,  unabsorbed  depreciation  either  with  or
without current year's depreciation is  deemed  to  be  the  current  year's
depreciation but it is well settled, as has been observed by this  court  in
Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. State of Bihar [1955] 2 SCR 603,  606;  6
STC 446, that the legal fictions are created only for some definite  purpose
and these must be limited to that purpose and should not be extended  beyond
that legitimate field.  Clearly, the avowed purpose  of  the  legal  fiction
created by the deeming provision contained in proviso (b)  to  s.  10(2)(vi)
is to make the unabsorbed carried forward  depreciation  partake   the  same
character as the current depreciation in the following year, so that  it  is
available, unlike unabsorbed carried forward business loss,  for  being  set
off against other heads of income of that year.”

It is clear from the above that though the  question  there  was  different,
namely, precedence  of  carried  forward  business  loss  over  the  carried
forward unabsorbed depreciation or vice versa,  what  is  important  is  the
interpretation that is given to Section 32(2) of the  Act  and  particularly
the deeming provision  thereof  which  creates  legal  fiction.   The  Court
clarified that the avowed purpose of the legal fiction  created  by  deeming
provision contained in Section 32(2) of the Act is to  make  the  unabsorbed
carried forward depreciation partake  the  same  character  as  the  current
depreciation in  the  following  year,  so  that  it  is  available,  unlike
unabsorbed carried forward business loss for being  set  off  against  other
heads of income of that year.  On that basis, the Court answered that  since
unabsorbed carried forward depreciation  had  become  part  of  the  current
depreciation, the entire depreciation had to be  given  preference  (current
as well as unabsorbed carried forward depreciation) over unabsorbed  carried
forward losses.

We do not understand as to how the aforesaid judgment  helps  the  assessee.
On the contrary, it goes against the assessee while answering  the  question
which has arisen  in  the  instant  appeals.  Once  the  unabsorbed  carried
forward depreciation has become a part of the depreciation  of  the  current
year, it is not open  to  the  assessee  to  bifurcate  the  two  again  and
exercising its choice to claim the depreciation of the  current  year  under
Section 32(1)  of  the  Act  and  take  a  position  that  since  unabsorbed
depreciation of the previous years is not claimed,  it  cannot  be  thrusted
upon the assessee.  The position would have been different if  the  assessee
had not claimed any depreciation at all.  However, once the depreciation  is
claimed and while giving deductions  the  depreciation  is  to  be  set  off
against the profits of the current year  prior  to  the  unabsorbed  carried
forward investment allowance, it is the  entire  depreciation,  namely,  the
depreciation of the current year as well as the unabsorbed  carried  forward
depreciation, which is to be taken into account as by virtue of the  fiction
created under Section 32(2) of the Act, carried  forward  depreciation  also
partakes the character of depreciation of the current year.  This  scrambled
egg cannot be unscrambled now.  Otherwise, it would amount to  negating  the
legal fiction that is created by the said provision,  even  to  the  limited
extent.  In fact, the case falls  within  the  ambit  of  the  said  limited
extent of legal fiction and gets covered by it.

Once we read the provision  in  the  aforesaid  manner,  the  aid  of  other
interpretative tools which is sought to be taken by the learned counsel  for
the assessee, namely, the provision is to  be  given  liberal  construction;
the scheme  of  the  Act  envisages  giving  preference  in  the  matter  of
deduction from income to those  expiring  by  afflux  of  time,  etc.  would
become irrelevant and pales into insignificance.

The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is to decide the question  formulated
against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue, though  for  our  reasons
contained in this judgment.  The appeals are,  accordingly,  dismissed  with
costs.

                             .............................................J.
                                                                (A.K. SIKRI)



                             .............................................J.
                                                     (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)

NEW DELHI;
MARCH 15, 2015.
-----------------------
[1]   (1981) 130 ITR 856
[2]   (2001) 252 ITR 590
[3]   (2002) 254 ITR 780
[4]   (2000) 243 ITR 56
[5]   (1985) 155 ITR 711

Eye Witnesses presence Doubtful - Suppression of Earlier Complaint which destroyed the entire story of present version - Resulted in Acquittal - Murder took Place at 7-30 p.m. - caught hold of Lingappa’s son Basavaraj-deceased while he was returning home, tied his hands behind his back splashed chilly powder on his face and assaulted him with a club of stones causing injuries on his head and other parts of body leading to his death. The incident is alleged to have been witnessed by Hanumantha (PW-1), brother of the deceased, and Mannamma (PW-4), mother of the deceased.- but the Eye Witness took no steps to rescue the deceased and to join him in the Hospital - even not untied the hands and all awaited till the arrival of police to take him to the treatment said to be dead on the way - Unnatural & Unbelievable reactions of the witnesses makes their presence on the spot doubtful - Earlier version as admitted by witnesses said that the injured was dead by the time police reached - that report not filed - This implies that the earliest version about the incident was destroyed by PW-19 and a new story stated in the fardbeyan was tailored to suit the prosecution version. This has the effect of completely demolishing the prosecution case and rendering its version wholly unacceptable. - Trail court rightly acquit the accused - High court committed an error and as such Apex court set aside the same and restored the orders of trial court - 2015 SC MSKLAWREPORTS


order of the Trial Court  acquitting  the  appellants  set  aside,  and  the
appellants convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous  imprisonment  for  a
period of seven years under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 IPC.  A
fine of Rs.5,000/- each and a default sentence of imprisonment for a  period
one year has also been awarded to the appellant.

 on 19th September,  2006  at
about  7.30  p.m.  the  appellants  are  alleged  to  have  caught  hold  of
Lingappa’s son Basavaraj-deceased while he  was  returning  home,  tied  his
hands behind his back splashed chilly powder on his face and  assaulted  him
with a club of stones causing injuries on his head and other parts  of  body
leading to his death. The incident is alleged  to  have  been  witnessed  by
Hanumantha (PW-1), brother of the deceased, and Mannamma (PW-4),  mother  of
the deceased. In connection with the  incident  Crime  No.168  of  2006  was
registered at Hutti Police Station for an offence punishable  under  Section
302 read with Section 34 IPC against the appellants herein.

 The  Trial  Court  on  an  appraisal  of  the  prosecution
evidence came to the conclusion that the prosecution  had  failed  to  bring
home the guilt of the accused for the offences allegedly committed by  them.
Aggrieved by the order of acquittal the State  preferred  an  appeal  before
the High Court of Karnataka which was heard and allowed by a Division  Bench
of that Court holding the appellants guilty of the offence punishable  under
Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 of the IPC and sentencing  them  to
undergo imprisonment for a period of  seven  years  with  fine  and  default
sentence mentioned above. The present appeal assails the correctness of  the
said order.
The prosecution case primarily rests on the depositions  of  Haumantha
(PW-1), brother of the deceased,  who  was  also  the  first  informant  and
Mannamma (PW-4), mother of the deceased both  of  whom  claimed  to  be  eye
witnesses to the occurrence.
When  he  stepped  forward  to  rescue
Basavaraj, his mother-PW4 dissuaded him from doing so.
 The  accused  persons
then left the spot whereafter the witness  and  his  mother  went  near  the
injured but returned home. 
Sometime later they again went to the field  with
PW3-Lingappa who too saw his son Basvaraj in an injured condition.  PW-3  is
then said to have gone to Gurgunta police post to inform  the  police  about
the incident and returned at about 6.00 p.m.  
It was  only  at  about  10.00
p.m. that a Sub Inspector from Hutti police station came to the  spot  in  a
Jeep. PW-1 Hanumantha  presented  to  him  a  written  complaint  about  the
incident.  
He also narrated the incident to the police Sub  Inspector  which
was reduced to writing by him and treated as  the first  information  report
marked as Ex.P-1 at the trial. 
The witness further states that  it  was  the
ASI of police who directed  him  to  untie  the  ropes  from  the  hands  of
deceased-Basavaraj which he accordingly did.  
 Deceased-Basavaraj  was  then
shifted in an injured condition to Government Hospital at Lingasugur.   PWs.
1 and 3 also accompanied the injured, but  the  injured  Basavaraj  breathed
his last on the way.   
The  deposition  of  PW-4  mother  of  the  deceased-
Basavaraj is also on the same lines.

In the  first  place,  the  Trial  Court
found the conduct of PWs 1 and 4 who are closely  related  to  the  deceased
unnatural.  
The Trial Court held  that  if  their  version  that  they  were
witnesses to the occurrence was correct, there was no reason why they  would
not intervene to rescue the deceased from the clutches  of  the  assailants.
More importantly, the Trial Court held that PW1, brother and PW4, mother  of
the deceased, instead of  untying  the  deceased  who  was  in  a  seriously
injured condition, returned home even after the  assailants  had  fled  away
from the spot. 
What is worse is that even after returning home PWs. 1 and  4
accompanied by PW-3 who is none other than the father of  the  deceased  had
gone back to the place of occurrence where they found  the  deceased  in  an
injured  condition  with  his  hands  tied  behind   his   back,   his   leg
broken/fractured and eyes burning with chilly powder, but made no effort  to
untie his hands or rush him to the hospital  for  treatment.  
Instead  PW-3
father of the deceased went to lodge a report with the  police  leaving  the
injured in a hapless condition on the spot where he was lying only  to  wait
till 10.00 p.m. at night for the  police  to  arrive. 
If  the  prosecution
version is correct, it is only after instructions were  given  by  the  Sub-
Inspector to PW-1 to untie the hands of  Basavaraj  that  he  does  so.  The
injured Basavaraj was then put in the police Jeep for  being  taken  to  the
hospital where he reached only after he had died.  
The  Trial  Court  found
the story, the sequence  of  events  and  the  conduct  of  the  prosecution
witnesses who claim to be  eye  witnesses  to  the  incident  to  be  wholly
unnatural and unreliable. 
The Trial Court  was,  in  our  opinion  perfectly
justified in taking that view. 
The  conduct  of  the  prosecution  witnesses
does not inspire confidence not only because they  did  not  intervene  when
Basavaraj  was  being  assaulted  but  also  because  post  the  event,  the
witnesses did practically nothing to help  the  unfortunate  soul,  who  was
left to die with his hands tied for over 4 hours without any  succor  coming
from any quarter.  
The High Court  has  made  light  of  these  aspects  and
thereby fallen in an error.

What makes the  entire  story  unacceptable
is that the mother PW-4 and the son PW-1  wait  till  10.00  p.m.  when  the
police arrive to untie the hands of the deceased. 
That  is  not  all.  
After
the police arrived, PW-1 presents a written complaint  about  the  incident.
His  statement  (fardbeyan)  is  recorded  by  the  Sub-Inspector  in  which
Basavaraj is said to have died,  meaning  thereby  that  Basavaraj  was  not
alive when the police reached the spot. 
What is  amazing  is  the  admission
made by PW-19 that the  report  received  by  him  about  the  incident  was
destroyed by him after the fardbeyan of PW-1 was recorded on the spot.  
This
implies  that  the  first  version  regarding  the  incident   was   totally
obliterated by the Investigating  Officer  and  Exb.  P-1  recorded  in  its
place.  It is difficult to appreciate how PW-19  could  have  destroyed  the
original complaint given to him by Hanumantha PW-1. 
This  implies  that  the
earliest version about the incident was destroyed by PW-19 and a  new  story
stated in the fardbeyan was tailored to suit the prosecution  version.  This
has the effect of completely demolishing the prosecution case and  rendering
its version wholly unacceptable.  
The  only  inference  which  can,  in  the
circumstances, be drawn is that Basavaraj was done to  death  and  his  dead
body left at the spot from where it was picked-up by the police  after  they
arrived around 10.00 p.m. 
The complaint presented to  Sub-Inspector  perhaps
did not say what the police intended to present as its case. 
 The same  was,
therefore, destroyed and a  new  version  brought  in,  according  to  which
Basavaraj was shown to be alive when the police reached the spot.  The  fact
of the matter, however, appears to be  that  Basavaraj  was  dead  when  his
brother, mother and father discovered the body, for otherwise there  was  no
question of the parents of the deceased and his brother  leaving  him  alone
in the condition, which they are alleged to have done. 
The conclusion  drawn
by the Trial Court that the prosecution had not proved the  charges  against
the appellants beyond reasonable doubt, was, in  our  opinion,  correct,  no
matter the judgment and order is not as happily worded as it  ought  to  be,
especially coming from a senior judicial officer of the level of  Additional
Sessions Judge. 
 Inasmuch  as  the  High  Court  has  overlooked  all  these
aspects, we are constrained to set aside the order passed by it  and  acquit
the appellants of the charges framed against them.  
We,  accordingly,  allow
this appeal, set aside the judgment and order passed by the High  Court  and
acquit the appellants of the charges framed  against  them.  The  appellants
shall be released from custody forthwith if not required in connection  with


any other case.-2015 S.C.MSKLAWREPORTS