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Saturday, May 16, 2015

As far as Sanjay Mahto (A4) is concerned, he is also a vegetable vendor in Paswan Chowk Market. Though the circumstances that he has also persuaded PW8 to pay the ransom amount to kidnappers and also accompanied PW8 to Sonepur to pay the ransom amount to the kidnappers, Sanjay might have accompanied PW8 as a bonafide helper. Neither any recovery was made from Sanjay nor any incriminating evidence is available against him. So far as Sanjay Mahto (A-4) is concerned, though there may be strong suspicion about his involvement in the commission of the offence, suspicion however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof. The case against Sanjay (A-4) is not proved beyond reasonable doubt and his conviction is liable to be set aside.


                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1831 OF 2011

RANJEET KUMAR RAM @
RANJEET KUMAR DAS                                   ..Appellant
                                   Versus

STATE OF BIHAR                                               ..Respondent
                                    WITH
                    CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1820-1821 OF 2013

PANDIT @ SANJAY MAHTO ETC.                     ..Appellants
                                   Versus
STATE OF BIHAR                                        ..Respondent
                                     AND
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1817 Of 2013

CHINTOO SINGH
..Appellant
                                   Versus
STATE OF BIHAR                                      ..Respondent

                               J U D G M E N T

R. BANUMATHI, J.

These appeals are directed against the judgment dated 11.10.2010  passed  by
the Patna High Court  in    Criminal  Appeals  (DB)  No.268/2008,  357/2008,
451/2008, No.156/2008 and Death Reference No.6/2008, in and  by  which,  the
High Court dismissed the appeals filed by  the  accused  persons  confirming
the verdict of conviction on the charge of murder  of  five  years  old  boy
Vicky and dismissed the death reference by converting the death sentence  of
Chintoo Singh (A-5) into life imprisonment.
2.          On 27.02.2006, Sunil Kumar  Singh-PW8,  a  vegetable  vendor  in
Paswan Chowk, lodged a complaint stating that his son Vicky aged five  years
was playing near PW8’s vegetable shop  and  Rubi  Kumari  aged  seven  years
sister of the victim boy Vicky was also playing with him.  At that time  two
unknown persons [later  identified  as  Chintoo  Singh  (A-5)  and  Birendra
Bhagat (A-3)] offered chocolates to Vicky and other children and  took  away
Vicky saying that they would come back and drop the boy;  but the boy  Vicky
did not come back.  On  the  above  complaint  on  28.02.2006,  a  case  was
registered as P.S. Case  No.105/2006  at  Hazipur  Town  (Industrial  Area),
Police Station, Vaishali.  Inspite of search, the missing boy could  not  be
traced.  After 5-6 days passed, Ranjeet Kumar Ram (A-1)  and  Sanjay  (A-4),
who were also vegetable vendors in the same market  i.e.  at  Paswan  Chowk,
told PW8 that his son would come back if he would pay money.   Nearly  after
three months of the incident, on 23.06.2006, PW8 received a phone  call  and
the kidnappers demanded a ransom of four lakh rupees for return of his  son;
but PW8 expressed his helplessness to meet the demand, and  the  demand  was
reduced to two lakh rupees. Another telephone call was received  by  PW8  on
1.07.2006 and the final amount of ransom was  fixed  for  Rs.1,05,000/-.  On
3.07.2006, PW8 received another call from the kidnappers  and  PW8  informed
them that he has arranged the ransom money and PW8 was asked  to  bring  the
money at New Gandak Bridge ahead of Line Hotel of Bachcha Babu  at  Sonepur.
When PW8 expressed fear in coming alone with money,  he  was  instructed  by
the kidnappers to come with his neighbours Ranjeet Kumar     Ram  (A-1)  and
Sanjay (A-4).
3.          In order to pay the ransom money, PW8 had withdrawn  Rs.80,000/-
from his Savings Bank account with Bank of India at Rajendra Chowk,  Hazipur
and PW-8 arranged balance money from his own  savings  and  borrowings  from
his father-in-law. On 4.07.2006, PW8 wrapped the ransom amount in a  plastic
bag and kept it in a gunny bag under  the  carrier  of  his  cycle  and  PW8
accompanied by Ranjeet Kumar Ram (A-1) and Sanjay (A-4)  and  Sanjeet  (A-2)
proceeded to the place as instructed by the kidnappers.  When  they  reached
the New Gandak Bridge, Sanjeet (A-2) got down  from  PW8’s  cycle  and  went
inside a hut on the left side of the road and PW8  followed  him.   At  that
time two persons came out and pulled away the  money  from  the  carrier  of
PW8’s cycle.  Sanjeet (A-2) informed PW8  that  his  brother-in-law-Birendra
Bhagat (A-3) lives in that hut and PW8 was informed that his  son  would  be
returned by evening.  Even after payment of  the  money,  the  boy  was  not
returned.  To inquire about the boy,  PW8 went to the hut  and  learnt  from
the local people that Birendra   Bhagat (A-3) is a criminal  and  the  other
person was identified as Chintoo Singh (A-5). On  16.08.2006,  PW8  informed
the investigating officer-Reeta Kumari (PW12),  the  names  of  the  accused
persons and also about the demand and payment of money to the kidnappers.
4.           Investigating Officer (PW-12) conducted a raid at  Sonepur  and
arrested Ranjeet Kumar Ram  (A-1)  and  Sanjeet  (A-2)  and  recorded  their
statement.   Based  on  the  statement   of   Ranjeet   Kumar   Ram   (A-1),
investigating officer recovered  a  currency  note  of  five  hundred  rupee
containing the name of Sunil Kumar Singh-PW8, written in green  ink  in  the
handwriting of PW8, from the house of Ranjeet Kumar     Ram(A-1),  which  is
recorded in the  seizure  list  (Ex.18).  Thereafter,  the  accused  persons
Sanjay (A-4), Birendra  Bhagat (A-3)  and  Chintoo  Singh  (A-5)  were  also
arrested and their statements were recorded. Investigating Officer-PW12,  on
the basis of statements went to Fakuli Out-Post and  learnt  about  recovery
of dead body of a boy aged 4-5 years near the culvert of Bhagwanpur  village
wherein (Fakuli OP) P.S. Case  No.128/06  dated  22.04.2006  under  Sections
302, 201 and 34 IPC was registered. PW12 obtained  from  Fakuli  police  the
seizure list relating to recovery of vest and half pant of deceased boy  and
his photograph. From the photograph shown to PW8,  he  identified  the  dead
body of child as well as clothes, as that of Vicky. After the completion  of
the investigation, PW-12 filed the chargesheet against  five  accused  under
Sections 364A, 302/34, 120B and 201 IPC.
5.          To  bring  home  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  prosecution  has
examined fourteen witnesses and exhibited documents  and  material  objects.
When questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused denied  incriminating
evidence and circumstances put against them.   Defence  has  examined  seven
defence witnesses.
6.           Vide  judgment  dated  24/28.01.2008,  the   First   Additional
Sessions Judge, Vaishali at Hazipur convicted the accused Chintoo Singh  (A-
5) and Birendra Bhagat (A-3) under Section 364A IPC and  sentenced  them  to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for life with fine  of  Rs.10,000/-.  For  his
conviction under Sections 302/34 IPC, Chintoo Singh (A-5) was awarded  death
sentence.  Sanjeet (A-2), Ranjeet Kumar Ram  (A-1)  and  Sanjay  (A-4)  were
convicted  under  Section  364A/120B  IPC  and  were  sentenced  to  undergo
rigorous imprisonment for life and were imposed a fine of rupees Rs.10,000/-
 each with default clause. Further, Ranjeet  Kumar Ram (A-1),  Sanjay  (A-4)
and Birendra Bhagat (A-3) were convicted under Section 302/34 IPC  and  were
sentenced  to  undergo  rigorous  imprisonment  for  life  with  a  fine  of
Rs.10,000/- each with default clause.  The  sentences  imposed  on  Birendra
Bhagat (A-3), Ranjeet Kumar Ram (A-1) and Sanjay (A-4) were ordered  to  run
concurrently.
7.          Being aggrieved by the  verdict  of  conviction,  accused  filed
Criminal Appeals No. 268/2008, 357/2008, 451/2008 and 156/2008 in  the  High
Court of Patna. For  confirmation  of  death  sentence  awarded  to  Chintoo
Singh(A-5), State filed Death Reference  Case  No.6/2008.   The  High  Court
vide common impugned judgment dated 11.10.2010, dismissed the appeals  filed
by the accused persons and thereby confirmed  the  conviction  and  sentence
imposed on accused A-1, A-3 to A-5.  The  High  Court  converted  the  death
sentence awarded to Chintoo Singh (A-5)  as  life  imprisonment.   Accepting
the defence plea of alibi, the High Court acquitted 2nd  accused–Sanjeet  in
Criminal Appeal (DB) No.249/2008.  In these appeals, appellants  assail  the
correctness of the verdict of the conviction and sentence imposed on them.
8.          Learned counsel for the appellants contended  that  Rubi  Kumari
(PW2) aged seven years, daughter of PW8, the key witness has not  implicated
Ranjeet Kumar Ram (A-1)  and  in  her  statement  she  has  identified  only
Birendra Bhagat (A-3) and PW2 being  a  child  witness  her  sole  testimony
cannot form  the basis for conviction.  It was submitted  that  Sunil  Kumar
Singh (PW8) on his own has requested Ranjeet Kumar   Ram(A-1) and Sanjay (A-
4) to accompany him to pay the alleged ransom and merely  because  A-1,  A-2
and A-4  accompanied  PW8,  they  are  being  falsely  implicated.   Learned
counsel for Chintoo Singh (A-5) submitted that in  the  test  identification
parade,  PW2  has  not  identified  Chintoo        Singh   (A-5)   and   her
identification of A-5 in the open court is  unreliable  and  without  proper
appreciation of the flaws in the prosecution case,  courts  below  erred  in
convicting the accused.
9.          Per contra, learned  counsel  appearing  for  the    respondent-
State  contended  that  the   sole   eye-witness-Rubi   Kumari   (PW2)   has
satisfactorily  identified  accused-Birendra  Bhagat  (A-3)  in   the   test
identification parade and while she  was  examined  in  the  court  she  has
identified Chintoo Singh (A-5).  It  was  submitted  that  PW8  has  clearly
deposed that Ranjeet Kumar  Ram  (A-1),  Sanjay  (A-4)  in  conspiracy  with
Birendra Bhagat (A-3), Chintoo  Singh  (A-5),  induced  him  to  pay  ransom
money, even when  no  such  demand  was  made,  which  clearly  shows  their
involvement in the commission of the offence.  It  was  submitted  that  the
kidnappers asked PW8 to bring Ranjeet Kumar  Ram  (A-1),  Sanjay  (A-4)  and
that they accompanied PW8 to pay the money which proves  the  complicity  of
accused Ranjeet Kumar Ram (A-1) and Sanjay  (A-4) in the commission  of  the
offence and upon proper  appreciation  of  evidence,  courts  below  rightly
convicted the appellants for the offence under Sections 302/34,  364A,  120B
and 201 IPC and  the  concurrent  findings  recorded  by  the  courts  below
warrant no interference.
10.         We  have  considered  the  rival  contentions  and  perused  the
impugned judgment, evidence and material on record.
11.         Sunil Kumar Singh (PW8)  and  his  wife  Nilam  Devi  (PW6)  are
vegetable vendors in Paswan Chowk Market, Hazipur.  Ranjeet Kumar Ram  (A-1)
and Sanjeet (A-2) [since acquitted] are  brothers  who  are  also  vegetable
vendors in the same market having shop situated nearby the shop of  PW8  and
Birendra Bhagat (A-3) is their brother-in-law. In her evidence,  PW6  stated
that first accused and his brother Sanjeet were jealous of them as  PW8  had
good business.  Though jealousy is suggested as a  motive,  but  it  appears
that the commission  of  murder  of  victim  boy  Vicky  is  mainly  due  to
kidnapping for ransom.
12.         Key witness PW2-Rubi Kumari is  aged  seven  years  and  is  the
sister of the deceased  boy  Vicky.    PW2  deposed  that  on  the  date  of
incident i.e. 27.02.2006, PW2 was playing around the  place  where  PW8  was
selling the vegetables. PW2 stated that two persons came on  a  motor  cycle
and gave chocolate to the children including PW8’s son Vicky and made  Vicky
to sit on the tank of the motor cycle and took him away.   PW2  stated  that
the man who took her brother-Vicky told that he would  come  back  and  drop
her brother. Rubi Kumari (PW2) identified Birendra Bhagat (A-3)  during  the
test identification parade and in the court she identified Chintoo Singh (A-
5) as the person who offered chocolate to her and to her  brother  and  took
him away.  Inspite of searching cross-examination, PW2  remained  consistent
throughout her cross-examination.
13.         On behalf of Chintoo Singh (A-5), it was  contended  that  PW2’s
testimony is not reliable as she has not  identified  Chintoo  Singh  during
the test identification parade and  that  PW2’s  identification  of  Chintoo
Singh (A-5) in the court was not reliable.  Identification  of  the  accused
by the witness soon  after  the  former’s  arrest  is  of  course  important
because it lends assurance to the prosecution, in addition to  corroboration
of the evidence of the witnesses. As noticed  earlier,  in  the  open  court
during the trial, Rubi Kumari (PW2) identified Chintoo Singh (A-5)  and  she
has not identified him in the test identification parade  conducted  in  the
prison.  Ordinarily, courts do not give much credence to the  identification
made in the court for the first time; but the identification of the  accused
for the first time in court is permissible in law.   But the said  principle
has to be applied in the facts and circumstances of each  case.   While  PW2
was examined in the court, trial court which had the opportunity  of  seeing
and observing demeanour of PW2 found her version identifying  Chintoo  Singh
(A-5) trustworthy and we see no reason to take a different view.
14.         At the time of occurrence, as well,  while  deposing  in  Court,
Rubi Kumari (PW2) was aged only seven years.  Evidence of the child  witness
and its credibility would depend upon the circumstances of each case.   Only
precaution which the court has to bear in mind while assessing the  evidence
of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one.   Before  PW2
was examined as a witness in the court during  trial,  her  statement  under
Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate (PW13).  In  his
evidence PW13 has stated that he tested the understanding  of  witness  Rubi
Kumari (PW2) and after being satisfied  about  her  understanding,  recorded
her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.  When PW2 was examined as a  witness
in the court  during  trial,  the  trial  judge  had  also  put  preliminary
questions to the child witness Rubi Kumari (PW2) and satisfied that she  was
capable of understanding the questions put to her.   When  the  trial  court
has ascertained the discernment of PW2 and has formed an opinion  that  PW2-
Rubi Kumari is competent to testify and then recorded her evidence,  we  see
no reason  to  discredit  PW2’s  testimony.  PW2  though  sole  witness,  by
concurrent findings courts below found  her  evidence  unassailable  and  we
find no ground to take a different view.
15.         On 4.7.2006, PW8 wrapped the ransom amount in a plastic bag  and
kept it in a gunny bag under the carrier of his  cycle  and  accompanied  by
Ranjeet Kumar Ram (A1), Sanjeet (A-2) and Sanjay (A-4), PW8 went to pay  the
ransom amount to the  kidnappers.  When  they  reached  New  Gandak  Bridge,
accused-Sanjeet (A-2) got down from the cycle and went  inside  the  hut  on
the left side of the road and PW8 followed him.  At that time,  two  persons
came out of the hut and took away  the  money  from  the  carrier  of  PW8’s
cycle. In the test identification parade, PW8 identified Chintoo  Singh  (A-
5) and Birendra Bhagat (A-3) as the persons who took away ransom money  from
the carrier of his  cycle.  The  evidence  of  PW8  amply  corroborates  the
evidence of PW2 as to the complicity of Chintoo  Singh  (A-5)  and  Birendra
Bhagat (A-3) in the offence.
16.         Evidence of Rubi Kumari  (PW2)  coupled  with  the  evidence  of
Sunil Kumar Singh (PW8) clearly  establishes that the accused Chintoo  Singh
(A-5) and Birendra Bhagat (A-3) kidnapped PW8’s son Vicky and PW8  informant
paid  Rs.1.05,000/- to them as ransom  amount.   On  the  evidence  of  PW2,
courts below rightly recorded concurrent findings that the  prosecution  has
established that deceased boy Vicky was last seen alive in  the  company  of
accused Chintoo Singh (A-5) and  Birendra  Bhagat  (A-3).   It  is  for  the
accused to explain how and when they parted company of  the  deceased  child
Vicky.  Absolutely, there is no explanation  forthcoming  from  the  accused
which is a strong militating circumstance against the accused Chintoo  Singh
(A-5) and Birendra Bhagat (A-3) which indicates that  they  are  responsible
for the crime.  This is further fortified by the evidence of PW8 who  stated
that the accused Nos.3 and 5 had snatched the money kept in the  carrier  of
his cycle, when he was near the hut of Birendra Bhagat (A-3).
17.         Based on the statement of  Chintoo  Singh  (A-5)   and  Birendra
Bhagat (A-3), investigating officer- Reeta Kumari  (PW12) went   to   Fakuli
O.P. and learnt  that  the  body  of  a   deceased  boy   was  recovered  on
22.4.2006 beneath the pulia   in  between  Bhagwanpur-Bahadurpur  road   for
which  F.I.R. in  (Fakuli OP) P.S. Case No.128/2006  dated  22.4.2006  under
Sections 302, 201  IPC  read  with  Section  34  IPC  was  registered.  PW12
received the clothes (material Ext.11), photographs of the deceased boy  and
PW8 has identified the said clothes (material Ext.11) as  that  of  his  son
and  also  photographs  (Ext.3  &   3/1)   as   of   deceased   boy   Vicky.
Identification of clothes recovered from the body of  deceased  boy  beneath
the pulia and identification of the photographs  and  knowledge  of  accused
No.3 and as to the place of dead body is a  strong  militating  circumstance
against the accused Chintoo Singh (A-5) and Birendra Bhagat (A-3).
18.         Learned counsel for the accused Chintoo Singh(A-5) and  Birendra
Bhagat (A-3) contended that the alleged disclosure statement of the  accused
is hit by Section  25  of  the  Evidence  Act  which  makes  the  disclosure
statement  inadmissible and the statement recorded from the accused did  not
lead to disclosure of  any fact  so as to make it admissible  under  Section
27 of the Evidence Act and there is nothing to connect the accused with  the
dead body of a boy recovered from beneath  the  pulia   in  connection  with
(Fakuli OP) P.S. Case No.128/2006.   It  was  submitted  that  the  link  to
connect  the accused with the murder of deceased boy Vicky is  missing   and
that the confession  statement  of  accused  Chintoo       Singh  (A-5)  and
Birendra Bhagat (A-3) recorded by  police  is  not  admissible  in  evidence
which was not kept in view by the courts below.
19.         So far as  the recovery of dead body of boy  under  the  culvert
between Bhagwanpur and Bahadarpur road is concerned, as noticed  earlier,  a
F.I.R. was registered in (Fakuli OP)  P.S. Case No.128/2006 dated  22.4.2006
under Sections 302, 201 IPC read with Section 34 IPC.  Though the  statement
recorded from the accused Chintoo Singh (A-5)  and  Birendra  Bhagat   (A-3)
did not lead to any recovery as admissible under Section 27 of the  Evidence
Act, their statement led to the disclosure of the details of the  dead  body
and registration of F.I.R. in (Fakuli  OP)  P.S.  Case  No.128/2006.  If  no
statement was recorded from the accused, place of the dead body of  deceased
boy would have remained unknown.
20.         So far as the contention regarding the  inadmissibility  of  the
statement recorded from the accused Chintoo Singh (A-5) and Birendra  Bhagat
(A-3), of course, the statement did not lead to the disclosure of  any  fact
as admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.  Ideally  based  on  the
statement recorded from the accused, the investigating officer  should  have
taken the accused to the alleged place of occurrence which  would  have  led
to the disclosure of place of occurrence and omission to do so,  is  only  a
lapse in  the  investigation.   Even  if  it  is  accepted  that  there  was
deficiency  in  investigation  that  cannot  be  a  ground  to   doubt   the
prosecution version which is otherwise cogent and credible.
21.         It  is  well  settled  that  in  criminal  trials  even  if  the
investigation is defective, the rest of the  evidence  must  be  scrutinized
independently of the impact of the defects in  the  investigation  otherwise
the  criminal  trial  will  plummet  to  the  level  of  the  investigation.
Criminal trials should not be made casualties for any  lapses  committed  by
the            investigating  officer.  In State of M.  P.  vs.  Mansingh  &
Ors., (2003) 10 SCC 414, it was held that even if there was deficiencies  in
the investigation that cannot be a ground for discrediting  the  prosecution
version. The same view was reiterated in Sheo Shankar  Singh  vs.  State  of
Jharkhand And Anr., (2011) 3 SCC 654 and C. Muniappan & Ors.  vs.  State  of
Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567.
22.            We are not impressed with the arguments  advanced  on  behalf
of the accused Chintoo Singh (A-5) and Birendra Bhagat (A-3) that  there  is
nothing to connect the  accused  with  the  body  found  under  the  bridge.
Corpus delecti in some cases may not be possible to be traced or  recovered.
 If the recovery of a dead body is  an  absolute  necessity  to  convict  an
accused, in many cases the culprits  would  go  unpunished  as  the  accused
would manage to see that the dead body is destroyed or not  recovered.   Any
lapse in recovery of the dead body or missing link qua the  dead  body  will
not enure to the benefit of the accused.
23.         Upon appreciation of evidence of PW2 and PW8, the  courts  below
recorded cogent and concurrent reasonings  that   Chintoo  Singh  (A-5)  and
Birendra  Bhagat  (A-3),  for  kidnapping  the  boy  Vicky  for  ransom  and
committed murder and the conviction of  Chintoo  Singh  (A-5)  and  Birendra
Bhagat (A-3) under Sections 364A,  302 and 201  IPC  and  the  sentence   of
imprisonment  imposed on them cannot be interfered with.
24.         Conviction  qua  Ranjeet  Kumar  Ram  (A-1)  and  Sanjay  (A-4):
PW6–Nilam Devi and PW8–Sunil Kumar Singh, mother and father respectively  of
the deceased boy Vicky  are  the  vegetable  vendors  in  the  Paswan  Chowk
Market.  Ranjeet  Kumar  Ram  (A-1)  and  Sanjay  (A-4)  were  also  selling
vegetables in the same market.  In her evidence, PW6 stated  that    Ranjeet
Kumar Ram (A-1) and Sanjay (A-4) were jealous of PW6 and  PW8  as  in  their
vegetable shops they were having good business. PW8 in his  evidence  stated
that he was persuaded by Ranjeet Kumar Ram (A-1) and  Sanjay  (A-4)  to  pay
the ransom money and get back his son even when no such demand was  made  by
the kidnappers viz., Chintoo  Singh (A-5) and Birendra Bhagat (A-3).   After
number of phone calls, demand of ransom was  reduced  to  Rs.1,05,000/-  and
PW8 was asked to deliver the amount. PW8 categorically stated that  when  he
expressed fear of going alone, kidnappers told him over phone to  bring  his
neighbours Ranjeet Kumar     Ram  (A-1)  and  Sanjay  (A-4).   PW8  withdrew
Rs.80,000/- from his Savings Bank account with Bank  of  India  at  Rajendra
Chowk and Ext.5 is the Savings  Bank passbook of  PW8.   PW8  took  loan  of
Rs.20,000/- from his father-in-law Sakal Mahto and PW8  was  already  having
Rs.5,000/-.  In his evidence, PW8 stated that the amount he arranged was  of
denomination of five hundred rupees and in some of the  currency  notes,  he
has signed.  PW8 stated that he wrapped the ransom amount in a  plastic  bag
and kept in a gunny bag in the carrier of his cycle and  when  they  reached
New Gandak  Bridge, Sanjeet (A-2)  got down from his cycle and went  to  the
hut on  the left side of the road and when PW8 followed him,  Chintoo  Singh
(A-5) and Birendra Bhagat (A-3) pulled away money  kept  in  the  gunny  bag
from PW8’s cycle.  Only accused Ranjeet Kumar Ram  (A-1)  and  Sanjay  (A-4)
had the knowledge that the money was kept in the gunny bag  in  the  carrier
of cycle.  From the conduct of A-5 and A-3, it  appeared  as  if  they  were
already having knowledge about money being kept in  the  gunny  bag  in  the
carrier of the cycle of PW8 which only indicates prior meeting of  minds  of
the accused.
25.          Birendra Bhagat (A-3) is the brother-in-law  of  Ranjeet  Kumar
Ram (A-1).  Had there been no complicity of Ranjeet Kumar Ram (A-1)  in  the
commission of the offence, on knowing for the first time that  his  brother-
in-law Birendra Bhagat (A-3) was involved in the kidnapping,  Ranjeet  Kumar
Ram (A-1) must have been greatly shocked and he  must  have  questioned  his
brother-in-law Birendra Bhagat  (A-3)  as  to  why  he  had  committed  such
gruesome act of kidnapping his  neighbour’s son? But Ranjeet Kumar  Ram  (A-
1) had not reacted to the situation and he remained quiet.  His  conduct  in
not showing any reaction to his brother-in-law’s act of kidnapping of  PW8’s
son, which is not in consonance with natural human conduct. This conduct  of
first accused  coupled with the evidence that he has been persuading PW8  to
pay the money to kidnappers to get back his son leads  to  the  irresistible
inference that accused Ranjeet Kumar Ram (A-1) shared the  common  intention
with accused Nos.3 and 5 in kidnapping the child and committing murder.
26.         Recovery of five hundred rupee currency  note  (Ex.1)  from  the
house of Ranjeet Kumar Ram (A-1)  is  yet  another  link  strengthening  his
complicity in the commission  of  offence.  Pursuant  to  the  statement  of
accused Ranjeet Kumar        Ram (A-1),  currency  note  of  Rs.500/-  which
contained signature of PW8-Sunil Kumar Singh in green ink  was  seized  from
the house of first accused  under  Ext.1  seizure  list  (Ext.18).   PW4-Raj
Banshi Devi, a neighbour had spoken about the  recovery  of  Ext.1  currency
note of Rs.500/- from the house of accused No.1 and PW8 had  identified  his
signature on Ext.1 currency note.  Recovery of a part of ransom amount  from
the house of Ranjeet Kumar Ram (A1) is a determining  link   completing  the
chain of circumstantial evidence against Ranjeet Kumar Ram  (A-1),  pointing
to his guilt.
27.         Defence plea of accused Ranjeet Kumar Ram  (A-1)  is  that  some
time prior to the occurrence, there was an altercation between him  and  PW8
and at that  time  PW8-Sunil  Kumar  Singh  stated  that  he  would  falsely
implicate Ranjeet in a criminal case.  To prove the  defence  plea,  defence
witnesses Baiju Sharma and Budhan Paswan were examined as DWs 4 and 5.   The
defence plea that PW8 falsely implicated Ranjeet Kumar  Ram  (A-1)  and  his
family members in the offence of kidnapping and murder  of  his  son  defies
logic and rightly rejected by the trial court as well by the High Court.
28.         Direct evidence of common intention is seldom  available.   Such
common intention of the accused can only be inferred from the  evidence  and
circumstances appearing from  proved  facts  of  case.   In  furtherance  of
common intention, Ranjeet Kumar Ram (A-1) had been  persuading  PW8  to  pay
the ransom amount even before there was no such demand from  the  kidnappers
viz., Chintoo Singh (A-5), Birendra Bhagat (A-3).  Considering  the  act  of
Ranjeet Kumar Ram and the proved circumstances, courts  below  rightly  held
that  Ranjeet  Kumar  Ram  had  the  common  intention  of  kidnapping   and
committing murder of the boy Vicky and the courts  below  rightly  convicted
Ranjeet Kumar Ram (A-1) under Section 364A IPC and Sections 302/34 IPC.
29.         As far  as  Sanjay  Mahto  (A4)  is  concerned,  he  is  also  a
vegetable vendor in Paswan Chowk Market. Though the  circumstances  that  he
has also persuaded PW8 to pay the  ransom  amount  to  kidnappers  and  also
accompanied PW8 to Sonepur to pay  the  ransom  amount  to  the  kidnappers,
Sanjay might have  accompanied  PW8  as  a  bonafide  helper.   Neither  any
recovery was made from Sanjay nor any incriminating  evidence  is  available
against him.  So far as  Sanjay  Mahto  (A-4)  is  concerned,  though  there
may be strong suspicion about his  involvement  in  the  commission  of  the
offence, suspicion however strong it  may  be,  cannot  take  the  place  of
proof.  The case against Sanjay (A-4) is not proved beyond reasonable  doubt
and his conviction is liable to be set aside.
30.         Criminal Appeals No.1831/2011, 1817/2013 and  1821/2013:   These
appeals filed by Ranjeet Kumar Ram (A-1), Chintoo Singh (A-5)  and  Birendra
Bhagat (A-3) are dismissed.
31.         Criminal Appeal No.1820/2013: Conviction of Sanjay (A-4) is  set
aside and this appeal is allowed. He is acquitted of the charges and  he  is
ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any case.


                                                                 …………………..J.
                                           (T.S. Thakur)



                                                                 …………………..J.
      (R. Banumathi)

New Delhi;
May  15, 2015

whether the dependant family members of the deceased employee of the appellant-Canara Bank were entitled to seek compassionate appointment on the basis of ‘Dying in Harness Scheme’ which was passed Vide Circular No.154/1993 w.e.f. 8.05.1993. The claim is resisted by the Canara Bank on the ground that the financial condition of the family members of the deceased employees is good and that the Scheme dated 8.05.1993 has been replaced with scheme dated 14.02.2005 (H. O. Circular No.35/2005) scrapping the provision of compassionate appointment and in lieu thereof introduced the new scheme of ex-gratia payment=Referring to Steel Authority of India Ltd.’s case, High Court has rightly held that the grant of family pension or payment of terminal benefits cannot be treated as a substitute for providing employment assistance. The High Court also observed that it is not the case of the bank that the respondents’ family is having any other income to negate their claim for appointment on compassionate ground. 17. Considering the scope of the Scheme ‘Dying in Harness Scheme 1993’ then in force and the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court rightly directed the appellant-bank to reconsider the claim of the respondent for compassionate appointment in accordance with law and as per the Scheme (1993) then in existence. We do not find any reason warranting interference. 18. So far as the cases in Civil Appeal No.266/2008 and Civil Appeal No.267/2008 are concerned, they are similar and those respondents are similarly placed and the appeals preferred by the bank are liable to be dismissed. The appellant-bank is directed to consider the case of the respondents in Civil Appeal Nos. 266/2008 and 267/2008. 19. In the result, all the appeals preferred by the appellant-bank are dismissed and the appellant bank is directed to consider the case of the respondents for compassionate appointment as per the Scheme which was in vogue at the time of death of the concerned employee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                          CIVIL APPEAL NO.260/2008

CANARA BANK & ANR.                                ..Appellants
                                   Versus
M. MAHESH KUMAR                                     ..Respondent

                                    WITH

                          CIVIL APPEAL NO.266/2008

CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR
CANARA BANK & ORS.                                ..Appellants
                                   Versus
       SANTHA & ANR.                                     ..Respondents

                                     AND

                          CIVIL APPEAL NO.267/2008

CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR
CANARA BANK & ORS.                                   ..Appellants
                                   Versus
A.K. SHEEBA & ANR.                             ..Respondents
                               J U D G M E N T

R. BANUMATHI, J.

            Common question of law falling for consideration in these  civil
appeals is whether the dependant family members of the deceased employee  of
the appellant-Canara Bank were entitled to  seek  compassionate  appointment
on the basis of  ‘Dying in Harness Scheme’ which was  passed  Vide  Circular
No.154/1993 w.e.f. 8.05.1993.  The claim is resisted by the  Canara Bank  on
the  ground that the financial  condition  of  the  family  members  of  the
deceased employees is good and that the  Scheme  dated  8.05.1993  has  been
replaced with scheme dated 14.02.2005 (H. O. Circular No.35/2005)  scrapping
the provision of compassionate appointment and in  lieu  thereof  introduced
the new scheme of ex-gratia payment.
2.            In Civil Appeal No.260/2008, the Division Bench  of  the  High
Court of Kerala at Ernakulam vide its Order dated 24.08.2006 in Writ  Appeal
No. 1313/2003 (B) titled as Canara Bank & Anr. vs. M. Mahesh Kumar  directed
the bank to reconsider the claim of the claimant-  M.  Mahesh  Kumar  within
two months from the date of order. Further,  due  to  the  pendency  of  SLP
against the decision dated 24.08.2006 in Writ  Appeal  No.1313/2003(B),  the
Division Bench of the High Court  of  Kerala  also  disposed  off  the  Writ
Appeal Nos.2333/2006 and 2335/2006 vide common order  dated  11.12.2006  and
directed the claimants to approach  this  Court.   Assailing  the  aforesaid
three decisions of  the  Division  Bench  of  the  Kerala  High  Court,  the
appellant-bank has filed the instant appeals.
3.          For convenience, Civil Appeal No.260/2008 is  taken  as  a  lead
case.  Brief facts which led to the filing of the appeal  are  as  follows:-
Respondent applied to  the  appellant-bank  on  30.11.1998  claiming  to  be
considered for compassionate appointment on account of death of his  father,
a clerk in  the  appellant-bank  who  while  on  duty  died  on  10.10.1998.
Respondent had applied for  the  compassionate  appointment  on  account  of
‘Dying in Harness Scheme’ with effect from 8.05.1993 then in  vogue  in  the
appellant-bank.  The bank vide its communication dated  30.06.1999  rejected
the claim of the respondent on  the  ground  that  the  respondent’s  family
financial position does not show any indigent  circumstances  warranting  to
provide  employment  on  compassionate  ground.  The  respondent  gave   his
representation to the General Manager  of  the  appellant-bank  and  several
other  representations  for  reconsideration  of  his  claim;  but   nothing
fruitful happened in consideration of respondent’s claim  for  compassionate
appointment.  Thereafter, respondent filed  O.P.  No.21630/2002  (Y)  before
the High Court  of  Kerala,  Ernakulam  seeking  to  quash  the  Ext.P4  and
direction to the appellant-bank to appoint him  as  per  ‘Dying  in  Harness
Scheme’ then in force in the appellant-bank.  The learned  Single  Judge  of
the High Court vide judgment dated 30.05.2003 allowed the Original  Petition
of the respondent herein and quashed Ext.P4 and directed the  appellant-bank
to reconsider the claim of the  respondent  for  appointment  in  accordance
with law within two months from the date of receipt  of  copy  of  judgment.
Appellant-bank assailed the decision of the learned  Single  Judge  in  Writ
Appeal No.1313/2003 (B) and the Division Bench upholding the  order  of  the
Single Judge dismissed the writ appeal.  The appellant-bank has  filed  this
appeal assailing the correctness of the above order.
4.           Learned  counsel  for   the   appellant-bank   contended   that
consideration  for  appointment  on  compassionate  ground  is  contrary  to
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and is only  in  the  nature
of concession and, therefore, it does not create a vested  right  in  favour
of the claimant/respondent. It was submitted that ‘Dying in Harness  Scheme’
is a non-statutory scheme and is in the form of a  concession  and  it  does
not create a vested  right  in  favour  of  the  claimant/respondent  to  be
enforced through a writ of mandamus.  It  was  further  submitted  that  the
compassionate appointment  is  justified  when  it  is  granted  to  provide
immediate succour to the deceased-employee and  cannot  be  granted  on  the
passage of time and in all these cases, the concerned  employee  died  about
two decades ago  and,  therefore,  the  High  Court  was  not  justified  in
directing the appellant-bank to reconsider the claim of the  respondent  for
compassionate appointment.  In support of his  contention,  learned  counsel
for the appellant relied upon number of judgments: Umesh  Kumar  Nagpal  vs.
State of Haryana And Ors., (1994) 4 SCC 138; Steel Authority of  India  Ltd.
vs. Madhusudan Das & Ors., (2008) 15 SCC 560; Union of India & Anr.  vs.  B.
Kishore, (2011) 4 SCALE 298;  State  of  Haryana  vs.   Naresh  Kumar  Bali,
(1994) 4 SCC 448; State Bank of India & Ors. vs. Jaspal Kaur, (2007)  9  SCC
571 and State Bank of India & Anr. v. Raj Kumar, (2010) 11 SCC 661.
5.          Per contra, learned counsel for  the  respondent  contends  that
the order was passed by the appellant-bank  without  considering  the  facts
that is size of the respondent’s  family/employment  status  of  his  family
members and sources of  their  income,  liabilities  and  expenses  and  the
decision of the bank rejecting the case of the respondent for  compassionate
appointment  is  arbitrary.    Placing  reliance  upon  Jaspal  Kaur’s  case
(supra) and  other  decisions,  it  was  submitted  that  the  case  of  the
respondent ought to have been considered in the light of the  Scheme  ‘Dying
in Harness Scheme’ which was then in vogue.   The  respondent  averred  that
the payment of terminal benefits cannot be taken as a ground  for  rejecting
employment under the ‘Dying in Harness Scheme’.
6.          We have considered the rival contentions  of  both  the  parties
and perused the impugned judgments and the material on record.
7.          Law with  regard  to  employment  on  compassionate  ground  for
dependant of a deceased employee is well settled.  In Sushma Gosain  &  Ors.
vs. Union of India & Ors.,          (1989) 4 SCC 468,  this  Court  held  as
thus:
“9. We consider that it must be stated unequivocally that in all claims  for
appointment on compassionate grounds, there  should  not  be  any  delay  in
appointment. The purpose of providing appointment  on  compassionate  ground
is to mitigate the hardship due to death of the bread earner in the  family.
Such appointment should, therefore, be provided immediately  to  redeem  the
family in distress. It is improper to keep such case pending for  years.  If
there is no suitable post  for  appointment  supernumerary  post  should  be
created to accommodate the applicant.”

The settled law which  has  been   reiterated  in  various  cases  has  been
succinctly  elucidated  in MGB Gramin Bank vs. Chakrawarti Singh, (2014)  13
SCC 583, wherein it was observed that compassionate  appointment  cannot  be
granted as of  right and the application to be decided as  expeditiously  as
possible and held as under:-
“6. Every appointment to public office must be made by strictly adhering  to
the mandatory requirements of Articles 14 and 16  of  the  Constitution.  An
exception by providing employment on compassionate grounds has  been  carved
out in order to remove the financial constraints  on  the  bereaved  family,
which has lost its breadearner. Mere  death  of  a  government  employee  in
harness does not entitle the family to claim compassionate  employment.  The
competent authority has to examine the financial condition of the family  of
the deceased employee and it  is  only  if  it  is  satisfied  that  without
providing employment, the family will not be able to meet the  crisis,  that
a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family.  More  so,  the
person claiming such appointment must possess required eligibility  for  the
post. The consistent  view  that  has  been  taken  by  the  Court  is  that
compassionate employment cannot be claimed as a matter of right,  as  it  is
not a vested right. The Court should not stretch the  provision  by  liberal
interpretation beyond  permissible  limits  on  humanitarian  grounds.  Such
appointment should, therefore, be provided immediately to redeem the  family
in distress. It is improper to keep such a case pending for years.”
(Underlining added)

8.          The  above  consistent  view  has  been  reiterated  in  various
judgments by this Court in Umesh Kumar Nagpal vs. State of  Haryana  &  Ors.
(1994) 4 SCC 138, State of Manipur vs.  Md.  Rajaodin,  (2003)  7  SCC  511,
Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. Madhusudan Das & Ors., (2008) 15  SCC  560
and Sanjay Kumar  vs. State  of   Bihar & Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 192.
9.          Before adverting to the arguments of  the  learned  counsel  for
the parties, it is necessary to  examine  the  scope  of  the  Scheme  dated
8.05.1993 vide Circular No.154/1993 for “compassionate  appointment”.    The
object of the Scheme  is to help dependants of employees of Canara Bank  who
die or become totally and permanently disabled  while  in  harness   and  to
overcome the immediate financial difficulties on account of sudden  stoppage
of the main source of income.  The  employment  under  the  scheme  will  be
considered  only  if  there   are   indigent   circumstances   necessitating
employment to one of the dependants  and  the  deceased  employee’s  service
record is unblemished.  Mere eligibility will not vest a right for  claiming
employment. As per para 3.1, application for  employment  should  be  sought
within 2½ years from the date of death of the employees.  In  para  3.2,  it
is stated that in case of the dependant  of  the  deceased  employee  to  be
offered appointment is a minor, the bank may keep the offer  of  appointment
open till the minor attains the age of majority provided a request  is  made
to the bank by the family of the deceased  employee  and  the  same  may  be
considered subject to rules prevailing at the time of consideration.
10.         During the pendency of the matter  before  the  Division  Bench,
Indian Banks Association (for short ‘IBA’) formulated a scheme based on  the
guidelines issued by the Government of India.  As per the said  Scheme,  the
banks have scrapped the scheme of compassionate appointment  and  introduced
the new scheme of ex-gratia payment in lieu of compassionate appointment  by
H.O. Circular No.35/2005 dated 14.02.2005.    According  to  appellant-Bank,
as  on  date  of  consideration  of  the   application   for   compassionate
appointment, there was no policy to provide compassionate appointment  under
‘Dying in Harness Scheme’.   It is therefore  the  contention  of  the  bank
that the new  scheme  of  2005  applies  to  all  pending  applications  for
appointment  on  compassionate  ground,  respondent’s  case  could  not   be
considered and as per the new Scheme, they are only  entitled  to  ex-gratia
payment in lieu of compassionate appointment.
11.         The main question  falling  for  consideration  is  whether  the
Scheme passed in 2005 providing for ex-gratia payment or the Scheme then  in
vogue in 1993 providing for compassionate appointment is applicable  to  the
respondent.  Appellant-bank  has placed reliance upon the judgment  of  this
Court in Jaspal Kaur’s case (supra) to contend  that  the respondent’s  case
cannot be considered on the basis of  ‘Dying in Harness  Scheme  1993’  when
the new Scheme of 2005 providing for  ex-gratia  payment  had  been  put  in
place.  In Jaspal Kaur’s case  (supra),  Sukhbir  Inder  Singh  employee  of
State Bank of India, Record Assistant  (Cash  &  Accounts)  passed  away  on
1.08.1999.  Widow of the employee applied for compassionate  appointment  in
State Bank of India on 5.02.2000.  On 7.01.2002, the competent authority  of
the bank rejected the application of Jaspal Kaur in view of the Scheme  vis-
a-vis the financial position of the family.  Against that  decision  of  the
competent authority, the respondent filed writ petition  before  the  Punjab
and Haryana High Court which has directed to consider  the  case  of  Jaspal
Kaur by applying the Scheme formulated on  4.08.2005  when  her  application
was made in the year 2000.  In that factual matrix, this Court has  directed
that dispute arising in the year 2000 cannot be decided on the  basis  of  a
Scheme that was put in place much after the  dispute.   By  perusal  of  the
judgment  in  Jaspal  Kaur’s  case,  it  is  apparent  that   the   judgment
specifically states that claim of compassionate appointment under  a  scheme
of a particular year cannot be  decided  in  the  light  of  the  subsequent
scheme that came into force much after the claim.
12.         The same principle was reiterated by this Court in the  case  of
Bhawani Prasad Sonkar vs. Union of India & Ors.,             (2011)  4   SCC
209,  wherein it  was  held  as under :-
“15.  Now, it is well settled that compassionate employment is given  solely
on humanitarian grounds with the sole object to provide immediate relief  to
the employee’s family to tide over the sudden financial  crisis  and  cannot
be claimed as a matter of right. Appointment  based  solely  on  descent  is
inimical to our constitutional  scheme,  and  ordinarily  public  employment
must be strictly on  the  basis  of  open  invitation  of  applications  and
comparative  merit,  in  consonance  with  Articles  14  and   16   of   the
Constitution  of  India.  No  other  mode  of  appointment  is  permissible.
Nevertheless, the concept of compassionate appointment has  been  recognised
as an exception to the general rule, carved out in the interest of  justice,
in certain exigencies, by way of a policy of  an  employer,  which  partakes
the character of the service rules. That being so, it needs little  emphasis
that the scheme or the policy, as the case may be, is binding  both  on  the
employer and the  employee.  Being  an  exception,  the  scheme  has  to  be
strictly construed and confined only to the purpose it seeks to achieve.
……
17.  In Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana,  (1994)  4  SCC  138,  while
emphasising that a compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as  a  matter
of course or in posts above Classes III and  IV,  this  Court  had  observed
that: (SCC p. 140, para 2)
“2. …The whole object  of  granting  compassionate  employment  is  thus  to
enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to  give
a member of such family a post much  less  a  post  for  post  held  by  the
deceased. What is further, mere death of an employee  in  harness  does  not
entitle his family to such source  of  livelihood.  The  Government  or  the
public authority concerned has to examine the  financial  condition  of  the
family of the deceased, and it is only if it is satisfied, that but for  the
provision of employment, the family will not be  able  to  meet  the  crisis
that a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family. The  posts
in Classes III and  IV  are  the  lowest  posts  in  non-manual  and  manual
categories and hence they alone can be  offered  on  compassionate  grounds,
the object being to relieve the family, of the financial destitution and  to
help it get over the emergency. The provision of employment in  such  lowest
posts by making an exception to the rule is justifiable and valid  since  it
is not discriminatory. The favourable treatment given to such  dependant  of
the deceased employee in such posts has a rational  nexus  with  the  object
sought to be achieved viz. relief against destitution. No  other  posts  are
expected or required to be given by the public authorities for the  purpose.
It must be remembered in this  connection  that  as  against  the  destitute
family of the deceased there  are  millions  of  other  families  which  are
equally, if not more destitute. The  exception  to  the  [pic]rule  made  in
favour of the family of the deceased employee is  in  consideration  of  the
services rendered by him and the legitimate expectations, and the change  in
the  status  and  affairs,  of  the  family  engendered  by  the   erstwhile
employment which are suddenly upturned.”
……..
20. Thus, while considering a claim for employment on compassionate  ground,
the following factors have to be borne in mind:

(i) Compassionate employment cannot be made  in  the  absence  of  rules  or
regulations issued by the Government or a public authority. The  request  is
to be considered strictly in accordance with the governing  scheme,  and  no
discretion as  such  is  left  with  any  authority  to  make  compassionate
appointment dehors the scheme.
(ii) An application for compassionate employment must be  preferred  without
undue delay and has to be considered within a reasonable period of time.
(iii) An appointment on compassionate ground is to meet  the  sudden  crisis
occurring in the family on account of the death or medical  invalidation  of
the  breadwinner  while  in  service.  Therefore,  compassionate  employment
cannot be granted as a matter of course by way of largesse  irrespective  of
the financial condition of the deceased/incapacitated employee’s  family  at
the time of his death or incapacity, as the case may be.
(iv) Compassionate employment is permissible only to one of  the  dependants
of  the  deceased/incapacitated  employee  viz.  parents,  spouse,  son   or
daughter and not to all relatives, and such appointments should be  only  to
the lowest category that is Class III and IV posts.”
(Underlining added)


13.         Applying these principles to the  case  in  hand,  as  discussed
earlier, respondent’s father died on 10.10.1998 while he was  serving  as  a
clerk  in  the  appellant-bank  and  the  respondent  applied   timely   for
compassionate appointment as per the scheme ‘Dying in Harness Scheme’  dated
8.05.1993 which was in force at that time.  The appellant-bank rejected  the
respondent’s claim on  30.06.1999  recording  that  there  are  no  indigent
circumstances  for  providing  employment  to  the  respondent.   Again   on
7.11.2001, the appellant-bank sought for particulars in connection with  the
issue of respondent’s employment.  In the light of the principles laid  down
in  the  above  decisions,  the  cause  of  action  to  be  considered   for
compassionate appointment  arose  when  the  Circular            No.154/1993
dated 8.05.1993 was in force. Thus, as per the judgment referred  in  Jaspal
Kaur’s case, the claim cannot be decided as per 2005  Scheme  providing  for
ex-gratia payment.  The Circular dated 14.2.2005 being an administrative  or
executive order cannot have retrospective effect so  as  to  take  away  the
right accrued to the respondent as per circular of 1993.
14.          It is also pertinent to note that 2005  Scheme  providing  only
for  ex-gratia  payment  in  lieu  of   compassionate   appointment   stands
superseded by the Scheme of 2014 which has revived the scheme providing  for
compassionate appointment.  As on date,  now  the  scheme  in  force  is  to
provide compassionate appointment. Under these circumstances, the appellant-
bank is not justified in contending that the application  for  compassionate
appointment of the respondent cannot be considered in  view  of  passage  of
time.
15.         Insofar as the contention of the appellant-bank that  since  the
respondent’s  family  is  getting  family  pension  and  also  obtained  the
terminal benefits, in our view, is of  no  consequence  in  considering  the
application for compassionate appointment.  Clause 3.2 of 1993  Scheme  says
that in case the dependant of deceased employee to  be  offered  appointment
is a minor, the bank may keep the offer of appointment open till  the  minor
attains the age of majority.  This would indicate that granting of  terminal
benefits is of no consequence because even if terminal benefit is given,  if
the applicant is a minor, the bank would keep the appointment open till  the
minor attains the majority.
16.         In Balbir Kaur & Anr. vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. &  Ors.,
(2000) 6 SCC 493, while dealing with the application made by the  widow  for
employment on compassionate ground applicable  to  the  Steel  Authority  of
India, contention raised was that since she is entitled to get  the  benefit
under Family Benefit Scheme assuring monthly payment to the  family  of  the
deceased employee, the  request  for  compassionate  appointment  cannot  be
acceded to.  Rejecting that contention in paragraph (13),  this  Court  held
as under:-

“13. ….But in our view this Family Benefit  Scheme  cannot  in  any  way  be
equated with the benefit of compassionate appointments. The sudden  jerk  in
the family by reason of the death of the breadearner can  only  be  absorbed
by some lump-sum amount being made available to the family — this is  rather
unfortunate but this is a reality. The feeling of security drops to zero  on
the death of the breadearner and insecurity thereafter reigns and it  is  at
that  juncture  if  some  lump-sum  amount  is   made   available   with   a
compassionate appointment, the grief-stricken family may  find  some  solace
to the mental agony and manage its affairs in the normal course  of  events.
It  is  not  that  monetary  benefit  would  be  the  replacement   of   the
breadearner,  but  that  would  undoubtedly  bring  some   solace   to   the
situation.”


Referring to Steel Authority of India Ltd.’s case, High  Court  has  rightly
held that the grant of  family  pension  or  payment  of  terminal  benefits
cannot be treated as a substitute for providing employment  assistance.  The
High Court also observed that it is not  the  case  of  the  bank  that  the
respondents’ family is having any other income to  negate  their  claim  for
appointment on compassionate ground.
17.         Considering the scope of the Scheme  ‘Dying  in  Harness  Scheme
1993’ then in force and the facts and circumstances of the  case,  the  High
Court rightly directed the appellant-bank to reconsider  the  claim  of  the
respondent for compassionate appointment in accordance with law and  as  per
the Scheme (1993) then in existence.  We do not find any  reason  warranting
interference.
18.         So far as the  cases  in  Civil  Appeal  No.266/2008  and  Civil
Appeal No.267/2008 are concerned, they are  similar  and  those  respondents
are similarly placed and the appeals preferred by the bank are liable to  be
dismissed. The appellant-bank is  directed  to  consider  the  case  of  the
respondents in Civil Appeal Nos. 266/2008 and 267/2008.
19.         In the result, all the appeals preferred by  the  appellant-bank
are dismissed and the appellant bank is directed to  consider  the  case  of
the respondents for compassionate appointment as per the  Scheme  which  was
in vogue at the time of death of the concerned employee.  In the  facts  and
circumstances of the case,  we make no order as to costs.


                                                                 ………………………J.
                                (T.S. Thakur)


                                                                 ………………………J.
                                 (R. Banumathi)
New Delhi;
May 15, 2015

The appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years on each count of conviction under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act and the sentence imposed was ordered to run concurrently. The incident had taken place in the year 1996 about nineteen years ago and for all these years the appellant has undergone the agony of criminal proceedings. Keeping in view the passage of time and that the appellant is now aged seventy four years, in our view, while upholding the conviction of the appellant, interest of justice would be met by reducing the sentence of rigorous imprisonment of four years to one year rigorous imprisonment. Application for exemption from surrendering was allowed by the Chamber Judge on 20.09.2013, which was subsequently continued until further orders by this Court’s order dated 25.11.2013. Necessary steps be taken forthwith to take the appellant into custody to serve out the remaining part of the modified sentence. Judgment of the High Court is accordingly modified and this appeal is allowed in part.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 797    OF 2015
                 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.8161/2013)


K.L. BAKOLIA                                              ..Appellant

                                   Versus

STATE THROUGH DIRECTOR, C.B.I.              ..Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T


R. BANUMATHI, J.


            Leave granted.
2.          This appeal assails the correctness of the  judgment  passed  by
the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No.207/2003 dated  11.7.2013,  in
and by which, the High Court  confirmed  the  conviction  of  the  appellant
under   Section 7 and Section  13(2)  read  with  Section  13(1)(d)  of  the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the sentence imposed on him.
3.          Shamsher Singh-complainant (PW4) is the sole proprietor of  M/s.
Colonel’s Security Services  working  on  contract  for  providing  security
staff to Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI), Pusa, New  Delhi  on
annual basis from 1.03.1993 which was  subsequently  renewed  from  year  to
year basis  upto  31.03.1996  and  the  contract  was  due  for  renewal  on
1.04.1996.  Complainant stated that  on  2.04.1996  when  he  contacted  the
appellant for renewal of his contract and payment of his  outstanding  dues,
the appellant demanded Rs.50,000/- as a bribe for renewal  of  contract  and
when complainant stated that he was not in a position  to  pay  Rs.50,000/-,
the bribe amount was reduced to Rs.20,000/- and the  complainant  was  asked
to meet the appellant on 3.04.1996 and pay the  bribe  amount.   Complainant
was not interested in paying the bribe and on the same day he  went  to  CBI
office and narrated the facts.  The complainant was asked  to  come  on  the
next day with Rs.20,000/- by CBI officer.  In the evening of 3.04.1996,  the
appellant rang up the complainant and inquired him as  to  why  he  did  not
contact him on the said date, for which, the  complainant  replied  that  he
would come to the residence of the appellant on the next  day  between  1.00
to 2.00 p.m.
4.          On 4.4.1996, the complainant  visited  CBI  office  and  he  was
asked to submit his complaint in writing.  Based on the complaint,  FIR  was
registered  in  RC  No.24(A)/96-CBI/ACB/N.Delhi  under  Section  7  of   the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.  Raiding party was constituted and  pre-
trap  proceedings  were  conducted  and  Rs.20,000/-  consisting  of   forty
currency notes  of  rupees  five  hundred  denomination  each  treated  with
phenolphthalein powder were given to complainant.  As the complainant  alone
was supposed  to  go  and  contact  the  appellant,  a  two  piece  recorder
consisting of recorder and mic-cum-transmitter  along  with  audio  cassette
was put in the pocket of the complainant.  A further direction was given  to
the complainant to give signal to the trap party by saying ‘Gin Leejiye’.
5.          The complainant and the trap  party  went  to  Pusa  Complex  at
about 1.45 p.m. The complainant after switching on  the  mic-cum-transmitter
went inside the house of the appellant  who  welcomed  him.   The  appellant
inquired from the complainant ‘Laye Ho’ and the complainant replied  in  the
affirmative.  When complainant gave the bribe amount of Rs.20,000/-  to  the
appellant, he raised the cushion of the sofa and asked  the  complainant  to
keep the money under the cushion of the sofa.  As the  complainant  insisted
that the money should be handed over in the hand, the complainant  took  the
tainted money in his right hand and kept it under the cushion of  his  sofa.
The complainant gave the signal ‘Gin Leejiye’ where after the CBI  officials
rushed into the drawing room of the appellant and questioned him  about  the
bribe money and the appellant was perplexed and kept mum.   On  instructions
from the officer, PW6 lifted the cushion of the sofa and the trap money  was
recovered.  Wash of both the hands of the appellant in the sodium  carbonate
solution turned pink.  Trap laying officer prepared  the  seizure  memo  and
completed other  formalities  of  trap  proceedings.   After  completion  of
investigation, chargesheet was filed against the appellant under  Section  7
and Section 13 (2) read with  Section  13  (1)  (d)  of  the  Prevention  of
Corruption Act, 1988 (for short ‘the Act’).
6.          To bring home the guilt of  the  accused,  the  prosecution  has
examined  ten  witnesses.   Upon  consideration  of  the  evidence,  learned
Special Judge convicted the appellant under  Section  7  and  Section  13(2)
read with Section 13(1)(d)  of  the  Act  and  sentenced  the  appellant  to
undergo rigorous imprisonment  for a period  of four  years  on  each  count
with a  fine of  Rs.500/-  each  with  default  clause.   Aggrieved  by  the
conviction, the appellant filed appeal before the High Court  of  Delhi  and
vide impugned judgment, the High  Court  confirmed  the  conviction  of  the
appellant and also the sentence and the fine imposed on  him.   This  appeal
assails the correctness of the same.
7.          We have heard Ms. Vibha Dutta Makhija,  learned  Senior  Counsel
for the appellant, who submitted that the initial demand was not  proved  by
the prosecution which is evident from the self-contradictory version of  the
complainant and in  the  light  of  contradictory  statement  of  witnesses,
recovery  has  become  highly  doubtful  and  the  courts  below  erred   in
convicting the appellant for the alleged receipt of  illegal  gratification.
The learned counsel inter-alia submitted that  the  occurrence  was  in  the
year 1996 and the appellant is now aged seventy four years  and  prayed  for
leniency.
8.          Per contra, learned counsel for the  respondent  contended  that
the prosecution  has  proved  the  demand  and  acceptance  of  the  illegal
gratification by the appellant and upon  appreciation  of  evidence,  courts
below rightly convicted the appellant and the  concurrent  findings  warrant
no interference.
9.          For coming to  the  finding  of  guilt  for  the  offence  under
Section 13(1)(d) of the Act, firstly, there must be a demand and   secondly,
 there must be acceptance in the sense that  the  accused  received  illegal
gratification. Courts below recorded  concurrent  findings  that  there  was
evidence on record to substantiate the fact that there was a demand and  the
complainant paid the bribe amount to the  appellant  who  has  accepted  the
same. Courts below also recorded   concurrent  findings  that  there  is  no
reason to discredit the testimony of the complainant (PW4) and Inspector  of
Police-A.K. Kapoor (PW7).  Defence plea of the  accused  that  the  currency
notes were put under the sofa without his knowledge was rightly rejected  by
the courts below. Conviction of the appellant under Section  7  and  Section
13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act is unassailable.
10.         In this appeal,  notice was issued only limited to the  question
of sentence.  The appellant was sentenced to undergo  rigorous  imprisonment
for four years on each count of  conviction  under  Section  7  and  Section
13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d)  of the Act and the sentence  imposed   was
ordered to run concurrently.  The incident had taken place in the year  1996
about nineteen  years  ago  and  for  all  these  years  the  appellant  has
undergone the agony of criminal proceedings.   Keeping  in view the  passage
of time and that the appellant is  now aged  seventy  four   years,  in  our
view,  while  upholding  the  conviction  of  the  appellant,   interest  of
justice would be met by reducing  the sentence of  rigorous imprisonment  of
four years to one year rigorous  imprisonment.   Application  for  exemption
from surrendering was allowed by the Chamber Judge on 20.09.2013, which  was
subsequently continued until further orders  by  this  Court’s  order  dated
25.11.2013.  Necessary steps be taken forthwith to take the  appellant  into
custody to serve out the remaining part of the modified sentence.   Judgment
of the High Court is accordingly modified and  this  appeal  is  allowed  in
part.


                                                                ……………………..J.
                                (T.S. Thakur)


                                                                ……………………..J.
                                 (R. Banumathi)

New Delhi;
May 15, 2015

Sec.5 of Limitation Act - Or.9, rule 13 of C.P.C. - Delay of 355 days in one suit and delay of 382 days in another suit - Reason for delay only after seeing the paper publication - Trial court order to deposit decreed amount for settling aside the decree else would be dismissed automatically - High court confirmed the same - Apex court held that though the court has got discretion to impose some costs or to direct to deposit part of suit claim but should not have imposed such an unreasonable and onerous condition of depositing the entire suit claim of Rs.1,50,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- respectively in the suits when the issues are yet to be decided on merits - set aside the orders of Trail court and High court - 2015 S.C.MSKLAWREPORTS



 The
respondents filed the suit being O.S.No.3/2011 for recovery of  the  sum  of
Rs. 1,50,00,000/- with interest.  The case was adjourned from time  to  time
on various dates.
On 16.06.2011, the  appellants-defendants  were  set  ex-
parte in the suit.  After recording evidence  adduced  by  the  respondents-
plaintiffs  on  5.07.2011,  the  said  suit  was  decreed  ex-parte  by  the
Principal District Judge, Thanjavur.


Respondents have also filed another suit O.S. No.6 of  2011  for
recovery of a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- said to have been paid by  them  to  the
appellants by way of an advance towards the purchase  of  another  property.
The said suit was decreed  ex-parte  on  16.06.2011.  
The appellants filed I.A.No.77 of 2012 and I.A.  No.78  of  2012
in both the suits praying for condonation of delay of    355  days  and  382
days respectively in filing the applications under Order  IX  Rule  13  CPC,
for setting aside the ex-parte decrees.
The appellants  averred  that  they
came to know about the ex-parte decrees only on 13.07.2012, when they saw  a
public notice in the daily newspaper regarding the attachment  of  the  suit
property.
The Principal  District  Judge,  Thanjavur  vide  separate  order
dated 4.12.12 condoned the delay of 355 days and  382  days  in  filing  the
applications under Order IX Rule 13  CPC  for  setting  aside  the  ex-parte
decree and allowed the applications in IA No.77 of 2012 and  I.A.  No.78  of
2012  but  subject  to  condition  that  the   appellants   should   deposit
Rs.1,50,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- respectively in the court on  or  before
3.01.2013,  failing  which  the  applications   will   automatically   stand
dismissed.
High court confirmed the same
Apex court held that
 It is well settled that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is  to
receive liberal construction so as to  advance  substantial  justice.   When
there is no negligence, inaction or want of bonafide  is  imputable  to  the
appellants, the  delay  has  to  be  condoned.   The  discretion  is  to  be
exercised  like  any  other   judicial   discretion   with   vigilance   and
circumspection.  The discretion is not to be  exercised  in  any  arbitrary,
vague or fanciful manner.  The true test is to  see  whether  the  applicant
has acted with due diligence.

While exercising the discretion for setting aside  the  ex-parte
decrees or condoning the delay in filing the application to  set  aside  the
ex-parte decrees, the court is competent to direct the defendants to  pay  a
portion of the decreetal amount or the cost

 Costs  should  be  so  assessed  as  would  reasonably  compensate  the
plaintiff for the loss of time and inconvenience caused by  relegating  back
the proceedings to an earlier stage. The terms which the  court  may  direct
may take care of the time or  mode  of  proceedings  required  to  be  taken
pursuant to the order under Rule 7. ….…the court cannot exercise  its  power
to put the defendant-applicant on such terms  as  may  have  the  effect  of
prejudging the controversy involved in the suit and virtually decreeing  the
suit though ex parte order has been set aside or to put the parties on  such
terms as may be too onerous……… That condition in  the  order  of  the  trial
court having been set aside by the High Court, we are  inclined  to  sustain
the order of the High Court but subject  to  certain  modification.  In  our
opinion the High Court was justified in setting aside the condition  imposed
by the trial  court  in  its  order  which  was  too  onerous,  also  vague,
uncertain and suffering from want of clarity.  The order of the  High  Court
to the extent of setting aside the ex parte proceedings  and  directing  the
expeditious trial of the suit has to be sustained as it serves the  ends  of
justice….”

  In  the  present  case,  while  the  trial  court  has  exercised  the
discretion to condone the delay in filing the applications to set aside  the
ex-parte decrees, in our view, the trial court should not have imposed  such
an unreasonable and onerous condition of depositing the  entire  suit  claim
of Rs.1,50,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- respectively in the  suits  when  the
issues are yet to be decided on merits. While considering the revision,  the
High Court should have kept in view that the  parties  are  yet  to  go  for
trial and the appellants ought to have  been  afforded  the  opportunity  to
contest the suits on merits.  When the  S.L.Ps  came  up  for  admission  on
1.08.2013, this Court passed the conditional order that subject  to  deposit
a sum of Rs.50,00,000/- before the trial court, notice shall  be  issued  to
the   respondents.  In  compliance  with  the  order  dated  1.08.2013,  the
appellants have deposited Rs.50,00,000/- before the trial court.  Since  the
appellants have satisfactorily explained the reasons for the delay and  with
a view to provide an opportunity to the appellants to contest the suit,  the
impugned order is liable to be set aside.

 The order dated 16.04.2013 of the High Court passed  in  C.R.P.  (NPD)
(MD) No.4/2013 and C.R.P. (NPD) (MD)  No.5/2013,  is  set  aside  and  these
appeals are allowed.  Delay in filing the applications to set aside the  ex-
parte decrees is condoned and the ex-parte decrees passed in  O.S.  No.3  of
2011 and O.S. No.6 of 2011 are set aside and the suits  are  ordered  to  be
restored to file.   The  appellants  shall  file  their  written  statements
within a period of six weeks if not already filed.  Since the suits  are  of
the year 2011 and the respondents are stated  to  be  senior  citizens,  the
trial court is directed to take up the suits at an early  date  and  dispose
of the suits expeditiously.  It is made clear that  we  have  not  expressed
any opinion on the merits  of  the  matter.  The  amount  of  Rs.50,00,000/-
deposited by the appellants before the trial court shall be  invested  in  a
Nationalized Bank so that the accrued interest may enure to the  benefit  of
either party.  In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no  order
as to costs.-2015 S.C. MSKLAWREPORTS

There is no quarrel with the proposition that registration can be insisted upon by the State Government or its departments for purposes of allotment of works and participation in auctions relating thereto. There is also no difficulty in the State providing for production of a character certificate as one of the conditions of eligibility. Experience of the Contractor, if considered relevant for the purposes of such registration, could also be stipulated as one of the requirements to be satisfied by the applicants under the Rules or Regulations. That such regulation ought to ensure participation of only genuine contractors and prevent the mafia from hijacking the system cannot also be faulted. The question, however, is whether that purpose which is indeed laudable could be achieved by a side wind viz. by the District Magistrate denying a character certificate to an applicant. Our answer is in the negative. We say so because the very fact that a character certificate is issued does not mean that everyone who has such a certificate gets a vested right to be registered as a contractor. The District Magistrate did not have any authority under the rules stipulating registration of contractors to consider such requests for registration or to grant or refuse the same. It is the competent authority in the Irrigation Department concerned who has to take a call. Inasmuch as the District Magistrate took upon himself the duty of examining whether the appellant was suitable for registration, he went beyond the legitimate sphere of the jurisdiction vested in him which was limited to considering the request for issuance of a character certificate.

                                             REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4475  OF 2015
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.25607 of 2013


Manyata Devi                                       …Appellant

Vs.

State of U.P. & Ors.                               …Respondents











                               J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1.    Leave granted.
2.    This appeal arises of out an order dated 2nd April,  2013,  passed  by
the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad whereby Writ Petition No.17398  of
2013 filed by the appellant has been dismissed and the order passed  by  the
District Magistrate, Basti, refusing to issue  a  character  certificate  in
favour of the appellant upheld.
3.    The appellant appears to  have  applied  to  the  District  Collector,
Basti, for a  character/enlistment  certificate  in  her  favour,  which  it
appears is  one  of  the  requirements  prescribed  for  registration  as  a
contractor under the Irrigation Department of the State  of  Uttar  Pradesh.
The appellant,  as  proprietor  of  M/s  Krishna  Construction  was  already
registered as a contractor but since the said registration  was  valid  only
for a period three years ending 31st June, 2009, a fresh  character/solvency
certificate was necessary for renewal of her registration.
4.    The application made  by  the  petitioner  appears  to  have  remained
unattended for some time forcing her to file Writ Petition No.17945 of  2010
which was disposed of by the High Court by its order dated 5th  April,  2010
directing the  District  Magistrate,  Basti,  to  consider  and  decide  the
application of the appellant within a period  of  six  weeks.  The  District
Magistrate in compliance with the said order issued a  solvency  certificate
in favour of the appellant on 24th May,  2010  but  deferred  the  grant  of
character certificate till such time the Superintendent of  Police  inquired
into the matter and submitted a report. On receipt of the  report  from  the
Superintendent of Police, the District  Magistrate  passed  an  order  dated
15th June,  2010  declining  to  issue  the  character  certificate  to  the
appellant on the solitary ground that  her  husband  was  involved  in  four
criminal cases during the past.
5.    Aggrieved by the refusal of the character certificate in  her  favour,
the appellant filed Writ Petition No.9875 of  2011  before  the  High  Court
which was disposed of by the High  Court  on  14th  February,  2012  with  a
direction that the appellant should  approach  the  Commissioner  in  appeal
against  the  order  passed  by  the  District  Magistrate.  The   appellant
accordingly preferred an appeal before  the  Commissioner,  Basti,  who  set
aside the order passed by the District Magistrate and  remitted  the  matter
back to him for appropriate orders with the  observation  that  the  request
for grant of a character certificate must be considered on the basis of  the
personal character of the person applying  for  the  same  and  not  of  her
family members. Notwithstanding  that  direction,  the  District  Magistrate
once again passed an order dated 12th December, 2012  rejecting  the  prayer
for the  issuance  of  a  character  certificate  on  the  ground  that  the
appellant did not have any knowledge of  contract  works  which  works  were
being got executed by her through her son and other persons.  The  appellant
challenged the said order before the High Court in  Writ  Petition  No.17398
of 2013 which came to be dismissed by the High Court by its order dated  2nd
April, 2013. Hence the present appeal.
6.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties at  length  and  perused
the orders passed by the District Magistrate and the Commissioner and  those
passed by the High Court. The material facts are not in dispute. It  is  not
in dispute that  the  appellant  is  the  sole  proprietor  of  M/s  Krishna
Construction.   It  is  also  not  in  dispute  that  the  appellant  was  a
registered contractor with the Irrigation Department of  the  Government  of
U.P.  for  executing  civil  works.  It  is  also  not  disputed  that   the
registration was earlier granted in favour of the appellant  pursuant  to  a
solvency and character certificate issued in  her  favour  by  the  District
Magistrate, Basti.  It  is  common  ground  that  the  registration  of  the
appellant remained valid upto 31st June, 2009, whereafter the same  required
a renewal based on a fresh solvency certificate and a character  certificate
according to the applicable norms prescribed by the  Irrigation  Department.
That a solvency certificate was issued in favour of the  appellant  is  also
not in dispute. So also there is  no  dispute  that  the  appellant  is  not
involved in any criminal case or activity of any  objectionable  kind.  That
being the position, the District Magistrate  should  have  simply  certified
her character because that was  the  only  question  which  the  former  was
called  upon  to  examine  while  dealing  with  the  request  made  by  the
appellant. The District Magistrate, however, appears to have been swayed  by
considerations wholly extraneous to the question whether the  appellant  had
a good moral character.  In the first order of refusal  passed  by  him,  he
opined that since the appellant’s  husband  had  criminal  cases  registered
against him, she was disentitled from claiming a certificate of  good  moral
character. Apart from the  fact  that  the  cases  against  the  appellant’s
husband to which the District Magistrate appears to be referring  had  ended
in  his  acquittal,  it  is  difficult  to  appreciate  how  criminal  cases
registered against the husband of the appellant could possibly  deny  her  a
certificate  of  good  moral  character.  The   Commissioner,   Basti   was,
therefore, perfectly justified in setting aside  the  order  passed  by  the
District Magistrate and directing him to consider the request for the  issue
of a certificate based on  the  character  of  the  applicant  and  not  her
relative or member of the family.  Since there  was  nothing  adverse  about
the appellant, one would have expected the District Magistrate to issue  the
requisite certificate in favour of the appellant. Instead of doing  so,  the
District Magistrate appears to have invented fresh reasons for denial  of  a
certificate.  This  time,  the  certificate  was  denied  not  because   the
appellant or anyone in her family was implicated in any  criminal  case  but
on the ground that she had no  experience  in  getting  the  contract  works
executed. We have not been  able  to  appreciate  as  to  how  the  District
Magistrate could have brought in the question of the appellant’s  capability
as a contractor or her experience in executing works to bear upon  her  good
moral character.  Even when the appellant may  have  had  no  experience  in
getting government works executed she could still  claim  that  she  bore  a
good moral character. The reasoning given by  the  District  Magistrate  was
wholly irrelevant to say the least.  Inasmuch  as  the  District  Magistrate
ignored the order passed by the Commissioner  and  the  considerations  that
would go into grant or refusal of the character certificate, he committed  a
mistake that is palpable on the face of record.
7.    It was argued  on  behalf  of  the  respondent-State  that  since  the
appellant had no experience of executing contracted works, the refusal of  a
character certificate was only meant to prevent her from getting  registered
as  a  contractor  with  the  department.  It  was  also  argued  that   the
registration of a contractor was necessary and unless such registration  was
granted only in deserving cases, the very purpose of the registration  would
stand defeated. There was, according to learned counsel for the  respondent,
a “contractors  mafia”  operating  in  the  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  which
demanded that registration is granted only to people who  have  no  criminal
background so that  genuine  contractors  are  not  prevented  from  winning
contracts from the Government and competing for allotment of works.  It  was
argued that since  the  husband  of  the  appellant  could  not  himself  be
registered on account of his criminal background, the  appellant  was  being
projected for such a registration only to make it possible for  the  husband
to carry out the works in  the  name  of  his  wife.   Registration  of  the
appellant, in such a situation, would defeat the very  purpose  behind  such
registrations, argued the learned counsel.
8.    There is no quarrel with the  proposition  that  registration  can  be
insisted upon by the State Government or its  departments  for  purposes  of
allotment of works and participation in auctions relating thereto. There  is
also no difficulty in the State providing  for  production  of  a  character
certificate as one of the conditions  of  eligibility.   Experience  of  the
Contractor, if considered relevant for the purposes  of  such  registration,
could also be stipulated as one of the requirements to be satisfied  by  the
applicants under the Rules or Regulations. That  such  regulation  ought  to
ensure participation of only genuine contractors and prevent the mafia  from
hijacking the system cannot also be  faulted.   The  question,  however,  is
whether that purpose which is indeed laudable could be achieved  by  a  side
wind viz. by the District Magistrate denying a character certificate  to  an
applicant.  Our answer is in the negative. We say so because the  very  fact
that a character certificate is issued does not mean that everyone  who  has
such a certificate gets a vested right to be  registered  as  a  contractor.
The  District  Magistrate  did  not  have  any  authority  under  the  rules
stipulating registration  of  contractors  to  consider  such  requests  for
registration or to grant or refuse the same. It is the  competent  authority
in the Irrigation Department concerned who has to take a call.  Inasmuch  as
the District Magistrate took upon himself the duty of examining whether  the
appellant was suitable for  registration,  he  went  beyond  the  legitimate
sphere of the jurisdiction vested in him which was  limited  to  considering
the request for issuance of a character certificate.
9.    Having said so, we must add that copy  of  the  rules  regulating  the
registration of contractors has not been  produced  by  the  State.  It  is,
therefore, difficult for us to  say  whether  the  rules  are  comprehensive
enough to disentitle persons who do not have any experience in execution  of
the contract works from claiming registration. But there  is  no  manner  of
doubt that, if the ground  situation  in  the  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  so
requires, the department concerned can and indeed ought  to  strengthen  the
registration procedure by framing new rules or amending the  existing  rules
on the subject making registration possible only upon satisfaction  of  such
conditions as may be  prescribed  by  such  rules  including  experience  in
executing contracts as one such condition.
10.   In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the order passed by  the
High Court and direct the District Magistrate to reconsider the  matter  and
dispose of the application for grant of a character certificate  keeping  in
view the observations made herein. We make  it  clear  that  even  when  the
character certificate is issued by the District Magistrate in favour of  the
appellant, the Competent Authority shall be free to examine the  prayer  for
registration or  renewal  in  accordance  with  law  having  regard  to  the
requirements that already exist or may be prescribed on the subject  by  the
authority       competent       to       do       so.        No       costs.



                                                      ……………………………………….…..…J.
                                                               (T.S. THAKUR)





                                                      ……………………………………….…..…J.
                                                     (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)




                                                      ……………………………………….…..…J.
                                                          (PRAFULLA C. PANT)
New Delhi
May 15, 2015