Food Adulteration case - High court reduced the sentence to 3 months minimum sentence - No further reduction - Clause (m) postulates a situation where the articles fall below the prescribed standard even if it is not injurious to health. It is clear from this provision that if salt is added to chillies even if it would not be rendered injurious to health, nevertheless the quality/purity of the article would fall below the prescribed standards/its constituents as prescribed in A.05.05.01 limit. It would be adulterated.- Apex court held that We are of the view that no further benevolence can be shown to the appellant, more so, when it is a case of food adulteration. There is no special circumstances which may warrant reducing the sentence below the minimum. The appeal is accordingly dismissed= MITHILESH APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF NCT,DELHI RESPONDENT= 2014(May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41547

Food Adulteration case - High court reduced the sentence to 3 months minimum sentence - No further reduction  - Clause (m) postulates a situation where the articles fall  below the prescribed standard even if it is not injurious to health.  It is clear from this provision that if salt is added to chillies even if it would  not be rendered injurious to health, nevertheless  the  quality/purity  of  the article would fall  below  the  prescribed  standards/its  constituents  as prescribed in A.05.05.01 limit.  It would be adulterated.- Apex court held that We are of the view that no further benevolence can be  shown  to  the appellant, more so, when it is a case of food adulteration.   There  is  no special circumstances which may warrant reducing  the  sentence  below  the minimum.  The appeal is accordingly dismissed=

They lifted a sample of red chilly powder (Lal Mirch) from an  open
container of 2 kg. capacity from the shop of the appellant.  
The sample  was
weighed on scale in a brown sheet and divided into three parts.  The  entire
sample collected was of 450 gms.  It was  sent  for  examination  by  Public
Analyst.  The report dated 7.4.1993 was  submitted  by  the  Public  Analyst
which, inter alia, affirmed that sample  adulterated  because  it  contained
salt as an adulterant. Relevant portion of the report is as under:
         “Moisture-8.22% Total ash – 7.44% A insoluble in dil.Ncl.  -  0.34%
         Non Voletile other extract – 20.97% Crude fibre – 19.25%  Test  for
         coaltar dye – negative Test for starch – negative Insect & Fungus –
         nil Microscopy-Chillies structures seen.  Test for sodium  chloride
         – positive Sodium chloride (common salt) – 2.54%”.

Confronted with the sample, the appellant exercised his right under  Section
13(2)  of  the  Prevention  of  Food  Adulteration  Act,  1954  (hereinafter
referred to as  'PFA  Act').   
Accordingly,  another  sample  was  sent  for
examination which was examined by  the  Director  of  the  Central  Forensic
Laboratory (CFL).  In its report dated 30.6.1993 even this sample was  found
to be adulterated on two counts, namely:
“(a)  Total ash content exceeds the  maximum  specified  limit  of  8.0%  by
weight.
(b) It is not free from the presence of sodium chloride.”
      Total ash was found to be 9.72% by weight and Sodium Chloride  content
was 2.5% by weight.  =

Learned  Metropolitan  Magistrate  found  that  the
appellant  had  violated  the  provisions  of  Section  2   (ia)(a)(m)   and
therefore, he was found guilty for the offence punishable  under  Section  7
read with Section 16(1) of the PFA Act.   Vide  order  dated  6.4.2002,  the
appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for  one  year  and
also was also imposed a fine of Rs.3000/-; in default of  payment  of  fine,
to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. =
However,  in  so  far  as  the
quantum of sentence is concerned, the High Court has reduced the  same  from
RI of one year to a  period  of  three  months  RI,  which  is  the  minimum
sentence.  The reasons for reducing the sentence has been given by the  High
Court in paragraph 25 of its judgment.
We are of the view that no further benevolence can be  shown  to  the
appellant, more so, when it is a case of food adulteration.   There  is  no
special circumstances which may warrant reducing  the  sentence  below  the
minimum.  The appeal is accordingly dismissed

2014(May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41547
B.S. CHAUHAN, A.K. SIKRI

                                                              NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S).1570 OF 2010

MITHILESH                                         APPELLANT

                                VERSUS
STATE OF NCT,DELHI                                RESPONDENT

                                  O R D E R
A.K. SIKRI,J.


            The appellant was running a  small  kirana  shop  at  96-A,  MIG
Flats, Opposite  G.T.B.  Hospital,  G.T.B.  Enclave,  Shahdara,  Delhi.   On
11.3.1993, some officials from the Food Adulteration Department visited  his
shop which was being run under the name  and  style  “M/s  Mithlesh  General
Store”.  They lifted a sample of red chilly powder (Lal Mirch) from an  open
container of 2 kg. capacity from the shop of the appellant.  The sample  was
weighed on scale in a brown sheet and divided into three parts.  The  entire
sample collected was of 450 gms.  It was  sent  for  examination  by  Public
Analyst.  The report dated 7.4.1993 was  submitted  by  the  Public  Analyst
which, inter alia, affirmed that sample  adulterated  because  it  contained
salt as an adulterant. Relevant portion of the report is as under:
         “Moisture-8.22% Total ash – 7.44% A insoluble in dil.Ncl.  -  0.34%
         Non Voletile other extract – 20.97% Crude fibre – 19.25%  Test  for
         coaltar dye – negative Test for starch – negative Insect & Fungus –
         nil Microscopy-Chillies structures seen.  Test for sodium  chloride
         – positive Sodium chloride (common salt) – 2.54%”.

Confronted with the sample, the appellant exercised his right under  Section
13(2)  of  the  Prevention  of  Food  Adulteration  Act,  1954  (hereinafter
referred to as  'PFA  Act').   Accordingly,  another  sample  was  sent  for
examination which was examined by  the  Director  of  the  Central  Forensic
Laboratory (CFL).  In its report dated 30.6.1993 even this sample was  found
to be adulterated on two counts, namely:
“(a)  Total ash content exceeds the  maximum  specified  limit  of  8.0%  by
weight.
(b) It is not free from the presence of sodium chloride.”
      Total ash was found to be 9.72% by weight and Sodium Chloride  content
was 2.5% by weight.  On the basis of the aforesaid reports, a complaint  was
filed with the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi and  trial  was  conducted
against the appellant.   Learned  Metropolitan  Magistrate  found  that  the
appellant  had  violated  the  provisions  of  Section  2   (ia)(a)(m)   and
therefore, he was found guilty for the offence punishable  under  Section  7
read with Section 16(1) of the PFA Act.   Vide  order  dated  6.4.2002,  the
appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for  one  year  and
also was also imposed a fine of Rs.3000/-; in default of  payment  of  fine,
to undergo simple imprisonment for three months.
            Aggrieved, the  appellant  preferred  the  appeal  against  such
judgment which was dismissed by the Additional  Sessions  Judge,  New  Delhi
vide  order  dated  30.7.2002.   The  appellant  thereafter  filed  Revision
Petition in the High Court of Delhi.  This Criminal  Revision  Petition  has
also been dismissed  by  the  High  Court  vide  judgment  and  order  dated
4.11.2009 thereby maintaining the conviction. However,  in  so  far  as  the
quantum of sentence is concerned, the High Court has reduced the  same  from
RI of one year to a  period  of  three  months  RI,  which  is  the  minimum
sentence.  The reasons for reducing the sentence has been given by the  High
Court in paragraph 25 of its judgment.

            Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in  one  sample
analysis by the Public Analyst, only salt was found as adulterant which  was
common in such cases as the appellant was a petty shopkeeper  who  had  kept
the things in open and there was every chance of spilling of this salt  into
the container which contained red chilly powder.  He further submitted  that
even the total ash was found to be marginally  higher,  that  is,  9.72%  by
weight as against maximum specified limit of 8% by weight.  He  also  argued
that in view of this, it was  a  fit  case  where  the  sentence  should  be
reduced to the  period  already  undergone.   More  so,  even  the  incident
happened way back in the year 1993.
      Though, an  attempt  was  made  to  argue  that  the  sample  was  not
adulterated, it is difficult to accept the said submission.
      Definition of “adulterated” as contained in  Section 2(ia)clauses  (k)
 and (m) thereof are relevant. Section 2 (ia)(k) reads as under:
         “(k) if  the  article  contains  any  prohibited  preservative  of
         permitted preservative in excess of the prescribed limits;”


Section 2(ia)(m) reads as under :
         “(m) if the quality or  purity  of  the  article  falls  below  the
         prescribed standard or its constituents are present  in  quantities
         not within the prescribed limits of variability but which does  not
         render it injurious to health:”


           Clause (m) postulates a situation where the articles fall  below
the prescribed standard even if it is not injurious to health.  It is clear
from this provision that if salt is added to chillies even if it would  not
be rendered injurious to health, nevertheless  the  quality/purity  of  the
article would fall  below  the  prescribed  standards/its  constituents  as
prescribed in A.05.05.01 limit.  It would be adulterated.
      Having regard to the  aforesaid  provisions,  it  is  clear  that  an
article of food may be adulterated once it does not meet the specifications
and exceed the limit prescribed under the PFA Act.  As pointed  out  above,
the presence of salt, that is , Sodium Chloride by 2.5% weight as  well  as
presence of total ash exceeding the prescribed limit is sufficient to  hold
that the sample drawn was adulterated, even if one was to  proceed  on  the
basis that mere addition of common salt to the chilly powder did not render
it injurious to health.   The  High  Court  in  support  of  its  aforesaid
conclusion has referred to various judgments and we are in  full  agreement
with the view taken by the High Court on this count.
           Faced with the aforesaid position,  the  main  emphasis  of  the
learned counsel for the appellant was for showing  some  more  leniency  by
reducing the sentence to the one already undergone.
           It is not in dispute that the sentence of R.I. 3 months, awarded
by the High Court, is the minimum prescribed in law.  No doubt, as per  the
provisions which were  prevailing  at  the  relevant  time,  it  was  still
permissible for the court to reduce it to below minimum, by giving  special
reasons.  We find that  the  High  Court  has  already  shown  leniency  by
reducing the sentence from RI one year to RI three months.  While doing so,
the High Court has given the following reasons:


            “24. However, on the quantum of sentence, this Court  has  taken
         due regard of the fact that the petitioner herein was a petty  shop
         keeper,.  Matter relates to the  year  1993  i.e.  dating  back  to
         sixteen years; petitioner has suffered incarceration  of  about  12
         days out of the period of sentence  of  one  year  which  had  been
         awarded to him. There is no overemphasizing the  fact  that  speedy
         trial which is the essence of justice has been lost.   The  Supreme
         Court in Braham Das vs. State of Himachal Pradesh AIR 1988 SC  1789
         had held that 8 years having been lost, where part of the  sentence
         had been undergone, the petitioner had been sentenced to the period
         already undergone by him.  In Veer Singh Chauhan vs. State of Delhi
         1994 (2) CCC 253, the revision had come up for hearing after  seven
         years; the court reduced the sentence to the one already  undergone
         i.e. of a period of 3 months.


         25. In the instant case, the offence relates to the year 1993.  The
         nature  of  offence  i.e.  the  sample  having  been  found  to  be
         adulterated in terms of Section 2 (ia)(m); the period of 12 days of
         incarceration already undergone by the petitioner who would  as  on
         date be about 47 years of age, he having rooted himself in society,
         the ends of justice would be met if the sentence is reduced from RI
         one year to a period of RI three months.  No modification  is  made
         in the fine which has been imposed.”


      We are of the view that no further benevolence can be  shown  to  the
appellant, more so, when it is a case of food adulteration.   There  is  no
special circumstances which may warrant reducing  the  sentence  below  the
minimum.  The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The appellant is directed to
surrender within four weeks to serve the remaining sentence, failing  which
the Chief Judicial Magistrate, New Delhi  shall  take  the  appellant  into
custody and send him to jail to serve out the remaining sentence.
                                                  ................J.
                                                  [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN]




                                                  ................J.
                                                  [A.K. SIKRI]
NEW DELHI
DATE; MAY 28, 2014

Contempt of court - High court imposed fine of Rs.20,000/- Apex court held that Section 12(1) of the Act provides that if the court is satisfied that contempt of court has been committed, it may punish the contemnor with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to Rs.2,000/-, or with both. Section 12(2) further provides that “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it.” Thus, the power to punish for contempt of the court is subject to limitations prescribed in sub-section (2) of the Act.= Bal Kishan Giri …Appellant Versus State of U.P. …Respondent= 2014 (May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41546

 Contempt of court - High court imposed fine of Rs.20,000/- Apex court held that Section 12(1)  of  the  Act  provides  that  if  the  court  is satisfied that contempt of court has been committed, it may punish  the contemnor with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend  to  six months, or with fine which may extend to Rs.2,000/-, or with both. Section 12(2)  further  provides  that  “notwithstanding  anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no court  shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in  sub-section  (1)  for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court  subordinate  to it.”   Thus, the power to punish for contempt of the  court is subject to limitations prescribed in sub-section (2) of the Act.=


    21.     Hence, in view of the above, the fine of Rs.20,000/- imposed on
    the appellant by the High Court by way of impugned judgment and  order,
    is reduced to Rs.2,000/- and is  directed  to  deposit  the  said  fine
    forthwith.

  Power of courts to punish for contempt is to secure public respect
    and confidence in judicial process.  Thus, it is a  necessary  incident
    to every court of justice.


    18.     Being a member of the Bar, it was his duty not  to  demean  and
    disgrace the majesty of justice dispensed by a court of law.  It  is  a
    case where insinuation of bias and predetermined mind has been  leveled
    by a practicing lawyer against three judges of the High  Court.    Such
    casting of bald, oblique, unsubstantiated aspersions against the judges
    of High Court not only causes agony and anguish to the judges concerned
    but also shakes the confidence of the public in the  judiciary  in  its
    function of dispensation of justice.  The judicial process is based  on
    probity, fairness and impartiality which is unimpeachable.  Such an act
    especially by members of Bar who  are  another  cog  in  the  wheel  of
    justice is highly  reprehensible  and  deeply  regretted.   Absence  of
    motivation is no excuse.


    19.     In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the
    High Court has not committed any error in not accepting the appellant’s
    apology since the same is not bona fide. There might have been an inner
    impulse of outburst as the appellant alleges that his nephew  had  been
    murdered, but that is no  excuse  for  a  practicing  lawyer  to  raise
    fingers against the court.


    20.     Section 12(1)  of  the  Act  provides  that  if  the  court  is
    satisfied that contempt of court has been committed, it may punish  the
    contemnor with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend  to  six
    months, or with fine which may extend to Rs.2,000/-, or with both.
          Section 12(2)  further  provides  that  “notwithstanding  anything
    contained in any other law for the time being in force, no court  shall
    impose a sentence in excess of that specified in  sub-section  (1)  for
    any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court  subordinate  to
    it.”               Thus, the power to punish for contempt of the  court
    is subject to limitations prescribed in sub-section (2) of the Act.


    21.     Hence, in view of the above, the fine of Rs.20,000/- imposed on
    the appellant by the High Court by way of impugned judgment and  order,
    is reduced to Rs.2,000/- and is  directed  to  deposit  the  said  fine
    forthwith.


    22.     We find no force in the appeal which is accordingly  dismissed.
    The appellant must surrender to  serve  out   the  sentence  forthwith,
    failing which, the learned Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Meerut,  would
    secure his custody and send him to jail to serve out the  sentence.   A
    copy of the order be sent to the  learned  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,
    Meerut, for information and compliance.  


2014 (May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41546
P SATHASIVAM, A.K. SIKRI
                               REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 555 OF 2010
      Bal Kishan Giri
      …Appellant
                                   Versus
      State of U.P.
               …Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T
      Dr. B.S. Chauhan,J.
      1.    In this appeal,  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated  5.2.2010
      passed by the High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Allahabad  in  Contempt
      Application (Crl.) No. 15  of  2009,  by  which  the  appellant  stood
      convicted for committing criminal contempt  under  the  provisions  of
      Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to  as  the  ‘Act’)
      and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month and to  pay
      a fine of Rs.20,000/- and in default to  undergo  simple  imprisonment
      for two weeks, has been assailed.


      2.    Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:
      A.    An FIR was lodged in P.S. Baleni, District Baghpat on  23.5.2008
      by Anil Kumar, appellant in connected Criminal Appeal No. 686 of  2010
      alleging that his younger brother Sunil Kumar alongwith  Puneet  Kumar
      Giri, who were residing in Sitaram Hostel of the Meerut College,  were
      not traceable and went missing the previous evening.   Another  inmate
      of the same hostel Sudhir Kumar was  also  reported  untraceable.  The
      very next day, three dead bodies of  the  said  missing  persons  were
      found on the banks of river Hindon. A   criminal  case  was  therefore
      registered.


      B.    During investigation, it  came  to  the  notice  of  the  police
      authorities that the place of occurrence fell within  the  territorial
      jurisdiction of P.S. Kotwali, Meerut, and thus investigation on  being
      transferred to P.S. Kotwali, Meerut, the case was registered  as  Case
      Crime No.190/2008.


      C.    During investigation, many accused persons  including  one  Haji
      Izlal were arrested. They moved bail applications  before  the  Meerut
      Distt. Court which stood rejected. Aggrieved, all the accused  persons
      filed bail applications before the High Court of Allahabad. It was  on
      14.8.2009 during the  pendency  of  the  said  applications  that  the
      appellant submitted an application to the  Hon’ble  Chief  Justice  of
      Allahabad High Court alleging that the accused therein were  gangsters
      and had accumulated assets worth crores of rupees  by  their  criminal
      activities. The accused persons were closely related to a local M.L.A.
      and Ex. M.P. and they had links with the  Judges  of  the  High  Court
      including Mr. Justice S.K. Jain who had earlier served as  a  judicial
      officer in Meerut Court. The appellant expressed his apprehension that
      Mr. Justice S.K. Jain would favour the accused persons to get bail.  A
      copy of the said complaint was also sent to the Chairman, Bar  Council
      of U.P.


      D.    The High Court examined the complaint and placed the  matter  on
      the judicial side on 12.11.2009. The court issued a show cause  notice
      dated 14.8.2009 to the appellant  as  to  why  the  criminal  contempt
      proceedings be not initiated against him under the provisions  of  the
      Act.


      E.     The  appellant  submitted  an   unconditional   apology   dated
      21.11.2009 submitting that the application was sent by him as  he  had
      been misguided by the advocates of District Meerut and he was in great
      mental tension as his nephew had been murdered.
      F.     The  High  Court  after  completing  the  trial  convicted  the
      appellant vide impugned judgment and order dated 5.2.2010 and  awarded
      the sentence as referred to hereinabove.
            Hence, this appeal.


      3.    Mr. J.M.  Sharma,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
      appellant has  submitted  that  the  show  cause  notice  was  not  in
      consonance with the provisions  of  Chapter  XXXV-E,  Rule  6  of  the
      Allahabad High Court Rules,  1952  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the
      Rules). Thus, all subsequent proceedings stood vitiated. More so,  the
      appellant is a practicing advocate and had written the said  complaint
      under a mental tension as his nephew had been murdered, and  on  being
      misguided by the advocates of the Meerut Court. Once the appellant has
      tendered an absolute and unconditional  apology,  punishment  was  not
      warranted and fine  imposed  therein  is  contrary  to  the  statutory
      provisions of the Act. Thus, the appeal deserves to be allowed.


      4.    Per contra, Mr. Irshad Ahmad, learned counsel appearing for  the
      State has opposed the appeal contending that very wild and  scandalous
      allegations had been made by the appellant not only against one  judge
      but against various judicial officers and merely tendering an  apology
      is not enough. As the appellant had accepted that he had  written  the
      letter and also owned its contents, and filed the reply  to  the  show
      cause notice issued to him, even if, the statutory rules have not been
      complied with, the order would not stand vitiated.  The  appeal  lacks
      merit and is liable to be dismissed.


      5.    We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel
      for the parties and perused the record.


      6.    The relevant part of the complaint filed by the appellant  reads
      as under:
           “4.   That Akhalakh family have good connection with all  judges
           posted at Meerut. Hon. Mr. Justice  S.C.  Nigam  was  posted  in
           Meerut in the year 1981 to 1984 and  2002-03  on  the  posts  of
           Addl. Civil Judge/A.C.J.M. and Addl. District &  Sessions  Judge
           respectively. Hon. Justice Mr. S.K.  Jain  was  also  posted  at
           Meerut as Additional District & Sessions Judge in 2002-03.


           5.    That all the Hon. Justices V.K. Verma, S.K. Jain and  S.C.
           Nigam have been promoted as High Court Judges from the cadre  of
           District Judges. Hon. Justice Mr. S.K.  Jain  and  Hon.  Justice
           S.C. Nigam remained posted in Civil Court Meerut  as  Additional
           District Judge together  in  the  year  2002-03  and  have  been
           promoted from Meerut Judgeship to the cadre of  District  Judge.
           They are very good friends. Hon. Mr. Justice V.K. Verma also has
           very good intimacy with them. They have made a caucus with  V.P.
           Srivastava, Senior Advocate of Allahabad High Court for granting
           major bails to known accused in  criminal  cases  illegally  and
           with ulterior motives.


                 Hon. Justice V.K. Verma has granted bails to  two  accused
           namely Rizwan and Wassim in aforesaid famous triple murder  case
           of Meerut in bail application No.924 of 2009 and 1238 of 2009 on
           17.7.2009 illegally and with ulterior motives.”




      7.    The appellant/complainant further expressed his apprehension  of
      having no confidence and faith in any  of  the  three  Judges  of  the
      Allahabad High Court as they could pass any order  at  the  behest  of
      Shri V.P. Srivastava, Senior Advocate.
           In sum and substance, the offending part of the  allegation  had
      been as under:
           (1) Akhlaq had good relations with Mr. Justice S.C.  Nigam  from
           the date since he was posted at Meerut on three terms, (2)  that
           justice V.K. Verma had good intimacy  with  the  family  of  the
           accused and the accused have made a clique  alongwith  one  V.P.
           Srivastava,  Senior  Advocate  of  Allahabad  High   Court   for
           procuring major bails illegally and with ulterior  motives.  Mr.
           Justice V.K. Verma has  admitted  bail  to  two  accused  namely
           Rizwan and Wasim illegally and with ulterior motives. The  three
           Judges (V.K. Verma, S.K. Jain and S.C. Nigam) may pass any order
           at the behest of V.P. Srivastava, Senior Advocate.




     8.     The allegations made by the appellant against the  3  judges  of
     the High Court are too serious, scandalous and, admittedly,  sufficient
     to undermine the majesty of law and dignity of court and  that  is  too
     without any basis.  The appellant is a practicing advocate.  Plea taken
     by  him  that  he  had  been  misguided  by  other  advocates   is   an
     afterthought.  He must have been fully aware  of  the  consequences  of
     what he has written.  The averment to the  effect  that  provisions  of
     Chapter XXXV-E of the Rules had  not  been  strictly  observed  remains
     insignificant as the appellant had not only admitted  transcribing  the
     complaint but also its contents.  The appellant had submitted the reply
     to the show cause notice issued by the High Court of Allahabad  on  the
     judicial side.  In such a fact-situation, even  if,  for  the  sake  of
     argument it is accepted that the aforesaid Rules have not been complied
     with strictly, we are not willing to accept the case of  the  appellant
     for the reason that Mr. J.M. Sharma, learned  senior  counsel  for  the
     appellant could not show as to what was that  material  which  was  not
     considered by the High Court that had been put up as a defence  by  the
     appellant resulting in any miscarriage of justice.


     9.     This Court in M.B. Sanghi, Advocate v. High Court of Punjab  and
     Haryana & Ors., AIR 1991  SC  1834,  while  examining  a  similar  case
     observed :
                 “The foundation of judicial system which is based  on  the
           independence and impartiality of those who man it will be shaken
           if disparaging and  derogatory  remarks  are  made  against  the
           presiding judicial officers with impunity. It is high time  that
           we realise that the much cherished judicial independence has  to
           be protected not only from the executive or the legislature  but
           also from those who are an  integral  part  of  the  system.  An
           independent  judiciary  is  of  vital  importance  to  any  free
           society”.




     10.     In Asharam M. Jain v. A.T. Gupta & Ors. AIR 1983 SC 1151, while
     dealing with the issue,  this Court observed as under:
           “The strains and mortification of litigation cannot  be  allowed
           to lead litigants to tarnish, terrorise and destroy  the  system
           of administration of justice by vilification of  judges.  It  is
           not that judges need be protected; judges may well take care  of
           themselves. It is the right and interest of the  public  in  the
           due administration of justice that has to be protected.”


     11.    In  Jennison v. Baker [1972]  1  All  E.R.  997,  1006,  it  was
     observed, “[T]he law should not be seen to sit by limply,  while  those
     who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope”

     12.     The  appellant  has  tendered  an  absolute  and  unconditional
     apology which has not been accepted by the  High  Court.   The  apology
     means a regretful acknowledge or excuse for  failure.   An  explanation
     offered to a person affected  by  one’s  action  that  no  offence  was
     intended, coupled with the expression of regret for any that  may  have
     been given.  Apology should be unquestionable in sincerity.  It  should
     be tempered with a sense of genuine remorse and repentance, and  not  a
     calculated strategy to avoid punishment

     13.    Clause 1 of Section 12  of  the  Act  and  Explanation  attached
     thereto  enables  the  court  to  remit  the  punishment  awarded   for
     committing  the  contempt  of  court  on  apology  being  made  to  the
     satisfaction of the court. However, an apology should not  be  rejected
     merely on the ground that it is qualified  or  tempered  at  a  belated
     stage if the accused makes it bona fide. A  conduct  which  abuses  and
     makes a mockery of the judicial process of the court  is  to  be  dealt
     with iron hands and no person can tinker with it to prevent, prejudice,
     obstructed or interfere with the administration of justice.  There  can
     be cases where the wisdom of rendering an apology dawns only at a later
     stage. Undoubtedly, an apology cannot be a defence, a justification, or
     an appropriate punishment for an act which tantamounts to  contempt  of
     court. An apology can be accepted in case where the conduct  for  which
     the  apology  is  given  is  such  that  it  can  be  “ignored  without
     compromising the dignity of the court”, or it is  intended  to  be  the
     evidence of real contrition.  It should be sincere. Apology  cannot  be
     accepted in case it is hollow; there  is  no  remorse;  no  regret;  no
     repentance, or if it is only a device to escape the rigour of the  law.
     Such an apology can merely be termed as “paper apology”.


       14. In L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P., AIR 1984 SC  1374,  this  court
           noted that it  cannot  subscribe  to  the  'slap-say  sorry-  and
           forget'  school  of  thought  in   administration   of   contempt
           jurisprudence. Saying 'sorry' does not make the slapper poorer.
     (See  also:  T.N.  Godavarman  Thirumulpad  v.  Ashok  Khot   &   Anr.,
        AIR 2006 SC 2007)


         So an apology should not be  “paper  apology”  and  expression  of
     sorrow should come from the heart and not from the pen; for it  is  one
     thing to 'say' sorry, it is another to 'feel' sorry.


     15.    An apology for criminal contempt of court must be offered at the
     earliest since a belated apology hardly shows the “contrition which  is
     the essence of the purging of contempt”.  Of course, an apology must be
     offered and that too clearly and at the earliest opportunity.  However,
     even if the apology is not belated but the court finds it to be without
     real contrition and remorse, and finds that it was merely tendered as a
     weapon of defence, the Court may refuse to accept it.   If the  apology
     is offered at the time when the contemnor finds that the court is going
     to impose punishment, it ceases to be an apology and becomes an act  of
     a cringing coward. (Vide: Debabrata Bandopadhyay & Ors. v. The State of
     West Bengal & Anr., AIR 1969 SC 189; Mulkh Raj v. The State of  Punjab,
     AIR 1972 SC 1197; The Secretary, Hailakandi Bar Association v. State of
     Assam & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 1925; C. Elumalai & Ors. v. A.G.L. Irudayaraj
     & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 2214; and Ranveer Yadav v. State of Bihar,   (2010)
     11 SCC 493).


     16.    This Court has clearly laid down that an apology tendered is not
     to be accepted as a matter of course and the  Court  is  not  bound  to
     accept the same.  The court is competent  to  reject  the  apology  and
     impose the punishment recording  reasons  for  the  same.  The  use  of
     insulting  language  does  not  absolve  the  contemnor  on  any  count
     whatsoever. If the words are calculated and clearly intended  to  cause
     any insult, an apology, if  tendered  and  lack  penitence,  regret  or
     contrition, does not deserve to be accepted.  (Vide:  Shri  Baradakanta
     Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court & Anr.,  AIR 1974 SC 710;  The
     Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar etc.,  AIR  1976  SC  242;
     Asharam M. Jain v. A.T. Gupta & Ors., AIR 1983  SC  1151;  Mohd.  Zahir
     Khan v. Vijai Singh & Ors.,  AIR 1992 SC  642;  In  Re:  Sanjiv  Datta,
     (1995) 3 SCC 619; Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai & Ors. v. Patel Chandrakant
     Dhulabhai & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 3016; and Vishram  Singh  Raghubanshi  v.
     State of U.P., AIR 2011 SC 2275).


    17.     That the power to punish for contempt  is  a  rare  species  of
    judicial power which is by the very  nature  calls  for  exercise  with
    great care and caution.  Such power ought to be  exercised  only  where
    “silence is no longer an option.”
    (See: In re: S. Mulgaokar AIR 1978 SC 727; H.G. Rangangoud v. M/s State
    Trading Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors., AIR 2012 SC 490;  Maninderjit
    Singh Bittav. Union of India & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC  273;  T.C.  Gupta  &
    Anr. v. Hari Om Prakash & Ors., (2013) 10 SCC 658; and Arun Kumar Yadav
    v. State of U.P. through District Judge, (2013) 14 SCC 127)
          Power of courts to punish for contempt is to secure public respect
    and confidence in judicial process.  Thus, it is a  necessary  incident
    to every court of justice.


    18.     Being a member of the Bar, it was his duty not  to  demean  and
    disgrace the majesty of justice dispensed by a court of law.  It  is  a
    case where insinuation of bias and predetermined mind has been  leveled
    by a practicing lawyer against three judges of the High  Court.    Such
    casting of bald, oblique, unsubstantiated aspersions against the judges
    of High Court not only causes agony and anguish to the judges concerned
    but also shakes the confidence of the public in the  judiciary  in  its
    function of dispensation of justice.  The judicial process is based  on
    probity, fairness and impartiality which is unimpeachable.  Such an act
    especially by members of Bar who  are  another  cog  in  the  wheel  of
    justice is highly  reprehensible  and  deeply  regretted.   Absence  of
    motivation is no excuse.


    19.     In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the
    High Court has not committed any error in not accepting the appellant’s
    apology since the same is not bona fide. There might have been an inner
    impulse of outburst as the appellant alleges that his nephew  had  been
    murdered, but that is no  excuse  for  a  practicing  lawyer  to  raise
    fingers against the court.


    20.     Section 12(1)  of  the  Act  provides  that  if  the  court  is
    satisfied that contempt of court has been committed, it may punish  the
    contemnor with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend  to  six
    months, or with fine which may extend to Rs.2,000/-, or with both.
          Section 12(2)  further  provides  that  “notwithstanding  anything
    contained in any other law for the time being in force, no court  shall
    impose a sentence in excess of that specified in  sub-section  (1)  for
    any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court  subordinate  to
    it.”               Thus, the power to punish for contempt of the  court
    is subject to limitations prescribed in sub-section (2) of the Act.


    21.     Hence, in view of the above, the fine of Rs.20,000/- imposed on
    the appellant by the High Court by way of impugned judgment and  order,
    is reduced to Rs.2,000/- and is  directed  to  deposit  the  said  fine
    forthwith.


    22.     We find no force in the appeal which is accordingly  dismissed.
    The appellant must surrender to  serve  out   the  sentence  forthwith,
    failing which, the learned Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Meerut,  would
    secure his custody and send him to jail to serve out the  sentence.   A
    copy of the order be sent to the  learned  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,
    Meerut, for information and compliance.


                                       ....…….……………………..J.
                                             (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)




                                                          ....……………………………J.
                                                             (A.K.   SIKRI)


      New Delhi,
      May 28, 2014





















































                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 686 OF 2010
      Anil Kumar
      …Appellant


                                   Versus
      State of U.P.
               …Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T
      Dr. B.S. Chauhan,J.
            In view of the  judgment  passed  today  in  connected  Criminal
      Appeal No. 555 of 2010, this appeal is dismissed. However, the fine of
      Rs.20,000/- imposed on the appellant by  the  High  Court  by  way  of
      impugned judgment and order, is reduced to Rs.2,000/- and is  directed
      to deposit the said fine forthwith.
             The  appellant  must  surrender  to  serve  out   the  sentence
      forthwith, failing  which,  the  learned  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,
      Meerut, would secure his custody and send him to jail to serve out the
      sentence.  A copy of the order be sent to the learned  Chief  Judicial
      Magistrate, Meerut, for information and compliance.


                                       ....…….……………………..J.
                                             (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)


                                                        .....……………………………J.
                                                            (A.K.    SIKRI)


      New Delhi,
      May 28, 2014






-----------------------
15

Service matter - Non supply of UPSC Advise report before imposing penalty is void - charges framed against delinquent - denied - Enquiry found no charges proved and send the report - Disciplinary Authority not satisfied the report and formed opinion to punish the delinquent - issued show cause notice - explanation submitted - Disciplinary authority send the same for opinion of UPSC - advise of U.P.S.C - not furnished and not asked for explanation from the delinquent - challanged - tribunal dismissed - High court set aside the both orders and direct to furnish report of UPSC and to give an opportunity to submit explanation before imposing penalty - Apex court confirmed the same and dismissed the appeal = UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .......APPELLANTS VERSUS R.P.SINGH ......RESPONDENT= 2014 (May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41544

   Service matter - Non supply of UPSC Advise report before imposing penalty is void - charges framed against delinquent - denied - Enquiry found no charges proved and send the report - Disciplinary Authority not satisfied the report and formed opinion to punish the delinquent - issued show cause notice - explanation submitted - Disciplinary authority send the same for opinion of UPSC - advise of U.P.S.C - not furnished and not asked for explanation from the delinquent - challanged - tribunal dismissed - High court set aside the both orders and direct to furnish report of UPSC and to give an opportunity to submit explanation before imposing penalty - Apex court confirmed the same and dismissed the appeal =

Rule  32  of  the
      Central Civil Services (Classification,  Control  and  Appeal)  Rules,
      1965 (for brevity “the CCS Rules”).  The said Rule reads as under:

            "32.Supply  of  copy  of  Commission's  advice.-  Whenever  the
           Commission is consulted as provided in these rules,  a  copy  of
           the advice by the Commission and where such advice has not  been
           accepted, also a brief statement of the reasons  for  such  non-
           acceptance,  shall  be  furnished  to  the  Government   servant
           concerned along with a copy of the order passed in the case,  by
           the authority making the order." 

 The respondent while serving as an Assistant Engineer (Civil) in
      the  Central  Public  Works  Department  (CPWD)  was  proceeded  in  a
      departmental proceeding in  respect  of  two  charges  which  read  as
      follows:

           "(a) 540 bags of cement were got issued  for  the  above  stated
           work  from  the  Central  Stores  on  31.3.97.   The  said  Shri
           R.P.Singh allowed Shri N.K.Sarin, Junior Engineer  to  issue  89
           bags of cement within 24 hours of receipt of the cement from the
           Central Stores without giving  any  written  permission  to  the
           Junior Engineer and without authenticating  the  said  issue  of
           cement, thereby violating the  instructions  contained  in  Para
           3(d) of memorandum No.DGW/CON/67 dated 6.5.94.


           (b) Out of the above  stated  lot  of  540  bags  of  cement  of
           "Superplus Jaypee" brand, 82 bags of cement  were  found  short,
           which had  been  pilfered  with  connivance  of  the  said  Shri
           R.P.Singh, Assistant Engineer."
As the  delinquent  officer  refuted  the  charges,  an  Inquiry
      Officer was appointed to conduct the inquiry and in  the  inquiry,  he
      found the charges levelled against the  delinquent  officer  were  not
      proven  and,  accordingly,  he  submitted  the  Inquiry  Report.   The
      disciplinary authority after expressing the disagreement, called for a
      representation from the respondent communicating the Inquiry Report as
      well as the opinion for  disagreement  requiring  him  to  submit  his
      explanation. 
After obtaining the advice from the UPSC, the  disciplinary  authority
      accepted the same, passed an order of punishment and communicated  the
      same to the respondent along with the advice of UPSC.

      4.    The said order of punishment  was  assailed  by  the  respondent
      before the  tribunal  on  many  a  ground  and  the  principal  ground
      propounded was that the advice of the UPSC was not  furnished  to  him
      before imposing the penalty and, therefore, there had  been  violation
      of principles of natural justice.  The  tribunal  negatived  the  said
      stand on the ground that no prejudice was caused to him.

      5.    Being dissatisfied with the said order, the respondent preferred
      the writ petition and the High Court placing reliance  mainly  on  the
      decision in State Bank  of  India  and  others  vs.  D.C.Aggarwal  and
      another[1] came to hold that 
non-supply of the copy of advice of  UPSC
      at the pre-decisional stage did tantamount to violation of  principles
      of natural justice for making effective  representation.   It  further
      observed that non-supply of such material could amount  to  denial  of
      fair opportunity of being heard. -

and  held that
    "We direct the respondents to allow the petitioner to make  his
           representation in respect of the UPSC  advice,  which  was  made
           available to him along with the order dated  28.1.2003  imposing
           punishment.  The  representation  of  the  petitioner  be   duly
           considered and the Disciplinary Authority  to  take  a  decision
           afresh, taking into account the representation  with  regard  to
           the disciplinary proceedings within a period of two months."
=
In the case of S.K.Kapoor, the Court  accepted  the  ratio  laid
      down in the case of T.V.Patel as far as the interpretation of  Article
      320(3)(c) is concerned and,  in  that  context,  it  opined  that  the
      provisions contained in the said Article 320(3)(c) of the Constitution
      of India are not mandatory. While distinguishing certain aspects,  the
      Court observed as follows:
"7.  We are of the opinion that although  Article  320(3)(c)  is
           not mandatory, if the authorities do  consult  the  Union  Public
           Service Commission and rely on the report of the  commission  for
           taking  disciplinary  action,  then  the  principles  of  natural
           justice require that a copy of the report  must  be  supplied  in
           advance to  the  employee  concerned  so  that  he  may  have  an
           opportunity  of  rebuttal.  Thus,  in  our  view,  the  aforesaid
           decision in T.V.Patel's case is clearly distinguishable."

after the  decision  in
           S.K.Kapoor's  case,  the  Government  of  India,   Ministry   of
           Personnel, PG & Pensions, Department  of  Personnel  &  Training
           vide Office Memorandum dated 06.01.2014 has issued the following
           directions:
            "4.   Accordingly, it has been decided that in all  disciplinary
           cases where the Commission is  to  be  consulted,  the  following
           procedure may be adopted :-

           (i)    On receipt of the Inquiry Report, the DA may  examine  the
           same and forward it to the Commission with his observations;

           (ii)   On receipt of the Commission's report, the DA will examine
           the same and forward the same to the Charged Officer  along  with
           the Inquiry Report and his  tentative  reasons  for  disagreement
           with the Inquiry Report and/or the advice of the UPSC;

           (iii) The Charged Officer shall be required to submit, if  he  so
           desires,  his  written  representation  or  submission   to   the
           Disciplinary  Authority  within  fifteen  days,  irrespective  of
           whether the Inquiry report/advice of UPSC is  in  his  favour  or
           not.

           (iv)    The   Disciplinary   Authority   shall    consider    the
           representation of the Charged Officer and take further action  as
           prescribed in sub-rules 2(A) to (4)  of  Rule  15  of  CCS  (CCA)
           Rules, 1965.

       27. After the said Office Memorandum, a  further  Office  Memorandum
           has been issued on 05.03.2014, which pertains to supply of  copy
           of UPSC advice to the Charged Officer.  We think it  appropriate
           to reproduce the same:
           "The undersigned is directed to refer to this Department's  O.M.
           of even number dated 06.01.2014 and to  say  that  it  has  been
           decided, in partial modification of the above O.M. that  a  copy
           of the inquiry report may be given to the Government servant  as
           provided  in  Rule  15(2)  of   Central   Secretariat   Services
           (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.   The  inquiry
           report  together  with  the  representation,  if  any,  of   the
           Government servant  may  be  forwarded  to  the  Commission  for
           advice.  On receipt of the Commission's advice, a  copy  of  the
           advice may be provided to the  Government  servant  who  may  be
           allowed  to  submit  his  representation,   if   any,   on   the
           Commission's  advice  within  fifteen  days.   The  Disciplinary
           Authority will  consider  the  inquiry  report,  advice  of  the
           Commission and the representation(s) of the  Government  servant
           before arriving at a final decision."

       28. In our considered opinion, both the  Office  Memoranda  are  not
           only in consonance  with  the  S.K.Kapoor's  case  but  also  in
           accordance with the principles of natural justice which has been
           stated in B.Karunakar's case.

       29. In view  of  the  aforesaid,  we  respectfully  agree  with  the
           decision rendered in S.K.Kapoor's case and  resultantly  decline
           to interfere with the judgment and order of the High Court.   As
           a result, the  appeal,  being  devoid  of  merit,  is  dismissed
           without any order as to costs.=

2014 (May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41544
DIPAK MISRA, N.V. RAMANA
                                                           Reportable

                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL No.6717 OF 2008


      UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                            .......APPELLANTS


                                   VERSUS


      R.P.SINGH
      ......RESPONDENT








                               J U D G M E N T




      Dipak Misra, J.


            Calling in question the legal defensibility of the judgment  and
      order  dated  19.01.2007  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Delhi   in
      W.P.(C)No.16104 of 2004 whereby it has annulled the judgment and order
      dated  28.06.2004  passed  by  the  Central  Administrative  Tribunal,
      Principal Bench, New Delhi (for short “the tribunal”)  in  O.A.No.1977
      of 2003 and the order dated  19.08.2004  declining  to  entertain  the
      review, the present appeal has been preferred by special leave.

      2.    The respondent while serving as an Assistant Engineer (Civil) in
      the  Central  Public  Works  Department  (CPWD)  was  proceeded  in  a
      departmental proceeding in  respect  of  two  charges  which  read  as
      follows:

           "(a) 540 bags of cement were got issued  for  the  above  stated
           work  from  the  Central  Stores  on  31.3.97.   The  said  Shri
           R.P.Singh allowed Shri N.K.Sarin, Junior Engineer  to  issue  89
           bags of cement within 24 hours of receipt of the cement from the
           Central Stores without giving  any  written  permission  to  the
           Junior Engineer and without authenticating  the  said  issue  of
           cement, thereby violating the  instructions  contained  in  Para
           3(d) of memorandum No.DGW/CON/67 dated 6.5.94.


           (b) Out of the above  stated  lot  of  540  bags  of  cement  of
           "Superplus Jaypee" brand, 82 bags of cement  were  found  short,
           which had  been  pilfered  with  connivance  of  the  said  Shri
           R.P.Singh, Assistant Engineer."


      3.    As the  delinquent  officer  refuted  the  charges,  an  Inquiry
      Officer was appointed to conduct the inquiry and in  the  inquiry,  he
      found the charges levelled against the  delinquent  officer  were  not
      proven  and,  accordingly,  he  submitted  the  Inquiry  Report.   The
      disciplinary authority after expressing the disagreement, called for a
      representation from the respondent communicating the Inquiry Report as
      well as the opinion for  disagreement  requiring  him  to  submit  his
      explanation.  The respondent submitted his explanation and  thereafter
      the disciplinary authority sought advice from the Union Public Service
      Commission (UPSC) by proposing to impose penalty of reduction  of  pay
      by two stages in the time scale of pay of the charged  officer  for  a
      period of two years without cumulative effect.  The UPSC  vide  letter
      No. F.3/144/2002-SI dated 20.11.02 gave the advice to  impose  penalty
      of reduction of pay by two stages in the time  scale  of  pay  of  the
      charged officer for a period of two years without  cumulative  effect.
      After obtaining the advice from the UPSC, the  disciplinary  authority
      accepted the same, passed an order of punishment and communicated  the
      same to the respondent along with the advice of UPSC.

      4.    The said order of punishment  was  assailed  by  the  respondent
      before the  tribunal  on  many  a  ground  and  the  principal  ground
      propounded was that the advice of the UPSC was not  furnished  to  him
      before imposing the penalty and, therefore, there had  been  violation
      of principles of natural justice.  The  tribunal  negatived  the  said
      stand on the ground that no prejudice was caused to him.

      5.    Being dissatisfied with the said order, the respondent preferred
      the writ petition and the High Court placing reliance  mainly  on  the
      decision in State Bank  of  India  and  others  vs.  D.C.Aggarwal  and
      another[1] came to hold that non-supply of the copy of advice of  UPSC
      at the pre-decisional stage did tantamount to violation of  principles
      of natural justice for making effective  representation.   It  further
      observed that non-supply of such material could amount  to  denial  of
      fair opportunity of being heard. Being of this opinion, the High Court
      directed as follows:-

            "We direct the respondents to allow the petitioner to make  his
           representation in respect of the UPSC  advice,  which  was  made
           available to him along with the order dated  28.1.2003  imposing
           punishment.  The  representation  of  the  petitioner  be   duly
           considered and the Disciplinary Authority  to  take  a  decision
           afresh, taking into account the representation  with  regard  to
           the disciplinary proceedings within a period of two months."



      6.    We have heard Mr.K.Radhakrishnan, learned  counsel  assisted  by
      Mr.W.A.Qadri and Ms.Rekha Pandey for the  appellant  and  Mr.Vasudevan
      Raghavan, learned counsel for the respondent.

      7.    At the very outset, we may state  that  the  facts  relating  to
      seeking of advice from UPSC and the stage of furnishing  the  same  to
      the delinquent employee  are  not  in  dispute.   Thus,  the  singular
      question that emanates for determination is whether the High Court  is
      justified  in  issuing  the  directions  which  have  been  reproduced
      hereinabove solely  on  the  ground  that  non-supply  of  the  advice
      obtained by the disciplinary authority from the UPSC and acting on the
      same amounts to violation of principles of natural  justice.   Learned
      counsel for the appellants has placed  reliance  on  Rule  32  of  the
      Central Civil Services (Classification,  Control  and  Appeal)  Rules,
      1965 (for brevity “the CCS Rules”).  The said Rule reads as under:

            "32.Supply  of  copy  of  Commission's  advice.-  Whenever  the
           Commission is consulted as provided in these rules,  a  copy  of
           the advice by the Commission and where such advice has not  been
           accepted, also a brief statement of the reasons  for  such  non-
           acceptance,  shall  be  furnished  to  the  Government   servant
           concerned along with a copy of the order passed in the case,  by
           the authority making the order."

      8.    Relying upon the aforesaid Rule, it is contended that  when  the
      only prescription in the Rule is that a copy of the advice  is  to  be
      furnished at the time of making of the order, it is not obligatory  in
      law to supply  it  prior  to  imposition  of  punishment  requiring  a
      representation  or  providing  an  opportunity  of  hearing   to   the
      delinquent officer. In support of the said submission,  our  attention
      has been drawn to the decision in  Union  of  India  and  another  vs.
      T.V.Patel[2]   wherein  a  two-Judge  Bench,  appreciating  the   Rule
      position, has held as follows:

           "Rule 32 of the  Rules  deals  with  the  supply  of  a  copy  of
           Commission's advice.   Rules  as  read  as  it  is  mandatory  in
           character.  Rule  contemplates  that  whenever  a  Commission  is
           consulted, as provided under the Rules, a copy of the  advice  of
           the Commission and where such advice has not been accepted,  also
           a brief statement of the reasons for such non-acceptance shall be
           furnished to the Government servant along  with  a  copy  of  the
           order passed in the case, by  the  authority  making  the  order.
           Reading  of  the  Rule  would  show  that  it  contemplates   two
           situations; if a copy of advice is tendered  by  the  Commission,
           the same shall be furnished to the government servant along  with
           a copy of the order passed in the case by  the  authority  making
           the order.  The second situation is that if a copy of the  advice
           tendered by the Commission has not been accepted, a copy of which
           along with a  brief  statement  of  the  reasons  for  such  non-
           acceptance shall also be  furnished  to  the  government  servant
           along with a copy of  the  order  passed  in  the  case,  by  the
           authority making the order.   In our view, the language  employed
           in Rule 32, namely "along with a copy of the order passed in  the
           case, by the authority making the order"  would  mean  the  final
           order passed by the authority imposing penalty on the  delinquent
           government servant."

      9.    Be it noted, in the said case,  interpretation  placed  by  this
      Court under Article 320(3)(c) of the Constitution in   State  of  U.P.
      v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava[3] has been placed reliance upon  and,  in
      that context, it has been opined thus: -
            "In view of the law settled by the Constitution  Bench  of  this
           Court in  the  case  of  Srivastava  (supra)  we  hold  that  the
           provisions of Article 320(3)(c) of the Constitution of India  are
           not mandatory and they do not confer any  rights  on  the  public
           servant so that the absence of consultation or  any  irregularity
           in consultation process  or  furnishing  a  copy  of  the  advice
           tendered by the UPSC, if any,  does  not  afford  the  delinquent
           government servant a cause of action in a court of law."

      10.   It is also necessary to mention here  that  the  learned  Judges
      distinguished the pronouncements in D.C.Aggarwal and  another  (supra)
      and MD, ECIL vs. B.Karunakar[4].

      11.   Mr.Vasudevan Raghavan, learned counsel for  the  respondent  has
      submitted that the said decision has been treated as a per incuriam in
      Union of India and others vs. S.K.Kapoor[5] in one aspect  as  it  has
      not taken note of the earlier decision  in  S.N.Narula  vs.  Union  of
      India and others[6].  Learned counsel while  clarifying  the  position
      has submitted that the decision in Narulas's case has been rendered on
      30.01.2004 which is prior to the decision in T.V.Patel's  case  though
      it has been reported later on.

      12.   In the case of S.N.Narula, the Court took note of the fact  that
      the proceedings therein were sent for information of the UPSC and  the
      UPSC had given the advice indicating certain punishment and  the  said
      advice was accepted by the disciplinary authority who, on that  basis,
      had imposed punishment.  Thereafter the Court took note of the factual
      score how the disciplinary authority had acted.  We think it seemly to
      reproduce the same: -
           “3.   It is to be noticed that the advisory opinion of the Union
           Public Service Commission was not communicated to the  appellant
           before he was heard by the disciplinary authority.  The same was
           communicated to the appellant along with final order  passed  in
           the matter by the disciplinary authority.”

           After so stating, the two-Judge Bench proceeded to opine thus: -

            "6. We heard the learned counsel  for  the  appellant  and  the
           learned counsel for the  respondent.  It  is  submitted  by  the
           counsel for the appellant that the report of  the  Union  Public
           Service Commission was not communicated to the appellant  before
           the final order was passed. Therefore, the appellant was  unable
           to make an  effective  representation  before  the  disciplinary
           authority as regards the punishment imposed.

           7.    We find that the stand taken by the Central Administrative
           Tribunal was correct and the High Court  was  not  justified  in
           interfering with  the  order.    Therefore,  we  set  aside  the
           judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and direct that
           the disciplinary proceedings against the  appellant  be  finally
           disposed of in  accordance  with  the  direction  given  by  the
           Tribunal in Paragraph 6 of the order.   The appellant may submit
           a representation within two weeks to the disciplinary  authority
           and we make it clear that the matter shall be  finally  disposed
           of by the disciplinary authority within a  period  of  3  months
           thereafter."

      13.   We will be failing in our duty if we do not  take  note  of  the
      submission of Mr.W.A.Qadri that  the  decision  is  not  an  authority
      because the tribunal had set  aside  the  order  of  the  disciplinary
      authority on the ground that it was a non-speaking order.  Be that  as
      it may, when the issue was raised before this Court and there has been
      an advertence to the same, we are unable to accept the  submission  of
      Mr. Qadri.  The said decision is an authority for the proposition that
      the advice of UPSC, if sought and accepted, the same, regard being had
      to the principles of natural justice, is  to  be  communicated  before
      imposition of punishment.

      14.   In the case of S.K.Kapoor, the Court  accepted  the  ratio  laid
      down in the case of T.V.Patel as far as the interpretation of  Article
      320(3)(c) is concerned and,  in  that  context,  it  opined  that  the
      provisions contained in the said Article 320(3)(c) of the Constitution
      of India are not mandatory. While distinguishing certain aspects,  the
      Court observed as follows:

            "7.  We are of the opinion that although  Article  320(3)(c)  is
           not mandatory, if the authorities do  consult  the  Union  Public
           Service Commission and rely on the report of the  commission  for
           taking  disciplinary  action,  then  the  principles  of  natural
           justice require that a copy of the report  must  be  supplied  in
           advance to  the  employee  concerned  so  that  he  may  have  an
           opportunity  of  rebuttal.  Thus,  in  our  view,  the  aforesaid
           decision in T.V.Patel's case is clearly distinguishable."

      15.   After so stating  the  two-Judge  Bench  opined  that  when  the
      disciplinary authority does not rely on the report of the UPSC then it
      is not necessary  to  supply  the  same  to  the  employee  concerned.
      However, when it is relied upon then the  copy  of  the  same  may  be
      supplied in advance to the employee concerned, otherwise, there  would
      be violation of the principles of natural justice.  To arrive  at  the
      said conclusion, reliance was placed upon the decision in S.N.Narula's
      case.  Proceeding further, the Court held:

            "9.  It may be noted that the  decision  in  S.N.Narula's  case
           (supra) was prior to the decision  in  T.V.Patel's  case(supra).
           It is well settled that if a  subsequent  co-ordinate  bench  of
           equal strength wants to take a different view, it can only refer
           the matter to a larger bench, otherwise the prior decision of  a
           co-ordinate bench is binding on the subsequent  bench  of  equal
           strength.  Since, the decision in S.N.Narula's case (supra)  was
           not noticed in T.V.Patel's case(supra), the latter decision is a
           judgment  per  incuriam.   The  decision  in  S.N.Narula's  case
           (supra) was binding on the subsequent bench  of  equal  strength
           and hence, it could not take a contrary view, as is settled by a
           series of judgments of this Court."

       16. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend  that  the  two-
           Judge Bench in S.K. Kapoor’s case could not have opined that the
           decision in T.V. Patel’s case is per incuriam.  We have  already
           noticed two facts pertaining to S.N. Narula (supra), (i)  it  ws
           rendered on 31.1.2004 and (ii) it squarely dealt with the  issue
           and expressed an opinion.  It seems to us that the  judgment  in
           S.N. Narula’s case was  not  brought  to  the  notice  of  their
           Lordships deciding the lis in T.V. Patel (supra).  There  cannot
           be a shadow of doubt that the judgment in S.N. Narula (supra) is
           a binding precedent to be followed by the later Division  Bench.
           In this context, we may fruitfully  refer  to  the  decision  in
           Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (dead) by  L.  Rs.  And  Others
           [7], wherein the Constitution Bench has held as follows: -
           “We are of opinion that a pronouncement of  law  by  a  Division
           Bench of this Court is binding on a Division Bench of  the  same
           or a smaller number of Judges, and in order that  such  decision
           be binding, it is not necessary that it  should  be  a  decision
           rendered by the Full Court or a Constitution Bench of the Court”

       17. In Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.,  v.  Municipal  Corporation  and
           Another[8], it has been observed that the Division Bench of  the
           High Court in Municipal Corpn., Indore v. Ratnaprabha Dhandha[9]
           was clearly in error in taking the view  that  the  decision  of
           this Court in Municipal Corporation, Indore v. Ratna  Prabha[10]
           was not binding on it.  In doing so, the Division Bench  of  the
           High Court did something which even a later  co-equal  Bench  of
           this Court did not and could not do.

       18. In Chandra Prakash and others v. State of U.P. and  another[11],
           the Constitution Bench has reiterated  the  principle  that  has
           already been stated in Raghubir Singh (supra).

       19. Thus perceived, it can be stated with certitude that S.N. Narula
           (supra) was a binding precedent and when the subsequent decision
           in T.V. Patel (supra) is rendered in ignorance or  forgetfulness
           of the binding authority, the concept of per incurium comes into
           play.

       20. In this regard, we may usefully refer to  a  passage  from  A.R.
           Antulay v. R.S. Nayak[12], wherein Sabyasachi Mukharji,  J.  (as
           his Lordship then was) observed thus: -
           “....‘Per incuriam’ are those decisions given  in  ignorance  or
           forgetfulness of some inconsistent  statutory  provision  or  of
           some authority binding on the court concerned, so that  in  such
           cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on
           which it is based, is found, on that account to be  demonstrably
           wrong.”

            At a subsequent stage of the said decision it has been  observed
      as follows: -
           “.... It is a settled rule that if a decision has been given per
           incuriam the court can ignore it.”


       21. In Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.
           [13], while dealing with the issue of  ‘per  incuriam’,  a  two-
           Judge Bench, after referring to the dictum in Bristol  Aeroplane
           Co. Ltd. (supra) and  certain passages from Halsbury’s  Laws  of
           England and Raghubir Singh (supra), has ruled thus:-
           “The analysis of English and Indian Law  clearly  leads  to  the
           irresistible conclusion that not only the judgment of  a  larger
           strength is binding on a judgment of smaller  strength  but  the
           judgment of a co-equal strength is also binding on  a  Bench  of
           Judges of co-equal strength.  In  the  instant  case,  judgments
           mentioned in paragraphs 135 and 136 are by two or  three  judges
           of  this  Court.   These  judgments  have  clearly   ignored   a
           Constitution Bench judgment  of  this  Court  in  Sibbia’s  case
           (supra) which has comprehensively dealt with all the  facets  of
           anticipatory bail  enumerated  under  Section  438  of  Code  of
           Criminal  Procedure   Consequently,   judgments   mentioned   in
           paragraphs 135 and 136 of this judgment are per incuriam.”



       22. Testing on the aforesaid principles it can safely  be  concluded
           that the judgment in T.V. Patel’s case is per incuriam.

       23. At this juncture, we would like to  give  our  reasons  for  our
           respectful concurrence with S.K. Kapoor (supra).   There  is  no
           cavil over  the  proposition  that  the  language  engrafted  in
           Article 320(3)(c) does not make the said Article mandatory.   As
           we find, in the  T.V.Patel's  case,  the  Court  has  based  its
           finding on the language employed in Rule 32 of the Rules. It  is
           not in dispute that the said Rule from the very inception  is  a
           part of the 1965 Rules.  With the efflux of time, there has been
           a change of perception  as  regards  the  applicability  of  the
           principles  of  natural  justice.   An  Inquiry  Report   in   a
           disciplinary proceeding is  required  to  be  furnished  to  the
           delinquent  employee  so  that   he   can   make   an   adequate
           representation explaining his own  stand/stance.  That  is  what
           precisely has been laid down in the B.Karnukara's case.  We  may
           reproduce the relevant passage with profit: -
           “Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry  officer  is  not
           the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a  right
           to receive a copy of the enquiry  officer’s  report  before  the
           disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to
           the guilt or innocence  of  the  employee  with  regard  to  the
           charges levelled against him.  That  right  is  a  part  of  the
           employee’s right to defend himself against the charges  levelled
           against him. A denial of the enquiry officer’s report before the
           disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges,  is  a
           denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee  to  prove  his
           innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice.”


       24. We will be failing in our duty if we do  not  refer  to  another
           passage which deals with the effect of non-supply of the enquiry
           report on the punishment. It reads as follows: -
           “[v] The next question to be answered is what is the  effect  on
           the order of punishment when the report of the  enquiry  officer
           is not furnished to the  employee  and  what  relief  should  be
           granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to
           be relative to the punishment  awarded.  When  the  employee  is
           dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is  set  aside
           because the report is not furnished to him, in  some  cases  the
           non-furnishing of the report may  have  prejudiced  him  gravely
           while in other cases it may  have  made  no  difference  to  the
           ultimate  punishment   awarded   to   him.   Hence   to   direct
           reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to
           reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual.  The  theory
           of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural  justice
           have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and  to  assist  the
           individual  to  vindicate  his  just  rights.   They   are   not
           incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all  and
           sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused  to
           the employee or not on account of  the  denial  to  him  of  the
           report, has to be considered on the facts and  circumstances  of
           each case. Where, therefore, even after the  furnishing  of  the
           report, no different consequence would have followed,  it  would
           be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty
           and to  get  all  the  consequential  benefits.  It  amounts  to
           rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and  thus  to  stretching
           the  [pic]concept  of  justice  to  illogical  and  exasperating
           limits.  It  amounts  to  an  “unnatural  expansion  of  natural
           justice” which in itself is antithetical to justice.”



       25. After so stating, the larger Bench proceeded to state  that  the
           court/tribunal should not mechanically set aside  the  order  of
           punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished.  The
           courts/tribunals would apply their judicial mind to the question
           and give their reasons for setting aside or  not  setting  aside
           the order of punishment. It is only if the court/tribunal  finds
           that the furnishing of report could have made  a  difference  to
           the result in the case then it should set  aside  the  order  of
           punishment.   Where  after  following  the  said  procedure  the
           court/tribunal sets aside the order of  punishment,  the  proper
           relief that should be granted to  direct  reinstatement  of  the
           employee with liberty to the authority/  management  to  proceed
           with the enquiry, by placing the employee under  suspension  and
           continuing the enquiry from that stage of  furnishing  with  the
           report.  The question whether the employee would be entitled  to
           the back wages and other benefits from the date of dismissal  to
           the  date  of  reinstatement,  if  ultimately  ordered,   should
           invariably  left  to  be  decided  by  the  authority  concerned
           according to law, after the culmination of the  proceedings  and
           depending on the final outcome.

       26. We have referred to the aforesaid decision in extenso as we find
           that in the said case it has been  opined  by  the  Constitution
           Bench that non-supply of the enquiry report is a breach  of  the
           principle of natural justice.  Advice from the UPSC, needless to
           say, when utilized as a material against the delinquent officer,
           it should be supplied in advance.  As it seems to  us,  Rule  32
           provides for supply of copy of advice to the government  servant
           at the  time  of  making  an  order.   The  said  stage  was  in
           prevalence before the decision of the Constitution Bench.  After
           the said decision, in  our  considered  opinion,  the  authority
           should have clarified the  Rule  regarding  development  in  the
           service jurisprudence.  We have been  apprised  by  Mr.Raghavan,
           learned counsel for the respondent, that after the  decision  in
           S.K.Kapoor's  case,  the  Government  of  India,   Ministry   of
           Personnel, PG & Pensions, Department  of  Personnel  &  Training
           vide Office Memorandum dated 06.01.2014 has issued the following
           directions:
            "4.   Accordingly, it has been decided that in all  disciplinary
           cases where the Commission is  to  be  consulted,  the  following
           procedure may be adopted :-

           (i)    On receipt of the Inquiry Report, the DA may  examine  the
           same and forward it to the Commission with his observations;

           (ii)   On receipt of the Commission's report, the DA will examine
           the same and forward the same to the Charged Officer  along  with
           the Inquiry Report and his  tentative  reasons  for  disagreement
           with the Inquiry Report and/or the advice of the UPSC;

           (iii) The Charged Officer shall be required to submit, if  he  so
           desires,  his  written  representation  or  submission   to   the
           Disciplinary  Authority  within  fifteen  days,  irrespective  of
           whether the Inquiry report/advice of UPSC is  in  his  favour  or
           not.

           (iv)    The   Disciplinary   Authority   shall    consider    the
           representation of the Charged Officer and take further action  as
           prescribed in sub-rules 2(A) to (4)  of  Rule  15  of  CCS  (CCA)
           Rules, 1965.

       27. After the said Office Memorandum, a  further  Office  Memorandum
           has been issued on 05.03.2014, which pertains to supply of  copy
           of UPSC advice to the Charged Officer.  We think it  appropriate
           to reproduce the same:
           "The undersigned is directed to refer to this Department's  O.M.
           of even number dated 06.01.2014 and to  say  that  it  has  been
           decided, in partial modification of the above O.M. that  a  copy
           of the inquiry report may be given to the Government servant  as
           provided  in  Rule  15(2)  of   Central   Secretariat   Services
           (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.   The  inquiry
           report  together  with  the  representation,  if  any,  of   the
           Government servant  may  be  forwarded  to  the  Commission  for
           advice.  On receipt of the Commission's advice, a  copy  of  the
           advice may be provided to the  Government  servant  who  may  be
           allowed  to  submit  his  representation,   if   any,   on   the
           Commission's  advice  within  fifteen  days.   The  Disciplinary
           Authority will  consider  the  inquiry  report,  advice  of  the
           Commission and the representation(s) of the  Government  servant
           before arriving at a final decision."

       28. In our considered opinion, both the  Office  Memoranda  are  not
           only in consonance  with  the  S.K.Kapoor's  case  but  also  in
           accordance with the principles of natural justice which has been
           stated in B.Karunakar's case.

       29. In view  of  the  aforesaid,  we  respectfully  agree  with  the
           decision rendered in S.K.Kapoor's case and  resultantly  decline
           to interfere with the judgment and order of the High Court.   As
           a result, the  appeal,  being  devoid  of  merit,  is  dismissed
           without any order as to costs.



                                             ..............................J
                                                               (DIPAK MISRA)




                                             .............................J.
                                                               (N.V. RAMANA)


NEW DELHI;
MAY 22, 2014.





























-----------------------
[1]   AIR 1993 SC 1197
[2]   (2007) 4 SCC 785
[3]    AIR 1957 SC 912
[4]   (1993) 4 SCC 727
[5]   (2011) 4 SCC 589
[6]   (2011) 4 SCC 591
[7]    (1989) 2 SCC 754
[8]    AIR 1995 SC 1480
[9]    1989 MPLJ 20
[10]   (1976) 4 SCC 622
[11]   (2002) 4 SCC 234
[12]   (1988) 2 SCC 602
[13]    AIR 2011 SC 312 : ( 2011) 1 SCC 694