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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

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Tuesday, July 31, 2012

the High Court has reversed the order of acquittal of accused Nos. A1, A15, A16, A21 and confirmed the order of conviction of accused Nos. A13 and A14 passed by the Sessions Judge, Bijapur, in Sessions Case No. 82 of 2002. The appellants are convicted under Section 302/149 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life.- Section 149 IPC creates a constructive or vicarious liability of the members of the unlawful assembly for the unlawful acts committed pursuant to the common object by any other member of that assembly.- accused- A1, A15, A16 and A21 were members of the same assembly which has caused the murder of the deceased, in terms of Section 149 IPC, as they had dragged the deceased after first assault and contributed in preventing the deceased from escaping the assault of A13 and A14. Therefore, accused A1, A15, A16, A21 are guilty of murder along with A13 and A14 under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. Moreover, the delay in registering FIR is justified as the complainant had to travel 30 kms on a mud road to reach the Police Station from the scene of crime. Also, the absence of S.I. in the Police Station further contributed in delay in registering the FIR.


                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 984 OF 2010

Krishnappa  &  Ors.                                                   …………..
Appellants
                                   Versus
State of Karnataka by Babaleshwara
Police                                                               Station
…………..Respondent

                                    WITH
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1147 OF 2012
                      (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 5830 of  2012)
                                (CRL.M.P.No.23190 of 2011)
Tippanna Ningappa Kundargi and Anr.                 ………….. Appellants
                                   Versus
State of Karnataka                                        …………..Respondent
                               J U D G M E N T

H.L. Dattu, J.


   1) Delay Condoned and Leave granted  in  SLP(Crl.)   No.  ....…  of  2012
      (Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.23190 of 2011).
   2) Since both Criminal appeals arise out of the common  judgment  of  the
      High Court, we   propose  to  dispose  of  the  same  by  this  common
      judgment.


   3) These appeals are directed  against  the  common  judgment  and  order
      passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Gulbarga in  Criminal  Appeal
      No.  1185  of  2006  and  Criminal  Appeal  No.  824  of  2006,  dated
      16.06.2009, whereby and where under, the High Court has  reversed  the
      order of acquittal of accused Nos. A1, A15, A16, A21 and confirmed the
      order of conviction of accused Nos. A13 and A14 passed by the Sessions
      Judge, Bijapur, in Sessions Case No. 82 of 2002.  The  appellants  are
      convicted under Section 302/149 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment  for
      life.

   4) The facts of the case, in brief, as put forth by the prosecution are:-
      Shri. Bhimappa Biradar (deceased), the father of the  Complainant  had
      long standing enmity with Mansani family and  Sirabur  family,  as  30
      years ago, members of Mansani and  Sirabur  family  had  murdered  the
      grand father  of  the  deceased.  Subsequently,  this  enmity  further
      intensified due to political rivalry  and  their  relationship  became
      more hostile.

   5) It is the case of prosecution that, at 10.00  am  on  15.09.2001,  the
      deceased Bhimappa Biradar (for short `Bhimappa’) was  sitting  on  the
      platform of village well and his son PW1 was getting his  motor  cycle
      tyres filled with air in the shop of PW-11, situated right opposite to
      the village well. PW-4  (grand  daughter  of  deceased)  informed  the
      Bhimappa  (deceased ) that his presence was  required  in  his  house;
      the Bhimappa (deceased) got up  and  started  proceeding  towards  his
      house. At that time, Maningappa  Sannasiddappagol  (A1)  holding  axe,
      Tippanna Ningappa Kundaragi  (A13)  holding  club,  Shivappa  Tippanna
      Kundaragi (A14) holding axe,   Krishnappa  alias  Kristappa  Shashappa
      Biradar (A15) holding club, Jaggappa Mallappa  Biradar  (A16)  holding
      club, Prakash Mallappa Shirabur  (A17)  holding  chopper  and  Malappa
      Shashappa Biradar (A21) holding club came running from the side of the
      well.  In response to this, the Bhimappa  (deceased )  tried  to  flee
      away but the above accused persons caught hold of him. Thereafter, the
      deceased sat down pleading not to assault.  A13 and A14 unperturbed to
      deceased’s imploration for mercy, assaulted him with axe due to  which
      deceased’s fingers of hand got cut.  He sustained severe head injuries
      and fell down on the ground.  Thereafter, A1, A15, A16 and A21 dragged
      Bhimappa  (deceased )  to a couple of feet to the road. Then, A13, A14
      and A17 again  assaulted  the  Bhimappa   (deceased  )  on  the  neck,
      shoulders and legs. The above accused also threatened  the  bystanders
      with dire consequences, if any one attempt to intervene to rescue  the
      deceased. Thereafter, A2 to A12, A18 to A20, A22 and A24 came  running
      to the scene and assaulted the deceased with  hands  and  kicked  him.
      After this assault, the above accused persons went away from the scene
      along with their weapons.


   6) After this incident, PW1 went to his elder brother  Venkappa  who  was
      constructing a house and from there, they  both  went  to  Babaleshwar
      Police Station at about 11:15 am to file a complaint  but  PSI  (SHO)-
      PW18 was on duty at some  other  village.  On  arrival  of  PW18,  the
      written complaint of PW1 was lodged at 12:00 Noon.  On  the  basis  of
      said complaint, the First Information Report dated 15.09.2001 in Crime
      No. 122/2001 was registered and sent to the Court of CJM, Bijapur.

   7) Thereafter, all the accused were arrested within a week from the  date
      of incident. Further, recoveries of blood stained weapons used for the
      commission of offence were made under a  mahazar.  The  blood  stained
      clothing of the deceased along with blood stained weapons were sent to
      the Forensic Science Laboratory. The Serology report and FSL confirmed
      that stains on the articles found are of human blood.

   8) After investigation, the police charge-sheeted all the accused persons
      for committing offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148,  504,
      506 (Part II)  and 302 read with Section 149 IPC.

   9) The Principal Sessions Judge, Bijapur  had  taken  cognizance  of  the
      offence under Section 193, Cr.P.C. and registered the case as S.C. No.
      82/2002. The learned Judge, on the basis of the  allegations  made  in
      the charge-sheet, framed the charges against all the  accused  persons
      under Sections 143, 147, 148, 504, 506(Part  II)  and  302  read  with
      Section 149 IPC.   The accused pleaded that they are totally  innocent
      and have been falsely implicated.

  10) In order to prove the charges, the prosecution examined  18  witnesses
      in support of their  case.  The  accused  persons  did  not  lead  any
      evidence, whatsoever. The learned Sessions Judge, after recording  the
      statement of the accused persons under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.  and
      after considering the evidence on record, has come to  the  conclusion
      that A13, A14 and A17  are  directly  responsible  for  the  death  of
      deceased and therefore, guilty of murder punishable under Section  302
      read with Section 149 of IPC. The learned Sessions Judge acquitted A1,
      A15, A16 and A21  on  the  ground  that  there  acts  are  not  solely
      responsible for the death of the deceased as they were merely  holding
      Kalli Katagi and just prevented the deceased from escaping the assault
      made by A13, A14 and A17 and further, the post mortem report does  not
      disclose any abrasion or injury by use of Kalli Katagi.

  11) Aggrieved by the judgment and order so passed by the learned  Sessions
      Judge, the appellants, A13, A14 and A17 preferred  Criminal appeal No.
      824 of 2006 before the High Court.  Similarly, the State  had  carried
      the matter in Criminal appeal No. 1185 of 2006 before the  High  Court
      against the acquittal of A1, A15, A16 and A21.

  12) The High Court, after perusing the entire evidence on record,  allowed
      the appeal filed by the State and found  it  fit  not  to  accept  the
      conclusion of acquittal arrived by the  learned  Sessions  Judge  with
      regard to acquittal of A1,  A15,  A16  and  A21,  convicting  them  of
      charges punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the  IPC
      and sentencing them to undergo imprisonment for life. The appeal filed
      by the appellants- A13 and A14 came to be dismissed and the  order  of
      conviction and sentence passed  by  the  Learned  Sessions  Judge  was
      confirmed by the High Court.  The High Court has  allowed  the  appeal
      filed by A-17 (Prakash Mallappa Shirabur) and  the  conviction  passed
      against A17 was set aside and he was acquitted.

  13) Feeling aggrieved by this judgment of conviction and order of sentence
      passed by the High Court, the present appellants-accused are before us
      in these appeals.

  14) Shri. T.S. Doabia, learned Senior Counsel appears for the accused- A1,
      A15, A16 and A21 and accused A13 and A14 are represented by Ms. Rajani
      K. Prasad. Ms. Anita Shenoy, learned Counsel appears for the State  of
      Karnataka.

  15) Shri. T.S. Doabia, learned Senior Counsel contends that the view taken
      by the Trial Court was just and proper and the High Court ought not to
      have interfered with an order of  acquittal.  Learned  Senior  Counsel
      also submitted  that  the  Trial  Court  in  its  judgment  has  given
      plausible and cogent reasons for acquitting these accused as there was
      no overt act on their part which has caused the death of the  deceased
      in terms of Section 149 of IPC. He would  submit  that  these  accused
      were just carrying Kalli Katagi and had not dealt any  blow  by  their
      Kalli Katagi on the deceased and this fact is corroborated by the post
      mortem report of the deceased. Therefore, they are not responsible for
      the murder of the deceased and deserves to  be  acquitted.   He  would
      submit that PW1’s evidence as an eye witness is under  serious  doubts
      because PW9 in his deposition says that PW1 and his  brother  came  to
      the spot after 30 minutes of the occurrence of the offence  and  asked
      him to accompany them to Police Station to file a complaint. He  would
      further submit that there are contradictions in the statements of  the
      eye witnesses regarding the arrival of the accused on the  spot.   PW1
      stated that the  accused came from behind the bench of the well.   PW3
      stated that they came from behind the road.  PW4 says they  came  from
      back side of the well, whereas,  PW2, PW5 and  PW6  stated  that  they
      came from the right side of the well. He would  further  contend  that
      there is another contradiction in the depositions of the eye witnesses
      with respect to the fact whether deceased was dragged or lifted to the
      road after the initial assault on his body.  The  statements  of  PW1,
      PW3, PW4 and PW6 shows that the deceased was dragged to the  road  but
      the statement of PW2 and PW5 shows that the deceased was lifted to the
      road. Shri. Doabia would rely on the decisions of this Court in Sahdeo
      v. State of U.P., (2004) 10 SCC 682 and  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  v.
      Kishanpal, (2008) 16 SCC 73 in support of his submissions.

  16) Ms. Rajani K. Prasad, learned Counsel would submit  that  there  is  a
      delay in registering the FIR and subsequent delay  in  submitting  the
      same to the Court.  She would contend that the incident took place  at
      10:00 am in the morning but the FIR  was  registered  at  12:00  Noon,
      after two hours of  the  occurrence  of  such  a  grievous  nature  of
      incident. She would further submit that this FIR was delivered to  the
      Court of C.J.M., Bijapur at 6.45 PM, after much unexplained delay,  in
      order to manipulate the facts of occurrence of offence.

  17) Per Contra, Ms. Anitha Shenoy, learned Counsel appearing for the State
      would submit that Section 149 of  IPC  would  squarely  apply  to  the
      accused in the  present  case  as  once  the  membership  of  unlawful
      assembly  is  established,  then,  every  member  of  the   group   is
      vicariously liable. She would submit that the testimony of all the eye
      witnesses unanimously depicts  that  all  the  accused  were  carrying
      weapons and have taken active participation in the occurrence  of  the
      offence. She would submit that the incident occurred in a  very  short
      span of time, therefore any parrot like  version  cannot  be  expected
      from the eye witnesses. She would  submit  that  the  Statement  under
      Section 166 Cr.P.C. was recorded on the same day of the incidence. She
      would further submit that FIR mentions the name  of  all  the  accused
      persons and this has been  further  corroborated  by  two  independent
      witnesses and one witness is related to both the complainant  and  the
      accused.  She would also submit that Kalli Katiga has  been  recovered
      from accused- A1, A15, A16 and A21, who  had  prevented  the  deceased
      from escaping the assault from A13, A14, A17 and they further  dragged
      the deceased towards the road after  the  first  assault  and  thereby
      facilitated A13 and A14 for assaulting the  deceased  for  the  second
      time.

  18) In response to the submissions of Shri. Doabia that PW1 came later  to
      the scene, Ms. Shenoy would contend that PW1 came back  to  the  scene
      after half an hour along with his brother as explained by PW9  in  his
      deposition and this was certainly not the first time he  came  to  the
      spot. She would further submit that there is no delay in  filling  the
      FIR as the Complainant had to travel nearly 30 km on the mud  road  to
      reach the Police Station and thereafter, he waited for  half  an  hour
      for the Sub Inspector of Police to arrive at the Police Station.


  19) In the backdrop of aforesaid arguments advanced  by  the  parties,  we
      will examine the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel  for  the
      parties with regard to the role of accused and application of  Section
      149 of  IPC.

  20) It is now well settled law that the provisions of Section 149 IPC will
      be attracted whenever any  offence  committed  by  any  member  of  an
      unlawful  assembly  in  prosecution  of  the  common  object  of  that
      assembly, or when the members of that assembly knew  that  offence  is
      likely to be committed in prosecution of that object,  so  that  every
      person, who, at the time of committing of that offence  is  a  member,
      will be also vicariously held  liable  and  guilty  of  that  offence.
      Section 149 IPC creates a constructive or vicarious liability  of  the
      members of the unlawful  assembly  for  the  unlawful  acts  committed
      pursuant to the common object by any other member  of  that  assembly.
      This principle ropes in every member of the assembly to be  guilty  of
      an offence where that offence is  committed  by  any  member  of  that
      assembly in prosecution of common object of  that  assembly,  or  such
      members or assembly knew that offence is likely  to  be  committed  in
      prosecution of that object. [Lalji v. State of U.P., (1989) 1 SCC 437;
      Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar, (1989) 3  SCC  5;  Ranbir  Yadav  v.
      State of Bihar, (1995) 4 SCC 392].  The factum of  causing  injury  or
      not causing injury would not be relevant, where accused is  sought  to
      be roped in with the aid of Section 149 IPC. The relevant question  to
      be examined by the court is whether the accused was  a  member  of  an
      unlawful assembly and not whether he actually took active part in  the
      crime or not. [State v. Krishan Chand, (2004) 7 SCC 629; Deo Narain v.
      State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 12 SCC 298].


  21) We have carefully perused the relevant records and statements  of  the
      eye witnesses in the  case.   In  our  opinion,  the  prosecution  has
      clearly established with ample evidence that accused- A13 and A14  had
      murdered the deceased. We are in agreement with the view taken by  the
      Trial Court and High Court. Therefore, the  High  Court  is  right  in
      dismissing the appeal against the order of conviction  passed  by  the
      learned Sessions Judge.

  22) We are also of the opinion that accused- A1, A15,  A16  and  A21  were
      members of the same assembly  which  has  caused  the  murder  of  the
      deceased, in terms of  Section  149  IPC,  as  they  had  dragged  the
      deceased  after  first  assault  and  contributed  in  preventing  the
      deceased from escaping the assault of A13 and A14.  Therefore, accused
      A1, A15, A16, A21 are guilty of murder along with A13 and  A14   under
      Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC.

  23) We are afraid that the decisions relied on by  Shri.  Doabia,  learned
      Senior Counsel would not come to assist the accused, as in the present
      case, there is clear evidence of overt act on the part of the accused-
      A1, A15, A16 and A21 who dragged the deceased and prevented  him  from
      escaping the fatal assault to his body.


  24) Moreover, the delay in registering FIR is justified as the complainant
      had to travel 30 kms on a mud road to reach the  Police  Station  from
      the scene of crime. Also, the absence of S.I. in  the  Police  Station
      further contributed in delay in registering the FIR.

  25) In the result, we do not find any infirmity in the  impugned  judgment
      and order passed by the High Court. Therefore, these appeals  deserves
      to be dismissed and, accordingly, they are dismissed.

        Ordered accordingly.




                      ....................................................J.
                                                                (H.L. DATTU)



                ..........................................................J.
                                     (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)




   NEW DELHI,
   JULY 31, 2012.

-----------------------
13


service matter - whether the appellant was suitable for appointment to the post of male constable, the appointing authority has mechanically held that his selection was irregular and illegal because the appellant had furnished an affidavit stating the facts incorrectly at the time of recruitment.- when consideration of such claim by the candidates who deliberately suppressed information at the time of recruitment; can there be different yardsticks applied in the matter of grant of relief.we have noted certain other decisions taking different view of coordinate Benches, we feel it appropriate to refer the above mentioned issues to a larger Bench of this Court for an authoritative pronouncement so that there will be no conflict of views and which will enable the Courts to apply the law uniformily while dealing with such issues. 34. With that view, we feel it appropriate to refer this matter to be considered by a larger Bench of this Court. Registry is directed to place all the relevant documents before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for constitution of a larger Bench.


                                                            Reportable


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                         CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5671/2012
                         (@ SLP (C) No. 28608/2011)


    Jainendra Singh                             ….Appellant




                                   VERSUS




    State of U.P. Tr.Prinl.Sec. Home                   .…Respondent
    & Ors.


                                  O R D E R


    Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla,J.


    1.  Leave granted.
           At the very threshold, we are confronted with a question  as  to
    which of the judgments which have taken conflicting views  have  to  be
    followed in the matter of termination of  a  Constable  in  the  Police
    Department, who concealed certain relevant facts which  he  was  called
    upon to disclose after his selection was finalized and after  order  of
    appointment was issued by placing him on probation.


    2.  The brief facts of the case are; the appellant applied for the post
    of Constable pursuant to which he participated  in  the  physical  test
    held in the month of October, 2006. He having cleared the physical test
    was permitted to appear in the written examination which  was  held  on
    5.11.2006. Having come out successful in  the  written  test  also,  he
    participated in the interview held in  the  month  of  November,  2006.
    After a subsequent  medical  examination,  the  appellant,  along  with
    others was declared fit and was sent for training.


    3.   At  the  time  of  consideration  of  the  appellant’s  claim,   a
    Declaration Form in the form of an Affidavit was called for in order to
    ascertain his conduct and involvement in any criminal  or  civil  case.
    The appellant submitted the Declaration Form on 10.11.2006 by  swearing
    to an affidavit.


    4.  In the said affidavit the appellant declared that he has  not  been
    convicted by any Court; that no criminal case  was  registered  against
    him; that no criminal case was pending against him in any  Court;  that
    no criminal case was under investigation against him; that he had never
    been arrested by police in connection with any criminal case;  that  he
    was never challaned in any criminal case and  that  his  character  was
    clean and bright. At the end of the declaration, in paragraphs 15-16 he
    declared that all  the  information/averments  which  he  made  in  the
    affidavit were true and correct and  if  any  information/averment  was
    found to be false or incorrect after his selection  on  the  said  post
    then his selection could be cancelled immediately  without  giving  any
    notice and he could be removed from the training course.


    5.   He  also  fully  understood  the  position  that  if  any  of  the
    information/averment in  that  affidavit  was  found  to  be  wrong  or
    concealed then he would agree for all the legal proceedings that  would
    be initiated against him.


    6.  However, it came to light that the  appellant  was  involved  in  a
    criminal case for an offence falling under Sections 147,323,336, I.P.C.
    which was pending in the Court at the  time  of  his  selection  though
    subsequently he was acquitted by the competent Court on 04.01.2007.


    7.  Since the appellant concealed his involvement in a  criminal  case,
    the  Senior  Superintendent  of  Police  passed  orders  on  27.10.2007
    terminating his appointment/ services on that ground.


    8.  Aggrieved by the said termination order, the  appellant  approached
    the High Court by filing a Writ Petition (C) No. 21900/2008 and by  the
    impugned order the High Court declined to interfere with the  order  of
    termination holding that the appellant deliberately concealed the vital
    information in order to  secure  employment  and  subsequent  acquittal
    would not enure to his benefit.     The High Court while reaching  upon
    the above conclusion, relied upon a decision of this Court in  Kendriya
    Vidyalaya Sangathan and Ors. Vs. Ram Ratan Yadav – (2003) 3 SCC 437.


    9.  Besides the above decision, the learned counsel for  the  appellant
    while seeking leave to challenge the  order  impugned  placed  reliance
    upon the three other decisions  of  this  Court,  namely,  Kamal  Nayan
    Mishra Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.-  2010  (2)  SCC  169;  order
    dated 19.8.2011 in  Ram Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. –  Civil  Appeal
    No. 7106/2011 and Commissioner of Police and Ors. Vs. Sandeep  Kumar  –
    (2011) 4 SCC 644.


    10. Relying upon the above  referred  decisions,  the  learned  counsel
    contended that a different view than what has been  expressed  by  this
    Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan Vs. Ram Ratan  Yadav  (supra)  in
    the matter of employment in Police services has  been  stated  and  the
    appellant being identically placed, he is entitled for the same  relief
    as was granted in the above referred to decisions.


    11. Learned counsel for the State, however, contended that the decision
    reported in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan Vs. Ram  Ratan  Yadav  (supra)
    having laid down the principle after referring to the earlier decisions
    on this issue and that in a series of subsequent  decisions,  the  said
    view having been followed consistently, no interference is  called  for
    to the order of the High Court impugned in this appeal.


    12. While  appreciating  the  respective  contentions  of  the  learned
    counsel for the parties and on perusing the decisions  relied  upon  by
    the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the decision  reported
    in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan Vs. Ram Ratan Yadav  (supra),  we  feel
    that a detailed analysis is required to be made in order  to  find  out
    whether the issue calls for further deliberations so as to arrive at an
    authoritative pronouncement.


    13. We have come across the following decisions in which this Court has
    taken a similar view which has been propounded  in  Kendriya  Vidyalaya
    Sangathan Vs. Ram Ratan Yadav (supra). The said decisions are  reported
    in Union of India & Ors. Vs. M. Bhaskaran - 1995  Supp.  (4)  SCC  100,
    Delhi Administration Through its Chief  Secretary  &  Ors.  Vs.  Sushil
    Kumar -1996(11) SCC 605, Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda Vs. Presiding
    Officer, Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal & Another - 1999(2) SCC 247,
    Secy., Deptt. of Home Secy., A.P. & Ors. Vs. B. Chinnam  Naidu  -  2005
    (2) SCC 746, R. Radhakrishnan Vs. Director General of Police  &  Ors  -
    (2008) 1 SCC 660, Union of India &  Ors.  Vs.  Bipad  Bhanjan  Gayen  –
    (2008) 11 SCC 314, Daya Shankar Yadav Vs. Union of India & Ors.- (2010)
    14 SCC 103, State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs. SK.  Nazrul  Islam  -  2011
    (10) SCC 184.


    14. We also find that the following decisions have  taken  a  different
    view than what has been expressed in Kendriya Vidyalaya  Sangathan  Vs.
    Ram Ratan Yadav(supra)   i.e., Commissioner of Police, Delhi & Anr. Vs.
    Dhaval Singh - 1999 (1) SCC 246, Kamal Nayan Mishra Vs. State of Madhya
    Pradesh & Ors.(supra), Commissioner of Police & Ors. Vs. Sandeep  Kumar
    (supra) and the unreported judgment relied upon by the learned  counsel
    for the appellant in Ram Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.(supra).


    15. One common feature which we noted in all these cases  is  that  all
    the above decisions were rendered by a Division Bench consisting of two-
     Judges alone. Though in the decisions in which the principle laid down
    in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan Vs. Ram Ratan Yadav (supra)   has  been
    either followed or similar view has been taken, we find a common thread
    in all those decisions in having laid down as a preposition of law that
    suppression of material information which a candidate was  called  upon
    to furnish and which he failed to do, such concealment would result  in
    serious consequences and also not befitting the nature of  service  for
    which such recruitment was made, the State would  be  well  within  its
    powers to resort to cancellation of such appointment when the appointee
    was under-going probation   in  order  to  ensure  cleanliness  in  the
    service.


    16. We feel it appropriate to make a brief reference to the  principles
    laid down in the various decisions  pro  and  cons  in  order  to  pass
    appropriate orders in this appeal.


    17. In Delhi Administration through its Chief  Secretary  and  Ors.  v.
    Sushil Kumar (supra); this Court held:
                “3.     It is seen that verification of the  character  and
        antecedents is one of the important criteria to  test  whether  the
        selected candidate is suitable to a post under the  State.   Though
        he was found physically fit, passed the written test and  interview
        and was  provisionally  selected,  on  account  of  his  antecedent
        record, the appointing authority found it not desirable to  appoint
        a person of such record as a Constable to  the  disciplined  force.
        The view taken by the appointing authority in the background of the
        case cannot be said to be unwarranted.   The  Tribunal,  therefore,
        was wholly unjustified in giving the direction for  reconsideration
        of his case.  Though he was discharged or acquitted of the criminal
        offences, the same has nothing to do with the question.  What would
        be relevant is the conduct or character  of  the  candidate  to  be
        appointed to a service and not the actual result thereof.   If  the
        actual result happened to be in a particular way, the law will take
        care of the consequences.  The consideration relevant to  the  case
        is of the antecedents  of  the  candidate.   Appointing  authority,
        therefore, has  rightly  focused  this  aspect  and  found  it  not
        desirable to appoint him to the service.
                                                       (Emphasis added)


    18. In Union of India & Ors. Vs. M. Bhaskaran (supra), this Court held:
        “6…………Consequently, it has to be held  that  the  respondents  were
        guilty of misrepresentation and fraud perpetrated on the appellant-
        employer while getting employed in railway service and had snatched
        such employment which would not have been made available to them if
        they were not armed with such bogus  and  forged  labourer  service
        cards.
                 xxx    xxx     xxx    xxx     xxx     xxx     xxx
        It was clearly a case of fraud on the appellant-employer.  If  once
        such fraud is detected, the  appointment  orders  themselves  which
        were found to be tainted and vitiated by fraud and acts of cheating
        on the part of employees, were liable to be recalled  and  were  at
        least voidable at the option of the employer  concerned.   This  is
        precisely what has happened in the present case.  Once the fraud of
        the respondents  in  getting  such  employment  was  detected,  the
        respondents were proceeded against in  departmental  enquiries  and
        were called upon to have their say and thereafter have been removed
        from service.  Such orders of removal would amount to recalling  of
        fraudulently  obtained  erroneous  appointment  orders  which  were
        avoided by the employer-appellant after following the due procedure
        of law and complying with the principles of natural justice.
                xxx     xxx     xxx    xxx     xxx     xxx     xxx
        The aggrieved  are  all  those  who  had  similar  or  even  better
        qualifications than the appointee or appointees  but  who  had  not
        applied  for  the  post  because   they   did   not   possess   the
        qualifications mentioned in the advertisement.   It  amounts  to  a
        fraud on public to appoint persons with inferior qualifications  in
        such  circumstances  unless  it  is   clearly   stated   that   the
        qualifications are relaxable.  No court should be a  party  to  the
        perpetuation of the fraudulent practice.  It is of course  true  as
        noted by the Tribunal that the facts of the case in  the  aforesaid
        decision were different from the facts of the present case.  And it
        is also true that in  that  case  pending  the  service  which  was
        continued pursuant to the  order  of  the  Tribunal  the  candidate
        concerned  acquired  the  requisite  qualification  and  hence  his
        appointment was not disturbed by this Court.  But that  is  neither
        here not there.  As laid down in  the  aforesaid  decision,  if  by
        committing fraud any employment  is  obtained,  such  a  fraudulent
        practice cannot be permitted to be countenanced by a court of  law.
        Consequently, it must be held that the  Tribunal  had  committed  a
        patent error of law in directing reinstatement of  the  respondent-
        workmen with all consequential benefits.”
                                                            (Emphasis added)
    19. In Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda Vs. Presiding Officer,  Central
    Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Anr. (supra), this Court held:
                “6.Learned counsel for the appellant  submitted  that  once
        the Labour Court has  found  that  the  respondent  was  guilty  of
        suppression of relevant facts and had also  snatched  an  order  of
        appointment which would not have been  given  to  him  had  he  not
        deliberately concealed the fact  about  the  aforesaid  prosecution
        against him  for an offence under Section 307 of the  Indian  Penal
        Code, there was no question of awarding him any  lesser  punishment
        save and except confirming  the  order  of  termination.   In  this
        connection, he invited our attention to a decision of this Court in
        the case of Union of India v. M. Bhaskaran [1995 Supp (4) SCC  100]
        wherein it has been clearly held that when appointment is  procured
        by a workman on the basis of bogus  and  forged  casual  labourer’s
        service card, it would amount to misrepresentation and fraud on the
        employer and, therefore, it would create no equity in favour of the
        workman  or  any  estoppel  against  the  employer  and  for   such
        misconduct,  termination  would  be  justified  and  there  was  no
        question of holding any domestic enquiry.


           7.  There  could  be  no   dispute   on   this   settled   legal
              position……………”


                In this decision, the employee had  already  completed  his
    probation and, however, having regard to the  peculiar  facts  involved
    therein, this Court interfered with  the  order  of  termination.  This
    Court at the end of the judgment has made it clear that the said  order
    was rendered on the peculiar facts and circumstances of  the  case  and
    would not be treated as a precedent in future.


    20. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan Vs. Ram  Ratan  Yadav(supra),  this
    Court laid down the law in no uncertain terms in para 12:
                “12. The object of requiring information in columns 12  and
        13 of the attestation form  and  certification  thereafter  by  the
        candidate was to ascertain and verify the character and antecedents
        to judge his suitability to continue in service. A candidate having
        suppressed material information and/ or  giving  false  information
        cannot claim right to continue in  service.   The  employer  having
        regard to the nature of the employment and all  other  aspects  had
        discretion to terminate his services, which is made expressly clear
        in para 9 of the offer of  appointment.   The  purpose  of  seeking
        information as per columns 12 and 13 was not to find out either the
        nature or gravity of the offence or the result of a  criminal  case
        ultimately.  The information in the said columns was sought with  a
        view to judge the character and antecedents of  the  respondent  to
        continue in service or not.  The  High  Court,  in  our  view,  has
        failed to see this aspect of the matter.  It went wrong  in  saying
        that the criminal case had been subsequently withdrawn and that the
        offences,  in  which  the  respondent  was  alleged  to  have  been
        involved, were also not of serious nature.     In the present  case
        the respondent was to serve as  a  Physical  Education  Teacher  in
        Kendriya Vidyalaya. The character,  conduct  and  antecedent  of  a
        teacher will have some impact on  the  minds  of  the  students  of
        impressionable age.   The  appellants  having  considered  all  the
        aspects passed the  order  of  dismissal  of  the  respondent  from
        service.  The Tribunal after due consideration rightly  recorded  a
        finding of fact in upholding the order of dismissal passed  by  the
        appellants.  The High Court was clearly in error in  upsetting  the
        order of the Tribunal.  The High  Court  was  again  not  right  in
        taking note of the withdrawal of the case by the  State  Government
        and that the case was not of a serious  nature  to  set  aside  the
        order of the Tribunal on  that  ground  as  well.   The  respondent
        accepted  the  offer  of  appointment  subject  to  the  terms  and
        conditions mentioned therein with his eyes wide open.   Para  9  of
        the said  memorandum  extracted  above  in  clear  terms  kept  the
        respondent informed that the suppression  of  any  information  may
        lead to dismissal from service.         In  the  attestation  form,
        the respondent has certified that the information given by  him  is
        correct and complete to the best of his knowledge and belief; if he
        could not understand the contents of column  nos.  12  and  13,  he
        could not certify so.  Having certified that the information  given
        by him is correct and complete, his  version  cannot  be  accepted.
        The order of termination of services clearly shows that  there  has
        been due consideration of  various  aspects.   In  this  view,  the
        argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that as per para
        9 of the memorandum, the termination of service was not  automatic,
        cannot be accepted.”
                                                                  (Emphasis
    added)
    21. In Secy. Deptt. Of Home Secy.  A.P.  &  Ors.  Vs.  B.Chinnam  Naidu
    (supra), this Court held:
                “7. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
        As is noted in Kendriya Vidyalaya  Sangathan  Case  the  object  of
        requiring information in various columns  like  column  12  of  the
        attestation form and declaration thereafter by the candidate is  to
        ascertain and verify the character and  antecedents  to  judge  his
        suitability to enter into or continue in service.  When a candidate
        suppresses material information and/or gives false information,  he
        cannot claim any right for appointment or continuance  in  service.
        There can be no dispute to this position in law.  But on the  facts
        of the case it cannot be said that the respondent  had  made  false
        declaration or had suppressed material information.”
                                                            (Emphasis added)
                Here again in the peculiar facts of the  case,  this  Court
    thought it fit to interfere with the order of termination.


       22. In R. Radhakrishnan Vs. Director  General  of  Police  and  Ors.
           (supra), this Court held:
        “10.     Indisputably, the appellant intended to obtain appointment
        in a uniformed service.  The standard expected of a person intended
        to serve in such a service is different from the one  of  a  person
        who  intended  to  serve  in  other  services.    Application   for
        appointment and the verification roll were both in Hindi as also in
        English.  He, therefore, knew and understood the implication of his
        statement or omission to disclose a vital  information.   The  fact
        that in the event such a disclosure had been  made,  the  authority
        could have verified  his  character  as  also  suitability  of  the
        appointment is not in dispute.  It is also not in dispute that  the
        persons who had not made such disclosures and were, thus, similarly
        situated had not been appointed.

        13. In the instant case, indisputably, the appellant had suppressed
        a material fact.  In a case of this nature, we are of  the  opinion
        that question of exercising an equitable jurisdiction in his favour
        would not arise.”
                                                       (Emphasis added)
    23. In Union of India and Ors. Vs. Bipad Bhanjan Gayen-  (supra),  this
    Court held:
        “10.  It bears repetition that what has led to the  termination  of
        service of the respondent is not his involvement in the  two  cases
        which were then pending,  and  in  which  he  had  been  discharged
        subsequently,  but  the  fact  that  he   had   withheld   relevant
        information while filling in the attestation form.  We are  further
        of the opinion that an employment as a police officer  pre-supposes
        a high level of integrity  as such a person is expected  to  uphold
        the law, and on the contrary, such a service  born  in  deceit  and
        subterfuge cannot be tolerated.”
                                                       (Emphasis added)
    24. In Daya Shankar Yadav Vs. Union of India & Ors.  (supra),  all  the
    earlier decisions right from Delhi  Administration  through  its  Chief
    Secretary and Ors. Vs. Sushil Kumar (supra) ending with Union of  India
    & Ors. Vs. Bipad  Bhanjan  Gayen(supra)  including  Kendriya  Vidyalaya
    Sangathan Vs. Ram Ratan Yadav(supra) were considered in detail and  the
    preposition of law was laid down as under:
                “16. Thus an employee on probation can be  discharged  from
        service or a prospective employee may be refused employment: i)  on
        the ground of unsatisfactory antecedents and  character,  disclosed
        from his conviction in a criminal case, or  his  involvement  in  a
        criminal offence (even if he was acquitted on technical grounds  or
        by giving benefit of doubt)  or  other  conduct  (like  copying  in
        examination)  or  rustication  or  suspension  or  debarment   from
        college, etc.; and (ii) on the ground of  suppression  of  material
        information or making false statement in reply to queries  relating
        to prosecution or conviction for a criminal offence (even if he was
        ultimately acquitted in the criminal case).This ground is  distinct
        from the ground of previous antecedents and character, as it  shows
        a current dubious conduct and absence of character at the  time  of
        making the declaration,  thereby  making  him  unsuitable  for  the
        post.”
                                                       (Emphasis added)


      25. In State of West Bengal and Ors. Vs.  Sk.  Nazrul  Islam  (supra),
          this Court held:
                 “3.   On  28.09.2007,  the  respondent  was   supplied   a
        verification roll for  verification  of  his  antecedents  and  the
        respondent filled the verification roll and submitted the  same  to
        the Reserve Officer, Howrah, on 29.09.2007.  The verification  roll
        of the respondent was sent to  the  District  Intelligence  Branch,
        Howrah, on 08.10.2007.  In the course of enquiry, it came to  light
        that he was involved in a criminal case  involving  offences  under
        Sections 148/323/380/427/596, IPC in Bagnan PS Case No.97  of  2007
        and after investigation, the charge-sheet had already been filed in
        the Court of the Additional Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Uluberia,
        Howrah, and that the respondent had surrendered  before  the  Court
        and had been granted bail.  All  these  facts,  however,  had  been
        concealed in Column 13 of the verification roll  submitted  by  the
        respondent in which he was required to state whether  he  was  ever
        arrested, detained or convicted.  The authorities,  therefore,  did
        not appoint the respondent as a constable.


             5. We have heard the learned counsel for the  parties  and  we
        fail  to  appreciate  how  when  a  criminal  case  under  Sections
        148/323/380/427/596, IPC, against the respondent was pending in the
        Court  of  the  Additional  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Uluberia,
        Howrah, any mandamus could have been issued by the  High  Court  to
        the authorities to appoint the respondent as a  constable.  Surely,
        the authorities entrusted with  the  responsibility  of  appointing
        constables were under duty to verify the antecedents of a candidate
        to find out whether he is suitable for the post of constable and so
        long as the candidate has not been acquitted in the  criminal  case
        of the charges under Sections 148/323/380/427/596  IPC,  he  cannot
        possibly be held to be suitable for  appointment  to  the  post  of
        constable.”
                                                            (Emphasis added)


    26. As against the above decisions, a contrary view has been  expressed
    by this Court in Commissioner of Police, Delhi & Anr. Vs. Dhaval  Singh
    (supra),  Kamal  Nayan  Mishra  Vs.  State  of   Madhya   Pradesh   and
    Ors.(supra), Commissioner of Police and Ors. Vs. Sandeep Kumar  (supra)
    and in an un-reported decision in Ram  Kumar  Vs.  State  of  U.P.  and
    Ors.(supra).


    27. In Commissioner of Police, Delhi & Anr. Vs. Dhaval  Singh  (supra),
    the factum of concealment of relevant information, namely, pendency  of
    a criminal case against the concerned applicant  was  not  in  dispute.
    This Court, however, distinguished the said case by stating that  after
    the provisional selection as well as the interview and before the order
    of  appointment  was  issued,  he  voluntarily  disclosed  the  pending
    criminal case by stating that by inadvertence he omitted to mention the
    same in the appropriate column and that he was subsequently  acquitted.
    The said criminal case was also noted  while  granting  the  relief  in
    favour of the candidate. The ratio laid down in the decision  in  Delhi
    Administration Through its Chief Secretary  &  Ors.  Vs.  Sushil  Kumar
    (supra) was distinguished by stating that no  such  corrective  measure
    was initiated by the candidate  in  Delhi  Administration  Through  its
    Chief Secretary & Ors. Vs. Sushil Kumar (supra) case.  In  Commissioner
    of Police, Delhi & Anr. Vs. Dhaval Singh (supra) decision it was held:
                “5.  That  there  was  an  omission  on  the  part  of  the
        respondent to give information against the relevant column  in  the
        Application Form about the pendency of the criminal case, is not in
        dispute. The respondent, however, voluntarily conveyed it on 15-11-
        1995 to the appellant that he had inadvertently failed  to  mention
        in the appropriate column regarding the pendency  of  the  criminal
        case  against  him  and  that  his  letter  may   be   treated   as
        “information”.  Despite  receipt   of   this   communication,   the
        candidature of the respondent was cancelled. A perusal of the order
        of the Deputy Commissioner of Police cancelling the candidature  on
        20-11-1995 shows that the information conveyed by the respondent on
        15-11-1995 was not taken note of. It was obligatory on the part  of
        the appellant to have considered that  application  and  apply  its
        mind to the stand of the respondent that he had made an inadvertent
        mistake before passing the order. That, however, was not  done.  It
        is not as if information was given by the respondent regarding  the
        inadvertent mistake committed by him after he had been acquitted by
        the trial court — it was much before that. It is also obvious  that
        the information was conveyed voluntarily. In vain, have we searched
        through the order of the Deputy  Commissioner  of  Police  and  the
        other record  for  any  observation  relating  to  the  information
        conveyed  by  the  respondent  on  15-11-1995  and   whether   that
        application could not be treated as curing  the  defect  which  had
        occurred in the Form. We are not told as to how that  communication
        was disposed of either. Did the competent  authority  ever  have  a
        look  at  it,  before  passing  the  order   of   cancellation   of
        candidature?  The  cancellation  of  the  candidature   under   the
        circumstances was  without  any  proper  application  of  mind  and
        without  taking  into  consideration  all  relevant  material.  The
        Tribunal, therefore, rightly set it aside. We uphold the  order  of
        the Tribunal, though for slightly different reasons,  as  mentioned
        above.
                                                            (Emphasis added)


         28. In the decision in, Kamal Nayan  Mishra  Vs.  State  of  Madhra
             Pradesh  &  Ors.(supra),  the  ratio  decidendi   in   Kendriya
             Vidyalaya Sangathan Vs. Ram Ratan Yadav(supra)   has  been  set
             out in para 14:
                “14. Therefore, the ratio decidendi of Ram Ratan Yadav  is,
             where  an  employee  (probationer)  is  required  to  give  his
             personal data in an attestation form  in  connection  with  his
             appointment (either at the time of or  thereafter),  if  it  is
             found  that  the  employee  had  suppressed  or   given   false
             information in regard to matters which had  a  bearing  on  his
             fitness or suitability to the post, he could be terminated from
             service during the period  of  probation  without  holding  any
             inquiry. The decision dealt with a probationer and not a holder
             of a civil post, and nowhere laid down  a  proposition  that  a
             confirmed employee holding a civil post under the State,  could
             be terminated from service for furnishing false information  in
             an attestation form, without giving an opportunity to meet  the
             charges against him.
                                                       (Emphasis added)


                In the said case, the appellant was appointed much  earlier
    and that while he was in service he was prosecuted for involvement in a
    criminal case for an offence u/s 148,324/149,326/149  and  506  IPC  in
    which  he  was  acquitted  by  the  Criminal  Court  on  9.9.2004.  The
    information furnished by him after more than a decade of his employment
    and the procedure followed while  taking  a  decision  in  passing  the
    ultimate order, this Court held that the appellant therein was entitled
    for the relief of reinstatement.


    29. In Commissioner of Police and Ors. Vs.  Sandeep  Kumar(supra),  the
    order of termination was interfered with holding as under:
                        12. It is true that in  the  application  form  the
        respondent did not mention that he was involved in a criminal  case
        under Sections 325/34 IPC.  Probably he did not mention this out of
        fear that if he did so he would automatically be disqualified.   At
        any event, it was not such a serious offence like  murder,  dacoity
        or rape, and hence a more  lenient  view  should  be  take  in  the
        matter.”


                This was also a case where the candidate  after  qualifying
    in all the tests, for the first time in the attestation form, disclosed
    his  involvement  in  a  criminal  case  which  was   compromised   and
    subsequently based on such compromise he was  acquitted.  A  Show-Cause
    notice was also issued  to  him  asking  him  to  show  cause  why  his
    candidature for the  post  should  not  be  cancelled  because  he  had
    concealed the fact of his involvement in the criminal case and had made
    a wrong statement in his application form. A challenge was made by  him
    before  the  Administrative  Tribunal  which  declined  to   interfere.
    However, the High Court granted the relief, set aside the proposal  for
    cancellation of his candidature. This Court also upheld  the  order  of
    the High Court by granting the relief as quoted in para 12 above.

    30. In the unreported decision  in  Ram  Kumar  Vs.  State  of  U.P.  &
    Ors.(supra), while suppression of the registration of a  criminal  case
    against the appellant therein was not in dispute; it was held that what
    was required to be  considered  by  the  appointing  authority  was  to
    satisfy himself as to the suitability of  the  applicant  to  the  post
    based on the nature of crime alleged  against  the  applicant.  It  was
    held:
                 “9.  The     order     dated     18.07.2002     of     the
        Additional   Chief  Judicial Magistrate had been  sent  along  with
        the report dated  15.01.2007 of the Jaswant Nagar Police Station to
        the Senior  Superintendent   of   Police,    Ghaziabad,    but   it
        appears    from    the   order  dated  08.08.2007  of  the   Senior
        Superintendent of  Police,   Ghaziabad,    that    he    has    not
        gone   into   the   question   as   to whether  the  appellant  was
        suitable for appointment to service or to the post of constable  in
        which he was appointed  and  he  has    only    held    that    the
        selection   of   the    appellant    was    illegal  and  irregular
        because he did not furnish in his affidavit in  the  proforma    of
        verification   roll    that    a    criminal    case    has    been
        registered against him.  As has been stated in the instructions  in
        the Government Order dated 28.04.1958,  it  was  the  duty  of  the
        Senior   Superintendent    of    Police,    Ghaziabad,    as    the
        appointing   authority,   to   satisfy   himself   on   the   point
           as    to  whether    the    appellant    was    suitable     for
        appointment    to    the  post     of     a     constable,     with
        reference   to   the   nature   of suppression   and   nature    of
         the   criminal    case.      Instead    of  considering    whether
        the   appellant   was    suitable    for   appointment    to    the
        post   of   male   constable,   the    appointing  authority    has
        mechanically   held   that   his   selection   was irregular    and
          illegal    because    the    appellant    had    furnished     an
        affidavit   stating   the   facts   incorrectly   at    the    time
        of recruitment.


           Ultimately the appointing authority was directed  to  take  back
    the applicant without grant of any back wages.


    31. As noted by us, all the above decisions were rendered by a Division
    Bench of this Court consisting of two-Judges and  having  bestowed  our
    serious consideration to the issue, we consider that while dealing with
    such an issue, the Court will have to bear in mind the various cardinal
    principles before granting any relief to the aggrieved party, namely:

    (i) Fraudulently obtained orders of appointment could  be  legitimately
    treated as voidable at the option of the employer or could be  recalled
    by the employer  and  in  such  cases  merely  because  the  respondent
    employee has continued in service for a number of years, on  the  basis
    of such fraudulently obtained employment, cannot get any equity in  his
    favour or any estoppel against the employer.


    (ii)        Verification of the character and antecedents is one of the
    important criteria to test whether the selected candidate  is  suitable
    to the post under the State and  on  account  of  his  antecedents  the
    appointing authority  if find not desirable to appoint a  person  to  a
    disciplined force can it be said to be unwarranted.




    (iii) When appointment was procured by a person on the basis of  forged
    documents, it would  amount  to  misrepresentation  and  fraud  on  the
    employer and, therefore, it would create no equity in his favour or any
    estoppel against the employer while resorting  to  termination  without
    holding any inquiry.




    (iv)        A candidate having suppressed material  information  and/or
    giving false information cannot claim right to continue in service  and
    the employer, having regard to the nature  of  employment  as  well  as
    other aspects, has the discretion to terminate his services.


           . Purpose of calling for information regarding involvement in any
             criminal case or detention or conviction is for the purpose  of
             verification  of  the  character/antecedents  at  the  time  of
             recruitment and suppression of such material  information  will
             have clear bearing on the  character  and  antecedents  of  the
             candidate in relation to his continuity in service.




    (vi)        The person who suppressed the material  information  and/or
    gives false information cannot  claim  any  right  for  appointment  or
    continuity in service.




   (vii)        The standard expected of a  person  intended  to  serve  in
   uniformed service is quite distinct from other services and,  therefore,
   any deliberate statement or omission regarding a vital  information  can
   be  seriously  viewed  and  the  ultimate  decision  of  the  appointing
   authority cannot be faulted.




   (viii)       An employee on probation can be discharged from  service  or
   may be refused employment  on  the  ground  of  suppression  of  material
   information or making false statement relating to his involvement in  the
   criminal case,  conviction  or  detention,  even  if  ultimately  he  was
   acquitted of the said case, inasmuch as such a  situation  would  make  a
   person undesirable or unsuitable for the post.




   (ix)  An employee in the uniformed service pre-supposes a higher level of
   integrity as such a person is expected to  uphold  the  law  and  on  the
   contrary  such  a  service  born  in  deceit  and  subterfuge  cannot  be
   tolerated.


   (x)           The  authorities  entrusted  with  the  responsibility   of
   appointing Constables, are under duty to  verify  the  antecedents  of  a
   candidate to find out whether he is suitable for the post of a  Constable
   and so long as the candidate has not been acquitted in the criminal case,
   he cannot be  held  to  be  suitable  for  appointment  to  the  post  of
   Constable.

   32.   When we consider the above principles laid down in majority of  the
   decisions, the question that looms large before us is when  consideration
   of such claim by the candidates who deliberately  suppressed  information
   at the time of recruitment; can there be different yardsticks applied  in
   the matter of grant of relief.

   33.   Though there are very many decisions  in  support  of  the  various
   points culled out in the above paragraphs,  inasmuch  as  we  have  noted
   certain other decisions taking different view of coordinate  Benches,  we
   feel it appropriate to refer the above mentioned issues to a larger Bench
   of this Court for an authoritative pronouncement so that there will be no
   conflict of views and which will enable  the  Courts  to  apply  the  law
   uniformily while dealing with such issues.


   34.   With that view, we feel it appropriate to refer this matter  to  be
   considered by a larger Bench of this Court. Registry is directed to place
   all the relevant documents before  the  Hon’ble  the  Chief  Justice  for
   constitution of a larger Bench.
                                                      …..……….…………………………...J.
                                                               [T.S. Thakur]
                                                        …………….………………………………J.
                                          [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla]


      New Delhi;
      July 30, 2012

M/s Best Oasis Ltd., the owner of the vessel in question, that huge demurrage charges are being incurred by the ship owner each day. We are of the view that once clearance has been given by the State Pollution Control Board, State Maritime Board as well as the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board for the vessel to beach for the purpose of dismantling, it has to be presumed that the ship is free from all hazardous or toxic substances, except for such substances such as asbestos, thermocol or electronic equipment, which may be a part of the ship’s superstructure and can be exposed only at the time of actual dismantling of the ship. The reports have been submitted on the basis of actual inspection carried out on board by the above-mentioned authorities, which also include the Customs authorities. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board has come up with suggestions regarding the removal of certain items of the ship during its dismantling. The suggestions are reasonable and look to balance the equities between the parties. 13. We, therefore, dispose of the two IAs which we have taken up for hearing and direct the concerned authorities to allow the ship in question to beach and to permit the ship owner to proceed with the dismantling of the ship, after complying with all the requirements of the Gujarat Maritime Board, the Gujarat Pollution Control Board and Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. It is made clear that if any toxic wastes embedded in the ship structure are discovered during its dismantling, the concerned authorities shall take immediate steps for their disposal at the cost of the owner of the vessel, M/s Best Oasis Ltd., or its nominee or nominees. 14. Before parting with the matter, we would like to emphasize that in all future cases of a similar nature, the concerned authorities shall strictly comply with the norms laid down in the Basel Convention or any other subsequent provisions that may be adopted by the Central Government in aid of a clean and pollution free maritime environment, before permitting entry of any vessel suspected to be carrying toxic and hazardous material into Indian territorial waters.


|REPORTABLE             |

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

                          I.A. NOS.61 & 62 OF 2012

                                     IN

                      WRIT PETITION (C) No.657 of 1995



1 RESEARCH FOUNDATION FOR SCIENCE,           … PETITIONER


2 TECHNOLOGY AND NATURAL RESOURCE


3 POLICY


           VS.



           2 UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                            …
RESPONDENTS






                                  O R D E R



ALTAMAS KABIR, J.


1.    On 6th July, 2012, Writ Petition (Civil) No.657 of 1995 filed  by  the
Research Foundation for Science, Technology  and  Natural  Resources  Policy
was disposed of by this Court.  I.A. No.61 of 2012 which had been  filed  by
M/s Best Oasis Ltd. on 9th May, 2012, and I.A. No.62 of 2012 filed by  Gopal
Krishna on 18th  June,  2012,  were  heard  separately  since  in  the  said
applications relief was prayed for in  respect  of  a  specific  ship  named
“Oriental Nicety” (formerly known as Exxon Valdez), which had  entered  into
Indian territorial waters and had  sought  the  permission  of  the  Gujarat
Pollution Control Board and the Gujarat Maritime Board to allow the ship  to
beach for the purpose of dismantling.  Such  relief  would,  of  course,  be
subject to compliance with all the formalities as required by the  judgments
and orders passed by this Court on 14th October, 2003, 6th  September,  2007
and 11th September, 2007 in the Writ  Petition.   The  Applicant,  M/s  Best
Oasis Ltd. is the purchaser of the said ship.

2.    Another prayer was for a direction to the above-mentioned  Authorities
and the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board to inspect the ship and to permit  it
to enter into Indian territorial waters and allow it  to  anchor  in  Indian
waters, which has been  rendered  redundant,  since,  as  submitted  by  Ms.
Hemantika Wahi, learned Standing Counsel for the State of Gujarat, the  said
stages have already been completed and the ships is anchored  outside  Alang
Port.

3.    After the application had been  filed,  the  Union  of  India  in  its
Ministry of Environment and Forests, and the Gujarat  Maritime  Board,  were
directed to file their respective responses thereto.

4.    Appearing on  behalf  of  the  Union  of  India  in  its  Ministry  of
Environment and Forests, Mr. Ashok Bhan, learned Senior Advocate,  submitted
that an affidavit had been affirmed by Shri M. Subbarao, Director,  Ministry
of Environment and Forests, in which it had been disclosed that a  Technical
Expert Committee  (TEC)  had  been  appointed  pursuant  to  the  directions
contained in the order dated 6th September, 2007, passed by  this  Court  in
the Writ Petition.  The said Committee Report dealt  in  great  detail  with
the hazards associated with the ship  breaking  industry,  occupational  and
health issues, social welfare activities of  workers,  occupational  hazards
associated with  breaking  of  different  categories  of  ships  of  special
concern, handling of hazardous material and the  role  and  responsibilities
of various defaulters. Mr. Bhan submitted that the said Report also  focused
on  ships  of  special  concern  in  assessment  of  hazardous  wastes   and
potentially hazardous materials.  It was urged  that  a  definite  procedure
for anchoring, beaching and breaking of ships had  been  laid  down  in  the
Report of the Committee which is applicable to ship-breaking  activities  in
all the coastal States of India. In fact, it was pointed  out  by  Mr.  Bhan
that the procedures recommended by the Committee were already in  force  and
in terms of  the  order  dated  6th  September,  2007,  the  Report  of  the
Committee is to remain in force until a comprehensive Report,  incorporating
the recommendations of the Committee,  was  formulated.   In  addition,  Mr.
Bhan submitted that  in  compliance  with  this  Court’s  order  dated  14th
October,  2003,  the  Union  of  India,  in  its  Ministry  of  Steel,   has
constituted  an   Inter-Ministerial   Standing   Monitoring   Committee   to
periodically review the status of implementation of the  recommendations  of
the Technical Expert Committee.

5.    Mr. Bhan  submitted  that  the  provisions  of  the  Basel  Convention
relating to the disposal of hazardous wastes  are  being  strictly  followed
and as far as the  present  ship  is  concerned,  it  was  for  the  Gujarat
Maritime Board, which is the concerned local authority to  take  a  decision
for anchoring and subsequent  beaching  and  dismantling  of  the  ship,  in
strict compliance with the directions contained in the order passed by  this
Court on 6th September, 2007.

6.    Mr. Bhan also referred to an  affidavit  affirmed  on  behalf  of  the
Ministry of Shipping, in which it was stated that for  permitting  a  vessel
to anchor, inspection is to be carried out by the State  Maritime  Board  in
consultation with the State Pollution Control Board and Customs  Department.
 In the affidavit, it has been specifically averred that  an  inspection  of
the vessel had been carried out by the Gujarat Maritime  Board  and  it  was
found that the ship had been converted from an oil tanker to a bulk  carrier
in 2008 and there was no sign of any hazardous/toxic substance on board.  It
was also  stated  in  the  affidavit  that  the  Board  had  given  its  “no
objection”  for  beaching  of  the  ship  and  the  Ministry  of   Shipping,
therefore, had no say in the matter.

7.    Appearing for the Gujarat Pollution Control  Board,  Gandhinagar,  Ms.
Hemantika Wahi submitted that in keeping with the  directions  contained  in
the order passed by this Court on 6th September, 2007, an  Inter-Ministerial
Committee  and  Standing  Monitoring  Committee  to  review  the  status  of
implementation of the directions of this Court from time to time,  had  been
constituted.  However, as a matter  of  precaution,  the  Gujarat  Pollution
Control Board had not recommended that permission be granted to  the  vessel
in question to anchor, until further orders were passed  by  this  Court  in
the pending Writ Petition.  Ms. Wahi submitted that in the order  dated  6th
September,  2007,  this  Court  had  recommended  the   formulation   of   a
comprehensive code to govern the procedure to be adopted to allow  ships  to
enter into Indian territorial waters and to beach at any  of  the  ports  in
India for the purpose of dismantling. However,  till  such  code  came  into
force, the officials of the Gujarat  Maritime  Board,  the  concerned  State
Pollution Control Board,  officials  of  the  Customs  Department,  National
Institute of Occupational Health and the  Atomic  Energy  Regulatory  Board,
could oversee the arrangements. Ms. Wahi submitted that the application  for
recommendation for anchoring could be  decided  in  view  of  the  aforesaid
order dated 6th September, 2007, and the TEC Report which had been  accepted
by this Court vide the said order, with liberty to file a  response  to  the
application at a later stage, if required.

8.    Ms. Wahi then referred to the affidavit  affirmed  on  behalf  of  the
Gujarat Maritime Board by Capt. Sudhir Chadha, Port Officer, Ship  Recycling
Yard, in the Gujarat Maritime Board at Alang.  Ms. Wahi  submitted  that  in
terms of the directions given on 25th June, 2012, on the application of  M/s
Best Oasis Ltd., the Gujarat Maritime Board instructed the company to  bring
the vessel to the Port area of Alang for  inspection.   Ms.  Wahi  submitted
that when the vessel arrived outside the Port area of Alang  on  30th  June,
2012, officers of all concerned departments, including the Gujarat  Maritime
Board, the Gujarat Pollution Control Board, Customs  Department,  Explosives
Department, Atomic Energy Regulatory  Board,  went  on  board  the  ship  to
inspect and ascertain that there was no  hazardous/toxic  substance  on  it.
Ms. Wahi submitted that upon inspection,  nothing  hazardous  or  toxic  was
discovered on the vessel, which was found  to  be  in  conformity  with  the
documents  submitted  for  desk  review.   The   Gujarat   Maritime   Board,
therefore, certified that the ship  was  fit  for  breaking/dismantling  and
beaching permission would be given after following the procedure  laid  down
by TEC and approved by this Court in its order dated 6th September, 2007.

9.    The recommendations of the Gujarat  Maritime  Board  and  the  Gujarat
Pollution Control Board to allow the vessel to  beach  at  Alang  was  hotly
contested  by  Mr.  Sanjay  Parikh,  learned  Advocate  appearing  for   the
Petitioner,  Research  Foundation  for  Science,  Technology   and   Natural
Resources Policy.  Mr.  Parikh  urged  that  while  disposing  of  the  Writ
Petition on 6th July, 2012, this Court had directed the Union of  India  and
the Respondents concerned to follow the procedure which had been  laid  down
in the  Basel  Convention  in  the  matter  of  ship-breaking,  which  often
generated large quantities of toxic waste.  Mr. Parikh submitted  that  none
of the safeguards which had been put in place by the  Basel  Convention  had
been complied with or followed in permitting the Oriental  Nicety  to  enter
into Indian territorial waters.  Mr. Parikh submitted that under  the  Basel
Convention, the country of export of the ship was  required  to  inform  the
country of import of the movement of the ship in question and  that  it  was
non-hazardous and non-toxic. Mr. Parikh submitted that in the  instant  case
such intimation was neither given nor was the  ship  certified  to  be  free
from hazardous and toxic substances.

10.   It was also urged that the owners  of  the  vessel  were  required  to
obtain clearance from the Government of India to bring the ship into  Indian
territorial waters, which was dependent upon the  availability  of  landfill
facilities, as also facilities for beaching.  Mr. Parikh submitted  that  it
is only after completion of the aforesaid requirements, that the ship  could
be allowed entry into Indian territorial waters and to beach at any  of  the
ship-breaking yards at any of the Ports designated for  such  purpose.   Mr.
Parikh submitted that in the absence of proper  compliance  with  the  norms
laid down in the Basel  Convention,  the  vessel  ought  not  to  have  been
permitted to enter into Indian territorial waters or the Port area at  Alang
by the Gujarat Pollution Control Board and the Gujarat Maritime Board.   Mr.
Parikh further submitted that now the vessel had  been  permitted  to  enter
the Alang Ship-breaking Yard, further steps to  dismantle  the  ship  should
not be permitted, without definite steps being taken to  ensure  that  there
were no hazardous substances on board the ship or that the ship  itself  was
not a hazardous object.

11.   Mr. Parikh further submitted that if during  the  dismantling  of  the
ship any toxic or hazardous materials were found on board the  ship  or  was
found to be an integral part of the ship,  adequate  precautionary  measures
should be taken immediately to neutralize the same  either  by  incineration
or by creating adequate landfills for disposal of such waste.

12.   We have carefully considered the submissions made  on  behalf  of  the
respective parties in the  light  of  the  submissions  made  on  behalf  of
Applicant, M/s Best Oasis Ltd., the owner of the vessel  in  question,  that
huge demurrage charges are being incurred by the ship owner  each  day.   We
are of the view that once clearance has been given by  the  State  Pollution
Control Board, State Maritime Board as well as the Atomic Energy  Regulatory
Board for the vessel to beach for the purpose of dismantling, it has  to  be
presumed that the ship is free  from  all  hazardous  or  toxic  substances,
except for  such  substances  such  as  asbestos,  thermocol  or  electronic
equipment, which may be a part of  the  ship’s  superstructure  and  can  be
exposed only at the time of actual dismantling of  the  ship.   The  reports
have been submitted on the basis of actual inspection carried out  on  board
by  the  above-mentioned  authorities,  which  also  include   the   Customs
authorities.   The  Atomic  Energy  Regulatory  Board  has  come   up   with
suggestions regarding the removal of certain items of the  ship  during  its
dismantling.  The  suggestions  are  reasonable  and  look  to  balance  the
equities between the parties.


13.   We, therefore, dispose of the two IAs  which  we  have  taken  up  for
hearing and direct the concerned authorities to allow the ship  in  question
to beach and to permit the ship owner to proceed  with  the  dismantling  of
the ship, after complying with all the requirements of the Gujarat  Maritime
Board, the Gujarat Pollution Control  Board  and  Atomic  Energy  Regulatory
Board.  It is made clear that if any  toxic  wastes  embedded  in  the  ship
structure are discovered during its dismantling, the  concerned  authorities
shall take immediate steps for their disposal at the cost of  the  owner  of
the vessel, M/s Best Oasis Ltd., or its nominee or nominees.


14.   Before parting with the matter, we would like  to  emphasize  that  in
all future cases of  a  similar  nature,  the  concerned  authorities  shall
strictly comply with the norms laid down in  the  Basel  Convention  or  any
other subsequent provisions that may be adopted by  the  Central  Government
in  aid  of  a  clean  and  pollution  free  maritime  environment,   before
permitting entry of any vessel suspected to be carrying toxic and  hazardous
material into Indian territorial waters.

14.   There will be no order as to costs.



                                                     ………………………………………………………J.
                                     (ALTAMAS KABIR)


                                                     ………………………………………………………J.
                                     (J. CHELAMESWAR)
New Delhi
Dated: 30th July, 2012.