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Sunday, December 18, 2011

as related to the persons dying intestate and maternal aunts are excluded from succession.


THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO
AND
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.N.RAO NALLA

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.271 OF 2009

19.02.2010
BETWEEN:

Kavuri Lilliyamma, W/o.late Wilson
          … Appellant
          AND

K.S.Joshua, S/o.late Satyanandam
And others
… Respondents





THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO
AND
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.N.RAO NALLA

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.271 OF 2009

JUDGMENT(per Hon’ble Sri Justice V.V.S.Rao)
          In this appeal under Section 384 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 the maternal aunt of K.Jeevan Rao is the appellant seeking one-third share of Rs.12,91,614/- lying in deposit in the name of her nephew Jeevan Rao in State Bank of India, Maruturi Branch, Prakasam District, the seventh respondent herein. S.A.O.P.No.18 of 2000 was filed by respondents 1 to 6 herein under Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act for grant of succession certificate in their favour with regard to the Bank deposit and balance in savings account of Jeevan Rao.
          The following genealogy table would help understand the relationship between the parties.

Kommu Satyanandam

 


         Caleb                              David =                           K.S.Joshua

     (son - died)                   (son – died on 31.5.1994)                    (son – P1)
                                                    
                                         = (Mariyamma )
           (sons)                 (wife – died on 13.4.2003)
Vinay Kumar (P4)                                         Hemanth Kumar (P2)
Vijaya Chandra Bose (P5)                              Sahan Kumar  (P3)
Vidyasagar Kennedy (P6)
                                      Jeevan Rao
(unmarried son died on 23.6.2004 at the age of 36 years)
Mariyamma, Sundaramma and Sudarsanamma, (all of them died) and Lilliamma–appellant; herein are sisters. It is not disputed by the parties that Mariyamma was a Government employee. She worked as multipurpose health assistant (female) and retired on 31.05.1994. All the amounts she got towards retiral benefits were deposited by her in State Bank of India in the joint names of herself and her only son Jeevan Rao. Mariyamma died on 13.04.2003 and the Bank deposits stood transferred in the name of Jeevan Rao. He also died on 23.06.2004.
Joshua (Jeevan Rao’s paternal uncle), his two sons and three sons of late Caleb filed the succession O.P. Their case was that they are alone entitled to succeed to the estate of Jeevan Rao under Section 48 of the Indian succession Act, 1925 (Succession Act, for brevity) being relatives of father’s side. After publication of notice, Lilliyamma filed objection petition and she was impleaded as respondent No.2. She filed counter opposing the grant of succession in favour of respondents 1 to 6. Her case was that herself, Mariyamma, Sundaramma and Sudarsanamma are sisters, that after death of her three sisters, she is lone surviving heir and that she is entitled to 1/3rd share in the property left behind by Jeevan Rao.
In the enquiry before the Court below, fifth respondent gave evidence as P.W.1 besides marking thirty documents. Lilliyamma deposed as R.W.1.  On considering the evidence, the Court below came to the conclusion that respondents 1 to 6 are in the nearest degree of kindred to late Jeevan Rao and are entitled to succeed to his estate.  The Court relied on Section 48 of Succession Act.
Learned Counsel for appellant submits that the provisions in Part IV of Succession Act dealing with consanguinity do not make any distinction among lineal and collateral consanguinity and that the law does not make any distinction between the persons related to the deceased through mother or father.  Per contra, learned Counsel for respondents 1 to 6 placing reliance on Sections 24 to 28 and 48 of Succession Act submits that when relatives standing in nearer degree of kindred to deceased are available, and such persons are related to father, those related to deceased though the mother are not entitled to succeed to the property of a person dying intestate.  He placed reliance on Siril Christian v Monga Mura[1]Thevan K. v Mathukutty[2]Mary Dowling v Margaret Merwan[3] and Ajit Datt v Ethel Walters[4].

Relevant provisions of law

          In the matter of Christian intestate succession, the provisions in Parts IV and V of Succession Act constitute substantive law.  Part IX of Succession Act contains regulatory procedure for grant and revocation of succession certificate. Sections 24 to 27 of Succession Act read as under.
24. Kindred or consanguinity.-Kindred or consanguinity is the connection or relation of persons descended from the same stock or common ancestor.

25. Lineal consanguinity.-(1) Lineal consanguinity is that which subsists between two persons, one of whom is descended in a direct line from the other, as between a man and his father, grandfather and great-grandfather, and so upwards in the direct ascending line; or between a man and his son, grandson, great-grandson and so downwards in the direct descending line.
(2) Every generation constitutes a degree, either ascending or descending.
(3) A person's father is related to him in the first degree, and so likewise is his son; his grandfather and grandson in the second degree; his great-grandfather and great-grandson in the third degree, and so on.

26. Collateral consanguinity.-(1) Collateral consanguinity is that which subsists between two persons who are descended from the same stock or ancestor, but neither of whom is descended in a direct line from the other.
(2) For the purpose of ascertaining in what degree of kindred any collateral relative stands to a person deceased, it is necessary to reckon upwards from the person deceased to the common stock and then downwards to the collateral relative, a degree being allowed for each person, both ascending and descending.

27. Persons held for purpose of succession to be similarly related to deceased.-For the purpose of succession, there is no distinction—
(a)          between those who are related to a person deceased through his father, and those who are related to him through his mother; or
(b)           between those who are related to a person deceased by the full blood, and those who are related to him by the half blood; or
(c)           between those who were actually born in the lifetime of a person deceased and those who at the date of his death were only conceived in the womb, but who have been subsequently born alive.

Before we notice intestate succession and rules therefor in Chapters I and II to Part V of Succession Act, we need to understand the above provisions.  If persons descend from the common ancestor the connection or relation of persons who descended from the same common ancestor or stock is explained as kindred consanguinity.  If two persons descended in a direct line from the other or descended downwards they are related by lineal consanguinity and every ascending or descending generation constitutes a degree.  In relation to a person, father and son are related in the first degree whereas his grandfather and grandson are related in the second degree and great grandfather and great grandson third degree and so on.  The relationship between the two persons who descended from the same stock or ancestor but not in direct line from the other are said to be in collateral consanguinity.  Section 27 of Succession Act does not make any distinction between the persons related to a deceased through his father or mother, between those related to deceased by full-blood or half-blood and between those who are actually born in lifetime of the deceased and those who at the time of his death were in the womb and born alive latter.
Schedule I to Succession Act sets out the degrees of kindred and Section 28 of Succession Act explains the Schedule. For better understanding, we may set out Schedule I and then consider Section 28 of Succession Act.
 



4
Great
Grand father
 
Great Grand Uncle
 
 



            3                                   5
 


            2                                 4
Great Uncle’s son
 
 



            1                                  3                                5
The person whose relatives are to be reckoned
 
 


                                                 2                              
                                                                                 4                                 6
Nephew
 
Son
 
           

 

            1                                                                   3                                  5
Second Cousin
 
Son of the Cousin german
 
Son of the Nephew or Brother’s Grandson
 
Grandson
 
Grandson of the Cousin-german
 
 


            2
Great Grandson
 

          The above table is explained by three illustrations in Section 28 of Succession Act.  The person who dies intestate and whose relatives are to be reckoned for the purpose of succession is shown along with persons in the first, second, third and fourth degree in ascending order and persons in first, second and third degree in descending order.  In addition, it shows the persons, namely, uncle, first cousin, nephew, second cousin, son of second cousin and grandson of second cousin.  Thus the persons who are in direct line from the same stock and common ancestor are included in the table.  Further, among four degrees, grandson of brother and son of uncle are considered to be in equal degree being each four degrees removed and grandson of first cousin being in sixth degree of kindred.  Schedule I to Succession Act nowhere speaks of maternal aunts. But, having regard to Section 27(a) of Succession Act for the purpose of succession, there cannot be distinction between those who are related to the deceased through his father and those who are related through his mother. We may now notice the rules of intestate succession contained in Chapters I and II of Part V of Succession Act.
The property of the person dying intestate devolves upon the wife or husband or upon those who are of the kindred of the deceased in the order and according to the Rules contained in Chapter II Part V of Succession Act.  Section 33 contains the rule of succession when the intestate left behind a widow and lineal descendants.  Sections 34 to 40 deal with distribution of shares where there are lineal descendants and Sections 41 to 49 deal with distribution rules where there are no lineal descendants. These sections deal with different situations like where intestate’s father is living, father is dead but mother, brothers and children are living, a situation where along with mother, brother, sisters, children are living etc. Section 48 is relevant for this case and it deals with the situation where intestate has left neither lineal descendants nor parent nor brother nor sister. The same with its illustrations reads as under.
          48. Where intestate has left neither lineal descendant, nor parent, nor brother, nor sister.-Where the intestate has left neither lineal descendant, nor parent, nor brother, nor sister, his property shall be divided equally among those of his relatives who are in the nearest degree of kindred to him.

Illustrations

(i)                  A, the intestate, has left a grandfather, and a grandmother and no other relative standing in the same or a nearer degree of kindred to him. They, being in the second degree, will be entitled to the property in equal shares, exclusive of any uncle or aunt of the intestate, uncles and aunts being only in the third degree.
(ii)                A, the intestate, has left a great-grandfather, or a great- grandmother, and uncles and aunts, and no other relative standing in the same or a nearer degree of kindred to him. All of these being in the third degree will take equal shares.
(iii)             A, the intestate, left a great-grandfather, an uncle and a nephew, but no relative standing in a nearer degree of kindred to him. All of these being in the third degree will take equal shares.
(iv)              Ten children of one brother or sister of the intestate, and one child of another brother or sister of the intestate, constitute the class of relatives of the nearest degree of kindred to him. They will each take one-eleventh of the property.

          The four illustrations are indeed the rules of succession where deceased has no lineal descendants, parents or siblings. In other words, it deals with succession of intestate property by those related to the deceased by lineal or collateral consanguinity. From the table in Schedule I, all those mentioned in the first vertical column, are related to the deceased by lineal consanguinity and in vertical column 2 and thereafter are related to the deceased by collateral consanguinity having descended from the same stock or ancestor.  One has to keep this in mind to appreciate the four specific rules of succession, in case where only collateral consanguinous heirs (respondents) survive the deceased. Before further analysing Section 48, we may refer to the case law.
          In Siril Christian (supra), a Division Bench of Assam High Court was concerned with a question whether Hindu paternal uncle of the deceased Christian could inherit the property of the intestate. On the construction of Sections 41 to 48 of the Succession Act, the Division Bench held that such “wide proposition receives no support from any of the provisions of Succession Act” and observed as below.
          Section 41 lays down that where an intestate has left no lineal descendants, the rules for the distribution of his property shall be those contained in Sections 42 to 48. Section 42 lays down that if the intestate’s father is living, he shall succeed to the property, Section 43 lays down that if the intestate’s father is dead, but the intestate’s mother is living and there are also brothers or sisters of the intestate living and there is no child living of any deceased brother or sister, the mother and each living brother or sister shall succeed to the property in equal shares. Section 48 lays down that where the intestate has left neither lineal descendant, nor parent, nor brother, nor sister, his property shall be divided equally among those of his relatives who are in the nearest degree of kindred to him.
          None of these provisions contain any limitation based on religion. If it was the intention of the Parliament when enacting the Indian Succession Act, to exclude from succession persons of non-Christian denomination or religion, that important circumstance and fact would have found a place in Succession Act itself. On the other hand, a careful reading of the various provisions of Succession Act shows that succession or a right to succeed to the property is dependent on relationship and consanguinity.
(emphasis supplied)

          In Thevan K (supra), Kerala High Court held that Indian Succession Act does not disentitle a non-Christian to inhere the property of Christian if former is a person kindred to the deceased. It was also observed that the religion of the claimant is not the crucial fact but it is the religion of the person dying intestate whose relations are to be reckoned for the purpose of succession.  In Mary Dowling (supra), a question arose whether a sister through a different mother is entitled to succeed the estate of her stepbrother. Referring to General Manager, Gwalior Sugar Co. v Srilal[5] and Arokyathammal v Mookayee alias Arokyathammal[6], S.N.Variava,J (as His Lordship then was) held as under.
          Part IV of the Succession Act lays down that for purposes of succession there must be a relationship by blood. Before a person can claim to be an heir there must be some relationship through a common ancestor or from the same stock. Section 27 makes no difference to this rule. Section 27 also recognises the fact that there must be a relationship through a common ancestor or through a common stock. There can be no doubt that Section 27 would also govern Part V of the said Act. … To that extent, I do not accept the submission of Mr.Khambatta that Section 27 canot apply to cases under Section 37. However, what Mr.Kini’s submissions fails to realise is that under Section 27(b), the relationship must be a “relationship with the deceased”. Therefore, when Section 27(b) talks of full blood or half blood, it refers to relationship by full blood or half blood with the deceased.
(emphasis supplied)

          In Ajit Datt (supra), a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court considered and held that, “an adopted son of Christian of Hindu origin comes within the purview of ‘lineal descendant’ or ‘lineal consanguinity’ and is entitled to inherit under Section 37 of the Indian Succession Act. In his concurring opinion, S.R.Singh, J held that, “adoption by a Christian couple of Hindu origin is neither opposed to any public policy nor interdicted by any statutory law or principle and philosophy of Christianity.”  The decision is not much of assistance.  Other three decisions referred to above, took the view that unless a person is related to the intestate by blood, such person cannot be treated as lineal descendant or lineal consanguinity. Indeed, Bombay High Court has taken a view that the relationship must be relationship with the deceased by blood, and that there must be relationship through a common ancestor or through a common stock. Therefore, a maternal aunt who is either younger or elder sister of the mother or mother’s cousin cannot be treated as being in relationship through a common ancestor or a common stock.  In the case of paternal aunt, there being a relationship through common ancestor or common stock, the things would be different. As we presently discuss, this is made clear by the special rules of succession contain in Section 48, which deals with the intestate succession when the person has not left any lineal descendant or parents or siblings.
          Section 48 contains – as noticed supra; four rules of succession, which are incorporated in a statute by way of illustrations. Rule 1 is a case, which speaks of the intestate succession by grandfather and grandmother being in second degree. They would be entitled to the property in equal shares exclusive of any uncle or aunt of the intestate, uncles and aunts being only in a third degree. This rule of succession is again subject to the condition contained in Illustration ‘A’ to the effect that, “no other relative standing in the same or a nearer degree of kindred to him”. It is also subject to the main provision, which stipulates that, “property shall be divided equally among those of his relatives who are in the nearest degree of kindred to him. This only means that in addition to grandfather and grandmother, if the deceased has left behind any relative in nearer degree kindred to him, the things would be different and the rule will not apply. Who will succeed to the property of the intestate would depend on the various rules contained in Sections 32 to 47.  Rule 2 enables great grandfather or great grandmother and uncles and aunts to succeed to his property. This is again where there are no other relative standing in the same or nearer degree of kindred to him. Rule 3 contemplates a situation where the person left great grandfather and an uncle and a nephew in which case all of them take equal shares. This is again subject to the same rule as in Rules 1 and 2. If there is any relative standing nearer degree, the rule will not apply. Rule 4 i.e., Illustration IV contains rule of succession when the children of brother and sister survive the deceased. It is interesting to note that though the four rules in Section 48 visualises a situation where the deceased is survived by grandfather, grandmother, great grandfather. Great grandmother includes aunts, nephews and children of brothers and sisters, nowhere contemplates a rule as to succession by the sister of predeceased mother. Therefore, Section 48 or other rules in Chapter II as held by Bombay High Court in Mary Dowling (supra) are subject to the Rules in Part IV. So reading all the provisions together, it becomes clear that unless any of the relative is related through common ancestor or through common stock and also related by blood, no person can claim to be nearer degree of kindred of deceased. The maternal aunt thus is not one of the heirs contemplated under Section 27 or 48 of the Succession Act.
          Counsel for appellant does not dispute that illustration (i), (iii) and (iv), have no application to the facts of the case. According to him, as there is no great grandfather or great grandmother, uncles and aunts take equal share and as Section 27 of Succession Act does not distinguish the persons related through mother or father, the maternal aunt is also entitled equally along with uncles of Jeevan Rao and his cousins.  We are not able to accept the submission on a true construction of Sections 24 to 27, 32 and 48 of Succession Act.  Uncles and aunts referred to in Rule 2 under Section 48 [illustration (ii)] means and refers to uncles and aunts related through marriage of the deceased and certainly excludes the maternal aunt. Secondly, the uncles and aunts in Rule 2 under Section 48 of Succession Act refers to those in lineal consanguinity being descendants in a direct line or in collateral consanguinity being descendants from the same stock of ancestors.  The paternal uncles and first cousins fall in these two categories but a maternal aunt having no descendancy from direct line or common stock can never be treated as the relative governed by Section 48(ii) of Succession Act.    There is yet another reason for this conclusion.  A careful reading of illustrations (i) to (iii) would show that all the rules would be attracted and are applied only where there is no other relative standing in a nearer degree of kindred to the deceased.  This only means that if there are relatives who are in nearer degree, those relatives in a distant degree are not entitled to succeed.  As between paternal uncles and first cousins who are in the nearer degree, a maternal aunt is certainly not entitled to succession even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that illustration (ii) of Section 48 of Succession Act is attracted to the case.
          In this connection, we may conveniently refer to the position in Administration of Estates Act 1925, as applicable to intestate succession in English Law, which deals with intestate succession[7].  Part IV thereof provides for the manner in which the estate is to be distributed and provides for six possibilities.  These are somewhat similar to the possibilities or situations, which may arise in matters of intestate succession in India.  These are as follows.
“(i) The deceased is not survived by spouse but by children, grandchildren:
If the deceased is survived by children and not a wife, entire estate to the exclusion of other relatives will go to the children (lineal descendants).
(ii) The deceased is survived by both, spouse and children: If the deceased is survived by legally married wife and children, they take the property between them to the exclusion of any other relative.
(iii) The deceased is not survived by children but by wife, by a parent, by a brother or sister of the whole-blood or by children of brother or sister of the whole-blood.  The wife is entitled to personally belongings of the deceased absolutely in addition to statutory legacy to a sum not exceeding 200,000 Pounds and interest thereon.  In the other properties – both movable and immovable; the wife would be entitled to one–half of the balance absolutely.  If parents survive, they take the balance absolutely and in their absence, brothers and sisters of whole-blood would take the share, which their parents would have taken.
(iv) The deceased is survived by spouse but not by children or by parent or by brother or sister of the whole-blood or by children of brother or sister.  In this scenario, the surviving spouse takes the entire residuary estate absolutely regardless of its size.
(v) If the deceased is survived neither by spouse nor by issue but is survived by a specified relative, grandparents or some one who descended from grandparents or specified relatives.  The distant relatives such as second cousin are not specified relatives.  The residuary estate of the intestate is held in trust for the specified relatives of the intestate in the following order.
(a)    Parents: Surviving parents take equal shares absolutely and if one parent survives, such parent takes absolutely.
(b)    Brothers and sisters of the whole-blood.
(c)     Brothers and sisters of the half-blood.
(d)    Grandparents: Surviving parents take in equal shares absolutely.
(e)     Uncles and Aunts of the whole-blood: An uncle or aunt of the whole-blood must be a brother or sister of the whole-blood of the parent of the intestate i.e., an uncle or aunt related by birth and not by marriage.
(f)      Uncles and aunts of half-blood: Such an uncle or aunt must be a brother or sister of half-blood of a parent of the intestate.
Any of the above, who takes vested interest under particular paragraph excludes any one filing under a later paragraph.  For example, if grandparents are surviving, they take the property absolutely to the exclusion of uncles and aunts of the whole-blood.  If uncles and aunts of whole-blood are surviving, they take the property to the exclusion of uncles and aunts of the half-blood, which are related by marriage.
(vi)                 The deceased leaves no surviving spouse and no issue or other relative of the intestate, who attains a vested interest, as described above.  In this situation, the State takes the entire estate as bona vacantia.”

          Thus even in England, uncles and aunts related by marriage are alone considered as related to the persons dying intestate and maternal aunts are excluded from succession.  Therefore, we do not find any merit in the appeal.  We accordingly dismiss the same with costs.
         
_______________
(V.V.S.RAO, J)


____________________
(B.N.RAO NALLA, J)
19.2.2010
pln



[1] AIR 1964 Assam 58
[2] AIR 1990 NOC 47 (Kerala)
[3] AIR 1991 Bom 389
[4] AIR 2001 All 109
[5] AIR 1958 MP 133
[6] AIR 1959 Madras 180
[7] ‘English Private Law’ edited by Prof. Peter Birks, OUP 2000 – pp.512–519.

Registration Act, 1908: s.49, proviso - Unregistered sale deed is admissible in evidence in a suit for specific performance of the contract - Evidence Act, 1872 - Specific performance - Transfer of property Act, 1882. The question which arose for consideration in the present appeal was whether the courts below erred in holding that an unregistered sale deed was not admissible in evidence in a suit for specific performance of the contract. =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: The Trial Court erred in not admitting the unregistered sale deed in evidence in view of the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 and the High Court ought to have corrected the said error by setting aside the order of the trial court. The main provision in Section 49 provides that any document which is required to be registered, if not registered, shall not affect any immovable property comprised therein nor such document shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property. Proviso, however, would show that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by 1908 Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered may be received as an evidence to the contract in a suit for specific performance or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. By virtue of proviso, therefore, an unregistered sale deed of an immovable property of the value of Rs. 100/- and more could be admitted in evidence as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance of the contract. Such an unregistered sale deed can also be admitted in evidence as an evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered document. When an unregistered sale deed is tendered in evidence, not as evidence of a completed sale, but as proof of an oral agreement of sale, the deed can be received in evidence making an endorsement that it is received only as evidence of an oral agreement of sale under the proviso to Section 49 of 1908 Act. By admission of an unregistered sale deed in evidence in a suit for specific performance as evidence of contract, none of the provisions of 1908 Act is affected; rather court acts in consonance with proviso appended to Section 49 of 1908 Act. [Paras 8, 11, 16] [519-C-D; 521-A-E; 525-B] K.B. Saha and Sons Private Limited v. Development Consultant Limited (2008) 8 SCC 564, relied on. Kalavakurti Venkata Subbaiah v. Bala Gurappagari Guruvi Reddy (1999) 7 SCC 114, referred to. Case Law Reference: (2008) 8 SCC 564 relied on Para 12 (1999) 7 SCC 114 referred to Para 13 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3192 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 13.11.2008 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in C.R.P.(PD) No. 261 of 2008. K.V. Vishwanathan, B. Rajunath, Vijay Kumar for the Appellant. T.S.R. Venkatramana, G.S. Mani, R. Satish for the Respondents.



                                                    REPORTABLE






                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3192 OF 2010
              [Arising out of SLP (C) No. 1451 of 2009]




S. Kaladevi                                         .... Appellant


                                 Vs.


V.R. Somasundaram & Ors.                          ....Respondents








                               JUDGMENT






R.M. LODHA,J.




              Leave granted.


2.            The short question is one of admissibility of an


unregistered sale deed in a suit for specific performance of the


contract.


3.            The appellant and the respondents are plaintiff and


defendant nos. 1, 2 and 3 respectively in the suit presented in the


Court of Subordinate Judge, Gobichettipalayam. The plaintiff in


the suit claimed for the reliefs of directing the    defendants to


                                                                 1
execute a fresh sale deed with regard to the suit property in


pursuance of an agreement for sale dated 27.02.2006 on or before


the date that may be fixed by the court and failing which execution


of the sale deed by the court.        She also prayed for grant of


permanent injunction restraining the defendants from disturbing


with her peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property.


4.            According to the plaintiff, 1st defendant for himself, as


the guardian father of 3rd defendant and 2nd defendant jointly


entered into an oral agreement with her on 27.02.2006 to sell the


suit property for a consideration of Rs. 1,83,000/-. It was agreed


that the sale deed, in pursuance of the oral agreement for sale,


would be executed and registered on the same day. The plaintiff


purchased the stamp papers; paid the entire sale consideration to


the defendants; the defendants put the plaintiff in possession of


the suit property and also executed a sale deed in her favour. On


27.02.2006 itself,     the said sale deed was taken to the Sub-


Registrar's office. The Sub-Registrar, however, informed that in


view of an order of attachment of the suit property the sale deed


could not be registered.        The sale deed, thus, could not be


registered.       The defendant nos. 1 and 2 then promised the


plaintiff that they would amicably settle the matter with the


concerned party who had obtained attachment of the suit property


                                                                    2
and get the sale deed registered no sooner the attachment was


raised. The plaintiff averred that she called upon the defendants to


get the sale deed registered, but the defendants avoided the same


by putting forth the reason that attachment in respect of the suit


property was subsisting.      On 04.02.2007 however, the plaintiff


called upon defendant nos. 1 and 2 to cooperate in getting the sale


deed registered, but instead of doing that            the defendants


attempted to interfere with her possession and enjoyment of the


suit property necessitating action by way of suit.


5.          The 1st defendant filed written statement and traversed


plaintiff's case. He denied having entered into an oral agreement


for sale with the plaintiff for himself and as a guardian father of 3rd


defendant and the 2nd defendant jointly on 27.02.2006 as alleged.


He also denied having delivered physical possession of the suit


property to the plaintiff. The 1st defendant set up the defence that


he   had   taken    loan   from   one    Subramaniam      and    when


Subramaniam demanded the repayment thereof, he approached


plaintiff and requested her to lend Rs. 1,75,000/- as loan. Upon


plaintiff's insistence that 1st defendant should execute an


agreement for sale in her favour, he and the 2nd defendant signed


the document believing that to be agreement for sale on


27.02.2006 and went to the office of Sub-Registrar for getting the


                                                                    3
agreement for sale registered. However, when the Sub-Registrar


asked the 1st defendant whether the consideration has been


received and sale deed could be registered, he and the 2nd


defendant learnt that plaintiff had fraudulently obtained the


signatures on sale deed by falsely stating that it was only an


agreement for sale and hence they went away refusing to agree


for the registration of the said document.


6.          On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the issues


were struck.    It appears that on 05.12.2007 at the time of


examination of PW. 1,          the unregistered sale deed dated


27.02.2006 was tendered for being marked. The counsel for the


defendants objected to the said document being admitted in


evidence being an unregistered sale deed. The trial court by its


order dated 11.12.2007 sustained the objection and refused to


admit the sale deed in evidence.


7.          The plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged the order of the


trial court dated 11.12.2007 by filing revision petition before the


High Court and hence this appeal by special leave.


8.          After having heard Mr. K. V. Vishwanathan, learned


senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. T.S.R. Venkatramana,


learned counsel for the respondents, we are of the opinion that


having regard to the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act,


                                                                  4
1908 (for short, `1908 Act'), the trial court erred in not admitting the


unregistered sale deed dated 27.02.2006 in evidence and the High


Court ought to have corrected the said error by setting aside the


order of the trial court.


9.           Mr. T.S.R. Venkatramana, learned counsel for the


respondents, however, strenuously urged that 1908 Act is a


complete code by itself and is a special law and, therefore, any


dispute regarding the registration, including the refusal to register


by any party, is covered by the provisions of that Act and the


remedy can be worked out under it only.       He referred to Sections


71 to 77 of the 1908 Act and submitted that refusal to register a


document by a party is exhaustively dealt with by the said


provisions and the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for


short, `1963 Act') cannot be and should not be invoked in a case of


failure to register a document which is complete in other respects,


except for want of registration.          Learned counsel for the


respondents submitted that the defendants           refused to admit


execution of the said document before the concerned Sub-


Registrar because of the fraud played by the appellant (plaintiff)


inasmuch as instead of writing an agreement to sell, she got


executed a full fledged sale deed contrary to the agreement and


understanding.     The defendants accordingly walked out of the


                                                                     5
office of Sub-Registrar without admitting the execution of the sale


deed and under these circumstances the only remedy available to


the appellant was to get an endorsement "registration refused" and


then file an application before the Registrar under Section 73 of


the 1908 Act.      He also referred to Section 3 of 1963 Act and


submitted that the provisions of 1963 Act would not override the


provisions of 1908 Act.


10.         Section 17 of 1908 Act is a disabling section.           The


documents defined in clauses (a) to (e) therein require registration


compulsorily.     Accordingly, sale of immovable property of the


value of Rs. 100/- and more requires compulsory registration. Part


X of the 1908 Act deals with the effects of registration and non-


registration.   Section 49 gives teeth to Section 17 by providing


effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered.


Section 49 reads thus:






            "S.49.- Effect of non-registration of documents
            required to be registered.- No document required
            by section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of
            Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered shall
            -


            (a)      affect any immovable property comprised
                     therein, or


            (b)      confer any power to adopt, or








                                                                      6
          (c)      be received as evidence of any transaction
                    affecting such property or conferring such
                    power,




           unless it has been registered:


                  Provided that an unregistered document
           affecting immovable property and required by this
           Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882),
           to be registered may be received as evidence of a
           contract in a suit for specific performance under
           Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (3 of
           1877), or as evidence of any collateral transaction
           not required to be effected by registered instrument."






11.        The main provision in Section 49 provides that any


document which is required to be registered, if not registered, shall


not affect any immovable property comprised therein nor such


document shall be received as evidence of any transaction


affecting such property. Proviso, however, would show that an


unregistered document affecting immovable property and required


by 1908 Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered


may be received as an evidence to the contract in a suit for


specific performance or as evidence of any collateral transaction


not required to be effected by registered instrument. By virtue of


proviso, therefore, an unregistered sale deed of an immovable


property of the value of Rs. 100/- and more could be admitted in


evidence as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific


performance of the contract. Such an unregistered sale deed can
                                                                    7
also be admitted in evidence as an evidence of any collateral


transaction not required to be effected by registered document.


When an unregistered sale deed is tendered in evidence, not as


evidence of a completed sale, but as proof of an oral agreement of


sale, the deed can be received in evidence making an


endorsement that it is received only as evidence of an oral


agreement of sale under the proviso to Section 49 of 1908 Act.






12.               Recently in the case of K.B. Saha and Sons Private


Limited v. Development Consultant Limited1, this Court noticed the


following statement of Mulla in his Indian Registration Act, 7th


Edition, at page 189:-








                  "......The     High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay,
                  Allahabad, Madras, Patna, Lahore, Assam, Nagpur,
                  Pepsu, Rajasthan, Orissa, Rangoon and Jammu &
                  Kashmir; the former Chief Court of Oudh; the Judicial
                  Commissioner's Court at Peshawar, Ajmer and
                  Himachal Pradesh and the Supreme Court have held
                  that a document which requires registration under
                  Section 17 and which is not admissible for want of
                  registration to prove a gift or mortgage or sale or
                  lease is nevertheless admissible to prove the
                  character of the possession of the person who holds
                  under it......"








1
    (2008) 8 SCC 564
                                                                          8
This Court then culled out the following principles:-




                  "1.   A document required to be registered, if
                        unregistered is not admissible into evidence
                        under Section 49 of the Registration Act.


                  2.    Such unregistered document can however be
                        used as an evidence of collateral purpose as
                        provided in the proviso to Section 49 of the
                        Registration Act.


                  3.    A collateral transaction must be independent
                        of, or divisible from, the transaction to effect
                        which the law required registration.


                  4.    A collateral transaction must be a transaction
                        not itself required to be effected by a
                        registered document, that is, a transaction
                        creating, etc. any right, title or interest in
                        immovable property of the value of one
                        hundred rupees and upwards.


                  5. If a document is inadmissible in evidence for want
                     of registration, none of its terms can be admitted
                     in evidence and that to use a document for the
                     purpose of proving an important clause would not
                     be using it as a collateral purpose."






To the aforesaid principles, one more principle may be added,


namely, that a document required to be registered, if unregistered,


can be admitted in evidence as evidence of a contract in a suit for


specific performance.






13.               In Kalavakurti Venkata Subbaiah v. Bala Gurappagari


Guruvi Reddy2, the question presented before this Court was


2
    (1999) 7 SCC 114
                                                                           9
whether a decree to enforce the registration of sale deed could be


granted. That was a case where respondent therein filed a suit for


specific performance seeking a direction to register the sale deed.


The contention of the appellant, however, was that decree for


specific performance based on unregistered sale deed could not


be granted. This Court noticed the provisions contained in Part XII


of 1908 Act, particularly Section 77, and difference          of opinion


between the various High Courts on the aspect and observed:-


             "The difference of opinion amongst the various
             High Courts on this aspect of the matter is that
             Section 77 of the Act is a complete code in itself
             providing for the enforcement of a right to get a
             document registered by filing a civil suit which but
             for the special provision of that section could not be
             maintainable. Several difficulties have been
             considered in these decisions, such as, when the
             time has expired since the date of the execution of
             the document whether there could be a decree to
             direct the Sub-Registrar to register the document.
             On the other hand, it has also been noticed that an
             agreement for transfer of property implies a
             contract not only to execute the deed of transfer
             but also to appear before the registering officer and
             to admit execution thereby facilitating the
             registration of the document wherever it is
             compulsory. The provisions of the Specific Relief
             Act and the Registration Act may to a certain extent
             cover the same field but so that one will not
             supersede the other. Where the stage indicated in
             Section 77 of the Act has reached and no other
             relief except a direction for registration of the
             document is really asked for, Section 77 of the Act
             may be an exclusive remedy. However, in other
             cases it has no application, inasmuch as a suit for
             specific performance is of a wider amplitude and is
             primarily one for enforcement of a contract and
             other consequential or further relief. If a party is
             seeking not merely the registration of a sale deed,
                                                                      10
            but also recovery of possession and mesne profits
             or damages, a suit under Section 77 of the Act is
             not an adequate remedy."






14.         This Court then held that the first appellate court rightly


took the view that under Section 49 of the 1908 Act, unregistered


sale deed could be received in evidence to prove the agreement


between the parties though it may not itself constitute a contract to


transfer the property. It was held:






            "......The document has not been presented by the
            respondent to the Sub-Registrar at all for registration
            although the sale deed is stated to have been
            executed by the appellant as he refuses to cooperate
            with him in that regard. Therefore, various stages
            contemplated under Section 77 of the Act have not
            arisen in the present case at all. We do not think, in
            such a case when the vendor declines to appear
            before the Sub-Registrar, the situation contemplated
            under Section 77 of the Act would arise. It is only on
            presentation of a document the other circumstances
            would arise. The first appellate court rightly took the
            view that under Section 49 of the Act the sale deed
            could be received in evidence to prove the
            agreement between the parties though it may not
            itself constitute a contract to transfer the property.....
            ".






15.          The issue before us is only with regard to the


admissibility of unregistered sale deed dated 27.2.2006 in


evidence and, therefore, it is neither appropriate nor necessary for


us to consider the contention raised by learned counsel for the




                                                                         11
respondents about the maintainability of suit as framed by the


plaintiff or the circumstances in which the sale deed was executed.


If any issue in that regard has been struck by the trial court,


obviously, such issue would be decided in accordance with law.


Suffice, however, to say that looking to the nature of the suit, which


happens to be a suit for specific performance, the trial court was


not justified in refusing to admit the unregistered sale deed dated


27.2.2006 tendered by the plaintiff in evidence.


16.         The argument of learned counsel for the respondents


with regard to Section 3(b) of 1963 Act is noted to be rejected.


We fail to understand how the said provision helps the


respondents as the said provision provides that nothing in 1963


Act shall be deemed to affect the operation of 1908 Act, on


documents.     By admission of an unregistered sale deed in


evidence in a suit for specific performance as evidence of contract,


none of the provisions of 1908 Act is affected; rather court acts in


consonance with proviso appended to Section 49 of 1908 Act.


17.         The result is that appeal is allowed, the order of the


High Court dated 13.11.2008 and that of the trial court dated


11.12.2007 are set aside.         The trial court shall mark the


unregistered sale deed dated 27.2.2006 tendered by the plaintiff in








                                                                    12
her evidence and proceed with the suit accordingly.        The parties


shall bear their own costs.






                                     ....................................J.
                                        [R.V. RAVEENDRAN]








                                     ....................................J.
                                              [R.M. LODHA]




NEW DELHI
APRIL 12, 2010.








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