LAW FOR ALL

PROMOTION = Seniority was only to be taken into consideration where merit and ability of two eligible candidates was found to be approximately equal. This would lead us to yet another relevant inference on the issue in hand. In the above view of the matter, every claim for onward promotion from the post of Motor Vehicles Inspector (Grade II) was liable to be considered on the basis of merit. Therefore, an individual with superior merit would steal a march over those less meritorious. Thus viewed, if respondent no.5, K.V. Karthalingan, was actually possessed of outstanding and exceptional merit, as is sought to be suggested, he would have stolen a march over his seniors even under the existing Special Rules. Thus viewed, even by the manner/method of onward progression postulated in the Special Rules, a person with conspicuous merit and ability (as postulated under Rule 36(b)(ii) of the General Rules), would overtake others without having to invoke Rule 36(b)(ii) of the General Rules. This does not seem to have happened in case of respondent no. 5, K.V. Karthalingan. On his consideration, after he had acquired eligibility for promotion to the post of Motor Vehicles Inspector (Grade I), he was promoted as such only on 10.5.2000. The merit and ability possessed by respondent no. 5, K.V. Karthalingan, is not shown to have resulted in his having superseded other members of the cadre senior to them. For the instant reason also, reliance placed by respondent no. 5, K.V. Karthalingan, for out of turn/accelerated promotion under Rule 36(b)(ii) of the General Rules deserves outright rejection. We find it difficult to appreciate the approach of the Administrative Tribunal, as also, the High Court. The simple reason depicted in the State Government’s order dated 8.12.1998 was, that the instances of extraordinary service relied upon by respondent no. 5, K.V. Karthalingan, to claim out of turn/accelerated promotion, could not be treated as exceptional or unprecedented, as such instances were common in the Transport Department. Even though respondent no. 5, K.V. Karthalingan, had not disputed the aforesaid factual position, it is difficult to understand how the Administrative Tribunal, as also, the High Court had accepted the claim of respondent no. 5, K.V. Karthalingan, by concluding that he had actually rendered extraordinary and exemplary service. Since the factual assertion made by the State Government in its order dated 8.12.1998, had remained unrebutted, we are of the view, that the Administrative Tribunal, as also, the High Court, were wholly unjustified in recording such a conclusion. For the instant reason also, the impugned orders dated 10.7.2002 (passed by the Administrative Tribunal) and 13.10.2004 (passed by the High Court) deserve to be set aside. 30. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find merit in the various contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants. The order passed by the Administrative Tribunal on 10.7.2002 (while disposing of Original Application no. 429 of 2002) and the order passed by the High Court on 13.10.2004 (while disposing of Writ Petition (Civil) no. 21562 of 2003) directing the promotion of respondent no. 5, K.V. Karthalingan, to the post of Regional Transport Officer, are clearly unsustainable. They are accordingly hereby set aside. 31. Allowed in the aforesaid terms.