LAW FOR ALL

whether provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable in respect of revision petition filed in the High Court under Section 81 of the Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the 'VAT Act').=there was no provision under the Cr.P.C. from which legislative intent to exclude Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be discerned and, therefore, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was taken aid of. Similar situation prevailed in Anshuman Shukla's case. On the contrary, in the instant case, a scrutiny of the scheme of VAT Act goes to show that it is a complete code not only laying down the forum but also prescribing the time limit within which each forum would be competent to entertain the appeal or revision. The underlying object of the Act appears to be not only to shorten the length of the proceedings initiated under the different provisions contained therein, but also to ensure finality of the decision made there under. The fact that the period of limitation described therein has been equally made applicable to the assessee as well as the revenue lends ample credence to such a conclusion. We, therefore, unhesitantly hold that the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to a proceeding under Section 81(1) of the VAT Act stands excluded by necessary implication, by virtue of the language employed in section 84. The High Court has rightly pointed out the well settled principle of law that “the court cannot interpret the statute the way they have developed the common law ‘which in a constitutional sense means judicially developed equity'. In abrogating or modifying a rule of the common law the court exercises the same power of creation that built up the common law through its existence by the judges of the past. The court can exercise no such power in respect of statue, therefore, in the task of interpreting and applying a statue, Judges have to be conscious that in the end the statue is the master not the servant of the judgment and no judge has a choice between implementing it and disobeying it.” What, therefore, follows is that the court cannot interpret the law in such a manner so as to read into the Act an inherent power of condoning the delay by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 so as to supplement the provisions of the VAT Act which excludes the operation of Section 5 by necessary implications. We, thus, do not find any infirmity in the judgment rendered by the High Court. The present appeals are devoid of any merit and are, accordingly, dismissed.