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Showing posts with label IPC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IPC. Show all posts
Tuesday, May 6, 2014

culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, IPC, - In the absence of motive to cause death and the injuries too never disclosed as that of such a fatal one to cause death and when the injuries were caused in spur of movement on sudden fight - it is not murder punishable under sec.302 but punishable under sec.304 not amounting to murder - The evidence produced against the accused does not show that the accused had any motive to cause death of the deceased or have intended to cause such bodily injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased. Evidence on record also does not establish that the injuries caused on the body of the deceased must in all probability cause his death or likely to cause his death. On the spur of the moment, during the heat of exchange of words accused caused injuries on the body of the deceased which caused his death. Therefore, the ingredients of the murder as defined in Section 300, IPC, have not been established against the accused. In our opinion, the accused was guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, IPC, and considering the fact that the accused had no intention to either cause the death of the deceased or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death of the deceased, it would be sufficient to impose on accused a sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment and to impose on him a fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, a further imprisonment of six months.= MANJEET SINGH … APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH … RESPONDENT = 2014 (April. Part)http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41473

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   culpable  homicide  not  amounting  to  murder under Section 304, IPC, -   In the absence of motive to cause death and the injuries too ...
Saturday, March 16, 2013

Sections 304B and 498A, IPC= In the alternative, the Trial Court and the High Court could have sought for an expert's opinion under Section 45 of the Evidence Act on whether the handwriting and signature were that of the deceased. But unfortunately, neither the Trial Court nor the High Court have resorted to these provisions of the Evidence Act and instead by their own imaginary reasoning disbelieved the defence of the appellant that Ext.D19 could not have been written by the deceased.- “While cleaning our house we found a chit on our dressing table. The said chit was written by my wife and it is in her handwriting and it also contains her signature. Ex. D 19 is the said chit. I identified the handwriting of my wife in Ex. D19 because my wife used to write chits for purchasing of monthly provisions as such on tallying the said chit and Ex. D19 I came to know that it was written by my wife only. Immediately I took the Ex. D19 to the P.S. Mangalhat and asked them to receive but they refused to take the same.” From the aforesaid evidence, it is clear that while cleaning the house the appellant came across a chit written in the handwriting of his wife and containing her signature. This chit has been marked as Ext. D19 and the appellant has identified the handwriting and signature of the deceased in Ext. D19 which is written in Hindi. The English translation of Ext.D19 reproduced in the impugned judgment of the High Court is extracted hereinbelow: “I, Meenakshi W/o Vipin Kumar, do hereby execute and commit to writing this in my sound mind, consciousness and senses and with my free will and violation to the effect that nobody is responsible for my death. My parents family members have harassed much to my husband. I am taking this step as I have fed up with his life. Due to me the quarrels are taking place here, as such I want to end my life and I beg to pardon by all.” It appears from Ext. D19 that the deceased has written the chit according to her free will saying that nobody was responsible for her death and that her parents and family members have harassed her husband and she was taking the step as she was fed up with her life and because of her quarrels were taking place. 8. When the appellant, who is the husband of the deceased, has said in his evidence as DW1 that the aforesaid chit (Ext. D19) has been written by the deceased herself and has been signed by her and it also appears from his evidence quoted above that he was acquainted with her handwriting and signature, the Trial Court and the High Court could have recorded a finding one way or the other by comparing her handwriting and signature with some of her other handwritings and signatures under Section 73 of the Evidence Act. In the alternative, the Trial Court and the High Court could have sought for an expert's opinion under Section 45 of the Evidence Act on whether the handwriting and signature were that of the deceased. But unfortunately, neither the Trial Court nor the High Court have resorted to these provisions of the Evidence Act and instead by their own imaginary reasoning disbelieved the defence of the appellant that Ext.D19 could not have been written by the deceased. 9. In our considered opinion, the evidence of DW1 (the appellant) and Ext.D19 cast a reasonable doubt on the prosecution story that the deceased was subjected to harassment or cruelty in connection with demand of dowry. In our view, onus was on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the ingredient of Section 498A, IPC and the essential ingredient of offence under Section 498A is that the accused, as the husband of the deceased, has subjected her to cruelty as defined in the Explanation to Section 498A, IPC. Similarly, for the Court to draw the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act that the appellant had caused dowry death as defined in Section 304B, IPC, the prosecution has to prove besides the demand of dowry, harassment or cruelty caused by the accused to the deceased soon before her death. Since the prosecution has not been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt this ingredient of harassment or cruelty, neither of the offences under Sections 498A and 304B, IPC has been made out by the prosecution. 10. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and that of the Trial Court and direct that the bail bond furnished by the appellant shall stand discharged.

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Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 1431 OF 2007 VIPIN JAISWAL(...
Friday, February 15, 2013

Sections 306 and 498A, IPC -whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the 18Page 19 society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.” 15. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and the judgment of the trial court holding the appellant guilty of the offences under Sections 306 and 498A, IPC and direct that the bail bonds executed by the appellant be discharged.

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Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 985 of 2004 Atmaram s/o Raysingh ...