LAW FOR ALL

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976+ Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 19993 = Family of the said Parsottambhai Patel - declared surplus/excessland to the tune of 12385 square meters. - itwill be acquired as andwhen required by the Government and till then, the holders may continue to remain in possession thereof.-Thereafter, on 8.3.1985/21.3.1985, a notification under Section 10(1) of the 1976 Act was issued proposing acquisition of surplus/excess land. -an application for exemption under Section 21 of the 1976 Act was filed byAmbalal Parsottambhai Patel and Tribhovandas Chotabhai Patel on 22.8.1985. While the said application under Section 21 was pending consideration, notification under Section10(5) of the 1976 Act came to be issued on 17.12.1985 to handover possession of the vacant land. -The application filed by the land owners under Section 21 ofthe1976 Act came to be rejected on 15.12.1986.-During the pendency of the remanded proceedings (arisingfrom application under Section 21), the repeal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 19993 came into force from 30.3.1999. The land owners then filed an application dated 30.4.1999 before the competent authority to give NoObjection Certificate to the effect that vide order dated 19.9.1998 passed by the Urban Land Tribunal/Ex­Officio Additional ChiefSecretary, Revenue Department, Gujarat, all the earlier orders or notifications stood quashed and set aside and the land no longer vested in the Government in any manner. Pursuant to the said application, the competent authority vide order dated 19.5.1999, held that such No Objection Certificate cannot be given to the land owners, as the land had already been declared surplus and 3 For short, “the repeal Act” 9 steps have been taken under Sections 10(1), 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6) of the 1976 Act, which have attained finality. hence the writ =The Division Bench, in our opinion, therefore, was right in concluding that the writ petition filed by the appellants after lapse of 14 years was hopelessly barred by delay and suffered from laches. We are in agreement with the said view taken by the High Court in the peculiar facts of the present case.