Natural Justice — Court not to travel beyond pleadings — Litigant cannot be rendered worse off in own petition — High Court exceeded writ jurisdiction.
The appellants, lessees under the Cochin Devaswom Board, challenged enhancement of licence fee from Rs.227.25 per annum to Rs.1,50,000 per annum. The High Court dismissed their writ petition upholding the enhancement, but proceeded further to direct (i) fixation of licence fee afresh applying T. Krishnakumar v. Cochin Devaswom Board, 2022 (4) KLT 798; and (ii) an inquiry by the Chief Vigilance Officer into leasing of Vadakkumnathan Devaswom land to the appellants.
Held, the High Court was not justified in issuing directions beyond the scope of the writ petition. The appellants, having only challenged the enhancement order, could not have been rendered worse off by directions that went beyond the reliefs sought. The impugned directions were made without notice to the appellants and in violation of principles of natural justice.
(Paras 20–23, 25–28, 29)
Judicial restraint — Remarks and directions without notice — Impermissible.
Reiterating V.K. Majotra v. Union of India, (2003) 8 SCC 40 and State of U.P. v. Mohammad Naim, AIR 1964 SC 703, the Court observed that writ courts must decide petitions on the points raised, and if exceptional circumstances warrant consideration of additional issues, affected parties must be put on notice. Judicial pronouncements must be guided by justice, fair play, and restraint; courts should avoid “fishing and roving enquiries” that impinge on the reputation of parties.
(Paras 23–25)
Litigants — Access to justice — Court action should not have chilling effect.
When courts travel beyond pleadings and make directions adverse to a litigant without notice, it discourages citizens from seeking judicial remedies and undermines access to justice and the rule of law.
(Para 28)
Writ Petition — Reliefs confined to scope of challenge — High Court cannot enlarge controversy.
In a writ challenging enhancement of licence fee, the High Court having upheld the enhancement should have dismissed the petition simpliciter. Directions for refixation of licence fee or vigilance inquiry were wholly outside its jurisdiction.
(Paras 20–22, 26–27)
Service Law analogy applied — Writ petitioner cannot be placed in worse position.
Applying the principle in Ashok Kumar Nigam v. State of U.P., (2016) 12 SCC 797 and Pradeep Kumar v. Union of India, (2005) 12 SCC 219 — a writ petitioner cannot be penalised or placed in a worse-off situation by approaching the Court for redress.
(Paras 26–27)
Result — Appeal partly allowed.
Directions in Para 53 of the High Court judgment directing fixation of licence fee afresh and vigilance enquiry expunged and set aside. However, the Cochin Devaswom Board may independently enhance licence fee in accordance with law. Appellants directed to pay balance amount as undertaken within three months. No order as to costs.
(Paras 30–33)
Held
High Court’s directions for refixation of licence fee and vigilance inquiry, being beyond the scope of writ proceedings and issued without notice, are set aside.2025 INSC 1183
Page 1 of 20
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.11902 OF 2025
(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.23740 OF 2023)
P. Radhakrishnan & Anr. …Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Cochin Devaswom Board & Ors. …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
K.V. Viswanathan, J.
1. Leave was granted in this matter on 09.09.2025.
2. The present appeal calls in question the judgment and
order dated 09.08.2023 passed by the High Court of Kerala at
Ernakulam in Writ Petition (C) No. 29089/2020. At the
commencement of the hearing, Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, learned
Senior Counsel, submitted that the appellants in terms of the
Ext.P3-Proceedings dated 16.09.2014 and Ext.P9-Notice
dated 27.11.2020, shall pay the licence fee, at the rate of
Page 2 of 20
Rs.1,50,000/- per annum along with arrears to the first
respondent-Cochin Devaswom Board (hereinafter referred
to as the “Board”).
3. However, the grievance of the appellants is that the
further directions of the High Court have rendered them
worse off in their own writ petition. The further directions in
Para 53 of the judgment, which according to the appellant,
are beyond the scope of the writ petition and with which they
are seriously aggrieved are in the following terms:
“The 1st respondent Board shall take necessary steps to fix
the licence fee in respect of the land covered by Exts.P13
to P16 orders, taking note of the law laid down by this
Court in T. Krishnakumar [2022 (4) KLT 798: 2022 (5)
KHC SN 8] and also the law laid down in this judgment,
with notice to the 2nd petitioner Chinmaya Mission
Educational and Cultural Trust, as expeditiously as
possible, at any rate, within a period of one month from the
date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment.”
“In view of the facts noticed by this Court in paragraphs 36
and 37 of this judgment and also the stand taken by the 1st
respondent Board before this Court that other than the
copy of Exts.P13 to P16 orders, no other documents are
seen in the relevant files, we deem it appropriate to direct
the 1st respondent Board to conduct an enquiry by the
Chief Vigilance Officer (Superintendent of Police), Cochin
Devaswom Board in the matter relating to leasing out the
Page 3 of 20
land of Vadakkumnathan Devaswom to the 2nd petitioner
Trust and take necessary action, if found necessary, based
on the report of the Chief Vigilance Officer”
4. The appellants filed a writ petition on 21.12.2020 before
the High Court of Kerala praying for the following reliefs:
“a) call for the records of the case leading upto Exts. P3, P7
and P9 and quash the same by the issuance of writ of
certiorari or any other appropriate writ order or direction.
b) issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ,
order or direction staying all further proceedings pursuant
to Exhibits P3, P7 and P9 proceedings.
and
c) Pass any other appropriate writ, order or direction
which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit to issue and the
petitioner may pray from time to time.”
5. Ext.P3 under challenge was the order of the first
respondent-Board dated 16.09.2014, enhancing the annual
license fee of the premises let out to the second appellant
from Rs.227.25/- per annum to Rs.1,50,000/- per annum.
Ext.P7 is the proceeding dated 02.05.2015 rejecting any
review of the order dated 16.09.2014 and further directing
the measurement of the property. Ext.P9 is the
communication dated 27.11.2020 demanding arrears totaling
Page 4 of 20
to Rs.20,46,788/- within 14 days of the receipt of the
communication.
6. To understand the grievance of the appellants before
the High Court, a brief reference to the facts of the case is
essential. The second appellant-Chinmaya Mission
Educational and Cultural Trust was established as a society
under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882. It functions under the
Central Chinmaya Mission Trust, Bombay, and is involved in
social, religious and cultural activities in Kerala for more than
half a century. By a Royal Order (Thittooram), the Maharaja
of Cochin, on the request of Swami Chinmayananda,
transferred the Rama Varma Bhajanamadam, a part of the
Bhuvaneswari temple and situated on the northern side of the
Swaraj Round, Thrissur, to the second appellant.
7. When matters stood thus, on 16.02.1974, the Board
allotted six cents of land adjacent to the Rama Varma
Bhajanamadam for constructing a hall subject to the
following conditions:
Page 5 of 20
“1. The hall constructed by the Mission should be used
only for marriage and religious and cultural activities.
2. Accommodation to the tourist pilgrims coming to the
Wadakunathan temple should be provided in the hall as
per request of the Assistant Commissioner, Trichur free
of rent.
3. For religious and cultural activities of the Devaswom
Department the hall should be spared free of rent as per
the request of the Assistant commissioner, Trichur.
4. The Mission will pay in the Wadakunnathan Devaswom
an annual contribution of Rs. 101/- for the use of this site.
5. The Assistant Commissioner, Trichur should be an exofficio member, in the committee for the proper
utilization and maintenance of the hall.
6. Space should be left at the northern end for providing
a pathway of 12 ft wide for entrance from the Devaswom
road to the remaining portion of the vacant space on the
eastern side of the proposed site.
7. The Mission will provide compound wall on the
northern and eastern sides of the site granted to them.
8. The Mission will execute proper agreement on stamp
paper as advised by the Devasom Advocate.”
8. It will be noticed that for the site, an annual contribution
of Rs.101/- was fixed as use charges. On the site a hall was to
be constructed by the second appellant and was to be used
Page 6 of 20
only for marriage, religious and cultural activities. As part of
the consideration, in the hall, tourist pilgrims coming to the
Wadakunnathan temple should be provided accommodation
as per the request of the Assistant Commissioner free of rent.
Further, for religious and cultural activities of the Devaswom
Department, the hall should be spared free of rent as per the
request of the Assistant Commissioner. The Assistant
Commissioner was also to be an ex-officio member in the
committee for the proper utilisation and maintenance of the
hall. A twelve feet wide pathway was to be left at the
northern end for entrance from the Devaswom Road to the
remaining portion of the vacant site. Pursuant to the
proceedings dated 16.02.1974, an agreement of license
dated 19.07.1974 was executed incorporating the conditions
set out in the proceeding dated 16.02.1974.
9. By the proceeding dated 13.12.1974, on the request of
the second appellant for additional space, and on being
satisfied that the purpose for which the site was originally
allotted can be achieved only if some additional space is
Page 7 of 20
allowed, a further extent of 2½ cents of land lying vacant on
the eastern side of the site already allotted, was allotted to
the second appellant. Consequently, fresh agreement of
license was executed on 25.03.1975. It is averred that the
license fee was revised from Rs.101/- per annum to Rs.142/-
per annum with the very same stipulations as contained in
the license agreement dated 19.07.1974. By proceeding
dated 09.12.1976, further four cents of land were allotted,
and by the proceeding dated 21.02.1977 a small bit of land
lying vacant on the eastern side was also sanctioned for the
second appellant and it was ordered that the license fee be
fixed on pro-rata basis.
10. The second appellant is in occupation of 13.5 cents of
land and is using the hall constructed by it for religious and
cultural purposes and for conducting marriages. According
to the appellants only few takers are available for the
marriage hall since there is no parking space and further that
the hall is not air-conditioned. Though the rent levied is
Rs.50,000/- per day for the marriages, very few marriages
Page 8 of 20
numbering ten or fifteen per year are held and the second
appellant-Trust is running at a loss with its income being
compensated from the money generated from other units. It
is also averred that even now the hall is given free for the
programmes of the Board as and when requested.
11. The license fee was finally revised in the year 1977 to
Rs. 227.25/- per annum. According to the appellants, no
period for license having been fixed, the license continued
uninterruptedly.
12. At this stage, by proceeding dated 16.09.2014,
unilaterally and without affording any opportunity the license
fee was refixed at Rs.1,50,000/- with a direction that the
license fee shall be renewed every three years. The
appellants, by a letter dated 29.10.2014, sent a reply to the
proceedings dated 16.09.2014. In the reply, the appellants
set out that the order of 16.09.2014 was unauthorized, illegal
and against the terms of entrustment. It denied that the
second appellant was a profit-making institution. It conceded
that a reasonable hike was justified but questioned the
Page 9 of 20
exorbitant hike to Rs.1,50,000/- per annum. It highlighted the
fact that after taking possession they had developed the
same and constructed a two-storey building with accessories
and provided furniture at their expense. They stated that the
hike was unilateral, and no notice was given to them and
prayed that the enhancement be dropped.
13. By its order of 07.02.2015, the Board declared that there
was no need for review of the orders hiking the license fee
charges to Rs.1,50,000/-. The Board further issued orders of
02.05.2015 and 27.11.2020, the details of which have been set
out hereinabove.
14. The first appellant filed Writ Petition (Civil) No.29089 of
2020 for the reliefs stated in the earlier portion of the order.
The second appellant was later impleaded as a party. It is in
the said writ petition that the order as extracted in para 3
above has come to be passed after the High Court found that
there was nothing illegal in the enhancement of the license
fee and the High Court upheld the proceedings dated
Page 10 of 20
26.09.2014, the order dated 02.05.2015 and the notice dated
27.11.2020.
15. The High Court, in the impugned order, was called upon
to decide on the validity of Ext.P3, P7 and P9. In the process
of adjudicating the validity, the High Court noticed that the
license fee issue was flagged by the local fund audit and the
local fund audit raised objection against the quantum of
license fee as originally fixed. The High Court observed that
there was no validity period fixed for the license and there
was no clause for periodic hike prior to the issuance of Ext.P3
order. The High Court saw the photographs of the property
in question. The High Court also made a detailed analysis of
the provisions of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious
Institutions Act, 1950 and dealt with the powers and duties of
a trustee.
16. The High Court, after perusal of the files in question and
the correspondence observed that the appellants themselves
had requested the Board to increase the fee to a reasonable
extent. After observing that the land was situated in a prime
Page 11 of 20
locality, the High Court dealt with the judgment of T.
Krishnakumar v. Cochin Devaswom Board1 and in the end
analysis upheld the levy of Rs. 1,50,000/- per annum by
observing as follows: -
“52. In the above circumstances, we find no reason to
interfere with Ext.P3 proceedings dated 26.09.2014 of the
1st respondent Board whereby the rate of licence fee of the
property covered by Exts.P13 to P16 was enhanced from
Rs.227.25 per annum to Rs.1.50 lakhs per annum; Ext.P7
proceedings dated 02.05.2015 of the Board whereby the
stand taken in Ext.P5 letter dated 07.02.2015 not to review
or reconsider the decision in Ext.P3 proceedings dated
26.09.2014 was intimated to the 2nd petitioner Trust; and
Ext.P9 notice dated 27.11.2020 issued by the 2nd
respondent Secretary of the Board, whereby the Trust was
directed to remit a sum of Rs.20,46,788/- towards arrears of
licence fee at the rate of Rs.1.50 lakhs per annum, penal
interest and GST, within a period of 14 days.
53. In the result, this writ petition fails and the same is
accordingly dismissed. It is for the 1st respondent Cochin
Devaswom Board to recover the arrears of licence fee in
terms of Ext.P3 proceedings dated 26.09.2014 and Ext.P9
notice dated 27.11.2020 by initiating appropriate
proceedings, if found necessary, by initiating proceedings
under the Revenue Recovery Act in terms of the
G.O.(P)No.22/2021/RD dated 09.02.2021 published in
Kerala Gazette Extra Ordinary No.668 dated 11.02.2021….”
17. In view of the statement of the learned Senior Counsel
for the appellants there is no need to discuss the correctness
of the reasons why the High Court upheld the enhancement
1 2022 (5) KHC SN 8
Page 12 of 20
of license fee. The learned Senior Counsel has fairly
submitted that the appellants are ready to deposit the license
fee as enhanced along with arrears as claimed inter alia in
the notice of 27.11.2020.
18. However, the appellants have been completely taken
by surprise with the High Court proceeding further and
directing fixation of the license fee in respect of the land in
question by applying the law laid down in T. Krishnakumar
(supra). Further, the High Court directed the first respondent
Board to conduct an inquiry through the Chief Vigilance
Officer with regard to the transaction between the Board and
the appellants and take necessary action based on the
report.
19. When the matter came up for admission, this Court on
30.10.2023 granted stay of operation of the order on
condition that the appellants deposit a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-
with the first respondent.
20. We are of the opinion that the High Court was not
justified in passing the directions extracted at Para 3
Page 13 of 20
hereinabove. The directions were far beyond the scope of
the writ petition. The appellants could not have been
rendered worse off in their own writ petition. What is more,
the directions have been made without putting the appellants
on notice.
21. A party invokes the jurisdiction of courts being
aggrieved by a certain course of action taken against him/it
by the respondent. In this case, the appellants were
aggrieved by the unilateral hike of the annual charges to
Rs.1,50,000/- per annum from Rs.227.25/- which they were
paying. The High Court was justified in examining the
correctness or otherwise of the said decision. In this case, the
High Court found that the respondents were justified in
enhancing the annual license fee to Rs.1,50,000/-. Having
done so, it should have disposed of the writ petition by
simply dismissing it.
22. It is well settled that if in an exceptional case the Court
feels the need to travel beyond the scope of the writ petition
Page 14 of 20
and make observations, the least a party is entitled to, is an
opportunity to explain and defend themselves.
23. Disapproving the practice of catching parties by
surprise by the writ courts travelling beyond the scope of the
issues in question, this Court in V.K. Majotra vs. Union of
India and Others2, made the following telling observations:-
“8. …. The writ courts would be well advised to decide the
petitions on the points raised in the petition and if in a rare case
keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case any
additional points are to be raised then the concerned and
affected parties should be put to notice on the additional points
to satisfy the principles of natural justice. The parties cannot be
taken by surprise. We leave the discussion here.”
24. Though said in the context of expunging adverse
comments in an order or judgment, the following paragraphs
from State of U.P. Vs. Mohammad Naim3,repays study: -
“11. The last question is, is the present case a case of an
exceptional nature in which the learned Judge should
have exercised his inherent jurisdiction under Section
561-A CrPC in respect of the observations complained
of by the State Government? If there is one principle of
cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is
this: the proper freedom and independence of Judges
and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be
allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly
and without undue interference by any body, even by
2
(2003) 8 SCC 40
3 1964 2 SCR 363
Page 15 of 20
this Court. At the same time it is equally necessary that
in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates
must be guided by considerations of justice, fair-play
and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping
generalisations defeat the very purpose for which they
are made. It has been judicially recognised that in the
matter of making disparaging remarks against persons
or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration
before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is
relevant to consider
(a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is
before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or
defending himself;
(b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on
that conduct, justifying the remarks; and
(c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case,
as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that
conduct.
It has also been recognised that judicial
pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should
not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and
reserve.”
25. No doubt, what the High Court has done in the present
matter is to direct the fixing of the license fee, keeping in
mind, the judgment of the Court in T. Krishnakumar (supra).
The appellant had no opportunity to explain whether T.
Krishnakumar (supra) had application to the transaction in
question or not. Further, to direct the Chief Vigilance Officer
to hold an inquiry in the “matter relating to leasing out the
land to the appellant” was not warranted on the facts and
Page 16 of 20
circumstances of the case. Directions of this nature for a
fishing and roving enquiry can seriously impinge upon
reputation and character of the parties. Even in a given case
if the High Court was constrained to pass such directions it
ought to have put the appellants on notice.
26. The directions extracted in Para 3 above have rendered
the appellants worse off in their own writ petition. In Ashok
Kumar Nigam v. State of U.P.4, this Court held as under:-
“2. Appearing for the appellant, Mr. D.K. Singh,
strenuously argued that the High Court had misdirected
itself in issuing a notice of enhancement of the punishment
awarded to the appellant. He submitted that by doing so,
the High Court had placed the appellant in a worse-off
position, simply because he had challenged the
punishment awarded to him. That was, according to Mr.
Singh, legally impermissible. In support of his submissions,
Mr. Singh placed reliance upon two decisions of this Court
in Pradeep Kumar v. Union of India and Others - (2005) 12
SCC 219 and Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of
Allahabad and Another - (2007) 4 SCC 247.
4. The legal position, as to the powers of the High Court to
direct enhancement of punishment in a writ petition arising
out of disciplinary action taken against an employee,
stands concluded by the decisions of this Court, referred to
above. In Pradeep Kumar's case (supra), in a somewhat
similar circumstances, a similar question had arisen for
consideration before this Court. In that case too the High
Court had found the punishment of reduction in pay and
denial of increments awarded to the appellant to be
4
(2016) 12 SCC 797
Page 17 of 20
inadequate, for the gravity of the misconduct. The High
Court had accordingly remanded the matter back to the
disciplinary authority to award the maximum punishment
of dismissal from service which direction was then assailed
before this Court on the ground that the High Court had no
such power to direct enhancement of punishment either by
itself or by remanding the matter to the disciplinary
authority. An employee complaining against the
punishment awarded to him could not, observed this Court,
be placed in a worse-off position for coming to the Court.
7. We have, in the light of the above decisions, no
hesitation in holding that the High Court had fallen in a
palpable error in directing issuance of a show cause notice
to the appellant. The appellant could not, as observed
earlier, be placed in a worse-off situation because of
his having sought redress against the punishment
awarded to him by the disciplinary authority which in
the instant case is the High Court itself.”
(Emphasis supplied)
27. In Pradeep Kumar v. Union of India5, the Court held: -
“4. Irrespective of the crime/offence with which the
appellant may have been charged, it was not open to the
High Court to have issued such a direction. The scope of
judicial review did not allow the High Court to have
interfered with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authorities on the appellant. Besides, a writ petitioner
cannot be put in a worse position by coming to court.
The directions of the High Court are not sustainable and
must be set aside. We are told by the learned counsel for
the appellant that the respondent authority pursuant to the
directions issued by the High Court initiated proceedings
against the appellant for the purpose of imposing the
penalty of dismissal from service. We have held that the
direction of the High Court was wholly outside its
jurisdiction. The appeals are thus allowed and the High
Courts directions are set aside. The disciplinary enquiry
initiated on the basis of the High Court's order is
5
(2005) 12 SCC 219
Page 18 of 20
consequently also quashed. However, the writ petitions will
stand dismissed. There is no order as to costs.”
(Emphasis supplied)
28. Litigants go to court for vindicating their rights when
they perceive that there is an infringement. The court may,
after hearing both parties, grant or deny them relief
depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. As
pointed out in V.K. Majotra (supra) and Mohammad Naim
(supra), if without putting parties on notice (even in the rare
and exceptional case where facts warrant) the court travels
beyond the scope of the petition, takes parties by surprise
and makes any strong observations and directions, it will
create a chilling effect on other prospective litigants too.
They will be left to wonder whether by going to court in
matters where they perceive injustice has resulted, they will
be rendered worse off than what they were, before initiating
the proceedings. This could seriously impact access to
justice and consequently the very rule of law. Hence, in such
matters, courts must exercise great caution and
circumspection.
Page 19 of 20
29. We are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances
of the case, the observations extracted hereinabove at para 3
are absolutely unjustified apart from the fact that they were
made in violation of principles of natural justice.
30. In view of what has been stated hereinabove, we partly
allow the appeal by expunging and setting aside the
following portion of the impugned order:-
“The 1st respondent Board shall take necessary steps to fix
the licence fee in respect of the land covered by Exts.P13
to P16 orders, taking note of the law laid down by this
Court in T. Krishnakumar [2022 (4) KLT 798: 2022 (5)
KHC SN 8] and also the law laid down in this judgment,
with notice to the 2nd petitioner Chinmaya Mission
Educational and Cultural Trust, as expeditiously as
possible, at any rate, within a period of one month from the
date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment.”
“In view of the facts noticed by this Court in paragraphs 36
and 37 of this judgment and also the stand taken by the 1st
respondent Board before this Court that other than the
copy of Exts.P13 to P16 orders, no other documents are
seen in the relevant files, we deem it appropriate to direct
the 1st respondent Board to conduct an enquiry by the
Chief Vigilance Officer (Superintendent of Police), Cochin
Devaswom Board in the matter relating to leasing out the
land of Vadakkumnathan Devaswom to the 2nd petitioner
Trust and take necessary action, if found necessary, based
on the report of the Chief Vigilance Officer”
Page 20 of 20
31. However, notwithstanding the expunction of the above
paragraphs, if the respondent-Board has legitimate rights to
enhance the licence fee, they may do so independently and
in accordance with law.
32. By our interim order of 30.10.2023, we directed the
appellants to deposit a sum of Rs.10 Lakhs with the first
respondent. The amount has since been deposited. In view
of the judgment passed today, we direct that the balance
amount be paid by the appellants to the first respondent, as
undertaken before us within three months from today.
33. No order as to costs.
……….........................J.
[DIPANKAR DATTA]
……….........................J.
[K. V. VISWANATHAN]
New Delhi;
06th October, 2025