Jameela & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh
Criminal Appeal Nos. 3641–3642 of 2025
(2025 INSC 1121, decided 15 Sept. 2025)
Bench
Justice Dipankar Datta
Justice Augustine George Masih
Facts
Sheikh Akhtar (Naib Nazir in court) was convicted in 2007 for offences under Sections 305 (abetment of suicide of child) & 506-B IPC (criminal intimidation).
He was sentenced to 10 years (Sec. 305) and 2 years (Sec. 506-B).
Akhtar appealed to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, but died in 2015 during pendency. His wife (Jameela) and children continued the appeal to secure his terminal benefits (30+ years service).
In 2024, the High Court:
Set aside conviction under Sec. 305 IPC,
Convicted him instead under Sec. 195-A IPC (threatening a person to give false evidence) and maintained 506-B IPC conviction.
Family appealed to Supreme Court.
Issues
Could Akhtar be convicted under Section 195-A IPC, introduced in 2006, for an incident of 1999?
Was the conviction under Section 506-B IPC sustainable?
Could his family still claim terminal service benefits after his death?
Supreme Court Findings
Section 195-A IPC (added in 2006) cannot apply retrospectively to an offence in 1999 (Article 20(1) Constitution). High Court erred.
However, evidence of PWs 2, 3 & 4 clearly proved Akhtar threatened the victim; thus, conviction under Section 506-B IPC was upheld.
Defence evidence (attendance records claiming Akhtar was in court) was considered unreliable by trial court; not raised in High Court appeal, so not accepted.
Since conviction under Section 305 IPC (abetment of suicide) was overturned, and only Section 506-B IPC survives, the termination of service requires reconsideration.
Court directed the Madhya Pradesh Government to reconsider de novo whether terminal benefits should be denied solely on the basis of Sec. 506-B conviction.
Authorities must take a humanitarian approach considering widow’s financial condition.
Final Order
Conviction under Sec. 195-A IPC set aside.
Conviction under Sec. 506-B IPC maintained.
High Court judgment partly modified.
State Govt. directed to reconsider Akhtar’s service termination and widow’s entitlement to terminal benefits within 3 months.
2025 INSC 1121
1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.3641-3642 OF 2025
JAMEELA & ORS. … APPELLANTS
VS.
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. Sheikh Akhtar1 (since deceased) was convicted by the Sessions Court
in S.T. No.378/2005 for commission of offence punishable under
sections 305 and 506-B, Indian Penal Code 18602 and sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for ten years and two years, respectively, with
fine together with default stipulations vide judgment and order dated
28th March, 2007.
2. The judgment of conviction and order on sentence was carried in
appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Principal Bench, at
Jabalpur3 under section 374(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 19734 by
1 Akhtar
2
IPC
3 High Court
4 Cr.PC
2
Akhtar in 2007 itself. During the pendency of the appeal, Akhtar
passed away on 23rd April, 2015.
3. Prior to conviction, Akhtar was a public servant. He was the ‘Naib
Nazir’ in the local court. He suffered an order of termination of service
soon after the aforesaid conviction. In the normal course, the appeal
preferred by Akhtar should abate in view of section 394, Cr.PC.
However, the widow of Akhtar (Jameela) and their children (Amreen
Khan, Naaz Khan, Aftab, and Shreen Khan) continued the appeal with
the fervent hope that should the conviction and sentence be set aside,
they would be entitled to the terminal benefits which had accrued to
Akhtar by reason of his rendering more than 30 years of service.
4. Upon hearing the parties, the High Court vide its judgment and order
dated 25th April, 2024 held that Akhtar cannot be held guilty for
commission of offence under section 305 IPC; however, by reason of
his acts of threatening the victim (a minor girl), Akhtar was guilty of
the offence under section 195-A IPC. Accordingly, while setting aside
the conviction under section 305 IPC, the High Court convicted Akhtar,
in the alternative, under section 195-A IPC as well as section 506-B
thereof and maintained the sentence imposed by the Sessions Court.
The appeal was, accordingly, disposed of.
5. An application5
for modification of the judgment and order dated 25th
April, 2024 did not meet success. It was dismissed by an order dated
2
nd August, 2024.
5
I.A. No.12367 of 2024
3
6. Aggrieved by the outcome of the appeal and the application before
the High Court, the widow and children of Akhtar appealed to this
Court whereupon leave was granted by us on 19th August, 2025.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and the respondentState at some length.
8. The offence alleged in the First Information Report6
lodged by the
victim’s mother (PW-4) is that the victim had been molested by coconvict Munna; that, Akhtar along with Munna, Bhadde and Mamu
Gudda had been threatening the victim with dire consequences if she
deposed in court against Munna; that, Akhtar, Munna, Bhadde, and
Mamu Gudda had threatened to kill the victim and her father, unless
they compromised the matter; and that, the victim could not bear and
withstand such threat for which she took the extreme step of putting
an end to her life to save her father by setting herself ablaze on 19th
February, 1999. The victim, unfortunately, passed away on 23rd
February, 1999. While in hospital, the victim’s dying declaration was
recorded by the local Deputy Tehsildar (PW-2). The dying declaration
is, however, not on record.
9. From the version of PW-2, we find that the victim was threatened
between 10-11 am of 19th February, 1999, while she was on the way
to the court by Akhtar and the co-convicts.
10. According to PW-4, who was accompanying the victim while on the
way to the court, Akhtar, Munna, Bhadde, and Mamu Gudda
6
FIR
4
threatened them around 11 am. This matches with the version of the
victim as spoken by her to PW-2 and supposedly recorded in the dying
declaration. However, PW-4 went a step further. She deposed that
while she had been away from the court to call a witness (Khima bai)
leaving the victim alone in the court and ultimately brought Khima bai
– in the interregnum, Akhtar and the co-convicts had again
threatened the victim. This was heard by PW-4 from the victim later,
after she set herself ablaze.
11. It was further in the evidence of PW-4 that since the court had
adjourned proceedings, she had returned home with the victim and
had left to go to a shop after a while. PW-4 was informed by one Bhuri
bai that the victim had suffered burn injury. Having heard it, PW-4
immediately returned home and saw the victim lying on the ground
with burns. At that point, the disclosure as aforesaid of the victim
having been threatened a second time by Akhtar, Munna, Bhadde, and
Mamu Gudda was made to PW-4 by the victim. The victim was
threatened to change her statement or else she and her father would
be killed. Since the victim did not want her father to die, she had set
herself on fire.
12. This second incident of threat spoken to by PW-4, however, does not
appear in the FIR.
13. PW-3, the victim’s elder sister, had also deposed at the trial. When
the victim had set herself ablaze and attempt was being made to
douse the fire, she had told PW-3 that while going to appear in the
5
court and while returning, Akhtar, Munna, Bhadde, and Mamu Gudda
stopped her and threatened her that compromise must be made
otherwise they would kill her and her father; and it is due to this threat
that the victim set herself on fire to end her life and, thereby, save
her father.
14. Learned counsel for the appellants has argued before us that there is
gross inconsistency in the version of PW-4, as recorded in the FIR, the
victim’s dying declaration recorded by PW-2 and the depositions of
PWs 3 and 4 as regards the number of times the victim was
threatened on 19th February, 1999.
15. True it is, PW-4 did not refer to the second act of threatening in the
FIR. However, the omission is not considered too material. PW-4, we
can presume, must have been under severe emotional stress when
information of the offence was given to the police. That apart, it is not
the requirement of law that an FIR while disclosing a cognizable
offence must also reveal all facts preceding and following the incident
of offence with precision. Having considered the contentions and
looking at the materials on record, we do not see reason to hold that
the inconsistency, as pointed out, is such that the same would lead us
to discredit the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 that Akhtar, along with the
co-convicts, had not threatened the victim.
16. Next, it has been urged on behalf of the appellants that although the
victim, PW-3 and PW-4 had spoken about Akhtar and the other coconvicts having threatened the victim, the versions of the other
6
prosecution witnesses (PWs 5, 6 and 7) is that the victim had taken
the names of Munna, Bhadde, and Mamu Gudda but not Akhtar as
those who had also threatened her.
17. Having read the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 as well as considering what
was recorded by PW-2 as the dying declaration of the victim, we have
no hesitation to overrule this contention. Merely because PWs 5, 6
and 7 had not taken the name of Akhtar while referring to what they
heard the victim say about the identity of those who had threatened
her would in no way render the version of the victim, as recorded by
PW-2, unreliable. In fact, narration of the version of the victim in the
dying declaration by PW-2 finds support from the evidence of PWs 3
and 4.
18. Next, it has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the High
Court grossly erred in convicting Akhtar under section 195-A IPC. The
incident which resulted in unfortunate death of the victim, as noticed
earlier, occurred on 19th February, 1999. Section 195-A IPC was
inserted by Act No.2 of 2006 with effect from 16th April, 2006. As on
date of the offence, section 195-A IPC was not on the statute book.
The High Court, therefore, fell in error in not noticing the date of
offence and the date of insertion of section 195-A in the IPC and
proceeded to hold Akhtar guilty under that section in clear breach of
clause (1) of Article 20 of the Constitution of India.
19. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State, while not
making any attempt to justify the High Court’s conviction of Akhtar
7
under section 195-A IPC, pointed out to us that Akhtar was held guilty
of the offence under section 506-B IPC and the finding of the trial
court, since affirmed by the High Court in this regard, does not suffer
from any infirmity.
20. We are in agreement with learned counsel for the appellants that the
High Court could not have found Akhtar guilty of Section 195-A IPC.
However, what cannot be ignored is that Akhtar was also found guilty
of an offence under section 506(B) IPC.
21. We have found from the memo of appeal filed before the High Court
that the convictions recorded both under sections 305 and 506-B IPC
were under challenge in the appeal. In the entirety of the appellate
judgment and order, impugned before us, we do not find any
discussion made by the High Court in respect of the conviction
recorded against Akhtar under section 506-B IPC. We are inclined to
the view that since the High Court had embarked on a process of
reasoning to convict Akhtar under section 195-A IPC, it did not
consider it necessary to make any further discussion regarding the
offence under section 506-B IPC. Had we upheld the conviction under
section 195-A IPC, obviously the omission of the High Court to
independently deal with the offence under section 506-B thereof with
reference to the evidence on record would not have been rendered
vulnerable. However, in the changed circumstances where we are
unable to uphold the conviction under section 195-A IPC, the omission
does assume significance and requires us to independently examine
8
whether, on the evidence on record, the offence under section 506-B
IPC stands proved.
22. Considering the evidence on record and in view of our discussions as
above relatable to the evidence of PWs 2, 3 and 4, we have no
hesitation in holding that Akhtar was one of four who threatened the
victim and, therefore, his conviction under section 506-B warrants no
interference.
23. At this stage, as a last-ditch effort, learned counsel for the appellants
has invited our attention to one other aspect.
24. Referring to the evidence of a staff of the court where Akhtar was
posted (DW-4), it was sought to be highlighted that DW-4 had spoken
of Akhtar, the Naib Nazir, to be present in the court for the entire day
on 19th February, 1999. According to DW-4, Akhtar usually came to
court at about 10 am and returned at 6/6.30 pm without leaving the
court. It was also his specific version that on the fateful day, i.e., 19th
February, 1999, Akhtar had come to the court at about 10 am and
had returned at around 6/6.30 pm; also, that Akhtar and DW-4 did
not go anywhere during the duty hours on that day.
25. The evidence of DW-3, the Deputy Nazir of the concerned court, would
also reveal that he had produced the attendance register from August
1997 to April 1999 to show that on 19th February, 1999, Akhtar was
at his work place.
26. According to learned counsel for the appellants, for whatever it is
worth, the defence evidence of DWs 3 and 4 should have been
9
considered by the High Court. He sounded critical of the omission of
the High Court to spare a single sentence in regard to the defence
evidence.
27. We had the occasion to peruse the judgment of conviction of the
Sessions Court. The depositions of DWs 3 and 4 were noted in
paragraphs 34 and 35 in the judgment and the Sessions Court appears
to have assigned good reasons as to why the defence evidence did
not appeal to him to be creditworthy for discrediting the versions of
PWs 2, 3 and 4 and for returning a finding of acquittal in favour of
Akhtar. We need not advert to the reasons assigned here, having also
noted that there is not a single ground urged in the memo of appeal
filed by Akhtar in the High Court assailing the reasoning of the
Sessions Court in this regard. It is quite possible that in course of
hearing of the appeal before the High Court too, no point of objection
was raised with regard to evaluation and assessment by the Sessions
Court of the evidence of DWs 3 and 4 for which the High Court did
not consider it necessary to discuss such evidence.
28. There is, therefore, no strong reason for which the recording of
conviction of Akhtar for the offence under section 506-B IPC in the
judgment passed by the Sessions Court can be faulted; and, by
extension, we do not see reason to interfere with the judgment and
order of the High Court affirming such conviction.
29. In our view, conviction of Akhtar under section 506-B IPC cannot be
interfered with on any valid ground, although his conviction under
10
section 195-A IPC by the High Court is unsustainable in law. Also, the
respondent-State not having carried acquittal of Akhtar for the offence
under section 305 IPC in appeal, such acquittal has attained finality.
30. Having regard to the nature of offence proved to have been committed
by Akhtar and also bearing in mind the evidence on record revealing
that a minor girl, to save her father, had to take the extreme step of
doing away with her own life, we could not have in the present
circumstances extend the provisions relating to release on probation
to Akhtar, had he been alive. Dismissal of the appeal, albeit setting
aside the conviction under section 195-A IPC but maintaining the
conviction under section 506-B thereof, is the obvious result. We order
accordingly.
31. However, unfortunately, Akhtar is no longer alive. He left behind him
the appellants as his surviving heirs. The appellants have brought the
lis to this Court only for the purpose of staking a claim to the terminal
benefits that had accrued to Akhtar for rendering three decades of
service.
32. Akhtar’s service was terminated on consideration of his conviction not
only for the offence under section 506-B IPC but also the graver
offence under section 305 thereof. Since the High Court has set aside
the conviction under section 305 IPC and the alternative conviction
under section 195-A thereof too stands set aside by us, only the
conviction against Akhtar for the offence under section 506-B IPC
survives. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that
11
interests of justice would be best served if the respondent-State
considers the matter of termination of service of Akhtar de novo and
decides, whether for his conviction only under section 506-B IPC, the
right to terminal benefits accruing for rendering three decades of
service would stand forfeited for all times to come.
33. Accordingly, while disposing of these appeals, we request the
appropriate department in the Government of Madhya Pradesh to
effect consideration of the matter as indicated in the preceding
paragraph upon taking into account the financial status of the
appellant no.1 and her liability, if any, adopting a humanitarian
approach. Such consideration may be effected as early as possible,
but preferably within three months from date.
34. Connected applications, if pending, shall also stand disposed of.
……………….…………………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
……………………..…………………..J.
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 15, 2025.