LawforAll

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Sunday, April 20, 2025

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – ss.3, 4 – Complainant made specific allegations against her husband and her mother-in-law for demand of dowry and harassment – However, as regards the appellants (complainant’s mother-in-law’s younger sister and her son), the allegation was that they pressurized her to act according to her husband and her mother-in-law’s wishes – High Court declined to quash criminal proceedings against the appellants – Challenge to: Held: Impugned judgements set aside – Charges against the accused including the appellants were sought to be substantiated based on the statements of the complainant, her parents and two panchayat elders – Complainant in her complaints did not assign any specific role to the appellants concerning cruelty, the demands of dowry or her physical and mental harassment except for making a sweeping allegation without specific details – Nothing on record to show that the parents or the two witnesses witnessed any of the incidents of physical harassment of the complainant at the instance of the appellants – Statements of the Panchayat elder is based on the information provided by the complainant’s father and is hearsay evidence – No prima facie case made out against the appellants for continuing the criminal proceedings against them in the trial – Pending criminal proceedings quashed qua the two appellants – Constitution of India – Article 142. [Paras 37, 23, 40] Matrimonial/domestic disputes – Criminalisation of domestic disputes, effect on the institution of family – Tendency to implicate family members/relatives – Duty of Court, discussed – In criminal cases of domestic violence, complaints and charges to be specific. [Paras 31-35]

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[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1 : 2025 INSC 160 Geddam Jhansi & Anr. v. The State of Telangana & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 609 of 2025) 07 Februar...

Sentence/Sentencing – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – ss.42, 42A – Interpretation – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) – Appellant convicted for offences u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC and ss.3/4, POCSO Act, life imprisonment awarded – Appeal rejected by High Court with certain modification – Plea of the appellant that as the offences were overlapping, POCSO Act being special law would prevail over IPC and hence, the appellant could not have been convicted for both the offences: Held: Conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC and ss.3/4, POCSO Act is wholly justified – Under s.42, POCSO Act, when the alleged acts or omissions constitute offence both under the IPC and the POCSO Act then, the law which prescribes the punishment of greater degree would have to be applied – s.42 and s.42A, POCSO Act operate in completely different spheres – s.42A, POCSO Act cannot be interpreted so as to override the scope and ambit of enabling provision, i.e., s.42, POCSO Act – Since, ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC provide for a higher sentence as compared to ss.3/4, POCSO Act, the trial Court was justified in choosing the former to award punishment in terms of s.42, POCSO Act – However, the High Court erred in directing that the appellant would have to serve life imprisonment for remainder of his natural life as provided u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC – Under these provisions it is not mandated that the convict must be awarded life imprisonment – The sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the trial Court for the offence u/ss.3/4, POCSO Act revived – For offences punishable u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC, the accused to undergo imprisonment for life, as awarded by the trial Court, without the stipulation that the life term will enure till the natural life of the appellant and fine, as directed. [Paras 19, 21, 23, 25, 26, 30, 31]

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[2025] 3 S.C.R. 490 : 2025 INSC 335 Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P. (Criminal Appeal No(s). 1257 of 2025) 07 March 2025 [Vikra...

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.227 – Discharge – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.34, 304 Part II, 304A – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Appellant no.1 was doing interior decoration of the shop on contract basis and the appellant no.2 was the Store Manager of the company which had taken the said shop on lease – Two employees of appellant no.1 while working on the sign board of the shop at a height of 12 feet from the ground level, struck by electricity, got electrocuted, and fell from iron ladder resulting in multiple injuries, leading to their death – Registration of FIR – Chargesheet against the appellants for committing an offence u/ss.304A/182/201 rw s.34 IPC since the appellants did not provide any safety equipments to the deceased employees – Appellants sought their discharge u/s. 227 which was dismissed – Revision applications thereagainst dismissed by the High Court – Correctness: Held: Basic ingredient of s.304 Part II is presence of knowledge and absence of intention – Doer must have the knowledge that the act performed by him would likely cause death etc. but there should not be any intention to cause death – No prima facie case can be said to have been made out against the appellants for committing an offence u/s.304 Part II – No intention on the part of the two appellants to cause the death or cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause the death of the two deceased employees – Also, the appellants had no knowledge that by asking the two deceased employees to work on the sign board that such act was likely to cause death – Thus, the basic ingredients for commission of offence u/s.304 Part II are absent – Furthermore, at the stage of consideration of discharge, the court is not required to undertake a threadbare analysis of the materials gathered by the prosecution – It is only to be seen that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused – On facts, the incident was purely accidental, and no prima facie case can be said to be made out against the appellants for committing an offence u/ss.304A and 304 Part II – In any case, the trial court only considered culpability of the appellants qua s.304 Part II as the Magistrate had committed the case to the Court of Sessions confining the allegations against the appellant to s. 304 Part II and not s.304A – Both the trial court and High Court erred in rejecting the discharge applications of the appellants – Order of the trial court and impugned order set aside and quashed, and the discharge applications are allowed. [Paras 12.3, 12.4, 14-16, 17.3, 18]

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[2025] 3 S.C.R. 502 : 2025 INSC 338 Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal No. 2356 of 2024) 07 March 2...