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Sunday, April 20, 2025

Contempt of Court – When – Appellants gave undertaking before the Trial Court to not alienate the property which was the subject matter of the suit – Respondents filed application alleging violation thereof – Trial Court held that the Appellants were not guilty of wilful disobedience of the undertaking given by them – Order set aside by High Court – Correctness: Held: Plea of the appellants that the undertaking to not alienate the subject matter property was given by the lawyer without requisite authority, not accepted – The undertaking in question was given in July 2007 and reiterated in August 2007 –Trial Court made such an undertaking into an order of the Court in November 2007, which was extended at regular intervals – The application for violation of the undertaking/order of the Court under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was made in 2011 i.e., after a period of four and a half years – Had the undertaking been without requisite authority, the appellants were well within their rights to seek discharge of that order, however, no such step was taken – Alienation of the subject matter property was despite express orders of the Court and thus, in violation thereof – High Court rightly punished the appellants for contempt of Court – However, order modified, as directed – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or. XXXIX R. 2A. [Paras 6, 11, 12, 14] Legal Profession – Relationship between Advocate and client – Nature: Held: A lawyer-client relationship is fiduciary in nature and the former is cast in terms of agency of the latter – The lawyer must respect the decision-making right of the client – Any undertaking given to a Court cannot be without requisite authority from the client. [Para 9]

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[2025] 3 S.C.R. 450 : 2025 INSC 325 Smt. Lavanya C & Anr. v. Vittal Gurudas Pai Since Deseased By LRs. & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 1399...

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 – Detenu was detained under the provisions of the COFEPOSA Act – It was contended that there was non-application of mind since the allegations were raised under clauses (i) to (iv) of s.3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act, in an omnibus manner, revealing the bias of the detaining officer – It was further contended that the attempt was to somehow obtain preventive detention of the person who was arrested on the basis of the offences alleged; in which crime he was granted bail by the jurisdictional Court, imposing very stringent conditions: Held: In the instant case, the facts reveal that the detenu has not only been involved in smuggling of goods, but also has abetted such smuggling of goods through carriers, engaged in receiving the same, dispatching it to middle-men for keeping it concealed in their premises and effecting sale through them; who were paid a commission – This definitely brings in the ingredients of each of the clauses under (i) to (iv) of s.3(1) – The jurisdictional Magistrate released the detenu on bail vide order dated 16.04.2024 on certain conditions – The specific ground raised by the prosecution of apprehension of involvement in similar type of smuggling activity was reckoned by the jurisdictional Magistrate while granting bail and imposing conditions to prevent the detenu from engaging in such smuggling activities – However, nothing is stated by the detaining authority as to why the conditions are not sufficient to prevent the detenu from engaging in further activities of smuggling; which was the specific ground on which the conditions were imposed while granting bail – It was for the detaining authority to look into the conditions imposed by the Magistrate and enter into a subjective satisfaction as to whether the same was sufficient to avoid a preventive detention or otherwise, insufficient to restrain him from further involvement in similar smuggling activities – The criminal prosecution launched and the preventive detention ordered are on the very same allegations of organised smuggling activities – The detaining authority ought to have examined the bail conditions – Whether they were sufficient to curb the evil of further indulgence in identical activities; which is the very basis of the preventive detention ordered – Since detention order is silent on that aspect, the detention order is interfered with – Hence, the order of detention is set aside – The detenu directed to be released forthwith. [Paras 7, 14, 15, 19, 20, 22]

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[2025] 3 S.C.R. 419 : 2025 INSC 327 Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 1180 of 2025) 06 March 2025 [Sudhans...

Penal Code, 1860 – ss.376, 384, 323, 504, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Criminal proceeding against the appellant for having sexually exploited/assaulted the complainant for over a period of 16 years, based on a false promise of marriage – Appellant chargesheeted u/ss.376, 384, 323, 504, 506 – Appellant sought quashing of proceedings – Rejected by the High Court – Justification: Held: Accused is not liable for the offence of rape if the victim has wilfully agreed to maintain sexual relations – Complainant’s allegations seem to be well-arranged story – Complainant, being a highly qualified major woman continued unabatedly in a consensual intimate sexual relationship with the appellant over a period of 16 years, which is sufficient to conclude that there was never an element of force or deceit in the relationship – It cannot be said that the appellant is liable to be prosecuted for having sexually exploited/assaulted the complainant based on a false promise of marriage – Allegations of the complainant are full of material contradictions and are ex facie unbelievable – Throughout the prolonged period of 16 years, the complainant kept completely quiet about the alleged sexual abuse, meted out to her by the appellant until she learnt that the appellant had married another woman – Further in complete contradiction to the case setup in the FIR, the complainant has on many occasions portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant and thus, evidently, they lived together as man and wife – Long gap of 16 years between the first alleged act of sexual intercourse, continued relations for one and a half decade till the filing of the FIR convinces that it is a clear case of a love affair/live in relationship gone sour – Allowing the prosecution of the appellant to continue for the offences alleged, would be nothing short of a gross abuse of the process of law– Impugned order quashed and set aside – Impugned FIR and proceedings arising thereunder quashed. [Paras 21, 24, 25, 27, 35, 37, 39]

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[2025] 3 S.C.R. 303 : 2025 INSC 308 Rajnish Singh @ Soni v. State of U.P. and Another (Criminal Appeal No. 1055 of 2025) 03 March 2025 [Vikr...

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – s.27 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.96 – The NCDRC imposed multiple penalties on the appellant for failing to deliver possession of residential units to home-buyers as per the agreed timeline – The appellant sought a stay on the penalty proceedings before the NCDRC, contending that an application u/s.95 of the IBC has been filed against them, triggering an interim moratorium u/s.96 of the IBC – The NCDRC vide the impugned order dated 07.02.2024 rejected this application, holding that consumer claims and the penalty imposed did not fall within the moratorium under the IBC – Correctness: Held: In the present case, the damages awarded by the NCDRC arise from a consumer dispute, where the appellant has been held liable for deficiency in service – Such damages are not in the nature of ordinary contractual debts but rather serve to compensate the consumers for loss suffered and to deter unethical business practices – Courts and tribunals, including the NCDRC, exercise their statutory jurisdiction to award such damages, and these are distinct from purely financial debts that may be subject to restructuring under the IBC – Since such damages are covered under "excluded debts" as per s.79(15) of the IBC, they do not get the benefit of the moratorium u/s.96 of the IBC, and their enforcement remains unaffected by the initiation of insolvency proceedings – The penalties imposed by the NCDRC arise due to non-compliance with consumer protection laws and serve a regulatory function rather than constituting "debt recovery proceedings" – This distinction is crucial – The IBC is designed to deal with insolvency resolution and financial distress, whereas consumer protection laws exist to uphold consumer rights and ensure fair business practices – The penalties u/s. 27 of the CP Act are aimed at compelling compliance and cannot be equated with recovery of an outstanding debt – The appellant cannot claim that such penalties fall within the scope of a debt moratorium, as they do not constitute financial liabilities owed to a creditor but rather statutory obligations enforced to uphold consumer rights. [Paras 33, 35]

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[2025] 3 S.C.R. 325 : 2025 INSC 314 Saranga Anilkumar Aggarwal v. Bhavesh Dhirajlal Sheth & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 4048 of 2024) 04 Marc...