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Saturday, December 22, 2018

Whether the alienation of the property pending the suit can be set aside in contempt of proceedings for voiltion of injunciton orders restraing from alienation ? - No- the appellant filed a suit against PABC's for specific performance in the year 1993 basing on sale agreement 0f the year 1981 and the same was decreed and sale deed was executed in the year 2003 - in the mean while in the year 1994 a suit was filed against the properties PABC - in the year 2003 the Madara High court granted interim injunciton not to alinate the properties of PABC- a contempt petition filed - Madras High court set aside the sale and order to restoration of the property - Appellant is not the party before the Madaras High court - Apex court held that in the present appeal, the case of the appellant that it was in pursuance of the decree passed by the Civil Court in Andhra Pradesh in a suit for specific performance that the appellant had obtained the sale deed through the process of the Court, could not have been negated in the summary manner in which the High Court had proceeded to pass orders in the exercise of its contempt jurisdiction. Moreover, it is not in dispute that the appellant is not a party to the suit pending before the Madras High Court. The issue as to Whether the alienation of the property by PABC is valid or otherwise must be adjudicated upon in the course of the hearing of the suit. That is also the basis of the order dated 26.04.2013 passed by this Court in the earlier civil appeals, noted above. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the impugned order passed by the High Court in purported exercise of its contempt jurisdiction should be set aside in so far as the appellant is concerned. It is ordered accordingly. We however, clarify that it will be open to the plaintiffs to seek appropriate remedies in the suit which is pending before the Madras High Court.

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 HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT  OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.2641/2011 AL...
Thursday, December 20, 2018

Whether it is an individual property or joint family property? merely becuase mutation of entires are effected in his name and tax and electicity bills etc. paid in his name - with out having any legal possession and without having any capcity to raise a building etc., Suit for restoration of possession, mesne profits and for a permanent injunction with respect to House - The plaintiff acquired the leasehold rights on plot under the perpetual lease deed granted by the President of India in his favour and registered on 31.01.1966. -raised a construction over the plot and obtained the necessary sanction from the competent authority as per the site plan and got installed electricity, water, and sewerage connections in the premises.- entire family started living in the said house. - The marriage of plaintiff, as well as defendants and all sisters, were solemnized from the house in question. - When the relationship of Defendant No.2- the sister of the plaintiff, became strained with her husband, she started living in the said house along with her daughter. - Defendant No.1 for some time in 1971 had resided out of Delhi. - Father of the parties Kashmiri Lal Dhall died on 10.08.1980, leaving behind several properties at Delhi. - Defendant No.1 started living separately with effect from the year 1986. - He acquired a house and one more residential accommodation, - the mother of the parties died in the premises in question in the year 1990. The house remained in the custody/ possession of the Defendant No.2. At the relevant point of time, the plaintiff was posted at Bombay.-Plaintiff came back to Delhi in the year 1993. However, at the same time, Defendant No.2 was permitted to occupy the house. Later on, it was found that Defendant No.1 had also started living in the said house. - The defendants version is that Father acquired the property in the name of his eldest daughter and he constructed the house therein and later at the time of her marrige , he transferred the same in the name of plaintiff - at the time , the plaintiff is a student - no capacity to earn money - the defendant No.1 from 1996 has been resideing init as of its owner - Trail court decreed the suit - High court confirmed the same - Apex court held that Firstly, the plaintiff has not come up with the case that the property was acquired in the name of Kumari Sneh Lata in the year 1963 and it was she who had spent the money for getting the land allotted from DDA and in the construction of the house. No case has been set up in the plaint to show that Kumari Sneh Lata had spent the money in the construction of the house. He has suppressed the fact of allotment in the name of Kumari Sneh Lata. On the contrary, it had been admitted in the plaint itself that family started residing in the premises right from the beginning. On the contrary, there is admission made by the plaintiff that he never resided in the house. Apart from that when we come to the source of money for the purpose of purchase of plot, admittedly, the plaintiff was a student and he was admitted in the year 1961 at IIT, Kharagpur. At the time when the land was allotted in the name of Kumari Sneh Lata, he was still a student and he had no source of income at the relevant time in 1963 or in January 1966, when the allotment was changed in his name owing to the marriage of Kumari Sneh Lata. Thus, obviously, it was Kashmiri Lal who had spent the money in getting the land allotted and also had raised the construction in the year 1965-66. Though the plaintiff has stated that the construction was made sometime in the year 1966, his version cannot be said to be reliable. Apart from that, the plaintiff has admitted that when he came to Delhi on posting at All India Institute of Medical Sciences, he started living in the rented accommodation, as there was a paucity of accommodation for his stay in the house in question. Thus, all the facts and circumstances indicate that it was a family property and not the exclusive property of the plaintiff . Thus, the Courts below have acted not only perversely but in a most arbitrary and illegal manner, while accepting the ipse dixit of the plaintiff and in decreeing the suit. Such finding of facts which are impermissible and perverse cannot be said to be binding. The legal inferences from admitted facts have not been correctly drawn. Merely the fact that house tax receipt, electricity and water bills and other documents are in the name of Dharampal would carry the case no further, as it was the father who got the name changed of Kumari Sneh Lata in question in the name of Dharampal. The receipts were only to be issued in the name of the recorded owner, but Dharampal never resided in the house as he was in service out of Delhi, obviously, the amount was paid by family, not by Late Dharampal. Thus, we find that no benefit could have been derived from the aforesaid documents. In view of the aforesaid, we have no hesitation in allowing the appeals and dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents.

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Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4534-4...
Wednesday, December 19, 2018

whether, the appellants, daughters of Gurulingappa Savadi, could be denied their share on the ground that they were born prior to the enactment of the Act and, therefore, cannot be treated as coparceners? Alternate question is as to whether, with the passing of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, the appellants would become coparcener by birth in their own right in the same manner as the son and are, therefore, entitled to equal share as that of a son? suit for partition - plaintiff filed this suit against his father, his father's brother , his father's sisters and his paternal grandmother who are the sons ,daughters and wife of late Gurulingappa Savadi - stating that the two sons and widow were in joint possession of the aforesaid properties as coparceners and properties mentioned in Schedule B was acquired out of the joint family nucleus in the name of Gurulingappa Savadi. Case set up by him was that the appellants herein were not the coparceners in the said joint family as they were born prior to the enactment of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - that is maternal aunts - that is daughters' of late Gurulingappa - The trial court, while decreeing the suit held that the appellants were not entitled to any share as they were born prior to the enactment of the Act and, therefore, could not be considered as coparceners. The trial court also rejected the alternate contention that the appellants had acquired share in the said properties, in any case, after the amendment in the Act vide amendment Act of 2005. - This view of the trial court has been upheld by the High Court in the impugned judgement dated January 25, 2012 thereby confirming the decree dated August 09, 2007 passed in the suit filed for partition. - Apex court held that :- Sec. 6 of Hindu Succession Act - Before amendment - . Devolution of interest in coparcenary property. When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act: Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. Explanation 1 . For the purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Explanation 2 . Nothing contained in the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a person who had separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein. we hold that according to Section 6 of the Act when a coparcener dies leaving behind any female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule to the Act or male relative specified in that class claiming through such female relative, his undivided interest in the Mitakshara coparcenary property would not devolve upon the surviving coparcener, by survivorship but upon his heirs by intestate succession. Explanation 1 to Section 6 of the Act provides a mechanism under which undivided interest of a deceased coparcener can be ascertained and i.e. that the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. It means for the purposes of finding out undivided interest of a deceased coparcener, a notional partition has to be assumed immediately before his death and the same shall devolve upon his heirs by succession which would obviously include the surviving coparcener who, apart from the devolution of the undivided interest of the deceased upon him by succession, would also be entitled to claim his undivided interest in the coparcenary property which he could have got in notional partition. The amended provision reads as under: sec.6 of Hindu Succession Act 2005 . Devolution of interest in coparcenary property.? (1) On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005), in a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall, (a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right the same manner as the son; (b) have the same rights in the coparcenery property as she would have had if she had been a son; (c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenery property as that of a son, and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004. (2) Any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of sub-section (1) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, as property capable of being disposed of by her by testamentary disposition. (3) Where a Hindu dies after the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005), his interest in the property of a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship, and the coparcenery property shall be deemed to have been divided as if a partition had taken place and, (a) the daughter is allotted the same share as is allotted to a son; (b) the share of the pre-deceased son or a pre-deceased daughter, as they would have got had they been alive at the time of partition, shall be allotted to the surviving child of such pre-deceased son or of such pre-deceased daughter; and (c) the share of the pre-deceased child of a pre-deceased son or of a pre-deceased daughter, as such child would have got had he or she been alive at the time of the partition, shall be allotted to the child of such pre-deceased child of the pre-deceased son or a pre-deceased daughter, as the case may be. Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. (4) After the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005), no court shall recognise any right to proceed against a son, grandson or great-grandson for the recovery of any debt due from his father, grandfather or great-grandfather solely on the ground of the pious obligation under the Hindu law, of such son, grandson or great-grandson to discharge any such debt: Provided that in the case of any debt contracted before the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005), nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect (a) the right of any creditor to proceed against the son, grandson or great-grandson, as the case may be; or (b) any alienation made in respect of or in satisfaction of, any such debt, and any such right or alienation shall be enforceable under the rule of pious obligation in the same manner and to the same extent as it would have been enforceable as if the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005) had not been enacted. Explanation. For the purposes of clause (a), the expression son, grandson or great-grandson shall be deemed to refer to the son, grandson or great-grandson, as the case may be, who was born or adopted prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005). (5) Nothing contained in this section shall apply to a partition, which has been effected before the 20th day of December, 2004. Explanation. For the purposes of this section partition means any partition made by execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) or partition effected by a decree of a court.] we hold that the rights under the amendment are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9-9-2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born. Disposition or alienation including partitions which may have taken place before 20-12-2004 as per law applicable prior to the said date will remain unaffected. Any transaction of partition effected thereafter will be governed by the Explanation. The section stipulates that a daughter would be a coparcener from her birth, and would have the same rights and liabilities as that of a son. The daughter would hold property to which she is entitled as a coparcenary property, which would be construed as property being capable of being disposed of by her either by a will or any other testamentary disposition. These changes have been sought to be made on the touchstone of equality, thus seeking to remove the perceived disability and prejudice to which a daughter was subjected. Section 6, as amended, stipulates that on and from the commencement of the amended Act, 2005, the daughter of a coparcener shall by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son . It is apparent that the status conferred upon sons under the old section and the old Hindu Law was to treat them as coparceners since birth . The amended provision now statutorily recognizes the rights of coparceners of daughters as well since birth . The section uses the words in the same manner as the son . It should therefore be apparent that both the sons and the daughters of a coparcener have been conferred the right of becoming coparceners by birth . It is the very factum of birth in a coparcenary that creates the coparcenary, therefore the sons and daughters of a coparcener become coparceners by virtue of birth . Devolution of coparcenary property is the later stage of and a consequence of death of a coparcener. The first stage of a coparcenary is obviously its creation as explained above, and as is well recognized. One of the incidents of coparcenary is the right of a coparcener to seek a severance of status. Hence, the rights of coparceners emanate and flow from birth (now including daughters) as is evident from sub-s (1)(a) and (b). According to the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law all the property of a Hindu joint family is held in collective ownership by all the coparceners in a quasi-corporate capacity. The textual authority of the Mitakshara lays down in express terms that the joint family property is held in trust for the joint family members then living and thereafter to be born (See Mitakshara, Ch. I. 1-27). The incidents of coparcenership under the Mitakshara law are : first, the lineal male descendants of a person up to the third generation, acquire on birth ownership in the ancestral properties is common; secondly, that such descendants can at any time work out their rights by asking for partition; thirdly, that till partition each member has got ownership extending over the entire property, conjointly with the rest; fourthly, that as a result of such co-ownership the possession and enjoyment of the properties is common; fifthly, that no alienation of the property is possible unless it be for necessity, without the concurrence of the coparceners, and sixthly, that the interest of a deceased member lapses on his death to the survivors. Hence, it is clear that the right to partition has not been abrogated. The right is inherent and can be availed of by any coparcener, now even a daughter who is a coparcener. Apex court held that In the present case, no doubt, suit for partition was filed in the year 2002. However, during the pendency of this suit, Section 6 of the Act was amended as the decree was passed by the trial court only in the year 2007. Thus, the rights of the appellants got crystallised in the year 2005 - On facts, there is no dispute that the property which was the subject matter of partition suit belongs to joint family and Gurulingappa Savadi was propositus of the said joint family property. - In view of our aforesaid discussion, in the said partition suit, share will devolve upon the appellants as well. Since, Savadi died leaving behind two sons, two daughters and a widow, both the appellants would be entitled to 1/5 th share each in the said property. Plaintiff (respondent No.1) is son of defendant No.1. Since, Def.No.1 will have 1/5 th share, it would be divided into five shares on partition i.e. between defendant No.1 , his wife- defendant No.2, his two daughters - defendant Nos.3 and 4 and son/plaintiff (respondent No.1). In this manner, the plaintiff/respondent No.1 would be entitled to 1/25 th share in the property. - The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms and decree of partition shall be drawn by the trial court accordingly.

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Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arjan Kumar Sikri   1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO...