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Friday, April 28, 2017

whether, when the seat of arbitration is Mumbai, an exclusive jurisdiction clause stating that the courts at Mumbai alone would have jurisdiction in respect of disputes arising under the agreement would oust all other courts including the High Court of Delhi, whose judgment is appealed against.= In arbitration law however, as has been held above, the moment “seat” is determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai would vest Mumbai courts with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between the parties.- It is well settled that where more than one court has jurisdiction, it is open for parties to exclude all other courts. For an exhaustive analysis of the case law, see Swastik Gases Private Limited v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, (2013) 9 SCC 32. This was followed in a recent judgment in B.E. Simoese Von Staraburg Niedenthal and Another v. Chhattisgarh Investment Limited, (2015) 12 SCC 225. Having regard to the above, it is clear that Mumbai courts alone have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts in the country, as the juridical seat of arbitration is at Mumbai. This being the case, the impugned judgment is set aside. The injunction confirmed by the impugned judgment will continue for a period of four weeks from the date of pronouncement of this judgment, so that the respondents may take necessary steps under Section 9 in the Mumbai Court. Appeals are disposed of accordingly.

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                                 REPORTABLE                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                         CIVIL APPEL...

i. The proceedings viz. Crime No. 198/92, RC.1(S)/92/SIC-IV/ND in the Court of the Special Judicial Magistrate at Rae Bareilly will stand transferred to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge (Ayodhya Matters) at Lucknow. ii. The Court of Sessions will frame an additional charge under Page 35 Section 120-B against Mr. L.K. Advani, Mr. Vinay Katiar, Ms. Uma Bharati, Ms. Sadhvi Ritambara, Mr. Murli Manohar Joshi and Mr. Vishnu Hari Dalmia. The Court of Sessions will frame additional charges under Section 120-B and the other provisions of the Penal Code mentioned in the joint charge sheet filed by the CBI against Mr. Champat Rai Bansal, Mr. Satish Pradhan, Mr. Dharam Das, Mr. Mahant Nritya Gopal Das, Mr. Ram Bilas Vadanti and Mr. Vaikunth Lal Sharma @ Prem. Mr. Kalyan Singh, being the Governor of Rajasthan, is entitled to immunity under Article 361 of the Constitution as long as he remains Governor of Rajasthan. The Court of Sessions will frame charges and move against him as soon as he ceases to be Governor. iii. The Court of Sessions will, after transfer of the proceedings from Rae Bareilly to Lucknow and framing of additional charges, within four weeks, take up all the matters on a day-to-day basis from the stage at which the trial proceedings, both at Rae Bareilly and at Lucknow, are continuing, until conclusion of the trial. There shall be no de novo trial. There shall be no transfer of the Judge conducting the trial until the entire trial concludes. The case shall not be adjourned on any Page 36 ground except when the Sessions Court finds it impossible to carry on the trial for that particular date. In such an event, on grant of adjournment to the next day or a closely proximate date, reasons for the same shall be recorded in writing. iv. The CBI shall ensure that on every date fixed for evidence, some prosecution witnesses must remain present, so that for want of witnesses the matter be not adjourned. v. The Sessions Court will complete the trial and deliver the judgment within a period of 2 years from the date of receipt of this judgment. vi. We make it clear that liberty is given to any of the parties before the Sessions Court to approach us in the event of these directions not being carried out, both in letter and in spirit.

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Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.751 of 2017 (@Special Leave Petition (Cr...

benefit of doubt.= PW-3 the eye-witness to the incident has neither stated as to when the accused came with alleged weapons nor he extended any help to the deceased. Rather he fled away from the spot as per his deposition, and came to know about the death of the deceased in the evening. This peculiar fact of the case completely over-rides the direct evidence rule, because ultimately probabilities creating doubts with respect to the cause and modus-operandi of offence increases when alleged eye-witness flee away from the place of occurrence. Where the medical evidence is such that it does not give any clear opinion with respect to the injuries inflicted on the body of victim or deceased, as the case may be, the possibilities that the injuries might have been caused by the accused are also ruled out. Such medical evidence is also very important in assessing the testimony of eye- witnesses and in determining whether the testimony of eye-witnesses can be safely accepted. Moreover, it is settled law of criminal jurisprudence as has been recognized by this Court in State of U.P. Vs. Krishna Gopal, (supra) that “A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.” After meticulously scrutinizing the facts and circumstances of the present case, and keeping in mind the proposition of law as observed in Yogesh Singh Vs. Mahabeer Singh & Ors. (supra), we are of the considered opinion that there are not only actual but substantial doubts as to the guilt of the respondents herein. We are, therefore, unable to find any evidence as to how the deceased was killed and by whom. The unfortunate man succumbed to injuries but the substantial doubts, mentioned above, confer a right upon the accused-respondents to be held not guilty.

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REPORTABLE                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION                ...