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Wednesday, July 27, 2016

Statutory protection would be available only to a statutory tenant, namely, a tenant under the Act. The Punjab Act of 1953 read with the relevant provisions of the 1887 Act do not include a tenant whose lease has expired. Nevertheless, retention/continuance of possession after expiry of the duration of the lease with the consent of the landlord will continue to vest in the erstwhile tenant the same status on the principle of holding over. Such continuance even after expiry of the deemed period of the lease under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, as in the present case, would clothe the occupant with the status of a tenant under the Act in view of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act which deals with the consequences of holding over. The operation of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act would confer legitimacy to the possession of the tenant even after the termination or expiration of the deemed period of the lease so as to confer on him a status akin to that of a statutory tenant and hence protection from eviction as envisaged by the provisions of the Act of 1953.

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Tuesday, July 26, 2016

Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/ contractor or distribution of State largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action.”[Para 21]- Respondent No.1 before us has clearly violated the strict terms of the tender condition on every occasion and hence cannot be given relief. And, secondly, we already find that due to litigation the present tender has not taken off for over one year. In the absence of malafides, and indeed the High Court judgment has found that malafides did not vitiate the calculation of minimum wage by the Labour Department, we cannot accept Shri Divan’s submission that the figure of Rs.2,91,00,000/- was tailor made to suit the bid offered by the Appellant herein. We, therefore, set aside the decision of the Gujarat High Court and allow the Government to proceed further in finalizing the tender in favour of the Appellant herein. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed with no order as to costs.

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                                  REPORTABLE                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                         CIVIL APPELL...
Monday, July 25, 2016

Section 11(5) read with Section 11(9) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the petitioner prays for the appointment of a sole arbitrator for adjudication of disputes that have arisen between the parties in relation to ‘Buyers Agreement’ dated 18.10.2012 executed between them.= The petitioner filed a petition before the Commercial Court in Lille to seize all the bank accounts of the respondent with the banks Caisse d’ Epargne, GCE Trade and HSBC bank alongwith all money, values and/or bonds held by these banks on behalf of the respondent. The court’s bailiffs seized a total amount of Euro 48000 in HSBC bank on 11.10.2013 and Caisse d’ Epargne on 14.10.2013 in compliance to order of Appellate Court, Douai, France dated 25.09.2014. The petitioner filed a claim before the Tribunal-DE-COMMERCIAL DE LILLE METROPOLIS, France for recovery of debt amounting to Euro 393916.95, the Tribunal however dismissed the claim of the petitioner vide its order dated 30.01.2014. Petitioner then filed an Appeal No. Minute:14/389/RG 14/01147 before the Appellate Court, Douai, France against the order dated 30.01.2014 passed by the President of the Commercial Court of LILLE, which also came to be dismissed by its judgment dated 25.09.2014. The appellate court declared the appeal inadmissible on the issue of jurisdiction in view of the arbitration agreement and also held that there was no emergency to approach the court instead of seeking remedy under the Arbitration Agreement. According to the petitioner, the aforesaid disputes and differences have arisen in India, are covered by the terms and conditions of the ‘Buyers Agreement’ and are to be resolved by the arbitrator in view of the arbitration clause 14 of the ‘Buyers Agreement’. Hence, the petitioner has filed this petition invoking the arbitration clause 14 of the ‘Buyers Agreement’ for appointment of a sole arbitrator in terms of ‘Buyers Agreement’ dated 18.10.2012 qua recovery of Euro 393916.95 payable to the petitioner alongwith interest at the rate of 24% per annum.= Whether the respondent is bound to pay Euro 393916.95 alongwith interest at the rate of 24% per annum; whether the respondent has committed breach of Clause 2.2 of the agreement in cancelling the orders; whether the respondent is liable to compensate for cancelling the orders and reimburse the cost and damages incurred by the petitioner; whether the respondent acted in violation of Clause 4.1 of ‘Buyers Agreement’ dated 18.10.2012 by diverting the orders to another agency and, if so, whether the respondent is liable to compensate the petitioner and such other incidental questions can be examined only by the arbitrator. When an arbitration agreement exists between the parties, the present petition under Section 11 (5) read with Section 11 (9) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, shall have to be allowed with appropriate directions. In the result, we allow this petition and appoint Mr. Justice Kailash Gambhir, a Former Judge, Delhi High Court as a Sole Arbitrator for adjudication of the disputes that have arisen between the parties in relation to the ‘Buyers Agreement’ dated 18.10.2012 executed between them. We leave it open for the parties to make their claims and counter claims in relation to the agreement aforementioned before the Arbitrator. All contentions otherwise open to the parties on facts and in law shall be open to be urged before the arbitrator. The arbitrator shall fix his own fee. The petition, is accordingly, allowed with the above directions leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Parties are directed to appear before the arbitrator on 14.09.2016.

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Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). = In the aforesaid facts and circumstances it did not lie in the mouth of the respondent contractor that the appellants had committed a default and had forfeited their right to appoint arbitrators as per terms of the agreement. The learned Judge failed to read the relevant clause of the agreement properly and therefore wrongly placed reliance upon judgment in the case of Datar Switchgears (supra). In that case this Court had extracted the relevant terms of agreement in paragraph 9 which showed that there was no stipulation of any time limit like that of 60 days in the present case. The terms of the Agreement bind the parties unless they have chosen to repudiate the same. Relevant terms, if provided, will be material for deciding when the right of a party to appoint the arbitrator will suffer forfeiture and when the other party would be entitled to give notice and on failure, move application under Section 11(6) of the Act. Such terms deserve respect of the parties and attention of the Court. In view of aforesaid discussions we find no option but to set aside the impugned order under appeal. We order accordingly. In case the respondent contractor is still desirous of pursuing its claim through arbitration in terms of the agreement, it is given the option to serve a fresh notice for arbitration within a month and on receipt of the same the appellants/railways shall be at liberty to send a panel of requisite number of names to the respondents within 60 days of receipt of the notice so that Arbitral Tribunal is constituted in terms of the Agreement. It goes without saying that if the Railways default in sending the panel within the stipulated time, the contractor will be at liberty to pursue its further remedies as per provisions of the Act and law. The appeal is allowed in aforesaid terms but without any order as to costs.

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