LawforAll

Saturday, February 13, 2016

Learned counsel for the respondents lastly argued that there was an encroachment made by the appellants on the suit premises and document (Ex-P- 6) was inadmissible in evidence, hence the eviction petition was liable to be dismissed on these two grounds also. These submissions, in our considered view, deserve to be rejected at their threshold because the same were not raised in the written statement filed by the respondents before the Rent Controller and nor were urged at any stage of the proceedings. We cannot, therefore, allow such factual submissions to be raised for the first time in this appeal.- It is also now a settled principle of law that the concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by Rent control laws has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. Indeed, ownership is a relative term, the import whereof depends on the context in which it is used. In rent control legislation, the landlord can be said to be the owner if he is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else to evict the tenant and then to retain control, hold and use the premises for himself. What may suffice and hold good as proof of ownership in landlord-tenant litigation probably may or may not be enough to successfully sustain a claim for ownership in a title suit.

                                                                  Reportable                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA      ...

Civil Procedure Code (Act V. 1908), section 35A, Order VII, rule 11 and 10-Duties of the court in curbing frivolous and vexatious cases. HEADNOTE: Respondent No. 2 in partnership, with his minor son the petitioner contested an eviction petition filed by the landlord-respondent No. 1 in respect of the premises where the partnership firm was located, and lost it at the trial, appellate and revisional stages. The High Court gave six months' time to vacate the premises. Thereafter, the petitioners filed a suit before the Fourth Additional First class Munsif, Bangalore for a declaration that the order of eviction which has been confirmed right upto the High Court and resisted by the second respondent throughout was one obtained by fraud and collusion and sought an injunction against the execution of the eviction order. During the hearing of the prayer for further time to vacate the premises filed by respondent No. 2, the learned Judge of the High Court, taking pity on the tenant persuaded the landlord for giving time for vacating the premises on the basis that the suit newly and sinisterly filed by the petitioner would be withdrawn. Another five months' time was granted accordingly. But, the petitioner instituted another suit before another Munsif making a carbon copy of the old plaint and obtained an ex-parte injunction which was, however, got vacated later by the respondent No. 1. An appeal against the said order having failed, the petitioner managed to get an ex-parte injunction once over again in revision from the High Court. At the hearing of the application for vacating the temporary injunction filed by respondent No. 1, the petitioner submitted that the said learned Judge having decided the earlier revision case should not hear the petition on the plea of bias referring to an affidavit filed by him to that effect. But the learned Judge heard the arguments, went into the merits and dismissed the revision. Dismissing the, petition for special leave, the Court, HELD : (1) If on a meaningful-nor formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he (Munsif) should exercise his power under Order VII rule 11, C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Chapter X, C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial court should insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot-down at the earliest stage. The penal Code (Chapter XI) is also resourceful enough to meet such men and must be triggered against them. In the instant case, the suit pending before the First Munsif's Court, Bangalore being a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints having no survival value, the court directed the Trial Court to dispose of it forthwith after giving an immediate hearing of the parties concerned and to take deterrent action if it is satisfied that the litigation was inspired by vexatious motives and is altogether groundless, reminding itself of sec. 35A of the C.P.C. [744 E-G, 745 A] Observation : The pathology of litigative addition ruins the poor of this country and the Bar has a role to cure this deleterious tendency of parties to launch frivolous and vexatious cases. The sharp practice or legal legerdemain stultifies the court process and makes a decree with judicial seals brutum fulmen. It may be a valuable contribution to the cause of justice if counsel screen wholly fradulent and frivolous litigation refusing to be beguiled by dubious clients and remembering that an advocate is an officer of justice and its society not to collaborate in shady actions. [743 B, C, 745 B] 743 [The Court expressed its hope that the Bar Council of India Would activate this obligation.]

PETITIONER: T. ARIVANDANDAM Vs. RESPONDENT: T.   V. SATYAPAL & ANOTHER DATE OF JUDGMENT14/10/1977 BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. ...
Sunday, February 7, 2016

critical spare parts for the defence and in particular, in developing submarine batteries under the aegis of the Defence Ministry and the High Court erred in directing the appellants to issue an advertisement giving details about the technical specifications for submarine batteries and in selecting the product submitted in response to the advertisement and the impugned order is not sustainable.= If the country wishes to play a substantial role in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, India must ensure high standards of defence power comparing with the neighbouring countries and it should have modernized submarines. Modernized submarines require submarine batteries with high sophisticated standard under the aegis of DGQA. The Government cannot put the life of its defence personnel and submarine worth crores of rupees to risk simply because the respondent claims to have the capability and can supply submarine batteries. For such defence critical spare parts like submarine batteries, there cannot be any open advertisement inviting tenders. Advertisements are issued calling for tenders only for common use items which are normally available in the open market with a wide range of sources. Submarine batteries do not fall under this category of common use items. The respondent cannot claim any vested right to be issued a development indent or RFP or a supply order simply because it has made investments to manufacture submarine batteries. Straightway RFP cannot be issued to the respondent by ignoring the procedure for issuing a development indent and testing the batteries. The aforesaid discussion and also the written submission as to how the respondent developed the batteries over a period of time reiterate that the development of second source could only be as per the guidelines of DGQA and under the supervision and inspection of the officials of the DGQA and not independently. The High Court did not keep in view the policy of the Government in purchasing the critical spare parts for the defence and in particular, in developing submarine batteries under the aegis of the Defence Ministry and the High Court erred in directing the appellants to issue an advertisement giving details about the technical specifications for submarine batteries and in selecting the product submitted in response to the advertisement and the impugned order is not sustainable. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside and this appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.

                                                                  REPORTABLE                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA      ...