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Saturday, May 16, 2015

As far as Sanjay Mahto (A4) is concerned, he is also a vegetable vendor in Paswan Chowk Market. Though the circumstances that he has also persuaded PW8 to pay the ransom amount to kidnappers and also accompanied PW8 to Sonepur to pay the ransom amount to the kidnappers, Sanjay might have accompanied PW8 as a bonafide helper. Neither any recovery was made from Sanjay nor any incriminating evidence is available against him. So far as Sanjay Mahto (A-4) is concerned, though there may be strong suspicion about his involvement in the commission of the offence, suspicion however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof. The case against Sanjay (A-4) is not proved beyond reasonable doubt and his conviction is liable to be set aside.

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whether the dependant family members of the deceased employee of the appellant-Canara Bank were entitled to seek compassionate appointment on the basis of ‘Dying in Harness Scheme’ which was passed Vide Circular No.154/1993 w.e.f. 8.05.1993. The claim is resisted by the Canara Bank on the ground that the financial condition of the family members of the deceased employees is good and that the Scheme dated 8.05.1993 has been replaced with scheme dated 14.02.2005 (H. O. Circular No.35/2005) scrapping the provision of compassionate appointment and in lieu thereof introduced the new scheme of ex-gratia payment=Referring to Steel Authority of India Ltd.’s case, High Court has rightly held that the grant of family pension or payment of terminal benefits cannot be treated as a substitute for providing employment assistance. The High Court also observed that it is not the case of the bank that the respondents’ family is having any other income to negate their claim for appointment on compassionate ground. 17. Considering the scope of the Scheme ‘Dying in Harness Scheme 1993’ then in force and the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court rightly directed the appellant-bank to reconsider the claim of the respondent for compassionate appointment in accordance with law and as per the Scheme (1993) then in existence. We do not find any reason warranting interference. 18. So far as the cases in Civil Appeal No.266/2008 and Civil Appeal No.267/2008 are concerned, they are similar and those respondents are similarly placed and the appeals preferred by the bank are liable to be dismissed. The appellant-bank is directed to consider the case of the respondents in Civil Appeal Nos. 266/2008 and 267/2008. 19. In the result, all the appeals preferred by the appellant-bank are dismissed and the appellant bank is directed to consider the case of the respondents for compassionate appointment as per the Scheme which was in vogue at the time of death of the concerned employee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.

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The appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years on each count of conviction under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act and the sentence imposed was ordered to run concurrently. The incident had taken place in the year 1996 about nineteen years ago and for all these years the appellant has undergone the agony of criminal proceedings. Keeping in view the passage of time and that the appellant is now aged seventy four years, in our view, while upholding the conviction of the appellant, interest of justice would be met by reducing the sentence of rigorous imprisonment of four years to one year rigorous imprisonment. Application for exemption from surrendering was allowed by the Chamber Judge on 20.09.2013, which was subsequently continued until further orders by this Court’s order dated 25.11.2013. Necessary steps be taken forthwith to take the appellant into custody to serve out the remaining part of the modified sentence. Judgment of the High Court is accordingly modified and this appeal is allowed in part.

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Sec.5 of Limitation Act - Or.9, rule 13 of C.P.C. - Delay of 355 days in one suit and delay of 382 days in another suit - Reason for delay only after seeing the paper publication - Trial court order to deposit decreed amount for settling aside the decree else would be dismissed automatically - High court confirmed the same - Apex court held that though the court has got discretion to impose some costs or to direct to deposit part of suit claim but should not have imposed such an unreasonable and onerous condition of depositing the entire suit claim of Rs.1,50,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/- respectively in the suits when the issues are yet to be decided on merits - set aside the orders of Trail court and High court - 2015 S.C.MSKLAWREPORTS

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 The respondents filed the suit being O.S.No.3/2011 for recovery of  the  sum  of Rs. 1,50,00,000/- with interest.  The case was adjour...

There is no quarrel with the proposition that registration can be insisted upon by the State Government or its departments for purposes of allotment of works and participation in auctions relating thereto. There is also no difficulty in the State providing for production of a character certificate as one of the conditions of eligibility. Experience of the Contractor, if considered relevant for the purposes of such registration, could also be stipulated as one of the requirements to be satisfied by the applicants under the Rules or Regulations. That such regulation ought to ensure participation of only genuine contractors and prevent the mafia from hijacking the system cannot also be faulted. The question, however, is whether that purpose which is indeed laudable could be achieved by a side wind viz. by the District Magistrate denying a character certificate to an applicant. Our answer is in the negative. We say so because the very fact that a character certificate is issued does not mean that everyone who has such a certificate gets a vested right to be registered as a contractor. The District Magistrate did not have any authority under the rules stipulating registration of contractors to consider such requests for registration or to grant or refuse the same. It is the competent authority in the Irrigation Department concerned who has to take a call. Inasmuch as the District Magistrate took upon himself the duty of examining whether the appellant was suitable for registration, he went beyond the legitimate sphere of the jurisdiction vested in him which was limited to considering the request for issuance of a character certificate.

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                                             REPORTABLE                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                         CI...