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Friday, March 27, 2015

whether, in the given facts and circumstances the case, the role attributed to the present three Accused-respondents lead to their implication under Section 34 of IPC. 11. Limiting ourselves to the above question, we find that there is indeed enough material to infer the common and shared intention of the present accused-respondents with that of Shyamu. Although, the learned counsel for the respondents has argued that they had not thrown the deceased down to the drain with intention of killing him but merely assaulting him. According to him, the shooting by Shyamu was an independent act. However, we find that firstly, there was no justifiable reason for the 4 accused persons to go 100-150 yards inside the field of the complainant. Second, the fact that they carried a weapon being 315 bore country-made pistol with them clearly shows that they had all the wrong intentions. Nowhere in the case of defence has this come out that the present three accused-respondents were not aware of the fact that Shyamu carried the weapon. Also, the exhortation made by the accused persons against the complainant and the deceased mentioned about killing them. Having made such an exhortation, they threw the deceased on the ground. It goes on to show that they all shared a common intention and worked in tandem. Balbir Singh is the father of other three accused persons; he could have asked Shyamu to stop short of shooting, but he did not do so. We find, in the light of these circumstances, that the High Court erred in acquitting the present accused-respondents. We are satisfied that the view taken by the High Court is not even a possible view and therefore calls for interference in this appeal. 12. On the basis of above discussion, we allow the present appeal. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the judgment and order passed by the Sessions Court is restored. 13. Learned counsel for the accused persons - respondents herein has submitted that there is a marriage in the house of the accused persons on 22nd April, 2015 and prayed that the accused may not be arrested till the marriage is solemnized. In view of this submission, we grant six weeks' time to the three accused-respondents to surrender, failing which the Court concerned shall take appropriate steps to take them into custody.

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                                                                  REPORTABLE                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA      ...

Specific Performance suit Decreed - time granted to deposit balance of sale consideration with in one month from the date of decree failing which the suit shall be deemed to have been dismissed - amount not deposited - time extended - Civil vacation - no deposit on the reopening day - deposit on the next day of re-opening with out obtaining permission for extention of time - without giving notice to the Jdr about the deposit of balance sale consideration - extention petition filed later - Trial court dismissed the E.P. as well as extention petition as the suit was dismissed automatically by efflux of time - High court remanded the case for fresh consideration - Apex court held that the trial rightly dismissed the petition and Execution petition and as such the question of remanding a case for fresh consideration does not arise due efflux of time , the suit was dismissed automatically as there was no any fresh order of extention on a petition filed with in time -2015 S.C. msklawreports

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the suit was decreed  on  15.02.2007  and  the Plaintiff-Buyer was directed to deposit the balance  sale  consideration  of Rs.33,60,00...

Thus, the principle "no work no pay" as observed by this Court in the catena of cases does not have any significance to the fact situation of the present case as the termination of the services of the workman from the post of Tube-well Operator is erroneous in law in the first place, as held by us in view of the above stated reasons. The respondent and his family members have been suffering for more than four decades as the source of their livelihood has been arbitrarily deprived by the appellant. Thereby, the Right to Liberty and Livelihood guaranteed under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India have been denied to the respondent by the appellant as held in the case of Olga Tellis and Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors[6]., wherein this Court has held thus: "32. As we have stated while summing up the petitioners' case, the main plank of their argument is that the right to life which is guaranteed by Article 21 includes the right to livelihood and since, they will be deprived of their livelihood if they are evicted from their slum and pavement dwellings, their eviction is tantamount to deprivation of their life and is hence unconstitutional. For purposes of argument, we will assume the factual correctness of the premise that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood. Upon that assumption, the question which [pic]we have to consider is whether the right to life includes the right to livelihood. We see only one answer to that question, namely, that it does. The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far-reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life. Indeed, that explains the massive migration of the rural population to big cities. They migrate because they have no means of livelihood in the villages. The motive force which propels their desertion of their hearths and homes in the village is the struggle for survival, that is, the struggle for life. So unimpeachable is the evidence of the nexus between life and the means of livelihood. They have to eat to live: only a handful can afford the luxury of living to eat. That they can do, namely, eat, only if they have the means of livelihood. That is the context in which it was said by Douglas, J. in Baksey that the right to work is the most precious liberty that man possesses. It is the most precious liberty because, it sustains and enables a man to live and the right to life is a precious freedom. "Life", as observed by Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois means something more than mere animal existence and the inhibition against the deprivation of life extends to all those limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed. This observation was quoted with approval by this Court in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P." (emphasis laid down by this Court) Therefore, with respect to the judicial decisions of this Court referred to supra, we hold that the appellant is liable to pay 50% back wages in favour of the respondent from the date of the termination order dated 22.08.1975 till the date of the Award passed by the Industrial Tribunal, i.e. 24.02.1997. In so far as the awarding of full back wages to the respondent by the High Court in its judgment and order dated 18.07.2006 for the period 24.02.1997 to 31.01.2005 is concerned, we retain the same. The appellant is further directed to pay full back wages to the respondent after computing the same on the basis of the revised pay-scale and pay him all other monetary benefits as well. The aforesaid direction shall be complied with by the appellant within four weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with modification regarding back wages as mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. The order dated 11.12.2006 granting stay shall stand vacated. No costs.

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                                 REPORTABLE                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                         CIVIL APPELLATE...
Thursday, March 26, 2015

As can be seen from the complaint the allegations are that the accused conspired with each other to cheat the complainant and a series of transactions gave rise to offence under Section 120B read with Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code as also Section 628 of the Companies Act. It is, therefore, clear that if the Special Court has jurisdiction to try offences under both the aforesaid Acts then the trial can certainly continue in respect of the offences which do not require the complainant to belong to the categories specified under Section 621 of the Companies Act. Thus the trial could certainly continue against those accused under the IPC. 9. The High Court completely overlooked the fact that the complaint made allegations against the accused A4, A5, A6, A9 and A10 only in respect of Section 120B and 420 of Indian Penal Code and there was no reason in law to quash a complaint against them on the ground that they were immune from prosecution under Section 628 of the Companies Act by virtue of Section 621 of that Act. 10. We accordingly set aside the findings of the High Court that taking of cognizance against the accused A4, A5, A6 and A9 is without jurisdiction on the ground that the complaint does not make out a prima facie case for the offences under Section 628 of the Companies Act, 1956 against the said accused. At this stage, it may be noted that the Special Court is empowered to try the offences under the Companies Act alongwith other Acts by virtue of a notification issued by the erstwhile Government of Andhra Pradesh dated 13.3.1981 which empowers such special Courts to try offences under specified enactments such as The Companies Act, 1956, The Income-tax Act, 1961, The Wealth-tax Act, 1957 etc., which reads as follows:- "even if such cases include offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and any other enactments, if such offences form part of the same transaction." [vide Notification reproduced in Criminal Petition No. 5846 of 2014 The Superintendent Of Customs Vs. Kannur Abdul Kader Mohammed Haneefa reported in 2014 (310) ELT49(A.P.)] 11. Thus, even if a number of persons are accused of offences under a special enactment such as 'the Companies Act and as also the IPC' in respect of the same transaction or facts and even if some could not be tried under the special enactment, it is the special court alone which would have jurisdiction to try all the offences based on the same transaction to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. We make this observation because at some stage in the hearing learned counsels addressed us on this point. We make it clear that in the present case all the accused are liable to be tried by the special court in respect of the offences under the IPC as well as the Companies Act as alleged in the complaint. 12. Appeals are allowed in above terms.

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                                                                  REPORTABLE                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA     ...

manner and method of determining seniority in the cadre of Sub-Inspectors of Police, in the State of Andhra Pradesh, are regulated by the Andhra Pradesh Police (Civil) Subordinate Service Rules= The judgments cited pertain to the particular rule of seniority, which was subject matter of consideration. None of the seniority rules which were taken into consideration is akin to rule 15 which is to be applied for determining the inter se seniority of Sub- Inspectors of Police, in the present case. Since the validity of rule 15 aforementioned, is not a subject matter of challenge, we have ventured to interpret the same, in consonance with the mandate and intent thereof. We would not like to burden this judgment, with the judgments cited at the Bar, by the rival parties.

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                                                                "REPORTABLE"                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF I...